TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 25, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
. I~~I~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
RENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
2 5 February 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 8)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Gdudad 6cm aubmali[
do.n,dinp and
dadassZcaion
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Introduction 1
President Nixon; Foreign Policy Report 2
Paris Talks: 19 February Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Statements on Use of Chemicals in the South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Scattered Action in the South, Comment on Pacification . . . . . . . . . 7
Southern Women's and Information,/Culture Group Meetings . . . . . . . . . 8
Assembly Standing Committee Chaired by Hoang Van Hoan . . . . . . . . . . 8
HOC TAP on DRV's Four Major Anniversaries in 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Soviet Criticism of Peking Policies on Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
LAOS
U.S. "Aggression," Bombing in Plain of Jars Condemned . . . . . . . . . 10
PRC AND NORTH KOREA
North Korean Ambassador Back in Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
MIDDLE EAST
Protest Meetings in USSR Condemn Israel for Abu Zabal Raid . . . . . . . 14
Palestinian Delegation's Visit to USSR Gets Little Publicity . . . . . . 16
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Hits Chinese on Warsaw Talks; Peking Restrained . . . . . . . . . 18
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Reports Warsaw Session, Continues Restrained Attacks . . . . . . . 19
STRATEGIC WEAPONS
Armed Forces Day Articles Mention Soviet ABM Capability . . . . . . . . . 20
Moscow Sustains Low-Key Attack on Safeguard Program . . . . . . . . . . . 21
WARSAW PACT
Grechko Article Recaps Details on Pact Organization . . . . . . . . . . . 22
POMPIDOU VISIT
Moscow Contrasts U.S. "Hostility" to France, Soviet Amity . . . . . . . . 23
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CONTENTS
(Continued)
WEST GERMANY
GDR Media Display Doubts Stoph-Brandt Talks Will be Fruitful 25
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA
Frictions Persist During Zhivkov Visit to Prague . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
25 FEBRUARY 19'TO
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 16 - 22 FEBRUARY 1970
Moscow (3539 items)
Peking (2984 items)
Middle East
(10%)
14%
Domestic Issues
(48%)
43%
[TASS Statement
(--)
7%]
Downing of U.S.
(11%)
4%
[Raid on UAR
(2%)
3%]
Pilotless Plane
Steel Plant
Middle East
(9%)
11%
Criticism of China
(5%)
8%
Vietnam
(5%)
5%
Soviet Armed Forces
(--)
6%
[PLAF Anniversary
(4%)
4%]
Day
Philippine Unrest
(0.4%)
2%
Nixon's Foreign
(--)
3%
CPR Embassy Protest
(--)
2%
Policy Statement
Vietnam
(5.5%)
3%
Over Damage to
Embassy in Kenya
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate vc!'ime of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Vietnamese communist comment on President Nixon's foreign policy report
sees "nothing new" in its review of U.S. Vietnam policies which,
according to Hanoi and the Front, add up to pursuit of Vietnamization
in an attempt to impose "neocolonialism" in South Vietnam. Propaganda
claims that the report's discussion of America's future world role is
indicative of the "stubborn and crafty" nature of the United States
in its "weakened and defeated position."
Current Moscow comment on Vietnam focuses on the report's statements on
the Vietnam problem. Dealing in stock generalities, Soviet commentators
complain that the President reaffirmed the "old policy" of Vietnamization
and that despite talk about peace the Administration is in fact spreading
the war and blocking progress at the Paris talks. Peking media have not
yet mentioned the President's report.
Coverage of the 55th session of the Paris talks on 19 February--as
usual confined to VIA and LPA accounts of the session itself--features
PRG delegate Mme. Binh's charges of U.S. use of chemicals in South
Vietnam and DRV acting delegation head Nguyen ivjinh Vy's general review,
along standard lines, of the main issues. VNA notes that Ambassador
Habib did not make a formal statement at the session, but it does not
indicate the nature of the lengthy verbal exchange between the
delegates.
Other propaganda on allied use cf chemicals in South Vietnam includes
a statement from the South Vietnam War Crimes Commission, released by
the PRG representative at an 18 February press conference in Hanoi.
The statement, which publicizes statistics on the alleged use of
chemicals since 1961, is followed by a flurry of other statements and
comment on the subject.
The departure of the Soviet Foreign Ministry delegation led by Deputy
Foreign Minister Firyubin from Hanoi on 21 February is reported by VNA
on the 22d. VNA says the delegation was received by DRV Foreign Minister
Trinh, but there is no indication of the substance of any talks.
On 24 February Moscow briefly reports the departure of the group, which
had arrived in Hanoi on the 13th.
Alleged U.S. action against the DRV on 19 and 20 February is condemned
by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, according to Hanoi radio on
23 February. The spokesman charges that the United States launched
artillery attacks from ships "against many areas belonging to Vinh
(Gang village, Vinh Linh area" on the 19th and that U.S. planes "intruded"
into the airspace of Ha Tinh Province and the Vinh Linh area the following
day. No air attacks on the 20th are claimed.
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Vietnamese communist media report scattered military action in the South.
