TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030029-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 8, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~Illllllllilllllll~~~~~~
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
8 July 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 27)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded Iran, axiomatic
downgrading and
drrtlaulficatian
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
DRV, PRG Foreign Ministries on President?s Cambodian Report . .
1
Hanoi, Front Call Bruce Appointment to Paris "Appeasement" . .
5
President's Remarks Prompt Only Routine Moscow Criticism . .
6
PRC Publicizes Chou inn-lai, Sihanouk Attacks on President . . .
8
Delegates at Paris Assail President's Report . . . . . . . . .
10
Meetings of SEATO, Allied Foreign Ministers in Saigon Scored .
11
New Conference Idea Ignore6 by Moscow, Rejected by Sihanouk . .
13
Sihanouk Government Calls Trial of Prince "Illegal" . . . . . .
13
Military Situation in Cambodia, Vietnam Discussed . . . . . . .
11E
Front Denies Allied Charge of 11 June Communist Massacre . . .
17
DRV Says U.S. Plane Downed, War Crimes Communiques Released . .
18
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Polemics Remain at Low Level; Kuznetsov Leaves Peking . . . .
19
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Disputes U.S. View of Mideast Balance of Forces . . . .
22
USSR Skeptical, Cautious on U.S. Peace Initiative . . . . . .
214
NEW TIMES Discusses Arab Differences on Mideast Crisis . . .
25
IZVESTIYA Observer Responds to FRG Critics of Dialogue .
Poland Presses Bonn on Recognition of Oder-Neisse Line . . .
New Treaty Registers Compromise on Contentious Issues
31
Maurer, Kosygin Remarks Mirror Respective Viewpoints ?
32
Bucharest Gives Kosygin Delegation Correct Reception . . . .
34
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Husak Assails Dubcek; Radio and Press Deny Impending Trial . .
36
(Continued)
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C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
Peking Leadership Rankings: A Game of Chinese Checkers?. . . . .
39
Broadcast Examines Party, Revolutionary Committee Relationship .
40
Progress in Party Rebuilding Shown by Province (Table) . . . . .
42
Head of Resident Burmese CP Mission May Be Absent From Peking . .
43
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 JUNE - 5 JULY 1970
Moscow (3690 items)
Peking (2667 items)
CPSU CC Plenum
(--)
8%
Indochina
(5%)
34%
[Brezhnev Report
3%]
[Nixon Statements
9%]
Middle East
(3%)
8%
[Sihanouk in DPRK
7%]
[Nasir in USSR
(--)
5%]
Korean War & Taiwan
(51%)
27%
China
(6%)
6%
Anniversaries
Soyuz 9
(8%)
5%
Domestic Issues
(11%)
14%
Indochina
(6%)
5%
CCP 49th
(--)
12%
RSFSR SS Session
(--)
4%
Anniversary
Warsaw Pact Foreign
(6%)
3%
Ministers' Meeting
in Budapest
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
me-nt or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970
INDOCHINA
President Nixon's 30 June report on the U.S. operation in
Cambodia and his 1 July television interview with journalists
draw high-level Vietnamese communist reaction in the form of
DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements and a VNA interview
with DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. The propaganda
uniformly claims that the President's remarks indicate that
U.S. "aggression" will continue in Cambodia and all of
Indochina and that he is still trying to win a military victory
and to negotiate from a position of strength. The President's
announcement in his TV interview of Ambr.ssador Bruce's appoint-
ment as head of the Paris delegation is characterized as a
move to appease public opinion.
Peking's reaction to the President's report includes Chou
En-lai's remark--at a 5 July banquet welcoming Sihanouk back
from his state visit to North Korea--that the United States'
expansion of its "war of aggression" into Cambod?.a and its
"deceptive" calls for a peaceful settlement are aimed at
"hanging on" to all of Indochina.
Moscow offers no high-level comment on the President's state-
ments; routine radio and press comment follows the Vietnamese
communist line in scoring the U.S. policy of continued
"aggression".'in Cambodia and throughout Indochina. Kosygin, in
brief remarks on Southeast Asia in his 7 July Bucharest speech,
seemed to go beyond earlier elite statements in connecting the
United States with the Cambodian coup. As rendered by TASS in
English and Russian, Kosygin said that "preparing for an armed
intrusion into the territory of Cambodia, the United States
provoked there a coup d'etat and then started an aggression
against that neutral country." The Soviet Governn:ant statement,
which Kosygin read at his [t May press conference, had said that
after the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, the "link between the
subversive activities of certain services of the United States
and the coup d'etat in Phnom Penh" became more evident.
There is currently :_ittle Soviet criticism of C`iina's Indochina
policies. But a 3 July Mandarin-language commentary, in the
course of a general attack, chides Peking for describing Soviet
support of the DRV's position on a political solution as
"collaboration" with the United States.
DRV. PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES ON PRESIDENT'S CAMBODIAN REPORT
HANG[ Following prompt, routine radio and press corm ent on
President Nixon's 30 June report on the Cambodian
operation and his 1 July interview with TV correspondents,
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Hanoi on the 3d released a DRV Foreign Ministry statement*
which says that on the occasion of the "forced" withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Cambodia the Pre:iident "again prattled
about his good will for peace and boasted about illusory
U.S. successes."
The statement, which makes no explicit reference either to
the President's report or to his TV interview, says that
"obviously" the. Nixon Administration is still entertaining
the "illusion" of a military victory and of negotiating from
a position of. strength. Like other comment, the statement
charges that although the United States "has been forced"
to withdraw troops, it continues to "wage aggression" against
Cambodia by using ARVN and Thai troops, carrying out air
strikes, stepping up military aid, and pressuring allies to
supply arms and weapons to the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime.
It also scores the United States for "stepping up" the war
in Laos, prolonging the war in South Vietnam through
Vietnamization, and "threatening" the DRV with air strikes
"as during the first days" of this May.
Without elaboration, the statement says that "Washington has
also left the door open" for the return of U.S. troops to
Cambodia. The President's exchange with the TV journalists
regarding a categorical assurance th..t troops would not be
sent back to Cambodia is exploited i. other propaganda. A
Hanoi radio commentary on the 3d says President Nixon "refused
to give a clearcut reply": it reports accurately that he
said he has no plea for a return of the troops but would
not like to be bound by a categorical statement, but it goes
on to conclude that he "has left the door open to future
U.S. armed aggression against Cambodia." A NHAN DA1' commentary,
as summarized by VNA on the 4th, says flatly that the President
"obstinately refused to declare that the United States
definitively would not commit troops to Cambodia again."
* The last previous President, al pronouncement to evoke
foreign ministry statements was the 20 April speech in which
the President announced that an additional 150,000 U.S.
troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam during the next
year. The President's 30 April speech announcing that U.S.
as well as ARJN ground troops were being sent into Cambodia
prompted statements from the DRV and the PRG at the govern-
ment level. The President's 3 November 1969 speech outlining
Vietnamization and troop-withdrawal policy also occasioned
government statements.
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The foreign ministry statement refers to "illusory" U.S.
successes but does not mention the specific mission of the
U.S. operation in Cambodia. Most of the routine comment
also similarly avoids details. But a 2 July VNA account
of the President's report does quote it as referring to
the "successful destruction of the enemy base area," and
the initial 1 July Hanoi radio reaction to the report
said that the President released statistics on "booty
seized from the enemy."* NHAN DAN on the 4th says that
the President merely gave out statistics and did not reply
to "the two hard questions--what is the outcome of the
Cambodian venture and has it helped shorten the war."
The statement issued on 1 July in Paris by the DRV spokes-
man, carried by VNA on the 3d, says cryptically that the
President "put the blame on the DRV and shamelessly charged
it with extending the war to Cambodia."
The Paris spokesman's statement, like other propaganda
including the NHAN DAN article, seeks to bolster claims
of U.S. defeats by citing the 20 June communique from
Sihanouk's "Defense Ministry" which VNA had released on
the 29th. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of 3 July,
broadcast by Hanoi radio that day, uniquely claims that
the President had to withdraw U.S. troops and some Saigon
troops out of Cambodia "in order to save the U.S.-puppets"
from a "dangerous situation in South Vietnam."
While the foreign ministry statement deprecates the
President's remarks on negotiations, it makes no reference
to the Paris talks. On the other hand, Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh responded in his 3 July interview to the
VNA correspondent's request for comment on the President's
1 July statement by saying that he "only reiterated that
stand the United States has adopted at the Paris conference
for more than a year"--demanding mutual withdrawal and "using
the Thieu administration to oppose the South Vietnamese
people's right to self-determination." This line is echoed
in the routine comment, and the 3 July Hanoi radio commentary
on the President's TV interview complained that "he would not
establish a concrete timetable for a total U.S. troop
withdrawal from South Vietnam."
* See the TRENDS of 1 July, pages 1-2, for a discussion of
Vietnamese communist vacillation on the matter of sanctuaries
in Cambodia.
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THE FRONT Th PRG Foreign Ministry statement of 3 July,
unlike the DRV statement, refers explicitly to
the President's 30 June report in charging that the United
States is continuing its "aggression" in Cambodia.. The PRG
statement also differs from that of the DRV in the detail
of its charges. The PRG says the President "shamelessly
laid the responsibility for the expansion of the war into
the whole of Indochina on the Vietnamese, people." And it
makes the unique charge that "on U.S. orders" the Thai,
Cambodian and Saigon governments "have set up a joint
military command in Phnom Penh." The statement says that
the "U.S. satellites" in SEATO "are campaigning for an
armed intervention against the patriotic movement of the
Khmer people" and that the United States has "instigated
the Djakarta conference's group to take perfidious moves
aimed at covering up the U.S. aggressive acts in Cambodia,
legalising the Lon Nol-Matak clique and advertising for the
Nixon Administration's peace hoax."
A 3 July Liberation Radio commentary on the President's
report casts doubt on his statement that there will be
neither advisers nor U.S. troops in Cambodia. The fact
cannot be concealed, it says, that "there is the U.S.
embassy staff--actually consisting of U.S. officers and CIA
agents--in Phnom Penh" and that the United States will provide
military aid to the Lon Not army. The commentary adds that
"of course" the U.S. embassy staff and military aid "are not
as limited as Nixon said." Noting that ARVN troops continue
to operate in Cambodia with-U.S. air support, it also charges
that this does not take into account the fact that a number
of U.S.-ARVN units, "although withdrawn from Cambodia, have
bivouacked in the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border area in
order to be ready to reinforce and to create military
prgssure, as was clearly pointed out by Western opinion."
