TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030049-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: November 12, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
II~I~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~IIIIII I ~ ' ~a ~~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
~~Illllllllll~~~ulllllllllll~~ II
RENDS
in Communist ProPaganda
I
Confidential
12 NOVEMBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 45)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by MIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sentions 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person Is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Ealuded from eurenre, e
dereripredinp Grid
deelenlReeden
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 NOVEMBER 1970
CONTENTS'
Topics and Events Given Major Attention, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
U.S. Elections Assessed as Defeat for President Nixon . . . . . . 1
Xuan Thuy on President's Plan, Mme. Binh on Vietnamization . . . . 3
Vietnam Trade Union Appeal for Cease-fire, Withdrawal Scored . . . 4
General Minh's Remarks on Saigon Government Reported . . . . . . . 5
October Revolution: Soviet Aid, Support for PRG Proposal . . . . . 7
Communist Media Mark Cambodian National Day . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
NFLSV Protests Drives into Cambodia by Saigon Troops . . . . . . . 11
Floods in Vietnam: Allies Censured, Communist Aid Lauded . . . . . 12
DRV Announces Procedures for Christmas Mail to U.S. POW's . . . . . 15
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Says UAR Acts on UNGA Resolution, Extends Cease-Fire . . . . . 16
SUSLOV SPEECH
Reassertion of Peace Policy, No Mention of Disarmament . . . . . . 19
Stress on Economic Integration, World Communist Unity . . . . . . . 20
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow, Peking Exchange Appeals for Normal State Relations . . . . 22
ALLENDE INAUGURATION
Moscow Hails United Front Victory as Milestone for Hemisphere . . . 26
Peking Remains Cautious in Approach to Allende Government . . . . . 28
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Draft PRC Constitution Released ly Taipei Media . . . . . . . . . . 30
Cadre Deficiencies Threaten Party-building Campaign . . . . . . . . 33
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Writers Union Leadership Reshuffled Prior to Congress . . . . . . 35
BULGARIA-YUGOSLAVIA
Terse, Uninformative Communique Reports on Bilateral Talks . . . . 36
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
12 NOVEMBER 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 NOVEMBER 1970
Moscow (3462 items)
Peking (3020 items)
October Revolution
(4%)
39%
Domestic Issues
(21%)
26%
Anniversary
Indochina
(9%)
16%
[Suslov Speech
(--)
6%]
[Vietnam
(3%)
10%]
[Grechko Speech
(--)
5%]
[Cambodia
(3%)
6%]
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
4%]
Japan
(10%)
11%
China
(4%)
4%
[Defense Statements
(3%)
5%]
WFDY Meeting in
Budapest
(1%)
4%
[Socialist Delega-
t ion in PRC
(2%)
4%]
Middle East
(2%)
3%
PRC-Italian Diplomatic
(--)
4%
DPRK Party Congress
(0.1%)
3%
Relations
Indochina
(6%)
3%
U.S. Elections
(--)
4%
U.S. Elections
(0.4%)
2%
DPRK Party Congress
(--)
3%
Investiture of Aliende (1%) 1%
in Chile
October Revolution
Anniversary
(--)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 NOVEMBER 1970
I1'lD0CHIlA
The results of the 3 November U.S. elections are assessed as a
"defeat" for President Nixon in DRV delegata Xuan Thuy's remarks
at the Paris session on the 5th and in other communist comment.
While observing that voters were influenced by economic and
other domestic issues, an article in the DRV party organ NHAN DAN
on the 6th says the elections also proved that the President was
wrong in his belief that antiwar sentiments could be "defused"
by propagandizing Vietnamization and his five-point peace proposal.
Current comment is virtually silent on the substance of the five
points: Xuan Thuy at the Paris session did deprecate the
President's stand on withdrawal, a cease-fire, and a political
settlement in some detail, but this is not reflected in the VNA
account.
PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris session read a
"special statement" on the widespread flooding in the northern
provinces of South Vietnam. Voluminous Hanoi and Liberation Radio
propaganda stresses communist relief measures and claims that allied
military action contributed to the damage.
The October Revolution anniversary providcs an occasion for
restatement of the Soviet policy of material aid for the Vietnamese
struggle and support of the PRG proposals for a settlement.
Suslov in his keynote speech voiced pro forma criticism of "U.S.
imperialist aggression" in Indochina and ignored the President's
five-point proposal.
Pel__ig propaganda pegged to Cambodian National Day (9 November)
contains pacsino, derogatory references to the President's
proposal without acknowledging its substance. Sihanouk, at the
Peking rally at which Chou En-lai also spoke, ridiculed the
proposal and repeated the line that the Indochinese peoples
should be allowed to settle their own problems.
Continuing propagane-t on the "correct" NLHS five-point solution
of the Laotian dispute includes the Pathet Lao radio's
9 November announcement that Prince Souphanouvong's special envoy,
Tiao Souk Vangsak, returned to Vientiane and expressed the hope
that Souvanna Phouma would now "give an appropriate response"
so that plenipotentiaries of the two princes could soon meet.
U1S1 ELECTIONS ASSESSED AS DEFEAT FOR PRESIDENT NIXON
HANOI AND Initial DRV reaction to the U.S. elections comes on
THE FRONT the 5th, in routine propaganda as well as in DRV
delegate Xuan Thuy's statement at the 91st session
of the Paris talks. PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh ignored
the elections completely in her statement at the session, but
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there is Front comment beginning on the 6th. The VNA account
of the session reports Xuan Thuy's observation that the
President failed in his attempt to convince the people, "through
fallacious propaganda," of his desire to end the war and that
he was foiled in his attempt to elect a majority of Republicans
"in order to implement more reactionary internal and external
policies."
VNA omits some of Thuy's more acerbic remarks, however; thus it
ignores his charge that in the campaign the President
"deliberately resorted to lying to mislead American public
opinion" and his r mark that Senator Muskie "himself accused
President Nixon of leading, inspiring, and guiding a political
campaign built on lies, slander, name-calling, and deception
of almost unprecedented volume."
VNA typically does not acknowledge the remarks in the give-and-
take portion of the session and hence ignores the exchange in
which Ambassador Bruce took exception to Thuy's "choice of
words and attitude" in regard to President Nixon, calling them
"shameful and totally inadmissible," and in which Thuy reaffirmed
his previous statements.
VNA on the 6th, reviewing articles in the party paper NHAN DAN
and try army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, observes that the "bitter
failure" of President Nixon and his party "drew long comments
in Hanoi papers." Extracts from the NHAN DAN article were also
carried by Hanoi radio, with the notation that it was written by
Nguyen Huu Chinh--the author of a detailed analysis of the
election campaign on 31 October. Chinh says that the Republican
campaign .actics of stressing law and order and using rough
language and "slanderous tricks" did not overwhelm the
Democratic Party's criticism of the war in Vietnam, unemployment,
and inflation. Chinh refers briefly to the President's
"deceitful" speech of 7 October and says the elections showed
that the President wan wrong in his belief that "raving about
Vietnamization and making noisy propaganda for the five-point
peace initiative" would d.efuse antiwar sentiments.
Chinh stresses that the results do not mean the U.S. electorate
has forgotten the Johnson Administration's expansion of the
Vietnam war, but that the vote primarily expressed discontent
over what the Nixon Administration has done in thi past two
years. A Liberation Radio commentary, also on the 6th, says
in a similar vein that "the question does not lie with either
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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the Democratic or the Republican-party but with the fact that
whoever really stands for an end to the war will be supported
by the U.S. people." It adds that the.South Vietnamese people
"never cherish any illusions" about either the Democrats or
the Republicans but that "anyone holding power" in the United
States must "seriously respond" to the two questions raised
by the PRG in Paris: Will the United States agree to
unconditionally withdraw all troops before 30 June 1971, and
does it agree to "forsake the U.S.-supported puppet Thieu-
ry-Khiem clique and to allow the South Vietnamese people to
determine their own fate?"
MOSCOW Moscow says the U.S. election results show that
the American public is not enthusiastic about the
President's foreign policy, and some commentators say his
continuation of the Vietnam war is a "main reason" for
Republican setbacks. There is no explicit mention of the
President's five points, but a 5 November Radio Peace and
Progress commentary in English remarks cryptically that the
President tried to convince the electorate that he is
"sincerely striving for peace in Indochina and intends to
pull out the U.S. troops from Viet tam." A Radio !.:;,:,cow
broadcast in English on the 6th recalls that President Johnson
was forced to quit the political scene because of his
"military gamble" and comments that the mid-term election
looked like the first round of the 1972 Presidential elections.
XUAN THUY ON PRESIDENTS PLAN. WE. BINH ON VIETNAMIZ4TION
DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on the 5th prefaced
his discussion of the U.S. elections with what the VNA account
called--somewhat inaccurately--a "point by point" analysis of
the President's five-point peace proposal. Thuy in fact did
not mention the President?z call for the immediate release of
prisoners of war or his proposal for a broad Indochina
conference.
