TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: September 10, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN'
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~Ililllll~~~ulllllllll~~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
10 September 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 36)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United Stntes,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents tc
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
E,,cI. ded N. aolon,oUc
downR?odinp and
d.clovi'colion
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10 SEPTEMBER 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Stock Charges Voiced as Xuan Thuy Returns to Paris Talks
1
Sihanouk Imputes Remark on DRV Presence to "False" Radio . . .
3
RGNU Protests to Prague; Diplomat Leaves Embassy for PRC . . . .
4
Vietnamese, Cambodian Representatives at Nonalined Conference
5
LPA Denies Attack on Orphanage in South Vietnam . . . . . . . . .
6
Hanoi Observes Anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's Death . . . . . . . .
6
Moscow Attacks PRC on Ho Anniversary; Peking Comment Minimal . .
7
Laos: Souphanouvong-Souvanna Phouma Messages Continue . . . . .
8
U.S. Statement on Cease-Fire Violations, Israeli Stand Noted
.
10
Moscow Publicizes UAR Refutation of Cease-Fire Violations .
.
.
.
13
USSR Cites Cairo Press Disapproval of Palestinian Hijackings
.
.
14
Moscow's East European Allies Deplore Hijackings . . . . . . . .
16
Peking Scores Soviet Policies, Promotes Asian "United Front" . .
'
19
Moscow
s Broadcasts to China Respond to Anti-Soviet Comment . . .
LUSAKA CONFERENCE
21
I
Tito Presses Case for Nonalinement, Restates Stock Positions . .
GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALICS
23
Moscow Hails Seabed Treaty, Attacks U.S. on CB-Weapons Ban . . .
CHILEAN ELECTION
25
Cuban Media Air Allende Statement of Confidence in Victory . . .
26
Moscow Mails Outcome as Product of Broad United Front'. . . . . .
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
29
Prague Names Hardliner as New Ambassador to USSR . . . . . . . .
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
31
Brezhnev Receives Mixed Treatment at Kazakh Celebration . . . . .
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
33
Second Session of Party Central Committee Reported . . . . . . .
35
New Director of PLA General Political Department . . . . .
36
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 31 AUGUST - 6 SEPTEMBER 197(,
Moscow (4032 items)
Indochina (4%)
[Vietnam (2%)
VJ Day 25th (2%)
Anniversary
Kazakh ASSR 50th
Anniversary
(50%)
China (6%)
Middle East (5%)
Brezhnev's Tadzhik (--)
Speech
Peking (2797 items)
17% Indochina (26%) 50%
15%] [DRV National Day (6%) 34%]
10% [Cambodia (11%) 8%]
Domestic Issues (37%) 19%
7% VJ Day 25th (--) 7%
Anniversary
5% Vice President's (1%) 5%
4% Asian Tour
3% Middle East (9%) 4%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary outpu` of the Mos:.,_ and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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I N D 0 C H I N A
in his first appearance at the Paris talks since December, DRV
delegate Xuan Thuy at the 82d session on 3 September delivered a
lengthy attack on the Nixon Administration's alleged lack of
goodwill and serious intent with respect to a negotiated settle-
ment. There is still no indication of when PRG Foreign Minister
Nguyen Thi Binh will return to Paris. Her arrival in Lusaka,
Zambia,for the nonalined conference was reported by NCNA on the
8th.
The issue of the legitimacy and recognition of Sihanouk's Royal
Government of National Union (RGNU) gets ccntinuing publicity as
more complaints are aired about Prague's attitude toward the
diplomat who seized the Cambodian embassy in Czechoslovakia on
behalf of the FUNK .tst month. Somalia beccmes the 24th regime
reported by NCNA an- the FUNK radio to have recognized Sihanouk's
government.
A spate of propaganda denies that Sihanouk, in a broadcast over the
FUNK radio, discussed the presence of North Vietnamese troops in
Cambodia. A statement by the RGNU, carried by NCNA on the 8th, says
the alleged remarks by Sihanouk were fabricated and broadcast over
"a false radio station purporting to be the Voice of FUNK which was
set up several weeks ago by the CIA."
In addition to the usual reports of military action in Cambodia,
VNA on the 7th rounds up alleged feats of the Cambodian '.'Liberation
Armed Forces" during August. It claims that more than 10 enemy
battalions were either wiped out or "heavily trounced," and'it
comments that the Cambodian "patriots" are following up victories
scored in the last dry season by defeating the enemy in the current
rainy season.
There is also a spate of press and radio comment on victories in South
Vietnam, much of it pegged to the 2 September DRV National.Day and to
the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death on 3 September 1969. Hanoi
observed the death anniversary with a wreath-laying ceremony and an
exhibit of models of Ho's future tomb. Peking has publicized the Hanoi
ceremonies but has originated little comment. Moscow marked the anni-
versary with a meeting sponsored by the USSR-Vietnam Friendship Society.
Routine Soviet comment lauds Ho's revolutionary example and his friend-
ship for the USSR, while also using the occasion to criticize the
Chinese and to recall the plea for socialist unity in Ho's testament.
S'? K CHARGES VOICED AS XUAN THUY RETURNS TO PARIS TALKS
The VNA account the 82d session of the Paris talks on 3 September
says tersely that GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam "a ain rehashed his
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brazen contentions" and that U.S. delegate Bruce "repeated his
argumentation used at the previous sessions and Nixon's old
contentions."
Both the VNA and LPA accctuzts* note that PRG delegate Nguyen Van
Tien, the third speaker at the session, "exposed" the United
States' argument in support of its "general view" that the
negotiators should put aside preconditions and give consideration
to both sides' legitimate concerns. Tien said the United States
in fact clings to "utterly absurd conditions" for troop
withdrawals and a settlement of the political problem in South
Vietnam, giving consideration only to its own "selfish,
colonialist interests."
Both accounts report that Tien repeated. the standard demand that
if the United States is interested in genuine negotiations it
must give up its "aggression" and seriously respond to the
10-point solution. But neither !ANA nor LPA reports his lengthy
discussion of various points in the NFLSV/PRG position on troop
withdrawal and political settlement issues; thus the accounts
do not report his remarks to the effect that the Vietnamese
people will never accept and have categorically rejected the
U.S. position on a mutual troop withdrawal, that the existence
of the GVN is a "major obstacle" to the restoration of peace,
and that the South Vietnamese are "entitle? to require U.S.
abandonment of it."
In his first participation in the Paris talks since last
Eecember, DIV delePn.t, Xuan Thuy delivered a lengthy statement
in which he set out to documer:' the Nixon Administration's
alleged lack of good faith reg ding a negotiated settlement.
The VNA account notes Thuy's r..nark that what the Administration
has done can be summarized in what he termed its three policies
of Vietnamization, negotiations from a position of strength,
and using Asians to fight Asians. The account glosses over
most of the details of Thuy's a-utacks on Administration policy,
but it dons report that he ridiculed--in standard fashion--the
President's "pretext" that the spread of the war to Cambodia was
* Liberation Radio last month had reverted to its past practice
of broadcasting full texts of the PRG statements, carrying the 6
and 13 August statements on tYe 10th and 17th, respectively.
But for the past three weel.s he FRG statements have been briefly
summarized by LPA.
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necessary to protect the lives of American troops in South Vietnam,
his refusal to announce a deadline for total U.S. troop withdrawal,
and his argument that "millions of people would be subjected to
reprisals" in Vietnam if U.S. troops were withdrawn.
VNA notes that in conclusion Thuy reaffirmed the DRV's goodwill
and serious intent at Paris and that he said it "is prepared to
come together with the other parties" on the basis of the NFLSV/PRG
10-point solution. As in the case of Tien's statement, however,
the account reports none of Thuy's remarks on specific points in
the PRG proposal. VNA also fails to acknowledge his remarks on
support for Laos and Cambodia, including his quotation from Pham
Van Dong's 2 September National Day speech.
SIHANOUK IMPUTES REMARKS ON DRV PRESENCE TO "FALSE" RADIO
NCNA on 7 September carried a statement by Sihanouk's private
secretariat, dated the 3d, which refutes "lies" told by Phnom
Penh Chief of State Cheng Heng on 28 A'agust to Vice President
Agnew regarding the "invasion by Vietnamese communists." The
secretariat repudiates this charge by citing reports from various
Western correspondents who have been released by the FUNK which
stress that the fighting F,gainst the Lon Nol regime is being
carried on by "Cambodian patriots."
On 8 September NCNA carried a statement by the RGNU which
repudiates "despicable rumors fabricated by the CIA" about a
"so -called appeal" by Sihanouk concerning the "so-called
intervention by 'North Vietamese' troops in Cambodia." (The
RGNU statement says that AFP dispatches from Phnom Penh
carried the purported Sihanouk remarks, but it obscures the
fact that AFP--and other news agencies --quoted the Cambodian
High Command as claiming on 7 September that the prince's
purported remarks were broadcast over the FUNK radio on
28 August.) The RGNU statement goes on to say that the so-called
"Sihanouk appeal" was made over a "false" radio station purporting
to be the Voice of FUNK but in fact set up several weeks ago by
the CIA in an effort to "split the solidarity of the Indochinese
people," "create confusion in the minds of our friends," and
"sow discord among the members of the front of anti-imperialist
struggle." The FUNK radio carried the RGNU statement on the 10th,
and VNA summarized 4t on the same day.