An LPA commentary on the 4th pegged to the President's TV
interview, like Hanoi comment, castigates the President for
calling for a mutual troop withdrawal. But it goes on
additionally to acknowledge his references to U.S. proposals
on a cease-fire and general elections under international
supervision. It also ridicules the President's statement
"that the Vietnamese people's demands for the total and
unconditional U.S. withdrawal and the overthrow of the
Saigon-puppet regime" are unacceptable. A Liberation Radio
commentary, also on the 4th, echoes LPA but goes on to say
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that "truthfully, whether or not the Americans will agree" to
end the war and withdraw all U.S. and allied troops "will
definitely not be determined by the Americans nor by their
'good will for peace,' but by the strength of the Vietnamese,
American, and world peoples who are tightening their drive
to knock out the U.S. aggressors."
HANOI, FRONT CALL BRUCE APPOINTMENT TO PARIS "APPEASEMENT"
Hanoi's first acknowledgment of the President's announcement
that he was appointing Ambassador David Bruce to head the U.S.
delegation in Paris appears in the 3 July radio commentary on
the President's TV interview. The commentary says that the
President tried to present the appointment "as an act of good
will" but that it is in fact "aimed at nothing but appeasing
public opinion--which has strongly criticized the Nixon
Administration for having minimized the importance of the
Paris talks--since he declared that the U.S. stand will not
change." Hanoi, of course, does not acknowledge the
President's remark that he hoped this act of good will would
be reciprocated by a similar move by the DRV in attempting
to find a peaceful solution.
Later on the 3d, VNA carried the interview with DRV Foreign
Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, who responded to a question on
the Bruce appointment by saying that the President had
refused to appoint a chief delegate since last November and
that by doing so now he is "simply correcting an arrogant
move." Trinh added that "if the United States intends to
make use of this to cover its obdurate stand, surely nobody
will fall dupe to it." When Trinh was asked if Xuan Thuy
will return to Paris, he said only that "as usual, Minister
Xuan Thuy has come back to Hanoi to report to the government
on the work at the Paris conference." The NHAN DAN
commentary of the 4th says that viewed against the President's
"unchanged stand," Bruce's appointment cannot be viewed as a
new factor beneficial to peace, nor has it in any way shown
U.S. good will.
Front reaction to the appointment came on the 4th with an LPA
"authorized" statement which says the appointment is "what
the United States must do after the prolonged absence of a
chief U.S. delegate." The LPA and Liberation Radio commentaries
of the same day charge that the appointment is an attempt to
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soothe public opinion indignant over the spread of the war.
The radio commentary says that "to add a sensational feature"
to his TV interview, the President began by announcing the
appointment. Observing that he "lavishly praised Bruce as
America's most distinguished diplomat and as an ambassador
who had served five Presidents," the broadcast charges that
the President "tried to create the illusory impression" that
the appointment would bring something new to the search for
a peaceful solution to Vietnam. But the "gist" of the
problem, it adds, is whether or not the United States agrees
to change its stand, and in this respect the President
"offered nothing new."
PRESIDENTS REMARKS PROMPT ONLY ROUTINE MOSCOW CRITICISM
Routine-level Moscow comment on the President's report and TV
interview claims that the withdrawal of troops from Cambodia
is merely an effort to "deceive" world opinion and does not
indicate a change in the U.S. policy of "interference" in
that country. A Moscow domestic service commentary by
Aleksey Leontyev on 2 July takes issue with the President's
references to successes, citing Western press reports that
the Cambodian partisans control a "far bigger part" of
Cambodia than they did before the entry of U.S. troops and
that the Lon Nol government is in a "more risky position"
than before. He says that the "interventionists"
accomplished none of their goals: they did not find the
"headquarters of the liberation army of South Vietnam,"
they failed to "encircle and wipe out the patriotic forces,"
&rd they failed to show that U.S. intervention in Cambodia
is now completed or to show that the United States wants
peace in Indochina.
Other propaganda, including a Krichevs=:_.y commentary broadcast
in foreign languages from 2 to 4 July, says that troop withdrawal
merely means a "new phase" in U.S. aggression in Cambodia. with
the burden of the fighting shifted to allied troops while the
United States continues bombings and provides military aid to
the Lon Nol regime. A brief 2 July TASS and radio news report
of the President's TV interview says he "gave no clearcut
assurances" that the United States will not repeat the "invasion"
of Cambodia under any circumstances, but Moscow commentators
do not dwell in any detail on the exchange over the possibility
of a renewed entry of U.S. troops.
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In a 4 July PRAVDA article Mayevskiy disputes the President's
statement that the action in Cambodia was necessary to save
American lives, maintaining that since air operations will
continue and South Vietnamese troops remain, the war and
therefore further losses will continue. He adds that the
extension of the war in Southeast Asia may not only undermine
the "timetable" for the withdrawal of troops from South
Vietnam, but may even require the dispatch of new troops.
South Vietnamese troops are already committing "terror" iii
Cambodia, he says, and the United States is pressing for a
Thai invasion as well, with the Thai air force already
conducting bombings in Cambodia.
A domestic service commentary by Zorin on 6 July takes issue
with the President's: position, in the TV interview, that
the present war, though undeclared, is in accordance with the
President's constitutional right to use his powers to protect
American troops in military operations. Zorin argues that
the "banditry" has lost its last semblance of legality with
the repeal of the Tonkin resolution, leaving the President
in an "awkward" position. The Mayevskiy article similarly
contends that the repeal of the Tonkin resolution "confirmed"
the illegality of the U.S. "invasion of Indochina."
Several commentators note that the President's 30 June report
coincided with the Senate's passage of the Cooper-Church
amendment. (TASS on 1 July, reporting the vote on the
amendment, called it a "serious blow" to Administration
policy.'.in Southeast Asia but added that its "political and
moral" importance tops its "practical consequences," since
the bill might be revised in joint committee and would
probably be vetoed by the President.) Mayevskiy in PRAVDA
points to the coincidence as showing the deepening split in
America, and brief 2 July TASS and radio reports of the TV
interview note that the President was "critical" of the
amendment and urged the House to introduce changes to "bring
it to naught."
NEGOTIATIONS Moscow commentators, including Mayevskiy in
PRAVDA and Krichevskiy, question the
sincerity of the President's statements that he seeks a
negotiated settlement, and like the Vietnamese communists
they discount the significance of the Bruce appointment in
view of alleged U.S. intransigence at Paris. A TASS report
on 2 July cites a New York POST editorial as commenting
that the President's TV interview "threw cold water" on
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rumors that the Administration may agree to a coalition
regime in Saigon and that in the face of this "letdown"
the appointment of Ambassador Bruce "loses much of its
impact." On 1 July, impugning the President's sincerity
regarding a political settlement, TASS cites Western
press comments on the President's "tough language" accusing
Hanoi of belligerence and intransigence.
A Moscow broadcast in English to South Asia on the 8th,
scoring the "American press" for starting a "new propaganda
drive" to make readers believe President Nixon has undertaken
a "peace offensive," says that the only proof the press can
offer is the appointment of Ambassador Bruce. But the
commentator remarks that this can "hardly change anything"
at the Paris talks as long as Bruce has "obviously limited
authority" in making policy; he concludes that the talk
of peace initiatives and the appointment of the.new Paris
delegation head is nothing but a "show," lacking any "real
readiness to make the necessary changes in policy."
PRC PUBLICIZES CHOU EN-LAID SIHANOUK ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT
Peking's initial reaction to the President's statement took
the form of pickups of Vietnamese communist comment, the first
being NCJ'A's 2 July report of a VNA commentary that day.
NCNA quo-,-.,ed it at length, including the charge that the Nixon
Administration is attempting to negotiate from a position of
strength and to use the Paris talks as a means to step up
Vietnamization. Other NCNA pickups include that on the 6th
of a NHAN DAN commentary of 4 July. It accurately quotes
much of the article as transmitted by VNA but omits a
passage referring to, the appointment of a new chief U.S.
delegate at Paris. The only Peking acknowledgment of the
Bruce appointment appears in an NCNA report of Sihanouk's
speech at the banquet hosted by Chou En-lai on 5 July.
Peking's first independent comment, carried by NCNA on 3 July,
says the President's statements show up troop withdrawal as
a "counterrevolutionary tactic" to cover war expansion and
the "'peace talk' sch-me." It notes that the President said
that the United States will continue to give the Lon Nol clique
military assistance, that the U.S. Air Force will continue
"air interception," and that the United States will encourage
third country efforts to "provide troops or supplies" to
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Cambodia. It also notes that South Vietnamese troops remain
in Cambodia and that Thai troops will "soon be introduced."
The commentary takes issue with the President's statements
about "seeking real negotiations" to obtain a "settlement fair
to both sides," routinely terming them "counterrevolutionary
duubledealing tactics."
A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article takes a similar line the
next day, saying troop withdrawal does not mean a slackening
of aggression and calling the President's description of the
withdrawal as an effort to seek peace "the greatest of lies."
The action in Cambodia was a "disastrous defeat" despite the
President's claims of victory, it says, with Cambodia's
national liberation struggle intensifying, the "people's war."
developing, and the Phnom Penh regime "moving closer to
collapse."
Both the NCNA commentary and PEOPLE'S DAILY note in some
detail the exchange in the TV interview on the question of
a renewed troop incursion. NCNA cites the President as
saying that "as commander in chief if again it becomes
necessary to make such a decision, I will certainly exercise
this power," and PEOPLE'S DAILY notes that he said he is
"not willing to say" that U.S. ground units will not be sent
to Cambodia again.
Chou En-lai, at the 5 June banquet for Sihanouk, charged the
President with "telling a hypocritical lie" when he said that
the U.S. troops had successfully fulfilled their combat
missions in Cambodia and that "all" had withdrawn. He
called the troop withdrawal announcement a "trick of political
deception" aimed at perpetuating the occupation of Frith
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia so as to "hang on to the whole
of Indochina." Like Vietnamese communist propaganda, he
cited Sihanouk's 30 June st-~.ement that the troop withdrawal
does not solve the problem of war in Cambodia and Indochina
and his demand for total, immediate, and unconditional
withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops. C,;.ou also briefly
cited the 3 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement'.s expression
of the Indochinese people's resolve to fight until "final
victory."
Sihanouk, in his banquet speech, branded as "cynicism" the
statement in the President's 30 June report that the Southeast
Asian people should determine their own future without
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outside interference, commenting that it; is only the United
States that violates the Geneva agreements. The troop
withdrawal is only a "trick," Sihanouk said, since the United
States is escalating "air intervention" and sending in
"mercenaries" and arms to help Lon Nol. He also asserted
that in his TV interview the President said American forces
would remain in South Vietnam long enough to "compel the
patriotic Vietnamese to accept a negotiated solution."
DELEGATES AT PARIS ASSAIL PRESIDENTS REPORT
Consistent with recent practice, Vietnamese communist media
give only cursory accounts of the 73d session of the Paris
talks on 2 July. According to VNA, the PRG and DRV delegates
"severely denounced" the President's 30 June report as
"another piece of deception" justifying U.S. "aggression"
against Cambodia and covering up the United States' failure
in "its scheme" to expand the war to all of Indochina.