The cursory VNA account goes on to say merely that Thuy
"pointed out that the United States has set unreasonable
conditions for an end to the war in Vietnam." The account
thus obscures the details of his discussion of a cease-fire,
troop withdrawal, and a political settlement: Thuy again
set out to demonstrate that it is the United States, not the
communist side, which is setting forth preconditions for a
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settlement--in its call for a "mutual" troop withdrawal, a
cease-fire in place while massive U.S. troop contingents
remain, and self-determination which in fact means continued
impositior of the "corrupt" Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime.
Unlike Thuy, Mme. Bin. -who spoke first at the session--said
nothing about the U.S. elections and did not discuss the
President's five-point proposfLl. Instead she attacked the
Vietnamization policy and deplored U.S. attempts to achieve
a position of strength on the battlefield and at the
conference table; many of the details of her remarks go
unreported in the VNA and Front media accounts. In her
diatribe against the Saigon leac1.ers she repeated her standard
claim that even members of the "puppet" army and administration
are more and more resolved to overthrow the Thieu regime.
Like Thuy, she concluded her formal statement with the usual
assertion that the PRG proposals provide the basis for a
correct settlement.
VNA covered the allied delegates' remarks in one cryptic
sentence: "Speaking next, both the U.S. and Thieu-Ky-Khiem
chief delegates obdurately opposed the fair and reasonable
eight-point clarifications of the PRG."
VIETNAM TRADE UNION APPEAL FOR CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL SCORED
A South Vietnamese trade union proposal for a cease-fire and
the withdrawal of North Vietnamese as well as U.S. troops
from the South is sharply attacked by Liberation Radio on
5 November and in a Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to the South
on the 9th. Liberation. Radio cites "reports from Saigon" that
"after two days of meeting at U.S. gunpoint under the command
of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique,.on 3 November Tran Quoc Buu,
on behalf of the workers, laborers, and trade unions, issued
an appeal demanding an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal
of all U.S. and allied troops an.. North Vietnamese troops."
The broadcast charges that
the U.S. Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique asked secret
agent Tran Quoc Buu* to issue . . . an appeal
which is consistent with the deceitful
* Liberation Radio on 2, 3, andNovember broadcast a series
of articles, attributed to Ngoc Phu, which denounced Tran Quoc
Buu as an agent for the l,i. and others and described his
"oppression of the workers movement" since 1955.
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arguments of Nixon and which is aimed at creat-
ing an illusion among public opinion . . . and
at, dividing and misleading the struggle move-
ment of the workers and laborers and urbanite
compatriots of all walks of life.
Liberation Radio says President Nixon's proposal for a cease-
fire--"repeated" by Buu--has already been "strongly denounced
by many strata of people in Saigon." The Hanoi broadcast on
the 9th also says that Buu's proposal merely echoes President
Nixon's, and it comments that "the U.S. imperialists have
forced Thieu to use Buu, as they did with Thich Tam Chau, to
wage propaganda for this U.S. political merchandise." The
broadcast claims that "everyone" is aware that buu "is a
professional secret agent, transferred from the French to
the CIA and disguised as chairman of the General Confederation
of Trade Unions." It adds that "therefore the appeal for a
cease-fire and for mutual troop withdrawal issued by Tran
Quoc Buu is a worthless appeal" and "cannot be taken as an
appeal from the workers and laborers of the southern cities."
GENERAL MINH'S REMARKS ON SAIGON GOVERNMENT REPORTED
HANOI AND Remarks by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh at activities
THE FRONT marking GVN National Day on 1 November are
publicized by North and South Vietnamese communist
media, but only one VITA item identifies Minh by name. A Hanoi
broadcast in Vietnamese to the South on 1 November said that
a Saigon meting on 30 October "opened a new political campaign
in which all elements opposed to the Thieu government would
participate." The broadcast went on to report that a "retired
puppet general" at the meeting "unhesitatingly criticized the
Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" and said that "'only a government
trusted by the people and including the true representatives
of the people can achieve peace in South Vietnam."
VNA on the 5th, reporting the same event, cited the same
remarks and attributed them to Minh, explaining that he is
a former general and was "a participant in the anti-Diem
coup." It did not go on to mention his position as head of
state, however. VNA noted that the Saigon meeting was
organized by Tran Van Don, "former general in the puppet
army and architect in the 1963 coup which toppled dictator
Ngo Dinh Diem."
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-6-
LPA's report, on the 11th, also took note;,of. the, meeting:
organized by Don and quoted the same remark but did not
attribute it explicitly to Minh. LPA also went on to say that
one 'df the "puppet" gene .9 4t a Buddhist'. receptibfi;oi?. u
1 November "predicted that 'many events' would take place from
now until the election date"--a remark Western news agencies
attributed to Minh. LPA also claimed that this adore geneie3+''":
at that reception announced that he would run in next year's
presidential elections.
BACKGROUND: Despite the reports of Minh's recent statements,
Vietnamese communist media did not acknowledge the fact that
PRG Foreign Minister Binh had been questioned about his remarks
on her return to Paris from London on 2 November. This
silence is consistent with the media's reticence regarding
questions put to Mme. Binh a year ago, at a luncheon given
by the Foreign Press Association in Paris on 111 November 1969.
Both Hanoi and the Front failed to acknowledge that her
remarks were in response to a question about Minh when they
quoted her.as saying that the PRG was ready.to talk with
anyone who approves peace, independence, and neutrality, who
opposes the GVN, and who wins the confidence of the urban
populace; they did not report that her remarks in this
connection were made in response to a question as to whether
Gen. Minh would be a val?.,`?le interlocutor.
A 16 September 1968 in Radio commentary offered no
comment on Minh himself in reacting to the 111 September
statement by Thieu that Minh would be invited back to
Saigon to assume the post of special advisor. The commentary
claimed that the move was ordered by the United States to
prove that the GVN had been broadened to "include oppos_;ion
factions."
TASS REPORT, In contrast to Vietnamese communist silence,
C * 1ENTARY TASS on 2 November reported that Mme.. Binh
had been asked about Minh. The exchange is
also recalled in a TASS commentary by Kharkov on the 11th.
Commenting on the PRG's point on a coalition government,
Kharkov recalls that on 2 November in Paris, questioned about
Gen. Duong Van Minh's call in Saigon the day before for
national reconciliation, Mme. Binh replied: "We are ready
to establish contacts with any leaders, with the exception
of Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, who come out for peace, independence,
neutrality, and democracy in order to discuss problems of'
ending the war and forming a coalition government."
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12 NOVEMBER 1970
OCTOBER REVOLUTION: SOVIET AID, SUPPORT FOR PRG PROPOSAL
In his October Revolution anniversary keynote speech Suslov
condemned the "war of annihilation" in Vietnam, calling the
conflict "the longest and most bloody one after the Second
World War" and noting that it has now spread to Cambodia and
Laos. But the Vietnamese people, aided by the USSR, he
said, have countered the plans of the aggressor and compelled
him to resort to various "subterfuges." Suslov described
"Vietnamization" of the conflict or "Americanization" of the
settlement as merely attempts to cast the "old policy" of
continued aggression in a "new form": This is why the Paris
talks are "marking time." He repeated the avowal that the
Soviets "highly value the constructive initiative" of the
PRG, whose proposals constitute a "good and just basis" for
ending the war. However, he did not mention President
Nixon's five points, saying merely that "the main thing"
is that the United States stop its aggression and withdraw
its troops.
Speaking at Red Square on the anniversary, Grechko noted
briefly that the USSR is providing "all-round aid and
support" to Vietnam's struggle against the "intervention"
of U.S. imperialism.
Standard Vietnamese communist observance of the October
Revolution anniversary included greetings messages from the
DRY and PRG leaders, a Hanoi meeting sponsored by the
Fatherland Front and friendship societies, and publicity
for a reception hosted by the Soviet ambassador at which
Phan Van Dong was the ranking guest.
Gratitude for Soviet aid and support was expressed as usual.
Criticism of President Nixon's peace initiative come from,
among others, Pharr Van Dong at the Soviet ambassador's
reception. According to the Hanoi domestic service on the
8th, he called the initiative a "perfidious '.rick" aimed
at fooling public opinion and at "avoiding compliance with
the fair and reasonable eight points of the PRG."
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COMl'IUNIST MEDIA MARK CAMBODIAN NATIONAL DAY
PRC COMMENT, Peking media devote considerable attention to
SIHANOUK Cambodian National Day (9 November) with
publicity for a congratulatory message from
Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and
Penn Nouth, a Peking rally addressed by Sihanouk as well
as Chou En-lai, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Stress,
predictably, is on the successes of the Cambodian patriots
in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and its "lackeys."
The Chinese leaders' greeting calls the Chinese and
Cambodian peoples "comrades in arms going together through
thick and thin," and it goes on to predict "complete
victory" given unity of the three Indochinese peoples
persevering in protracted war.
Chou En-tai in his rally speech comments along similar lines
and also criticizes the United States. for continuing to use
"counter-revolutionary dual tactics." Both Chou and the
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial deprecate the President's peace
proposal, with the editorial calling it an effort to "dupe
the people of Indochina into laying down their arms and to
stamp out the flames of the people's revolution in this area."
