TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030034-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 12, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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F 0 R E I GN"'
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVIGE,i
lllllll~~u~ui~~~~~lllll
RENDS
in Communist Propaganda
confidential
12 August 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 32)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report Is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. ..-t is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
withi; i the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US lode, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law,
ONOUP I
Excluded from aulomolic
downgrading and
d?clar lfkalion -
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 AUGUST 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
U.S. Air Support for Government Forces in Cambodia: Assailed . . . .
1
VNA Says Ambassador Bruce "Rehashed Old Allegations" at Paris . . .
5
Moscow Scores U.S. "Rejection" of Coalition, Bruce Statement . . .
7
Peking, Moscow Trade Charges on Indochina Policies . . . . . , . .
9
Establishment of Sihanouk Government Press Agency Announced . . . .
10
USSR Reports Firyubin Meeting With Sihanouk Cabinet Minister . . .
11
Action in Cambodia Described, "Victories" at Kirirom Hailed .
11
Comment on the War in the South, U.S. Strategy , . . . . . . , . .
12
Le Duan Meets With "High-Ranking" Army Personnel . . . . . . . . .
.L3
Moscow Welcomes Cease-Fire as Step Toward Peace
15
Israeli Good Faith in Accepting U.S. Initiative Questioned . . , .
17
USSR Builds Up Its Peace Image, Rejects Joint Big-Two Role . . . .
18
Moscow Restrained on Arab Opposition to Political Solution . . . .
20
Peking Extols Palestinian Struggle, Assails "Superpowers" . . . . .
22
Tirana Supports Palestinian Rejection of U.S. Initiative . . . . .
23
FRG-SOVIET TREATY
Accord Hailed by Moscow as "Milestone" for Europe . . . . . . . . .
25
U.S. BASES IN SPAIN
USSR Says Bases Agreement Links Spain to NATO
28
MITRIONE SLAYING
Havana Stresses Slain Official's Ties With CIA, FPI . . . . . . . .
29
PHILIPPINES
Peking Hails Revival of Armed Struggle Led by CPP . . . . . . . . .
32
YT;GOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA
Tito Calls for Improved Ties, Pledges Noninterference . . . . . . .
34
USSR INTERNAL, AFFAIRS
NOVY MIR Continues Its Support of Liberal Causes . . . . . . . . .
36
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shanghai Exercises Control Over Its Rusticated Youth
Apprfo*ediFT i Ses285 /X18 0&11G4&kZDE $.~iJODUEtR0003.00N0034; 539
Rebuilding of YCL Urged by HUPEH DAILY Editorial . . . . . . . . , 40
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- i -
FBIS TRENDS
12 AUGUST 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 3 ?- 9 AUGUST 1970
Moscow (3310 items)
Peking (2553 items)
China
(5%)
7%
Domestic Issues
(16%)
24%
Indochina
(6%)
6%
PLA Anniversary
(23%)
16%
Middle East
(5%)
5%
Indochina
(14%)
12%
Hiroshima-Nagasaki
(--)
3%
[Cambodia
(8%)
9%]
Anniversaries
South Yemen Govern-
(3%)
1.1%
Potsthun Anniversary
(6%)
3%
ment Delegation
Test-Fan Treaty
(--)
2%
in PRC
Anniversary
Sudan Government
(--)
10%
FRG-USSR Talks
(0.1%)
1.5%
Delegation in
Nerve Gas
(--)
1.5%
PRC
Dumping
Middle East
(13%)
8%
DPRK Military
(6%)
6%
Delegation in
PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Poking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 AUGUST 1970
INDOCHINA
Western press reports detailing instances of direct U.S. air
? support to Cambodian ground troops prompt.a flurry of
VietnamesN .?ommunist.comment, including articles in the army
paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th and in the party paper
NHAN DAN on the 8th. Commentators say that this has exposed
the President's "hypocrisy" in declaring in his 30 June
report on the U.S. operations in Cambodia that U.S. air strikes
would be continued only to interdict communist supply lines.
Maintaining the fiction regarding the Vietnamese communist
i.ole in Cambodia, Hanoi says that by "communists" the United
States means the "Cambodian patriotic armed forces."
Peking's NCNA briefly reports the Hanoi press commentaries,
stressing direct air support and ignoring the issue of
interdicting supply lines. Moscow follows Hanoi's lead in
deploring the air action as a further indication of U.S.
intent to pursue the war.
The first session of the Paris.talks attended by Ambassador
Bruce--on 6 August--was marked by the usual diatribes against
U.S. "aggression" and obstruction of a peaceful settlement.
The communist delegates also reviewed evidences of their
"goodwill" since the bilateral talks started in May 1968 and
denigrated--without detailing---the proposals advanced by
the United States and Saigon.
Peking continues to publicize. Sihanouk statements, and on
9 August NCNA releases his "open.letter to kings, heads
of state, and heads of government of nonaligned countries."
Not yet available in its entirety, the letter reviews the
provisions of the Cambodian constitution to prove the
illegality of Sihanouk's overthrow and of his replacement with
the new regime.
Peking again publicizes criticism of the USSR for its failure
to recognize Sihanouk's government, in a 10 August NCNA
summary of an article in a Japanese leftist monthly. Moscow
for its part continues its routine-level polemic, answering
Peking's charges of U.S.-Soviet collusion with countercharges
of Sino-U.S. coll.'tsion.
U.S. AIR SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT FORCES IN CAMBODIA ASSAILED
HANOI AND Beginning on 7 August Hanoi media exploit the
THE FRONT flurry of press reports that U.S. air strikes
in Cambodia are directly supporting the Lon
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Vietnam--repeated on the 8th--says that despite Western press
reports of direct U.S. air support for the Cambodians, the
Nixon Administration continues to insist that U.S. planes
"attack only the supply routes and concentrations of
communist troops--that is, the Cambodian liberation troops--
who might become a menace for U.S. and allied troops--that
is, satellite troops in South Vietnam." The broadcast then
juxtaposes reiterations by White House and Pentagon spokes-
men that the air strikes are aimed at interdicting supply
lines to press accounts, including AP's report of the
5 August battle near Skoun, and quotes officers on the
scene as confirming that the air strikes are directly
supporting the ground troops.*
The Hanoi broadcast cites REUTERS for the report that Defense
Secretary Laird at his 6 August press conference "was forced
to admit" that U.S. planes r' port the Lon Nol "puppet troops."
It goes on to say that he argued that the strikes are protect-
ing ordinary people, and that when asked about direct support
of Cambodian troops "he was embarrassed and nonsensically said
that these flight missions were being carried out in accordance
with the battlefield commanders' decisions." A brief reference
to Laird's press conference along similar lines also appears
in a 7 August Hanoi English-language broadcast.
Western press reports giving eyewitness accounts of direct
U.S. air support are also reviewed in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
article, broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service on the
7th, and in a NHAN DAN article, carried by VNA on the 8th.
The army paper echoes the Hanoi broadcast earlier that day
in recalling the U.S. guidelines that the air strikes are
aimed at interdicting communist supplies and troops. And it
also maintains the fiction. regarding the Vietnamese communist
role in Cambodia by inserting the editorial explanation that
"communist troops" means "Cambodian patriotic armed forces."
NHAN DAN, on the other hand, merely refers to "air interdiction
missions" aimed at "protecting U.S. forces in South Vietnam."
NHAN DAN also explicitly recalls that the guidelines had been
* Comment before the 30 June withdrawal of U.S. ground forces
from Cambodia suggested that the U.S. air strikes were aimed at
"shoring up" the Lon Ncl regime. In July there were more charges
of air attacks and, at least .once, Hanoi cited Western reports of
U.S. air support fcr troops as refuting U,S. claims that air
strikes were limited to supply routes. (See 22 July TRENDS, p. 13.)
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enunciated by President Nixon in his 30 June report, on the
withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Cambodia, but the army
paper does not mention the President's report.