Both the LPA and VNA accounts note that PRG delegation deputy
chief Dinh Ba Thi said the United States was "compelled" to
withdraw its ground forces by failure and the pressure of
world opinion. And both accounts note his argument that the
war in essence remains an American one, since the U.S. air
force "keeps on openly attacking the whole territory of that
country and spraying toxic chemicals and gases on Cunbodia,
continues to have Saigon puppet troops in ~ambodia, and has
sent Thai mercenaries to fight in place of American GI's."
LPA notes that Thi presented "proof" of communist victories
and the United States' failure to improve its position by
the Cambodian action, but the account reports none of the
detail of his remarks.
The VNA account briefly reports DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's
comments that even though U.S. troops are withdrawn, the
United States continues its "war of aggression" against
Cambodia by using Saigon and "other mercenary" troops,
finding ways to retain U.S..military advisers there, and
sending U.S. aircraft to bomb. VNA ignores both delegates'
charges that the President still claimed the. right to send
U.S. troops back to Cambodia "under the absurd pretext" of
protecting U.S. troops in South Vietnam.. It also omits Vy's
charge that the President, "in order tojustify the U.S.
aggression in Cambodia and his extention of the war to the
whole of Indochina," again resorted to "slander" accusing
"the DRV of bringing the war to Cambodia and even of causing
the 'downfall of Prince Sihanouk.'"
010NFIDENTId.L
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11 JULY 1.970
VNA motes that Vy stud the United States failed to achieve
any of' its objectives in entering Cwnbod:i a, but omits Vy's
listing of the objectives--reducing U.S. casualties,
ensuring the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam
according to plan and carrying out Vietriamization as
scheduled. VNA also deletes Vy'u citation of the 20 June
communique issued by Sihanouk's "Deferise Ministry" and
Sihanouk's 30 June statement as documentation of U.S. looses
and defeats--odd omissions given the frequent references to
both documents in other propaganda.
ALLIED Again obscuring the allied delegates' speeches,
SPEECHES VNA says that GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong
"again rehashed the same preposterous and
arrogant allegations he had made in previous sessions."
U.S. delegate Philip Habib, according to the account,
"pleaded for the flagrant U.S. invasion in Cambodia and took
up the peace hoax advanced by Nixon" in the 30 June report
and the TV interview.
MEETINGS OF SEATO. ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SAIGON SCORED
NANO[ A Hanoi broadcast on 6 July and, a NIIAN DAN articJ e
carried by VNA on the 7th refer to the 2-3 July
SEATO Council meeting in Manila. (Earlier, on the 2d,
Liberation Radio had linked the Manila meeting with the
President's statements as demonstrating U.S. "aggressive"
designs on Cambodia.) The Hanoi broadcast alleges that
the SEATO meeting was held with the aim of "further attracting
the U.S. satellites and lackeys to participate in the U.S.
military adventure in Indochina." It complains that the
SEATO communique "expressed sympathy" for the Lon Nol
government's appeal for aid and "again Insolently i'al.ely
accused North Vietnam of invading Cambodia." It further
notes that the communique "called for support of the diplomatic
efforts of the U.S.-puppets and lackeys at the so-called
Djakarta conference on Cambodia" and hailed the "imaginery
victories" of the allies in Cambodia.
NILAN DAN on the 7th lumps the SEATO conference and the Saigon
meeting of the foreign ministers whose countries have troops
in South Vietnam, charging that their purpose was to tie the
United States' allies more closely to "the U.S. w&r chariot."
The meetings, it said, show that the President is bent on
realizir,z his doctrine of "making Asians fight Asians."
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O .1UI,Y 1.9 j0
Both NIIAN DAN and the rud-io broadcast claim th(Al, the meetings
met with failure. The 'uroudctLut ULLya the uppcr.Llr by Secretary
Hogcra and his "clique" for direct military Intervention "were
responded to pcrfunctor .iy." Stating that the Saigon and. 'L'ha..
"regimes" at the Manila and Suigon rnectingu "called e)n SEA'I'0
to bring its troops to Cambodia to replace U.S. troops," NIIAN
DAN cites Wcatcrn press aourcen ao saying the uuggeLtion "was
coolly received" and that "none of them, except; South Vietnam
and the United States, made a precise commitment concerning
the aid which they agreed to give Cambodia."
MOSCOW Some of Moscow's ccmment on the Preuldent's state-
ments also refers to the SEATO Council and Saigon
foreign ministers' meetings, both attended by Secretary
Roger . Commentators say both meetings discussed the
widening of the war and the drawing in of allied troops.
A 4 July broadcast in English to North America notes that
Thailand was the first to respond, dispatching aircraft
i.o bomb Cambodia and declaring readiness to send troops.
TASS on 2 July, commenting on the SEATO meeting, says the
U.S. effort to draw Asian allies into the war is shown
by President Nixon's 3C June statement that the United
States will encourafe and support efforts by other countries
to aid the Phnom Penh regime "with troops and arms."
On 7 July TASS cites Western reports of Secretary Rogers'
press conference in which he said that military assistance
to Cambodia was discussed at his meeting in Saigon with
Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick. 'L'ASS comments
that Rogers' statement "confirms" the United States'
intention to continue intervening in Cambodia.
At the same time, Moscow commentators stress that the
United States failed to obtain "collective action"
from its SEATO allies, pointing to the allied states'
reluctance to be drawn into Cambodia. A TASS report
on 4 July, for example, says there were disagreements
at the SEATO meeting on measures to be taken regarding
Cambodia and that the allies were in no hurry to "pull
the U.S. chestnuts out of the fire." A PRAVDA article
reviewed by TASS on 8 July comments in a similar vein
on the Saigon conference, asserting that the United
States failed to obtain further troop contingents and
that even Thailand said it had not yet taken a decision
on the dispatch of more forces.
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(1 JULY 1970
PEKING Peking'u comment on the L'rcu.LdenL'o ataLcmcn,s does
not mention the SEATO meeting, or the troop
contributors' conference, although both rncetirigu are noted In
other I'RC comment. which uayn the United States used them to
carry out the Nixon doctrine ,f' "using Aoianu against Asians."
NCNA conunr.nLarleu on 6 July uuy that Secretary Rogers had
upeclul talk:; with the T'halu at the SEATO meeting on the
question of supporting the, Lou Nol clique and that the Saigon
conference war; hc; l.d solely for the purpose of planning
e,onLl.nu(ed expansion of aggression In Indochina, Secretary
Rogers exprcuuing the hope that the allies would aid the
Cambodian "clique."
NEW CONFERENCE IDEA IGNOR1T) BY MOSCOW, REJECTED BY SIHANOUK
Moscow's continued avoidance of the issue of a new international
conference on Indochina is pointed up by o brief Moscow radio
report on 2 July of French President Pompidbu's press conference
that day. Moscow cites him as stressing that peace can be
restored in Indochina only if the United States decides to
withdraw its troops, but it does not acknowledge that he also
said France's proposal "for broadly based talked on Indochina"
would be "always valid."
Sihcnouk's opposition to a new international conference is
reiterated, and endorsed by Kim Ii-song, in the joint communique
r%icaoed at the conclusion of Sihanouk's state visit on 2 July.
It says the solution of the Cambodian problem "at present needs
no new inteiraciona'. conference" but rather requires strict U.S.
objcrvance of the Geneva agreements and the "immediate,
uric-nditional, and total" withdrawal of troops from Indochina.
SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT CALLS TRIAL OF PRINCE "ILLEGAL"
The trial of Sihanouk in Phnom Penh is denounced as "illegal" in a
3 July statement by the Cambodian. Royal Government of National Union,
carried by NCNA on th I:th. The statement asserts that the govern-
ment will bring the "traitors" in Phnom Penh to trial before a
''people's tribunal" after final victory. it does not specify that
one of the charges against Sihanouk was collusion with Vietnamese
communist. troops, merely noting that he was accused of colluding
with "foreign elements" to leave Cambodian territory whenever their
presence was discovered. Condemning U.S. "aggression" against
Cambodia, it declares that "the Vietnamese people's patriotic
forces have never attacked the Cambodian people." Peking supports
the statement in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--carried by
NCNA on the 7th. VNA summarizes the statement on the 6th.
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B JULY 1970
MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, VIETNAM DISCUSSED
ACTION IN Hanoi media highlight the fighting in Kompong
CAMBODIA Chain Province, pegging comment to reports by
the FUNK information bureau. On the 4th, VNA
carries an announcement by the bureau that the Cwnbodian
National Liberation Armed Forces (CNLA) from 5 to 14 June
"wiped out" nearly 2,100 U.S.-South Vietnamese troops in
Kompong Chain. And VNA on the 5th cites the bureau for a
report that the CNLA in that province from 26 to 28 June
"wiped out" 1,350 enemy troops and destroyed nearly 70 tanks
or armored vehicles In attacks on the ARVN 318th combat
group and 5th and 18th armored regiments.
The 26 to 28 June feats in the Piem Cheng and Chup areas of
the province are acclaimed in the 6 June issue of the army
paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as "one of the greatest victories
recorded" by the Cambodians in the past two months. The
paper, as reported by VNA, comments that "by striking hard
at a multi-battalion unit of the Saigon army supported by
U.S. tanks, armored cars, aircraft, and infantry" the
"Cambodian armed forces and people" have proved their capability
of mounting repeated and big offensives over a long period of
time in an area where the enemy deploys large amounts of troops
and "war means." Hanoi radio comments along similar lines
in a Vietnamese-language broadcast to the South on the 6th.
CHIEN BINH, On 3 July Hanoi radio's domestic service
OTHER COMMENT broadcasts an article from the 1 July
QUAN DOT NIIAN DAN attributed to "Chien Binh,"
the pseudonym often used on authoritative North Vietnamese
military commentaries.* Chien Binh claims that the United
States has failed in its "strategic objective" of turning
Cambodia irto a military base and cites, among other things,
* A Hanoi broadcast on 2 July reported another article by Chien
Binh on the Cambodian "revolution" entitled "A Major Turning
Point in Cambodia's History," which appeared in the army paper
that day. The last known previous Chien Binh article, published
in the ]. June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, also commented on military
action in Cambodia. Among other things, it ridiculed the
Administration's announced intention to capture the Viet Cong
headquarters, noting that the French had similarly attempted
unsuccessfully to seize Ho Chi Minh's "'government"' and that
U.S. efforts in 1966-67 to destroy the communist headquarters
in Tay Ninh had failed.