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The Hanoi domestic service on the 8th carried a commentary
attributed to the FUNK radio which denounces the "false" radio
for alleging that Sihanouk "intends to turn Cambodia into a
communist country having close relations with other communist
countries in Asia." It also scores the VOA., BBC, and Saigon
radio stations for reporting that the military spokesman of the
Lon Nol government claimed that Sihanouk said North Vietnamese
troops are present in Cambodia. The commentary says the "false"
radio station was established in an attempt to uistort the
line of the FUNK, to sow dissension between Sihanouk and the
Khmer people and between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples, and
to deceive world opinion during the Lusaka conference of
nonalined nations. The FUNK radio and Liberation Radio carried
the commentary on the 9th.
On 9 September a Hanoi domestic service broadcast commented in
a similar vein on its own authority, scoring the "slander" of
the "fake" radio. The commentary notes that the statement
attributed to Sihanouk acknowledged that North Vietnamese
troops fighting in Cambodia had "ransacked pagodas and pillaged
the Khmer people" but called on the Khmer people to have a
tolerant attitude. Hanoi cites UPI as reporting that U.S.
officials in Phnom Penh "did not question the accuracy" of a
document on the alleged statement handed to newsmen by the "Lon
Nol clique," and it notes a REUTERS comment that the release of
the report was timed to coincide with the Lusaka conference.
RGNU PROTESTS TO PRAGUE; DIPLOMAT LEAVES EMBASSY FOR PRC
The RGNU continues to air complaints about Prague's attitude.
An official protest dated 2 September, carried by NCNA on the
4th, decries the Czechoslovak Government's measures, "counter
to international law," against the diplomat who seized the
Cambodian embassy on behalf of the FUNK last month. The RGNU
statement says that the Prague authorities "wrongly" termed the
seizure an illegal occupation and that since the Czechoslovak
Government has not recognized de jure the Phnom Pexih government,
the measures taken against the Cambodian embassy constitute
"interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia." It
complains that messages from Sihanouk to President Svoboda and
from Prime Minister Penn Nouth to his Prague counterpart asking
for an end to the "inhuman measures" against the embassy were
never answered, and it adds that the RGNU also asked the embassy
in Peking of "a country friendly to both parties" to intervene,
to no avail.
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The RUNU statement acknowledges that the diplomat subsequently
evacuated the embassy. It declares that although the Czechoslovak
Government has not declared him persona non grata and has not
taken measures to expel the students who took part in the
seizure, the FUNK and RGNU consider their presence on Czechoslovak
territory "undesirable" and have asked "friendly embassies to aid
and, if necessary, to grant them the right of exile at their
request."
NCNA reported on 9 September that the Cambodian.diplomat
arrived that day.in Peking, where he was welcomed by members
of Sihanouk's government and by PRC officials. Peking had
supported the RGNU statement with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article, carried by NCNA on 5 September, which said that although
the Czechoslovak Government has verbally expressed support for
the Cambodian people's struggle, its actions oblige the "so-called
ambassador of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique" and slander the
"patriotic" diplomat. Commentator asked rhetorically if it is.not
"perfectly clear" on which side the Czechoslovak Government stands--
on the side of the Cambodian people or on the side of U.S.
imperialism and its lackeys.
VIETNAPIESE, CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATIVES AT NONALINED CONFERENCE
THE RGNU NCNA reports that the "delegation" of Sihanouk's
RGNU, headed by Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak,
arrived in Lusaka, Zambia on 2 September for the nonalined
conference. The first explicit acknowledgment of controversy
over the seating of this delegation comes in a 4 September NCNA
report of a statement by a spokesman of the RGNU, dated 31 August,
which refutes "slander" by "Malayan" deputy prime minister Abdul
Razak concerning "the admission to the conference" in Lusaka
of an RGNU representative. The statement once again denounces
Razak's contention that the RGNU controls no territory, repeating
claims that more than two-thirds of Cambodian territory are
governed by three RGNU ministers who are in the "liberated areas."
A similar statement, dated the 29th and carried by NCNA on the
3lst, had denounced such "slanders" by Indonesia and "Malaya"
but had not specifically mentioned the Lusaka conference.
On 9 September VNA summarized an "open letter" from Sihanouk
to heads of state of nonalined countries "on the occasion of"
the Lusaka conference. The content, as briefly summarized by
VNA, is like that of Sihanouk's lengthy "open letter" which
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;TCNA had carried from 9 to 14 August. It argued the case for
ti..,- illegality of the Lon Not regime and the legitimacy of the
RGNL 'hut did not explicitly mention the Lusaka conference.
THE PRG NCNA reports the arrival in Lusaka, Zambia of
Le Quang Chanh, special envoj and deputy foreign
minister of the PRG, and of PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh
on 5 and 7 September, respectively.* The reports fail to mention
a "delegation," merely noting that both individuals arrived "to
attend" the conference. There is no acknowledgment so far from
either Peking or Liberation media of the reported agreement at
the conference to accord the PEG "observer" status.
LPA DENIES ATTACK ON ORPHANAGE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Reacti.g to Western press reports that communist forces attacked
an orphanage in Quang Nam Province on 30 August, killing a number
of children, LPA on 3 September issued an authorized statement
that "completely rejects this brazen, familiar, slanderous
argument of the U.S.-puppet clique." The LPA statement does not
take note of Western reports, instead asserting that Saigon
Radio on 30 August had reported the incident as away of coping
with the increased wave of public condemnations against the GVN's
"crimes"--especially at Con Son prison. (The last LPA authorized
statement, on 10 July, similarly denied a Saigon report that the
PLAF near Pleiku had killed a clergyman and six children.)
HANOI OBSERVES ANNIVERSARY OF HO CHI MINH'S DEATH
The first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death on 3 September 1969
was observed with a wreath-laying ceremony in Hanoi.** According
to Hanoi radio, the ceremony was attended by the same top leaders
who were present at the 31 August meeting marking DRV National
Day--all the regular members of the VWP Politburo except Pham Hung
Mme. Binh's activities were not reported following her latL:
July visit to India and Ceylon. On 3 September TASS reported that
she had stopped in Moscow from 29 August to 3 September en route
to Dar Es Salaam, and communist media reported her it September
arrival in Tanzania for what TASS called a "private" visit.
** The communique on observance of Ho's death anniversary is
covered in the TRENDS of 26 August, page 13.
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and alternate Politburo member Tran Quoc Hoan, but not Van
Tien Dung.* NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the
3d, as broadcast by Hanoi radio that day, paid tribute to.Ho
and urged that the teachings in his testament be implemented,
with NHAN DAN recalling the Politburo's 29 September 1969
instructions on study of the testament.
Hanoi radio on the 3d also reported the preceding day's
opening of a pictorial exhibit of models of Ho's future tomb,
which it says the party and government decided to build "in
order to fully preserve his corpse for a long time." Hanoi
notes that those present at the opening included Truong Chinh,
Vice President Nguyen Luong Bang, Hoang Van Hoan, and Tran
Quoc Hoan. The broadcast states that the people's comments
on the models will be welcomed, and it quotes Minister of
Architecture Bui Quang Tao as saying that the exhibit will
tour other parts of the DRV before the final design is selected.
MOSCOW ATTACKS PRC ON HO ANNIVERSARY; PEKING COMMENT MINIM L
MOSCOW Moscow marked the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's
death with publicity for a meeting in the capital
sponsored by the USSR-Vietnam Friendship Society and routine-level
propaganda. A brief domestic service report of the meeting on
3 September says speakers praised Ho as a staunch Marxist-Leninist
and a "true friend of our party and our country." Commentaries
similarly laud Ho's revolutionary example and his friendship for
the USSR.
A Radio Peace and Progress commentary broadcast in Mandarin on
3 September recalls that Ho's testament called for socialist
unity and grieved over the "current dissonances among the various
fraternal parties.'.' In this context the commentary recalls
Soviet aid to the Vietnamese and attacks Chinese "splittist
activities" aimed at "sabotaging" Soviet-Vietnamese ties. It
complains that Peking used the forum of the mass rally on the
DRV's 25th anniversary to attack the USSR, "the best friend"
of the DRV. This commentary makes no specific reference to
Li Hsien-nion's speech when it labels Peking's attack disrespect
for the internationalist revolutionary principles to which.Ho
dedicated his life. But another Radio Peace and Progress talk in
* See the TRENDS of 2 September, pages 1-2.
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Mandarin on the same day, pegged to the DRV anniversary,
expressed "indignation" over Li's attack on the "loyal
friend and ally" of the DRV, calling it a "horrible act of
blasphemy."*
Earlier comment on the DRV anniversary also scored the Chinese,
with a Mandarin-language broadcast on the 2d repeating the
charge that the United States was encouraged in carrying out
aggression by the Chinese policy of refusing united action with
the other socialist countries to repulse aggression. A Radio
Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin on the same day
reviewed Soviet aid to the DRV and scored the Chinese for
rejecting the call by the USSR and other socialist countries
to form a united front to support Vietnam. It claimed chat
the PRC is intensifying splitting activities, attacking the
USSR and. other socialist countries; and for the first time in
Soviet media sine June it repeated the charge that the
Chinese authorities have even "detained military materials sent
from the Soviet Union to the DRV through China."