Chou En-lai also criticizes the United States for having
stage managed the Phnom Penh "farce" of establishing a
republic, and he includes an oblique slap at the Soviets
when he adds that "in collusion with its collaborator,"
the United States is "scheming to carve up Cambodia." He
recalls.that Sihanouk has condemned these "schemes of U.S.
imperialism and its collaborator."*
Chou also obliquely attacks the Soviet Union when he recalls
that at the Lusaka conference of nonalined countries and
during the UN 25th anniversary activities "many countries
condemned the superpowers" for monopolizing international
affairs, contending for "world hegemony," "dividing spheres
of influence," and "using the UN as an instrument" for their
power' politics.
* Sihanouk and his government did not mention a "collaborator
in several statements which denounced President Nixon's
7 October international conference proposal as an effort to
"partition" Cambodia..
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Sihanouk at the rally, as reported by NCNA, routinely expresses
his gratitude for the "multifarious aid and complete support"
of the PRC, the militant solidarity of the fraternal Vietnamese
and Laotian people, and the support of "those reliable friends
who have kindly accorded de jure recognition" to his government.
He also again scores President Nixon's "deceptive proposals of
'peace' for Indochina," and calls for .a. U.S. withdrawal from
Indochina. so that the people can solve their own problems. And
he repeats that "for Cambodia, any international conference is
unnecessary, and that any international control (like the ICC)
is not admissible in our sovereign country."
MOSCOW Moscow acknowledges Cambodian National Day only in
routine-level radio commentaries, broadcast in
Mandarin to Southeast Asia and in Cambodian on the 9th, which
are notable for their failure to mention either Sihanouk or
Lon No 1. The broadcasts extol Cambodia's pursuit of an
"independent foreign policy" for 17 years, and deplore the
hardships and the deteriorating economy following the U.S.
and Saigon military intrusion after the coup d'etat. The
Cambodian-language commentary does briefly criticize the
"current regime" in Cambodia which "colludes with Washington
in sabotaging its own economy" and says that- Cambodia's own
interests demand that it "return to a path of nonalinement,
reconsolidate its independence, refuse foreign aid which
undermines its position, and adhere to the Geneva agreement
on Indochina." Avoiding any mention of the FUNK or RGNU,
both commentaries merely note that the "Cambodian People's
Liberation Armed Forces" are fighting imperialism.
The Mandarin-language commentary recalls that the 1954
Geneva conference on Indochina guaranteed Cambodian
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, and
that the USSR and other socialist countries "including the PRC"
safeguarded the national interests of the Cambodian people.
But it also recalls that the Peking leaders, "having taken the
stand of big power nationalism, began to undermine Cambodia's
national unity in efforts to establish a system there which
is suitable to them."*
* This is presumably a reference to the episode in September
1967 when Sihanouk accused the Chinese of trying to use
friendship associations for subversion against the Cambodian
Government. See the FBIS SURVEY of 28 September 1967, pages
16-18.
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VIETNAMESE A message from DRV President Ton Duc Thang to
COMMUNISTS Sihanouk, marking National Day, reaffirms
respect for Cambodia's independence, sovereignty,
neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity and promises
Vietnam will "give all-out support till total victory to the
just struggle of the valiant Khmer people . . . ." As was the
case last year, the occasion is marked by comment in an article
in the 9 November NHAN DAN, carried by VNA, and an article in
the same paper by the Cambodian ambassador, broadcast by
Hanoi's domestic service. On 11 November VNA reports that
the previous night a meeting was held, under the auspices of
the Fatherland Front and the Asian-African Solidarity
Committee, to mark an international week of solidarity with
Cambodia.* Party Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet
delivered the opening speech at the meeting and the main
address was given by Hoang Minh Giam, an official of the
Fatherland Front and vice chairman of the Asian-African
Solidarity Committee. Giam promised that "now as in-the past,
the Vietnamese people will do their best in conjunction with
the Khmer people to defeat the U.S. imperialists and will
join them in long-term cooperation to build the country each
according to its own way . . . ."
A joint message to Sihanouk from NFLSV leader Nguyen Huu Tho
and PRG President Huynh Tan That expresses "unreserved and
complete support" for the Cambodian "struggle" and promises
that the people of South Vietnam will "always unite with the
Khmer people and together wit:i them carry the struggle
against U.S. aggression through till the common victory of
the two nations."
Liberation Radio on 8th reports that a meeting was held
that day to inaugurate a week of solidarity with the
Cambodian people. The meeting, organized by the NFLSV
Central Committee, was attended by PRG President Phat and
Dr. Phung Van Cung, deputy chairman of the Front Central
Committee. In a speech to the gathering, Cung is said to
have "strongly criticized Nixon's 7 October speech and
unmasked the deceitful character and crafty and stubborn
* A Liberation Radio broadcast on 10 November reported
that an international conference in solidarity with Laos,
held in Cairo last May, had decided to organize a solidarity
week with the Khmer people beginning on 9 November.
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nature of the U.S. imperialists." Liberation Radio on the
9th carries an "article" by PRG ambassador to Cambodia Nguyen
Van Hieu which, among other things, welcomes Sihanouk's
refutation of "Nixon's peace swindle."
NFLSV PROTESTS DRIVES INTO CAMBODIA BY SAIGON TROOPS
Reaction to large-scale ARVN drives into Cambodia on 24-26 October
includes Liberation Radio's broadcast on the llth of an NFLSV
Central Committee statement, dated the 5th. To date no
acknowledgment of the 6 November movement of South Vietnamese
troops into Takeo Province has, been monitored.
The 5 November NFLSV Central Committee statement charges that on
26 October Saigon sent 6,000 troops-"supported by U.S. aircraft
and artillery--to invade the 'Parrot's Beak' area in Svay Rieng
Province and the 'Fishhook' area in Kompong Cham Province." It
claims that the move brought to 18,000 the total number of GVN
troops in Cambodia. The statement, after routinely decrying
U.S.-Saigon "aggression," pledges that the "South Vietnamese
armed forces and people," led by the NFLSV and PRG, will
"vigorously and effectively support" the Khmer people's
"struggle."
Earlier Liberation Radio comment, in a broadcast on the 4th,
had noted South Vietnamese statements announcing new operations
in Cambodia and then cited foreign news reports of fighting there
which, it claimed, indicated that the GVN troops had been
"intercepted by Cambodian National Liberation Armed Forces (CNLAF)
and sustained many losses" and the outset of their drive. The
broadcast charged that the "aggression" against Cambodia had
exposed the allies' "stubborn anti-peace posture" and it concluded
with an appeal to ARVN troops to not allow themselves to be sent
to fight in Cambodia.
Other attention to the fighting includes a VNA report on the
5th which claims the GVN troops were intercepted in Cambodia and
"many" companies and battalions. put out of action, killing or
wounding "thousands." Specific figures on alleged GVN losses
in Kompong Cham and Kratie provinces are contained in VNA
roundups of the fighting in Cambodia since the 7th.
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FLOODS IN VIETNAM: ALLIES CENSURED. COWUNIST AID LAUDED
The widespread flooding in the northern provinces of South Vietnam
prompts a spate of propaganda beginning on 1 November which
publicizes communist relief measures and charges the allies with
having increased the damage through their military activities
and taking advantage of the floods to harass the populace
and carry out military operations.* A NI1AN DAN commentary on
the 5th compares "the U.S.-puppet criminal acts" to alleged
allied actions during typhoons and floods in 1961, 1964, 1966,
1968, and 1969. High-level attention includes messages from
PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, DRV President Ton Due Thang, and
the leading organs of the central Trung Be regional NFLSV
and PRG, as well as comment in Paris by Mme. Binh in "additional
remarks" at the 5 November session of the talks and a statement
by the PRG spokesman in Paris on the 3d. In addition, the
chief PRG representative in Hanoi held a press conference on
6 November to denounce allied "crimes" in the flood-stricken
areas.
A 31 October letter from the central Trung Bo NFLSV committee
and PRG representation, broadcast by Liberation Radio on
4 November, claims that "scores of thousands of compatriots
and hundreds of thousands of their houses" have been "swept
away." The letter, like some other comment. traces the "main"
cau-,e of the "catastrophe" to actions by the allies, who "had
torn down the compatriots' houses and hamlets, destroyed
their boats, and herded the compatriots into concentration
camps and strategic hamlets" so that they "had nothing with
which to cope with flood and typhoon." More specific informa-
tion on th3 flood daTaage appears in a 6 November LPA report
which says that more than 300,000 people have been rendered
homeless and that the flood devastated 50 to 85 percent of the
crops in the area. LPA also reports that "2,000 inmates of
the Thuong Due and Kiem Lam concentration camps and 4,000
others of the Hoi An and eastern Duy Xuyen concentration
camps were swept away or drowned by the flood waters."
A Liberation Radio commentary on 8 November, echoed in
subsequent propaganda, blames the flood damage on allied
defoliation and bombing of South Vietnamese watersheds,
* The volume of propaganda on the floods has been unusually
heavy. From 1 to 10 November Liberation Radio broadcast
more than 75 items on the flood and Hanoi broadcast more
than 50.