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commeent, attributed to USIS that the "patriotic forces" in
Cambodia have expanded their position from the narrow stretch
of land they occupied on the bord.Lr and now "occupy half the
country and are in a position to seize the entire country."
lie asserts that the United States has been defeated in the
first phase of Its "war of aggression" in Cambodia, adding
that "the inaugural phase plays a very important role,
exerting a great influence upon the subsequent phase of the
war. it
Claiming that the Administration tried a blitzkrieg strategy,
Chien Binh says that allied efforts to carry out a massive
surprise attack failed and that the "Cambodian national
liberation troops . . . took the initiative in attacking the
U.S.-puppets right at the outset." Recounting various
engagements to document this point, he says, for example, that
the Americans "sustained heavy defeats in Mimot and Kratie,"
and that while U.S. troops were sent into the Fishhook area
to attack Mimot, "Cambodian liberation troops cut off a series
of strategic roads converging on Phnom Penh." Chien Binh
adds that contrary to American boasts of "victories beyond
expectations" and of driving the enemy out of its sanctuaries,
"at the end of June the U.S. 11th Armored Regiment sustained
heavy defeat in Minot, six kilometers from the South Vietnam
border, while the puppet troops were attacked in the Fishhook
area."
Hanoi on 5 July broadcasts in its domestic service a article
from the June issue of the QUAN DOI NHAP1 DAN magazine.
attributed to Le Trong Toan, which hails alleged successes
of "numerous newly-created units of the Cambodian Natione.l
Liberation Armor and guerrilla and militia forces." The
fiction of the Cambodian liberation forces is dropped briefly
when the article, in enumerating allied "political setbacks,"
notes that "the U.S. imperialists failed in their 'operation
aimed at annihilating the Viet Cong's general headquarters'
in order to save the Vietnamization program." Claiming that
recent events have created "favorable conditions for developin
the Cambodian revolution," the article goes on to portray a
drawnout struggle., noting that "the Cambodian people's recent
victories have provided a firm basis for their protracted and
arduous, yet inevitably victorious, struggle."
A 6 July Liberation Radio commentary claims that insurgent
forces in South Vietnam took advantage of allied problems after
the fall of Sihanouk and, in the first 20 days of April, put
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out of action over 50,000 allied troops, destroyed nearly 50 percent
of the remaining strategic hamlets and concentration centers, and
"liberated many vast areas." It says that since late April, "after
Nixon openly publicized his aggressive policy in Cambodia, the
U.S. puppets have had further great shortcomings on the South
Vietnamese battlefield because they have had to move a part of
their fragile numerical strength and war means to a new battle-
field." Later, pressing the point of the reduction of allied
forces in South Vietnam, the eonmentary says that great ar
successes are certain since the allied position has been
weakened by the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the extension of
the war into Cambodia.
PLAF COMMAND On 5 July Liberation Radio broadcasts the text of
COMMUNIQUE a communique from the PLAF command, dated 1 July,
which enumerates communist achievements in South
Vietnam and reviews "important events" in Indochina in the first
six months of 1970, including the Pathet Lao success in
recapturing territory and the development of the "Cambodian
people's revolutionary movement." The communique claims that
in South Vietnam during this period nearly 230,000 allies were
killed, wounded, or captured; 4,200 planes downed or destroyed;
10,000 military vehicles destroyed; 250 war vessels sunk; and
1,500 artillery pieces and heavy mortars destroyed. It maintains
that pacification has been frustrated by the complete or partial
destruction of "the majority" of strategic hamlets. The
communique says that the Administration's "war expansion policy"
has "run into strong opposition in U.S. political circles," and
that the opponents include "some members of the Nixon
Administration and many of Nixon's advisers and diplomats."
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 7 July peg editorial comment
to the PLAF communique. The NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by
Hanoi domestic service, asserts that the allied move into
Cambodia was a "serious strategic error," making their situation
in South Vietnam "even more precarious."
GUERRILLA A 2 July Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to South
PROBLEMS Vietnam praises the development of guerrilla
warfare in the Quang Nam-Da Nang area but also
frankly alludes to the need to overcome problems. It says that
various echelons of the leadership in the area have educated
the guerrillas to "clearly realize that to carry out revolution
is to be on the offensive, and that only by launching attacks
can victories be won." Acknowledging a problem in attitude,
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it adds that the "leading echelons have tried to overcome all
'rightiat'ideologY, conservatism, and hesitancy, thanks to which
everyone, especially cadres and the people's armed forces, is
of the same mind, determined to struggle fierrel'y and protract-
edly." The leadership, according to the commentary, has also
made everyone understand thoroughly the particularly important
strategic position of the
guerrilla, warfare against the U.S.
aggressors' Vietnemization and pacification scheme." The
commentary also notes that attention has been devoted to
improving the cadre corps, especially at the lowest levels.
The existence of rightist thinking among insurgent forces in
South Vietnam has been noted occasionally in communist comment.
For example, an editorial in the southern party's journal TIEN
PHONG, broadci~st by Liberation Radio on 31 January, warned
against "passive, rightist thoughts."
FRONT DENIES ALLIED CHARGE OF 11 JUNE COMMUNIST MASSACRE
A Hanoi broadcast on 6 July in Vietnamese to South Vietnam,
quoting LPA, reports that on 30 June the Quang Nam Province
NFLSV committee issued a statement responding to allied charges
that a communist force on the night of 10-11 June massacred
South Vietnamese civilians in the village of Phu Thanh, Que Son
district, Quang Nam Province.
The statement maintains that the area of Phu Thanh village,
south of Ba Reng bridge, is an allied stronghold and ARVN troop
and personnel center. According to the NFLSV version, on the
night of 10 June the Que Son district PLAF "attacked the Ba
Reng stronghold and annihilated more than 130 of the enemy,
including one civil. guard and civil defense platoon, one paci-
fication team, and nine or ten U.S. advisors." The statement
rejects the ^hevrge that the PLAF opened fire on civilians and
claims instea..' that U.S. forces killed more than 120 people--
"most of whom we.re old, women, or children of puppet soldiers"--
in a subsequent attack *.,ith artillery, air strikes, and infantry.
The allies are accused of burning many houses and of killing
GVN soldiers in the air and artillery attacks.
The statement seems to be indirectly responding to the allied
charge that the communists killed civilians taking refuge in
a bunker when it claims U.S. troops "wantonly opened fire on
women, elderly persons, and children, and used mines to destroy
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one bunker, killing; all 46 people who were in it." It maintains
that U.S. forces "and their henchmen" have similarly in the past
"annihilated surviving puppet soldiers wii-,h their families after
a battle . . . in order to conceal their crimes and defeats."
DRV SAYS U.S.; PLANE DOWNED, WAR CRIMES COMMUNIQUES RELEASED
VNA on 3 July claims that the armed forces in Thai Binh Province
downed an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane that day, raising
Hanoi's total of downed American planes to 3,354.
On the 4th, VNA reports a Vietnam War Crimes Commission communique,
dated 1 July, which lists U.S. "war crimes" committed in both
North and South Vietnam during the first half of 1970. The
charges of U.S. "crimes" against the North include the usual
tabulations of reconnaissance missions and sorties, and tactical
and B-52 attacks. The communique selectively spells out alleged
attacks on specific dates and areas, including the 1 May attack
on Le Ninh state farm in Quang Binh Province. In addition it
lists alleged artillery bombardments from south of the demili-
tarized zone and the 7th Fleet, and claims that U.S. ships
patrolling the coast "Jeopardized the normal life of coastal
fishermen."
Reviewing alleged crimes in the South, the communique charges,
in standard fashion, that the United States used both tactical
and B-52 planes to "wantonly carpet-bomb's villages and "even"
populous areas close to Saigon. It spells out the alleged U.S.
use of gas bombs in January, toxic chemicals in February, and
CS gas canisters in March. And it charges that "at U.S. bidding"
the Saigon administration "cracked down" on religious sects,
mistreated war invalids, and repressed students, the press, and
members of parliaient "having progressive tendencies."
On 8 July LPA releases a communique from the South Vietnam War
Crimes Commission which details alleged allied crimes in South
Vietnam during the first half of 1970. The communique lists
numerous alleged incidents to demonstrate charges that the
allies have terrorized 'ie people with sweeps to carry out
pacification, looted anct destroyed food stores, sprayed toxic
chemicals and poison gases on heavily populated areas, and
stepped up "the policy of fascist suppression" of the urban
people.
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S I N0-SOV I ET RELATIONS
FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970
POLEMICS REMAIN AT LOW LEVEL; KUZNETSOV LEAVES PEKING
Moscow and Peking are in a period of relative polemical
disengagement, with each side's propaganda kept at a low,
unobtrusive level. The Soviet central press has all but
totally ignored China since mid-June, while propaganda
attacking Chinese policies has been confined largely to
broadcasts beamed to the Chinese. Peking has limited
itself to oblique attacks on Moscow and piib].icity for
characteristic Albanian denunciations of Soviet policies.
According to a Peking dispatch of the Hungarian news agency
MTI on 30 June, the chief Soviet negotiator at the Peking
talks, Kuznetsov, retarned to the Soviet Union that day
because of illness. The dispatch noted that both Soviet
and Chinese physicians had examined Kuznetsov, apparently
in order to verify the medical reason for his departure.
Neither Moscow nor Peking has carried the report or
acknowledged his departure.
Also on 30 June, Peking announced that the 16th regular
session of the joint commission for border river navigation
would be held on 10 July in Heiho, on the PRC side of the
Amur opposite Blagoveshchensk. The 15th session was held
last year-,-for -the first' time since the abortive 1967 session--
in Khabarovsk beginning on 18 June and ending on 8 August.
There were signs last year that the Chinese decided to put
aside territorial questions in order to achieve an accord on
limited measures regarding navigation.
MOSCOW Broadcasts to the Chinese have followed standard
lines in criticizing various aspects of Peking's
domestic and foreign policies. The CCP's anniversary on
1 July occasioned attacks on deviationist Maoist policies,
as in a Mandarin broadcast on the 4th claiming that Mao's
personality cult now dominates the Chinese party. Another
Mandarin broadcast, on the 3d, decried Peking's charges of
Soviet collaboration with the United States on such issues
as a Vietnam settlement and Germany, though for its only
documentation it reached back to a Chinese attack last
December on Moscow's talks with Bonn.
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In addition to critical comment, stress has been placed on
themes of past Soviet cooperation with the PRC. A commentary
in Mandarin on the 3d, for example, recalled the signing of
the treaty of alliance in 1950, and another on the 5th marked
the anniversary of a Sino-Soviet cultural exchange agreement.
In acknowledging the deterioration of relations, current
comment has passed over the border conflict and blandly
recited Soviet appeals for a restoration of good relations.
A vague reference to the China problem was included in
PRAVDA's 26 June summary of a speech by Politburo member
Kirilenko the previous day marking the Tatar ASSR anniversary.