PEKING Peking carries accu.mt:, of Hanoi's commemoration of
the anniversary of Ho's death and reports that the
PRC ambassador laid a wreath before the shrine of Ho in the Ba
Dinh meeting hall in Hanoi. There is no indication of any
ceremony in Peking. The only Chinese comment is a report by PRC
correspondents on a "recent" visit to ?io's native province, Nghe
An, in which they praise the military and economic achievements
of the people in response to Ho's teachings.
LAOS: SOUPHANOWONG-SOUVANNA PHOUMA MESSAGES CONTINUE
Pathet Lao media report that on 1 September Souphanouvong's
emissary, Tiao Souk Vongsak, delivered a 30 August message
calling on Souvanna Phouma to appoint a plenipotentiary and keep
to his 25 June proposal that the representatives of the two
princes meet in Khang Khay. Souphanouvong's message states that
he has appointed Gen. Phoune Sipraseuth as his plenipotentiary.**
* In his rally speech Li Hsien-nien repeated the charge that
"social. imperialism" and U.S. imperialism are "colluding,"
specifically to promote a "so-called peace settlement" in the
Middle East and Indochina.
** The Patriotic Neutralist Radio on 1 September had reported
that this appointment was made as an outcome of Souphanouvong's
talks with Soth Pethrasi, the NLHS permanent representative in
Vientiane, who had returned to Sam Neua to report.
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The media, also publicize a 1 September message from 5ouk.Vorgsak
rejecting a 29 August proposal by Souvanna Piiouma that during
the latter's trip abroad Souk meet with a Souvanna plenipotentiary
in Vientiane. Souk explained that he is not a plenipotentiary
but only a special envoy and that Souvanna's suggestion would
mean abandoning the projected meeting of plenipotentiaries in
Khang Khay.
Pathet Lao media have not been heard to mention that Souk did
in fact meet with Souvanna Phouma's plenipoiCcubiary on the 8th.
According to the Vientiane domestic service on the 9th, Souk
went to the plenipotentiary's residence during nonworking hours,
not wishing to recognize his official status in the Vientiane
government by meeting him at his office.
On 7 September the Pathet Lao news agency carried an interview
with Souphanouvong's plenipotentiary Gen. Phoune Sipraseuth who,
among other things, rejects a suggestion by Souvanna Phouma that
Souphanouvong come to Parr to meet him. Phoune calls this
merely another effort to postpone talks between plenipotentiaries.
A "press communique" by Tiao Souk Vongsaks. dated the 7th, carried
by Pathet Lao radio on the 10th, comments on a meeting in
Paris between the two princes without flatly rejecting the
idea. Souk reviews the NLHS ccir.jlaints that Souvanna Phouma
has gone back on his suggestion of a meeting of plenipotentiaries
in Khang Kbay and has appointed a "government delegation" for
talks, and he notes that Souvanna Phouma has suggested a meeting
in Paris. Souk says he has reported the "above problems" to
Souphanouvong and is awaiting instructions, expressing the
belief that Soth Pethrasy will soon return to Vientiane with
Souphanouvong's views.
In his interview reported on the 7th, Phoune Sipraseuth also
notes that during exchanges of views Souvanna Phouma's.side
had "threateningly hinted" that the NLHS participation in the
Indochinese people's conference is a violation of the 1962 Geneva
agreement. Calling this "slander," he says that the conference
is not a military alliance but merely an effort of the three
peoples to gain their fundamental national rights and safeguard
the principles of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements.
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MIDDLE EAST
Moscow continues to portray Israel, particularly "extremists"
such as Defense Minister Dayan, as responsible for "sabotaging"
the Arab-Israeli talks under Jarring. Accusations of UAR cea.3e-
fire violations are again rejected as part of Israel's attempt
to put the blame on the Arabs for failure of the talks, to obtain--
mid justify--new U.S. arms deliveries, and ultimately to retain
occupied Arab territory. Moscow poiui,s to a "UAR Government
memorandum" to the United States--not made public by Cairo--as
contending that all the missiles on the western bank of the Suez
Canal were installed befove the cease-fire began.
While Moscow is critical of reported U.S. arms deliveries to
Israel and says the United States bears "grave responsibilities,"
propagandists are in general relatively restrained in dealing with
the U.S. role. At the same time, Moscow depicts the Arabs as
behaving "calmly," insists that Cairo is committed to a search
for a peaceful solution, and pointedly reports meetings of Egypt's
UN representative Dr. az-Zayyat with Jarring to demonstrate the
UAR's adherence to efforts for a peaceful settlement.
Commentators continue to echo Brezhnei's call, in his 28 August
Alma-Ata speech, for honest compliance with the cease-fire agree-
ment and real steps toward peace; PRAVDA's Belyayev in a It September
domestic service commentary urges that no time be lost, but that
"constructive proposals" be made toward a political settlement.
U.S. STATEMENT ON CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS, ISRAELI STAND NOTED
In Moscow's first reference to the 3 September State Department state-
ment which confirmed "violations of the cease-fire standstill agree-
ment," TASS on the 4th recalled that American officials "stated more
than once that they had no data which would confirm the Israeli alle-
gations," but Washington "resolved to meet the Tel Aviv ultras half-
way." strengthening tLi.ierican support for the "ultras," TASS added,
is borne out by the recent U.S. decision on more arms deliveries to
Israel. TASS did not mention that the statement said the United
States is continuing to watch the balance and has no intention of
permitting Israel's security to be adversely affected. Predictably,
Moscow has not acknowledged that the violations were to be taken up
with the USSR, but it has reported U.S.-Egyptian contacts in Cairo
on the matter. While the brief TASS report does not take the
occasion to spell out the nature of the violations, and propagandists
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10 SEPTEMBER 1970
do not on each occasion detail the charges, Moscow has freely ac-
knowledged that the Tel Aviv "fabrications" entail the UAR's in-
stallation of new antiaircraft missiles in the Suez Canal. zone.
The statement's reference to the importance of continuing the
talks under Jarring was mentioned by Mikhailov in the 6 September
PRAVDA. Mikhailov observed that the State Department "has yielded
to Tel Aviv's solicitations and 'confirried' these provocative
Israeli fabrications." It is true, he conceded, that the State
Department spokesman said at the same time that the United States
considers it of primary importance that the talks in New York
should be continued immediatt;ly, but as soon as Tel Aviv received
"its indulgence," reports from Israel said it would not participate
in the talks until the question of violations was settled.
Propagandists, in assessing the U.S. action in issuing the state-
ment confirming violations, seem cautious in reproaching
Washington for a move which they say con only give support to
Israeli "extremist circles" and "obstructionist policies." Some
commentators present the United States as being "led on" by
Israel, others portray a U.S.-Israeli "game" wherein the two
seemingly had differences until Washington "followed Tel Aviv's
wishes" and came out in open support of Israel. An Arabic-language
commentary on the 7th accuses the United States of "helping its
stooge cover up its crimes," and complains that if Washington
sincerely desires to rectify these "crimes" it should have used
all its influence so Israel could not have opposed a settlement.
Ryzhikov in a domestic service commentary on the 9th cited the
Egyptian press and radio as saying the next move must be made by
the United States, and will show the seriousness of its peaceful
initiatives.
ISRAELI STATEMENT Moscow's domestic service on the 7th carried
ON JARRING TALKS the first Soviet, report on the Israeli state-
ment of the 6th announcing that Israel will
not participate in the Jarring talks "as long as the cease-fire
agreement and the standstill are not fully observed and while the
situation is not returned to what it was previously." Ignoring
the second condition, Moscow said Israel is refusing to take part
in the Jarring consultations until its accusations against Egypt
of cease-fire violations "are accepted," and it pointed out that the
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10 SE!-i'EM13ER 19'(0
accusations have been "resolutely repudiated by the UAII." The
report cited Cairo radio as calling the decision another step
to thwart Jarring's mission, and as placing responsibility for
the decision on the United States, since Israel "is sure of
Washington's unconditional support."
In an Arabic-language broadcast later on the 7th, Moscow indicated
further :Israeli conditions but still failed to spell them out,
citing Israeli Prime Minister Meir as calling for acceptance of
Israel's conditions, "one of which" is to admit that Egypt
violated the cease-fire agreement. `PASS on the 8th, in reporting
that Israel's UN representative Tekoah nad informed Jarring that
Israel is "abandoning" the talks, called the step a logical con-
clusion of Israel's tactic of procrastination aimed at wrecking
a peaceful solution of the conflict. Other comment subsequent to
the Israeli decision has described it in similar terms. Ryzhikov
in a domestic service commentary on the 7th, noting that a White
House spokesman said President Nixon had expressed profound regret
in connection with the delay signified by the Israeli de-.sion,
claimed that such U.S. Government regrets "savor strongly of
hypocrisy."
