TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: September 2, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
11111111111111111111111111111
-3.74NDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
Confidential
2 September 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 35)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amenOed. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
i Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declouification
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
2 SEPTEMBER 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Hanoi Meeting, Pham Van Dong Speech Mark 25th DRV Anniversary . . 1
Moscow, Peking Mark DRV Anniversary With Messages, Meetings . . . 5
Communists Impugn Sincerity of U.S. Statements at Paris Talks . . 8
Further Criticism of Vice President Agnew's Asian Trip 10
Issues of Legitimacy, Recognition of Sihanouk's Government . . 12
Hanoi Protests Alleged B-52 Strikes in Demilitarized Zones . . 14
Laos: Contacts Between the Princes Continue 14
MIDDLE EAST
Brezhnev Calls for Realism, Responsibility in Mideast 17
Moscow Accuses Israel of Obstructing Jarring Talkq 18
Events in Jordan Given Minimal Propaganda Attention 22
FRG-SOVIET TREATY
Brezhnev at Alma Ata Hails Accord Along Standard. Lines 24
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Decries Agnew Visit to Taiwan as Serious Provocation . . . 25
3IN0-SOVIET RELATIONS
Brezhnev Takes Conciliatory Line in Comment on China 27
Peking Sustains Polemical Restraint Toward Moscow 29
CUBA
Castro Warns States Backing Exile Invasion Plans 31
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Leaders Use Slovak Uprising Anniversary To Attack Reformers . . . 36
TASS Ignores Husak Remarks on Irvasion Anniversary 37
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS ;MENDS
2 SEP1EMI-3ER 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 24 - 30 AUGUST 1970
Moscow (3188 itel s)
PelcIDE (276 items)
Kazakh ASSR 50th
(2%)
23%
Domestic Issues
(28%)
37%
Anniversary
Indochina
(27%)
'26%
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
11%]
[Csmbcdia
(2(%)
1'1]
Warsaw Pact Meeting
(8%)
11%
[Vietnam
(17;
10%]
China
(6%)
6%
[Laos
(--)
4%]
Middle East
(3%)
5%
Middle Eat
(?;)
9%
Indochina
(5%)
4%
Romanian Liberation
(4%)
4%
Vice President's
(1%)
4%
Vice President's
(--)
1%
Asian Tour
Asian Tour
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Pham Van Dong, speaking on 31 August at the annual Hanoi meeting
markiqg the annlversary of the DRV's founding on 2 September 1945,
voiced a standard endorsement of the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution
but went beyond the usual perfunctory formulations on the
proposal in stressing the suitability of a coalition form of
government to unite the South Vietnamese people.
Dong noted that the insurgents in South Vietnam have been
concentrating on defeating the Vietnamization policy and claimed
that their fight is taking place under more favorable conditions
in the wake of he U.S. incursion into Cambodia--a "military
setback" an "political disaster" for the United States. He
also offered the f:!.rst explicit DRV support for the Laotian
princes' agreement to hold a meeting of their plenipotentiaries.
Departing from the pattern of his anniversary speeches in 1968
and 1969, Pham Van Dong specifically cited the Soviet Union and
China in expressing gratitude for foreign assistance. Moscow
marks the DRV anniversary in generally standard fashion, with
the Soviet leaders' message repeating promises of "all-round
assistance" and avowals of support for the DRV stand on a settle-
ment. The Chinese message also predictably promises "support
and assistance" and assails U.S. "counterrevolutionary dual
tactics" and "schemes and machinations."
Vietnamese communist delegat..)s at the 27 August session of the
Paris talks called routinely for a change in U.S. policies and
attempted to demonstrate that U.S. actions and statements
contradict professions of American good will in the search for a
settlement. The delegates echoed attacks in North and South
Vietnamese communist media on recent statements by Vice President
Agnew.
Peking's first reaction to the Vice President's 22-30 August
Asian trip came on the 31st with the broadcasting of a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article, which routinely links the trip to
plans for "U.S. imperialist aggression in Asia."
HANOI MEETING, P1-LAM VAN DONG SPEECH MARK 25TH DRV ANNIVERSARY
The 2 September anniversary of the DRV's founding was marked with
the usual meeting, this year on 31 August, attended by all the
regular meml,ers of the VWP Politburo except Pham Hung, who has
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not been reported present in North Vietnam since his attendance
at a Hanoi reception on 29 September 1967.* Following
traditional patterns, Premier Pham Van Dong delivered the
major address on the occasion. Opening remarks, however, were
made by President Ton Due Thang, where in recent previous
years the opening remarks have been made by Truong Chinh.
As is normal, Pham Van Dong also held a reception in
celebration of the anniversary; no reception was held last year, .
perhaps because of Ho Chi Minh's illness.
POLITICAL Pham Van Dong, in his address to the 31 August
SETTLEMENT national day meeting, predictably supported
the NFLSV/PRG 10-point proposal and stressed
the need for a U.S. withdrawal and the formation of a provisional
coalition government to organize the election of a coalition
government.
Dong had not gone beyond a reiteration of this familiar
position last year. This time he went on to elaborate on
the suitability of a coalition form of government in meeting
the problems in South Vietnam today. He declared that the
NFLSV's proposal for a coalition government stems from
"national spirit and humanism," and he added that "after years
of wars and chaos, the most important thing, the prerequisite
for the restoration of the normal life of the society and of
each Vietnamese, is the realization of the policy of great
national union and national harmony without discrimination
as expounded in the political program of the NFLSV." He
maintained that this will have a direct effect on the people,
naromlinc their enthusiasm, their mutual love and confidence,
which are very necessary for stabilizing the political and
social situation in South Vietnam." Dong added, in this
context, that NFLSV and PRG policies do not countenance
reprisals and are intended to eliminate all enmity amongst
the people.
* While Tran Quoc Hoan, alternate member of the Politburo, was
listed at some MOT festivities marking the anniversary, Van
Tien Dung, the other alternate Politburo member, was not
mentioned. His last known appearance was on 18 May at celebra-
tions of Ho Chi Minh' c 80th birth anniversary. He was present
at National Day festivities in 1969, 1966, and 1965, but was
not listed as present in 1968 and 1967.
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Although Hanoi statements do not usually discuss the role of a
coalition government in this fashion, the 10 points themselves
indicate that Ve tasks of a provisional coalition government
would be, among other things, to "achieve national concord
and a broad union" of various elements and to "prohibit all
acts of reprisal and discrimination." These stipulations in
the proposal have been recalled periodically. For example,
LPA quoted FRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien as stating at the
30 July session of the Paris talks that "those Vietnamese who
cherish the supreme intorests and legitimate aspirations of
the nation, including many persons in Saigon political circles
and even in the present Saigon administration, have clearly
seen the spirit of national concord and broad union" in the
NFLSV's proposals for the formation of a provisional coalition
government.
In claiming that there is growing opposition to Vietnamization,
Pham Van Dong professed to see a "new element" emerging
particularly in allied-controlled areas in South Vietnam and in
the United States. He d9scribed this element as a "new outlook
on the war, its origin and the dangers it carries as well as the
new undertakings to end the war and restore peace . . . ."
Attempting to link the commudists with antiwar elements in South
Vietnam, Dong said that the "struggle of the broad masses of
people" in Saigon, Da Nang, Hue, and other cities "bears an
important and profound significanc?." and that this "patriotic
movement" represents a "happy meeting" between the masses in
South Vietnam's cities and towns and the NFLSV's and PRG's
"great policies."
Earlier, in his discussion of U.S. domestic opposition to
ViAnamization, Dong said that "contradictions among the U.S.
ruling circles have become acute" and "many well-known figures"
in Congress have done "all in their power" to oppose Vietnamization.
Describing their position as though it were virtually identical to
Hanoi's, he said they "strongly protest against the Nixon
Administration's committing U.S. troops to Cambodia and Laos and
widening the war to the whole of Indochina. They demand that,
the Nixon Administration bring all American troops home in a
short period of time, that the Saigon puppet administration be
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toppled, that a coalition government be set up, and that
negotitions be stepped up to end the war at an early date."*
NFLSV/PRG OBSERVANCE DRV National Day was marked in the
OF DRV ANNIVERSARY South with a meeting on 25 August and
publicity for a joint NFLSV/PRG message
signed by Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat. Last year the PRG
and the Front sent separate messages to the DRV leaders, and no
meeting was reported. PRG President Phat delivered the principal
address at the 25 August meeting, hell in a "liberated area" and
under the joint auspices of the PRG, NFLSV, and Vietnam Alliance.
The speech was carried in full by Liberation Radio on the 27th.
The next day Liberation Radio reported a speech at the meeting by
Vietnam Alliance Secretary General Ton That Duong Ky, but there
is no other available information on who was present.
Phat condemned the United States for, among many other things,
resorting to "peace frauds to cover up its failures and intention
to de-escalate from a 'position of strength.'" As would be
expected on the occasion, Phat called on the Vietnamese people
to carry on the struggle until "we wipe out all U.S. and lackey
troops, liberate the South, protect the North, and advance
toward. peacefully reunifying the country."
Other propaganda on the DRV anniversary includes a combined
appeal, carried by Liberation Radio on I September, issued by
various Front, PRG, 'Ind Alliance components including trade
union, women's, peasant, and youth organizations.