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This commentary and others ridicule the GVN's "so-called
relief work," with Liberation Radio on the 6th charging
that the allies will use their relief committee to "take
advantage of the compatriots' misfortune to rake in the
money, food, and medicines which the people from other
parts of the country will contribute." The broadcast goes
on to claim that "after the typhoons and floods in 1961 and
1968, the corrupt puppet administration officials stole most
of the money, food, and other necessities of life contributed
by the people as relief' goods . . ."
Some comment, including a Liberation Radio broadcast on the
7th, acknowledges President Thieu's visit to the flood-damaged
areas on the 4th and charges he went there to "deceive the
people" and "order an intensification in the concentration of
people and in conscription."
Allied "crimes" in connection with the floods are officially
protested in a 6 November statement by the southern war
crimes committee and in a statement by Col. Ha Van Lau,
member of the standing committee of the DRV war crimes
commission, both broadcast on the 10th.
ASSISTANCE TO The initial report of mobilization to meet
FLOOD VICTIMS the emergency, broadcast by Liberation
Radio on 2 November, said that the
representation of the PRG in central Trung Do held an
extraordinary meeting on 29 October to devise urgent
measures to assist the victims and overcome consequences
of the flood. The representation, according to the radio,
instructed "all echelons of administrative organs and the
PLAF and all sectors" to concentrate on carrying out relief
activities and mobilizing the people to repair the damage
and oppose allied actions. Decisions were also taken to
organize assistance committees at all echelons and to send
groups of cadres to the localities to guide the implementa-
tion of these tasks.
The 31 October letter from the central Trung Bo NFLSV committee
and PRG' representation announces the decision of the NFLSV
and PRG to take 100 million dong from relief funds to assist
flood victims. The letter says that the liberation front
committee, people's councils, and people's revolutionary
committees at all levels are working to overcome the effects
of the flood. PRG President Phat's 4 November letter,
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broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 5th, informs "compatriots"
in the flooded areas that "the PRG has directed the central
Trung Bo PRG representation to take emergency measures to
mobilize all forces and abilities to promptly overcome the
consequences caused by storms and floods, while taking the
decision to use part of the public budget to send a quantity
of paddy, rice, money, cloth, and medicines . . . ."
There are several reports of communist drives to gather flood
relief in different parts of South Vietnam. A Liberation
Radio report on 10 November says the PRG representation in
central Nam Bo (the southernmost section of South Vietnam)
held an extraordinary conference on the 6th to discuss
measures to help the flood victims. The conference decided
to launch a campaign to provide flood relief, and the
regional PRG representation offered five million piasters
to help the flood victims. Also on the 10th, Liberation
Radio announced that a fund drive for the flood-stricken
areas was being launched in Saigon by the Saigon NFLSV,
alliance, and people's revolutionary committee.
The message from DRV President Thang, carried by VNA on
5 November, is addressed to NFLSV head Nguyen Huu Tho and
PRG President Phat, who are asked to convey sympathy to the
people in the flood-stricken areas and to "turn over to them
a quantity of rice, textiles, and medicines." The extent
of DRV assistance is spelled out in an 8 November VNA report
that Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi on the 7th announced the
North Vietnamese Government's decision to present flood
victims in the central provinces of South Vietnam with
40,000 tons of rice, four million meters of textiles, and
200 tons of medicines. VNA says Nghi informed Truong Cong
Dong, acting head of the PRG representation in the DRV, of
this decision. Subsequent DRV propaganda notes low-level
emulation efforts to produce more goods in order to provide
aid for southern flood victims.
BACKGROUND: Hanoi has publicized the granting of material
assistance to the South on previous occasions. A letter
from Pham Van Dong to Nguyen Huu Tho in March 1968 announced
that the DRV Government had decided to send the NFLSV Central
Committee a gift of 50,000 tons of rice, 10 million meters
of textiles, and 100 tons of medicines. Propaganda at the
time indicated that the aid was intended to "help lessen the
difficulties and suffering" caused by the allies "during the
recent past." A 16 March 1968 NHAN DAN editorial recalled that
rice, textiles, and medicines had been given by the DRV to
victims of floods in South Vietnam in November 1964 and
September 1966.
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DRV ANNOUNCES PROCEDURES FOR CHRISTMAS MAIL TO U.S. POWYS
For the third consecutive year, the DRV announces that U.S.
prisoners of war in the North may receive holiday mail. VNA
carried the notice on 9 November, earlier than in 1968 and
1969, i3tipulating that parcels must be sent via Moscow "in
accordance with the procedures already laid down" and that
those sent in any other way will not be accepted. The notice
adds that the parcels may weigh 5 kilograms instead of 3 and
that greetings to the prisoners may be sent either "by post"--
presumably via Moscow--or in care of the Committee of Liaison
with Families of Servicemen, New York.
Last yeart,VNA carried a notice from the DRV General Department
of Posts and Telecommunications on 18 November saying that
gifts could be sent from 1 through 31 December 1969 "according
to procedures stipulated on previous occasions." Procedures
had been outlined on 23 July 1969 in a VNA item, which referred
back to the 3 July announcement on the release of some U.S.
prisoners and the decision to allow gifts to be sent to
prisoners on the occasion of U.S. Independence Day. The item
on the 23d stated that the address should be Hanoi, in care of
Moscow, and that the weight of the parcels should not exceed
3 kilograms--6.6 pounds. VNA said that the procedure was the
same as that established for Christmas 1968, but propaganda
at that time is not known to have spelled out the regulations.
nn 13 December 1968 VNA merely announced the decision of the
VPA's General Political Department that U.S. pilots could
recr:ive Christmas gifts.
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR SAYS UAR ACTS ON UNGA RESOLUTION, EXTENDS CEASE-FIRE
In a moderate amount of propaganda on the UN General Assembly
debate on the Middle East, Moscow sustains the line that Israel
and the United States found themselves "isolated." Propaganda
for th?. most part gives only pro forma support to the Afro-Asia.i
draft resolution adopted on It November, noting that Israel and
the United States were "among the few" to have opposed it and
explaining the Soviet vote as bused on the resolution's aim of
solving the dispute by political means. Propaganda underlines
UAR President as-Sadat's decision to extend the cease-fire and
hold contacts with Jarring, contrasting it with Israel's state-
ments rejecting the UNGA resolution and crl.ling renewal of
Jarring's mission "less probable" than before.
UNGA RESOLUTION Reporting the adoption of the resolution,
TASS notes that the vote was 57 to 16 with
39 abstentions, the latter being; "mainly" Latin American
countries which moved for Assembly consideration of their own
draft resolution, although it did not get the necessary
majority. TASS points out that apart from Israel and the United
States, those who voted against included Australia, New
Zealand, and the Netherlands, as well as some Afro-Asian and
Latin American countries "which are under the strong influence"
of the United States. Noting that France supported the
resolution and Britain abstained, TASS fails to indicate that
seven Arab countries, including Algeria, Syria, and Iraq, did
not participate in the vote. Although TASS' summary of the
resolution fails to mention operative paragraphs two and
seven, the maission does not seem-significant: Paragraph two
incorporates principles drawn from Security Council Resolution
242 of November 1967, whose implementation is continuously
urged by Moscow; the request in paragraph seven that U Thant
report to the Security Cou4._i1 and the General Assembly on
Jarring'o efforts and implementation of Resolution 242 was
touched on in earlier Soviet propaganda on the UNGA debate.
Comment on the resolution underli:.?s its confirmation of the
inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force. In a
dispatch in PRAVDA on the 6th, Kolennichenko additionally
singles out for attention the resol.ution!a call for implementa-
tion of Resolution 242 providing for Israeli withdrawal and
recognition of Palestinian rights, its call for renewal of
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contacts with Jarring, and its recommendation for extension of
the cease-fire for another three months. Kolesnichenko also
notes the resolution's request that the Security Council
examine, if necessary, the question o "additional measures"
to insure implementation of Reeolutio. 242.* Asserting that
the Assembly has charted "realistic paths" to a speedy
political settlement, Kolesnichenko urges implementation of
t-ie resolution and says all attempts at evasion must be
regarded as rejection of a peaceful settlement.
IZVESTIYA on the 7th scoffs at the New York TIMES for calling
the UNGA resolution evidence of a lack of peaceful intentions
on the part of the UAR and for arguing that the resolution has
weakened the United Nations' status as an instrument of peace.
If one is to believe the TIMES' equilibristics, the paper says,
Israel's attempt to retain the Arab lands, with U.S. assistance,
strengthens the status of the United Nations while the UAR's
consent `o an immediate restoration of contacts with Jarring
shows a lack of peaceful intentions.