The party paper quotes Senator Mansfield as saying that the
sending of aircraft to support the Fhnom Penh administration
would result in an ".allsided war." And it goes on to say-that
the fact that "Nixon has gone back on his 30 June statement
by ordering brazen bombing and strafing of the Cambodian
territory once again evidences the U.S. criminal policy of
aggression" against Cambodia.
Both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI PHAN DAN insist that U.S. support
cannot save the Lon Nol "clique" from defeat, but the army.paper
is more explicit in documenting this claim. It cites as an
example of U.S. air ineffectiveness the fighting around the
city of Skoun, Kompong Cham Province, where government forces
allegedly still sustained high casualties and ?led in spite of
American air support.
Liberation Radio commentaries on the 6th and 8th commented on
U.,3. air action in Cambodia. in routine terms, like Hanoi
referring to "daily" B-52 and other air strikes and saying
that this would not help the Lon Nol "puppets." Apparently
the first reaction to the recent flurry of news reports and
Administration spokesmen's statements about direct support
comes in a commentary on the 9th entitled "Nixon's New Trick.
Is Exposed." It makes a passing.reference to Secretary Laird's
press conference on the 6th, saying that he "admitted that U.S.
aircraf-,; have bombed in support.of Lon Nc1. troops but that this
support is but indirect, and that U.S. p,.icy toward Cambodia
will not change."
PEKING On 1.0 August, Peking's NCNA carries accounts of the
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI.NHAN DAN commentaries.on
direct U.S. air support for the.Cambodi,~,:, forces. NCNA notes
that the party paper ci.ted Western.press reports that large
numbers of aircraft have been dispatched, and that this is
another "escalation" of the war, but it ignores NHAN DAr's
reference to the President's 30 June exrlanation.tLat U.S..air
strikes would be used for interdiction of-communist supply.lines.
The only known Peking acknowledgment of the President's
reference to interdiction came in an NCNA commentary on 3 July,
it that distorted his remarks when it reported that he said "air
interdiction would be continued. against the Cambodian Liberation
Army struggling against the rightist clique."
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Peking's only other attention to the U.S. strikes comes in an
NCNA dispatch on the 11th which condemns the U.S. "escalation."
This item similarly ignores the controversy between reporters
and Administration spokesmen on the nature of the strikes.
MOSCOW Soviet media first note reports of direct U.S.
air support for Phnom Penh troops on 4 August,
when TASS cites the French CP of-gan L'HUMANITE as quoting a
Cambodian colonel as saying the.t American planes had been
supporting Cambodian troops fo'c a week. The L'HUMANITE
item added that this is occurring "despite the fact that
President Nixon had assured the American public that the
American Air Force would not provide cover to the Saigon
army and the Phnom Penh troops in Cambodia." However, neither
this nor subsequent items recalls the President's statement on
interdiction of communist supply lines.*
On the 5th TASS reports that White House spokesman Ziegler
the day before said that American aircraft "make raids on
Cambodian territory" but that U.S. policy has "remained
unchanged," since on 30 June the President said that the
United States would carry out "air operations" in Cambodia.
TASS notes that Pentagon spokesman Friedheim said that
American planes "'sometimes' help Phnom Penh and Saigon troops
in their military operations," and says that this "actually
confirmed" reports by American news service that U.S..planes
have raided the Kirirom area for over a week. And a 6 August
IZVESTIYA article says that although Washington has been
trying to cover up the fact that U.S. planes continue "barbaric
bombing" of Cambodia, Ziegler, confronted with "irrefutable
facts," "cynically declared that there was no change of policy."
On the 7th TASS reports Secretary Laird's press conference of
the previous day, asserting that he "admitted" that the United
States is waging an "air war" in Cambodia, "confirming" press
reports that the United States is "rendering active assistance"
to the Phnom Penh troops when he said that the bombing raids
are "of use" to those troops.
r Moscow propaganda has generally avoided reference to air
interdiction in commenting on Presidential statements. React-
ing to the President's 30 June report, commentators cited him
as saying that "bombing raids," "air raids," or "air operations"
over "Cambodian territory" would continue.
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Other reports also stress that the air operations mean an
extension of the war. On the 5th.TASS cites the New York
POST as saying that there are all indications;tnat'the
United States is conducting in Cambodia a "secret aerial
war similar to that waged in Laos," and another TASS report
that day cites Senator Mansfield-as expressing alarm over
the air support, saying that it could lead to U.S. involve-
ment in a "new full-scale war."
VNA SAYS AMBASSADOR BRUCE "REHASHED OLD ALLEGATIONS" P..T PARIS
The VNA account treats Ambassador Bruce's debut statement at
the 78th session of the Paris talks on 6 August in typical
cryptic fashion, and interjects rebuttals of his remarks.
Observing that Bruce "rehashed shopworn allegations of the
U.S. President" and said that Nixon wanted to solve the c
conflict through negotiations, VNA adds that "as everybody
knows, Nixon is going ahead with his policy of prolonging
the war of aggression in Vietnam and expa'.iding the war to the
whole of Indochina. in the hope of securi?,a a military victory."
VNA says that Bruce "claimed" the United States wants the
South Vietnamese people to determine their own future, and
comments that "as everybody knows," it is the United States
and nobody eloe that has undermined the South Vietnamese
people's right to self-determination. After reporting that
Bruce "evoked the question of 'troop withdrawal,'" VNA
remarks that he did not touch on "the South Vietnamese and
world peoples' demand" for an end to the U.S. "aggression"
and a rapid, total, and unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal.
VNA fails to report, among other things, Bruce's urging that
an effort be made to narrow the differences between the two
sides' proposals, and that both sides take another look at
each other's positions; neither does the account acknowledge
his remark that the "central issues" a'e troop withdrawal,
political settlement, and -drisoners of war.
VNA dismisses the statement of GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam--
who spoke first at the session--with the remark that he "again
took up the fallacious allegation" made at the previous
sessions concerning the "'re-establishment of the DMZ,'
'mutual troop withdrawal,' free elections organized by the
Saigon puppets and so on."
CONFIDENTIAL
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COMMUNIST Both PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien and the DRV's
SPEECHES Nguyen Minh Vy delivered lengthy, polemical
statements discussing the origins of the war,
reviewing the various communist proposals, questioning U.S.
sincerity, and charging U.S. escalation and spread of the war
to all Indochina.
The PRG delegate's statement--which Liberation Radio broadcast in
full on 10 August'--recalls the NFLSV 10-point solution and its
basic provisions, namely, a U.S. troop withdrawal and the
establishment of a provisional coalition government. Nguyen
Van Tien also recalled the PRG proposal--first advanced last
December--that if the United States agrees to unconditionally
withdraw its troops within six months, then the parties will
discuss measures concerning the safety of the withdrawing
troops. Tien added that had the United States engaged in
serious negotiations and- responded seriously to the 10-point
solution, peace would have been restored in Vietnam, "or at
least this conference would have made a long step forward."
Tien reiterated the standard charge that the United States is
seeking a position of strength on the battlefield and at the
conference table. And he claimed that President Nixon's
eight-point program and President Thieu's political solution
stand "simply aoil down to schemes aimed at maintaining
American neocolonialist domination over South Vietnam."
He added that "they contain absurd and arrogant demands we
have severely criticized and rejected many times."
The VNA report of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement
notes that he explained "why" the Paris talks were stalemated
and "why" the United States is prolonging the war in South
Vietnam and extending it throughout all Indochina, but it
does not report his de?cailed.argumentation in this regard.
In noting that Vy charged the Nixon Administration with
stubbornly rejecting the DRV-PRG demands for settlement, the
account fails to report h?is critique of the allied settle-
ment position. Thus, it ignores his saying that since the
onset of the talks, the United States has insistently maintained
* In the past three months Front media attention to the
sessions has been confined to brief LPA summaries of the PRG
statement. Prior to that Liberation Radio had usually broad-
cast the full text of the PRG statement the day after the
session.