RECTIFICATION Moscow hab apparently failed to acknowledge the
OF VIOLATIONS statement by State Department spokesman McCloskey
on It September that the United States is "seeking
rectification" of the violations of the military standstill.. But
domestic service commentator Ryzhikov, in his broadcast on the 7th,
observed in regard to the return of Israel's UN representative to
New York 'that Tekoah "brings with him the ultimatum decision" of
the Israeli cabinet "not to take part in preparatory talks until
Egypt dismantles its antiaircraft defense system on the west bank
of the Suez canal." In a domestic service commentary the following
da,- Ryzhikov again made a reference to the issue of removal of the
missiles in assailing an Israeli "ultimatum" attributed to Defense
Minister Dayan. Judging from Tel Aviv press reports, Ryzhikov
said, Dayan's "ultimatum" is formulated as a plan for the total
demilitarization of a 60-kilometer zone on both sides of the Suez
Canal. But in fact, Ryzhikov said, "it is the same absolutely
unjustified demand" that Cairo "dismantle the whole system of
Egyptian antiaircraft defense on the western bank of the canal."
Dayan, he added, intends to confront the Egyptians with a simple
choice: "either take away the ack-ack missiles or regard any
agreement on a cease-fire as nonexistent."
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MOSCOW PUBLICIZES UAR REFUTATION OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS
PASS on' the 5th cited the Ciro AL-AIIRAM for the retort that UAR
Foreign Minister Riyad had told Donald 13ergus, head of the U.S.
interests section at the Spanish Embassy in Cairo, that th e
accusations of UAR violations of the cease-fire agreement were
"'absolutely groundless' and 'far from the true state of
affairs.'" Both 'PASS and an Arabic-language broadcast on
the 5th noted that Riyad said the United States did not
mention Israel's "numerous violations" of the cease-fire agree-
ment, and that he drew the U.S. Government's attention to the
fact that it itself violates the agreement by supplying Israel
with Phantoms while the agreement is in force. (TASS on the
9th picked up without comment a report in the Washington POST
that day that the United States has agreed to sell Israel 16
to 18 more Phantoms. And on the '0th it reported from Cairo that
UAR official circles stressed the?; the U.S. actions "contravene
the commitments which the United States assumed" by supporting
the contacts through Jarring. Cairo radio on the 9th had
reported a statement by a UAR official source declaring that
the United States had "categorically pledged that it would
refrain from giving Israel more planes" during the cease-fire
period.)
UAR MEMORANDUM On the j th TASS and Moscow's Arabic service
reported a UAR Foreign Ministry memorandum
which, according to the Arabic-language broadcast, had been sent
to the State Department "a few days ago and was announced in
Cairo today." Curiously, the memorandum has not been carried in
monitored Cairo media; Moscow normally follows Cairo's lead in
reporting Egyptian statements or developments first made public
by the UAR.
The broadcast in Arabic said that the memorandum declares that all
the missiles on the western bank of the Suez Canal "were installed
before 8 August" and that "at present, only measures to consolidate
the security of the missile sites and the troops are taking place
there." Both accounts reported the memorandum as saying that
Israel is the violator of the cease-fire agreement by restoring
and strengthening the Bar-Lev line, TASS additionally noting
that the UAR drew U.S. attention to recent deliveries of large
quantities of U.S. "offensive weapons" to Israel. TASS quoted the
memorandum as stressing that "Egypt did. not bring new missile
launchers into the Suez Canal zone after the temporary cease-fire
agreement came into force," and that the UAR will continue to
observe the agreement.
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Gub:aqu'.nt continent also points to the "UAR Government memoranda m"
as refuting Israeli allegations. A Tsoppi conunentary in foreign-'
language broadcasts on the 7t?h not-d that the memorandum was
"announced today" and a talk by the same commentator in the
Arabic service on the 8th reiterated that the Egyptian antiaircraft
defense remained "where. it was on 8 August, from where it shot
down raiding Israeli Phantoms and Skyhawks." (Moscow had earlier
cited President Nasir's statement to a World Peace Council
delegation on 30 August that the missiles were in the Suez.Cana.l
zone before the cease-fire agreement came nto force, and that
it was these batteries which shot down Israeli Phantoms.)
A Swnilovskiy foreign-language commentary on the 9th, also
referring to the UAR memorandum, says that the UAR is determined
to insist on a peaceful settlement; an Arabic-language commentary
the same day, however, points out that Cairo cannot disregard
statements by Israeli ministers that Israel must be prepared for
war, as if no cease-fire exists. While also declaring that the
PAR is determined to secure a peaceful solution, the broadcast
says Egypt is also fully determined to "repel the aggressors" if
they commit new armed aggression.*
USSR CITES CAIRO PRESS DISAPPROVAL OF PALESTINIAN HIJACKINGS
The first reference in Soviet media to the Palestinian hijackings
of TWA, Pan American, and Swiss aircraft on 6 September came
belatedly on 9 September in the Moscow domestic service at 1500 GMT,
shortly followed by a TASS Russian-language dispatch and a Moscow
Arabic-language broadcast. TI'::re is no mention of the abortive
hijacking of an El Al airliner on the 6ti:, or the hijacking of
a BOAC plane a few hours prior to the Moscow reports.
According to U.S. press reports, the 9 September RED STAR, not
yet available here, cited the memorandum as saying that the
Egyptian side has the full right to carry out a redeployment of
missiles already in the Suez Cana] zone to avoid a surprise attack
on them from the Israeli side. (The cease-fire agreement says
that activities in the cease-fire zone "will be limited to the
maintenance of existing installations in their present area and
positions and to the rotation and supply of forces now in these
regions.")
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The initial domestic service report says merely that many foreign
agency reports are devoted to the seizure of the three aircraft
by Palestinian guerrillas. It cites AFP .s carrying e, statement
by the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), George Habbash, saying that his organization takes respon-
sibility for the hijacking in reply to the "criminal conspiracy
aimed at the liquidation of the rights of the Palestinian people."
Implicitly conveying Soviet disapproval, all three Soviet reports
cite the Cairo AL-AKIIBAH as criticizing the actions of the
fedayeen and declaring that such acts damage the Arabs in the
eyes of world public opinion. The TASS and Arabic-language items
further quote AL-AKHBAR to the effect that no one, regardless of
nationality, believes that such dangerous acts against means of
transportation linking the capitals of various countries fall
within the program of the revolutionary liberation movements.
The TASS item, datelined Cairo, cites the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
(MENA) as reporting that Cairo is investigating "an explosion"
aboard the PanAm 747 at Cairo airport which "was seized while
airborne by several Palestinian guerrillas." TASS adds that on
the same day Palestine guerrillas seized TWA and Swissair planes
which later "landed on Jordanian territory." The item says that
a PFLP 6tatement published in Cairo says the passengers on the
planes which landed in Jordan will not be released until "three
Palestinian guerrillas confined in Switzerland for an attack last
year on an Israeli airline plane at Zurich airport are set free."
Moscow's belated acknowledgment of the hijackings may have been
prompted by the Security Council adoption on the 9th of a "consensus "
appealing to all parties concerned for immediate release of
passengers and crews without exception, held as a result of "hijack-
ings and other interference in international travel," and calling
on states to take all possible legal steps to prevent "further
hijackings or any other interference with international civil air
travel." TASS on the 10th, in reporting the Council decision
which was "passed without discussion and voting," makes no men-
tion of the circumstances or the reasons for the decision.
* Arab sources have attributed PFLP statements on the hijacking
to unnamed spokesmen and representatives. Habbash himself arrived
in Pyongyang on 2 September for a visit to the DPRK, according to
KCNA that day; his delegation's activities on the 4th and 5th were
summed up by KCNA on the 7th.
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BACKGROUND Moscow's delayed and obscured reports on the hijackings
are consistent with its treatment of similar incidents
in the past which elicited equally reluctant, reserved, and implicitly
disapproving comment, if acknowledged at all. The December 1968
Palestinian attack on an El Al aircraft at Athens airport was given
somewhat more attention than other incidents have received, in
that it was followed two days later by Israel's retaliatory
destruction of civilian aircraft at Beirut airport, and this action
was debated in the Security Council. The propaganda dismissed
Israeli arguments that the Beirut action represented a reply to
the Athens incident, and commentators obF,cured the Palestinians'
affiliation with a fedayeen organization.
The incidents of the Swissair crash and the explosion aboard an
Austrian airliner on 21 February this year also were given more
notice by Moscow than other incidents; in this case, Soviet
propaganda stressed Palestinian and Arab denials of responsibility
and thus was able to come to the defense of Palestinian
resistance organizations, at the same time pointedly confining
its support to fedayeen operations on "occupied Arab territory."
The initial Palestinian hijacking, of an El Al aircraft from
Rome to Algiers in July 1968, was promptly reported by TASS, but
Moscow ignored subsequent developments. Other actions, such as
the August 1969 hijacking of a TWA plane to Damascus and various
incidents involving El Al offices abroad, are not known to have
been acknowledged by Moscow.
MOSCOW'S EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES DEPLORE HIJACKINGS
Qualified by professions of sympathy for the Palestinian Arab
cause, comment uniformly critical of the guerrilla hijackings
has appeared in the media of the Soviet-oriented East European
allies. Bucharest media, fol!Dwing Romania's independent and
traditionally cautious line on the Middle East, have limited
themselves so far to carrying factual accounts of the hijackings,
emphasizing reports of the diplomatic efforts to obtain release
of the passengers. Extensive news coverage in Belgrade media
has been accompanied by sparse comment critical of the hijackers.
Tirana has not been heard to mention the hijackings so far.