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, 'broadcast by Hanoi on 21 February,
focuses on the situation in the delta and on the importance of attacking
the allied pacification effort.
Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi her recently attended and addressed a
number of conferences held by various DRV production branches to
review achievements in 1969 and set forth directions and tasks for 1970.
On 17 February Hanoi radio reports that Nghi visited the architectural
conference; VNA reports on the 18th that he met with the light industry
branch;* on the 19th Hanoi radio reports his attendance at the chemical
production branch conference; and on the 22d the radio recounts a
communications and transportation branch conference, also attended by
Nghi.
An editorial in the January issue of HOC TAP, the party's theoretical
journal, concentrates on the importance of the commemoration of North
Vi:.,tnam's four major anniversaries this year. The editorial lists
party building, the improvement of cadres' and party members' knowledge
of Marxism-Leninism, party lines and policies, and President Ho's
ethics and behavior, as well as the initiation of a production and
combat emulation movement as components in the sh1^cessful celebration
of the anniversaries.
PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT
HANOI AND President Nixon's 18 February foreign policy report is
THE FRONT denounced in fairly widespread comment in Vietnamese
communist media. The first available Hanoi reaction appears
in a domestic broadcast on the 19th, there is further comment in a
broadcast on the 20th, and on the 22d commentaries are published in
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and a VNA commentary is publicized by
the press and radio. (The NHAN DAN commentary, noted in the Hanoi radio
press review, has not been disseminated by 1:he radio or VNA.)
The first Front comment on the President's report is a brief derisive
remark by PRG delegate Mme. Binh at the 19 February Paris session.
There is LPA comment on the report on the 22d.
* On 74 February Hanoi ra0.io had briefly reported a conference of
the light industry branch and had noted Nghi's presence there.
Presumably VNA'3 report on the 18th discusses the same conference.
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The 19 February Hanoi broadcast charges that the President's report
reiterated the "deceitful arguments" put forward by the U.S. side in
Paris, accused the DRV-PRG side of lacking goodwill, and "absurdly"
said that the United States would adopt a flexible and generous attitude
when serious talks begin. According to the broadcast, the report
demonstrates that the Administration refuses to seek a negotiated solu-
tion and "only wants to score success by means of force." It notes the
report's reference to President Thieu's 11 July 1969 election proposals
and dismisses them as proposals for elections "organized by the
puppets under the cannon muzzle of the puppet and U.S. occupation
troops." The Hanoi broadcast on the 20th again attacks the report's
statements on Vietnam and goes on to assail the United States' global
strategy.
The broadcasts on the 19th and 20th note that the President pointed to
the strengthening of the South Vietnamese armed forces and extension
of pacification as the main elements of Vietnamization. The VNA
commentary on the 22d says the report "magnified the imaginary successes"
of the Vietnamization program. And the 22 FebruaryQUAN DOI NHAN DAN
commentary echoes the earlier broadcasts in saying that, the document
could not conceal the President's "anxiety" over the Vietnamization
program's future when it posed, but did not answer, a number of questions
regarding the program's status. "In short," the paper comments, the
President "conceded that the Vietnamization program is facing very
gloomy prospects."
The LPA commentary of the 22d, much like Hanoi's comment, calls the
President's report "merely a rewrite" of the principal 1969
presidential addresses dealing with Vietnam, all of which were
"repeatedly rejected by the Vietnamese people." The commentary says
the President revealed his "evil colonialist design to firmly cling
to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" in his reassertion that a great nation
cannot renege on its pledges.
MOSCOW Dealing in stock generalities, commentaries on the President's
foreign policy report complain that the President, while
"admitting that the Vietnam wax has already divided American society,"
reaffirmed the "old policy" of Vietnamization. They also assail the
report for failing to give a timetable for troop withdrawal. Matveyev
in IZVESTIYA on the 20th finds "absolutely nothing new" on Vietnam in
the report. Commentators note that despite promises to end the war
when the Administration came into office, a year later the war is
spreading into Laos and Cambodia and the United States is blocking
progress at the Paris talks. Commenting on the statement that pacifica-
tion will be extended, commentators describe pacification as a program
of "terror" and "annihilation."
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-4-
Mayevskiy ii.,PRWDA on 22 February, commenting on responsibility for the
continuation of the war, says that the authors of the presidential
report are "wasting their ink" when they try to lay responsibility
on "the Soviet Union because it is helping the Vietnamese people"--an
allusion to the expression of regret, in the section of the report
on relations with the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union bears a
heavy responsibility for continuation of the war because it gives
the DRV the overwhelming majority of its war materials. Mayevskiy
ignores the statement that the Soviet Union has "failed to exert a
helpful influence" over the North Vietnamese at Paris.
PARIS TALKS: 19 FEBRUARY SESSION
COMMUNIST PRG delegate Mine. Nguyen Thi Binh's statement at the
SPEECHES 55th session of the Paris talks dealt almost exclusively
with the chemical warfare aspect of the "extermination
war" allegedly waged by the United States in South Vietnam. Repeating
charges made earlier in Vietnamese communist propaganda, she Stated
that while the Nixon Administration had recently renounced any use of
bacteriological weapons and first use of lethal or paralyzing chemicals,
American troops were continuously spraying chemicals in South Vietnam
in order to "poison the population and destroy the crops." She
charged that under the Nixon Administration the United States has
"intensified" the use of chemicals and toxic gases in South Vietnam.