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its "arrogant" demand for a mutual troop withdrawal, "although
termed as 'mutual withdrawal of-all external forces' or
'withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces.'"
VNA also omits Vy's remarks.on the manifestations of goodwill
of the DRV and PRG in getting the bilateral May 1968 talks
started and in solving the procedural matters so.that the
present four-party talks got under way. VNA does report Vy's
urging that the Nixon Administration change its policy and
respond seriously to the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution, but
it ignores his lengthy exposition of the 10 points.
THE PRESIDENT'S Both communist delegates commented on
PRESS CONFERENCE President Nixon's 30 July press. conference
remarks opposing a coalition government,
be it negotiated or imposed, along the lines of earlier
propaganda. For example, PRG delegate Tien said the President's
remarks again disclosed "more. clearly his obduracy" in opposing
the Vietnamese people's demands, and that his reaffirmation of
the non-negotiability of the South Vietnamese people's right
to self-determination is "simply a signboard" to avoid
renouncing the GVN and engage in serious negotiations for a
correct political solution.
MOSCOW SCORES U.S. "REJECTION" OF COALITION, BRUCE STATEMENT
Commentator Yuriy Zhukov, writing in PRAVDA on 6 August, makes
the first substantial comment on President Nixon's 30 July
press conference remarks on the issue of a coalition. government.
Zhukov cites the President's remarks that.Thieu's position
concerning talks "fully corresponds with ours" and that "we
are against a coalition, government whether it is created
through talks or imposed," and goes on to note that Nixon
sent Ambassador Bruce to Saigon to make sure that there
would be no divergences , in positions at the Paris talks.
Zhukov observes that the President's stand is harder than
that taken by Secretary Rogers on 13 July when, speaking in
a "completely different tone," Rogers said that United
States holds "an extremely flexible - position" an, "ready
to do everything we can in the course of the talks" to end
the war. Zhukov further cites an AP commentator on 23 July
as recalling that Rogers stated that the communists could
have political representation in proportion to their real
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power in the country.* Zhukov says that people in Washington are
waiting with interest to see if the President will support his
Secretary of.State or Thieu and adds. that Thieu's position is the
position of the American generals in Saigon, of the Pentagon, and
of the White House itself. In this connection he quotes Washington
POST commentator Marder and New York TIMES commentator Smith as
asserting that the press conference shows that the U.S. position
has become "more rigid."**
A panelist in the 9 August domestic service roundtable discussion
comments similarly and briefly refers to subsequent efforts in
Washington to mute the thrust of the President's remarks. The
commentator says that no sooner had "one American source"
mentioned the possibility of "forming a coalition government
removing from the scene the odious puppet figures," than the
White House denied it, the President in his press conference
giving "special emphasis" to opposition to a coalition govern-
ment. The commentator adds that subsequently "observers" in
Washington began to assert that the President "had not intended
to say this," the Washington POST asserting that Ambassador
Bruce "had some new proposal to make." But he notes that Bruce
himself said that his presence "will not open a, new phase,"
but will simply be a "continuation."
BRUCE IN Routine-level radio comment on Ambassador Bruce's
PARIS participation in the 6 August session of the Paris
talks takes him to task for offering nothing new
in spite of the U.S. effort to portray his presence as a
demonstration of a desire for a peace settlement. Commentators
say that he merely restated the U.S. Government's position as it
Moscow propaganda is not known to have previously acknowledged
such remarks. The 15 and 16 July TASS reports of Rogers' comments
upon his return from Asia, for example, reported only remarks to
the effect that the end of the war was not near and that the
United States was trying to get its allies to assist the Phnom
Penh regime.
** Moscow media have not reported the substance of a Kosygin
interview with the editor of the Indian paper PATRIOT in which,
according to a brief AFP report on the 10th, Kosygin criticized
the United States for rejecting the "Just proposal" to create
a coalition government, calling this "a step back from the
previous U.S. position."
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had been stated by President Nixon in his 30 July press
conference--expressing unwillingness to withdraw troops,
to stop-all military operations, and to agree to a coalition
government. A 9 August PRAVDA article says without
elaboration that the session showed that not only has
nothing changed but that the U.S. position has ber:ome "even
more rigid and, consequently, unacceptable."
PEKING, MOSCOW TRADE CHARGES ON INDOCHINA POLICIES
PEKING Peking currently does not originate comment critical
of Soviet policies on Indochina. But on 10 August
NCNA in Chinese summarizes an article in the July issue of a
leftist Japanese monthly MAO TSETUNG THOUGHT which attacks the
Soviet stand with regard to U.S. aggression in Indochina a
the revival of "Japanese militarism." It includes the
assertion that the Soviet "revisionist" government's failure
to recognize Sihanouk's government and its maintenance of
diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol regime is "absurd."
Peking has previously picked up third-party criticism of the
USSR for failing to recognize the Sihanouk government; the
first instance was a 10 May NCNA report of a statement by
the Burmese CP. On its own authority Peking has not gone
further than implicitly criticizing the Soviet Union by
pointedly noting the number of regimes which recognized the
government--as Mao Tse-tung did in his 20 May statement.
The article in the Japanese organ, as reported by NCNA,
also attacks th'.:i USSR for having proposed through its UN
representative "the convening of a new Geneva conference."
It notes tha,%; 1 is proposal was later "withdrawn," but
points to Soviet-Japanese "accord" when it juxtaposes a
reference to the subsequent Japanese proposal for "a new
international. conference" at the Djakarta conference. An
* Moscow's East European allies, except for Romania, have
also failed to recognize the new government. On 10 August
Prague's CTK reports that Cambodian sympathizers with Sihanouk
occupied the Cambodian embassy in Prague and that the second
secretary announced the FUNK takeover of the embassy. Hamburg's
DPA on the 10th reports that CTK later "withdrew" the above
report, but FBIS has monitored no such "withdrawal."
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NCNA English version of the item, carried on the.llth, omits
the references to a Geneva conference and the Djakarta
conference, although it does include the attack on the Soviet
Union for failing to recognize Sihanouk's government.
MOSCOW Moscow's continued routine-level attacks on Peking's
Indochina stand include a 7 August Mandarin-language
commentary which again takes issue with the 1 August Peking
joint editorial. The broadcast cites the editorial's "slanders"
of the USSR for "collaboration with U.S. imperialism" as an example
of "rece:it" statements from Peking which have "shocked and provoked
concern" among those people who really cherish the interests of the
Indochinese peoples. It Ic not necessary to refute these statements,
says the commentary, since "official statements of the DRV leaders
and leaders of other countries in Indochina" have highly praised
Soviet aid. The commentary responds to Peking's charges by
countercharging Sino-U.S. collusion, saying that Peking's attack
brought "Joy" to the American imperialists who have been talking
about improving Sino-U.S. relations.
A Mandarin-language broadcast on the 8th does not mention Peking
explicitly when it says that Soviet aid is "a fact no rumormonger
can deny," and that all "genuine fighters" against oppression will
understu'id that "any provocative statements opposing the Soviet
Union will be advantageous to the imperialists."
ESTABLISHMENT OF SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT PRESS AGENCY ANNOUNCED
On 9 August the Cambodian Front radio cites the information bureau
of the FUNK for the announcement that the News Agency of Kampuchea
(AKI) will be established on the 10th as the "formal spokesman" of
the FUNK and Sihanouk's government. According to the announcement,
AKI will replace the information bureau in releasing news items
on the struggle of the Khmer people and all documents issued by the
FUNK and government. Also on the 9th, the radio carries a state-
ment by Hu Nim, minister of information and propaganda'in Sihanouk's
government, that AKI will release "genuine information" to rebut
the "fallacious propaganda" of the U.S. "imperialists" and the
"puppet" administrations in Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Bangkok. Nothing
emanating from the new press agency itself has thus far been
monitored although, beginning on the 10th, VNA and Liberation
Radio carry battle reports which they attribute to AKI.