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SOVIET ALLIES In the most critical treatment of the guerrillas
to date, the Czechoslovak news agency CTK
commented on 7 September that the hijacking of four passenger
planeE; by the fighters of "the so-called Popular Front for the
Libere.tion of Palestine" is "according to all international law
an act, of terrorism." CTK added that "it is difficult to imagine
how these acts could ameliorate the fate of millions of Palestinian
Arabr; quite definitely, they have nothing in common with politics."
Stating that there can be "no other than a negative response in
the world to sit-4 actions," the agency warned that "American public
opi.ninn's 'nfluence on the formulation of Nixon's stand at this
delicate stage of the [Jarring] talks should not be underestimated."
The commentary appeared in Loth the European and African services
of the Prague radio, and portions of it--including the passages
branding the hijackings an act of terrorism--were carried in the
Czechoslovak central press.
The East Berlin radio picked up CTK's commentary in arguing on
9 September tt-.at the hijackings. coupled with the destruction of
aircraft and threats to the lives of the passengers, "do not
benefit the just cause of the Palestinian guerrillas but harm
it considerably." It added: "On this many papers in the Arab
wor'__' and commentaries of the socialist camp today agree; CTK
says it is difficult to see how these acts can help improve the
fate of millions of Palestinian Arabs."
Warsaw's ZYCIE WARSZAWY, as quoted by the Polish news agency PAP
on the 10th, expressed understanding of some of the guerrillas'
motivations and noted that two Algerians had been taken off a
transit flight in Tel Aviv, but commented that "despite all that,
no one can recognize she Palestinian partisans' right to exert
pressure by means of threatening the lies of innocent travelers."
And Budapest's MTI, in a commentary on the 9th described as
"issued by the central press servi^e," called the hijackings
"immensely harmful tr the Arr:a cause, including the international
forces which support Palestinian liberation." By actions that
divert attention from their cause, MTI added, the guerrillas
"are doing a great service to Israel and its backers."
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Radio Sofia on 9 September noued briefly that a British plane
had been hijacked by the "Palestinian partisans to put pressure
on the British Government so that Leila Khaled might be
released." On the same day the radio carried a one-sentence
report from Cairo noting that "AL-AHRAM condemns the hijacking
of passenger aircraft by .he Palestinian partisans." No
original Bulgarian comment is available.
BELGRADE Extensive news coverage in Belgrade media includes
pickups of UAR press comment critical of the
commando actions, but original Yugoslav comment is sparse.
While blaming Israel for the absence of a Middle East settlement
in his remarks at the Lusaka nonalined conference, Tito mentioned
neither the guerrillas nor the hijackings. A Radio Belgrade
talk on the 7th, the only one to pass judgment on the guerrilla
actions, remarked that the hijackings would only add grist to
the Israeli propaganda mill and deflect attention from Israel's
rejection of a peace settlement.
Noting a Washington report that the Unit(d States has dispatched
six transport planes to Turkey to stand by in case the hostages
are released by the guerrillas, Radio Belgrade on 9 September
questioned "whether the U.S. Government will conclude that the
internationa' atmosphere and the situation in the inter-Arab
relations enable it to interfere directly in a military way in
the increasingly confused situation in Jordan with the excuse
that its own citizens are threatened and must be saved."
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S I CVO-SOV I E T RELATIONS
The communique on the CCP plenum ending 6 September contains the
first direct attack on Moscow on an authoritative level since
Pek g!:._22. APril. ~.oint citorial on_the__Lenin .centenary. The
communique does not, however, signal a renewal of an all-out
polemical campaign against the Soviets. On the whole, Peking
has sustained its partial propaganda standdown toward the
Soviets while seeking common ground with a variety of countries
and groups in opposition to the interests of the superpowers.
The communique registers Peking's resurgent diplomatic activity
in declaring that the PRC's foreign relations "are daily developing"
land that it has "friends all over the world,"
After playing up foreign reaction to Brezh:iev's conciliatory
remarks in his 28 August Alma-Ata speech, Soviet central media
have again fallen silent on China. However, the Soviets have
not abated their polemical pressure on Peking in their broadcasts
to the Chinese in the wake of the Brezhnev speech. While
avoiding direct attacks on Mao, Moscow has used this channel
to respond to anti-Soviet thrusts in Peking's treatment of the
DRV's national day and the 25th anniversary of V-J Day.
PEKING SCORES SOVIET POLICIES, PROMOTES ASIAN "UNITED FRONT"
The CCP plenum communique, dated 6 September and released on the
9th, praises the Albanian party and unnamed "other genuine
Marxist-Leninist" organizations for their struggle against
"modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its center"--
a reference that is little more than a ritualistic gesture, in
such a party document, to the enduring ideological conflict.
Otherwise, the communique reflects the polemical restraint
shown in recent months by referring to "social imperialism"
(without naming the Soviets, a measure of Peking's effort to
keep tensions at a low level. In taking note of the PRC's
revived diplomatic activity, the communique reaffirms the
country's fealty to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.
Previous authoritative statements have called for relations with
the United States and the Soviet Union to be based on these
principles.*
* Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial, which contained
slashing anti-Soviet attacks, qualified an endorsement of
peaceful coexistence with a warning that the Chinese could
not tolerate "invasion and occupation" of their territory by
"imperialism or social im e i "
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The plenum communique records prominent themes in recent Chinese
propaganda, citing Mao's 20 May statement as a programmatic
document and referring to the Indochina-conflict, "Japanese
militarism," and persisting "armed struggle" in the Middle East.
During the period of the plenum, which began on 2311s,
Peking made use of these issues to press its case against
Moscow and to play up its own role in promoting Asian unity.
While avoiding last year's direct attacks on Moscow, the
Chinese took advantage of the DRV anniversary to accuse the
Soviets of collaborating with the United States in seeking
peaceful settlements in Indochina and the Middle East. In
the harshest anti-Soviet remarks, Li Hsien-nien told a rally
on 2 September that the United States and its "accomplice"--
"jackals of the same lair"--were "contriving Munich plots"
in these areas and were reviving "Japanese militarism" and
"West German revanchism," The reference to West Germany hints
at a rebuke to the soviets for con,::- uding the treaty with the
FRG, a subject on which Peking has abstained from direct comment.
The 25th anniversary of the defeat of Japan has provided another
occasion for anti-Soviet thrusts. A joint PEOPLE'S DAILY/
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on 3 September accused the
"social imperialists" of flirting with a revived Japanese
militarism and seeking to enlist it in an Asian collective
security system against China. Recent Soviet comment on
Japan has included several references to Asian collective
security, a subject which had been dormant rafter being a
source of sharp polemical exchanges in mid-1969. Counter-
posing a call for an Asian "united front" extending from
"Korea to Indochina and from East Asia to West Asia," the
editorial played a theme which at once accents Peking's
diplomatic initiatives in recent months and implicitly
rejects Soviet influence in these areas.
Peking has sought to exploit the theme of Asian unity to
emerge from its isolation while carrying on its competition
with Moscow for influence in the communist and revolutionary
movements. Chou En-lai's visit to North Korea in early
April signalled a major campaign to associate Peking's
interests with those of Pyongyang and the anti-U.S. forces
in Indochina; after the U.S. incursion into Cambodia this
campaign was given a further impetus. The keynote of the
campaign was sounded in the title of Peking's major joint
editorial on the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the
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Korean War on 25 June, "People of Asia, Unite and Drive the
U.S. Aggressors Out of Asia." The anti-Soviet dimension of
tho campaign was reflected in the editorial's statement that
"at a time when the people of Asian countries are xitrengthening
their unity . . . there are certain persons" collaborating with
the United States, fraternizing with Japanese rea'-,tionaries, "and
even maintaining dirty relations with Lon Nol and his like."
The editorial introduced a claim that an anti-U.S. "united front"
was rapidly developing in Asia.
During this period the Chinese publicized a statement by North
Korea's Kim Il-song calling for an Asian united front including
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnem, China, and Korea. Huang Yung-sheng,
heading a PRC delegation in the DPRK to mark the Korean War
anniversary, quoted Kim's appeal in one speech and made a
similar pitch in subsequent speeches during his visit, taking
special note of the presence of "the anti-imperialist comrades-
in-arms from six parties of five countries" and naming the
same five countries. Peking sometimes specifies these countries
as composing the "united front," while at other times--as in the
quotation from the V-J Day editorial--it defines the term more
broadly.
MOSCOW'S BROADCASTS TO CHINA RESPOND TO ANTI-SOVIET COMMENT
Brezhnev's 28 August speech in Alma-Ata stands as the authoritative
exposition of current Soviet foreign policy. According to Soviet
reports, he delivered other speeches during his Central Asian
tour, but the substance of his comments on foreign affairs has not
been published, Soviet media followed up the Alma-Ata speech by
citing foreign reaction chosen to underscore the conciliatory
element: in Brezhnev's remarks on China. Moscow has not
originated any additional comment in its central media.
The Soviets have continued to use their broadcasts to the Chinese
to sustain their side of the polemical crossfire. Peking's
implicit anti-Soviet attacks on the occasion of the DRV and V-J
Day anniversaries have drawn sharp retorts from Moscow, which
has rebuked Peking for seeking to sow discord between the Soviet
Union and North Vietnam and for perniciously ignoring the Soviet
role in the defeat of Japan and in the Chinese communist revolution.