Kirilenko urged high vigilance and strengthened defense
against both imperialism and "all hostile intrigues from
wherever they originate." There has been no direct Soviet
comment on China cn an authoritative level since the election
speeches by the top leaders on 10-12 June.
PEKING There were recurrent oblique attacks on the Soviets
in speeches by the Chinese during ceremonies in
late June marking the' anniversary of the Korean War, as Peking
stressed anti-U.S. themes of Asian revolutionary unity while
suggesting that Moscow continues trafficking with the enemy.
Subsequent comment has included faint echoes of the bombastic
charges of Soviet collaboration with the United States which
forme:?ly issued from Peking. Thus Chou En-lai, speaking at
a 5 July Peking banquet for Sihanouk, observed that "those
who fear war and even more fear revolution will continue to
render services" to the United States. Chou claimed that
President Nixon wants to intimidate "certain countries" into
helping him create "a Munich" in the Middle East, Indochina,
and elsewhere.
In keeping with the low key in which Peking is treating
Moscow, the PRC joint press editorial on the Chinese party
anniversary avoided mentioning.the Soviets by name in citing
opposition to "U.S. imperialism" and "modern revisionism
represented by social imperialism." Peking has, however,
continued publicizing Albanian attacks on Moscow, as in an
NCNA summary on 2 July of a ZERI I POPULLIT article on
thr; COP 'anniversary which denounced the "Moscow social
imperialists" for seeking to encircle China in concert
with the United States. But Peking failed to report a
24 June ZERI I POPULLIT article. charging that Moscow has
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collaborated with Washington in seeking a peaceful settlement
in Indochina and the Middle East. The article discussed the
visits to Moscow of U Thant and the three-nation mission from
the Djakarta conference as evidence of Soviet conspiratorial
intent.
Since the major ideological assault on Moscow's authority in
Peking's joint editorial on the 22 April Lenin centenary, the
Chinese have sought to portray a militant Asian united front--
implicitly excluding the Soviets--while taking care not to
antagonize such independents as Hanoi and Pyongyang by renewing
the fierce Sino-Soviet polemical rivalry.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW DISPUTES U1S, VIEW OF MIDEAST BALANCE OF FORCES
In a low volume of propaganda reacting to President Nixon's 1 July
television interview, Moscow focuses on the issue of the balance
of power in the Middle East, again insisting that there is a
difference between "giving arms to the aggressor" and arming the
"victims of the aggression." TASS, in briefly reporting the
President's remarks on the Middle East, merely noted that he
acknowledged the potentially dangerous situation but that "under
the pretext of observing the notorious balance of forces," he
went on record "for a situation in which military superiority
would be on the side of the Israeli aggressors." TASS also
reported that the President declined to answer questions on the
content of the "so-called political initiative mentioned by Secre-
tary Rogers last week." Not until the 6th, in a foreign-language
commentary by Tsoppi, did Moscow indirectly acknowledge the Pres-
ident's observations on the Soviet position it the Middle East.
Initial Moscow comment on the interview was typified by a Glazunov
talk on the 3d, widely broadcast to foreign audiences, which said
that President Nixon "spoke entirely about preserving the balance
of power" in the area. Like other commentators, Glazunov noted
reports that delivery of U.S. aircraft previously consigned to
Israel would be speeded up; he also cited reports of U.S.-Israeli
agreement on replacement of Israeli combat losses. Complaining
that Israeli losses are not so great as to warrant such replace-
ments, Glazunov said that what is involved is strengthening
Israel's air force and shifting the balance of power in the Middle
East. By giving the "Israeli extremists" more aid, Washington is
driving them to more and more military adventures, he asserted,
and the UAR and other Arab countries "cannot be expected to remain
indifferent and passive before this kind of policy aimed at forcing
them to surrender."
CHARGES OF AMERICAN Belatedly, the Tsoppi commentary on the
THREATS, BLACKMAIL 6th takes up American press reports on
recent statements by U.S. officials on
the Middle East problem. Only a few days ago, Tsoppi says, there
might have been a few people inclined to believe that the United
States had embarked on the "path of reconciliation." But the
"meaning and tone" of present "official statements by American
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8 JULY 1970
politicians and of American press art:icles," filled with "military
threats and blackmail," lead to the conclusion that the United
States is ready to "make a new dangerous stride toward escalating
its intervention in the conflict on Israel's side." Tsoppi notes
that the "United States declares" that the possibility of sending
servicemen to Israel cannot be ruled out, that the United States
is ready to "open the so-called defense urbrella" of the U.S. air
force over Israel, and that it will not allow any disturbance of
the present balance of power.
Pointing out that Israeli Prime Minister Meir congratulated the
President for his "open and b::.Llicose support" to Israel in his
1 July interview, Tsoppi adds that in trying to justify its in-
creasing "complicity with Israel's aggression," the United States
refers to the need to "slow Russia!- penetration in the Middle
East, even threatening the risk of a clash between the two super-
powers." The only answer to these threats, he concludes, is that
the Arab countries have the same right to self-defense as all
other states. He declares that the Sov:`.c,: Union, is working for
peace and the sovereign existence of all people in this region--
a point made by other commentators--and for implementation of the
November 1967 Security Council resolution, "now the only acceptable
basis" for a political settlement.
Belyayev had complained, in an article in the 2 July PP.AVDA, about
"imperialist propaganda attempts" to shift the blame to others,
but had added only that "some people in the West" were "falsely
accusing the Soviet Union of a reluctance to agree on elimination
of the dangerous crisis." Only full implementation of the
Security Council resolution, with obligatory withdrawal of the
Israeli forces, can lead to speedy restoration of peace, Belyayev
said.
KOSYGIN SPEECH Kosygin also referred to "blaclenail and military
IN BUCHAREST threats" against the Arabs in a speech at a
Soviet-Romanian friendship meeting in Bucharest
on 7 July, broadcast live by Bucharest radio. Turning to the Middle
East, he charged that the Israelis, "encouraged and supported by
Washington," remain in the invaded Arab territories, continue to
raid the neighboring Arab countries, and raise more and more
obstacles to a Middle East settlement. "The calculations that they
will be able to break the progressive development of the Arab
peoples by blackmail and military threats" and deprive the Arabs
of the opportunity to organize their own life are "shortsighted
calculations doomed to failure," Kosygin said. He declared that
the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries "come out
determinedly against the aggressive actions of imperialism," be
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is JULY I9'(U
they in Southeast Asia, the Middirt Eaut, or in any other part
of the worlc.. And he pledged Moscoaki u uolid,Lrity, sympathy,
and "efficient support" for peoples defending their honor,
freedom, and indepcndo nLc.
RISKS TO AMERICAN 13yehov in NEW TIME-13 on 3 July and
MIDEAST INTERESTS Kudryavtucv in IZVE 3T1YA on 1s July both
portray the United Staten as ranking
the loos of its standing in the Middle East by virtue of its
support for Israel. The course of events it. the Middle: Last,
Kudryavtsev says, has "placed U.S. ruling circles in c, diffi-
cult position," with military aid to Israel increasing onti-
U.S. sentiment in the Arab countries and "threatening the
United States with the final loss of its strategic and petro-
leum positions." As a conacquenLe, Kudryavtacv adds, Washington
has temporarily deferred the resolution of the question of new
aircraft supplies to Israel and will gradually replace Israeli
combat losses, which "essentially does not change matters."
A Demchenko article in the 3 July NEW TIMES notr.a that Arab
inader.s, meeting in June in Tripoli, Libya, exchanged opinions
on measures a be undertaken should Washington agree to supply
a new consignment of aircraft to Icrael. Proposals introduced
at the conference would strike a forcible blow against American
interests in the region, Demchenko says, and he speculates that
"this fairly weighty warning" had an effect on Secretary Rogers'
25 June press conference statement.
USSR SKEPTICAL. CAUTIOUS ON U,S, PEACE INITIATIVE
References to the U.S. political initiative cnnounced by Secretary
Rogers at his 25 June press conference continue to be skeptical
but guarded. Consistent with past practice, Moscow media have
been silent on the new Soviet suggestions for a Middle East
settlement which, according to U.S. press accounta, were presented
by Dobrynin at a meeting with Secretary Rogers on 2 June and at
a meeting of the Big Four ambassadors in New York on the 24th.
A Tyssovskiy commentary broadcast in the dcmesti service on
1 July, like Belyayev's article in the 2 July PRAVDA, mentioned
the U.S. initiative in the context of deliveries of U.S. planes
to Israel; Belyayev referred to accelerated delivery of Phantoms
previously sold to Israel, while Tyssovskiy asserted that
Washington, intending to supply Israel with some of the addi-
tional planes Tel Aviv is requesting, at the seine time "put
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t;ONFl1) E11'C.iA1, 1" IiIi; 'I'ItEilU.l
f_I Jtt1,Y 1.9(O
1'( rwarcl It number oi' bttlttncecl uuggerttions" for it solution to Lhe
rrlnin "in order to butter up the Arab uLaLeu."
Nychov' n artlcic in NEW TIMES of 3 July mcntlonu that :ir cretttry
Nogeru cutid the 11.:. proposals had been brought to the knowledge
"ot' the video directly involved and other interested utatcu."
One Nets the lrnprenuion, Nychov nays, that; through its peace
lnitiaLivc Washington does not so much attempt to promote it
peg 7c1ul political nettlcment as to upset Arab unity, and he
seen In the initiative it "characteristic" American tactic of
t.rying to "create it semblance of some steps or other to meet
the Arab countries midway." But he cautiously entertains the
possibility that "certain of the proposals advanced by the
United States do contain some constructive elements; naturally,
they cannot be rcjected a priori, without knowing their sub-
stance."
NEW TIMES DISCUSSES ARAB DIFFERENCES ON MIDEAST CRISIS
In an unusually forthright discussion of Arab differences on ways
of settling the Middle East crisis, Demchenko says in the 3 July
NEW TIMES that c,ccretary Rogere' statement "about some new
American plan" and U.S. "deferment of a final decision" on
Israel's request for more planes wa:r greeted "extremely critical-
ly" in the Arab capitals. The American statement, Demchenko
says, is appraised "as a more or less disguised formula for the
realization of Israeli designs," and "people here" believe the
United States is surreptitiously supplying weapons to Tel Aviv.
Ile adds that Cairo observers see in the State Department
demarche an attempt to "somehow check the collapse of U.S.
prestige" in the Middle East.
Dealing with the meetings of Arab leaders in Tripoli, Libya,
which ended on 22 June, Demchenko says the first question dis-
cussed--the coordination of Arab efforts in the struggle against
the "Israeli aggression"--is "being complicated by the absence
in the Arab world of a unified view of the present situation and
of ways out of the crisis." He notes that the UAR is the Arab
country suffering the most losses and is constantly trying to
strengthen its armed forces, "a very costly process." Cairo,
he adds, is an advocate of a political settlement, a position
which "differs fror.r the viewpoint of a number of Arab countries"
that are skeptical about such a settlement.