* DRV media have continued to publicize expressions of dissent
from the Administration's Indochina policies. In a notable
recent example, Hanoi radio on 30 August broadcast lengthy
excerpts from Senator Muskie's 5 July NEW YORK TIMES article
including reference to his prorosal for a U.S. troop withdrawal
7-thin an 18-month timetable. QUAN DOI NI-IAN DAN's excerpting
early last month of portions of Townsend Hoopes' book "The
Limits of Intervention" was another example.
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5
? MOSCOW AND PEKING MARK DRV ANNIVERSARY WITH MESSAGES, MEETINGS
MOSCOW Soviet media mark the DR\r's 25th anniversary with the
usual leaders' message and account of a Moscow meeting.
Signed as usual by Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, the message
is addressed to Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham
Van Dong; last year's was addressed to Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan,
Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Reaffirming that the USSR will
continue to give "all-round assistance and support" to the
Vietnamese people's struggle, the message again endorses the
DRV position on a Vietnam settlement, calling for "unconditional
withdrawal" of U.S. and allied troops, but does not refer to
the Paris talks. The message last year had similarly promised
the DRV "comprehensive assistance" suad expressed support for the
DRV's efforts aimed at settling the Vietnam problem, singling
out the demand for troop withdrawal, without mentioning Paris.
Th P Paris talks had been cited in the 1968 message. This year's
message criticizes new U.S. "provocations" which have "spread the
front of imperialist aggression to the whole of the Indochinese
peninsula," but unlike Peking it does not specify Cambodia or Laos.
The Moscow meeting, attended by Politburo member Mazurov and
Secretary Katushev, was addressed by the chairman of the Council
of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet. Last year's meeting was
attended by Politburo member Demidhev and addressed by the
Moscow gorkom secretary. A Vietnam?USSR Friendship Society
delegation is in Moscow for the anniversary, and its leader,
Tran Huu Duc, Minister Attached to the Office of the DRV Prime
Minister, also addressed the meeting. No Soviet delegation is
reported to be in Hanoi.
Moscow radio and TASS briefly summarize PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA
editorials on the anniversary which point to Soviet assistance.
to Vietnam. IZVESTIYA recalls that the DRV leaders have.repeatedly
expressed gratitude for Soviet aid and specifically mentions
the 20 October 1969 communique on Pham Van Dong's Moscow visit
as stressing Vietnamese resolve to strengthen solidarity and
friendship with the USSR. A PRAVDA editorial has been customary
on the anniversary, although inexplicably there was none last year.
Other publicity includes a TABS interview with Pham Van Dong and
a press conference by the DRV Ambassador, both of whom again
thanked the Soviets for 'heir assistance. There is no report
thus far of the usual DRV Ambassador's reception.
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Anti-Chinese polemics are held to a minimum in anniversary
comment; a 31 August broadcast in Mandarin contains the only
available comment with polemical overtones, recalling the
Soviet role at the 1954 Geneva conference as well as Soviet
assistance to the Vietnamese people's building of socialism
and struggle against U.S. "aggression." It asserts once
again that "if the Chinese leaders responded to repeated
calls of the USSR and other countries of the socialist
community for united action to support the fraternal Vietnamese,
the anti-U.S. struggle wo-td achieve greater victories."
LaEt year several routine-level commentaries had decried
the anti-Soviet "slander" contained in the Chinese leaders'
message on the anniversary.
PEKING The usual leaders' message from Mao, Lin Piao, and
Chou En-lai is addressed to Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan,
Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dg, the customary address of
past messages having been to Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and
Pham Van Dong. It praises the struggle of the North and South
Vietnamese people and adds that the "three Indochinese peoples"
war against U.S. aggression has entered a "new stage," with
the situation improving all the time. Responding to the call
of the Indochinese peoples' summit conference, it says, the
people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, "uniting closely and
growing ever stronger through the fight,' have dealt telling
blows to the United States. In order to extricate itself
from its difficult position, the message says, the United States
is "pushing its counterrevolutionary dual tactics," plotting
"all kinds of schemes and machinations" while expanding the war.
The message promises "support and assistance" to the "three
Indochinese peoples" and expresses the conviction that the
three peoples, "strengthening their unity" and persevering in
"protracted people's war," will win. It describes the Chinese
people and the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as
"brothers and comrades in arms." There are no anti-Soviet
references in the message this yeax, where the 1969 message had
accused the Soviets of "collusion" with the United States.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial praises the Vietnamese people's
struggle and quotes Mao's 20 May statement that "the people
of a small country can certainly defeat a big country" if they
"dare" to rise in struggle. The editorial repeats the claim
that the revolutionary situation in Indochina is "excellent," the
Cambodian "patriots" having liberated two-thirds of their country
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and the people of South Vietnam and Laos having won many victories.
It declares that the people of the three Indochinese countries have
formed a "strong united front" against U.S. aggression, but that
the United States, unreconciled to its defeat, is stepping up its
"trick of counter-revolutionary dual tactics," carrying out a
"troop withdrawal fraud" while intensifying aggression.
PEOPLE'S DAILY quotes Ho Chi Minh as having said that the
Vietnamese will fight until "all the aggressors are driven out,"
and it adds that by following Ho's teachings and persisting in a
"protracted war" the Vietnamese will surely drive out the U.S.
aggressors. The editol'ial concludes by asserting that China and
Vietnam are related like "lips and teeth," that the 700 million
Chinese people provide a "powerful backing," and that China's
territory is the "reliable rear area" of the Vietnamese people.
Chou En-lai was the ranking official present at the Peking rally,
which was addressed by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and the DRV
ambassador. Such a rally has been a standard feature of the
anniversary observance, although none was held in 1969 when
a Peking "reception," hosted by friendship societies and attended
by Li Hsien-nien, was held instead. In 1965, on the 20th
anniversary, Chou En-lai had attended the rally and Peng Chen, then
a Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee,
delivered the address. Li Hsien-nien's current rally speech
includes %/1 anti-Soviet reference when it repeats the charge that
"social-imperialism" and U.S. imperialism are "colluding,"
specifically to promote a "so-called peaceful settlement" in the
Middle East and Indochina.
As in Moscow, there is no report so far of the usual reception
given by the DRV ambassador which Chou En-lai has habitually
attended in the past. A Chinese journalists' delegation and a
medical delegatioil went to Hanoi to attend the anniversary
observance and for a "friendly visit," but there is no report
of a DRV delegation in Peking.
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COMMUNISTS IMPUGN SINCERITY OF U.S. STATEMENTS AT PARIS TALKS
At the 81st session of the Paris talks on 27 August, PRG delegate
Nguyen Van Tien, according to the VIA and LPA accounts, impugned
U.S. good will and sincerity in seeking a settlement at Paris
while "intensifying and widening" the war in South Vietnam and
Indochina as a whole. VNA says Tien gave "concrete figures" on
increased allied war activities and "repression" of the South
Vietnamese, but it omits his documentation--references to
U.S. B-52 strikes, use of toxic chemicals, naval bombardments,
and the like.
Also omitted from VNA's account is a reference to remarks by
Vice President Agnew on the 23d in Guam, at the beginning of is
Asian trip. Tien claimed that Agnew "blatantly" said the United
States "would not hesitate" to send U.S.. forces back to Cambodia.
His distortion of the Vice President's statement occurred in the
course of a passage seeking to demonstrate that events have
contradicted President Nixon's statements about restrictions
on the use of U.S. combat troops in Laos and Cambodia and
limitations on U.S. air strikes in Cambcdia, as enunciated in
the President's 30 June speech.
VNA and LPA report Tien's charge that the Nixon Administration
is deceiving public opinion when it says that the level of
fighting and the number of U.S. casualties in South Vietnam
have decreased. VNA notes his claim that during the first
six months of 1970 nearly 230,000 allied troops were put out
of action, including 70,000 American and "satellite" personnel.
VNA's account of the statement by DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy
is shorter than usual and touches only briefly on his
denunciation of recent statements by Vice President Agnew.
VNA notes Vy's assertion that while the U.S. delegate in
Paris "repeatedly spoke of 'conciliation' and 'concession'
and 'respect' of the right of self-determination of the South
Vietnamese people, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew in his
17 August speech and 23 August statement called for war
intensification and military victory."
VNA does not report the particulars of Vy's charge; he
specifically decried remarks by the Vice President about a
potential "bloodbath"* following a U.S. withdrawal from
* Vy also referred to Townsend Hoopes' July FOREIGN AFFAIRS
article, quoting it as arguing that a bloodbath already exists
in South Vietnam.
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South Vietnam and about the "domino theory" and observed that
"Lt Is difficult to find" in such statements "what the U.S.
delegate has called here 'a genuinely conciliatory atmosphere,'
a 'process of compromise,' and a'desire cf narrowing differences.'"
VNA also omits Vy's allusion to th Vice President's remark
about the possible return of U.S. forces to Cambodic, in order
to protect U.S. troops in South Vietnam--a condition Vy
described as an "arrogant pretext."
VNA reports Vy as saying that the Nixon Administration's
"fallacious" talk of peace as well as its "hysterical" calls
for war can in no way shake the resolve of the Vietnamese
people to fight on, together with the Lao and Cambodian
peoples, against the United States.
VNA deals with the allied delegates' remarks at the session
in a single catch-all sentence, declaring that Ambassadors
Lam and Bruce "rehashed the same obdurate and perfidious
allegations they had made in the previous sessions."