Hanoi's VNA promptly carried both announcements on the 9th, and on
the 10th carries a congratulatory message from the director general
of VNA. Hanoi radio had been the first--on 28 July--to report the
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CON]'IDEN't'lAL 1 '13 r 'THE N1),;
].,' A(JGU;J'.C 1.970
FUNK irrforrnatlon bureau's announcement that the now FUNK radio
would begin broadcasts on 1 August, and the chief editor of
Hanoi radio had promptly sent a, congratulatory meaaage,on its
founding.
Poking acknowledges the news agency with an 11 August NCNA
report of the Initial announcement, attributed to the Front
radio, and a summary of Ilu Nirn's statement, which is attributed
to the news agency itself. There is no available Moscow report
of the news agency thus far.
USSR REPORTS FIRYUBIN MEETING WITH SIHANOUK CABINET MINISTER
'i'ASS on 7 August, and PRAVDA on the 8th, reports that Deputy
Foreign Minister Firyubin saw 'i'hiounn Mumm, "minister of national
economy and finance of the Royal Government of National Union of
Cambodia," during the latter's "stopover" in Koscow. There is
no mention of Firyubin's earlier meeting with Thiounn Mumm on
29 June--reported by TASS and PRAVDA at the time. On 3 July
AFP had reported that the minister had left Moscow for Peking,
postponing a planned tour of East Europe. Ile subsequently
attended the 18-19 July Paris world trade union conference
of "solidarity with the Indochinese people," and then visited
Poland and Hungary. These reports are the only instances in
which Soviet media are known to have mentioned Sihanouk's
government, except for the original announcement of its establish-
ment in May.
ACTION IN CAMBODIA DESCRIBED. "VICTORIES" AT KIRIROM HAILED
Communist media continue to acclaim "brilliant exploits" by the
Cambodian liberation forces in the Kirirom area and a
detailed review of the fighting there appears in a 3 August
"special communique" from the Sihanouk government's defense
ministry. The communique, publicized by the FUNK radio on
the 6th and by Liberation Radio and VNA on the 7th, commends
cadres and combatants for overcoming difficulties in achieving
success at Kirirom and notes, among other things, that in
16 days the liberation forces there "vigorously fought more
than 10 battles." The "victories" at Kirirom, according t~)
the communique, testify to the "correctness" of the policies of
the Front and government led by Sihanouk.
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10B113 'I1U NI.)S
1P AUGUST 1.970
AchicvumurrLu of the I:beraLlorr forces throughout Ctunbodla during
the month of July arc rocounted in a FUNK Information bureau
communique, oununarized by VNA on the 6th and by NCNA the following
day. Avniltiblc battle reports on recent fighting do not mention
the current engagcmentu near Phnom Penh. Reports do note action
In Kompong Clicun Province--particularly around the city of Skoun--
and In Kompong I'Irorn, Kompong Spcu, Takeo, Kandal, Prey Vcng, and
Glom Reap provinces.
CCNWiENT ON THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, U. S. STRATEGY
Recent alleged conununist military achievements in South Vietnam
are cited in a 1 August GIAI PIIONG commentary which acclaims
insurgent efforts In the first days of the rainy season. The
commentary, broadcast by Liberation Radio on It August, claims
that. "exploits" at the start of the rainy season "have invalidated
the U.S.-puppets' deceitful arguments about their recent
imaginary victories in Cambodia, such o.s : 'fhe Viet Cong--that,
is, the liberation armed forces--were driven far from the border'
and that 'the udversary cannot recover his strength for six more
months."
DNV military commentator Chien 'Mang (victor) in a 7 August QUAN
1)01 NIIA14 DAN article entitled "U.S. Strategy Is Confused," deals
with U.S. failures throughout Indochina. Ile calls the allied
Cambodian operation the "Liggest political and strategic mistake
of the Nixon clique" and says the "counteroffensive to nibble
at and occupy the Plain of Jars in Laos" was the biggest U.S.
"military setback" in Laos.
The article, broadcast by Hanoi on the 7th, begins with the
claim that U.S. stirate&y has basically shifted from fighting
rapidly for a quick solution to the strategy of fighting
protractedly. It maintains routinely that "time does not
work In favor of the U.S. aggressors." Ridiculing U.S.
measures to carry out its strategy, the article cites
the role of British expert Sir Robert `Thompson as an
adviser to President Nixon and derides him for "nonsensically"
saving that the revolution in South Vietnam is "merely a
guerrilla war" and for "mechanically" applying his Malaysian
experiences to South Vietnam. Chien Thang claims that, on the
contrary, in South Vietnam "there have not only beer steadfast
revolutionary bases and strong guerrillas but also powerful
main forces" and there have been "armed struggles, political
struggles, a guerrilla war, and a conventional war."
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CONP.I:DEN'.l'IAL, i'131~, 'I'HEND
12 AUUU;1'1' 19'l0
I~~ :crt.bing the Cambodian "attack" as "defeated" and "irrational,"
Chian 'I.'hang goes on to sae unusually vitupcirativc language in
criticizing President Nixon. He says that "Nixon is but a
mcccliocre utratcglot who has sometimes been cLupid to the point
that he believed that the Saigon puppet troops could be stronger
than the Viet Cong and who at other times htu been stupidly
rerkleu;." Maintaining that any U.S. hope for a "decisive
victory" through the move into Cambodia would have required
the "adversary" to be "stupid," Chien Tang concludes that
"Nixon continues to erroneously assess his adversary. This
paves that Nixon is more idiotic and ignorant than Johnson
,Lnd that tic will certainly meet heavier setbacks than Johnson
dtd."
LE DUAN MEETS WITH "HIGH-RANKING" ARMY PERSONNEL
Hanoi radio and VNA on 6 August report that VWP First Secretary
Le Duan "recently called on and talked to high-ranking officers"
of the Vietnam People's Army, and the VNA press review on the
same day notes that the meeting was prominently featured in
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Available reports do not
indicate if c,ther DRV leaders were present, but VNA does note
that "stanuing members" of the "central commission of the party
.in the army" were there. The "commission" is presumably the
high party organization in the army which is usually referred
to as the Central Military Party Committee. Such high-level
figures as Vo Nguyen Glap, Song Ilao, and others have, at
various times, been identified as members of the committee.
Precedent for the current meeting was set last year when,
according to a 22 May 1969 Hanoi broadcast, Ho Chi. Minh
addressed a "recent" meeting of "high-ranking cadres of
the eriLire army."* Last year Hanoi reported that the
meeting was also attended by Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and
Giap. Truong Chinh was not appearing in public duffing
this period in 1969.
See FBIS TRENDS, 28 May 1969, pages 7-8.
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CONFIDENTIAL 14'I3ILI '1'IILNDS,
12 AIJGU;.IT :1970
- lh -
Le Duan'n remarks at the current meeting are briefly uwnmarizcd
by VNA. But judging by the VNA report, he touco,ed on many
points raised in his lengthy lh February article on the 40th
anniversary of the North Vietnamese party. VNA says that
Le Duan recalled experiences of the party in developing a
correct strategic line. It notes that he stressed the party's
leading role and the role of the worker-peasant alliance
and that he cited the party's ability to take advangagc of
"enemy contradictions."
VNA reports that Le Duan "encouraged the officers to sum up
their experiences from the practical as well as the critical
points of view" in order to develop a Vietnamese military
science. And it notes that he recommended to the officers
"to see clearly the current situation and tasks," charging
that the United States still "nutures its scheme" to prolong
and expand the war and quoting Ho that the war "may drag
out" and the compatriots "may have to undergo new sacrifices
to terms of property and human lives," but the Vietnamese
people must be resolved to fight until total victory.