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13 JULY ].9'jO
The difference in political evai.uaLtonrr [inr. extended to the mill-
Lary sphere as wel.L, I)emchenko nays. During Lite Tripoli meeting,
,tc points out, the Libyanu and Iraqis presented plane for more
complete mobilization of Arab resources against the ":Israeli
aggrcnoion"--proponals which arc not contradictory, "but neither
do they fully coincide." While granting that u final plan of
action has not yet been formulated, Ucmchcnko concludes that
the Arab countries "have indeed tome close to it."
Noting that the Tripoli meeting also discussed the recent con-
flict in Jordan between the Jordanian army and the resistance
movements, Ucmchcnko says the absence of a single line wuo
"particularly painfully manifest" during these events, which
placed "in a aomewhat new plane the entire complex of the mutual
.clatiorio between the Arab governments and the Palestinian
resistance movement." He credits leaders of Fatah, "the most
influential" Palestinian organization, along with several Arab
countries, with measures to suppress the conflict. And he takes
the occasion to direct one of Moscow's periodic swipes at an
"extremist wing" of the Palestinian movement, "which has committed
irresponsible deeds"--actions "objectively in keeping with Tel
Aviv's designs." Demchenko concedes that "the nistory of the
origin of this armed conflict is as yet not quite clear," but
he places it against the background of a plot against the
Palestinian movement prepared by "American intelligence and
local reactionary forces" in Jordan.
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(;c)IU1' I.I)I;ri'I'I Al.
FRG AND) SOVIET BLOC
Flit"), 'i'I0;NnS
8 JflLY. a()'(()
IZVESTIYA OBSERVER RESPONDS TO FRG CRITICS OF DIALOGUE
A 1 July IZV1,;S'I'iYl1 article over, Lhe authorLtrtitive signature
of Obucrver rcaucnerts Moucow'n hope that the talks with the
'IiG on a nonuse-of-force agreement, which began in December
1969, w i It come to a "uucceuuful end." success can be
achieved, the article adds, If both sides "keep to the norms
i.und customs accepted in relatio(s between governments."
'I.'he article directs a largely pro forma attack at CDU and
CSU opponents of' the continuing Moscow-Bonn dialogue and
of Brandt's "Ostpolltik" generally. It ainglen out Kissinger,
Barzei, fund Strauss, among others, charging that their views
"leave no room for normalization of relations between the FRG
and the socialist countries, even if in words they express
readiness for this." The opponents of Ostpolitik, Observer
says, have demanded that Brandt return to the policy of the
previous government and that he "go back on" the statement
that the FRG regards the GDR as a state.
With regard to the Bonn-Moscow dialogue, the article declares
that the results of the work already done in the negotiations
"are impossible to erase., and no one can hope that success
,-an be achieved through the advancement of senseless demands
inspired by reactionary circles." It rejects as "absurd
lies" the assertions of unspecified persons that the USSR
seeks, through a treaty with the FRG, to repeal treaties
And agreements aimed at eradicating militarism and Nazism
on German soil and wishes to repeal the rights and commitments
stemming from those treaties and agreements.
Notably, the Observer article appearu in the wake of the
publication in the West German magazine QUICK on 30 June
of the purported 10 points negotiated by State Secretary
Bahr in Moscow with Foreign Minister Gromyko.* On one
* Hamburg's BILDZEITUNG on 1 July published the last six points
of fhe purported agreement, having reported the first four on
12 June. Moscow is not known to have mentioned either
BILDZEITUNG's or QUICK's disclosures.
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8 1I.11.,Y 19'(O
point at I.cast, German reunlficri,Lion, it sterna directly
responu 1 ve to QUICK' a criticism. The rnr gitzl.no had
complained that the .1.0 poirrtu make no mention of German
reunification. Gratuitouo),y, Observer remarks that the
pool Lion of the USSR on the glueutlon of the unification
of' the Lwo German states lu sufficiently well known.
"There exist today," he bays, "two independent sovereign
German utateu, Independent from one another. They have
different social systems, and it is impo usable to fuse
them, parLtcularly because of the fact that they do not
wish this."
QUICK had said Bonn had forwarded to Moscow a draft
unilateral statement 'to accompany a nonuse-of-force
agreement holding open the possibility of a unified
Germany, and It claimed that Gromyko had agreed to
accept such a statement. Predictably, IZVESTIYA's
Observer mentions no such loophole.
ANTICIPATION OF In apparent anticipation of further
PEKING CRITICISM Chinese criticism of the FRG=Soviet
talks, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin
on 3 July reached back to a 22 December 1969 PEOPLE'S
DAILY article which "alleged without any basis" that the
USSR in its negotiations with Bonn had embarked on a road
allowing the FRG to annex the GDR and West Berlin. The
commentary concluded that six months have passed and that
the Soviet Government, "of course," has made "no deal with
West Germany."
POLAND PRESSES BONN ON RECOGNITION OF ODER-NEISSE LINE
Polish propaganda surrounding the 20th anniversary, 6 July,
of the signing of the Zgorzelec Treaty--which "finalized"
the Oder-Neisse line as the border between Poland and the
GDR--breaks no new ground on the matter of normalizing
relations between Poland and West Germany. Premier
Cyrankiewicz, in his keynote speech on the 5th in
Zgorzelec, called the Oder-Neisse border one of the
"realities" of postwar Europe. Referring to Gomulka's
May 1969 proposal for negotiations with Bonn on the
normalizing of relations, he observed that "it is understood
that the point of departure for such normalization should
be a final recognition" of the Oder-Neis se line by the
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8 JULY 19'!0
I'ItG. As Gomulku had done In May 1969, Cyranki.ew:Icz'said
the Zgorzelec Treaty could nerve as a prototype for an
accord with West. Germany. That treaty's very existence,
he added, hiui facilitated the negotiations with the F11G.
In hi;s c peech Cyrunklewi.cz did not go beyond this passing
referenco to tiic ongoing political talks between Bonn and
Wuruuw. But in an Interview carried in the GDR'u NEUES
DEUT3CiLLAND on the 3d, he stated that Polish and West German
delt,gutions have been engaged since February in talks on
''in agreement on final recognition of the Oder-Ncisse as the
western border of Poland, and that the next round of talks
is to take place in the second half of July. A 10 June
communique on the end of the fourth round of talks--in
Bonn 8-10 June--had also indicated that the next round
would be held in the last half of July.
At Zgorzelec on the 5th, Cyrankiewicz said that recognition
of the Oder-Neisse line by Donn would represent an important
step toward establishing a durable peace in Europe and would
also be a factor in normalizing relations between the two
German states. Implicitly endorsing Brandt's Ostpoll.tik, he
took note of the "hullabaloo" raised by "reactionary forces"
in the FRG over the beginning of Bonn's negotiations with
Poland, the GDR, and the USSR. He expressed hope that the
West German public will reject he "chauvinists' demagogy,"
and he conc'.uded that the Bonn government can help by
recognizing the "realities" in Europe and successfully
concluding its negotiations with its eastern neighbors.
ARTICLE IN At the level of routine propaganda, an article
POLITIYKA in the Warsaw weekly POLITIYKA, reviewed by
PAP on 3 July, stressed that "more realistically
thinking forces" hale gained the upper hand in the FRG and
declared that if Bonn will not yield to the pressure of the
"rightist-nationalistic opposition which is still demanding
that the German problem and the problem of frontiers be
left, 'open,'" there will be "no obb ^les to concluding a
treaty" between Poland and the FRG.
The article said it has become obvious that normalization of
relations between the FRG and the countries of Eastern Europe
demands recognition of the inviolability of frontiers and
that the conclusion of an accord similar to the Zgorzelec
Treaty "is the condition for the normalization of relations"
between Bonn and Warsaw.
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8 JUI,Y 19Y0
TRADE MISSIONS PAP on the 6th brictly reported the arrival
.in Warsaw of a West German delegation to
discuss "the matter of enlarging the competence of the We---,t
German trade mission in Warsaw and of the Polish mi:auiun in
Cologne." A Hamburg DPA report the same day said that the
purpose of the talks is to extend the jurisdiction of the
trade miosaions "to cover consular activit'.tcs as well."
GDR ON WEST GERMAN East ,run propaganda on the treaty
RELATIONS WITH BLOC anniversary is characteristically less
forthcoming toward Brandt and his
Ostpolitik. Premier Stoph, in his speech at the 5 July
ceremony, did not mention the Polish-West German negotiations
or Brandt's policies, confining himself to reiteration of
the demand that Bonn recognize the "finality and inviolability"
of Poland's western frontier and repetition of the stereotyped
charge that West German "revanch:ism" is threztening European
peace and security.
Stoph also failed to treat the question of FRG-GDR relations.
But Ulbricht, in a 2 July speech in Cottbus reported in NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND the next day, noted that the GDR had submitted a
draft treaty to Bonn on the establishment of equal relations
on the ba:L of international law and stated that the GDR
favors equal relations through 'the establishment of diplomatic
relations at the ambassadorial level.
Ulbricht had also suggested an exchange of ambassadors in an
earlier speech before the 13th plenum of the SED Central
Committee, carried in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 16 June. That
Speech was more notable, however, for its endorsement of
the USSR's talks with the FRG and for Ulbricht's expression
of hope that a third round of talks between the heads of
the FRG and GDR governments might follow the Erfurt and
Kassel rounds. Ulbricht's call for a third round has not
been followed up in available propaganda.
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CONI"i1)EN'.VIAI. FBIS '.l'REN1X3
8 JULY 1970
ROMANIA-IISSR
NEW TREAT, rEGI,STERS COMPROMISE ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES
'I'i.' new ioviet-Romanian friendship treaty signed in Bucharest
~)n 7 July, available In full from Radio Moscow on the 8th,
emerges as a compromise reflecting Bucharest's unique
relationship with Moscow. The Soviets appear to have
-;--red some Political and propaganda points by broadening
th.~ Romanian commitment to mutual defense, in line with
ocher Soviet bLlutcral. treaties with East European states,
while Bucharest has succeeded in keeping out of the treaty
thy, Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty as well as any
commitment to economic "integration" under CEMA.
ARTICLE 8 The mutual defense clause, in Article 8 of the
new treaty, reads: "In case cne'.of the high
contracting parties is subjected to an armed attack by any
:state or group of states, the other party, implementing the
inalien.abl.e right to individual or collective self-defense
in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, will
immediately render it all-round assistance with all the
means at its disposal, including military, essential to
repulse armed attack."