Over the last eight years, she said, the United States has sprayed
toxic chemicals over 43 percent of South Vietnam's arable land and
"poisoned" 1,293,000 people, most of them elderly people, women, and
children.
Remarking that the U.S. reaction to the Son My incident had been to label
it an isolated one, Mme. Binh asked: "Does the chemical warfare that
the United States has been conducting in South Vietnam these last few
years also constitute an 'isolated case?"' She coupled her routine
demand that the Unite :states end its "aggression" in the South with a
call for U.S. renunciation of the use of "chemical weapons" and of "any
other criminal act to massacre the South Vietnamese people."
The VNA account of the session indicates that acting DRV delegation head
Nguyen Minh Vy expressed support for Mine. Binh's statement in remarks
made prior to the reading of his formal statement. And the attack on
U.S. chemical warfare was sustained on 20 February with the release of
a statement by the PRG Paris delegation spokesman--carried by LIBERATION
PRESS AGENCY on the 24th--denouncing the State and Defense Departments
for reacting in a cursory fashion to Mme. Binh's accusations.
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Reporting the remark in Nguyen Minh Vy's statement that U.S. "aggression"
against Vietnam was the immediate cause of the war, the VNA account
notes that the remark .;as responsive to Ambassador Habib's denial of an
allegation to this effect at the previous session. (Vy said U.S.
aggression is "so obvious an objective reality in Vietnam that it needs
to be proved no further.") The account further notes Vy's standard
critical portrayal of the Nixon Administration's Vietnam policies, its
attitude at the Paris talks, and its domestic policies and practices.
In this connection, VNA reports Vy's denunciation of the Administration's
"fascist repression" of antiwar leaders at the Chicago conspiracy trial.
He points by contrast to the "goodwill and serious attitude" of the
DRV and PRG and to the "fair and logical" NFLSV 10-point proposal for
a settlement.
Vy picked up Ambassador Habib'& remark at the 54th session that the U.S.
side was flexibly and reasonable, asking rhetorically how flexibly
and reasonably the United States is behaving when it is pursuing the
Vietnamization program, "encroaching on the security and sovereignty"
of the DRV, posing "conditions" for an allied troop withdrawal,
maintaining the Saigon "stooge" administration, and downgrading the Paris
talks with a view toward "sabotaging" the conference.
ALLIED VNA reports GVN Ambassador Lam as repeating "the ridiculous
SPEECHES charge that North Vietnam commits aggression against the
South" and as "brazenly" supporting U.S. policy in South
Vietnam. Lam claimed, VNA adds, that "the Vietnamese people are
committing aggression in Laos, thereby attempting to conceal the
aggressive nature of the United States, which is intensifying and
expanding its special war in that country."
VNA says that Ambassador Habib "delivered no speech" but "only repeated
the old themes and renewed the preposterous demand for mutual withdrawal
with a view to evading the fundamental problem--namely, that the United
States must withdraw totally, promptly, and unconditionally its troops
and the troops of its satellites from South Vietnam." The VNA account
thus obscures the nature of the lengthy verbal exchange during which
Habib spoke nine times. VNA reports routinely that Mme. Binh and
Nguyen Minh Vy, in their additional remarks, "completely rejected all
the absurd allegations" of the U.S. and GVN delegates and declared that
the responsibility for the Paris deadlock lies with the allied side.
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STATEMENTS ON USE OF CHEMICALS IN THE SOUTH
A flurry of propaganda denouncing alleged allied use of chemical weapons
in South Vietnam is highlighted by a statement of the South Vietnam War
Crimes Commission, released at an 18 February press conference held by
the PRG representative in Hanoi. VNA's report that day on the press
conference indicates that the statement contains statistics on the use
of -:hemical weapons in the South and that it charges that Vietnam is being
used as a testing ground and the people gas, guinea pigs, The statement
routinely asserts that the Nixon Administration has increased the use of
chemical weapons. It recalls the President's 25 November statement on
CBW and claims that the tear gas and weed killers excluded from his ban
are being used in Vietnam to "massacre" people. Chemical weapons, it
alleges, have never before been used on such a large scale or for such
a long period as in the Vietnam war.
Other statements on allied use of chemicals include one from the Vietnam
Biologists Association, dated 20 February and released by VNA on the 22d,
which similarly charges that the extent of the use of chemicals in the
Vietnam war is without precedent. This statement alleges that chemicals
are being used "in execution of a systematic and large-scale genocide."
A statement from the Kien Phong revolutionary committee, dated 10 February
and broadcast by the Front radio on the 24th, denounces the allies for
intensifying the use of chemical weapons in the province. Also on the
24th, LPA publicizes a "recent" communique of the central Trung Bo NFLSV
committee claiming that the allies diunped over 8,000 tons of noxious
chemicals on the region during 1969, The communique lists chemical
substances frequently used, including mixtures of arsenite and arsenate,
and enumerates gases allegedly used against the population in pacification,
including CS, The teaching staff and students of Hanoi Polytechnics on
23 February held a meeting which condemned the use of chemical weapons
and, according to VNA on the 25th, adopted a resolution demanding that
the allies stop using toxic chemicals.