RADIO There is comment on the Paris talks, an infrequent
COMMENT occorence, in a 30 August Liberation Radio broad-
cast which reviews the allied and communist
negotiating posit.i.ons at the end of 19 months of the four-sided
talks. The commentary advocates the 10-point solution in
routine terms and condemns the "unjust and illogical" stand
of the Nixon Administration and the United States' adherence to
the "very absurd demands" for a mutual troop withdrawal and
recognition of the Saigon administration as legal and
constitutional. It also derides U.S.-GVN proposals for "free
general elections" and the "restoration of the DMZ."
RETURN OF VNA reports on 27 August that DRV chief delegate
XUAN THUY Xuan Thuy arrived in Paris the day before and.
was greeted by PRG delegation members Nguyen
Van Tien and Dinh Ba Thi, DRV general delegate to France
Mai Van Bo, and others, including Soviet and Chinese diplomats
and a representative of Sihanouk's government in France.
VNA reports that in remarks responsive to correspondents'
questions at the airport, Thuy reaffirmed the PRG 10-point
solution, called Agnew a "warmonger," and said that President
Nixon is still pursuing his Vietnamization policy and wants
to prolong the war and apply neocolonialism in South Vietnam.
Hanoi as usual fails to report the post-session press briefing
and hence does not publicize DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's
remark that Xuan Thuy will attend the next session of the talks.
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SEPTEMBER 1970
FURTHER CRITICJSM OF VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW'S ASIAN TRIP
HANOI The DRV press trouts the conclusion of Vice President
Agnew's 22-30 August Asian tour in standard fashion
with comment in the 1 September NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN,
reviewed by VNA on the same day. VNA quotes NHAN DAN as saying
that Agnew's mission was "far from being a success" and that "what
he would report to Nixon would be a far cry from what he told the
press." It describes as a "plain lie" the observation by the
Vice President that the Asian allies have accepted the idea of
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence as their capabilities
for self-defense increase.
Portraying the Vice President as treading a tightrope in seeking
support for an Asian policy that combines a reduction of American
forces with reassurances to U.S. allies, NHAN DAN comments that
these "contradictions" can best be seen in South Vietnam where
the combined U.S.-GVN military cannot handle the situation. It
asks rhetorically how the United States can hope to bring the
Asian peoples to their knees if "puppet" troops are left alone
to fight with American material and financial support.
Of all the capitals visited, NHAN DAN says, the only place
where Agnew was warmly received was Phnom Penh, where the
government, "drowning" under the "Khmer people's struggle,"
regarded the stopover as a "lifeboat." The Cambodian Government
leaders "rejoiced," according to the commentary, at a "deeper"
U.S. commitment, an unlimited U.S. air war in Cambodia, and the
"veiled promise" of a renewed American invasion of Cambodia.
(A Hanoi radio news dispatch of the 29th, reporting on the
Vice President's trip to Phnom Penh, quotes him as calling
that visit a warning to the communists that "the United States
cannot resign itself to folding its arms and remaining inactive
when other countries freely stage an invasion.")
The NHAN DAN commentary says Agnew was received "coldly" in
Bangkok by the Thai leaders, who were urging the United States
to increase its military and economic aid to Thailand in
return for the dispatch of Thai "mercenaries" to South Vietnam
and Cambodia
MOSCOW Routine-level Moscow comment continues to denounce
the Vice President's tour as an effort to implement
the Nixon doctrine, showing that the United States plans to
continue military, political, and economic interference in Asia.
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A TASS commentary on 31 August also suggests that the trip was
made for reasons of "narrow political partisanshJe in view of
the forthcoming congressional elections.
Commentators note that Agnew assured the South Koreans of
additional military aid and say that he promised resolute support
to Chiang Kai-shek with a view to turning Taiwan into a B-52
base. U.S. aggressive plans toward Cambodia are said to have
been revealed by the trip, in the wake of the U.S. announcement
of 40 million dollars' worth of military aid to the Lon Nol
regime. Moscow says that in Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh
Agnew stressed the Vietnamization program and assured the allies
of increased aid, particularly the financing of operations of
Saigon and Thai troops in Cambodia. TASS comments on the 31st that
this violates Senator Fulbright's amendment forbidding the
financing of "mercenaries" on the territory of Laos and Cambodia.
Brief reports say that in Phnom Penh Agnew discussed "the
possibility of a new intrusion into Cambodian territory" and that
the Lon Nol regime asked for stepped-up U.S. aid. Commentators
interpret the visit as a gesture confirming U.S. intent to
continue "all-round support" to the Lon Nol regime.
A number of commentaries now bring up Agnew's 23 August remarks
raising the possibility that a decision to re-enter Cambodia
could be made if necessary to protect the security of U.S.
troops in South Vietnam. A TASS commentary on the 31st says
these remarks have raised "serious alarm." In PRAVDA on the
27th, Shchcdrov says "the U.S. milftarists are threatening
Cambodia with a new intervention," pointing to unspecified
"hints" by Agnew during his trip as well as to alleged
evidence of growing U.S. interference in Cambodia. Shchedrov
adds that "official U.S. propaganda" is putting forth a "new
thesis" that Vietnamization and the security of U.S. troops
in South Vietnam depend on the "durability" of the Lon Nol
regime. A panelist in the 30 August domestic service roundtable,
noting that Agnew had "directly linked" Cambodia and South
Vietnam in tying the security of American troops in South
Vietnam to the situation in Cambodia, commented that one gets
the impression that Washington is preparing for a new "direct
military interference" in Cambodia.
PEKING Peking's first comment on it, own authority on Vice
President Agnew's trip comes at the conclusion of
his tour in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, broadcast on
the 31st. The article says routinely that the object of the
trip was to make further plans for U.S. aggression in Asia and
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to peddle the "bankrupt" Nixon doctrine. On the later point,
it comments that the failure of Washington's plan to rely on
its allies in Asia wan demonstrated by the dispatch of U.S.
troops to Cambodia, but that "after receiving a severe beating,
the United States has again had to place its hopes on its running
dogs." In line with this analysis, the article says that in
Saigon the Vice President supported the GVN in stepping up the
war "under the guise of 'Vietnamization" and that in Bangkok
his objective was to drive more Thai "mercenaries" onto the
Indochina battlefield.
A 31 August NCNA report on the Vice President's trip similarly
pictures the United States as beset with problems in implementing
the Nixon doctrine. NCNA contrasts recent Administration
promises to back the Asian allies with a statement by the
President calling for Asian "self-help."
The Commentator article briefly notes that "before Agnew's
arrival in Phnom Penh, he flagrantly announced that the
Nixov Administration will do its utmost to support" the Lon
Nol government. The article does not mention reports that the
Vice President also raised the possibility of U.S. troops
returning to Cambodia; but Peking accounts of foreign reaction
to the trip include an NCNA account of an LPA commentary whic14
says the Vice President declared that the issue of Cambodia is
"related to the security of U.S. forces in South Vietnam" and
that if that security is threateLed, "U.S. ground forces will
once again be dispatched to Cambodia."*
ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY, RECOGNITION OF SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT
Sihanouk again argues the case for the legitimacy of his Royal
Government of National Union (RGNU) in a 29 August statement,
carried by NCNA on the 31st, refuting "slanders" by the
Indonesian and "Malayan" governments. These governments, he
says, have been trying to prove that the RGNU is a "government
in exile" and a "government without territory." Although the
statement does not mention the forthcoming nonalined conference
in Lusaka, Zambia, it is evidently prompted by the question of
Cambodian government representation.
* See the Sino-U.S. Relati)ns section of this TRENDS for a
further discussion of Peking's comment on the Vice President's
trip.
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Iiihan.uk repeats elvdms that the RONU oeoupies two-thirds of
'iamb-Alan LerriLory, that it. has its own army, und that three
RGNU ministers are "leading the people's and national
administration" in Cambodia. He adds that Western reporters
recently released by the FUNK "formally recognize" the existence
of the Front and its army. Asserting that hio government "has
all the attributes of the legal government, of the Khmer state,"
he recalls that in his "open letter" to the leaders of nonalined
Jtules (carried by NCNA from 9 ,c:) 14 Auguot) he had made a case
for the illegality of the Lou Nol regime. He insists that it
governo only Phnom lenh and that its authority over nearby
territory is ensured solely by Saigon troops, and he concludes
that the argument of Indonesia and "Malaya" should be rejected
by the states of the third world.
The recognition issue is raised sharply in a 25 August "commentary"
by the "information bureau of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the FUNK," carried by NCNA on the 27th. Commenting
on the seizure of the Cambodian embassy in Prague on behalf of
the FUNK, the commentary says "certain people" who call this
action a "patriotic act" at the same time brand it an "illegal
occupation." It argues that to describe the takeover of the
embassy by a diplomattof the FUNK, "whom the Czechoslovak
Government has recognized as such," as an illegal occupation is
tantamount to saying that "the liberation and present occupation
of two-thirds of Cambodia by our national liberation armed
forces are also illegal"--unless, it adds sarcastically, one
recognizes the "fascist, antipopular regime of the traitorous
Lon Nol/Sirik Matak/Son Ngoc Thanh clique"as the only legal
representative of the Khmer people.
In previous meJsages to President Svoboda on the episode,
Sihanouk had more politely asked the Czechoslovaks to "clarify"
their position on recognition. On 18 August a Czechoslovak
Foreign Ministry announcement had said that the seizure violated
the laws of the host country.