One comm' -tary, a M- --.dari.n broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress
on 3 September, invoked the appeal in Ho Chi Minh's testament for
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an end to fraternal strife in scolding Peking for its anti-
Soviet attacks on DRV national day. Another commentary,
broadcast by Radio Moscow in Mandarin on the same day, blamed
the Chinese for failing to contribute to the normalization of
Sino?.Soviet relations and cited Brezhnev's appeal at Alma-Ata
for an improvement of relations. The Soviets are remaining
silent about the Peking talks, however.
A commentary ?.n Mandarin on the 4th lectured the Chinese on the
folly of their doctrine of self-reliance in military affairs
and on the decisive advantages of being a part of the socialist
camp. The commentary underscored this point by observii,g that
the "socialist community" is safeguarded by Soviet nuclear-
missile power and that Peking's doctrine that a weak country
can defeat a strong one--an allusion to Mao's 20 May statement--
is absurd in. the nuclear age.
A Peace and Progress broadcast on the 4th expressed indignation
over Peking's refusal to permit Soviet embasrry officials to visit
monuments in provincial cities dedicated to Soviet soldiers
killed in World War II. In the previous three years this had
been reported in the central media. By now confining its
polemics to broadcasts to the Chinese, Moscow evidently seeks
to minimize any detraction from its stance as a willing partner
in negotiations while at the same time conveying to the Chinese
its displeasure over their failure to reach an accommodation
and their persisting efforts to undercut Soviet policies in a
variety of areas.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 SEPTEMBER 1970
- 23 -
LUSAKA CONFERENCE
Thu PRESSES C:'-SE FOR NONALINEMENT. RESTATES STOCK POSITIONS
In an effort to pump life into the "lagging nonalined movement,
President Tito told the Lusaka summit on 8 September that
nonalinement--"whether the protagonists of force and domination,
like it or not"--is a policy favored by the majority of mankind
and represents "the only possible way to set the world on a
new democratic road." As reported by Radio Zagreb, he defined
"the essence" of nonalinement as "open and uncompromising
opposition to force and aggression, joint resistance to pressure,
intervention, and the imposition of the will of one upon another."
Tito generally hewed to familiar Yugoslav positions on specific
foreign policy issues, but in apparent deference to his African
hosts he seemed to come down especially hard on the need to take
action against "racist" regimes in southern Africa.--a central
theme in speeches by Zambian President Kaunda.and Ethiopian
Emperor Haile Selassie. The Yugoslav leader declared that
support by the nonalined should include "the most efficient
material support for those who, with arms in hand, are fighting
colonial oppression and racial discrimination." He did not
elaborate on what form such "material support" might take.
In line with Yugoslavia's current propaganda standdown toward
Moscow, Tito made no mention of Czechoslovakia. He did,
however, take an indirect swipe at the Brezhnev doctrine
and appeared to have the interests of his Romanian friends
in mind when he remarked that the policy of force and.
interference in the internal affairs of other countries
represents a threat "not only to the nonalined, but also to
those countries which fellow a foreign policy based on
equality and which do not want their sovereignty, security,
and progress to depend on the benevolence and goodwill of
any foreign power."
His only direct mention of the Soviet Union came in.a passing
reference to the Soviet-FRG treaty, which he described as
"the first concrete result" of bilateral talks on complex..
European problems. Although he voiced support for talks
between the major powers, he reiterated Yugoslav opposition
to "any dialogue among them that would work to the detriment
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 SEPTEMBER 1970
of third countries" or promote divisions into spheres of influence.
He rejected "often heard objections" that the nonalined countries
are trying to set up their own bloc, arguing that "we are working
to overcome the existence of the present blocs and for their
disappearance."
Without naming the United States, Tito went on to condemn the
"flagrant" policy of force and intervention presently being.
pursued in Indochina. He pointed in particular to "the inter-
vention" in "nonalined" Cambodia, stressing that Sihanouk's
government is "the only legal" one. He also welcomed the
"inclusion" of South Vietnam's PRG in the conference* as "very
significant both for the nonalined movement and the principle
of unreserved support to the peoples against foreign intervention."
His only reference to China came in his call for the PRC's
admission to the United Nations.
Tito placed the entire blame on Israel for "preventing a
peaceful solution of the crisis" in the Middle East and remarked
that recent developments have shown that Israeli acceptance of
the Rogers plan "was only a maneuver, since Israel interrupted
the talks before they had actually begun." He made no mention
of the Palestinian guerrillas.
In an obvious pitch to improve Yugoslavia's. trade ties with the
developing states, Tito stressed that "the policy of nonalinment
should be concerned with development of economic relations to
a far greater degree than they are at present." He added that
the developing countries should "utilize the advantages which
economic integration and cooperation offer them."
* Liberation Radio has yet to mention the reported agreement
at the conference to grant the PRG "c")server" status.
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CONFIDENT] Al, 11'1ill" '11fil;Nb;l
10 U}:1".I'I;M131'1 1910
GENEVA D`VsARMAMENT TALKS
MOSCOW HAILS SEABED TREATY. ATTACKS U.S. ON CB-WEAPONS BAN
Consistent with Moscow's low-key treatment of the Geneva diuarma-
ment talks since their resumption in mid-June, there to minimal
propaganda attention to the recessing of the talks on 3 September.
The TASS account of the cloning meeting, reviewing the major
issues that had come under discu.nsion, notes that chief Soviet
delegate Roshchin has called the adoption of a revived draft
treaty banning deployment of nuclear and other ;nano-annihilation
weapons on the seabeds the "main result" of the talks.
Roohchin's remark is also quoted in a 5 September IZVESTIYA
article which hails the joint U.S.-Soviet draft as an important
step toward the "complete demilitarization" of the seabed.
There is no doubt, IZVESTIYA says, that UNGA approval of the
accord would facilitate the adoption of necessary measures to
ban both mass-annihilation weapons and conventional types of
arms on the seabed, as well a~ promoting international
cooperation in the peaceful '.tses of seabed resources.
An article in PRAVDA on the 7th also welcomes the adoption
of the seabed treaty. Unlike IZVESTIYA, however, PRAVDA goes
on to complain about U.S. opposition to the communist
countries' proposal for a simultaneous ban on chemical and
bacteriological weapons, asserting that the United States
insists on a ban on bacteriological weapons only in order to
retain "the chemical weapons which the U.S. Army is now using
in Vietnam." Roshchin, in remarks on the 2d report-d by TASS,
had also criticized American insistence that the two types
of weapons be dealt with separately, alleging that the motive
is to keep open the U.S. option to use chemical weapons in
Vietnam. The TASS account adds that Roshchin expressed concern
about the failure of the United States to ratify the 1925
Geneva Protocol on chemical and bacteriological weapons.*
* In his remarks as reported by TASS, Roshchin did not take note
of President N4.xon's 19 August message to the Senate urging
ratification of the Protocol. For a discussion of Moscow's
reaction to the President's message, see the TRENDS of 26 August
1970, page 30.
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CONF11)P,N'I'I AI,
CHI LEAN ELECT I ONS
1,13I1C '1'W 1 N W
1.0 U1;l"I'l lIJE'It :19'ro
With l"idcl Castro now on record--in it l August interview with a
visiting Chilean delegation--as endorsing the Chilean electoral
path to socl.u turn, Cuban media have given predictably heavy
play to the plurality won by leftist candidate Salvador Allende
ir. the -t September Chilean el.ectAon. Welcoming the outcome in
commentaries and aii-ng interviews with Allende, Havana at the
uciine time evinces concern over alleged rightist machinations to
deprive Allendc of his victory. To win the presidency, he must
be chosen over ccnoervative candidate Jorge Aleusandri in a vote
by the Chilean Congress slated for 24 October.
Moscow has welcomed Allende's victory in a much more moderate
volume of comment, emphasizing that it was a product of a broad
coalition of leftist forces and generalizing on the effectiveness
of the united-front approach. Like Havana, Moscow warns of
"reactionary" efforts to deprive `llende of the fruit of his
electoral triumph, and like Havana it mentions the possibility
of a military coup.
Peking media have not been heard to report the election outcome,
although Allende has named the PRC in his listings of communist
countries--headed by Cuba and including the Soviet Union, North
Vietnam, and North Korea--with which he would seek cordial
relations if elected. Chinese media report strikes, protests,
and disorders in Latin America from time to time but generally
ignore organized political activity in the hemisphere. They
did not report or comment on the Chilean election campaign.
CUBAN MEDIA AIR ALLENDE STATEMENT OF CONFIDENCE IN VICTORY
Havana media on 5 September featured interviews with Allende,
who commented that in view of the statements of defeated
Christian Democratic Party Candidate Radomiro Tomic greeting
him as the President-elect, it would be "a political impossibility"
for Christian Democratic and rightist congressmen to collaborate
to defeat him in next month's balloting. He also expressed
confidence that the Chilean armed forces would "respect the
people's verdict."