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CONFtI*M't'TA1, PU1:0 Diis'NI)U
1;' AUGU;P.I' 1970
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW WELCOMES CEASE-FIRE AS STEP TOWARD PEACE
TARS on 7 August In a brief triple?-datelined item from Cairo,
L,ondorr, and Washington promptly reported the respective
Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. announcements that the UAR-
israeli cease-fire would go Into effect at 2200 GMT that day.
Moscow's first comment comes in a domoutic service report
from its Cairo correspondent on the 8th which credits the
agreement on the three-month cease-fire to the "UAI{ pence
initiative," and says that the Arab world considers the
"temporary" cease-fire a victory for the UAR's constructive
foreign policy. Also on the 8th, TASS says the Egyptian
press points out that the UAR accepted the ceauc?-fire
suggestion only "after agreement was reached" that during
the three months "the enemy will not try to damage the
security" of Egyptian troops on the Suez front or the
positions of Arab troops on other fronts.
Moscow has given minimal attention to subsequent military
action on the Jordanian and Lebanese fronts: A brief TASS
item on the 10th reports from Beirut that the Israeli air
force made several raids into southern Lebanon on the 9th.
And Moscow's domestic service, also on the 10th, notes
Beirut press reports on an Israeli raid and observes that
while Israel has undertaken a three-month cease-fire in
the Suez Canal zone, to judge by latest eventa it is not
prepared to cease "aggressive activity" in other regions.
TASS has carried no reports of fedayeen operations since
the 7 August cease-fire; the last such brief report, as
usual attributed to the Joint Palestinian Command, was on
3 August. An average number of such _?eports--between
12 to 17 per month in the past three months--was transmitted
by TASS in July.
Propaganda has noted that the Suez front remains quiet; TASS
correspondent Trushin reported on the 9th that daring a visit
by correspondents to the front that day four Israeli planes
flew over and UAR defenses fired warning shots. According
to Trushin, the UAR military spokesman later told journalists
that the Israeli planes were making a "reconnaissance flight"
but almost entered the air defense zone. (Cairo media are
the only sources for a report that Nasir on the 7th received
Soviet air force commander Marshal Kutakhov, who arrived from
Moscow on 1 August.)
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONI''ID1'.NTIAI, F131L '.''RENDS
1,1 AUCUG"T 1.970
i',ovlut conuncntators weleomc I,he culu.'e-t'Ire with caut.Louu
optim.iunr, dcucrtbing LL an the "fir-,t, Important, Step" toward
preparing conditions for a peaceful :;eLLicrnunt, but; warming
of the obutacleu ahead. Medvedko krr.I.tuu In the 9 August
I'ItAVDA of "real" difficulties and "difficult.icn artificially
created by the enemieu of peace" which rnuut be overcome
before a genuine peace can be eutabl.inhod. Lukovets in
PRAVDA the amine day, observing that tlrc UAIt'u "peace
initiative" aimu at uettling the cri;iu "by tneanu of talhu,"
says much effort iu utill required. Koryavin, in IZVESTIYA
on the loth, points out that there are still complications
and obutacles to the establishment of a firm peace, but
asocuucs the "steps already takers" an malting "many things
look more optimistic." An Arabic-language radio commentary
by Soltan on the 10th says "the main point is that
negotiations should riot be allowed to turn into political
maneuvers." Even now, before the start of negotiations,
he :rays,, "some In Israel" are trying to Interpret the
November 1967 Security Council resolution as not dealing
with the liberation of all occupied territories.
An Arabic-language commentary on the 11th foresece "hard
bargaining" on "regional and other questions" in view of
Israeli statements regarding withdrawal and borders. A
commentary by PRAVDA's I3clyayev, broadcast in English to
North America on the 12th, says the UAR Government feels
it necessary for both sides to "declare their readiness"
to carry out all points of the Security Council Resolution
No. 242, particularly regarding Israeli withdrawal from
"all" occupied territories; at the same time, he adds. "the
foundation cot;.Id and should be laid for recognition u?'
Isi.el's borders as ''iey existed before 5 June 1967."
U THANT TASS on the 8th reports without comment U Thant's
REPORT 7 August report to the Security Council on the
reactivation of the Jarring mission. The TASS
account notes that the Secretary General's report included a
letter to him from Jarring stating the agreement of the UAR,
Jordan, and Isra!1 to hold discussions "under my auspices"
aimed at the estitblishment of peace based on mutual
acknowledgment oi' each other's soveriegnty, territorial
integrity, and political independence, and on Israeli with-
drawal from "territories occupied in the 1967 conflict."
TASS does not, of course, acknowledge that the language of
the Jarring letter is identical to that proposed in the U.S.
initiative of 19 June.
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Isracl'u reaction to the U Thant report is noted but riot detailed
by Moucow's domestic service in a report from its Cairo correspondent;
on 10 August. The UAR Government, the report says, has drawn the
attention of the United Nations to "To) Aviv's maneuvering" on
the interpretation of the November resolution. Correspondent
Itasuad:iri adds that U 'c'hant's report contains demands for the
withdrawal of Israeeli troopu frcm the occupied Arab territories,
and It iu "precisely this point that has aroused irritation and
dissatisfaction among the Tel Aviv leaders." (Jerusalem radio
on the 10th noted that the Secretary General's report omitted
the conditions on which Israel based its acceptance of' the U.S.
Initiative. Israel's reply called for withdrawal from occupied
territories "to secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries.")
ISRAELI GOOD FAITH IN ACCEPTING U.S, INITIATIVE QUESTIONED
Moscow has glossed over Israel's 4 August official acceptance of
the U.S. initiative:* A Turkish-language commentary on the 5th,
for example, notes in passing that after the UAR's agreement
with the American proposals, Israel, "hithough making certain
provisos, was forced to declare .t s agreement" with the U.S.
initiative, and thus "some progress" has been made toward a
peaceful settlement. The acceptance is also acknowledged in
the course of a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Yiddish
on the 5th dealing with Prime Minister Meir's Knesset statement.
Limited comment touching on the statement singles out Mrs. Meir's
refusal to return to the 4 June 1967 borders and her insistence
on secure frontiers, and asserts that "Israeli ruling circles"
thus intend, "during the first steps leading to a settlement,"
to create cbstacles and ultimately frustrate a solution.
In reporting the statement on the 6th, TASS fails to mention
that Mrs. Meir was responding to, the. V"B initiative when it cites
her as saying Israel is ready to conduct talks and send a
representative to r;iscuss with the UAR and Jordan, "'with
Gunnar Jarring's mediation,' questions that 'fall within the
framework of the Security Council resolution." At the same
time, TASS adds, she repeated "aggressive" Israeli claims,
* The text of Jordanian Foreign Minister Atallah's 26 July
reply to Secretary Rogers approving the U.S. proposal,
broadcast by Amman radio on 5 August, is identified by TASS
in a short report the following day as an official Jordanian
Government statement "in support' of the peace initiative of
the UAR."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL F'BIS TRENDS
12 AUGUST 1970
.,p 7ceciCLcally declaring that Israel would not withdraw to the
pre-5 June 1967 borders. TASS comments that "Israeli ruling
circles refuse to give up their methods of blackmail and
backstage maneuvers," which create difficulties for political
normalization of the Middle East situation.
Mrs. Meir'o remarks on borders are similarly singled out in
a 6 August foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi, which asserts
that the United States "compelled" the Israeli Government to
"formally .ccept" its proposal. But Israel does not intend
to revise its policy of military expansion, Tsoppi says, and
even its consent to the U.S. plan, "which in fact does not
:,et., any obligations for it, was only given after receiving
the U.S. assurance that it would continue to supply modern
offensive weapons."
