TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030031-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 22, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIIIiIIU~~~~~~~~~iiIlllll
INFORMATION
SERVICE
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
RENDS
in Communist Prod Uganda
Confidential
22 July 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 29)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadca;f? :;nd press media. It is published
by FBIS without cooedination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP 1
Eacludsd Iron, auromalic
dorrngroding and
d!clorcirmlion
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Hanoi, Front Comment on 1954 Geneva Agreements Anniversary .
1
Moscow Marks Anniversary, Scores Peking on United Action
3
PRC on Political Solution; Sihanouk Anniversary Comment
5
Paris Talks: U.S. Accused of Sabotaging Geneva Accords , , . . .
6
Madame Binh Visits India, With Stopovar in Hanoi
8
NLHX Marks Anniversary of Geneva Agreement's on Laos , . . , . , ,
9
New Ministries Created in Sihanouk's Government , . , , , , , . .
12
Yemen, Tanzania Recognize Sihanouk Government , , . . , , . .
.12
Reports on Cambodian Military Action
13
Comment on War in South Vietnam , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
14
Continued Exploitation of Con Son Prison Criticism
14
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Attacks on DRV
15
Truong Chinh and To Huu Address Science Meeting . , . , , , , , .
16
UAK-Soviet Communique Supports Mideast Political Settlement . . .
18
Belyayev Rejects Charges of Direct Soviet Involvement . . , . . .
21
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Suslov Reaffirms Soviet Desire for SALT Agreement
23
FRG-SOVT,ET RELATIONS
USSR Reports Bilateral Talks Tc Resume, Downplays Press Leaks . ,
24
JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY
JCP Congress Underucores Independence in World Movement . , . , ,
26,
Soviets Launch Polemical Attack on Eve of Congress , , . . . . .
28
ALBANIA-ROMANIA
Tirana Welcomes Romanian Trade Union Delegation
30
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Party Daily Explains Dubcek Ouster, Rebukes Hardliner , . . . . ,
31
USSR ?INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Republican Laws Against "Parasites" Publicized Belatedly
34
Editorials Indicate Concern for Strengthened Defense 37
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C 0 N T E N TS (Continue(])
? PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CCP-Revolutionary Committee Relationship Again Discussed . . . . 39
Heilungkiang Farm Shifts Mess Halls to Lower Units . . . . 40
Hopeh Provincial Service Resumes Local Broadcasting . . . 41
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FBIS TREND?
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 JULY 19-x0
Moscow (3 13 .terjis )
Peking (2450 items)
Supreme Soviet session
(--)
23%*
Domestic Issues
(23%)
35%
Indochina
(7%)
8%
Indochina
(33%)
22%
[Supreme Soviet
(--)
3%]
[Cambodia
(26%)
12%]
Statement
Tanzanian, Zambian
(5%)
7%
Middle East
(4%)
8%
Government Dele-
[Nasir in USSR
(0.2%)
3%]
gations in PRC
[Supreme Soviet
(--s
3%]
Vice President of
(--)
5%
Stc.temcnt
China
(5%)
6%
Congo-B in PRC
PRC -DPRK Friendship
(5%)
4%
CPSU CC Plenum
(4%)
14%
Treaty Anniversary
Iraqi Revolution
(--)
2%
French National Day
(--)
3%
Anniversary
These statistics are based on tha voice;ast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international ; adio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
The Supreme Soviet's statements on Indochina and on the Middle East
are included here as well as in the figures on Indochina and Middle East.
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I11D0CH I N A
President Nixon's 20 July press conference is typically reported
promptly and briefly by TASS. The report says that the President
"completely supported" the GVN's stand opposing political
settlement and the formation of a coalition government and
that he said the United States "does not intend" to speed up
troop withdrawal. It also notes that he "confirmed" U.S.
policy regarding Laos, particularly that the bombing there will
continue.
The 16th anniversary of the Geneva agreements on 20 July
prompted the customary DRV Foreign Ministry statement, which
rejects U.S. avowals of respect for the agreements and
reiterates Hanoi's position that the DRV and Front proposals,
as well as the Laotian Patriotic Front's five-point solution
and Sihanouk's 23 March statement, "fully and clearly reflect"
the principles embodied in the accords. The statement recalls
that Ho Chi Minh's appeal on the anniversary last year had
expressed the Vietnamese people's resolve to continue fighting
until U.S. troops are completely withdrawn and the Saigon
government collapses.
Peking publicized an rnniversary statement by Sihanouk's govern-
ment, which rules out participation in "any negotiations or
conferen^.e" aimed at "legalizing" the Lon Nol regime or
"partitioning" Cambodia. There is little other Peking attention
to the anniversary, although Chinese media publicize Vietnamese
comment on the occasion.
Moscow media, recounting the usual public meetings and messages
from public organizations on the anniversary, have broadcast
comment routinely accusing the United States of violating the
Geneva agreements. There is no Soviet editorial comment on
the occasion, but editorials in PRAVDA on the 19th and in RED
STAR on the 18th reiterate the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement's
expression of support for the Indochinese peoples.
The DRV's NHAN DAN published the Supreme Soviet statement on the
17th, along with an editorial stating that the Vietnamese have
constantly received "strong support and great assistance" from
the USSR. The Front welcomed the statement in an LPA editorial
on the 19th.
HANOI, FRONT COMMENT ON 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ANNIVERSARY
HANOI Following the practice of previous years, the DRV
Foreign Ministry issued a statement to mark the
anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on 20 July 1954.
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On the 18th VNA also carried a communique issued the preceding
da;;? by a joint session of the National Reunification Commission
of the DRV National Assembly and the South Vietnam deputies to
the Assembly, condemning the United. States for "having seriously
and systematically undermined" the agreements. Hanoi media
recall Ho Chi Minh's appeal on the occasion of the anniversary
last year, but no statement comparable to Ho's annual anniversary
appeal has been issued.
The DRV Foreign Ministry statement, dated 19 July and broadcast
by Hanoi radio that day, includes routine chai,ges that the
United States has sabotaged the agreements and ignored the
fundamental national rights of the three Indochinese peoples.
It censures the Nixon -administration for "cl.tnging to its
stubborn stand" in the Paris negotiations and refusing to
withdraw U.S. forces completely and unconditionally, as well
as for trying to maintain the Saigon government in order to
oppose the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.
It says that to deceive public opinion and cover up its "crimes,"
Washington has "advanced many cunning arguments" to make people
believe it has been respecting the Geneva agreements and the
Indochinese people's right to self-determination. But it
asserts that "all the deceitful tricks on peace" have "failed
to fool anybody."
Declaring that the Indochinese peoples, for their part, have
continuously safeguarded the principles of the Geneva agree-
ments, the statement asserts that the DRV government's four-
point stand, the NFLSV's 10-point solution, the Laotian Patriotic
Front's five-point solution on Laos, Sihanouk's 23 March five-
point statement, and the joint statement of the Summit
Conference of the Indochinese peoples have "fully and clearly
reflected these principles."
After recalling Ho Chi Minh's 20 July 1969 appeal in which he
asserted the Vietnamese people's resolve to carry on t1.t, war
"until the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops and unti). the
total collapse of the puppet army and administration . . . "
the statement avows the determination of the Vietnamese to
strengthen solidarity with the Khmer and Lao peoples and
jointly to oppose the United States and its allies "until
total victory." It declares that "no impudent threat can shake
this iron-like determination."
A 20 July NHAN DAN editorial, carried by VNA that day, largely
echoes the foreign ministry statement and the communique. But
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in ridiculing the notion that President Nixon has respected
the Geneva agreements and the Vietnamese people's right to
self-determination, it comments that the President has
spoken "vaguely" of free elections and democracy and questions
"how they can be realized if "such 'elections' would be carried
out by the U.S. lackeys under American bayonets."
NFLSV/PRG There is little available Front comment on the
Geneva agreements anniversary. Liberation Radio
on the 19th broadcast a radio editorial marking the occasion
with routine charges that the United States has "systematically"
sabotaged the agreements over the past 16 years. The
editorial reviews the current military and political situation
in Vietnam and Indochina in glowing terms. Among other things,
it reaffirms the 10-point solution as the basis for a
settlement in Paris and repeats the view that the naming of
Ambassador Bruce to head the U.S. delegation at the Paris talks
was an effort to "fool public opinion" into believing the
United States wants to end the war.
Also on the 19th, Liberation Radio broadcast an editorial which
it said was published in a special Geneva agreements anniversary
issue of the clandestine journal THOI SU NHAN DAN (People's
Current Events). The editorial discusses the anniversary
only briefly; it concentrates on favorably assessing the current
Indochina situation and reasserts the southern people's
determination to fight until final victory.
The anniversary has been marked in previous years by official
statements fr,,m the NFLSV, PRG, and Vietnam Alliance.
MOSCOW MARKS ANNIVERSARY, SCORES PEKING ON UNITED ACTION
ANNIVERSARY, Moscow marked the Geneva agreements anniversary
OTHER COMMENT with the usual meetings and messages from
public organizations and with a "solidarity day."
The occasion was also marked with a solidarity day in 1966,
although a solidarity month has been observed in the intervening
years.
Commentators routinely denounce the U'aited States for violating
the Geneva agreements and express support for the proposal for
a political settlement advanced by the "patriots" of South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, stressing the demand that the
United States withdraw its troops from Indochina. The United
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States is blamed for the "deadlock" at the Paris talks and is
charged again with using the talks as a cover for continued
aggression. A commentary broadcast in foreign languages on
the 20th says Washington is currently trying to give the
impression that it attributes prime importance to the talks in
order to counter the negative impression created by the
Cambodia operation. The commentator notes that President
Nixon referred in his 1 July TV interview to a "new
contribution" to the success of the talks, but it adds that
this contribution turned out to be only the appointment of
Ambassador Bruce. The net result, says the commentator, is
simply "a renewal of the situation that prevailed at the talks
half a year ago."
While the customary Soviet press editorials on the anniversary
have not appeared, editorials in PRAVDA on the 19th and in
RED STAR on the 18th, or. the results of the Supreme Soviet
session, sustain the Soviet propaganda denunciation of U.S.
"aggression" in Cambodia and echo the expression of support
for the Indochinese peoples in the 15 July Supreme Soviet
statement on Indochina. Both editorials repeat the state-
ment's demand for an "immediate, complete, and unconditional"
withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops, but they do not
reiterate the statement's remarks on a political settlement
in Laos.