Several of the statements outline the effects of the chemicals on humans,
including birth defects and insomnia as well as death. LPA reports on
the 24th that the South Vietnam Wa:1 Crimes Commission has released
documents proving the bad effects of the chemicals on child-bearing.
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 24th cites statistics from the South
Vietnam War Crimes Commission statement and again charges that the use
of chemicals has increased since the Nixon Administration came to power.
It recalls President Nixon's 25 November statement on CBW and calls
attention to domestic U.S. criticism of continuing use of chemical
weapons. The commentary also describes the use of chemical weapons 'by
the allies as genocide.
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SCATTERED ACTION IN THE SOUTH, COMMENT ON PACIFICATION
Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to report scattered military
activity throughout the South. The only available comment comes in a
21 February Hanoi broadcast of that day's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial
claiming successful attacks on ARVN marine units in the delta.. The
editorial says the ARVN units were sent to replace the U.S. 9th Division,
which had been "forced" to pull out, and to strengthen forces supporting
pacification. ARVN main force divisions and U.S. combat units are also
being mobilized to "assume pacification," the editorial says. The
paper states that by continually attacking troops supporting pacification,
the communists can not only annihilate forces but also create favorable
conditions for guerrilla warfare, thus assisting the rural people in
rising up against the allies. The armed forces, particularly guerrilla
and regional units, are urged to step up combat and force the allies
to leave their fortifications, thus exposing themselves to heavier blows.
SOUTHERN WOMEN'S AND INFORMATION/CULTURE GROUP MEETINGS
Liberation Radio on the 14th reports a conference held by the information
and cultural jection of the central Nam Bo NFLSV committee from 26 January
to 3 February, No conference of this sort is known to have been
publicized previously. The gathering reviewed work accomplished in 1969
in the ideological and political area, praising the popularizing of Ho's
testament. Stress was on determination to consolidate and develop the
section, "especially the assault propaganda forces."
The third all-South women's conference was held from 5 to 12 February,
according to a Front radio report on the 18th. This conference, a-i:,ended
by more than 100 delegates, reportedly reviewed the 1969 women's move-
ment and discussed their tasks for 1970. The meeting was presided over
by Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh, president of the Liberation Women's Union.
(The second conference, held in January 1969, issued its communique
on 20 January.)
The communique released by the conference, broadcast by the Front on the
18th, hails women's achievements in 1969 and charges that pacification
involves terrorization and "massacre" of women. The communique further
accuses the allies of trying to weaken the women's support by holding
out the lures of a depraved culture and money and by "subduing them
sentimentally." The women's movement dcv'!ioped rapidly where the 1969
conference resolution was disseminat':d 4tlt was weakened in areas where
the cadres clung to old work methods and had no confidence in the
masses, the communique says. It adds that 1969 successes showed the new
capabilities of the women's struggle against Vietnamization. A
resolution for 1970 urges the women to mobilize and work using armed and
political struggles. to defeat Vietnamization, to annihilate allied
forces, and to prese_ve the revolutionary administration.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY HOANG VAN HOAN
A communique on a DRV National Assembly Standing Committee meeting held
18-19 February, carried by Hanoi radio on the 19th, notes that this
"regular" session was presided over by committee vice chairman Hoang
Van Hoan, This is the first session of the Standing Committee that
Hoan has presided over since 10 June 1969, duriag the extended
absence--from 20 March to 19 July--of its chairman Truong Chinh.
Available propaganda offers no explanation for Truong Chinh's current
apparent absence,
According to the communique, the Standing Committee discussed its
tasks for 1970, It approved a regulation for the application of the
marriage and family laws in the Tay Bac Autonomous Region, and it
heard a report from the Nationalities Commission of the National
Assembly on the situation of nationality activities and the campaign
for permanent resettlement and cultivation in the cooperativization
of agriculture in the mountainous regions. The committee also
approved several ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary appoint-
ments, passed on a number of resistance and labor awards, and decided
on a number of questions concerning decisions of the people's supreme
court.
HOC TAP ON DRV's FOUR MAJOR ANNIVERSARIES IN 1970
An editorial in the January issue of HOC TAP, the VWP's theoretical
jouranl, concentrates on the importance of the commemoration of North
Vietnam's four major anniversaries in 1970: the 40th anniversary of the
VWP, 3 February; Lenin's 100th birthday, 22 April; Ho's 80th birthday,
19 May; and the 25th anniversary of the founding of the DRV, 2 September.
Calling 1970 an extremely important year because of the anniversaries, the
editorial recalls that on 22 April 1969 the Politburo* had pointed out
that activities marking the anniversaries must aim at 1) improving the
cadres' and party members' knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, of the party's
lines and policies, and of President Ho's ethics and behiavor; 2)
initiating a production and combat emulation movement "in order to
transform the spirit of the four great anniversaries into concrete acts";
and 3) consolidating and developing the party.