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CONP'.I.1)NN'I'[A1_, P'13I111 'PHEND:1
10 SEP'1.'LM13P,R .L9'(0
Allende has had close personal ties wiLh Castro for some time
and reiterated, after his clectora'.l victory was announced,
his intention to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba and
establish relations with other communist regimes. In his
1. August intervier' with the visiting Chilcano,* Castro had
expressed his Interest "in opening relations with only a few
countries, among them Chile," and added that "perhaps in the
case of Chile we have the mor't Interest." The Madrid 1FE
reported under a Santiago dateline on the 5th that Castro
sent a congratulatory mcsut,ge to Allende, and REUTERS the
next day cited Socialist Party sources as stating that he
telephoned Allende to "congratulate him on the electoral
victory and extend Cuba's recognition of his election as
President ri Chile." Havana media have not carried either
report as yet.
Despite his avowed admiration for Castro and the Cuban
revolution, Allende has emphasized in public statements
that Chile's path to socialism would differ from Cuba's.
In post-election interviews with Havana r:cuia re effusively
lauded Cuba but stressed that Chile would purst'e its own
path: "We who have seen in Cuba an expression of dignity
and the struggle to build socialism find it significant to
be able to say that in the cone of South American today
there are also people who will begin to advance along their
own path, different from that of Cuba, but with the same
goal." Allende also referred obliquely to Castro's
endorsement of the Chilean electoral path to socialism,
praising "the Cuban people, who have learned that each
nation has its own reality and its own path." In a press
conference in Santiago on the 5th, duly reported by PRENSA
LATINA's correspondent to his home office, Allende affirmed
his belief in a multiparty system and his commitment to
free elections: "We are going to do something that is
ours, authentically ours according to Chile's reality,
history, and idiosyncrasies. We are not anybody's parakeet."
In the course of the 1 August interri ew--parts of which were
carried in Cuban media and shown on Chilean TV--Castro had
expressed concern over use of the Cuban revolution as an issue
* For a discussion of the interview, see the TEENDS of
19 August 1970, pages 38-41.
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CON1' IIEN'J'lA1, F13111 'J'UI'NUC
:10 13EPTEM13' li 1970
by rightintu cwnpaigning against Allende. Chilean TV carried
remarks in which Castro appeared anxious to counter charges
that Allende planned to convert Chile Into another Cuba
and seemed particularly anxious to reassure the Chilean
armed forces:
I believe that conditions are different than those in
Cuba. I believe that things cannot be done there as in
Cuba. I heard a speech by Allende, and it appears that
this was very clear on the different circumstances of
the process in Chile and the Cuban process. Truly they
would be different. We made a, revolution in an open
struggle, a guerrilla struggle, . . . and we destroyed
the army here. Then our relations with the armed forces
were determined by those things. Relations in Chile
with military institutions will be determined by other
factors.
Allende made a similar point when questioned at his post-election
press conference about the possibility of a military coup. In
Cuba Castro defeated the armed forces of a dictator, he said,
so "it was logical th;-~, those armed forces could not continue
to exist"; but in Chile "no war" has occurred, and "there is
no dispute between the armed forces and the people."
Expressions of Cuban concern over efforts`by conservative forces
to deprive Allende of the presidency are typified by comments
in an 8 September Radio Havana discussion program, in which
panelists charged that "Alessandri's spokesmen have been
practically encouraging a coup d'etat" and that "a climate
of raistrust is being created--a climate of uneasiness in the
nation that would prompt a military coup." A radio commentary
on the 6th, hailing the election outcome as a major defeat for
both the United States and the Chilean "oligarchy ," cautioned
that "the Yankee imperialists and the Chilean reactionary
forces will resort to all means to c:,ce more try to evade the
people's decision."
Observing that the Chilean Congress in the past has always
ratified the victory of the candidate receiving a plurality
of the votes, the 6 September commentary declared that "any
other course taken on this occasion, when the candidate is
of the left, would be a bloody farce." It recalled that the
Chilean Socialist Party has called for a general strike if
Allende is not chosen.
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("ONf'1I)EN'1'tAL 11310 TR1t;NDS
10 SEP`iEM13ER 1970
MOSCOW HAILS OUTCOME AS PRODUCT OF BROAD UNITED FRONT
Moscow's limited comment welcoming the election outcome is
typified by a 7 September 'PASS commentary which finds in
Allendc's victory "great implications both for Chile and
the entire national liberation movement in Latin America."
Moscow has not singled out the role of the Soviet-oriented
Chilean CP, picturing the electoral victory rather as an
exemplary product of a broad coalition of leftist forces.
Thus the TASS commentary stated:
Salvador Allende's success was made possible only by
the unity of all democratic and anti-imperialist
forces in Chile which acted in a unite', front for
the first time in many years. Of great importance
was the establishment of the popular action bloc
which included the Communist, Socialist, Radical,
and Social Democratic Parties as well as "Independent
Popular Action" and the "Movement of United Popular
Action."
In a similar vein, a Radio Moscow commentary on the 5th
noted that despite efforts by the "dominating classes"
to prevent unification of the left, "the leftwing parties
managed to form a wide democratic coalition which has
fully justified its name of Popular Unity."
A series of three articles by Ernst Henry which appeared
.4n LITERARY GAZETTE in July had drawn a glowing picture
of prospects for a political alliance of leftist forces
in a number of capitalist countries, citing Chile as a
vase in point. In the second article, on 8 July, Henry
noted that the Chilean CP had withdrawn from consideration
the candidacy of communist poet Pablo Neruda for the sake
of leftist unity even though it was "generally acknowledged"
that Neruda would have been "the strongest" candidate the
left could present. This demonstrated, according to Henry,
"how dear" unity is to the communists and "how necessary
it is to meet one another halfway and to make reciprocal
concessions."
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CONFIDE NTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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Post-election comment in Soviet media points to "reactionary"
designs to block Allende's I;ath to power, T--SS mentioning on
the 7th that some "imperialist press organs . . . even talk
about the possibility of a military coup." Soviet propagandists
had warned of such a possibility in pre-election comment, a
31 August broadcast saying that "domestic and foreign reactionary
forces" were planning to stage "a military takeover" if the left
won. A number of Moscow commentaries allege n,aw that Chilean
rightists are trying to "create economic chaos" and blame it on
the left.
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CONFIDENTIAL F1310 TRENDS
10 SEPTEMI3ER 1970
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PRAGUE NAMES HARDLINER AS NEW AMBA3SADCZ TO USSR
The Prague domestic service reported briefly on 8 September that
Bohuslav Chnoupek, heretofore Central Director of Czechoslovak
Radio, has been appointed by President Svoboda as ambassador to
the USSR replacing Vladimir Koucky. Thus an out-an-out pro-Moscow
hardliner takes over the po. from a man who had held a high
party position tinder Novotny but to all appearances made
strenuous efforts to adapt to the 1968 liberalization. The report
said Koucky was being "entrusted with other tasks."
BACKGROUND Under Novotny, Koucky had chaired the CPCZ Central
ON KOUCKY Committee's Ideological Commission until he was
replaced by Hendrych in 1965. He stayed on as a
party Secretary some three months after Dubcek's takeover as
First Secretary in January 1968. Koucky was removed as secretary
at the April 1968 plenum and was appointed. ambassador to the
USSR in May. In his self-criticism at that plenum, he indicated
that his removal from the high party post stemmed chiefly from
his alleged shortcomings prior to 1965 when, as head of the
Ideological Commission, he was "forced" by Novotny to impose "a
complete unanimity of views on almost everything." He defended
his subsequent record as party Secretary in charge of relations
with foreign CP's as "positive," and he recalled Dubcek's praise
at the plenum for the work of the Czechoslovak delegation--headed
by Koucky--at the February-March 1968 13udapest preparatory meeting
for the Moscow international party conference.
Koucky conscientiously pursued the CPCZ's then liberal, independent
line at the Budapest meeting, publicly opposing adoption of any
"single all-inclusive document" for the impending Moscow conference
and criticizing to newsmen the handling of mediation efforts in
the incident that led to Romania's walkout from the preparatory
meeting. His public statements during his two years and three
months as ambassador to Moscow, as reported in the media of both
countries, have faithfully reflected the status of bilateral
relations under the leadership first of Dubcek and then of Husak.
In his last publicized remarks, reported in Soviet media on
26 August, he "emphasized the decisive role of the Soviet Army"
in World War II at a Moscow meeting on the anniversary of the
194 anti-Nazi Slovak National Uprising, whose "legacy" was a
regime pledged to "guard, strengthen, and develop" friendship
with the USSR.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONVID19N'T:i11L 1"1IIS 'i'101ND
10 UIEP.L'EMBNU 1970
Koucky'u replacement had been anticipated on 1 September when
TASS reported that he was received by Soviet Doputy Premier
Novikov for a "friendly" talk "in connection with his coming
departure for home." Soviet media reported that he held
"friendly" talks with a variety of other second-echelon figures
during the next three days, without mentioning his impending
departure.
BACKGROUND Ambassador-designate Chnoupek had publicly
ON CHNOUPEK voiced pro-Soviet sentiments and criticized the
1968 liberalization even in its early stages.
In an interview with IZVESTIYA on 30 March 1968, as deputy minister
of culture and information heading a visiting delegation, Chnoupek
hailed the new cultural-exchange protocol as reflecting the
"further extension and deepening of our friendly relations" and
pointedly indicated concern over "which part of our national
culture is best re,: esented to our Soviet friends."