CAIRO Moscow approvingly cites the UAR's agreement to an
STANCE extension of the cease-fire, an effusive commentary
in Arabic on the 6th repeatedly praising Cairo's new
and important "peaceful, positive initiative." Soviet media
report but do not stress Egypt's condition for an extension,
a Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 4th noting that the
UAR official spokesman called resumption of the Jarring mission
a "necessary :undition" of P. truce extension. TASS on the 6th
cites the Cairo A.L AHRAM as saying the UAR attaches great
importance to tke extension, "having in view" a resumption of
Jarring's mission during this period. TASS also notes that
UAR Foreign Minister Riyad, meeting with Jarring on the 6th,
reaffirmed Cairo's readiness to prolong the cease-fire agreement
* Soviet UN delegate Malik, in a UN anniversary article in
KOMMUNIST No. 15 (signed to press 19.October), thought it
possible that the question of measures to compel fulfillment
of Security Council decisions "will be posed with increasing
acuteness" and cited Israel's "cynical ignoring" of UN
decisions on Middle East questions, particularly Resolution 242.
He also said U Thant believed that for Security Council decisions
to be effective, the permanent members should be in "agreement
on specific paths" of implementation.
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for three months "in accordance with the UNGA resolution."
While reporting Riyad's meeting with U Thant, TASS on the 9th
does not include his remark that- according to Cairo radio's
account--the UAR under no circumstances will accept a third
extension of the cease-fire.
ISRAELI Commentators almost uniformly contrast the UAR's
ATTITUDE attitude with Israel's. Thus Orestov asserts in
the 7 November PRAVDA that the Israeli leaders were
"compelled" to agree to a cease-fire extension. Like other
propagandists, Orestov points to Mrs. Meir's "rejection" of the
UNGA resolution in remarks made in London and says Foreign
Minister Eban met with Jarring "for the sole purpose" of telling
him Israel refuses to implement the resolution. A widely broad-
cast foreign-language commentary by Samilovskiy also points
out that while the UAR immediately stated that it was ready to
extend the cease-fire and take part in talks with Jarring, Israel
said it was not p1'epared to resume the contacts and the United
States "immediately supported Israel" and charged supporters of
the UNGA resolution with lack of objectivity.
SUSLOV ON In his October Revolution anniversary speech on the
MIDEAST 6th, Suslov routinely dismissed the "false charges"
that the USSR is "not fulfilling the cease-fire
conditions'' in the Suez Canal zone..calling these allegations
diversionary maneuvers designed to "whitewash" Israel and its
protectors. He accused the Israeli "adventurists" of hostility
toward UN decisions on a political settlement of the crisis,
charging that they are motivated not by a desire to insure
Israel the right to independent national existence "on a par
with other states in that area," but by annexationist aims.
He proclaimed the justness of the cause of liberating the
occupied territories and "not allowing interference" in the
Arabs' internal affairs, and he made the customary pledge of
Soviet support for the Arab peoples' struggle for their
legitimate rights, including the rights of the Arab people of
Palestine, and for an early political settlement.
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SUSLOV SPEECH
REASSERTION OF PEACE POLICY, NO MENTION OF DISARMAMENT
Suslov's 6 November keynote address for the 53d October Revolu-
tion anniversary offered nothing essentially new in the customary
review of foreign policy questions. But while reaffirming Soviet
pursuit of a foreign policy aimed at preventing war and charging
the United States with pursuit of the arms race, Suslov :notably
failed to mention any disarmament issues.* The omissiri departs
from the pattern of October Revolution anniversary speeches in
recent years. In delivering the anniversary speech last year,
Podgornyy had expressed hope for positive results from SALT, sched-
uled to open within two weeks, and had taken note of the socialist
bloc's proposal for a bars on chemical and bacteriological weapons--
then as now a question before the UN General Assembly.
Suslov defined the USSR's "Leninist" foreign policy as aimed, among
other things, at insuring peaceful conditions for the building of
socialism and wmmur._sm, at strengthening the principles of peaceful
coexistence, and at preventing war at a time when U.S. "imperialism"
is continuing its policy of "criminal aggression and the arms race."
Consistent with propaganda following the U.S. charges that the USSR
was building a submarine base in Cuba and the intrusion of a U.S.
plane into Soviet airspace on 21 October;* Suslov declared that the
United States is "preserving and strengthening its military bases
scattered throughout the world directed against the socialist coun-
tries, above all against the Soviet Union." The USSR, he said,
would maintain watchfulness against imperialist plans, perfecting
and arming its army and navy "with the most up-to-date weapons so
* Suslov last endorsed the goal of general and complete disarma-
ment in remarks on 29 September before the Foreign Affairs Commis-
sions of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, which were then
considering ratification of the 7 July USSR-Romanian friendship
treaty. In his 24 November 1969 speech at a session of the Presi-
dium of the Supreme Soviet considering ratification of the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, he called the NPT a step leading to the
resolution "of the vitally important pr...blen, of universal disarma-
ment."
** TASS on 10 November announced the release of the U.S. and
Turkish officers who were aboard the aircraft.
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as to be able, if need be, to give a shattering rebuff to those
who might encroach on the sacred frontiers of our homeland."
Defense Minister Grechko, in his Order of the Day as well as in
his 7 November Red Square speech, similarly pledged a continuing
effort t~) strengthen the capabilities of the USSR's armed forces
against an imperialist threat.
EUROPEAN Suslov hailed the 12 August FRG-Soviet treaty in
ISSUES standard 'erms as an important step toward improv-
ing bilateral relations as well as the general
climate in Europe. As Brezhnev had done in his speeches on
28 August and 2 October, in Alma-Ata and Baku, Suslov said that
the "ful.L weight" of the accord will come into play when it is
ratified. It is over this issue, he added, that a struggle with
"reactionary forces . . . opposed to the establishment of good
relations with the Soviet Union" has developed. In keeping with
Moscow's generally restrained treatment of the FRG Government,
however, he did not address himself to Chancellor Brandt's long-
standing contention that ratification is dependent on progress in
the four-power talks on Berlin.
Suslov noted with satisfaction a grow5ng sentiment among various
circles in Europe in favor of a relaxation of tensions and a
broadening of cooperation in commercial and scientific-technical
fields. Differences among states on certain issues, he said,
"must not be allowed to obscure those fields where cooperation
is possible and useful, above all where it is essential to avert
the threat to mankind of a missile and nuclear war." He followed
this observation with an endorsement of the socialist countries'
proposal for the convening of a conference on European security.
The "necessary preconditions" for "practical preparations" for
such a conference exist, he said, warning at the same time that
it "would be unforgiveable not to see in Europe the lively
activity of the forces of aggressive militarism and revanchism,
which continue to hatch their devious plans for reshaping the
map of Europe."
STRESS ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. WORLD CO4U1IST UNITY
Suslov's statements on relations among the socialist countries
emphasized economic integration under CEMA rather than military
integration under the Warsaw Pact. He did not refer to the Pact,
which Defense Minister Grechko mentioned in his Order of the Day
but not in his speech at the Red Square parade on the 7th..
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Citing CEMA at the outset of his remarks on the world socialist
system, Suslov noted that the member countries "alone account
for over one-third of total world production although they have
only 10 percent of the world population." Declaring that "the
economic and military might of the socialist countries has
increased" in 1970, he reported that "protocols are now being
signed for coordination of national economic plans for 1971-75"
and that "the integrated long-term program c" the development
of socialist economic integration is beginning to be implemented."
Suslov went on to cite the socialist countries' "foreign political
cooperation" under the network of bilateral treaties of friendship,
cooperation, and mutual assistance, listing "recent" new treaties--
signed in the period since 1961--between the USSR and the GDR,
Poland, the MPH, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Romania.*
Skirting the subject of Czechoslovakia's 1968 "counterrevolution''--
a topic highlighted in anniversary speeches on the 5th in Prague
by CPCZ Presidium member and Secretary Bilak and Soviet Ambassador
Chervonenko--Suslov took the tack of denouncing "ideologists of
imperialism and its revisionist flunkeys; who have made every
effort to whitewash and embellish the bourgeois system and to
remove from the agenda the necessity of a revolutionary transfo?L-c-
tion of capitalist society."**
Suslov transparently raised the issue of Czechoslovakia, however,
in remarks on the unity of the world communist movement in the
wake of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference. He
noted an intensification of the struggle, in the postconference
period, against attempts by "revisionists and nationalists to dis-
tort the policy of the fraternal communist parties and the theory
of Marxism-Leninism." With Garaudy and Ernst Fischer--expelled
this year from the French and Austrian CP's, respectively--evi-
dently in mind, he noted that "opportunists of all kinds attempt
to impose on the communist parties a pattern of actions which would
unavoidably lend to weakening the revolutionary workers movement."
He added that "it is natural for communists to draw certain conclu-
sions from this" and to "expel" such opportunists from their ranks.
* The Bucharest SCINTEIA's account of Suslov's speech includes the
reference to the bilateral treaties but ignores all the passages on
CEMA and world communist unity.
** He went on to score also the "adventurist leftist pseudorevolu-
tionaries" in passages leading up to his remarks on relations with
Peking. See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.