The editorial says the 1970 anniversaries will be good occasions on which
to accelerate the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle and socialist
construction. It adds that "we must strive to study" Marxism-Leninism,
the party's lines and policies, and Ho's virtues "in order to strengthen
solidarity and unanimity with the party and consolidate absolute
confidence in the party Central Committee's leadership and in the
Vietnamese revolution's inevitable victory."
* The Politburo resolution was not released until 8 July, when it was
carried by Hanoi radio.
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The editorial recalls that the Central Committee had decided that 1970
was a good occasion "to consolidate and develop the party" and "absorb
into the party a new class of party members called the 'Ho Chi Minh
class.." It urges preparation for and satisfactory implementation of
the new party member recruiting phase and emphasizes the importance of
training new party members.
HOC TAP points to the importance of carrying out production and combat
tasks and of satisfactorily implementing the 1970 state plan. It goes on
to note that socialist reforms in the national economy will be continued;
and in this connection it points to several continuing problems which must
be corrected. It says that in agriculture "we will continue to satisfac-
torily and correctly implement the agricultural production cooperative
statutes and correct deviations and mistakes in the 'three-contract
system for peasant families."' With regard to handicrafts, it urges the
people "to overcome such negative manifestations as stealing raw
materials and materials from the state . . . and other exploiting forms
which have appeared in a number of handicraft cooperatives." And it says
"we must continue achieving socialist reform vis-a-vis small trade which
has developed again in cities and vis-a-vis bourgeois industrialists and
merchants--a number of whom are again practicing illegal business." In
1970, says the editorial, or%~er and security must be firmly maintained,
free markets closely managed, and all social vices and illegal business
undertakings elminated.
The editorial also stresses the importance of mobilizing labor for production
and improving economic leadership. It claims that "only by successfully
mobilizing the socialist labor force will we be able to overcome the present
situation in which the number of persons engaging in productive labor is
small, labor output is low, and social products are 1t.mited." The journal
declares that the two tasks--the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle and
socialist construction--require everyone to engage in productive labor; it is
necessary "to make everyone deeply aware of the present situation and
tasks . . , to effect a strong ideological change" so that the 1970 state
plan may be implemented and the North's economy improved, making it possible
to "fully and promptly satisfy all. requirements" of the two main tasks.
SOVIET CRITICISM OF PEKING POLICIES ON VIETNAM
Some Moscow broadcasts in Mandarin currently attack Peking's Vietnam
policies. A 20 February commentary on the Sino-U.S. meeting in Warsaw that
day recalls that such talks had been held in early 1965 allegedly to discuss
the Chinese attitude toward planned U.S. bombing of the DRV, Mao Tse-tung
having previously assured the United States that the Chinese would go to
war only if Chinese territory were directly attacked. The commentary once
again recalls that Peking turned down a Soviet proposal for united action
to counter U.S. aggression in Vietnam. A broadcast on the 23d revives
charges that Peking profits from selling food supplies in Hong Kong to
U.S. forces from Vietnam.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS 'T'RENDS
25 FEBRUARY 1970
LAOS
U. S n "AGGRESSION , BOMBING I N PLAIN OF JARS CONDEMNED
PATHET LAO T'he NLIIX denounces various aspects of alleged U.S.
aggr:~ssion in connection with current fighting in the
Plain of Jars area through a barrage of official statements on
20 February. An NLIIX Central Committee statement condemns the United
States for using B-52's on 17 and 18 February for the "first time to
bomb the Xieng Khouang-Plain of Jars region." Decrying this "crazy act
of war" wnich further aggravates the situation in Laos and seriously
threatens peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia, the statement routinely
calls upon the peace-loving countries of the world, especially the
participants in the 1961-62 Geneva conference, to compel the United
States to respect the Geneva agreement. The use of B-52's is also
condemned in a 20 February message to the Geneva conference cochairmen
from Phoumi Vongvichit, NLHX Secretary General and member of the national
commission for implementation of the Geneva agreement.
Another NLIDC Central Committee statement on the 20th once again deplores
the participation of Thai troops in the fighting in Laos, citing an AP
report on 28 January as confirmation that there are "about 12,000" Thai
troops in Laos. A third Central Committee statement that day denounces
alleged "war crimes" against Buddhists in Xieng Khouang Province bf the
Americans and their "puppets."
An "authorized statement" by the Pathet Lao news agency on 20 February
denounces a press conference held by the RLG Information Minister to
condemn the North Vietnamese attack on the Plain of Jars and to present
DRV prisoners. (Pathet Lao Radio carried the statement on 19 February,
saying it was dated the 18th.) The statement "flatly refutes" this
"trick" and argues that current attacks launched by the Laotian People's
Liberation Army and the Laotian Patriotic Neutralist Armed Forces are
aimed at punishing the "U.S. aggressors and their puppets" for their
"illegal nibbling attacks," On 17 February a similar VNA statement had
refuted he "calumny" of the press conference.