Belgrade's TANYUG reports on 1 September that a Czechoslovak
Foreign Ministry spokesman said the secretary who had seized
the Cambodian embassy had agreed to leave the building on the
understanding that the amLassador representing the Lon Nol
regime would not return to it. Prague media have not so far
carried such a report.
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HANOI PROTESTS ALLEGED B-52 STRIKES IN DEMILITARIZED ZONES
A 27 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, reported
in Hanoi media that day, protests alleged U.S: "acts of war" in
the demilitarized :one (DMZ). The protest says the United States
used "many airplanes, including 13-52's,* for repeated attacks"
on Huong Lap village from lh to 25 August and fired artillery
on Vinh Son village "from south of the DMZ" on 19, 21, and
2) August. It, also charges that U.S. aircraft spread toxic
chemicals on Vinh Quang, Vinh Clang, Vinh Son, and Vinh Thanh
villages on 25 August, "poisoning many peope." According to
the reports, all the -Mager.; are located in the northern part
of the DMZ.
Hanoi radio claimed on 23 August that the army and people of
Quang Ninh Province, "competing to score merits to mark" the
25th anniversaries of the August Revolution and National Day,
had shot down an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane that day.
The alleged downing brings Hanoi's total of downed U.S. planes
to 3,360.
LAOS: CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PRINCES CONTINUE
Pathet Lao propaganda continues to complain that Souvanna Phouma
is avoiding the issue of a meeting of the plenipotentiaries of
the two prinees despite nis 25 June suggestion that representatives
meet at Khang Khay. On 27 and 28 August Pathe :: Lao media reported
that Souphanouvong's envoy, Tiao o. Vongsak, met Souvanna Phouma
f?,r the fifth time on the 21st an(' took him to task for "evading
the question of a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the
two princes" and for appointing a delegation of "his illegal.
administration" for negotiations. The report added without
elaboration that Tiao Souk Vongsak and Soth Pethrasi, the NLHS
permanent representative in Vientiane, also met the French and
Indian ambassadors in Vientiane on the 21st.
The Pathet Lao radio reported on S An?alst that Soth Pethrasi
had "recently" returned to Sam Neua to report to Souphanouvong
on the progres of Lh,.2 contacts. And on 1 September the Radio
* Th ,.2 last previous DRV charges of the U.S. use of B-52's
sppe:Ired it August foreign mini try spokesman's statement.
See 11c MMUS ot i9 August 1970, rt 13.
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of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces reported that as a result of
his talks with Soth Pethrasi, Couphanouvong sent to his envoy
in Vientiane an "urgent order" to arrange with Souvanna Phouma
!or a meeting ?Jewecn the two princes' plenipotentiaries at
Khan Khay "at the earliest date." The order, according to the
radio, stated that Souphanouvong had apDointed Gen. Phoune
Sipraseuth as his plenipotentiary, and it once again criticized
Souvanna Phouma for designating a "so-called government
delegation" in order to avoid a meeting of plenipotentiaries.
HANOI Pham Van Dong's 1 September DRV National Day speech
contains the first direct expression of DRV support
for the contacts between the two princes, although Hanoi media
had prer.:.ously mentioned that the activity was taking place.
Dong says the United Stutes' "failures" in its war in Laos
prompted "many personalities in Vientiane who have so far
relied on the Jnited States" to start worrying about the
consequences of American "aggression." In this situation, says
Done, an exchange of letters has taken place between
Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma which led to agreement on
a meeting of their plenipotentiaries in Khang Khay. "Our
people welcome this event of positive significance," Dong
declares.
MOSCOW Moscow expresses satisfaction with the contacts in
a radio commentary broadcast in English to Seith
Asia on 26 August. It calls the agreement on a meeting of
"authorized delegates" of the two sides in Khang Khay "a
definite advance" in the contacts, and it adds that "those who
want peace in Lac3 now hope that a peaceful settlement will
be reached."
The commentary does not mention the subsequent controversy
over the meeting of plenipotentiaries or the appointment of
Vientiane's "government delegation." Charging that U.S.
intervention is what stands in the way of a settlement, it
says that every time there is a hint of a peace settleuent,
the United States whips up tension in Laos. "It can hardly
be a coincidence," the commentator adds, that as soon as the
possibility of contacts emerged, the United States sent
Saigon troops into the Saravane region--the charge made by
Souphanouvong in his 13 August message to Souvanna Phouma.
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PEKING Peking continues to avoid all mention of the current
contacts. The subject is unmentioned in a PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article, carried in the Peking domestic
service on 31 August, supporting the 15 August NLHS CeAral
Committee stutement which protested the alleged U.S. dispatch of
Saigon troops into Laos. PEOPLE'S DAILY says the alleged U.S.
move indicates that "while playing the trick of troop withdrawals,"
the United States is at the same time stepping up aggression
against the three Indochinese countries with the object of
converting "the whole of Indochina into its colony and military
base."
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MIDULE EAST
BREZHNEV CALLS FOR REALISM, RESPONSIBILITY IN MIDEAST
In contrast to his usual relatively brief, pro forma remarks on
the Middle East, Brezhnev gave considerable attention to the
crisis in his 28 AuglIst Alma-Ata speech, with notable stress on
the need for "honest observance" of the cease-fire agreement
and 'real steps" toward a peaceful settlement. He noted with
apprpval the UAR and Jordanian agreement to a three-month cease-
fire--with no mention of the U.S. initiative--which "compelled"
I5rael also to agree to the cease-fire and to declare for the
first time its readiness to comply with the November 1967 Security
Council resolution. Mentioning that the sides have held their
first contacts through Ambassador Jarring, Brezhnev said the
USSR takes a "positive view" of such developments and looks with
satisfaction on the UAR's "constructive position."
Brezhnev declared that there are now opportunities for approaching
the settlement of the conflict "from positions of realism sad
responsibility." In an admonition clearly directed at Israel,
he said what is needed now is "not new provocations and
subterfuges designed to circumvent or violate the cease-fire
agreement, but an honest observance of the agreement reached
and real steps in favor of peace." He added that those who
have been trying to "impose their will 'from a position_of
strength'" on the Arab countries should abandon this "hopeless
adventurist line dangerous to world peace."
Brezhnev seemed also to atAxess a warning to militant Arabs and
Palestinians who reject a peaceful solution when he said .this
"little step" toward peace has already "met with sharp opposition
from supporters of continued military actions and all.adherents
of an aggressive course." It is very important, he added, for
the peace forces in the region not to.let the initiative for
settling the conflict out of their hands and not to let "the
foes of peace undermine the agreement reached or use it as a
cover for their aggressive designs."
It is in the general interests of the peoples, Brezhnev concluded,
that the cease-fire .become a good beginning for a fair, durable,
and lasting peace. Earlier in the speech, he expressed the Soviet
Union's "profound conviction" that an end to the conflict
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would meet, the vital interests of both the Arab countries oild
Israel. Here he made the point?which has appeared in other
recent propaganda--that the Arabs need peace to pursue their
economic development. In the same vein, in a 5 August speech
at a luncheon for an Iraqi delegation, Ma2..-rov had called
peace an "imperative condition" for the succesu of the Arabs'
"progressive socioeconomic transformations."
in his 12 June election speech, Brezhnev made no mention
of the United States, referring only to Israeli actions
dictated by "international imperialist circles"; in June he
had referred to the Tel Aviv rulers "and all those who
encourage them." He again expounded the Soviet view that
there can be no revard for the "aggressor" and that peace
can only be insured through full Israeli withdrawal. And
he again affirmed the right of Israel to exist while repeating
the standard Soviet formulation on Palestinian "rights," calling
for assurance of the national rights, security, and independence
of all states of the area, "including assurance of the legitimate
rights of the Arab people of Palestine." PRAVDAts Belyayev, in
the 30 August domestic service commentators' roundtable, asserted
that this statement dealt a "shattering blow" to all those who
allege that the Soviet Union "wants to destroy the state of
Israel or supports certain forces who would like to do so."
And in a PRAVDA article on 2 September, reviewed by TASS,
Belyayev says that fulfillment of this condition would create
a possibility t.7) "guarantee the territorial integrity of both
the Arab countries and the state of Israel."
MOSCOW ACCUSES ISRAEL OF OBSTRUCTING JARRING TALKS
Soviet propagandists express concern over the delay in the
Arab-Israeli contacts, accusing Israel of trying, to obstruct
Jarring's mission by delaying appointment of its representatives,
then calling home its UN envoy, Tekoah, for consultations and
postponing his return to New York. TASS reported on the 31st
that Jarring had expected Tekodh's return to New York that day,
making it possible to place contacts "on a more permanent basis
and start the discussion of more essentidl'issues." On
2 September TASS noted that since the Israeli cabinet failed
to adopt any "specific decision" in its meeting the preceding
day, Tekoah again postponed his return, and therefore Jarriilg
cannot continue his contacts.
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Commentators claim that these delays, as well as Israel's
continued charges of UAR cease-fire violations, are aimed at
creating difficulties for Jarring's mission and ultimately
at preventing fulfillment of the Security Council resolution,
or at least at gaining some sort of advantage "by means of
threats." In effect shrugg4ng off charges and countercharges
of cease-fire violations, Moscow insists that the important
thing is to get the talks under way. Commentators continue
to express guarded optimism, but complain that such optimism
could be more justified were it not for I,rael's behavior and
statements by Israeli leaders.