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S I WO-SOVIET RE LAT I OILS
MOSCOW, PEKING EXCHANGE APPEALS FOR NORMAL STATE RELATIONS
Both sides have taken the occasion of the October Revolution
anniversary to reaffirm their commitment to negotiations on
Sino-Soviet state relations while indicating that their
ideological differences remain as basic as ever. In the
anniversary keynote address on 6 November, Suslov expressed
the hope that the Peking talks will lead to success in
normalizing state relations but added that the Soviets will
stand firm on their ideological positions. The Chinese message
on the anniversary, while not mentioning the talks directly,
renewed the call for normal state relations despite "differences
of principle" which had been made in the 7 October 1969 PRC
Government statement announcing agreement to open negotiations.
MOSCOW In his brief remarks on Sino-Soviet relations Suslov
observed that the Peking talks "cannot be described
as easy," but he followed Soviet practice since last spring in
avoiding direct censure of the Chinese for causing the stalemate
and in blandly exprerzing a hope for progress in normalizing
state relations. Strengthening the impression that Brezhnev's
28 August Alma-Ata speech stands as the principal Soviet policy
statement on China, Suslov invoked the CPSU chief's call for
normalization of relations between the two countri3s. As
befits his role as ideologue, Suslov was more explicit than
Brezhnev in declaring that the Soviets would "continue upholding
our Marxist-Leninist positions on ideological questions."
Similarly, in another passage he took a swipe at "adventurist
leftist pseudorevolutionaries" who oppose the line of peaceful
coexistence. But despite such signs that he may be chafing
at the bit of polemical restraint now inhibiting Soviet elite
comment on China, Suslov did not indulge in any direct
ideological attacks on Peking.*
* In a passage discussing the results of the Ju?..e 1969 Moscow
international communist conference, Suslov expressed satisfaction
over the "intensified" struggle against "revisionists and
nationalists" and called for expulsi -i from the communist ranks
of "opportunists of all kinds." Whi.ie the language is generalized,
the thrust of these remarks seems aimed at dissident and autonomist
elements within Moscow's sphere of influence in the communist
movement rather than at the Chinese. This aspect is covered in
today's TRENDS in the section headlined "Suslov Speech."
CONFIDENTIAL
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PRAVDA (8 November) edited the PRC message by deleting a reference
to Stalin's tutelage in a sentence calling on the Soviets to "carry
forward the glorious traditions" of the October Revolution. While
engaging in a partial rehabilitation of Stalin, the post-Khrushchev
Kremlin leadership has from the outset been concerned to avoid
giving the impression that a switch from a polemical to an irenic
approach to the Chinese reflected capitulation to PRC pressure.
An absence of anti-Chinese polemics in the Soviet central press
was broken by an article on the anniverea.ry in the 6 November RED
STAR by V. Korionov, a major commentator on communist affairs.
Referring to the benefits accruing from the alliance of socialist
countries, the article held up Peking as a negative object lesson
on the "moral and political isolation" resulting from separation
from the "family" of socialist countries. The article referred
to "the Maoist group." an anathema formula that the Soviets have
largely avoided in rec?nt months. That this hardline formula,
in an article by an author who normally writes for PRAVDA,
should appear in RED STAR might suggest impatience among the
military over the restraints imposed by Moscow's China policy.
if does express, coming as it does in a passage hailing the
indestructible alliance" embodied in the Warsaw Pact, Moscow's
interest in a show of unity among its allies against the Chinese.
Soviet broadcasts beamed to the Chinese have elaborated on Suslov's
appeal for normalized relations, recalling the benefits from past
Sino-Soviet cooperation and holding up the Soviet experience as
the proper model for a communist nation. Comment keyed to the
anniversary has avoided blaming the Chinese for lack of progress
at the Peking talks, but a Mandarin broadcast on 5 November was
unusually forthright in charging the Chinese with taking a hostile
approach not conducive to a normalization of relations. After
citing the Kosygin-Chou meeting'last year, the opening of the
Peking talks, negotiations on trade and border river navigation,
and the appointment of a Soviet ambassador as signs of good
will, the commentary complained that the Chinese had not
reciprocated and had engaged is anti-Soviet propaganda at the
time of the ambassador's arrival. In adducing evidence of this
hostile attitude the commentary made a rare reference to last
year's border clashes, citing pictures published by Peking
showing heroic Chinese soldiers on Damanskiy Island.
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PEKING The PRC message, like last year's, was sent in the
name of the NPC Standing Committee and the State
Council to their Soviet counterparts and greeted "the fraternal
Soviet people." Also in the pattern of last year, Peking
reported a film reception cosponsored by the Sino-Soviet
Friendship Association and a Soviet embassy reception (hosted
by new ambassador Tolstikov) attended by Vice Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua, head of the PRC delegation at the Peking talks.
The Chinese message, while not mentioning the Peking talks,
calls on the Soviets to take "effective measures to settle
important outstanding questions"--not specified--in the
state relations between the two countries. The effect of
the message is to reaffirm the line taken in the 7 October
1969 government statement announcing agreement to open
negotiations and to match Moscow's show of dedication to a
negotiated adjustment of relations. It does not, however,
serve to offset the signs of stalemate in the protracted
Peking talks.
Twice as long as last year's, the message follows the line
of the October 1969 statement in calling for normal state
`/~~ relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence and in taking explicit note of the underlying
ideological rift--the "differences of principle"--dividing
the two sides. It also includes an ideological thrust in
expressing a conviction that the Soviet people "educated
by the great Lenin and Stalin will certainly inherit and
carry forward the glorious traditions" of the October
Revolution.
The reference to peaceful coexistence, a concept conventionally
applicable to relations between communist and noncommunist
countries, as the basis for Sino-Soviet relations reflects the
basic ideological schism sundering the alliance. This
application of the doctrine is a corollary of Peking's formal
identification--in Lin Piao's political report to the April
1969 CCP congress--of the Soviet bloc ("social iwperialism")
with the enemy side in the "fundamental contradictions" of the
present era. A different use of the doctrine of peaceful
coexistence was made by the Chinese in their effort to
mediate bloc conflict during the period of destalinization
strains following the 1956 CPSU congress: A PRC Government
statement on 1 Novemuer 1956 demanded that mutual relations
among socialist countries be base(?. on the principles of
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12 NOVL;M13161i 1970
- 25 -
peaceful coexistence. Subnequently, however, the doctrine was
held to apply to relations between countries with different
political systems. Thus, Peking's programmatic "general line"
for the communist movement issued on 14 June 1.963 listed the
following basic aspects of a socialist foreign policy: "friend-
ship, mutual assistance, and cooperation" among the socialist
countries; peaceful coexistence on the basis of the five
principles with countries having different social systems;
and support for revolutionary struggles. In the present phase,
the Soviet Union having undergone a "restoration of capitalism"
under revisionist leadership, Peking regards its relations with
Moicow as falling within the second category.
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- 'a' 6
-
ALLENDE INAUGURATION
MOSCOW HAILS UNITED FRONT VICTORY AS MILESTONE FOR HEMISPHERE
Fairly extensive Soviet news coverage of Oalvador Allende's inau-
guration as provident of Chile on 3 November in accompanP!d by
comment depicting his advent to Power as a victory for united
front tactics having implications for all of Latin America.
Suslov gave authoritative expression to the broad Soviet view in
remarking in his October Revolution anniversary address that "the
national liberation struggle of the peoples in Latin America is
spreading and intensifying: more than 10 years ago the Cuban
revolution smashed the chain of imperialist oppression in Latin
American countries, and new links in this chain have become
apparent recently in Peru, Chile, and Bolivia."
The significance of the Chilean events for the hemisphere is
brought up in an IZVESTIYA interview with Allende, featured in
the paper on 5 November (morning edition), in the question "How do
you assess the present situation in Latin America?" IZVESTIYA
quotes Allende's reply to the effect that "national forces, which
are much alike in their aims and which are similar to those which
today inspire the victorious Chilean people, are struggling and
gaining strength in one form or another in various Latin American
countries."
TASS commentator Chigir on 4 November defined Allende's success--
a victory for Chilean unity that is "difficult to overestimate"--
as a "milestone" for the hemisphere as a whole. "The success of
the People's Unity Movement that united the widest masses of the
Chilean working people, all the patriots of the country," Chigir
said, "is at the sane time the success of the entire national
liberation, anti-imperialist movement of Latin America which has
assumed unprecedented scope of late." Picturing Chile, as Suslov
did, as a new link in the broad chain begun by Cuba, Chigir went
on to reiterate--in low key--the Soviet case for a flexible,
diversified revolutionary strategy, in effect representing the
Chilean events as a vindication of Soviet support for the parlia-
mentary alternative to the Cuban route to power. The national
liberation struggle in Latin America "assumes different forms in
various countries on the continent and is at different stages there,"
he said. With both the Cuban and Chilean examples in the background,
"the peoples come increasingly to realize that only they themselves
can and must decide their own destiny."