HANOI VNA takes the 14"ixon Administration to task on 21 February
for intensifying the war in Laos by the "new step" of
using B-52's as well as other aircraft to bomb Laos to an "unprecedented
degree." It also refers to Souvanna Phouma's 19 February statement that
"North Vietnam escalates the war in Laos," and the press agency "flat7,,r
rejects" his "deceitful claim."
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25 FEBRUARY 1970
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial carried by VNA on 24 February hails the
exploits of the Laotian People's Liberation Army in the Plain of Jars?
Meng IGhouang area, noting that the area has been part of the "liberated
zone" since before the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreement. It praises
the Pathet Lao's victories and warns that the United States and its
puppets remain very aggressive and stubborn, are intensifying the use
of aircraft, including B-52's,and are ordering Souvanna Phouma to
"slander" the DRV with charges it is escalating the war in Laos. The
editorial concludes by praising the victories of the Laotians as a
"strong encouragement to and a valuable act of coordination with the
Vietnamese people's resistance to U.S. aggression."
On 23 February a Hanoi English broadcast to Southeast Asia cites
expressions of concern by Senators Mansfield and Symington over the use
of B-52's, saying that these statements expose Souvanna Phouma's
allegation regarding the DRV presence as cover for U.S. air escalation.
MOSCOW Routine-level propaganda from Moscow charges the United States
veith escalating the war in Laos and denounces alleged, American,
efforts to conceal the truth about the U.S. activity. A TASS dispatch on
the 19th, for example, takes the State Department to task for refusing
to comment on the bombing and for keeping secret the testimony at the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Laos. At the same time,
TASS notes, the American press is publicizing the 17 and 18 February
B-52 strikes. A 22 February broadcast to North America says the United
States is developing a "second Vietnam" in Laos, claiming among other
things that more than 12,000 "American advisers" are there as well as
1,200 Green Berets. An IZVESTIYA article summarized by TASS on the 23d
condemns U.S. efforts to conceal the real scale of its aggression in Laos
and predicts further escalation will stem from Washington's "recent
decision" to use B-52's against liberated districts. A PRAVDA commentator,
according to TASS on the 25th, says the Pentagon's "dangerous" attitude
toward defeat in the Plain of Jars is revealed by the fact that ii'
recent days a large part of the U.S. air power based in Thailand and
in the Seventh Fleet was used in Laos, the U.S. Command even deciding to
"weaken temprvarily" the bombings of South Vietnam.
PEKING NCNA reports the NLHX Central Committee statement denouncing
the use of B-52's as well as a number of reports attributed
to Pathet Lao media on the fighting in the Plain of Jars, but Peking is
not known to have commented on its own authority.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 FEBRUARY 1970
- 12 -
PRC AND NORTH KOREA
NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR BACK I N PEKING
Chou En-lai received the DPRK Ambassador for a "cordial and friendly talk"
on 17 February, according to NCNA that day, and the Pyongyang KCNA
reports on the 19th that the meeting took place in a "friendly atmosphere."
Shortly thereafter, TASS reports on 23 February that Kosygin received
the DPRK Ambassador in Moscow for a "friendly" meeting.
The reports of the meeting in Peking provide the first available
Indication of the ambassador's presence in the PRC capital in more
than two years? Accredited in June 1967, he was last reported in Peking
in September 1967 when he hosted a reception marking DPRK National Day.
The new sign of further normalization of Sino-Korean relations follows
reports some weeks ago of the signing of a new agreement on navigation
on the Yalu and Tumen Rivers.* Since then, Pyongyang has been giving
the PRC some atypical routine-level propaganda support:
+ A MINJU CHOSON article carried by KCNA on 5 February denounced a U.S.
"scheme" to perpetuate the occupation of Taiwan, "an inseparable part
of the territory of the PRC," and decried this "grave hostile act against
People's China." A similar charge was made in a NODONG SINMUN commentary
carried by KCNA the same day scoring Japanese support for alleged U.S.
aggressive plans in Asia.
+ A MINJU CHOSON article also carried by KCNA on the 5th, denouncing
President Nixon's 30 January press conference, remarked that he spoke
"balderdash about 'countering nuclear attack' from People's China,"
thus showing that he was resorting to schemes of "nuclear blackmail."
+ On 7 and 12 February KCNA gave unusual replay to Peking comment,
reporting an NCNA commentary on the State of the Union address and a
PEOPLE'S DAILY article denouncing Japanese militarism.
Korean Army Day on 8 February, however, got standard propaganda treatment
from Peking. In the pattern of last year, Peking publicized only an
NCNA report of a reception and film show by the DPRK military attache.
The report noted that in toasts the DPRK attache and the PRC deputy
defense minister praised the "militant frierdehip cemented in blood"
of the two peoples and armies. Although this formulation has not
appeared in Peking propaganda on DPRK Army Day for some years, it has
appeared sporadically in reports on other North Korean anniversaries,
* See the 14 February 1970 FBIS TRENDS, page 28, for a discussion of
this agreement and background on Sino-Korean relations.
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25 FEBRUARY 1970
most recently on 25 October 1969 in an NCNA report of the DPRK
charge d'affaires' banquet marking the anniversary of the Chinese
People's Volunteers' entry into the Korean War. Peking has not
publicized a greetings message to the North Koreans on Army Day,
although a 21 February k''NA roundup of messages received does note
that one was received fro:," the PRC Ministry of Defense. This
treatment accords with that of last year.