In this connection, Moscow's domestic service on the 29th cited
remarks by Israeli Information Minister Galili that a situation
might arise in which Israel would be forced to withdraw from
the "preliminary talks." Israeli leaders are continuing their
"verbal blackmail," the radio said, in an effort to condition
public opinion to the idea that the talks could end without
results. And panelists in the domestic service roundtable
program on the 30th quotea Prime Minister Meir to the effect
that Israel would break off the talks if the Arabs did not
submit to Tel Aviv's demands.
Roundtable panelist Belyayev, referring to Arab and Israeli
charges of respective cease-fire violations, said the important
thing is not mutual accusations but "really concrete measures"
to find a way a peaceful settlement. In his PRAVDA article
on 2 September, Belyayev urges that in the interests of speedy
restoration of peace Israel should stop its "sabre rattling"
and delays and get down to business, "to the advancement of
concrete proposals" for complete fulfillment of Resolution
242. Similarly, Mayevskiy commented in the 30 August PRAVDA
that it was time the Israeli leaders .put an end to their
"unrealistic approach" and switched to serious steps for a
peaceful solution.
CEASE-FIRE Moscow continues to dismiss as fabrications
Israeli charges of UAR cease-fire violations,
claiming that such assertions have "repeatedly been officially
denied" by Cairo. Thus TASS on the 31st maintained that official
UAR spokesmen have made it clear that the UAR has not contravened
the cease-fire agreement aud "strictly adheres to it." At the
same time, Moscow reports--without special emphasis--UAR,
Jordanian, and Lebanese prote3ts against Israeli actions.
Belyayev, in the commentators' roundtable on the 30th, noted
Arab press reports of Israeli violations in the form of
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construction of "new fortifications" and repair of roads and
airfields on the cast bank of the Suez Canal. Speculating on
the motive behind these efforts to ''prepare the military
arsenal," Belyayev said it might be to start a "new round of
some kind of military adventures," or the T.oraelis could have
"some other provocative purposes in mind."
Reporting Wasir's remarks to a W..:rld Peace Council delegation
which the Egyptian President received on 30 August, TASS the
following day cited his staten..mt?with regard to Israeli
charges of movement of OAR missile units in the Suez Canal
zone?that "these missiles were there long before the cease-
fire agreement came into force." Mosccw's domestic service
on the 31st went on to cite Nasir's further remark that it
was these batteries which shot down Israeli Phantoms.
The domestic service commentary, by Ryzhikov, makes Moscow's
t,econd known ref,rence to U.S. air survillance of the
cease-fire zone, claiming that the "complete groundlessness"
of Tel Aviv accusations "has been confirmed by data from
aerial photographs taken by American spy satellites and U-2
reconnaissance aircraft" which were "illegally" sent up "over
Egypt to check Israel's complaints." A Shulyukin article in
TRUD on 25 August, in what was apparently Moscow's first
reference to U.S. monitoring of tha cease-fire, represented
Israel as making the "brazen demand" that "U.S. aircraft
exercise control over the cease-fire line between the UAR
and Israel." Moscow was not heard to mention the UAR's
rejection .according to Cairo radio on the 21st--of monitoring
by "U.S. satellites or 0-2 espionage planes."
U.S. MILITARY TASS on 1 September reported without comment
AID TO ISRAEL that Defense Secretary Laird, in a letter 1,o
Senator Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, said the United States should allocate
credits for arms shipments to Israel on a much larger scale
than was planned last February. TASS added that Laird demanded
Congressional approval of the part of Ule military oales bill
which "gives the government power to help Israel" with planes
and other types of armaments. "As to arms shipments to Israel
during the temporary cease-fire," TASS said, Secretary.Laird
in his letter said the United States "is taking all the
necessary steps to keep the arms balance in favor of Israel."
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On 2 September TASS reported that the Senate, "under government
pressure," adopted an amendment to the military procurements
bill which gives the government "unlimited opportunities" to
provide Tel Aviv with modern military equipment on easy terms.
The government did everything possible to gain Senate approval
of the expansion of military aid to Israel, TABS said,
recalling that Laird in his letter to Stennis before the vote
"especially insisted" on the adoption of the amendment to the
bill giving the government powers to supply Israel with
combat planes and other weapons.
A Kolesnichenko article in the 2 September PRAVDA, reviewed
in Moscow's domestic service, observes that the U.S. Government
"officially admitted that it dispatched to Israel . .
during the period of the cease-fire agreement," a
new consignment of weapons whose delivery is effected "under
the pretext of preservation of the balance of power."
BIG 11:0 Moscow has taken no note of U.S. press reports
PEACE FORCE on remarks by Administration officials at a
press background briefing in San Clemente on
24 August concerning a possible U.S.-Soviet peace-keeping role
as part of practical security arrangements stemming from a
political settlement. Nor has there been any acknowledgment
of President Nixon's remark on 31 August to CBS correspondents
t"lt he did not believe such suggestions would be particularly
helpful at a time when the Jarring mission is going forward.
Earlier, in a 7 August Arabic-language broadcast, Moscow had
rejected the idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet peace-keeping .force
as suggested in a 4 August Washington POST editorial. A
broadcast in Arabic on 6 August recalled that Kosygin, in
his 25 June 1967 press conference at the United Nations, had
"refuted the statement that the two major powers" should lead
the world and dictate their ccnditions to it.
FULBRIGNT TAG'S on 23 August provided a short summation
STATEMENT of Senator Fulbright's Middle East proposals
released that day, pointing to his recommenda-
tion for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and
noting that he drew attention to "the grievous position of
Palestinian refugees" and welcomed the UAR's and Jordan's
"realistic and constructive" stands.
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TASS made no mention of the Senator's suggestion of abilateral
U.S.-Israeli treaty which would be supplementary tc UN
guarantees followjng a settlement. But IZVESTIYA and a Soltan
foreign-language commentary on the 25th called attention to a
"warmongering speech" by an Israeli politician of the Free
Center demanding, according to IZVESTIYA, that Israel be "tied
still more strongly to the American military chariot through
the conclusion of a military pact with the United States or
even by the i.,-lusion of Israel in NATO."
Belyayev, in the 30 August commentators' roundtable, made the
only other available propaganda reference to the Fulbright
statement. Speculating on the U.S. position with regard to
a Middle East settlement, Belyayev found it "difficult to
guess the position and what it will be like--it has not yet
been revealed"--but added that .ie thought Senatm. Fulbright's
speech "worthy of attention." Belyayev went on to point out
that the Senator "is for the complete withdrawal" of Israeli
troops from "all" occupied Arab territories.
EVENTS IN JORDAN GIVEN MTAIMAL PROPAGANDA ATTENTION
Having maintained virtual silence on events in Jordan, Moscow
on 2 September reported the apparent assassination attempt
against King Husayn the day before. TASS cited.Cairo's
MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) for an Amman radio report of
the firing on Husayn's car and for reports of armed clashes
between Jordanian army trc,,.2s and fedayeen forces. TASS went
on to attribute to the Cairo ALAHRAI4 a series of related
reports of Palestinian and Jordanian charges and countercharges,
Amman denying that Jordanian troop fired on Palestinian
guerrillas while Palestinian spokesmen denied the attack on
Husayn and called the report an attempt to justify Jordanian
army firing against resistance headquarters.
TASS also picked up a MENA report that the Palestinian
resistance movement had appealed to the Iraqi authorities
to intervene; but it did not mention Baghdad radio's 1 September
report that the Iraqi foreign minister told the Jordanian
ambassador that Jordan must stop "measures against the fedayeen"
or "the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi army stationed on the
eastern front will take all necessary measures to protect
fedayeen action."
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Moscow had ignored fedayeen confrontations with Jordanian
forces just prior to and following the 27-28 August emergency
cession of Cho Palestine National Council in Amman, held to
discuss measures against the U.S. plan for a settlement of
the middle East crisis. Moscow's Arabic-language service, in
a dispaLch from its Beirut correspondent on 28 August, carried
the sole report on the opening of the "urgent" Council session.
The account guardedly said the Council would study the Middle
East situation and "prospects for developing the Palestinian
movement in view of the situation in the area due to the UAR's
initiative" regarding a political settlement. It noted that
Palestine TAberation Organization (PLO) chairman and Fatah
leader Yasir Arafat, speaking at the session, "dealt with
the results of his recent talks in Cairo." (TASS on the same
day cited AL-AERAN as saying Nasir's recent meetings with a
Palestinian resistance delegation "demonstrated Cairo's
loyalty to all the Arab nation--the struggle for the restoration
of lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine.")
A brief :ioscow domestic service report on the 30th of King
Husayn's speech the day before made no mention of Husayn's
remarks regarding the fedayeen, representing him merely .as
'again supporting the UAR:s peaceful initiative" regarding
the settlement of the Middle East crisis. Husayn's speech also
revealed the new definition of "Arab fighting fronts" and
arrangement for command approved at the 5-6 August meeting in
Tripoli, Libya, of foreign and defense ministers of the "front-
line" states--the UAR, Jordan, Syria, Libya, and Sudan, with
Iraq and Algeria absent. The recommendations provided, Husayn
explained, for the dissolution of the former "eastern front"
and for the general commonder, UAR War Minister Fawzi, to
exercise control over three fronts--the western or UAR front,
the northern or Syrian front, and the eastern or JordaW.an
front. liusayn added that the order provides that Arab forces
on the territory of any of the three states are under the
orders of that state's command--a situation which places
Iraqi forcer; in Jordan under Jordanian command.