An IZVESTIYA article carried by TASS on the 17th says the
"military success" claimed by the United States in Cambodia
was actually a strategic and political defeat. The article
says "observers" believe that "the Lon Nol regime will be
short-lived," that it controls only about half the territory
of Cambodia, and that the capital is "under threat of capture
by the patriots."
ATTACKS ON Moscow continues routine-level attacks on
PEKING Peking's Indochina policies, with a broadcast
in Mandarin to Southeast Asia on 17 July
pointing to the Supreme Soviet statement as evidence of the
USSR's support for the Indochinese peoples. The commentary
says the USSR's aid to the Indochinese has dealt a blow to
Peking's propaganda "fabrications" about Soviet-U.S. collusion.
It recalls that the Chinese leaders did not react to the call,
in the 5 May Soviet Government statement on the U.S. incursion
into Cambodia, for unity of all socialist, anti-imperialist,
and peace-loving forces. U.S. expansion of the war in Indochina
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has "threate?aed the security of China," it adds, and the
Chinese should realize this danger and unite with the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries to take "unified action."
A commentary broadcast in Mandarin by Radio Peace and Progress
the same day similarly takes the Chinese to task for failing
to understand the importance of strengthening the unity of
all anti-imperialist forces in support of the Indochinese
people. It repeats the charge that Peking is "intentionally
trying to alienate the Indochinese people from the Soviet
Union and otiier socialist countries" and "underrates the
significance of the socialist commonwealth" to the world
anti-imperialist struggle. It once again charges that Peking
has rejected the USSR's proposals for a united front in
support of Vietnam, thereby abetting U.S. escalation.
PRC ON POLITICAL SOLUTION; SIHANOUK ANNIVERSARY COMMENT
AGREEMENTS The only original Peking attention to the
ANNIVERSARY Geneva agreements anniversary is a 20 July NCNA
Chinese-language item offering "background"
on the agreements. The brief item reviews the contents of the
agreements and says that they "frustrated the scheme of the
United States to expand the Indochina war" but that the United
States "quickly turned its back on its promise" not to obstruct
the agreements. Reviewing U.S. "aggression" in Indochina, it
concludes that the dispatch of American troops to Cambodia
expanded the war throughout Indochina, "thereby completely
wrecking the Geneva agreements." Peking media also carried
the text of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the
anniversary.
The Sihanouk government declares in its anniversary statement,
carried by NCNA on the 20th, that it "refuses to participate
in any negotiation or conference directly or indirectly aimed
at legalizing the puppet regime of the traitors Lon Nol and
Sirik Matak, partitioning Cambodia in any way and camouflaging
the U.S.aggression." The "only just solution in conformity
with the spirit of the Geneva agrements," it says, is "the
immediate cessation of U.S. aggression, the immediate, complete,
and unconditional withdrawal of the puppet troops of South
Vietnam, Thailand and other satellites, and the immediate
cessation of all acts of war against the fraternal Laotian
and Vietnamese people." The statement expresses the conviction
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that the Khmer people, "closely united" with the peoples of Vietnam
and Laos, "firmly supported" by the PRC and DPRK, and enjoying
the "militant solidarity" of the people of "other socialist and
progressive countries," will be victorious.
POLITICAL PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien denounced. the notion
SETTLEMENT of a political settlement in Indochina in successive
speeches during the past week. At a banquet for a
visiting Congolese delegation on the 15th and at an Iraqi embassy
reception the next day, he derided U.S. proposals for a political
settlement in both the Middle East and Indochina, accusing the
United States in the latter speech of "peddling the swindle of
a so-called political settlement" in both areas.
In the speech of the 15th, after charging the United States with
advertising a "peaceful settlement" in Indochina while continuing
the war under the "camouflage" of troop withdrawal, he stated
that "so-called" peaceful settlements in the Middle East and
Indochina are simply "refurbished versions of the Munich policy
of the 30's" aimed at stamping out the armed struggles of the
peoples and at "realizing the division of the world by the
super powers at the expense of small nations."
At a 5 July Peking banquet for Sihanouk, Chou En-lal, in a.
remark presumably aimed at the Soviets, had claimed that
President Nixon wants to intimidate "certain countries" into
helping him create a "Munich" in the Middle. East, Indochina,
and elsewhere.
PARIS TALKS: U1S, ACCUSED OF SABOTAGING GENEVA. ACCORDS
The communist delegates at the 75th session of the Paris talks
on 16 July marked the Geneva agreements anniversary by devoting
their presentations to charges that the United States has
sabotaged the accords, thereby bringing about the conflict in
Scuth Vietnam. Following recent practice, the VNA and LPA
accounts of the session are highly selective, focused chiefly
on denunciations of U.S. "crimes" by the PRG representative
and on general charges of U.S. aggression by the DRV delegate.
VNA notes that PRG deputy head delegate Dinh Ba Thi, speaking
first, recalled the process of U.S. "intervention and aggression"
in South Vietnam, charging that the United States had "sabotaged
the various clauses" of the Geneva agreements and committed
"countless crimes." Neither the VNA nor the LPA version records
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Thi's full argumentation on how the United States has
"sabotaged" the agreements--his charges that the United
States had "illegally" set up the GVN administration and
ordered it to "repudiate all consultations for general
elections," had introduced its troops and war material,
and along with the GVN had "carried out a series of terroristic
reprisals."
The LPA and VNA accounts only briefly report Thi's listing of
alleged U.S.-GVN crimes, although Thi devoted nacre than a third
of his text to them. VNA--but not LPA--reports his claim that
from mid-1954 to late 1964, the United States and GVN had
"killed nearly 170,000 persons, wounded, or tortured to
disability almost 800,000 others . . . and jailed more than
400,000." And VNA notes Thi's charge that since early 1965
"persecution and destruction have been intensified" and
"hundreds and thousands of bloody massacres" have been carried
out .
The accounts mention Thi's charge that "barbarous" methods of
torture are practiced by the United States and the GVN in South
Vietnamese jails. Neither reports his lengthy, graphic
descriptions of alleged torture and conditions in the Jails,
(including Cc,Li Son,) but both note his assertion that the
United States should be held responsible for "the penitentiary
regime" since it has "organized, trained, equipped, paid, and
commanded the puppet administration in this matter."
VNA reports briefly that in their supplementary speeches the
PRG and DRV delegates "again condemned the towering crimes
committed by the U.S. puppets in South Vietnam, especially
the barbarous regime in the prisons set up by them, and
refuted all the U.S.-puppets' perfidious allegations."
VNA reports that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy "condemned the
United States for systematically sabotaging" the Geneva
agreements and "conducting intervention and aggression" in
Vietnam. It ignores Vy's brief general charges about the
buildup of the war and 16 years of alleged U.S. "crimes,"
but it does note his claim that the United States came to the
Paris conference on Vietnam "due to its heavy defeats" and
his charge that it "still refuses to give up its scheme
of aggression." VNA says Vy recalled the "U.S. maneuvers and
acts of aggression" in Laos and Cambodia and condemned the
Nixon Administration for expanding the war to all of Indochina.
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It omit;z the detail he devoted to these charges, as well as his
recitation of victories allegedly scored by the Indochinese
people.
Vy, according to VNA, refuted jus',;ifications of U.S. policies
of "aggression and war prolongation" in Vietnam based on
arguments about the security of the United States, the
protection of honor, and avoidance of humiliation and defeat.
Vy charged that such arguments are meant to "incite chauvinism
and appease the opposition" of the American people to the
Vietnam policy.
Both communist delegates praised the NFLSV's 10-point solution
as the correct one for the Vietnam problem. PRG delegate Thi
concluded that whether the war "will or will not end soon,
whether peace will or will not be restored promptly in South
Vietnam and Indochina," depends on the Nixon Administration's
readiness to give up its "aggressive" policy. The DRV
delegate placed the responsibility for the stalled Paris
talks on the U.S. Administration.
ALLIED REMARKS VNA gives only cryptic, one-sentence
coverage to the allied presentations. It
says that GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam "did his best to distort
the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements and to slander the DRV"
and that U.S. delegate Habib "repeated his shopwc.rn allegations
on 'mut;,ai troops withdrawal,' 'free elections,' and 'POWs'
questions."
MADAME BINH VISITS INDIA, WITH STOPOVER IN HANOI
Liberation Radio on 1.7 July said that PRG Foreign Minister
Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh would visit India "in the near future" at the
invitation of Indian Foreign Minster Swaran Singh. Included
in her delegation, according to the report, is Ly Van Sau,
PRG advisor to the Paris conference. Mme. Binh was reported
to have been in Peking in mid-June, and on 14 July Front
media said she had reported to the PEG and Front on the
situation at the Paris talks. VNA on the 18th and LPA on the
20th reported that Mme. Binh had "stopped over in Hanoi or, her
way to risit India." She was received by Premier Pham Van
Dong and Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh. Trinh saw her off
along with Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV Government's delegation
in Paris. The only available Vietnamese attention to Mme. Binh's
activities in India is a 21 Jul,VNA report which notes her
arrival on the 18th and reports that she met with Indian
President V.V. Giri on the 20th.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Moscow media have carried several reports on Mme. Binh's
activities in India, and a Radio Moscow broadcast in Bengali
on the 18th noted that this was the second "important contact
between the leaders of India and the patriotic forces in
South Vietnam." The broadcast recalled that a delegation
of the NFLSV had been accorded "a warm welcome in India"
in January.' It commented that "these goodwill visits
prove that the Indian Government is anxious to develop close
relations with the patriotic forces in South Vietnam."
(Indian press reports on the visit flay that Mme. Binh is
messing the Indian Government for formal recognition of
the PRG.)
On 21 July TASS reported a meeting between Mme. Binh and
Swaran Singh at which they "touched on questions of mutual
relations and possibilities of a peaceful settlement of
Indochina's problems." TASS on the 19th reported a press
conference at which Mme. Binh, touching on the Paris talks,
charged that the United States continues "its aggression
in South Vietnam and impedes peace talks." PTI the
following day said she indicated in an exclusive interview
with its chief diplomatic correspondent that "she was willing
to return to Pario for the Vietnam talks with David Bruce."
PTI reports on 18 July that Mme. Binh will make a three-day
official visit to Ceylon after her stay in India. The report
said the Ceylon Government has recognized the PRG and that
"an official announcement of the visit will soon be formally
made simultaneously by both governments."