The counterpart article in the 1948 Soviet-Romanian treaty had
committed the contracting parties only to mutual military
assistance in the event that either should "be involved in
hostilities with a Germany which might seek to renew its
policy of aggression, or with any other state which might
have been associated with Germany in a policy of aggression
TASS highlighted the new version in its summary of t:ie Soviet-
Romanian treaty on 7 July, quoting the operative passage in
Article 8 in full.
Since the Warsaw Pact commits members of the alliance to
military involvement only in the event of an armed attack
"in Europe," Moscow has been revising its bilateral treaties
to commit the individual Pact members to broader involvement.
The USSR-Bulgarian pact of 12 May 1967 and the new USSR-
Hungar-ian pact of 7 September 1967, as well as the new
Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact of 6 May 1970, all remove the
geographical confines, referring simply to "an armed attack
by any state or group of states." The treaty with Romania
is thus brought into line with the new stereotype.
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CON!'IDEN'11A1, P13r;) 'I'ii ENDS
11 ,.JUI.,Y 19 (0
COMPROMISES IN Where the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty for
ROMANIA'S FAVOR the first Lime committed the signatories
to undertake "the necessary measures t,~
defend the socialist gains" of the two countries, however,
the Ilomaninn pact with Moocow merely binds the two parties
to take "measures to defend international peace and the
security of people against cncroachmerite, by the aggressive
.forces of imperialism and reaction. . . ." And where the
Soviet treaty with Czechoslovakia commits Prague to
"socialist economic integration" within CEMA, the new pact
with Romania maker no mention of "integration."
Article 1 is essentially identical to the counterpart in the
Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, committing the signatories, "in
accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism,"
to "continue to strengthen the eternal and inviolable
friendship between the peoples of both countries" and develop
cooperation "on the basis of fraternal. aid, mutual advantage,
respect for sovereignty and national independence, equality,
and noninterference in each other's internal affairs." But
the Soviet concept of "fraternal aid" is demonstrably flexible,
and the demands of "socialist internationalism" are subject
to varying interpretations.
MAURER, KOSYGIN REMARKS MIRROR RESPECTIVE VIEWPOINTS
In his address following the signing, broadcast live by Radio
Bucharest, Maurer pointedly quoted the passage in Article 1
on cooperation on the basis of fraternal aid, mutual advantage,
respect for sovereignty and independence, equality, and
noninterference. He went on to offer assurances that Romania
is ready to "cooperate" in CEMA and meet its obligations in
the Warsaw Pact, while underlining the "defensive" character
of the alliance.
Pledging to make active contribution to communist unity, and
in effect defending Romania's good relations with Moscow's
ideological enemies, Maurer emphasized that Bucharest believes
"objective premises exist for developing close relations of
friendship and collaboration among all the socialist countries."
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8 JULY 1970
K ):.yf{in Interpreted the now treaty as utreuuing the importance
of "iriternationaliut solidarity of the uocial,ist states" and
played up the need for "vigilance" against the imperialist
threat. Ile remarked that as the .taut international communist
mcr:ting pointed out, "the defense of socialism is the inter-
nationalist duty of all communists," thus reaching back to
the June 1969 conference document--which Romania signed--for
the formula absent from the new treaty.
As if to compensate for another element lacking in the treaty,
KosygLn pointed out that economic Integration "involves
continuous deepening of the development of equal and mutually
advantageous cooperation between the socialist countries."
He went on to deny Western "slanders" to the effect that
relations among socialist countries involve any 13.mitations
of sovereignty and "other such foolishness." Imperialism,
he warned, is trying to exploit national differences and to
break up the alliance of the socialist countries. But he
added, again echoing a formula used in the June 1969 ccnference
document, that Marxist-Leninists know that "correctly under-
stood" national and international interests coincide.
EARLIER The respective vantage points of the contracting
SPEECHES parties had been expressed in Maurer's and Kosygin's
remarks throughout the Soviet delegation's visit.
At airport ceremonies broadcast live by Bucharest radio and TV,
Maurer cited the need for action against "the policy of
imperialism and of diktat and interference in the affairs of
,_ther peoples and for the peaceful solution of international
problems." Kosygin remarked that the new treaty would
strengthen the fraternal alliance of the two countries,
"closely connected with proletarian internationalism and
socialism." He made a brief bow to "equality of rights"
in declaring that "two decades of cooperation" had confirmed
its existence.
At a reception for Kosygin on 6 July, Maurer expressed
Romanian willingness to promote further bilateral
cooperation with the Soviet Union but reiterated that
it must be based on principles of equality and noninterfer-
ence. After reaffirming the fundamentals of Romanian foreign
policy, he remarked that the development of bilateral
cooperation between states must be based on respect for
mutual interests and "on the observance of international
law." Kosygin, stressing the need to use cooperation
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among all socialist states to accelerate their collective
advance, declared that the treaty would serve to "strengthen
the solidarity of the states of all the socialist community
and to develop their fraternal mutual assistance and close
political, economic, and military cooperation."
BUCHAREST GIVES KOSYGIN DELEGATION CORRECT RECEPTION
Romania tendered a fog-orally correct reception to Kosygin,
substituting for Brezhnev as leader o:r the Soviet delegation
because--according to the 4 July TASS announcement--of the
latter's "catarrhal ailment." Ceausescu adhered rigidly
to protocol, absenting himself from all the official
ceremonies directly connected with the treaty signing
and leaving them on a strict premier-to-premier basis,
between Maurer and Kosygin. Ceausescu's signature on the
treaty as Brezhnev's counterpart would have been dictated
by protocol had the Soviet First Secretary been present;
in Brezhnev's absence, the document was signed only by
Premiers Maurer and Kosygin.* Ceausescu confined his
contact with the visitors to a single reception--at party
headquarters.
Radio Bucharest reported that Maurer greeted the Soviet
de-legation, which also included Suslov and Gromyko, upon
their arrival at Bucharest airport on 6 July. Maurer was
also the ranking Romanian at the talks between the two
delegations, the reception for Kosygin on the 6th at the
treaty signing, and a Soviet embassy reception on the 8th.
The Romanian news agency AGERPRES reported that Ceausescu
gave a luncheon in honor of the Soviet delegation at party
Central Committee headquarters on the 7th. It added that
* The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was signed on 6 May of this
year by top party leaders Brezhnev and Husak as well as by
Premiers Kosygin and Strougal. In September 1967 the Soviet-
Hungarian treaty was signed by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev
and Hungarian party First Secretary Kadar, with Kosygin and
Fock signing at the premier level. The treaty with Bulgaria
was signed in May 1967 by Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev
and Deputy Premier Mazurov, with Zhivkov alone signing for
Bulgaria as party First Secretary and Premier. Brezhnev and
Kosygin signed the treaty with Poland on 8 April 1965 as
counterparts, respectively, of Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 19TO
the luncheon passed "in a comradely atmosphere of warm
friendship and that toasts were exchanged by Ceausescu
and Kosygin. A TASS report of the meeting noted that
"an extensive and useful exchange of views" took place
prior to the luncheon.
In the backdrop of the Soviet visit was a frontpage Romanian
press report the day before Kosygin's arrival on Ceausescu's
Berlinguer, who has been a vocal critic of the Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were also repeated
Romanian reminders of the need for countries to refrain
from interfering in each other's affairs. During a tour
of the provinces prior to the Soviet delegation's arrival,
Ceausescu had seemed to put unusual emphasis on the
noninterference theme. In a speech in Arad on 2 July,
broadcast by Radio Bucharest, he assured his audience
the RCP is actively campaigning to insure that inter-
national relations are based on "respect for independence
and national sovereignty, noninterference in internal
affairs, and respect for the right of each people to
determine their own fate without outside interference."
Similarly, in remarks t,t Timisoara on the 3d, also
broadcast by Radio Bucharest, Ceausescu emphasized that
"it is necessary to put an end to the policy of force
and diktat, to renounce the policy of threats and
interference in internal affairs, to promote a policy
of :respect and collaboration that would insure that
each nation - could decide its own fate."
warm" talks with the visiting Italian CP deputy leader
MANIFESTATIONS Romanian media have continued to carry
OF INDEPENDENCE reports underscoring Bucharest's policy
of good relations with "all" countries.
Radio Bucharest repor-:,ed on 3 July that party Executive
Committee member Bodnaras attended a luncheon at the Chinese
embassy in honor of the delegation he had led to Peking in
June. Peking's NCNA noted on the same day that Executive
Committee member Voitec and Foreign Minister Manescu also
were present and that the guests toasted Mao and Ceausescu.
On the ith, the Romanian press frontpaged Ceausescu's
congratulations to President Nixon on U.S. independence
Day, emphasizing hope that relations between the two
countries."wi.ll witness a steady expansion."
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CONFIDENT'IAF FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970
-36-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUSAK ASSAILS DUBCEK: RADIO AND PRESS DENY IMPENDING TRIAL
The first explicit attack on Alexander Dubcek by Gustav Husak
is a lengthy one, taking up a quarter of Husak's speech delivered
5 July at a friendship rally at Devin Castle, near Bratislava.
The CPCZ First Secretary hotly denied, at the same time, that
there had been any controversy between him and the conservatives
in the top party leadership over Dubcek's expulsion from the
party, announced at the 25-26 June party plenum.
Before and after Husak's speech, the Czechoslovak radio and
press carried assurances that there would be no political
trials. And in a gesture apparently designed to buttress
regime assurances of no return to the Stalinist past, CTK
announced on 3 July that Slovak CP First Secretary Lenart
and Slovak Premier Colotka hed extended 60th birthday
congratulations to the widow of Vladimir Clementis, who was
executed for "bourgeois nationalism" in 1952. CTK identified
Clementis as a "former Czechoslovak foreign minister."
RADIO COMMENTARY A Prague international service commentary
ON EVE OF SPEECH in English on 4 July, repeated the next
day in Czech and Slovak for citizens
abroad, had backed up Husak's own implicit denial of 28 June
that the fallen leader would be subjected to any political
trial. Responding to alleged conjectures in Western media
that Dubcek "would be tried as a common criminal and perhaps
'even physically liquidated," the commentary termed this
possibility "of course a lie,"' adding that the expulsion
as "the final step in disciplinary proceedings against
:)ubcek for his violation of the party statutes." It went
on to note that the June plenum had "reaffirmed once again
that there would be no political trials in Czechoslovakia,
and that applies also to Alexander Dubcek," who "will have
the opportunity to work in a job equal to his abilities."
HUSAK ON DUBCEK In now attacking Dubcek by name, Husak
in the 5 July speech did not repeat his
denial of a week earlier that political trials were impending.
Largely echoing the charges spelled out by RUDE PRAVO Chief
Editor Moc on 29 June, Husak answered "the great hullabaloo"
in "the West" about the expulsion in declaring that Dubcek
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970
had led.-the party into "disruption such as it had not known
since 1945," brought the country "to the brink of economic
bankruptcy," and isolated it from the Soviet Union and Ito
all ies.