TASS on the 31st reported an AL-AHRAM account of this decision
to set up three Arab fronts; it noted that the new eastern front
will include the troop contingents from Iraq and Saudi Arabia
and that all three fronts will interact in accordance with the
plans of the joint Arab command headed by General Fawzi. TASS
has not reported subsequent AL-AHRAM accounts, carried by MENA,
of Iraqi objections to the "new plan for the eastern line of
confrontation."
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- 2.4
FRG-SOVIET TREATY
BREZHNEV AT ALMA-ATA HAILS ACCORD ALONG STANDARD LINES
Brezhnev's widely publicized remarks in Alma-Ata on 28 August,
his first extensive discussion of foreign polic issues since
his 12 June pre-election speech, highlight Moscow's continuing
propaganda attention to the SoViat-FRG trece:y, signed on 12 August.
Aside from his denial--in response to "fabrications and slander"
in the "imperialist" press--that the treaty with West Germany was
sought to free Moscow's hands for stepping up pressure on China,
Brezhnev's comments on the accord repeat routine propaganda
themes. Calling the treaty "a very important event," he says
it is important for the development of relations botween the
two countries as well as for the easing of tension in Europe.
On the latter score, Brezhnev stresses that the treaty gives
"dlear and unequivocal recognition to the inviolability of
existing borders" in Europe, including the Oder-Neisse line
and the border between he two German states.
Bre,:hnev calls the treaty the product of the prolonged efforts
of the USSR and the socialist states "with whom we remained in
close contact," and he recalls that the 20 August meeting in
Moscow of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee
voiced approval of the treaty. He gives due credit to the
"realistic approach" taken by the FRG Government and calls
Bonn's recognition of postwar realities "a wise step along a
correct political path." He Observes, however, that the treaty
"will present all its opportunities only when it is ratified
by both sides and goes into effect."
While Brezhnev does not touch on the-economic advantages of
improved FRG-Soviet relations, routine commentaries continue
to play on this theme. A domestic service talk on 30 August,
for example, cites "economic circles" in Bonn for the
observation that trade with the USSR should be more extensive.
The commentary reports that Hamburg's WELT AM SONNTAG has
complained that West German imports from the Soviet Union are
no higher than German imports from Russia on the eve of World
War I. It adds that a West German businessman has stated
that with the treaty the possibility has been created "to
more than double the trade" between the two countries in the
near future.
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-
? SIO S. RELATICAS
PEKING DECRIES AGNEW VISIT TO TAIWAN AS SERIOUS PROVOCATION
In the first comment originated by Peking on Vice President
Agnew's Asian tour, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
broadcast on 31 August claims that "thin god of plague" sought
to prop up U.S. allies in "aggression in Asia" and denounces
his visit to Taiwan as "particularly intolerable" and a serious
provocation. An NCNA report dated the 31st goes to greater
length In discussing the Vice President's visit to Taiwan as
well as other evidence which it takes as indicating that the
United States "will never give up its plot for invading
China and Asia." Like the Commentator article, NCNA views
the visit as a "serious provocation" to China, a charge Peking
has used in protesting against activities that might enhance
the Chiang regime's legitimacy and strength.
Peking's reaction to the current visit is similar 1:o its
treatment of the Vice President's Asian tour early this
year. In each case Peking reported that the United States
had reaffirmed its treaty commitment to Chiang end its
intent to prevent the Chinese from "liberating" Taiwan. An
NCNA report on 5 January included the additional charge that
the United States remains "stubbornly hostile" to the Chinese.*
On both occasions Peking has cited evidence that the United
States has expanded military installations on Taiwan. Unlike
the North Koreans, however, Peking has not reacted to reports
that an airfield has been extended to accoiodate B-52'a.
Though Peking's reaction to the Agnew visit and its recent
treatment of the Taiwan question in general have registered
a sharp sense of being affronted by what the Chinese regard
as trc-3passing on their own territory, Peking has not reverted
to the hard line on Sino-U.S. relations which it followed after
canceling the session of the Warsaw talks scheduled for
20 February last year. While stressing that U.S. support for
* Four days later Peking announced that agreement had been
reached to hold a session of the Warsaw talks on 20 January.
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CONEIDENTrAi. PHIS 'PHENIX;
:N.:PPP:MBE!), 19y0
the Chiang regl me remains the central obs Ladle to improved
relationn, Peking 11 110 not drawn on portrayaln of a hontile
encirclement of China to reprenent the (hated Staten an a
threat to the NC and as a partner of the Soviet Union In
effortn to contain it. An the manner of Poking'n pontponement
of the Warnaw meeting met for 20 May nuggento, Peking appears
to have given p.lority to itn patronage of the Sihanouk
government in exile and its ctunpaign for Anian anti-U.S.
unity, while nuopcnding official contactu with the United
States. During the name period Sino-Soviet relationa have
been relatively calm, reducing one of the motiven for Peking
to make une of the W:i.rsuw channel.
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corw I DEMI A I, 1ME1lD:I
;1 El.:MT:MEN 1.970
r
-SOVIFLAT! S
BREZ1.1i.:EV 1711(ES COIX I Li ATMY LWi I'l CeiVENT ON C.H I
hi h is major poi i Cy adch.ens on :!ii Aw-7,u5t , Brozhnev offered the
inos I (.'oti( II. atory gen Lure .toward Ch I ni ince the early period
or the Lek 1 ng, talks lirezhnev cholla Alma-Ata, the capital of
a border repuld i c heaC,,i,usrters of the new Central Aaiun
military dist ri ct racl ng the Plikl as the uJ. to for reassuring
the Chinese that the Soviets have no aggressive designs and
rot. reaffirming Moscow 'kz commitment, tr, the negotiat-ions and
normalization or relations.
Bre zhnev rems....ks reprer'it the first authoritative comment
on the Peking talks since Deputy Foreign Minister ilichey
arrived on 15 August to serve as the new chief Soviet
negotiator. There has been no further report on the talks,
nor has there been any announcement on the session of the
joint river navigation commission since its opening on
10 (July. Last; year's session, which opened on 18 June,
ended on 8 August with the signing of a protocol. Some
measure of success in achieving agreement was reflected on
a low level in a report carried by Radio Moscow on 23 August
that trade exchange accounts had been settled between local
;ovi:.q: and Chinese trade organizations along the river
border.
Brezhnev did not mention an impending exchange of ambassadors,
which has not been confirmed in Soviet media. Kosygin
acknowledged in his interview published in the Indian
paper PATRIOT on 10 August that agreement had been reached
to exchange ambassadors, but the content of the interview
has not been carried in Soviet media.
BREZHNEV Brezhnev's current remarks on China were notably
SPEECH more moderate than in his 12 June election speech--
his last public comment on Sino-Soviet relations--
and were reminiscent of his 27 October 1969 appeal to the
Chinese to reciprocate good will in the settlement of bilateral
questions through the Peking talks, which had opened a week
earlier. Speaking in Alma-Ata on the 50th anniversary of Soviet
rule in Kazakhstan, Brezhnev introduced his comments on China
with r, rebuttal of Western speculation that the recent signing
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CONFINPATIAL PHIS TRENDS
;) SEPTEMBER MO
or the Soviet-FR(1 treaty freed Lite Soviet Union to increase
pressure on the PRC. lloseow has seemed. Intent on reasnuring
the Chinese that it is not seeking to apply military pressure
Cite tics; Kosygin in hit.; PATRIOT In had similarly
deplored speculation that the Soviets might undertake a
preclve strike against the PRC.
While acknowledging that; the Peking talks are "going slowly,"
Brezhnev did not place the blame on the Chinese, as both
he and Kosygin had done in their election speeches in early
.J uric, and he stressed that Moscow is "not losing hope" and will
"continue to display a constructive and patient approach" in
the hope that the Chinese "will respond in the same way."
Calling for a broa2.er accommodation than simply the restoration
of correct bilateral state relations, Brezhnev asserted that
the Soviet party and government are ready to contribute "not
only" to the normalization of state relations "but also to the
restoration of good neighborliness and friendship between the
Soviet and Chinese peoples and the unity of their efforts in
the struggle against imperialism and reaction." He had mentioned
both the party and jovernment in his speech last October but not
in June; in each instance, however, there has been no reference
to party relations.
While culling for normalization of relations in the mild terms
of last October, Brezhnev added the usual reminders that the
Soviets will look after their national security and will
continue to struggle for communist unity based on "the
unshakable foundations of Marxism-Leninism"--a passing
reference to the ideological dispute. He did not, however,
attack the Chinese for their ideological positions, as he
had done in June.
Brezhnev's conciliatory comments may have been timed to give a
boost to the Peking negotiations following the arrival of
Ilichev, just as he had put his authority behind the talks
shortly after they opened last October. Apart from developments
relating directly to the Peking negotiations, Moscow may be
taking a cue from Peking's polemical restraint and its resurgent
diplomatic activity in order to seek relief from the strains of
the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Brezhnev's remarks on China may
also be viewed in a broader context as part of an effort to
foster an atmosphere of detente around Soviet policies in
several key areas of tension, as his conciliatory comments on
West Germany and the Middle East as well as China suggest.