NU-D( MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON LAOS
The NLHX marked the eighth anniversary of the signing of the
1962 Geneva agreement on Laos'(23 July) with the usual
central committee memorandum, dated the 20th and carried by
the Pathet Lao news agency the next day. There appears to
have been no mention this'year of the 23 June anniversary
of the founding of the tripartite government, marked jointly
*A Joint NFLSV/PRG delegation led by Nguyen Van Tien made a
"friendship visit" to India from 13 December to 8 January.
See the TRENDS of 14 January 1970, pages 7-8, and
17 December 1969, page 10. ,
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CON I'i!1 N'r'iAI, P'Itia(31 ' LEWD;:;
2 ;' JULY 1.9`(0
with the Geneva agreement anniveruury .Lunt; year In tln NLIIX
Central Committee memorandum dated :; June.* 'l'lrr, two
anniversaries had been marked separately in prior years.
POLITICAL The current memorandum uu:;erLu that the NLIIX
SETTLEMENT has persistently sought a political solution
to the Laos problem and re calla LhaL it has
"trrany times put forth proposals" and has taken the initiative
of sending representatives to "aLtend meetings and peace
talks among the Lao parLien concerned." These Lalku have
so far failed, it says, because of "sabotage" by the United
States and its agents.
The memorandum describes the NL1IX's five-point peocc program
of 6 March as "consistent with the realities in Laos and the
fundamentals of the 1962 Geneva agreements, creating the
current basis for a peaceful settlement of the Lao question.
Pointing to international support for the 6 March program,
it recalls--in addition to statements by the 1)1W, PRG, and
Sihanouk--that the USSR supported the plan In a 16 March
letter from Kosygin to President Nixon. It recalls that
Kosygin said "favorable conditions" for a meeting of the
"Lao parties concerned" could be created only when the
United States ends the bombing of Laos "totally and
unconditionally."**
The memorandum stresses the need for a "complete and
unconditional" end to U.S. bombing, "a legitimate and urgent
demand" of the Lao people that "will create favorable
conditions for the Lao parties concerned to meet at an
early date." So far, it says, there has been "no progress"
toward a peaceful settlement on the basis of the five-point
proposal because "no conditions have been created for the
Lao parties concerned to meet at the same table, the
immediate obstacle being the continuation of the U.S. bombing
of Lao territory." It recalls that Souphanouvong, in his
* The Geneva agreement annivers'.ry was marked again in an
NLHX Central Committee statement on 22 July.
** In this letter, summarized by Radio Moscow on 15 March,
Kosygin rejected President Nixon's call for consultations
between the signatories of the Geneva conference on Laos.
See the 18 March TRENDS, page 12.
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CONE LL EN711AL, I fl I:J '['IiENLx3
;';' JULY 1970
I.;' June rncnr;age to :1o11vanna 11houma, expresneit rendincnn to
meet other part::,cii concerned ".irnrnedintely ai'tcr U e
carnpletc and uncondItional ecunaLion of the U.;1. bombardments
agttinut, Lao territory."
Also on 2i July, VaLLet, Lao radio carried it nttttemenL read by
an NIJIIX Central Committee member at it preen conference called
in :;tun Newt to publicize the memorandum. Replying to it
question about. "new peace efforLn the NI,IIX In undertaking,"
he replied that, "recently" Prince :.buphttnouvong sent, '1'.1ao
,ottk Vongnttk,, his personal envoy, to Vient.i.-tnc to deliver it
personal message to Prince ;touvarnntt Photuna and hold dincuutions
''which will. make it possible for plcrrlpot.cntlaries of the
two sides to meet," and to discuss the ccustation of bombings
which would guarantee security for such it meeting.*
BRITISH The NLIIX Central Committee member was asked
COCHAIRMAN another question about the NL1IX attitude toward
the British Government, "which unilaterally
sent it letter" to the 1962 Geneva agreement; signe"orics "after
it had received it request; from the Vientiane administration
concerning the movement of the ICC in !.aos."** fie replied that
the. Vientiane administration is not the legal tripartite
government and therefore does not have the right to ask for
action from the 13ritish Geneva cochairman, and he praised the
"correct stand" taken by the Sovict cochairman, who opposed
the "illegal" unilateral British action.
* On 13 July Vientiane media and Paris AFT reported that
NLIIX delegate in Vientiane, Soth Pethrasi, called on Souvanna
r'houma the day before to inform him that a messenger from
Souphanouvong would come "in the immediate future."
** On 8 July Vientiane media publicized a letter from Souvanna
houma--dated 12 June--to the Geneva conference cochairmen
which recalled that on 29 May he had requested the ICC to
inspect Saravane for the presence of North Vietnamese troops.
He complained that the uncooperative Polish attitude made it
impossible for the ICC to comply with his request, and he
asked the cochairmen to do their utmost to check Hanoi's
aggression in Laos. Also on 8 July, the British cochairman
unilaterally cii':ulated this letter to the Geneva signatories
after failing to enlist Soviet cooperation.
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t;ONVII)i',NT1A1, OIt11; 11'I1, i?;NI);,
JULY I)'(0
'I'}' Itrltlnlt move I., also cri.t,lcI eel in it 10 July NI,IIX Central
ConuniItc.c 11pol:cntnan'13 titnLemcul,, carried by Lhc Radio of Lhe
I'ntriottc Ncutral.i.nt, Forcer on the ;'ft,h, which pralnetj the
soviet, Government for exprcnning oppottltlon to 11,U, nggret)ulon
in i,aon "many t lm(,o" an(t ncoren the liritioli Government, for
"col.l.uding" with the Untted ;,tatcu. It, rr.cnl.lr; that, ;;ODUvannn
I'hoLUna nent? a rnnnnnNc to the Geneva cochairmen "iflanderIng
the 11I,11X and the i)I(V" and that t,hc Itritinh Government,,
"Ignoring the Soviet protcnt," Went mennagen to the Geneva
cinfcrence nignaLoricn requcnti.ng ICC I r;pectlonn of Laos.
NEW MINISTRIES CREATED IN SIHANOUKIS GOVERNMENT
According to NCNA on 16 July, ;;ihanouk the prevtouu (lay
appointed Kcat Chhon "minister delegate to the Prime Minister"
of the Hoyal Government of National. Union and Thloumt Prasith
"minister in charge of' the cocr(ll,nation of the effort[; of
struggle for national. liberation." 't'hese are apparently new
ministries, added to the original 12.
Kcat Chhon, former industry minister in Lon Idol's government,
announced his decision to join the FUNK in a statement
datelined Para:., 10 July, and carried by NCNA on the 1.1 ,ith.
Aluo on the 1');h, NCNA reported his arrival in Peking that
day. Thiounn Prasith is the brother of Thiounn Mumm, minister
of economy and finance in Sihanouk's government.
YEMEN, TANZANIA RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT
Sihartouk's Royal Government of National Union adds Yemen acid
Tanzania to the list, of countries which recognize it, bringing
the total of states or regimes it claims have recognized it
tot?..
A "press communique" issued by the government, carried by NCNA
on 19 July, says the Yemeni ambassador told Sihanouk the day
before that Yemen "does not recognize" the Lon Nol government
and "has never ceased, recognizing" Sihanouk as the only legal
head of state, thus recognizing only his government as legal.
The communique adds that the position taken by Tanzania is
"identical" to that of Yemen, and therefore the Royal
Government of National Union counts these two states among
those which have recognized it "de jure."
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CO NA'l1)1 N'I'IAI l~'13:t '['H} NUS
JULY 1970
REPORTS ON CAMBODIAN MILITARY ACTION
The :lhanoult government statemenL on t};c Geneva agreements
annlvernary, publicized by Peking anal Iltuuci, c laitnu that the
NaLtonal Union government "has practically controlled two-
thirds of the territory" of Ctunbodia. And a lengthy utate-
mcnt by _;ihanouk, carried by NCNA on the Atli and summarized
by VNA on the 19th, charges the Ctunbodlan Government with
trying to prevent the residents of Phrrom Penh from finding
out about, the true situation outside the capital. An 18 .July
llruioi broadcast; Nays AI''P reported that 13-52'11 bombed near
Phnom Penh on the 18th and charges that O.S. planes have
been uued to support Cambodian and SouthVictnamesc 'troops,
thus "exposing Nixon's deceitful argument that aircraft have
been used to attack only the enemy's supply routes."
Hanoi and Front reports on military action in Cambodia pay
particular attention to engagements in Kompong Cham and
Kompong Speu provinces. A 16 July Liberation Radio
commentary says that in the course of fighting around the
city of Kirirom in Kompong Speu, the Cambodian liberation
forces annihilated nearly 1,000 "enemy" troops, captured
"hundreds" of others, completely annihilated three government
battalions, seized an armaments factor-, and severed Route 1t
linking the capital to the country's seaport. The commentary
says Kirirom was captured on the 11th and alleges that
almost all provinces south of Phnom Penh are occupied by the
Cambodian "patriotic forces," which are vigorously attacking
the enemy.
VNA reported in its press re.'iew on the 17th that QUAN DOI
N1IAN DAN that day said the "K}Lner patriots" had seized
control of Kirirom and the Kamani military subsector, in
Kompong Speu Province, on 11 ani 13 July. The army paper
commented that forces of "the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique, backed
by U.S. and Saigon troops, are doing their best to consolidate
the defense perimeter of Phnom Penh, but their repeated failures
in Kompong Cham, Kompong Speu, ani; elsewhere have driven them
into a serious position of being encircled."
A 15 July Liberation Radio account of a FUNK information bureau
commentary describes the Cambodian struggle it, highly generalized
terms. The commentary claims that the Cambodian "revolutionary
administration is strongly developing in the rural and urban
areas, is efff-etively leading our people in combat and production,
and is mobilizing manpower and riches to serve the frontline
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(.,'ONI-JI)I TI-AI, P'Itl.li '1'it1;N1W,
JUI,Y 1.97()
and Lhc development, of, Nuerri.Lia warfare." I)Lncuuu.ing the
recent allied ground Jperat101111 In Cambodia, it a.I.so says
the allies wanted to donLroy Lhr. south Vietruun 1'I.,AF on
Cumbodiun territory but; were "unable to find th.t.s Invisible
and dreadful opponent In CtLmI)Odia." American atkOX'rncrrtu
about; thousands of V.LeL Cong killed in Cwnbodia arc rebuLtcd
In the DUNK commentary, which claims thaL "actually theuc
were innocent Khm:cr people and horient Chinese imid Victrituneuc
nationals barbarously maunacred by Lhc U.,1_)'.-IpuppeLu."