At the April 1968 CPCZ plenum, Chnoupek apparently struck the
only discordant note in roundly denouncing anti-Soviet aspects
of the liberal course, its alleged persecution of conservatives,
and the new activation of noncommunist political parties in
Czechoslovakia. The speech was reported at length in RUDE FRAVO
on 7 April 1968 and rebutted the next day by the Socialist
Party daily, SVOBODNE SLOVO. Chnoupek was named director of
the Czechoslovak radio in May 1969, a month after Husak's take-
over as CPCZ First Secretary. Like Koucky, he is a member of the
CPCZ Central Committee.
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CONFIDENTIAL I''ll:la; 11'R ENDS
10 UEP'I'EMIJEB 1970
-33-
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
EREZHNh' RECEIVES MIXED TREATMENT AT KAZAKH CELEBRATION
Brezhnev was both lavishly praised and conspicuously slighted at
the Kazakh semicentennial celebration in Alma Ata on 28 August.
Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev, a longtime Brezhnev admirer and
protege, paid exceptional homage to his patron's political
accomplishments, while other prominent leaders in attendance--
from Moscow, Azerbaydzhan, Armenia, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan,
Uzbekistan, Moldavia, and the Ukraine--either praised Brezhnev's
speech at the gathering or referred to him in higl??y favorable
terms. On the other hand, Brezhnev's speech was totally ignored
by the representatives from Belorussia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Turkmenistan, and it was conspicuously downgraded
by the representative from Leningrad.
BREZHNEV Kunayev devoted four paragraphs of his opening
EULOGIZED speech to Brezhnev, calling him an "outstanding"
leader not only of the Soviet party and government
but of the international communist movement as well and characteriz-
ing him as a "true Leninist who heads the Central Committee"
(PRAVDA, 29 August). He recalled Brezhnev'sa leadership of the
Kazakh party during "one of the responsible. periods" of Kazakh
history and his "enormous personal contribution"'in developing
the virgin lands. Kunayev's praise was published in all the
central papers. The only other visiting dignitary praised by
Kunayev was Defense Minister Grechko, who was termed "one of the
glorious military leaders."
Kazakhstan also demonstrated its pro-Brezhnev stance by announcing
the publication of a Kazakh translation of Brezhnev's two-volume
collected works on the day before his arrival in Alma-Ata (PRAVDA,
25 August). Kazakhstan is the only republic so far to issue a
local translation of the recently published collection.
The speeches of the leaders of the visiting delegations were
published in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on 29 August. Moscow City
First Secretary Grishin characterized Brezhnev's speech as
"brilliant"--as he has on similar occasions in the past--and he
joined Kunayev in calling Brezhnev an 'outstanding " leader of
the international communist movement and in recalling Brezhnev's
achievements as party leader of Kazakhstan.
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-311-
Azerbaydzhan First Seeret'iry Aliyev called 13vezhtiev's speech
"brilliant and de,;pp in content" and important "not only for
Kazakhstan but for all union republics." In addition he
attributed "the successes in the foreign policy arena and
inside the country" to the "fruitful work" of the Politburo
and the "energetic, tireless activities" of Brezhnev.
Armenian First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan, while ignoring
Brezhnev's speech, staked out a pro-Prezhnev position by
mentioning the "Politburo headed by" Brezhnev--a highly
controversial formulation previously used only by Kunayev.
Brezhnev's speech was also labeled "brilliant" by Kirgiz
First Secretary T. Usubaliyev, Tadzhik First Secretary
D. Rasulov and RSFSR President M.A. Yasnov; it was termed
"remarkable" by Moldavian First Secretary I.I. Bodyul, Uzbek
First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov and Ukrainian President
A.P. Lyashko.
SPEECH By way of contrast, Brezhnev's speech was totally
IGNORED ignored by Belorussian Premier T. Ya. Kiselev,
Latvian First Secretary A. E. Voss, Turkmen First
Secretary M. Gapi.rov and Estonian First Secretary I.G. Kebin.
It was mentioned without comment by Lithuanian President
M. Yu. Shumauskas.
Leningrad city 'xecutive committee chairman A.A. Sizov
appeared to dowz::Zrade Brezhnev's speech by listing it after
Kunayev's and characterizing it as an "evaluation." He
noted that Kazakhstan's achievements "were brilliantly
described today in the report of Comrade Kunayev D.A. and
in the evaluation given by L.I. Brezhnev." Only four other
speakers hLl,d even mentioned Kunayev's report, and Brezhnev's
"speech"--a nationally televised address--clearly outranked
it. Moreover, Sizov not only failed to use Brezhnev's title
of general secretary but--in an obvious violation of
etiquette--failed to place the prefix "comrade" before his
name.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 SEPTEMBER 1970
- 35 -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SECOND SESSION OF PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORTED
On 9 September, Peking gave wide publicity to a communique
on the second plenum of the Ninth CCP Central Committee held
from 23 August through 6 September.* The communique portrays
Mao and Lin Piao, the only Central Committee members named,
as in full control of the session, which was attended by 255
of the Central Committee's 279 full and alternate members.
Mao "personally presided" over the plenum, and he and Lin
delivered speeches, the contents of which have not been
disclosed. Mao also made speeches, still unpublicized, at
the two previous plenums, in April 1969 and 0^tober 1968.
Amid rumors of an imminent convening of the fourth National
People's Congress (NPC), the plenum merely proposed "that
necessary preparations be made so that the fourth NPC will
be convened at an appropriate time." Provincial radios have
not yet mentioned any preparations for the NPC in their local
areas.
The plenum approved "the State Council's report on the national
planning conference a,..d the national economic plan for 1970,"
as well as a report on strengthening preparations against war
presented by the Central Committee's Military Commission. This
is the first notice given of these reports, and no further
information is supplied.
PARTY The need to continue both "ideological and
BUILDING organizational" party rebuilding was expressed
in the communique, while at the same time it
claimed that "the whole party has achieved unprecedented
unity and unification." The 18-month attempt to rebuild
the party as c. 9.isciplined organizational structure continues
to mark time, however, particularly in establishing new
committees above the county level. During July and August,
Kwangtung, Kirin, Kansu, Heiluilr-kiang and Chekiang, all
provinces which had previously claimed rebuilt county
party committees, reported c.ne or more new county party
committees; one additional province, Liaoning, reported
* The three-day gap between the closing day of the plenum and
release of its communique is unusual. In the case of the last
three plenums the communique was released on the final day or
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 SEPTEMBER 1970
- 36 -
its first county-level party committee; but there were no
further reports of city-level committees, with Heilungkiang
and Kwangtung remaining the only areas that have claimed any.
A ne,T push to speed up party building in Kirin was reflected
in a KIRIN DAILY editorial, broadcast by Changchun radio on
3 September, celebrating the formation of the Tungfeng county
party committee, only the second new county committee set
up in Kirin since the Ninth Party Congress. The editorial
firmly urged that the PLA's experience in building the army
be used to quicken the pace of party building and predicted
that "party committees at all levels will soon be gradually
established" in Kirin. Another 8 September Changchun radio
report on the Tungfeng committee specified that "local party
committees at and above the county level" should be established.
NEW DIRECTOR OF PLA GENERAL POLITI CAL DEPARTMENT
Recent NCNA reports marking Peking celebrations for the 25th
anniversary of the DRV's founding identify Li Te-sheng e
director of the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA,
a post vacant for the past three years. The GPD, responsible
for maintaining party control over the army, ti -came deeply
involved in political struggles early in the cultural revolution,
and its former director, Hsiao Hua, was removed in late 1967.
I:i.'s appointment as director, following previous media reports
indicating gradual rebuilding of the GPD, appears to signal its
reemergence as a functioning, active office.
Little is known of Li's political coloring although his career
profited after he clamped down on Red Guard activities in Anhwei
during the cultural revolution. Originally a field commander,
Li was sent into Anhwei in 1967 to restore order among factional
Red Guard units. From his 1967 position as commander of the
Anhwei Military District, he became chairman of the Anhwei
Provincial Revolutionary Committee in April 1968, positions
he has continued to hold. At the Ninth Party Congress he
was elected an alternate member of the Politburo, and he
became a member of the Military Affairs Commission.
Rebuilding the GPD has been a slow process. After the fall of
Hsiao Hua, it received no official media attention for three
years until last November when MINA, reporting on a Peking
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CONFIDENTIAL F'i3IS TRENDS
10 SEPTEMBER :1.970
reception for a visiting Albanian army art troupe, identified
Huang Chih-yung as a deputy director of the GPD. The department
was not then, however, portrayed as performing any important
functions. Organizational rebuilding of the department was not
indicated until 26 December when Nanking radio named Yang Kuang-li,
vice chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee
and chairman of the Nanking Military Region, which includes Li's
Anhwei bailiwick, as vice chairman of the Political Department
of the PLA Nanking units.
Recent media references to the GPD depict it as revitalized
and functioning normally. On 1 September Harbin radio reported
on an activists congress attended by representatives of companies
of the PLA. Shenyang units and representatives "from the PLA
General Political Department." Kunming radio, also on 1 September,
reported on a similar meeting for Kunming army units at which
"the PLA General Political Department sent a representative to
attend the opening ceremony."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030038-1