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SONVIDENT[Ak PHIS MNDS
SEPTEMBER 1970
SORDLR Soviet, media have recently carried material on activities
RIVERS along the border rivers?such as the 2 Augunt SOVIET
RUSSIA article dseussing agricultural development of
two Sovtot-hold 1:11andu near Khabarovsk?indirectly buttressing
Soviet claims to dlspItted islands but not raising the territorial
dispute as such. As in dealing with other contentious issues,
however, It has been left to Moscow's East European allies to
present the Sovtet side of the dispute in more explicit terms.
On the same day the SOVIET RUSSIA article appeared, Budapest's
weekly MAGYARORSZAG published the first in a series of articles
on Sino-Soviet relations which reviewed the border dispute and
explained the different Soviet and Chinese positions on the
status of an island strategically situated at the point at
which the Ussuri River joins the Amur near Khabarovsk.
Acknowledging that "this little plot of land has no
importance vs such," the article quoted a Soviet contention
that accession to the Chinese claim to the island--it did not
mention that the Chinese base their claims on the central
channel as the border line--would mean that "one of our
most important Far Eastern cities would be situated near the
border." But while raising this issue, the article was
generally optimistic regarding the future of Sino-Soviet
relations, reporting the absence of border incidents and
pointing to a number of agreements by the two sides to hold
negotiations and their willingness to exchange ambassadors.
A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 11 August referred to the
first two articles in the Hungarian weekly's series, but it
omitt.A any mention of the border dispute. None of the
articles has thus far been reprinted in the Soviet weeklies,
which have carried several East European commentaries on China.
PEKING SUSTAINS POLEMICAL RESTRAINT TOWARD MOSCOW
In keeping with its general polemical restraint toward the
Soviets, Peking has refrained from commenting on the Soviet-
FRG treaty, limiting itself to a reprint of an Albanian
denunciation of the treaty as designed to free the Soviets
to confront China (NCNA, 14 August) and publicizing a GDR
statement on the arrival of the FRG President in West Berlin
which stressed that the city does not belong to the FRG
(NCNA, 27 August).
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CONPIDENTIA1, EMS TRENDS
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Apart from its propaganda standdown on Sino-Ooviet issues,
Pektng's abstention Crom comment on the German issue may also
reflect its concern not to offend elements h Eastern Europe
which the Chinese have been wooing. At the time of the visit
to the PRC of a high-ranking Romanian delegation in June,
Peking not only sought common ground with the Romanians in
denouncing militry blocs in Europe but also struck notes
which may have sounded discordant to Romanian earn. Thus
Chou En-lai, speaking on 11 June, coupled his attack on
military blocs with a warning that the danger of a revival
of West German "militarism" has become "ever more serious."
He questioned whether there could be any talk about peace
and security in Europe in these circumstances, thereby
implicitly denigrating efforts toward a detente in Europe.
The next month, during the visit of the Romanian defense
minister, the Chinese ignored the German question and
European security. On both occasions the Chinese ignored
the Middle East, another area in which they diverge from the
Romanian position.
Attacks on Moscow now appearing in MC media consist largely
of pickups of foreign comment, particularly a steady stream
of attacks on the Middle East peace initiative and Moscow's
role in seeking a settlement. On its own authority Peking
continues its effort to score points among the lesser powers
by rebuking the "superpowers" for exerting an undue influence
in a variety of areas. In a characteristic use of the new
formula, Chou En-lai's 31 August message to the African
summit meeting in Addis Ababa concluded by declaring that
Africa belongs to the African people, "and not to any
colonialism, imperialism, or 'superpowers.'"
References to the "superpowers" began to appear in Chinese
comment in mid-July, apparently in response to President
Nixon's remarks on the Middle East in his 1 July television
interview in which he spoke of the dangers of a collision
of the superpowers in that area. Speaking at the Iraqi
embassy on 16 July, Li Hsien-nien assailed the notion of
a balance of power in the Middle East as an effort by the
superpowers to contend for spheres of influence there.
Peking has made frequent use of the formula to express
disapproval of Moscow's policies without reverting to its
formerly harsh anti-Soviet polemics.
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CUBA
CASTRO WARNS STATES BACKING EXILE INVASION PLANS
At a 23 August ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of the
founeng of the Cuban Women's Federation (FMC), Castro concluded
his speech by reiterating a threat of retribution against states
that permit their territory to be utilized by Cuban exiles to
launch armed expeditions against Cuba. He singled out Nicaragua
and Costa Rica as countries conspiring with "imperialists" and
counterrevolutionary "worms" in anti-Cuban plans, warning that
his government "feels free" to carry "the war to the territory
of that country which lends itself to the organization of any
invasion of our country."
Castro had made similar remarks in a 19 May speech greeting
returning Cuban fishermen who had been abducted to the Bahamas
by an exile organization. He promised then that Cuba would
"find a way to mount war" on the territory of states that think
they can launch "wars against [Cuba] with impunity."
NEED FOR Although Castro's retaliatory threats may be related
AIRCRAFT to genuine fears that Central American states will
provide bases for aggressive forays against Cuba,
they may also be aimed in part at impressing the USSR with the
magnitude of the alleged military menace to Cuba in order to
buttress a case for more extensive Soviet military assistance.
Thus, in both speeches, Castro bemoaned the fact that Cuba did
not have the long-range aircraft that would be useful as a
deterrent against raids launched from neighboring Caribbean
states. In his remarks on the FMC anniversary, he declared:
Our arms, as you know, are eminently defensive,
unfortunately. I am sure that if we had bomber
squadrons, these gentlemen would not be walking
around with such effrontery . . . organizing
expeditions against us, because we could then
turn their expeditions into dust, and them too.
We could, we said, if we had the bomber
squadrons. The fact is that we do not have the
bomber squadrons.
Castro concluded by noting that while Cuba lacks offensive
weapons its "men are offensive," ready "to take on any
mission on any soil." Similarly, in his speech last May Castro
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- 32 -
lamented that Cuba "unfortunately . . . does not have long-range
aircraft," concluding that if it did "some of those puppets of
imperialism would be somewhat more careful in providing bases
for acts of aggression against our country." He noted that
during the crisis over the kidnaped fishermen Cuban MIG-21's--
which "unfortunately . . . have u very limited range"--had flown
as far as they could, to the northern edge of the Bahamas.
Castro prefaced his warning to Nicaragua and Costa Rica on
23 August with a reiteration of remarks made during his Lenin
Day speech, scorning suggestions that Cuba sever its "military
Lies with the USSR" in exchange for a lifting of the economic
blockade. "Instead of severing our military ties with the
Soviet Union," he said, "our disposition is to establish, if
possible, even more military ties with the Soviet Union."
In the Lenin Day speech Castro had lauded Soviet military aid
to Cuba, alleging that Moscow had provided "1.5 billion pesos
in arms," and had vowed that he would "always be ready to have
closer military ties with the Sovie. Union."
Soviet-Cuban military ties have been underscored by the
unprecedented visit of a Soviet naval squadron to Cuba in
July 1968, the "friendly official visit" of Soviet Defense
Minister Grechko to Cuba in November 1969, reciprocated by a
month-long "friendly official visit" to the USSR by Cuban Armed
Forces Minister Raul Castro in April and May of this year,
and the May 1970 visit to Cuba of a Soviet naval squadron
which included a nuclear-powered submarine. Although it seems
likely that the question of future Soviet arms aid was
discussed during the Grechko and Raul Castro visits, neither
Havana nor Moscow propaganda during the visits shed any light
on the matter. Raul Castro lauded Soviet military and economic
assistance in publicized statements in Moscow but did not
suggest any anticipated change in the quantity or quality of
the aid. Soviet and Cuban reports of a 12 May Brezhnev meeting
with Raul Castro, also attended by Grechko, did not mention
Soviet military assistance.
In reporting Castro's 23 August speech, Moscow media cited his
expression of determination to strengthen Cuban-Soviet relations--
it did not specify military relations--and noted that he said
Cuba's "defensive capacity" must be strengthened to meet the
"incessant threats of a new aggression from American imperialism
and its flunkeys in Central America." No mention was made of
Castro's retaliatory threats.
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DEFENSE OF 26 JULY For the second time since he delivered
ADMISSION OF FAILURES his 26 July speech, in which he
catalogued and accepted responsibility
for Cuban economic failures while admitting that, Cuba's
"enemies are right" In noting discontent and dissent in Cuba,
Castro felt constrained 'o defend his remarks. In a 1 August
discussion with a Chilean delegation to the 26 July festivities,
Castro evinced concern over alleged distortion of ltis speech by
the Chilean rightist press as part of Its effort to defeat
leftist presidential candidate Salvador Allende. In his
23 August speech he appeared concerned lest his admission of
domestic discontent embolden exiles plotting mi:l.itary action
against Cuba. Referring ?to his 26 July admissions, he stated:
Some of the revolution's enemies . . . were on the
verge of thinking that the revolution had failed
or that the pointing out of deficiencies was some
sort of swansong for the Cuban revolution . . . .