A broadcast in Arabic on the 7th sets Mrs. Meir's statement
in the context of "desperate maneuvers" by Tel Aviv in the
.light of its "total isolation" as a result of prospects for
a political settlement. The broadcast says this was the
first time the word withdrawal was heard in the Knesset
since June 1967, and that Mrs. Meir was "also compelled
to declare" Israel's agreement to hold talks through Jarring
and within the framework of Resolution 242. It too, however,
believes the statements on borders signify an Israeli
intention to create obstacles to a settlement.
USSR BUILDS UP ITS PEACE IMAGE, REJECTS JOINT BIG-TWO ROLE
While playing up the UAR's "farsighted and consistent" position
and giving Cairo credit for its "peaceful initiative," Moscow
at the same time takes pains to enhance its own image as a
promoter of a political settlement "from the very start."
But Soviet propaganda rejects any notion of a "special role
by two major powers" in pursuing a peaceful solution.
Comment emphasizes that "as long ago as 1967" the Soviet
Union put forward proposals aimed at a peaceful settlement,
and propagandists present the adoption of Resolution 242
as resulting from the activity of the USSR and other socialist
countries. A Soltan commentary broadcast in Arabic on the
10th, for example, finds it "worth mentioning" that the USSR
"was one of the first countries in 1967 to submit proposals"
for effecting a just peace. And Radio Peace and Progress
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12 AUGUST 1970
broadcasts in English to Africa and in Yiddish to Israel en
the 10th, also recalling Soviet proposals "back in 1967," say
that the cease-fire dispells "American myths" that the Arabs
plan to liquidate Isra-~cl as a state, and that the Soviet
Union has "some sort of special aims" in the Middle East
and is interested Jn preserving tension there.
A broadcast in Arabic on the 6th complains of "imperialist
propaganda" attempts to "disfigure the aim of the USSR's
present attitude, plaoing both the Soviet Union and tI.e
United States on the same level regarding the efforts
made for a Middle East settlement." It argues that the
two countries' attitudes toward the essence and form of
a settlement are "totally contradictory," the United States
pursuing imperialist aims while the Soviet Union as a
socialist state opposes oppression, exploitation, violence,
and expansion in international relations.
Declaring that the USSR strives to enable "the Egyptians,
Syrians, Pales~i,;fans, and other people" of the Middle
East "to determine their destiny by themselves," the
commentary repeats the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement's
formulation that the people and governments of the Middle
East alone should be masters of the situation. And it
recalls that in June 1967 Kosygin "refuted the statement
that the two major powers" should lead the world and
dictate their conditions to it. (In response to a question
at his 25 June 1967 press conference at the United Nations
regarding suggestions that peace in the world could be
established by the two superpowers, Kosygin said that such
a view, in the Soviet opinion, "is completely erroneous
and certainly runs counter to our outlook, our doctrine,
our plilosophy. We believe that all nations, big and
small, can and should participate in the discussion and
solution of all world problems, in particular in the
General Assembly. We can never share the view that
there can be any kind of dictatorship of two states--
the United States and the Soviet Union--over the world.")
A broadcast in Arabic on 9 August also recalls that
Kosygin said in June 1967--this time in his 19 June
address at the special session of the General Assembly--
that the USSR did not recognize Israeli usurpation of
territories and would work for the establishment of
peace.
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12 AUGUST 1970
U.S.,-SOVIET An Arabic broadcast on 7 August contains
PEACEKEEPING Moscow's only monitored reaction to the idea
of a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force
in the Middle East, as suggested in a 4 August, Washington POST
editorial. Noting the efforts of "some imperialist circles"
to impose their ways of solving the Middle East problem, the
commentary observes that the POST proposed a plan "to use
Soviet and U.S. forces in this respect." It rejects the
idea as "an attempt to drag the c.oviet Union into U.S.
diplomatic ways and methods which are alien" to the USSR,
and asserts that the Soviet Union "resolutely denounces and
condemns such ways and methods." A just Middle East
settlement can be guaranteed by eliminating the causes
of the conflict, it says, not by bringing in foreign forces.
MOSCOW RESTRAINED ON ARAB OPPOSITION TO.POLITICAL SOLUTION
Propaganda touches only indirectly on militant Arab--primarily
Palestinian and Iraqi--opposition to Cairo's acceptance of
the U.S. initiative, portraying the UAR action as meeting
with growing approval in the Arab world. Moscow gave limited
attention to the 5-6 August conference in Tripoli, Libya,
of foreign and defense ministers of the "frontline states,"
TASS on the 5th noting the presence of delegates from the
UAR, Syria, Jordan, Sudan, and Libya. The main topic on
the agenda, TASS added, was discussion of fulfillment of
the "joint action plan against Israeli aggression" approved
by the conference of heads of a number of Arab states in
Tripoli 21-22 June. Iraq and Algeria, which attended the
June meeting, were not present at the August conference.
Assessing the results, TASS blandly cites UAR, Jordanian,
and Libyan press comment to the effect that the "successful"
meeting brought "full agreement on unity of action of the
Arab states" against Israel.
Moscow widely publicizes the speech by Mazurov at a 5 August
luncheon for a party-government delegation from dissident Iraq*
* Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG in a 5 August article called Iraq's
"negative attitude" on the question of a negotiated settlement
"definitely harmful to the cause of peace in, the Middle East."
Such a stand, it said, "only adds grist to the mills of the
aggressive imperialist policy, against which the progressive
forces of Iraq" are waging a "long and hard war." Articles
in Budapest's ESTI HIRLAP on 28 July and MAGYAR NEMZET on the?
31st had similarly taken "Arab extremists" to task for refusing
to act responsibly.
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in which he pledged continued Soviet aid to the Arab states
and pointedly added that the Soviet Government, at the same
time, "will do everything within its power to facilitate the
attainment of a just political settlement." He characterized
such a settlement as entailing "first of all," withdrawal of
Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories and
"satisfaction of the just rights of the Arab people of
Palestine." Other propaganda also stresses these dual
aims proclaimed by Cairo.
TASS on 11 August reported that Kosygin received the head of
the Iraqi delegation that day and that "the discussion of
questions of mutual interest passed in a friendly atmosphere."
The delegation left for home on the 12th; no communique has
as yet been released.
PALESTINIAN Again indicating sensitivity on the Palestinian
QUESTION question, Moscow in a 5 August broadcast to
Arab listeners assails Peking for its opposition
to a political settlement, and complains that Peking depicts
the Palestinians' struggle "for their lawful rights as though
it contradicted the possibility of peacefully liberating the
occupied Arab territories." The commentary rhetorically asks
if liberation of the lands occupied since 1967 does not serve
the basic interests of the Palestinian people. And it
maintains that realization of the November 1967 Security
Council resolution, which provides for liberatic of the
occupied territories and insures the Palestinian refugees'
lawful rights, "would be an important step along the path
of completely solving the Palestinian question."
A Petrov article in LIFE ABROAD, signed to press 29 July,
argues along the same lines in stating that Palestinian
"national rights" can only be implemented within the
framework of the general Arab "liberation struggle."
Given the possibilities inherent in the 1967 Security
Council resolution and other UN decisions, he says,
Palestinian rights can undoubtedly be ultimately
guaranteed "without infringing on the Israeli people's
rights." In a lengthy article contrasting the "class"
'rersus "national" approaches to the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Petrov says that Arab leaders are experiencing
difficulties in convincing the working masses of the
correctness of a political course to a Middle East
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12 AUGUST 1970
settlement. Considering that "not all Arab countries" agree
with Cairo's decision regarding a political solution, the
UAR leadership faces a diffictit task in explaining its
policy to the Arab public, Petrov concludes.