CO'Iv1ENT ON WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Routine Vietnamese communist; battle reports cite scattered
actions throughout South Vietnam. VNA'L; press review notes
that NIIAN DAN on 21 July announced that the PLAN' shelled
Saigon's Independence Palace early on the 20th.
An undated QUAN DOI N1[AN DAN article, broadcast by Hanoi radio
on the 19th, reviews U.S. "defeats" sustained during the first
half' of 1970 in implementing the clear-and-hold strategy as
part of the Victriamlzation prog?_ am. Stating that the overall
U.S.-GVN military and political situation has ":urther
deteriorated," it claims that "despite their intensive
implementation of the clear-and-hold strategy, the U.S.
aggressors could not maintain a secure foothold, could not
reduce U.S. troop casualties, could not keep the puppet
army and administration from declining, could not 'sweep'
the PLAF's main force units, could not check the developmcrnL
of the guerrilla warfare movement, and could not destroy the
southern revolutionary bases."
On the 20th Hanoi radio carried another QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN
article, dated the 19th, which reviews in standard terms
the "very great" military-political achievements since the
1968 Tet offensive and the worsening U.S.-GVN position.
CONTINUED EXPLOITATION OF CON SON PRISON CRITICISM
Vietnamese communist media continue to give considerable
play to reports of prisoner maltreatment at Con Son prison.
DRV and Front publicize statements issued by their respective
"war crimes" commissions denouncing the U.S.-GVN "crimes,"
"inhuman treatment," "tortures," and "horrors" at Con Son
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CONli' l I)l N'i'I Al, 1'13I;; 't'H)N1 i
JULY 1~fl(
and in the GVN penal uyntcm an it whole. The D}V utatement,
public L; r.d on tho 15th, claimu that the llnlLed. (itateu and the
GVN are experiencing "unprecedented isolation" Uri it result of
the Corr Lion revciati.orru and that the "irrefutable" evi:lence
of their "crirneo" cannot be denied. 'Lt calls for world
condemnation of the Con Jon "tiger cages" and the: GVN
detention system.
A ;Louth Vie:nan crimes cornmiuu:Lon statement, dated the 12th and
broadca'at on the 15th, dcl:a.Llu charg;eu of Con Lon atrocities
allcgedJ.y committed during the past several years. And on
the 2lot Liberation Radio carried a 16 July statement from
the commission which reiterates criticism of Cori Son and thz
GVN penal system and urges worldwide demands for prompt
adoption of "effective measures to immediately check the
T'hicu-Ky clique's bloody hands in the prisons in South Vietnam."
It demands ch'ngco in the prison system and the release of
"patriots," and it insists that the PRG and Front have always
treated enemy prisoners well.
Additional propaganda exploitation ine1ides a 16 July VNA
account of an interview with an inmate of Con Son under the
Diem regime, Nguyen Due Thuar,--now vice president and
secretary general of the North Vietnamese Vietnam Federation of
Trade Unions. Also on the 16th, Hanoi radio and VNA summarized
a QUAN DOI NIL&N DAN commentary of the stone day which calls
the U.S.-GVN airlifting of 500 inmates out of Con Son to the
Chi boa prison in Saigon a "clumsy trick" aimed at mollifying
the outraged U.S. and world peoples. An 18 July LPA
commentary added that the transfer of the 500 prisoners as
also aimed at dispersing and disposing of witnesses necessary
for an investigation into the GVN prison system.
FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN DENOUNCES U.S. ATTACKS ON DRV
A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 22 July,
broadcast by Hanoi radio he same day, accuses the United
States of attacking a num')er of areas in Quang Binh Province
and the northern part of the DMZ. It claims that U.S.
F-4's and F-105's "strafed a number of areas" in Tuyen Hoa
district, Quang Binh Province, on the 19th and that on the
21st U.S. aircraft "dropped many demolition and steel-pellet
bombs onto a number of localities on the outskirts" of Dong
Hoi, the capital of Quang Binh. On 20 July, according to
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(;0N1''1I)1-;N'1 LA L, PIiiC '.I'ItI NUI;
JULY 1.9'x0
the upokeuman, (J.(). urLi:L1cry, from poui.t.lonn uouth ol.' the
demiiitar1zed zone (D W.) , uhciled VInh 'I'an and V.inh Thunh
villageu in the northern part of the DMI,. The utatemorit uuyu
the DHV Government "vrIwnicnLLy denounced and sternly" condemns
Lhcnc "uctu of war" and dcmandu that; the U.L. authorities
"ccauc forthwith all groou violations" of I.)1W uove.rcignty
cu,d uccurity.
The most recent previous Spokesman's protests were issued on
27 and 30 June. The 30 June staLemcnL protest-.,(]. U.S. plane
and artillery attacks against; ~,wo villages in the northern part
of the DM'L. The utatcrncnt of the 27th charged the United
States with a 25 June aerial attack on Dien Chau district,
Nghc An Province.
DOWNINGS OF On 18 and 19 July Ilan of radio reported that
U.S. PLANES two unmanned U.S. reconnaissance planes were
downed--the first in Vinh Linh on the 17th
and the second in Thanh ltoa Province on the 19th. The claims
bring Ilanoi's total of U.S. planes downed in the DRV to
3,356.
TRUONG CHINH AND TO HUU ADDRESS SCIENCE MEETING
On 18 Jul l Iiar radio reported that the first improvement
course was held "recently" for 1135 deputy chairmen of
propaganda and education committees in charge of scientific
and educational activities in the DIV. The radio noted
that the meeting was held to implement the party
Secreta,iat's "instruc(.ions" and was meant to help the
cadres better understand party policies and better
fulfill their tasks. It said that the trainees studied
Le Duan's major February article, which emphasized the
importance of scientific and technical training, and
"carefully studied party policies and lines concerning the
educational task, the training of scientific, technical,
and managerial cadres, the scientific and technical task,
the medical task . . "
Politburo member Truong Chinh and Secretariat member To Huu
addressed the trainees, according to the broadcast. Truong
Chinh pointed out the role of the scientific and educational
task and added that "it is impossible to detach the economic
building task, the strengthening of national defense, and the
anti-U.S. resistance from the scientific and education development
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CONIF'IDP;N'I'fAL F13IS 'i'REND:3
22 JULY 19'(0
Lr_
tank,' lie utreused that it is insufficient to have only
political, economic and military knowledge; scientific and
education tasks must also be understood. He warned
against dismissing the party's scientific and educational
organizations an "unneceuuary," and he cautioned--without
amplification--that "the slight reduction in the scientific
and educational personnel" should not be used to assign
cadres to other jobs. lie declared that "party echelons
must choose qualified and experienced cadres to build and
strengthen the scientific and educational committees."
The radio account noted that he said the scientific and
educational task is new and "will encounter many difficulties"
and that he enjoined students to constantly study the
party's line and policies and "strive to overcome difficulties."
To Huu in his address also stressed the position and
responsibility of the scientific and educational task at
present, stating that it must be considered as important
as the military and economic fronts. Ile called upon the
scientific and educational branches to improve their work
quality "at all costs."
Like Truong Chinh, To Huu took note of personnel limitations.
He urged students to build scientific and educational
organizations "with the limited number of personnel
prescribed for various levels by the party central
committee," and he stated that "because of limited personnel,
great attention must be paid to choosing good cadres" who
must continually improve themselves.
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CONIV'7:1)1i;NT[AL 1"B.10 TRENDS
22 JULY 19 r0
MIDDLE EAST
UAR-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE SUPPORTS MIDEAST POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
The widely publicized communique concluding UAR Presiaent Nasir'z
29 June-17 July visit to the Soviet Union underlines the objective
oC a political settlement of the Middle East problem, stating
that the sides discusucd "further steps which they believe must
be taken" to achieve such a settlement and "declared for further
coordination of their efforts in this direction." A political
settlement was specifically not mentioned in the communique on
Nusir's last official visit to the USSR, in July 1968, although
the idea was implicit in the two sides' support for settling the
crisis on the basis of the November 1967 Security Council resolu-
tion.
TASS' summary of the 1970 communique highlights the sides' support
for "efforts undertaken in the UN framework" aimed at such a
settlement--presumably a reference to the Big Four talks. Brief
TASS announcements of Big Four consultations in New York invariably
describe them as meetings "on a peaceful political settlement."
As would be expected, the communique contains no reference to the
U.S. or Soviet proposals for a settlement. A Petrov article in
NEW TIMES No. 28 of 10 July, discussing the recent U.S. initiative,
wondered to what extent the U.S. Government, "in advancing its
'political initiative,' has utilized the existing mechanism of the
four-pow:r consultations within the UN framework."
The communique calls for unspecified "urgent measures" to end
Israel's armed attacks on the Arab countries, for withdrawal from
"all" occupied territories in accordance with the principle of
nonacquisition of territories through war, and for complete
implementation of The November 1967 Security Council resolution
and of UN decisions on the Palestinian refugees. The 1968 communi-
que had specified Israeli withdrawal to positions held before
5 June 1967. The growing importance of the Palestinian resistance
organizations is reflected in the solidarity expressed by both
sides in the current communique with "the Arab people of Palestine
conducting the c^.cageous anti-imperialist national liberation
struggle." In 1968, the communique went no further than the cus-
tomary vague Soviet formulation on "heeding the legitimate rights
of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people in Palestine."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
The communique routinely asserts that Israel is able to conduct
its "aggressive, expansionist policy" because of the "invariable
support of the imperialist circles, above all the United States."
It goes on to accuse Israel of violating the UN Charter and prin-
ciples, raiding Arab territories, and carrying out measures aimed
at annexation of the "temporarily occupied territories" and
subjecting the Arab population of these territories to "terror
and repressions." However, the communique fails to include a
series of pro forma, propagandistic charges present in the 1968
communique, which additionally called Israel's continued occupation
of Arab territory a threat to the Arab countries' independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The 1968 document pro-
fessed to see a link between Israeli "aggression" and imperialist
policy; it charged "imperialist and aggressive forces" with
using Israel as their tool and concocting new plots and provoca-
tions against the Arab states.