Our enemies say that there is discontent here, and
we say that they are right. How stupid they are
that they do not understand to what degree this
attests to the strength and consciousness of the
revolution . . . ! When we opeak of discontent or
disagreement, we speak of discontent within the
revolution, not against the revolution; to
improve the revolution, not to destroy the
revolution . . . . The reactionaries do not
realize that revolutions are irreversible, that
revolutions go forward despite man's errors, man's
deficiencies
Havana's sensitivity to reports of internal discontent and its
effort to tie such reports to counterrevolutionary invasion plans
were illustrated by a PRENSA LATINA item of 23 August, built
around a Cuban Interior Ministry spokesman's denial of foreign
press allegations that three dynamite explosions had occurred in
Cuba the preceding week. PRENSA LATINA termed the increased
circulation of "false information regarding alleged events which
would confirm the development of active internal opposition to
the revolution" part of a "psychological offensive" launched by
Jose de la Torriente, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Cuban birth
who Havana alleges is active in preparing an invasion of the
island. This tactic, PRENSA LATINA remarked, had been used
prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and had "only served to
'convince' the mercenary groups who were in training in Guatemala
under the direction of the CIA."
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THE ROLE OF Castro's complaints about Nicaraguan and Costa
TOkRIENTE Rican involvement in anti-Cuban plans came
after Havana media had publicized Torriente 's
visits to those countries, alleging that he had secured the
support of Presidents Somoza and Figueres for a new attempt to
invade Cuba. During his 1 August dialogue with the Chilean,
delegation, Castro referred to the "Torriente plan" wherebv a
counterrevolutionary army being prepared in the Caribbean
countries and Mexico would be utilized to disguise a direct
U.S. invasion of Cuba. Castro had previously mentioned the
Torriente plan during his Lenin Day speech when he read a UN
dispatch discussing it.
Both Castro's remarks on Torriente and comment on the alleged plan
in Havana media depict Torriente as providing a facade for
projected U.S. "aggression" against Cuba. Thus a Radio Havana
commentary on 18 August described him as "an anonymous and
insignificant individual who Yankee imperialism made into an
indisputable chief of the counterr,-)volution." Alleging that
the anti-Cuban plans will be formulated "by the Pentagon," it
concluded that
imperialism is recruiting, arming, and leading the
mercenaries. Torriente cannot define his plans
because he does not know them. He is only a
puppet, and Washi_ .ton Is pulling the strings.
His mission is to pretend that he is acting on his
own, but Yankee imperialism is behind all his plans.
The 23 August PRENSA LATINA report of the Interior Ministry
statement commented that Torriente had said his plan
included The preparation of a volunteer army "with the
collaborat:.on of the U.S. and Central American governments"
and an invasion of Cuba by 15,000 men "within 120 days."
PRENSA LATINA claimed that he counted on "the unrestricted
support of Washington--which will supply air cover and naval
support for the aggression--and the support of the OAS,
under -.hose banner the new adventure would be carried out.
CHARGES AGAINST Castro has continued to hold President Nixon
PRESIDENT NIXON personally responsible for plans to mount
"aggressions" against Cuba. In the course
of his remarks on 1 August he reviled the President as "a
cynical and treacherous guy" who 1'.s "never given up the idea
of a lightning invasion by his troops." He observed that
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"iiuerialism" had not carried out an attack on Cuba only
"becAipe it is tied up in Vietnam." The "dango/ of such
aggression is very obvious," he said, "more so than ever before."
Castro also attacked the President in passages in his FMC
anniversary speech on the need for Cuba to maintain its military
prepareaness. Noting a report alleging that Senator Smathers
said he had discussed with President Kennedy the possible
assassination of Castro and -uhe organization of a spurious
attack on the Guantanamo Naval Base to justify an attack on
Cuba, he concluded: "If Kennedy conceived such things, . . .
if Kennedy planned such things, what must Johnson have been
capable of? Gentlemen: What must Nixon be capable of? Nixon!
I can assure you that Kennedy had no scruples, but Nixon even
less."
Castro's personal attacks on the President for plotting anti-
Cuban actions began with a 19 April speech delivered at the
funeral Li Cubans killed fighting exiles who had landed near
Baracoa. On that occasion he said President Nixon had assigned
to the Pentagon the task of "organizing and recruiting
mercenaries for new aggressive plans" against Cuba and described
the President as an "enthusiastic" supporter of the Bay of Pigs
invasion. In his Lenin Day speech Castro accused President
Nixon of "preparing a new, imminent adventure" against Cuba.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA
LEADERS USE SLOVAK UPRISING ANNIVERSARY TO ATTACK REFORMERS
The 26th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising provided an
occasion for new regime attacks on the 1968 reformers--by Husak
in a 28 August speech in Nizna Orava, central Slovakia, as well
as by the hardlining CSSR Premier Strougal in a 27 August speech
at Povazska Bystrica, also in central Slovakia, and by CPCZ
Presidium candidate and secretary Alois Indra at a party meeting
at Hodonin, in south Moravia near the Slovak border, on the 28th.
The uprising, an armed revolt against the German occupation which
broke out in Banska Bystrica on 29 August 1944, was organized by
the communists--led by Husak, Smidtke, and Novomesky--as well as
by Social Democrats and ordinary Slovak citizen groups. It
continued as a partisan movement in Slovakia until it was joined
by the advancing Soviet forces in October 1944. The communists
claim exclusive credit for the uprising.
Husak scored the 1968 reformers for alleged attacks against, the
"heritage" of the uprising, charging that they "sowed discord
between the Slovak and Czech peoples" and "attacked" relations
with the Soviet Union. In a somewhat lwer key, Strougal hailed
the "close collaboration With the Red Army" at the time of the
uprising and registered a striking endorsement of Husak's
leadership, both in the 1944 event and in the "consolidation"
of the country following "the critical situations which all of
us witnessed up to April 1969." Strougal appeared to be
pointedly underscoring his own role as governmental rather
than political leader by devoting the major portion of his
speech to economic affairs.
In characteristically vitriolic terms, Alois Indra charged
tht "the makers of the so-called Czechoslovak model of
socialisnrhad"desecrated the importance of the Slovak
National Uprising and betrayed its bequest in their slanders
of the history of the Communist Party." Indra went on to
attack historical "juggling" of the Communist Party's role in
the uprising--aimed at the Dubcek regime's efforts to achieve
a modicum of historical objectivity both with regard to the
Slovak uprising and to the role of American forces in liberating
the country in 1945. The "rightwing opportunists" of 1968-69,
Indra declared, "made light of the liberating role of the
Soviet Union" in World War II. He also recalled that "in the
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hour of mortal danger for Czechoslovak socialism two years ago,"
the Soviet Union and its allies "once again tendered us their
helping hand" in support of "the sound forces" in C7echoslovnkia.
INDRA REMARKS Of the three top loaders giving speeches on the
ON FEDERATION Slovak National Uprising anniversary, only
Indra delved into the sensitive subject of the
country's federative system, in 7hich the Sievaks have the largest
stake but whose future is in doubt under the Husak regime. The
federation of two equal Czech and Slovak notions wns a principal
teLet of the Dubcek regime's Apral 1968 "acti.on program" and--in
the face of stony silence from Soviet media on the subject?was
implemented on 1 January 1969.
Since becoming First Secretary in April 196!:., Husak has dropped
hints to the effect that the federative system has "gotten out
of hand" and needs to be "reexamined." Now Indra said that
while the present system "has created legal and organization
preconditions for complete equality" of the Czech and Slovak
nations, it is a "complicated" business and "certain mistakes"
have occurred in its implementatien. He went on to stress the
-primacy of "the requirements of a united state" over "artificial,
narrowly national interests of both the Slovaks and the Czechs."
Husak in his speech pointedly called for strengthening "a
single, independent and sovereign state of Czechs and Slovaks"
and for "Czechoslovak and secialist patrictism." TASS duly
reported Husak's remarks but. did net publicize India's speech.
TASS IGNORES ilISAK RE1ARKS ON INV. W4IVERSARY
Sensitive to any airing of the idea taat the anniversary of the
August'1968 invasion could provoke popular disturbances in
Czechoslovakia, TASS' lengthy account of Husak's 28 August
Nizna Orava speech--also published in IRAVDA--omits entirely
remarks expressing gratification over the calm which prevailed
in Czechoslovakia on the second anniversary of the invasion.
Moscow did not report any of the substance of the speech the
preceding day by Strougal, which contained more candid remarks
on the sd)ject. TASS' exclusion of Husak's remarks on the
anniversary accords with generally low-keyed Soviet propaganda
treatment of the apparently uneventful observance in the CSSR,
evidently kept under control in part by some 6,000 arrests of
"criminal, antisocial elements" during the anniversary period.
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In the recorded version of his speech carried by:the Bratislava
domestic service and Prague TV on the 28th, Husak remarked that
"in the past few days Western radios and periodicals have noted
with great astonishment or shown interest in the fact that
around 21 August the days in our country passed peacefully."
He added that "they waited for some disturbance or something" but
"the working people worked normally" as en "any other day," which
"shows a high degree of political consolidation." He went on
to claim in this connection, increased support and "trust" of
his leadel..ship by the populace.
Strougal recalled that "only a year ago . . . we were compelled
with socialist power to suppress open actions of the counter-
revolutionary elements and antisocialist forces and of various
criminal elements and to intervene very drastically to restore
order and peace in our country." This year, he added, "peace
reigned," the regime "in essence was not forced to intervene,"
and the people did not "take the bait" but "worked" during the
anniversary.
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