Dispensing with the euphemisms he had used before in repeated
complaints about Dubcek's populority, h'isak said "imperialist
propaganda" was "creating a legend about Alexander Dubcek"
with a view to disrupting Czechoslovakia and the socialist
camp. He prefaced this charge with an analogy to the driver
who must lose his license after causing an accident; when
a top leader brings "disaster" upon the party and state,
he asked rhetorically, "are we to bow to him and honor him,
and not call him to responsibility and expel him from his post?"
Where he had in the past made only obscure public remarks
about difficulties the conservatives were giving him in his
efforts to steer a moderate course, Husak now named names
in insisting that there was "complete unity" in the top
leadership on the matter of Dubcek's expulsion as well as
on evaluation of the problems of "last year," the present,
and the future. Denying that "I was outvoted by the
conservatives," IIusak declared that there are "no differences
between my opinions and the opinions of Comrades Svoboda,
St rougal, Bilak, Lenart, and other comrades in the leadership"
and that "our course of action Is common and united."
At the same time, Husak cautioned, "we have also learned
from past years" that "differences within the leadership"
help the enemies of socialism at home and abroad. He appeared
to leave open the possibility of a further high-level house-
cleaning in stressing concern for "principled unity," rather
than "formal unity or just any unity."
Soviet broadcast media have so far been heard to carry only
a brief report of Husak's speech, the Moscow domestic service
late the same day noting only his stress on the USSR's
important role in Czechoslovakia's socialist construction
and his praise for the socialist system.
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CON[" L1)l NTIA1, PISS' 'L'I(L:ND:
8 JULY 197(
- 38 -
FOLLOWUP COMMENT IN RUDE L'R/1VO on the 7th echocu lluurilt'ti
CZECH, SLOVAK PRESS denial of "alleged 'dluputeu'" In the
CPCZ :leudcruhip, and liraL lulava PRAVDA
the carne day adds a further auuurance that there 0 11 be no
"chow trial." In the most derenuive terms used In Lhiu
connection by Czechoslovak propaganda to date, Lhe Slovak
paper's editorial includes a pcrc.?ation againoL "political"
trials in Greece, the trial in absentia of Sihanouk, and
"the recent pretentious political trial" of British Labour
Party member William Owen.
ito
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CONFIu1-;tVTIAI, I'll1;; 'rnl;Nll13
R JULY 1970
-3'9-
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PEKING LEADERSHIP RANKINGS: A GAME OF CHINESE CHECKERS?
Top C Itncuc leaders based In Peking continue to snake numerous
appf~arances at public functions honoring foreign dignitaries
NCNA .scams more and more inclined to dispense with the practice
oC luting Politburo members in stroke order, but Its latest
1.Lr;Lingu do little to facilitate efforts, to discern Politburo
rank through the order in which leaders are named. The
apparent decline in position of Peking city chief 11sieh
Fu--chih, who has made no public appearances wince March, is
thy, only concrete indication of a leadership struggle which
:nighL be behind recent changes in the method of listing
leaders, though this factor alone suffices to indicate that
the shifts are not necessarily all without major political
tgni.L'icance.
While the earliest change in relative positions was a
seentingly temporary elevation of Air Force commissar
Wu Fa-hsierr over Vice Premier Li Iisien-nien for a period
in May and June, the most obvious change has been renewed
emphasis on taking state ranks into account at state functions.
Since 19 June Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu has been listed ahead
of Chou En-lai at certain state functions where he is
apparently filling the role of acting chief of state. While
this is clearly a ceremonial ranking, it does further under-
line the gulf between Chou and Lin Piao, who by strict
protocol should rank even lower at state functions.
The listing of leaders according to the occasion was further
expanded in a 5 July report of a banquet for Prince Sihanouk;
h?:~re leaders were grouped under a system that seemed to
combine state rank, party rank, and functional categories.
Tung Pi-du l,,d the list, followed by Kang )heng and Kuo
Mo-jo in their capacity as vice chairmen of ;,he Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress--the first time
in recent years that Kuo has been ranked above Politburo
members. The same list placed Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng
above the cultural revolution triumvirate of Chiang Ching,
Yac Wen-yuan and Yeh Chun, marking the first time that
Chiang has been ranked below another ordinary member of the
Politburo in a nonstroke-order list since the ninth congress.
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CON F'I.I)I-.MI'I1\L fllltl 'I'1th:NDU
8 JULY .L970
On () July NCNA l'r Dv , dc>d a r.-w ,veg..n reporting a
c71, )r t..? rally at t''n(Jcd by ' . huuW,uk and .: c vc~ rrl L I1,A1. Lburo mcmbcra ;
Chtung wun I,lucr:d after Twig P -wu 1a(IC.I Chou and ahead of
Iluartg, wht.lo Ku', Mci-jo t'cl L ht:, a u,a: I ,?.t; c' following the
I'.,L.t.t.buro A differ-rice .c, r.'.ritlvc .wp c'r.tn:. butweon
' utog,)rie'c, :", 1' i 71.. bur mcrnh!?t% may be inf'crrc:d from another
li,?t in th' uutru: NCNA cut, )ft' the nancl'st after
Huang and Ych Chun, tr.:avtng Li. Il.:.~ :n- .r ^u and c,thor members
of the I'oll.t.burc; Li be nvot,''i mclruly it-
A recent Radio I'ek;ng br::d.us,t :uggear.~ ti: it the formal,
pr'l-cc11;tura. rev.1uL1 art ~prirfaf.: ~u h?_tw c;:,7 th't CU and the
ci'f i ul g Dvernmec;tui stria; titre may in sL; -nce be revived,
with rec'. ; f. ed party c :mmi t t + ~ fcrming a .icadcr;thip core
cc;nco.rrn-d :hic1'1y with poi':y mrcter6 while- rev;lutlonary
commltt.-2 carry out. daily g,)v(:inmc?nt,al tasks. The separation
of policy frcm cpciatiDnru,l function:,, ii' it. proved feasible,
would insure tht? _.:-hu(,d a-ility of re?;:;1uLionary committees
empowered to execu.o n_rmai g:)verrimc-atal decision:, while the
rebuilding of the party gradually proceeds
The 19 June broadcast, dwelling in mire detail than usual on
thr' ;pc ific r_lationshp be cw,ien t;ht party :ntuntttee and the
revolutionary committee at a heal Fer.:ng factory, outlined a
plan ad,)pued by the fa:t.;ry which pl :,,A administrative and
organizational work in the hands of .he revoiut tonary committee,
while the party committee remained ari _ndirect control, above
i:iv,;1vement in daily decisions. Th.? b: oadca.;t nDted that there
had been complaints that principal members of the party committee,
w;=rc "6pendirtg too much time at the higher level and too little
time among basic-level units," because party members had taken
on "too much responsibility" including "assuming the work of the
revolutionary committee." Some party members, the broadcast
said, incorrectly held that because the principal members of the
party committee and of the revolutionary czmmttee were one
and the same, it made no difference which ccmmittee assumed
responsibility for a particular task, ;o "the party committee
handled almost everything." The party secretary was condemned
because he "personally handled" family disputes, school
problems, and even the "water temperature in bathhouses."
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-BROADCAST EXAMINES PARTY, REVOLUTIONARY COWITTEE RELATIONSHIP
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CON 1" I DF N'1'i/1L 10131U '. HEN'7L
f3 `rr?Y .1-970
'i'hcoc probleuru were corrected, the report claimed, ai'ter study
with the aid of the fae Lory' o PLA propaganda team, and a new
uyutem was set up. Members of the party committee now avoid
"holding too many duties concurrently" arid spend 20 days a
month at the basic level, working and conducting investigations
on overall implementation of party policy. The party committee
has also learned to "give play to the role of the revolutions."y
committee as an administrative organ," and fewer party
corruni ttee meetings are now called.
Previously, "leading members were immersed in administrative
affairs," but under the new system revolutionary committee
members are given "due authority and power" to carry out their
work and report to the party committee on the work situation
at all times. This system, the broadcast said, removes party
committee members from administrative affairs and allows them
time to concentrate their efforts "on grasping the fundamentals
and maintaining contact with reality, the masses, and labor."
Inherent in this system, as in the old one it resembles , is the
risk that party members will become a bureaucratic elite--
notwithstanding the heightened emphasis on the old Maoist
precept to mingle with the masses. Some fears on this score
were implied in an article by the Hungan county party committee,
broadcast by Wuhan radio on 2 July. The article warned that party
menibers "are not allowed to misuse their party posts" and may
not "have their speeches recorded at their own request," nor
may "speeches of individual county party committee members be
published."
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CONFIDENTIAL 1'1315 TRENDS
8 JULY 1970
-42-
PROGRESS IN PARTY REBUILDING SHOWN BY PROVINCE
COUNTY CCP PROVINCIAL CCP
COMMITTEES PUBLICIZED CORE GROUPS MENTIONED
Heilungkiang (5)
Hupeh (2)
Kirin
Kwangsi
Kwangtung (5)
Shen--,-
Anhwei
Chekiang (3)
Fukien
Hunan (8)
Kansu
Kiangsi
Kiangsu (4)
1eilungkiang
Hupeh
Kwangsi
Kwangtung
Inner Mongolia
Liaoning
Tsinghai
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number (more than one) of
county committees publicized in monitored broadcasts.
Heilungkiang and Kwangtung have in addition publicized one
municipal CCP committee each. Recent additions to the list,
during July, are underlined.
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- h3 -
BURMA-PRC
1'131 i '1.'HFN1Mi
8 )U1-,Y :1.9'(0
HEAD OF RESIDENT BURMESE CP MISSION MAY BE ABSENT FROM PEKING
The possible absence from Peking of the head of the Communist
Party of Burma's resident delegation in the PRC, Thakin Ba
`1'hein Tin, is indicated in NCNA's 6 Jr.1y report of the Peking
rally in honor of Sihanouk. NCNA lists Thakin Pe Tint, "mem-
ber of the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPB and
member of its Central Committee," as the Burmese communist
representative on the guest list but doep, not mention Ba Thein
Tin, normally identified as attending ceremonies in Peking as
"head of the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPB
and vice chairman of the CPB Central Committee."
Ba Thein Tin was last reported by NCNA to have made a public
appearance on 21 May. Recounting the Peking rally that day
in honor of Mao's 20 May statement, NCNA reported the presence
of both Ba Thein Tin and Pe Tint in their respective capacities
as head and member of the delegation. More recently, however,
in reporting the Peking rally on 25 June marking the 20th
anniversary of the Korean War, NCNA simply noted the presence
among the foreign guests of "the delegation of the Central
Committee of the Burmese Communist Party."
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