PEKING EXTOLS PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE, ASSAILS ;I SUPERPOWERS "
Predictably, Peking fails to ac'".-o Tledge Nasir's acceptance
of the U.S. initiative, and ignores the UAR-Israeli cease-
fire instituted on 7 August. Long a voluble exponent of
Palestinian armed struggle, Peking exploits the opposition
of militant Arabs to the U.S. initiative for a peaceful
settlement in the Middle East, at he same time obliquely
attacking the Soviets for betrayal of the Arab cause. NCNA
depicts the U.S. proposal as meeting with "strong condemnation
and resolute opposition by the 100 million Arab people,"
quoting from Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian statements, but
carefully avoids mentioning any criticism of the UAR, whose
revolution anniversary on 23 July was duly saluted by Chou
En-lai in "warm" greetings to Nasir. Thus NCNA on the 8th,
summarizing Iraqi President al-Bakr's interview with the
GUARDIAN, reports his rejection of the American proposal
and his vow to continue the struggle against Zionism,
but omits his charges, as published in the GUARDIAN, that
Egypt is incapable of leading the Arabs or his critical
comment regarding the "Nasirites."
In keeping with present Chinese policy of not attacking
Moscow directly, an NCNA commentary on 30 July accused
the United States and "another so-called superpower"
of planning a Middle East Munich* "in a vain attempt
to force the Palestinian people and the people of the
Arab countries to give up their just struggle." An NCNA
commentary on 7 August described the cease-fire proposals
as "a trick" designed to enable the "U.S. and Israeli
aggressors to reinforce their base for aggression." It
went on to assert that President Nixon had enlisted "certain
people of the no-called superpower" to aid him in his Middle
East "plot."
* Prague's RUDE PRAVO on 6 August took a swipe at the Chinese
in noting that NCNA's charges that the United States and the
USSR are preparing a new Munich in the Middle East closely
parallel the Munich charges made by rightwing "chauvinists"
in the Israeli Government.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 AUGUST 1970
AIeco cii '( August, NCNA publicized the reply of FATAH, the
,,.organ of the leading fedayeen organization, to PRAVDA's
rit..1cism of the guerrillas' stand on the U.S. proposal.
G'ATAII, NCNA said, had enjoined Moscow to be silent if it
could not offer the fedayeen "internationalist support."
Two days later, in a dispatch from Damascus, NCNA reported
that FATAH had charged the Soviet Union with assuming the
right to decide the fate of Palestine and with supporting
decisions that were against the will of the Palestinian
people. (Chou in late May had sent a warm message of
support to Fatah leader Yasir Arafat, on the occasion of
the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, pledging the support
of the PRC people and government for the armed struggle
of the Palestinian revolution.) A Palestinian "special
envoy," according to the Syrian news agency on the 11th,
left the previous day for a tour of the PRC, DRV, and
DPRK to hold "important talks" with officials on the
"present situation and the necessary measures to counter
the recent plot."
Concurrently, Peking has given a warm welcome to a delegation
from the hard-line People's Republic of South Yemen, and is
now feting a delegation led by Presiuent an-Numayri of Sudan.
In a speech at a 7 August reception for an-Numayri, PRC
Vice Chairmen Tung Pi-wu, according to NCNA, warned
against attempts by the United States and its "collaborator"
to split the Arab countries and to stamp out revolutionary
struggle in the Middle East. He confidently noted that the
Arab people are "well tempered" in revolutionary struggle
an-1 added that "so long as the goal of the national
liberation movement of Palestine and other Arab countries
remains unrealized, the so-called Middle East question
cannot possibly be settled." It is the Palestinian and
other Arab peoples, he said, "and not one or two 'super-
powers' who will decide the destiny of Palestine and the
Arab world."
TIRANA SUPPORTS PALESTINIAN REJECTION OF U.S. INITIATIVE
Peking's Tirana ally has underscored its support for the
Falestinian fedayeen by giving a warm reception to a Fatah
delegation which visited Tirana from 30 July to !< August.
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- 24 -
12 AUGUST 1970
The leader of the group, identified by Radio Tirana as a
member of the "upper central committee" of Fatah, was
greeted at Tirana airport by Defense Minister Balluku and
later met with Premier Shehu and party chief Hoxha.
ZERI I POPULLIT on 30 July, in an article marking the
group's arrival, assailed he United States and the Soviet
Union for their "plans" to "lay their hands on the riches
and strategic positions of the area" and "to save the
Israeli Government from political and military disaster."
The article acknowledged, without comment, that the UAR
and "some other Arab countries" have agreed to hold talks
with Israel. It underlined, however, that Iraq, Syria,
and the Palestinian Arabs have rejected the U.S. initiative,
adding that "the Arab people are fully entitled to liberate
by force their territories occupied by Israel through
force."
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CONVII)(,MCJA1, i'uI 11111-0.111
1;' AIARR,T 19'(0
FRG-SOVIET TREATY
ACCORD HAILED BY MOSCOW AS "MILESTONE" FOR EUROPE
The. 12 AuE;uut signing in Moscow of the Soviet.-Went German
treaty is promptly hailed by TAGS commentator Orlov au it
"milestone" in Europe's poutwar history which will facilitate
an improvement in that continent's political climate and may
facilitate an Improvement in the general international
situation. According to Orlov, the spirit of "realism"
Is evident in the recognition of the inviolability of
European frontiers, including the Oder-Neiuac line and the
frontier between the FRG and the GD11, and in the commitment
of the USSR and the FRG not to solve disputes through force
or the threat of force. The common point of departure in
the treaty, Orlov says, is the desire to help reduce
tension and to promote the development of peaceful relationu
for the sake of consolidating security in Europe. Orlov
routinely takes note of the fact that there are "forces"
in West Germany which do not r,pprove such developments as
the treaty, "but, judging by everything, such quarters
enjoy ever less support."
At thin, writing, Soviet media have not released the text of
the treaty and the accompanying letters to the USSR and the
FRG's Western allies; nor are they known to have acknowledged
the premature release of the documents by the Springer press.
Consistent with treatment of the negotiations with Bonn since
cneir resumption in the Soviet capital on 27 July, Moscow
devoted only a low volume of prop,.ganda to the 7 August
initialing of the FRG-Soviet treaty. TASS and Radio Moscow
on the 7th promptly reported the fact of the initialing, and
subsequent dispatches took note of favorable world reaction
to the treaty. TASS on 9 August, for example, drawing heavily
on the East European press, pointed up the importance of the
agreement for the cause of European security. In the period
between the initialing and the formal signing, TASS items
briefly reported Brandt's arrival in Moscow for the 12 August
ceremony and his activities in the Soviet capital, including
his meeting with Kosygin.
Gromyko's remarks at the 7 August airport departure
ceremonies for Scheel had highlighted Moscow's minimal comment
on the treaty initialing. As reported by TASS, Gromyko said
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CO II V I01-JI' IAI, FM:; TH1.1;111):1
I,' d\t (I ;.T 19'(0
th'1.t thr' I'll Ikt; y1--;"r?d I'rrl;t(ltl; wht('h t)t'r^ 1)rt1)K "p1.tt;itJvoly
I by bol h '; Idr"; , rind I,llrtl. I'll- :i()Vlrt (ir_IVOt't11)ICl)t,
ror it,t; part, In eonvlncrd t,hn,L the' rot;rrll,;; tiro In 1,11r
Lntrr^ot;tn or ltnpruvItiff, rrl.rcticmro beiwr'rrl 11,11f two rolli0x1vil
rind In Lhc Lntt r^et;t(; of fut^t,her? di'LrnL;' tul(i t;c ;rt Ity III
Ellrupr . A par?1.lelpn.nt to the dcmlent.fc acrvJco colr.menLntot'r;'
r(I,u?ldtrtl?le Dhow on thr 9th paraphrar;cd tlrolti %o without,
t.ttt,rIbution and took fULr' of the ravorablc rc,act Ion to the
accord by the world put,I te, 'I'he cclnunctlttrtor want, on to
c)br:r'r?ve that, "t,hot,e circler; In the Wrt;t," which were .l.nl.t.ta.l.ly
critical of the t,re.aty "hicvc no groun(It: f'or narking tiny
obj"et,ionr; againut the rc:;ultr, which were ext.r?crncly rruiLful,
nccer;t:ary, and Important rot, the cause of peace In Europe."