The 1970 communique places stress on the "particular importance"
of Arab unity and expresses satisfaction with "growing inter-Arab
solidarity" and cooperation. As in 1968, the document touches on
such international topics as Vietnam, Africa, disarmament, and
Europe, additionally pointing to the United Nations as "an impor-
tant instrument of peace and security," confirming the sides'
allegiance to UN principles, and calling for observance of the UN
Charter.
BILATERAL Soviet military assistance to the UAR gets muted
RELATIONS treatment in the communique. In the context of
the Middle East situation, Nasir expresses grati-
tude for Soviet political, economic, and "other" support to the
UAR and other Arab countries in their struggle against Israeli
"aggression," and the Soviet side declares readiness to give the
"necessary assistance" to the Arab peoples in their struggle for
national independence, sovereignty, and freedom. The only
explicit reference to military matters is in the section on
bilateral relations, in which Nasir thanks the Soviets for "all-
round assistance" and the sides confirm their efforts to further
develop and strengthen "friendly cocperation" in political,
economic, and defense fields. In 1968, the UAR had expressed
gratitude for Soviet aid to the UAR economy -nd "defense poten-
tial," while the USSR had said it would continue to offer the
UAR political and economic support and "assistance in enhancing
defense ability"; the sides were said to have considered several
practical measures to expand cooperation in the political,
economic, and military fields.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
With respect to party relations, the current communique says the
sides discussed ways of further extending CPSU-ASU contacts and
agreed to continue the "fruitful and useful practice" of exchang-
ing party delegations and information. In 1968 the sides had
welcomed the "establishment and. development of friendly contacts"
between the CPSU and the Arab Socialist Union. As in 1965 and
1968, Nasir was invited in his capacity as ASU chairman as well
as UAR president.
The communique concludes with the acceptance of an invitation to
Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to visit the UAR--an invitation
not extended in the 1968 communique , although that document did
note the sides' agreement on expanding Soviet-UAR consultations.
In the current communique the sides express confidence th?Lt
Nasir's visit and the "wide and open exchange of opinions" will
promote the extension of Soviet-UAR friendship and cooperation.
The talks are characterized as having taken place in an atmosphere
of "openness, friendship, and complete mutual understanding."
As transmitted by TASS, the communique says that during the "ex-
change of opinions the sides confirmed their similarity of views"
on the Middle East situation and topic1 international questions;
the version published in PRAVDA on the 18th, however, describes
the views as identical rather than similar. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS
AGENCY (MENA)renders the passage "confirmed that agreement exists
between the views." The 1968 communique, in the vein of the one
issued on Nasir's 1965 visit, had referred to a "frank" exchange
of views on matters of bilateral cooperation and the Middle East
situation and "agreement of views" on important international
problems.
MOSCOW Followup comment on the 15 July Supreme Soviet state-
COMMENT ment and the 17 July Soviet-UAR communique stresses
Moscow's support of a political settlement. A panelist
on the 19 July domestic service roundtable program maintained
that interest in such a settlement is "the most important thing"
about the Soviet-Egyptian talks. Comment pegged to the Supreme
Soviet statement reiterates its vague warning that either the
military escalation will continue if the aggressor is not curbed,
or measures must be taken to insure a political settlement. At
the same time, propagandists point toy the statement's assertion
of the right of all Middle East states to national existence,
declaring that this demonstrates the absurdity of allegations
that the Soviet Union threatens tr,,. Israeli state.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
Commentator Tsoppi, in a fore ign-language 'broadcast on the 16th,
says escalation of the military danger in the Middle East may lead
to a new explosion that would endanger world peace. But the USSR
does not believe such an outcome inevitable, he adds; the "aggres-
sor must cease fire" and return all Arab territories "without
exception," for only then will peace be restored and sovereignty
of the Arab states and Israel be insured.
The Supreme Soviet statement's new formulation--that the peoples
and government of the Middle East states should be the masters of
the situation in the region--is not picked up in available propa-
ganda.
BELYAYEV REJECTS CHARGES OF DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT
PRAVDA's Belyayev in a series of recent comments has addressed him-
self to charges of Soviet involvement in Egyptian military operations
more openly than Moscow propagandists have done up to now. Comment
has heretofore been confined largely to acknowledgment of the presence
of "Soviet experts" in the UAR and to vague mentions of "the so-called
Soviet penetration of the Arab world" and charges of a "Soviet
threat" to Israel. Now, in the 19 July domestic service roundtable
broadcast, Belyayev mentioned Israeli, U.S., and West European
charges "about some sort of foreign intervention in the war," in-
cluding even charges that the Soviet Union is directly involved" and
that Israeli Phantoms were brought down "by rocket installations
serviced by Soviet personnel." He dismissed such charges as unfounded
and unsupported "by a single real fact."
In a 20 July domestic service broadcast Belyayev stated that follow-
ing Israeli air losses in the Suez Canal zone, Israeli generals
made assertions to the effect "that the Soviet Union is all but
operating on the Egyptian front," and Israeli politicians began
declaring that an almost fatal threat, not from the Arabs but from
the Russians, hung over Israel. As in the roundtable program, when
he noted that President Nixon had attacked the Arabs "in an unusually
sharp way," Belyayev stated that the President in his 1 July tele-
vision interview "accused the Arabs of wanting to throw Israel into
the sea and called the Arab countries the aggressors." He added that
American and Israeli papers seek to depict the situation as though
the Soviet Union is sabotaging a Middle East settlement, a portrayal
which he said does not correspond with reality.
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S TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
Iti an article in the 21 July PRAVDA, as reported by 'PASS, Belyayev
again turned to Israeli and Western press "clamor" about "the
alleged danger to the state of Israel and about 'participation'
of the Soviet Union in the military actions on Egypt's side."
Here he cited the UAR official spokesman as saying.that military
actions in the Suez zone are conducted only by Egyptians. One
gets the impression, Belyayev said, that Israel and "those
supporting it" are taking steps on purpose to aggravate the
situation in the Middle East.
U.S. ARMS Belyayev in PRAVDA traced the "noise" in Washington
TO ISRAEL and Tel Aviv about a change in the Middle East
balance of power to an improvement in the Arab
countries' defense capacity and a diminution of Israel's "much
vaunted military advantages." He called it not accidental that
the "panicky" Israeli statements about "Soviet 'interference'
and 'presence'" coincided with stepped-up demands to the United
States for new consignments of aircraft and speedy delivery of
other armaments. Claiming that such equipment as howitzers and radar
jamming instruments are being sent to Israel from the United States,
Belyayev concluded that if anyone is disturbing the balance of
power in the region, it is Israel.
Other propaganda has also dealt with the issue of U.S. arms
deliveries: A RED STAR military review on 18 July said the
anti-Soviet propaganda campaign in Israel is aimed at distract-
ing attention from "growing U.S. interference" in the conflict,
and it cited reports about the delivery of howitzers, electronic
equipment, and Phantoms to Israel. U.S. aid is not confined to
arms and credits, RED STAR added, pointing to "Western information
ag:nc " reports that Washington is placing at Israel's disposal
intelligence information on the location of Egyptian troops
acquired with the aid of spy satellites.
A Tsoppi commentary, broadcast in Arabic and in German to Austria
on the 17th, claimed that the "spying American satellites" collect
information for Tel Aviv on Arab armies, fortifications, and
weapons. Tsoppi called this a "criminal violation of the treaty
on the peaceful use of space signed by the United States," proving
that the United States "has taken over the political command of the
Israeli aggression." Soviet propaganda over the years has routinely
assailed U.S. use of satellites for "espionage" and other military
purposes, but has only infrequently gone on to charge that their
use is a violation of international accords.
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CONFIDEN'1'IAL
- 23 -
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATI0,11
T'i3IS TRENDS
22 JULY. 19'x0
SUSLOV REAFFIRMS SOVIET DESIRE FOR SALT AGREEMENT
While Soviet media remain virtually silent on the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) in "ienna, a Japanese news
agency report on 17 July quoted CPSU Politburo member Suslov
as saying that although the United States was seeking an
agreement "which would weaken the Soviet power," the Soviets
were "still hoping" to conclude "a limited agreement." A
Tokyo KYODO dispatch from Moscow on a meeting there between
a Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation and Suslov reported
that he believed SALT would "recess shortly."
Mazurov's It June Minsk election speech in which he expressed
hope for a successful conclusion of the Vienna talks is the
last Soviet leader statement on SALT to be carried in Soviet
media, which have not acknowledged Suslov's reported comments.
The JSP-CPSU communique, published in PRAVDA on 19 July, notes
the JSP's "high appraisal" of the Soviet quest for nuclear
disarmament and says both sides consider it necessary to
continue efforts to ban and destroy nuclear weapons, but does
not mention SALT.
In Moscow's INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (No. 7, signed to the press
23 June 1970), A. Zimin, in the course of a review of the
Nixon Administration's first 18 months in office, concluded
that although the Administration's foreign policy actions have
"by no means promoted the relaxation of international tension,"
the Helsinki and Vienna SALT are among the "positive features"
of U.S.-Soviet relations since January 1969. Sustaining Moscow's
attacks on recent speeches by Defense Secretary Laird advocating
the development of various kinds of strategic weapons systems in
response to a Soviet threat, Zimin contended that such an attitude
has "a direct bearing" on SALT. Agreement is possible, he said,
only if both parties "proceed from the need to insure the equal
security of the sides, with simultaneous and complete considera-
tion of the tasks-of reducing the military danger and strengthen-
ing peace."
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(:0!P I UEN'I.' I AL FBI,", 'i'IiIs41D;1,
.'.' JULY .19'(0
-,2 ); -
FRG-SOVIET RELATInNJS
USSR REPORTS BILATERAL TALKS TO RESUME. DOWNPLAYS PRESS LEAKS
Thu USSR continues L devote occint, prjpag~.inda ut,tcnf,ion to the
FRG-Soviet i-,alku on a renunca.rLt.ion-:~1'-.three agreement which,
according to Ifumburg'u DPA, are s,.heciulcd to Ce.surrlc in Moscow
on 27 July. TASS reported briefly and without comment on
1.7 July that Foreign Minister Scheel ir1 to arrive in Moscow
on the 26th "for talks with the Sovi.ct o idc on questions of
mutual interest." Consistent with this circurnrrpoction, available
TASS reports on Scheel's brief visits to London and Washington
last week fail to mention the impending Moscow talks. A 19 )uly
dispatch does say, however, that the foreign minister "tried to
'secure American approval for the new Eastern policy proclaimed
by Chancellor Brandt,."