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MIDDLE EAST
25 FEBRUARY 1970
PROTEST MEETINGS IN USSR CONDEMN ISRAEL FOR ABU ZABAL RAID
Moscow continues to extol the recent Soviet "initiatives" toward a
Middle East settlement--the Kosygin letters to the United States,
Britain, and F:Lznue, revealed on 12 February, and the 16 February
TASS statement pegged to Israel's bombing of a UAR metal plant on
the 12th. The Abu Zabal raid is the focus of comment assailing
Israel for its deep raids into Arab territory and its treatment of
the Arab population in the occupied territories. Following the
TASS statement, Moscow on the 20th began tc mount a campaign of
protest mestings throughout the USSR condemning the Abu Zabal raid
and supporting Soviet policy in the Middle East. The ground was
prepared for the protest campaign, still being publicized on the 25th,
with a flurry of statements by various Soviet public organizations
and messages to their UAR counterparts expressing indignation over,
Abu Zabal, At the same time, comment on the raid rejects Israeli
explanations of pilot error. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article by
Agaryshev on the 21st recalls that Nasir has said that if Israel
has decided to bomb civilian enterprises, "not only Egyptian plants
will be attacked."
Current Moscow propaganda is largely devoid of comment on the U.S.
and Soviet proposals for a settlement or of references to the Big
Four talks. There _:, still reiteration of the need for a political
settlement, which Israel is accused of thwarting. The November 1967
Security Council resolution continues to be cited as the basis for a
settlement, and there is the usual insistence on Israeli withdrawal.
IZVESTIYA on the 21st, along with other comment, construes U.S. policy
in the Middle East as an extension of "Vietnamization," with Israel,
using American weapons, attempting to attain U.S. aims in the region.
Having long argued that the United States seeks the downfall of all
"progressive" Arab governments, Moscow plays up President Nasir's
charge, in recent interviews, that the Americans have tried for years
to overthrow the Egyptian regime. Soviet commentators maintain that .
this effort will prove"unsuccessful. TRUD on the 24th, acknowledging
"temporary successes" by the Israeli "aggressors," echoes the language
of the Kosygin notes in declaring Soviet determination to frustrate
imperialist adventures in the Middle East.
Abba Eban's visit to the FRG--the first by an Israeli foreign minister--
is the peg for a recounting df Bonn's past and present support for Israel
and fs seen by Moscow as evidence of further cooperation, despite FRG
"talk about the desire to restore links" with the A I-)s.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 FEBRUARY 1970
SWISSAIR CRASH Moscow comes to he defense of Palestinian resistance
organizations, which have denied responsibility for
the 21 January crash of an Israel-bound Swissair plane near Zurich and
for the explosion aboard an Austrian airliner on the same day.* Previous
incidents involving El Al planes, for which responsibility was claimed
by Palestinian fedayeen groups, were virtually ignored by Moscow.
Implying its disapproval of such actions, Moscow briefly reported but
gave no further attention to the hijacking of an El Al plane to Algeria
in July 1968, and it acknowledged but obscured the details of the
December 1968 attack in Athens and the February 1969 incident in Zurich.
The subsequent hijacking of a TWA airliner to Damascus and incidents
involving El Al offices abroad apparently got no Soviet propaganda
attention.
In Moscow's first reaction to the new incidents, TASS commentator
Velichanskiy says on the 23d that Washington and Tel Aviv immediately
attributed the crash to sabotage by Arab guerrillas, seizing on "a
false communique hurriedly concocted which allegedly came from some Pales-
tinian organization." Noting the Palestinian denial;,-he says the.."yells" of
Israeli and Western "propaganda" were aimed at distracting attention
from the Abu Zabal raid, justifying in advance announcements of new
U.S. arms deliveries to Israel, and "compromising the heroic struggle
of Arab guerrillas" on "occupied Arab territory"--a qualification Moscow
has always been careful to insert when supporting partisan operations.
Subsequent comment sustains the line that the outcry is intended merely
to cover up Israeli and imperialist "crimes" in the Middle East, and
Moscow stresses Palestinian and Arab denials of involvement. A Shakhov
foreign-language commentary on the 24th asserts that Western propaganda
uses one set of criteria when "it is a matter of crimes in Vietnam, Laos,
or Cambodia" but resorts to "every kind of slander and fabrication" when
it is a matter of people's struggles for liberation.
Dealing with Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's visit to West Germany, a
Moscow commentary broadcas`:; in German on the 24th says the visit is
taking place in an atmosphere of "premeditated hysteria and unresttained
propaganda" against the Arabs and cites "agitational" news about the
"recent fire in Munich" and the Swissair crash. These and other
incidents are linked with partisan activity, the commentary says,
although the West German police admit there is no evidence to prove this.