An it August I'UAVUA article, reviewed by TA::, concluded
that. "there are good rear.;onu" for world public at ton t, ton to
the treaty because the quctti.onu treated in the agrecmenL
"have a great importance both for the development, or
relations between the :;ovlet, Union and the FRG Lind for the
i1tuaLion in Europe as a whole."
EAST Moccuw's European allies, including It_>muniu,
EUROPE have hailed the initialing of the accord as a step
toward European security turd au an augury for
LrnprLved relations betwoen the I11IG and other East European
states. On the latter point, an article in ZYCIE WAHZAWY
on Lhc 8th, reviewed by PAP, said that the initialing of the
treaty "huu certainly produced a favorable climate" for other
negotiations. A CTK-reviewed article in the Bratiulavrs
PRAVDA on 8 August made a similar point but went on to warn,
however, that the CUU/CSU opposition in West Germany remains
intent on "torpedoing" the accord before .ratification. The
Prague daily ZEMEDELSKE, NOVINY, in an article on the 10th,
observed that the treaty could become "a springboard into
the future of Europe" if Bonn continues to pursue the Polish-
West German talks, seeks to resolve the "open issue" with
Czechoslovakia, and "expresses its positive relation" to
the GDR.
* Soviet media have not reported the substance of a Kosygin
interview with the Indian paper PATRIOT, in which, according
to AFP on the 10th, he said that the treaty was a "major
political event" which should serve to stabilize the situation
in Europe and throughout the world.
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t;UNI'II)I;N'I'IA1, VBI;; 'I'ItENI)
1;.1 A11(111t;'i' 1.1970
I'hr' Cirr;t nubuLrxnt,.Lttl Lttst, Ccrmar- ummenl; .tn the wake of the
treaty .1nii,io'-.inN appcaru in it 1.' Aut~uul; NIJE," I)HU'i'GCIILANU
rtrIi.cle, transmitted textually by A1)N late on the 11th. The
ttrL.LCic uayu that it, is "good n(!ws" that, the I.itG-13ovicL
nc.otLationt; have reached ct positive conclusion, and it
Calls Lh-2 Lt'caty it uuccenti for 13ovie_t, policy and for the
;;)cI!ti.at;t. community as it whole. 'I'hc article further
Charrtctr.rtzc?u the treaty as a defeat for the "rightist forces
in Wcut Germany, for all those who lack the understanding to
rvcogr,i~c the realities" of postwar Europe. A later ADN
c11upat;ch on thL) 11th calls the treaty "a significant step
toward detente, in Europe" and hails the Brandt-Schccl govern-
ment's "more realistic" approach toward European affairs.
In it related development, East German media on the 9th
sutnrnari;:ed Ulbricht'c letter to the heads of state of various
NA'.1'O and nonaligned countries on the need for developing
relations with the GDR. Accordirg to the letter, the
"fundamentally new situation" in Europe demands this.
While the letter does not specify the FRG-Soviet treaty as
an clement in the "new situe ;ion," an East Berlin broadcast
on the 10th says that the successful Bonn-Moscow talks as well
as the Polish-West German talks "belong to the factors of
European politics which Walter Ulbricht, in his message to
various heads of state, said has led to a new sit?iation."
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iW nuruS'r 1970
U. S. BASES ,N S P A I NO
USSR SAYS BASES AGREEMENT LINKS SPAIN TO NATO
Soviet comment: oil the 6 August; uigoirig of the military bases
agreement between thn tinIte(l StatCtl and ')pa.In utresucu that
the agreement .links t;pain more closely with the NATO defense
system to the detriment of ii:uropctui security, fills the
"breach" in the NATO front created by the French withdrawal,
and provides the Pentagon with new footholds in the
Mediterranean. :;ovict media also point. out the risks of
the new agreement to the ;Spuuish people and claim the
agreement's "new obligations toward Madrid" are provoking
domestic U.S. opposition to the Nixon Administration's
use of the executive agreement. Commentators ;rnerally
opined that, the Administration rushed the signing of the
agreement i:r order to present the Senate and the country
with a fait accompli, asserting that the agreement involved
"the expansion of American military commitments" and should
have been referred to the Senate for ratification.
A commentator on the 9 August doriestic service roundtable
program declared that the agreement binds Spain "to the
NATO military system by the bac,' door." This theme was
embellished by PRAVDA's Strelnikcv who rioted, according to
a TASS review of the 10th, that U.S. military considerations
have assisted Spain to realize, in affect, its "old dream"
of membership in NATO despite continued opposition to Spanish
membership by several NATO members. Strelnikov attributed
tae conclusion of this "dangerous deal" to Pentagon efforts
to strengthen and expand "the military beachhead in the
Iberian Peninsula." RED STAR on 8 August, according to TASS,
said that Spain has become the only place where the Pentagon
can "somehow compensate the loss of its bases first in France
and then in Libya." TASS correspondent Melikyan on 7 August
claimed that the agreement's establishment of a high-level
joint committee on defense matters creates "a bridge between
Spain and the NAIJ military bloc" and represents "the first
step" in Pentagon designs to "strengthen the NATO rear."
Melikyan also asserts that nuclear-armed U.S. planes flying
from bases in Spain will "create daily and hourly the danger
of a new Palomares for the Spanish people," recalling the
17 January 1966 incident. Several other Sovicc. commentaries
also raise the spectre of Palomares in stressing that the
agreement "contradicts Spain's national security and the people's
interests."
CONFIDENTIAL
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COI1I I I )I?; IT I A1, 1, 13 1.;., 7'It131U;.;
J AUGIJ 'r I.970
MITRI0NL SLAYING
HAVANA STRESSES SLAIN OFFICIALS TIES WITH CIA, FBI
I;xL r;a i.v,: IU'w-cua re:portrtr,c u.ncl .l im!.Le(I ec:,nmtent on the abduction
rtnrl ;,trt~;.c+ltu.?nt. s In.y f ng; of' Dun Mitr?iottc, U. S. police adviser to
th,! ttr1wun.yrr.n GOvernrncnt, ha., emphau.i.zed hiu alleged lurks to
t.1te CIA anrf P131. Havana Itnu sr.rggeu tied that; Washington refrtti.ned
ft?:nn uruint? ilrutf+_tay to agree to the Tuixunarou guerriilari'
clcnuuiWW;; for the ref ertue of prisoners In exchange for Mitrionc;
L cc ;,ut;e 1 t t'carc+i his. release, would focus public attention on
U.;;. c l.rtn+lcuttnc rretivit.Ieu in Latin America. Although Ilavana
h.'!:t 'lVQ1(1Cd .1 .2ci.fical.ly approving Mltrione': execution, it
ha!., I'.trtdcd t.hc "prudent and firm policy" followed by the
'l'ul"'uac+rns in the Mitrionc case.
P:&th hc?fore and after M.itrione'u slaying, Ilavctnu medics repeatedly
,.7lrar?act;f:rizccl him as a CIA and FBI agent with a long history of
CounLerrevolutlonary activity. Thus Radio Havana on the 6th,
ci.ting political exiles in Paris as the source, reporteu that
Mitrionc had ps.i.rtir..ipated in the 1961 Brazilian military coup
which o't:,te:d President Goulart. It noted that he was a
"po.litic:al-rnil.itary adviser" in Brazil at that time and
"r?ocper:ited" with Brazilian generals responsible for the coup,
t'arning up "during 1962 and 1963 . . . as a CIA agent in Belo
!i ,r i :ante, :t c: ty where L;everaL of the officers who cooperated
i . L':r:? r vup r?_ s i ded . " Other WLrtrana comment has intimated that,
of Mitr:ione's connections with U.S. security organiza-
Wr.t>,h;rigton preferred to "sacrifice" him rather than risk
,tI?,,u~._ r)f U.13. c1