Propaganda has taken due note cf the West German leaks to the
press of the 10-point agreement purportedly negotiated earlier
by State Secretary Bahr and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko,*
but it has laid the b.lrme at the feet of the CDU/CSU and has
not suggested that the leaks have adversely affected the talks.
An article in PRAVDA on 14 July by A. Yulyev says that the CDU/
CSU bloc--"the banner-carrier of the most reactionary chauvinistic
forces in West Germany"--has resorted to "organizing 'a leakage'
oil' government secrets" and to charging treachery to undercut the
poli..'es of the Brandt-Scheel government. Yulyev comments that
the government has shown a. degree of realism in evaluating the
situation in Europe but that "even the very idea that the FRG
may have normal relations with socialist countries on the basis
of the existing order of things meets with fierce resistance"
from the CDU/CSU blo3.
A 13 July broadcast for German audiences over Moscow's "Radio
Peace and Progress," reporting the "speculation" in West
Germany about the causes of the disclosures and allegations
in BILDZEITUNG and QUICK, charged that the "main purpose"
is to prevent all talks between the FRG and the socialist
countries and "not to allow any realistic" assessments in
* Hamburg's BILDZEITUNG on 12 June published the first four
points of the purported agreement and followed up with
publication of the last six on 1 July. QUICK on 30 June
published all 10 points.
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CONVI1)I',N'I'I1W FIii;; 'I'!I1;N1)11)
?? JUDY I9'(()
WcuL Gcrrnlrrry'u 1'orcigir pal.icy. A repreaentatl.ve of, Hadio Moscow,
In 1L broadcast carried by Lhc Nast Rerl.In radio on the 17th,
c ri L.ic I. zed an "antI -;iovieL attacIt" recenl;.ly shown on FRG
television, calling LL part of the righLia1 ILLLr_tck on the 1'HG-
i1SGli LlLlks. The attack has furtlrcL' manii'enLed .1Lurif, the
upoltcstnlur sa:l.d, in the "purlolrring and publishing of the
con 1'!Llentlidl. papers' of OIL, Federal Government."
GDR ON FRG-- in a 16 July speech during Baltic Week
SOVIL' TALKS celebrations In Hostock, Ulbricht reaffirmed
his support for the Soviet-FRG exchange of
views on a renunciation-of-force agreement and voiced the
hope that such an agreement "will be signed as soon as
possible." He added that it should then "be possible to
conclude an agreement on equal relations between the GDR
and the FIG on the basis of international law." In his
speech at the 13th plenum of the SED Central Committee,
published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 16 June, Ulbricht had
"wished success" to the forthcoming Soviet-FRG talks,
concluding that they "could have a favorable influence
on relations between the GDR and the FRG." Ile had also
touched on the Bonn-Moscow exchange in an interview published
in Iiamburg'. DER SPIEGEL on 6 July. He concluded in the
interview that the Brandt government "constitutes progress,"
citing as evidence the "more realistic assessment of the
limits in the negotiations with the Soviet Union."
Other regime spokesmen have joined Ulbricht in endorsing the
renunciation-of-force talks. SED Politburo member Norden,
at a lRo:,tocl: rally on 18 July reported by ADN, stated that
the Soviet move to conclude an agreement with the FRG "serves
the cause of preserving peace." The GDR, he added, "would
welcome the conclusion of such a treaty because it would
constitute an important step toward European security,
because it would have favorable effects on shaping relations
between the GDR and the FRG." And Foreign Minister Winzer,
r:t a 13 July press conference in Rostock, was reported by
Hamburg's DPA as having said that the Moscow-Bonn talks
"could favorably influence" talks between the two German
states.
* Ulbricht did not take the occasion in Rostock to repeat the
call--made last month at the 13th plenum of the SED Central
Committee--for a third round of talks between the heads of the
FRG and GDR governments. He did suggest, as he had done in the
plenum speech, the establishment of diplomatic relations at the
ambassadorial level and the application by both German states
for UN membership.
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CONIC IUP;NTI.AL
JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY
FBI[; 'i'HEN1)U
22 JULY 1.970
JCP CONGRESS UNDERSCORES INDEPENDENCE IN WORLD MOVEMENT
At its 11th congress, held 1-7 July, the Japan Communist
Party (JCP) reaffirmed Its independent i.inc in the inter-
national communist movement, attacking policies of both the
CI'SU and the CCP and underscoring the strength of autonomist
:ucntiment In the world movement. The proceedings of the
congress, recounted In the JCP organ AKAHATA, were reported
only briefly in Soviet media and totally ignored by the
Chinese. The Japanese communists rebutted contentions of
"certain foreign parties" that the JCP had become inter-
nationally isolated by pointing to the attention given the
congress by a number of "fraternal parties," including
"sincere messages" from the ruling North Korean and North
Vietnamese parties and the Laotian and South Vietnamese
fronts.*
The tone of the congress was set by the draft r--solution
made public on 18 May, which denounced "big-power chauvinistic
intervention in Japan's revolutionary movement" by both the
CCP and the CPSU and itemized alleged errors of both parties
in some detail.
STRAINS BETWEEN Strains between the JCP and the CPSU
JCP AND SOVIETS crystallized around the latter's message
to the congress. While formally acknowl-
edging messages from various other parties, including those
of East Germany and Poland, the JCP in effect rejected the
CPSU message and simply ignored one from Bulgaria.
The CPSU message, carried in Soviet media, was addressed to
the congress delegates "and all Japanese communists," a
formulation which the JCP cited to charge continuing Soviet
intervention in the JCP's internal affairs. The point at
issue was alleged Soviet support for the expelled "Shiga
group," a source of strained relations dating back to
factional ctruggles and Soviet pressures during the
Khrushchev era. In addition to citing the offensive phrase
in the CPSU message, the JCP claimed that Soviet embassy
personnel attended a meeting sponsored by the Shiga group.
* The North Vietnamese message to the JCP congress was carried
in the same issue of NHAN DAN, on 1 July, as the North Vietnamese
greeting on the CCP's anniversary.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CON 1011) ENI'l Ali FBI!') Tfl N1)I;
2,' JULY 19'(0
The JCP leadership explained at the congreaa that because of
Soviet intervention in Its affairo it had dccidccl, not to
invite a CPSU delegation or to request a message. Presidium
Chairman Miyamoto, in his concluding speech at the 6 July
session of the congress, cited the absence of such a request
as the reason for not reading the CPSU message, commenting
that "we would read any message here no matter what it said
if we had requested It." Miyamoto added that the CPSU message
to he 10th JCP congress, in October 1966, was identically
addressed and was similarly not read to the congress.
OTHER Messages from the North Korean and North Vietnamese
PARTIES parties and from the South Vietnam NLF seemed to
show deference to JCP sensitivities,, being
addressed to the congress "and through the congress" to all
members of the JCP. Both parties' greetings to the 10th JCP
congress had used the same formulation.
The East German and Polish messages to the current congress
evaded the issue by directing their greetings simply "to
the 11th Congress of the JCP." But the Bulgarian greeting
to "the delegates to the 11th Congress of the JCP and the
Japanese communists"--available only from Sofia media--
apparently fell into the same pitfall as the CPSU message
and was not acknowledged by the JCP. Moreover, again like
the CPSU message, it contained tendentious appeals for
struggle against ideological deviations and for inter-
nationalist communist unity, and it even went beyond the
CPSU message in citing the June 1969 Moscow conference,
which the JCP had boycotted.
RELATIONS The JCP's troubles with the CCP were also
WITH CCP aired at the congress. Putting his finger
on a basic issue which divided the two
parties, Miyamoto called on the CCP to !hange its stand
from one based on "an anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet united
front" to a united front in which the anti-Soviet
dimension was removed. This had been the burden of the
JCP's mediatory effort in 1966, at a time when the post-
Khrushchev Soviet leadership was seeking to regain
influence in the Asian wing of the communist movement
by its line of united action focused on the Vietnam
conflict. While acknowledging that he had "no optimism"
about improvement in JCP-CCP relations, Miyamoto renewed
his party's expression of hope for an Asian anti-imperialist
front which t.cculd include China.
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CON I,'IUIUITIAl, FllC TH ENDS
;'" JULY 1.9r0
The corrgrenu' draft rcnoluLi on hod attacked the CCI' and Mao
Tuc-tung by ruunc for "ultra Left opporLunium," for their
attacks on the JCP, and for aiding; antlparty clementu In
attempts to overthrow the JCP lcadcruhi.p.
The CCI' had sent a message to the JCP'u 10th congress but
uhparently not to thin one. Reflecting the strains In the
two parties' relations growing out of Pcking'u adamant
rejection of united action with the Soviets, the message
was cool in tone and pointedly called for struggle not
only against the United States in support of Vietnam rat
also against "modern revisionism with the leadership of
the CPSU as its center."
SOVIETS LAUNCH POLEMICAL ATTACK ON EVE OF CONGRESS
The Soviet party put on record its side of the contentious
issues straining CPSU-JCP relations in an article in PARTY
LIFE (No. 13) which Radio Moscow broadcast in Japanese on
27 June, four days before the opening of the congress.
While acknowledging the :right of each party to have "its
own independent policy line" and denying the right of any
party to interfere in the internal affairs of another,
the PARTY LIFE ar+icle cited as its rationale for discussing
JCP affairs the draft resolution's treatment of "general
problems of the international communist movement which
concern not only the JCP itself but also other fraternal
parties," as well as the fact that the draft resolution
contained "an unwarranted and open attack" on the CPSU
and its policies "which our party can never accept."
PARTY LIFE alleged that in refusing to participate in the
Moscow conference of June 1969 the JCP leadership became
"responsible for an open attack" against the unity of the
international communist movement and "rendered assistance"
to the enemy of that movement. It denounced the JCP
leadership--although without singling out individuals--
for its policies on such issues as the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion treaty, Czechoslovakia, and the "Kuriles problem."
While accusing the JCP of "a plot of forming a third
force" in the international communist movement, PARTY LIFE
simultaneously charged the JCP leadership with aiding the
Peking leadership's efforts "to ease itself out of political
Isolation by splitting the communist movement."