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CONP0II,14N'I'IA1 1''141!1 '1'I01Nl)II
L;' Nr)VI14I)I+34 I970
'IIit sodas of I,he A.L.Inndo rog.1,111n rtu part of it dnve.lop.l.rig chats
reaction ],it Latin Aminrl(1a 1.ri al.uo convnyad, in bi.'oit(I(lauLr.i to
l,at to Amnrlca, by it porLrrtyrtJ. or Lhn Ur d. Ln(f thetas au rtuxa.ously
cauLitng about for wItyu to wcrrtlcrn Lite Alkmida government out of
fear of .I.Lu iml)act, on other hemisphere nountrlau. rL was with
this objective In mind, according to it Moscow broadcast to Brazil
on 9 November, that "the bosuen of Anaconda copper carried out
another subversive action by decreasing the extraction of copper
in order to bring about economic difficulties" in Chile. Pointing
to allegedly rising U.S. concern over the "political and psycholo-
gical" effects of the Chilean example, the commentator asked: "Who
would classify as normal the pressure exerted by the U.S. propaganda,
machine on Costa Rica due to that country's decision to establish
friendly relations with the socialist countries without U.S. per-
mission?"
Over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the
6th, Moscow suggested ominously that in the aftermath of the
Chilean elections Washington "is reconsidering at top speed its
plans for extending its military bases in case armed intervention
against that country becomes necessary." The 9 November Radio
Moscow broadcast to Brazil, however, cited the Washington POST
to the effect that "official circles are not now mentioning the
possibility of direct military intervention in Chile," resorting
ri.ther to indirect tactics to counter the impact of a regime
solidly in power.
Soviet commentators foresee "profound socio-economic transforma-
tions" and real opportunities to "get rid of the rule of U.S.
monopolies" under a genuinely popular Chilean regime. A
5 November PRAVDA dispatch recounting the "exciting day" of
Allende's inauguration remarks that the new government is the
first in Chile's history to represent "all the democratic strata
of the people on a broad basis." As it has done from the outset,
Moscow plays down the specific role of the Chilean Communist Party.
CHILE-USSR Soviet media on 25 October publicized Podgornyy's
RELATIONS message to Allende expressing "sincere" congratula-
tions on his election and a hope for "wider develop-
ment of relations of friendship and mutually advantageous coopera-
tion between the two countries." On 6 November the radio reported
that Allende had received the Soviet delegation to the inauguration
festivities, led by Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium
Dzotsenidze. They discussed "the further development of commercial,
scientific-technical, and cultural relations" between the two
countries," according to the Soviet report.
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12 NOW:MI01U 1970
'l.'he .I;YIVht1L'JYA Interview with Allende includeu I,he Chilean 1'reoi-
dent'u statement, in reuponuc to a queution about the main pr:inci-
pleu of his government's foreign policy, that Chile will seek
cordial relations with all countrieu on the principles of "the
people's self-dc termination and of noninterference in other
countries' domestic affairs" and that it will develop relations
with the Soviet Union "on the economic, cultural, and diplomatic
plane."
PEKING REMAINS CAUTIOUS IN APPRGACH TO ALLENDE GOVERNMENT
PRC media continue to exhibit caution In their approach to a
regime that ,ame to power via the peaceful parliamentary road
in an electoral coalition that included the Soviet-lining
Chilean Communist Party. Consistent with Chinese propaganda
following Allende's electoral victory on It September,* NCNA
accounts of the inaugural ceremonies make no reference to
Allende's political affiliation, referring to him simply as "the
Chilean President." But Peking has moved to court a regime that
affords the PRC an opportunity to gain a diplomatic foothold in
Latin America at a time when the Chinese are attempting to broaden
their diplomatic base worldwide.
Chou En-lai's message to Allende upon his election by the Chilean
congress, carried by NCNA on 28 October, "warmly" congratulated
him and cited the Chinese people's support for the Chilean people
"in their just struggle against imperialist aggression,
plunder, and interference and in defense of national
independence and state sovereignty." An unofficial Chinese
delegation, described by NCNA on 29 October as a "workers delega-
tion" but including two party Central Committee members, attended
the investiture ceremony. NCNA reported on the 9th that Chilean
Interior Minister Toha and Foreign Minister Almeyda attended a
Chinese reception and had "friendly talks with members of the
workers delegation." The guests, NCNA said, repeatedly toasted
Mao's health, friendship between the Chilean and Chinese peoples,
"and victory of the world peoples' struggle against U.S. imperial-
ism and in defense of national sovereignty."
* See the 23 September 1970 TRENDS, page 38, for , riew of
Peking's circumspect treatment of the 4 September election out-
come and for background on earlier Peking comment denigrating the
"parliamentary road."
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].S' NOVIVI5LM I.9'(0
- 29 -
A 7 November NCNA account of the "mammoth" rally addressed by
Allende in Santiago takes note of the Chilean president's pledge
to "put an end to monopolies" and nationalize copper and other
mineral resources. It also contains the closest approach to
date in Peking media to an acknowledgment of Allende's public
commitment to establish relations with communist countries,
specifically including the PRC. NCNA quotes Allende's remarks,
"I want to salute the delegation from those countries with which
we still have no diplomatic relations. Chile will do 'them justice
by recognizing their governments."
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1.2 NOV1!1MI3E'H 1970
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
DRAFT PRC CONSTITUTION RELEASED BY TAIPEI MEDIA
The draft constitution of the PRC, as released by Taipei news
media on It November, appears from internal evidence to be genuine.
While this version is only a draft, it is unlikely that the final
document will be greatly altered, in light of the fact that the
draft was approved by the Central Committee plenum last September.
In the end, the final version of the party constitution closely
resembled the previously released draft.
Like the party constitution, the state charter is basically a
tract intended to enshrine Mao and Mao's Thought. Mao is
designated as "head of state of the dictatorship of the
proletariat" and "supreme commander" of the PLA; Lin Piao
is termed his "successor" and "deputy supreme commander."
There is no provision for their Joint departure from the
scene, nor for Lin's untimely demise.
The constitution makes the government more directly the
creature of the party. Under the 1954 constitution, the PRC
was a multiparty "people's democratic" state with power
belonging "to the people as represented by the NPC" and local
assemblies. Under the new constitution the PRC has advanced
to the stage of "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the
proletariat" led by the working class "through the CCP." All
powers are now more generally apportioned simply "to the people,"
perhaps indicating that, while the people's congresses "-xercise"
the people's power, the party is the final authority of the
people's will.
State organs must now follow the example of revolutionary
committees and "enforce the revolutionary three-way alliances
of the array, cadres, and masses as well as of the old, middle-
aged, and young." The latter provision, not originally a part
of the three-way-alliance formula but more recently noted in
the media, may prove administratively beneficial in reducing
the power of pre-1949 cadres who often lack the qualifications
for their current posts. While a cadre-army-masses alliance
in state organs is unlikely to produce any more power for the
masses than they now seem to exercise in the revolutionary
committees, the PLA will apparently gain a formal and permanent
role in the civil sector. This marks a significant change from
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the post-l9l-9 period of military rule when PLA officers assumed
civilian functions but terminated their active military duties.
Under the new constitution they will apparently retain military
rank, duties, and discipline, and rely on military channels for
promotion while exercising--if the cultural revolution pattern
continues--dominant administrative power throughout the country.
ECONOMY The draft constitution does not advocate any radical
economic changes and indicates a continuation of
policies in force for most of the past decade. In line with
Maoist dogma, the transition stage of socialism is foreseen to
be a lengthy period, and at the present stage the system of
ownership will not be changed. The commune system will retain
the team as the basic accounting unit, and the ownership of
small private plots and of houses and tools will be continued.
Reflecting the change to a "socialist" state, there are no longer
any real guarantees of land ownership, handicraft rights, or
right of. inheritance. Predictably, the guarantees to capitalists
have also been dropped.
RIGHTS OF The PRC is still officially proclaimed a "multinational"
CITIZENS state, and the continued existence of the "autonomous
regions" for minority groups is recognized. But while
nationalities may still "use their spoken and written languages,"
the 1954 provisions that they may "develop" their languages and
"preserve or reform their habits and customs" have been dropped.
Freedom of religion has officially been retained, and certain
new "freedoms" have been granted. Freedom to strike is now said
to be one of the rights of citizens, and the airing of opinions
in posters and debates "to create a lively political situation"
is encouraged. But such activity is said to be subject to
"discipline" and "unity." The primary duty of citizens as
enumerated by the new charter is to support Mao, and secondarily
to support the CCP.
JUSTICE The 1954 provision that "all citizens are equal before
the law" apparently no longer holds. The law has lost
? its Western gloss of being an entity unto itself, and the courts
are now explicitly creatures of the people's congress at the
corresponding level. Judges have no fixed terms of office, but
again are subject to the pleasure of the congresses. Courts of
law are expected to follow the "mass line," and in "important
cases of counterrevolution" the masses must join in the procedure
through discussion and criticism--a standard cultural revolution
practice.
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NATIONAL PEOPLE'S The supreme state organ is still the National
CONGRESS People's Congress, (NPC), with its standing
committee and chairman exercising power while
it is not in session. There is no provision for the election of
a chief of state, and the entire section previous y devoted to the
office has been eliminated. Most of Liu Shao-chi's former duties
remain with the NPC and will presumably be exercised by the NPC
chairman, although Mao has been assigned the FP,C chairman's former
role as army supreme commander ar.d given personal rank as "head
of state of the dictatorship of the proletariat."
The structure of the NPC has apparently been little changed,
although its term of office has been extended from four years
to a very flexible five-year term which may be extended "under
special circumstances." The membership criteria differ slightly
from those in 1954, with a provision that "in case of necessity
a certain number of patriotic personalities" may take part. This
proviso would allow the center to stack the congressional deck
in case of necessity, but it is perhaps primarily intended to
serve as a means of retaining some flexibility, a primary aim
of the charter. Under the provision, aged noncommunist leaders
could be placed on the NPC without actually electing them. The
category may also be used for Hong Kong or Taiwan delegates who
are not considered overseas Chinese but who cannot be elected.
The powers of the NPC have been considerably weakened by the
new constitution. Even its power to appoint the premier is
now subject to the "recommendation of the Central Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party." While the NPC still "examines"
the state budget, there is now no specific requirement for its
approval. There is no mention of its former power to decide
on war or peace, nor of the National Defense Council, a prestigious
collection of old military leaders formerly responsible to the
NPC. One predictable omission in the light of cultural revolution
events is the clause insuring immunity from arrest for NPC members.
REVOLUTIONARY The existing revolutionary committee system,
COt+IITTEES coopted by the constitution into the formal
government structure, will form the basis
of the new system of local government. The revolutionary
committees, which are more directly controlled by the party
than the previous government councils, are to act as standing
committees for local people's congresses, yet to be elected.
The revolutionary committees will be responsible to the congresses
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and to "the state organs at a higher level." In the light of
current power alinements in the revolutionary committees, their
new role seems to assure continuance of a dominant administrative
role for the PLA.
CADRE DEFICIENCIES THREATEN PARTY-BUILDING CAMPAIGN
Recent PRC broadcasts continue to decry the failings of cadres
at the leadership level and indicate provincial plans to require
additional study of Mao's Thought as the panacea. Like the
Cheng Feng Movement of 1942-44, which some broadcasts cite as
an antecedent, the current campaign appears designed at least
in part to provide discipline and ideological guidance during
a period of party rebuilding and growth. Thus NCNA on
21 October applauded the Chiente county party committee in
Chekiang for its success in using veteran cadres and military
representatives to train the large number of new cadres who
have emerged in the county during the cultural revolution in
Mao's thought.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, released by NCNA on 30 October,
added momentum to the campaign, explaining that "the purpose
of our study" of Mao's philosophic works is "to raise the
theoretical level of the whole party," which is now the
"fundamental task" in rebuilding the party. On 29 October,
Radio Peking broadcast a PEOPLE'S DAILY article which complained
that while workers, peasants and soldiers had learned the
importance of studying Mao's works during the cultural revolu-
tion, some cadres still do not "correctly accept the lesson."
Nanking radio on 28 October broadcast a HSINHUA DAILY editorial
portraying the current campaign as one that is "under the
personal guidance of Chairman Mao" and is linked to past study
movements within the party, including "the rectification
campaign launched in 1942" which--the editorial stressed--
united the whole party by 1945. The editorial forcefully
argued that the present effort to study Mao's works "is
not a trivial problem" but an "urgent militant task" to be
"solved immediately." The link to the 1942 rectification
movement as well as to Mao's personal concern for the
present campaign was again expressed in a HUNAN DAILY
editorial broadcast by Changsha radio on 27 October. The
editorial dredged up a Mao quotation of 32 years ago, not
recently publicized but part of the Cheng Feng study
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documents: "I hope to see an all-party emulation in study which
will show who has really learned something and who has learned
more and learned better." Complaining that some cadres cannot
"distinguish between right and wrong nor be clear about their
orientation" in carrying out party policies, the editorial
urged a mass campaign to study Mao's Thought to correct their
mistaken political outlook.
Kansu and Kiangsu have announced formal procedures for provincewide
study of Mao's philosophic works. Lanchow radio on 4 November
reported that in response to the party plenum communique issued
in September, which called for more 6tudy of Mao's thought at
the leadership level, the Kansu Provincial Revolutionary
Committee (RC) has decided that the "top leaders" of party
committees, core groups, and revolutionary committees must lead
"the masses of personnel of party committees and revolutionary
committees" in studying Mao's thought in an "organized, well-
planned way." Progress reports must be sent to the RC; Tuesday
and Thursday afternoons must be regarded as periods of study
throughout the province, and "under no circimstances should
any change be made."
A Nanking radio report on 27 October indicates that the Kiangsu
Provincial Revolutionary Committee has issued a similar plan
for cadres, "particularly those at or above county level," to
"observe special days for studying" until Mao's thoughts are
"memorized as though they had taken deep root in our minds."
Revolutionary committees at special district and municipal
levels must make regular checks and submit periodic reports
to the RC on the progress of leading cadres at all levels.
Cadre deficiencies in Kwangtung appear to be threatening the
meager gains of the 18-month campaign to rebuild the party
there. Canton radio on 3 November broadcast a NANFANG DAILY
editorial that called on those party branches which have done
above-average rectification work to "raise standards," while
those which have not done well "should start the work again
from the very beginning." The editorial urged that a renewed
effort be made to mobilize the masses to "conduct assessments
of the party branches and members" and gradually to establish
new party committees "in a planned way" at the county, special
district, and municipal levels in the more advanced areas.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
WRITERS UNION LEADERSHIP RESHUFFLED PRIOR TI CONGRESS
In preparation for the upcoming fifth congress of the USSR Writers
Union, the union's organizational secretary, K.V. Voronkov, has
been replaced by a party official, Yu. N. Verchenko. The move
occurred at a 4 November plenum of the Writers Union board, which
also announced that the fifth congress will convene in June next
year.
Verchenko was director of the Komsomol's publishing house and a
member of the Komsomol Central Committee bureau under S.P. Pavlov,
former Komsomol first secretary. In March 1968 he left the
Komsomol leadership and became head of the culture section of the
Moscow city party committee. As Moscow culture chief, Verchenko
has been known for ideological orthodoxy, especially for his
insistence on party control over the Moscow theaters (see
MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 14 December 1969).
This change does not, presumably, signify any ideological shift:
Voronkov was one of Solzhenitsyn's main assailants in the
Writers Union leadership and presented the report on Solzhenitsyn's
e%pulsion from the union at a meeting last December of the
secretariat of the Moscow Writers Union board (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA,
2 December 1969). Voronkov has been transferred to the post of
USSR deputy culture minister--an unusual appointment for a Writers
Union official.
Changes in the RSFSR and Moscow writers union leaderships occurred
earlier this year. At the RSFSR Writers Union congress in March,
the 72-year old L.S. Sobolev was retired and replaced as RSFSR
Writers Union chairman by S.V. Mikhalkov (SOVIET RUSSIA, 28 March
1970). At a May plenum of the Moscow Writers Union Mikhalkov was
relieved of his post as Moscow first. secretary and replaced by
conservative S.S. Narovchatov (PRAVDA, 19 May). Hardliner
Mikhalkov has been one of Solzhenitsyn's most frequent critics.
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BULGARIA-YUGOSLAVIA
TERSE, UNINFORMATIVE COt+ JNIQUE REPORTS ON BILATERAL TALKS
A brief, uninformative communique on 9-10 November talks in Sofia
between high-level Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations indicates
that except for an agreement to continue to talk, the meeting
brought little progress toward the resolution of differences. The
communique, as carried by TANJUG on the 10th, merely reports
that the two delegations "set forth their stands" on current
matters in bilateral relations and agreed that the talks would
continue at an unspecified date. The Yugoslav delegation was
led by Council of the Federation and Executive Committee
member Vlahovic, while Politburo member Velchev headed the
Bulgarian side. Deputy foreign ministers of both countries
took part in the talks, according to TANJUG.
TANJUG had reported on 9 November that the talks were initiated
by an exchange of letters between Zhivkov and Tito on the need
for "further developing relations." On 19 September Radio
Sofia had disclosed that Tito's reply to a letter from Zhivkov
had been delivered to the Bulgarian leader by the Yugoslav
ambassador in Sofia. Details on the exchange of letters have
not been officially revealed, but the Paris LE MONDE said on
3 September that Zhivkov's letter had proposad a meeting
between the two paa'~y leaders, the signing of a Bulgarian-
Yugoslav friendship treaty, and a renunciation of territorial
ambitions.
The perennial Macedonian question is at the core of the
frictions between the two countries: The Yugoslavs insist
that the population of Macedonia is Yugoslav, while the
Bulgarians claim it is Bulgarian. Summing up the dispute
in a Radio Zagreb commentary on 7 September, Yugoslav
commentator Milika Sundic said that the essence of the
Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute "consists of Bulgaria's claims
on a Yugoslav republic." The conflicting claims have been
the subject of recurrent low-level polemics in the media of
the two countries. There was a flareup in June, for example,
when according to the Skoplje party daily NOVA MACEDONIA on
5 July, the Yugoslav delegation at a Sofia meeting submitted
the draft of a bilateral economic agreement which the Bulgarians
refused to sign because it was in Macedonian.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030049-9