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CONFIDENTIAL T'BIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
As for CPSU-JCP relations, PAR'T'Y LIFE sought to place full
blame for their deterioration on the JCP leadership and
denied that the CPSU was intervening in JCP affairs. The
journal did not directly acknowledge the JCP's specific
charge that Moscow's intervention took the form of support
for the "Shiga group." But it noted that "according to
reports" some lectures and programs given by officers of
the Soviet pavilion on the Expo 70 grounds "were attended
by some expelled JCP members," and'it disparaged the idea
that this constituted evidence for such a charge.
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ALBANIA-ROMANIA
TIRANA WELCOMES ROMANIAN TRADE UNION DELEGATION
As part of its low-key campaign to further improve relations with
Romania, Tirana has given a warm welcome to a Romanian trade
union delegation headed by Romanian TU Central Council. chairman
and RCP Executive Committee member Danalache--the highest ranking
Romanian official to visit Albania, in recent years. Radio
Tirana reported that the group. arrived in the Albanian. capital
on 15 July for a "friendly visit" at the invitation of the
Central Council of Albanian Trade Unions and was greeted by
its chairman, Rita Marko, also a member of the Albanian
Politburo. The delegation stayed until the 20th.
The Albanians went beyond the requirements of protocol at a
dinner given by Marko for the delegation on the 19th. According
to Radio Tirana, it was attended by Politburo member Myftiu
and Foreign Minister Nase, as well as by numerous district
party officials. Bucharest's AGERPRES reported that the
Romanians and a DRV National Assembly group were honored on the
16th at a concert attended by Marko and the People's Assembly
President Shtylla.
Since the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which apparently
raised Albania's apprehensions about its own security, Tirana
has signaled its desire to improve relations with its Balkan
neighbors. Editorials in ZERI I POPULLIT on 14 April and
4 September 1969 underlined a common bond with Romania, as well
as with Yugoslavia, in the face of Soviet pressures. And
Albanian party chief Hoxha, addressing a mass rally in Kukes
on 28 May, pledged Albanian support for Romania in its
efforts to resist "shameful" Soviet pressures. "You are
strong," he told his Romanian "brothers," whereas "your
enemies are weak; stand firm, for you have numerous friends
in the world who love you and back you on your just road."
Albanian and Romanian moves to improve bilateral ties have
been paralleled by Romanian-Chinese efforts to cement cordial
relations. Romanian Vice President and Presidium member
Bodnaras led a party-government delegation to the PRC on
9 June, and AGERPRES announced on 13 July that a military
delegation led by Defense Minister Ionit a had left for
"friendly" visits to Pyongyang and Peking. NCNA carried a
fairly lengthy report on the Danalache visit to Albania the
day after it ended.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
PARTY DAILY EXPLAINS DUBCEK OUSTER, REBUKES HARDLINER
The Husak regime's dilemma in having to contend with both
the strong residual popularity of Dubcek and hardline
pressures for an intensified purge is underscored in
lengthy defensive articles in RUDE PRAVO on 16 and 17 July.
The articles were given unusually full treatment by other
Czechoslovak media, which normally summarize press
commentaries: the 16 July article on Dubcek was carried
in full on the same day by CTK in English, and the one of
the 17th denouncing dogmatist Professor Lang was carried
virtually in full that day by the Prague domestic service.
Soviet media have ignored both articles.
ARTICLE ON DUBCEK The unsigned article j'~stiE`ying
Dubcek's expulsion from the CPCZ
appears calculated to appease both the hardliners and,
to a lesser degree, the moderates. The fallen leader
is portrayed, on the one hand, as unrepentant, blinded
by his popularity, and therefore-.by implication--ripe
for prosecution in a political trial. "The party,
socialism, and the internationalist fraternity of the
working people," the article concludes, "were lost
behind countless 'egos' in his speeches," and "it
was he himself who caused his expulsion from our
ranks." He took "the easier road of agreeing with
the rightist and counterrevolutionary forces, which
finally led him to their platform." These forces
"paid him for this by creating the 'Dubcek legend'
in which he believed and continues to believe."
On the other hand, the article departs from the practice
of other recent denigrations of Dubcek in paying due
tribute to the former first secretary as having personified,
initially, a necessary break with the discredited Novotny
era. While calling the choice of Dubcek for this role a
"surprise" and a "compromise," the article emphasizes that
the party was on solid ground in selecting him because he
had "spent his youth in the Soviet Union," and it recalls
that "communists and the overwhelming majority of the
citizens received the change in the party leadership with
great approval."
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C0 N1'.[DIt;N'1':[A1, 1131, 'i'[uENDS
22 JULY 1970
Snmltovaky, Kriegel, and other "rightists," the article adds,
were opposed to the choice of llubcek at first. But when he
displayed his "weakness" and failed to curb their "disruptive"
activity during the first half of 1968, they rapidly developed
a "downright personality cult" around him. The communications
media "glorified his every move," showing him diving into a
swimming pool or "receiving various delegations bringing him
resolutions with anti.socialist demands."
The remainder of the article follows previous patterns in
recounting the development of Dubcek's "rightwing opportunism,"
as manifested in his failure to deal decisively with the June
1968 ultraliberal "2,000 Words" manifesto, his boycott of the
July 1968 meeting of the Warsaw Five, and his acquiescence in
the 21 August 1968 CPCZ Presidium statement condemning the
invasion. In his speech on his return from Moscow at the end
of August, "he again posed in the role of a misunderstood
messiah," the article says.
DENUNCIATION In denouncing a leftwing dogmatist at some
OF DOGMATIST length, the 17 July RUDE PRAVO article by
two members of the CPCZ Secretariat, Jan
Fojtik and the paper's chief editor Miroslav Moc, marks a
departure from the policy laid down in March in an authoritative
Bratislava PRAVDA article which ruled out a "two-front"
ideological struggle against both right and left as only
serving the interests of the "rightwing and antisocialist"
forces. The RUDE PRAVO article takes its cue rather from
Husak's implicit warning to the ultraconservatives, in his
5 July Devin speech, that "differences within the leadership"
help the enemy at home and abroad and from his avowal of
determination in that speech to achieve "principled unity."
Under the title To Denigrate Everything Again?", the
article by Fojtik and Moc attacks an article by Prof. Dr.
Jaromir Lang in issue No. 13 of the military-political
biweekly LIDOVA ARMADA which had pointedly cited the Czech
poet S.1'. Neumann (1875-1947) as exemplifying "irreconcil-
ability" toward antisocialist forces and support for the USSR.
According to RUDE PRAVO, Lang had charged, among other things,
that "the CPCZ's present leadership is afraid" to hold a public
"dialog on questions of culture and policy" and is too
lenient toward "the so-called mistaken" persons of the 1968
liberalization.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
't'erming Lang'a "slander" identical with that of "the rightwing
and foreign reaction," the authors underscore Soviet support
for the Husak regime's moderate course in declaring that its
"positive results are again winning the confidence of the
internationalist forces at home and abroad." They add that
"to denigrate this credit, as Comrade Lang does, is extremely
dangerous and hazardous."
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- 34 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
REPUBLICAN LAWS AGAINST "PARASITES" PUBLICIZED BELATEDLY
In the wake of attacks on labor indiscipline, and loafing by.the
December plenum of the Central Committee, new legal measures
have been adopted on the republic: level against "parasites"
who have avoided any sort of regular job. Although adoption
of the republican laws began in late February, the campaign
was kept very much under wraps throughout the first half of
1970. Most of the republican laws were adopted quietly,
some with no immediate publicity at all.
Now the campaign has been publicized on the national level
for the first time, in an 11 July PRAVDA article by USSR
Prosecutor General R.A. Rudenko entitled "Everyone is Required
to Work." Rudenko complains that some people simply refuse
to work, serving as a "harmful influence" on others and
frequently leading juveniles into crime. Condemning the
authorities' laxness toward parasitism, begging and vagrancy,
he informs the public that union republics have adopted new
tougher laws in these areas.
The first such law--cited as the model by Rudenko--was adopted
by the RSFSR on 25 February. It stipulates that those not
engaged in socially useful labor will be called into the
local MVD offices and warned to get a job within 15 days.
Anyone who fails to comply is assigned a job. If he refuses
to accept it, he can be sentenced to confinement or
corrective labor for up to one year. Those convicted of
vagrancy or begging can be sentenced to up to two years.
Second offenses receive longer sentences (NEWS OF THE RSFSR
SUPREME SOVIET, 2 April).
Identical laws were adopted on 18 March by the Ukraine
(RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 9 July), on 25 March by Kirgizia
(SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, 24 June), on 27 March by Azerbaydzhan
(BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 29 March), in late March by Uzbekistan
(PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 28 March), on 30 March by Belorussia
(SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, 7 June), in early April by
Moldavia (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 7 June), on 29 April by
Lithuania (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 23 June), in early May by
Tadzhikistan (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 6 May), on 14 May by
Georgia (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 21 May), in mid-May by Armenia
(KOMMUNIST, 20 May), and on 29 May by Turkmenia (SOVET
TURKMENISTANY, 27 June).
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22 JULY 1970
In contrast to the campaign against labor indiscipline, these
moves have received little publicity. Only five of the 12
republics (Azerbaydzhan, Tadzhikistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan
and Armenia) appear to have announced the new laws in the
press at the time of enactment. In the case of the RSFSR
there appeared to be deliberate concealment: The
25 February session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which
adopted the new RSFSR laws, was reported and described in
the 26 February SOVIET RUSSIA, but there was no mention of
parasites or new laws in the report.
The anti parasite campaign appears to have been limited to
the republic level until 11 July, the date of Rudenko's PRAVDA
article. Despite the noisy campaign against "violators of
labor discipline, rolling stones, loafers and drunks"
early this year, parasites, beggars and speculators--those
not in the public labor force at all--appear to have been
ignored on the national level. Even as late as June, the
leaders' election speeches failed to mention this problem,
although Brezhnev and Polyanskiy may have had parasites in
mind also when they criticized those who flout the "rules of
socialist society" and "norms of life."
The only apparent reason for the secrecy is Soviet sensitivity
to unfavorable foreign publicity. An article in the 18 June
SOVIET RUSSIA by assistant RSFSR prosecutors A. Kogan and
M. Shapkin attacked foreign "inventions" about a "tightening
of the screws" in the USSR following Brezhnev's 12 June comments
on law and order. Secrecy was perhaps no handicap in this
instance because the new laws provide that the M1D contact
each "parasite" personally and inform him of the new
obligation that he'immediately find a job.
TARGETS OF LAWS Lithuanian Prosecutor A. Kayryalis
declared that the "main purpose" of the
new laws is to draw into socially useful labor "persons who
have stayed from the correct path" (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 23 June).
The main targets appear to be youths who simply refuse to
work and kolkhozniks who live off private enterprise and
speculation. Adoption of the new laws followed revelations
of the existence of large numbers of persons not employed
in the public economy in some republics.
Complaining of a severe labor shortage in industry at a
24 December Azerbaydzhan Central Committee plenum,
Azerbaydzhan First Secretary G.A. Aliyev stated that
there were many people not engaged in social production: "Part
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2,? JULY 1970
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of Lhe nonworking population is occupied with their own
Private livelihoods, but there are also those who carry
on a parasitical way of life and engage in speculation in
vegetables, fruits, flowers and other agricultural
products, not only in our republic but even outside it"
(BAKINSKIY RAI3OCIIIY , 27 December) . IIe declared that "we
must adopt all measures to draw the entire able-bodied
population into social production."
PRAVDA's correspondent L. Tairov on 13 January reported
that there were over 100,000 able-bodied persons in
Azerbaydzhan who should be drawn into vacant industrial
jobs. lie also noted that many young people had not had a
job for a long time or continually changed jobs.
Although Tairov noted that Azerbaydzhan's jobless rate was
much higher than the national average; the problem is
apparently serious in some other republics too. Youthful
parasitism and the crimes engendered thereby have recently
been complained about in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia also.
At the February-March Georgian Komsomol congress, Georgian
First Secretary Mzhavanadze admitted that "we still have
young people who lead an idle, parasitic way of life and
do not engage in socially useful labor" (ZARYA VOSTOKA,
1 March). These "parasites," declared Mzhavanadze, "neither
study nor work." Mzhavanadze also told of punishing "many
young people" for using and selling narcotics. Georgian
prosecutor A. Takidze, in discussing the new nntiparasite
laws in the 21 May ZARYA VOSTOKA, complained that existing
laws against those who refused to work had proved
ineffective.
At the March Kazakh Komsomol congress, Kazakh First Secretary
Kunayev complained of youths' "scornful attitude toward labor,
study and civic duty" and of the "still large number of
crimes committed by youths" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 March).
Kazakh MVD chief Sh. Kabylbayev expressed alarm over "street
crimes" in Alma Ata and urged a stricter attitude toward
"drunkenness, parasitism and disrespect for the rules of
socialist society" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 22 March).
Moldavian MVD chief N. Bradulov told of youths who get jobs
for a few days, quit and loaf for many months, and then
repeat the cycle (for example, 14+ times in four and one-half
years) or simply refuse to work at all (SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA,
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22 JULY :L9'(0
? 7 June). 1radulov said that in the two months that Moldavia's
new law has been in effect it has had a "sobering effect" on
many parasites, influencing them to get jobs, although there
are still some who stubbornly refuse.
Armenian, Moldavian, and Lithuanian commentary on the new laws
indicates that kolkhozniks who shirk kolkhoz labor in favor
of their own private activities and speculation are intended
targets also. Such people "exert a harmful influence" on
others and often draw youths into criminal activities (KOMMUNIST,
20 May). Bradulov noted that 'there are "many parasites" in
rural areas and some sell illegal home brew and home-made wine
(SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 7 June). Lithuanian Prosecutor
A. Kayryalis also mentioned kolkhozniks who produce home brew
and do not work (SOVETSKAYA LITVA, 23 June).
EDITORIALS INDICATE CONCERN FOR STRENGTHENED DEFENSE
In editorials on the Central Committee plenums of 2-3 July
and 13 July, PRAVDA, RED STAR and RADYANSKA UKRAINA expressed
a concern for strengthening defense that was not voiced in
the similar editorials in other central and republican papers.
The RED STAR editorials seem to be no more than routine
examples of that paper's normal absorption in defense matters.
But the editorials in the other two papers are of more
interest. PRAVDA's editorial support for defense parallels
its favoring of continued heavy industrial priority in its
2 July editorial. The Ukrainian paper's promotion of
defense conforms 'to Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest's
election speech statement on further strengthening of the
"economic and defensive might of our fatherland" (RADYANSKA
UKRAINA, 2 June). Shelest himself worked for years in the
defense industry.
PRAVDA on 5 July said that the 2-3 July plenum's decisions
"have historic significance for further strengthening of
the economic and defensive might of the USSR at the present
stage." RED STAR on 5 July declared that agriculture is so
important that "without its comprehensive development,
moving ahead successfully, the further strengthening of the
economic and defensive might of the motherland and raising
of the living standard of the Soviet people is impossible."
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CONI-' f I)NN'.l.' IA 1, FBI.')' Til?NIJU
JU1,Y .I9'to
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in two uucccuul,,o edltorialu, fADYANtIKA UKIIA1.NA stressed defense.
On 5 July it cited the "steady raining of the cconorni.c and
defensive na,gh,, of the socialist fatherland and of the welfare
and culture of the workers" uincc the :'3d congress. On 't .1u].y
(there was no paper on 6 July) it repeated 1'ItAVDA' u for. mulation
that the agricultural tasks have "great significance for
further strengthening the economic and d r_fcnwivc might of
the USSR at the present stage." No other central or provincial
newspaper editorials even mentioned defe noc--although eight
republic papers played it safe by simply reprinting PRAVDA's
editorial.
Again, in the 17 July editorials on the decision to call the
24th party congress, only PRAVDA and RED STAR raised the
defense issue. PRAVDA said that "the further strengthening
and development of the economic and political bases of the
Soviet system and the growing defensive might of our country
determine the continually growing influence of the Soviet
Union in international conditions." RED STAR noted that the
USSR had created "a powerful economic potential making
possible the maintenance of its defensive capability at the
proper height," and declared that "the party and government
intend also in the future not to weaken concern for the
Soviet armed forces." The nearest any other central paper
came to backing defense was the 18 July TRUD editorial's
statement that in recent years "the economic and defensive
might of the country has been strengthened and the living
standard of the workers has been raised."
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CON P'II)I N'I'JAI,
P R C INTERNAL AFFAIRS
F'I31:., 'I'Ii1'Nb;,
22 Ji1LX .1.9'(0
CCP-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE RELATIONSHIP AGAIN DISCUSSED
I'ropa1;andiuLu continue to nhow concern over the problems
inherent in the diviulon of authority between the revived party
.:omrnittecn rind the t tablinhed revolutionary committees:
Asuertionn that the revolutionary committees-will continue to
play dL leadership role arc couplod with warnings that party
committees must play the .1cadcruhip role.
On 14 July Shangliai radio reported on the difficulties of
establishing unified party leadership in a local factory
while at the same t.irnc sustaining the role of the revolu-
tionary committee. After the setting up of the
factory party committee, some nonparty members of the
revolutionary committee came to feel that, four years
having passed since "they fought their way out at he
beginning" of the cultural revolution, "their Wstorical
mission had ended with the formation of the mill's party
committee." Members of the revolutionary committee lost
their initiative and let the now party committee solve
"a lot of work problems.." Under the leadership of the
factory's party committee, however, the revolutionary
committee soon realized that strengthening party
leadership does not mean that the "party committee
should monopolize all routine work." After study,
members of the revolutionary couuniLcee understood that
"they should continue to work under the leadership of
the party committee," realizing the party's objectives.
On 12 July NCNA released a RED FLAG article on the party
building experiences in a Shenyang plant which set up its
new party committee in August 1969 after a year of work.
The article was critical of those members of the party
committee who then "felt that . . . the ideological
building of the party was about completed" and "found
satisfaction in the normalization of party life." The
article told in general terms how this problem was
solved by reliance on the masses, but then it turned
to a specific condemnation of those members of the
masses "who had been more seriously affected by the
anarchist trend of thought" and "wanted to participate
in every meeting of the party and to inquire into all
the party's business." The RED FLAG article noted
that at one party committee meeting, held to readjust
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CON I'I1)1,N'i'..AL 1'131;3 11RLNDS
?2 JULY 1970
ba:ii.r,-level. leading groups, a leader of a rnaus organization
asked, "Why didn't you people ask me to partl.cipate in your
mreting to (1k cuuu pr.)blems?" The party committee dismiused
this question as reflective of "an incorrect attitude," and
asocrted: While "there was a time when our party committee
udopLed a compr.orniuing att[tude toward Interference from
the left," It "line of demarcation" must now be established
between relying on the maoucu and succumbing to "tailisrn"
which would nullify the party's leadership role.
Similar problems were outlined in a 19 July Chengchow radio
report on a Honan provincial conference on party building
held from 23 June to 16 July. The conference called on the
masse:; to assist in the creation of a new leadership to
counter "those erroneous trends which negate party leadership
and place the mass organizations above the party organizations."
Propaganda teams are to be formed to carry out Mao's line on
party building so that those who "pursue bourgeois factionalism"
do not "Join the leadership groups" nor by any means become
"the number one men."
The Honan conference also concluded that "it is necessary to put
on the party's agenda the work of rectifying and building the
Young Communist League," a suggestion originally advanced in
last year's joint editorial on the anniversary of the CCP but
ignored in the propaganda attention to the party anniversary
this year. Reconstruction of the YCL was not mentioned in
other recent reports on provincial-level meetings on party
rebuilding held in Heilungkiang, Kwangtung and Hunan.
HEILUNGKIANG FARM SHIFTS MESSHALLS TO LOWER UNITS
A 9 July Harbin radio report on conditions at a farm for
reeducating young intellectur-ls has sharply criticized large-
unit messhalls, a basic innovation of the "great leap forward."
While many communal messhalls were abandoned after the leap
period, there were a few references to messhalls during the
cultural revolution and certainly no criticism of the basic
concept of large-scale feer;ing. The youth farm report now
strikes at the heart of the system .n arguing that "it
took a long time to serve a meal because of the large
niunber of people," thus affecting production. The farm
reduced the messhall unit from the branch farm to the
"company" level, with the result that "meals are better
and can be served in a relatively short time."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JULY 1970
HOPEH PROVINCIAL SERVICE RESUMES LOCAL BROADCASTING
The Hopeh provincial service was heard broadcasting a local
program, of routine interest, on 22 July, its first known
break from a solid relay of Radio Peking since October 1968.
Only three provincial-level radios are still limited to
relaying Radio Peking, carrying no local broadcasts: Inner
Mongolia (since 5 January 1970), Kweichow (since 30 September
1969), and Szechwan (since 19 November 1969).
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