* An initial claim of responsibility for the crash by a fedayeeii splinter
group was reported on the 21st by REUTERS and Baghdad radio and disavowed
the next day, and a spokesman of the fedayeen's new Unified Command on
the 23d deplored the explosions on both planes and denied any responsiblity
by the Command's member organizations.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 FEBRUARY 1970
PALESTINIAN DELEGATIONS VISIT TO USSR GETS LITTLE PUBLICITY
Moscow is uninformative in its minimal attention to the 10-20 February
visit -to the USSR by a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation
led by it3 chairman, Yasir Arafat, at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-
Asian Solidarity Committee A cor;nunique released by TASS on the 20th
and published in PRAVDA on the 21st says the group visited Moscow,
Leningrad, Volgograd, and Tashkent, and held talks in Moscow with the
host organization on questions of mutual interest, "including cooperation
In the join. struggle for liquidation of the consequences of the
imperialist aggression by Israel and in defense of the lawful rights*
and interests of the Arab people of Palestine." The PLO delegation, it
says, told of the people's resistance in the occupied territories and
expressed gratitude for the Soviet people's support.
The communique stresses the people-to-people aspect of the vsit, with
no suggestion of any c Ltacts by the delegation with Soviet Government
officials. The delega,;ion thanks the Soviet people for their support,
it says, and the Soviet host committee emphasized the Soviet people's
support for the Arab peoples "against the Israe:L: aggressors and their
imperialist patrons in support of the national liberation and anti-
imperialist struggle of the Palestinian Arab people." A subsequent
commentary in Arabic on the 23d follows the lines of the communique9
again emphasizing the "people's" friendship in citing Arab reaction to
the visit
During the visit an Arabic-language commentary on 12 February said the
struggle of the Palestinian fedayeen "has enjoyed the recognition and
support of all progressive mankind." The Arab press, it noted, has
pointed out that the visit aims at strengthening contacts between the
Soviet and Palestinian Arab peoples. The Arab papers are correct, it
added, in saying that Arafat's visit is a "logical result of Soviet
policy which aims at backing national liberation movements." It
explained that the basis of the attitude of the Soviet Government and
pecple toward the Palestinian patriots' struggle "is not prompted by
temporary considerations necessitated by any specific circumstances,"
but by "firm principles," and it went on to recall Kosygin's statement
of support for the Palestinian organizations' struggle in a 10 December
speech. Kosygin, however, had added a qualification to his statement
which the commentary seems at pains to deny: "In conditions of the
* Arafat was reported by the Beirut AL-MUHARRIR to have remarked on his
return to Beirut that the Soviet attitude toward the Palestine issue "has
changed greatly," and that the USSR "now recognizes our people's national
rights" in Palestine. AL-MUHARRIR says this is an "important step," since
the Soviets had been using the expression "legitimate rights."
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25 FEBRUARY 1970
continuing Israeli aggression," he had said, the Soviet people regard
th' struggla of Palestinian organizations for the liquidation of the
aftermaths of the aggression as a just national liberation and anti-
imperialist struggle and support it.
ARAFAT The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 20th says that
C01+ENTS a Voice of Palestine radio correspondent accompanying the
delegation reported that the group held several meetings
with "senior Soviet figures," and that Arafat met with the chief editors
of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA and with TASS and Soviet TV officials. Reporting
Arafat's arrival in Beirut from Moscow on the 20th, MENA says that Arafat
expressed great satisfaction with the results of the visit, "where he was
given head-of-state treatment," and said his talks with "Soviet officials
and trade union representatives were very beneficial." Asked whether the
USSR had decided to extend aid to the fedayeen operations, MENP says
Arafat replied that no such agreement was reached "but we hope. -co receive
such aid."
At a press conference in Amman on the 24th, reported by MENA's Damascus
office, Arafat said the visit to the USSR "was supposed to have taken
place four months ago," before the Arab summit conference in Rabat.
The coming days, he added, "will show the great, reaction to and the
important outcome of this visit." TASS briefly reports the press
conference, citing Arafat as saying the delegation was warmly received
and that the Soviet people support the "national liberation, anti-
imperialist struggle of the Palestine Arab people."
The Syrian news agency reports on the 24th that a Fatah source announced
that, a French CP delegation would be arriving in Amman shortly to continue
discussions begun during a Fatah delegation's visit to France 4-10 February.
The Fatah delegation attended the French CP congress, the report adds, and
also held talks with representatives of the NFLSV, the DRV, the USSR, and
other countries "which helped strengthen the Palestine revolution's
international relations."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 FEBRUARY 1970
- 18 -
Si NO-SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW HITS CHINESE ON WARSAW TALKS; PEKING RESTRAINED
While Peking devot+.~s only one item to anti-Soviet themes, a 21. February
NCNA report on Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, Moscow accuses the Chinese
of seeking to put pressure on the Soviets at the current Peking
neg;tiation$ through dual policies of propagating anti-Sovietism and
war psychosis at home while: talking with the United States in Warsaw.
Mosc,:w charges in a Mandarin broadcast on 19 February that the Chinese
:leaders' militaristic domestic policies are aimed at "applying pressure
tc the Soviet Union in order to win the upper hand at the Soviet-Chinese
talks in Peking" and suggests that the holding of talks in Warsaw is
intended "to intimidate the Soviet Union by presenting a possibility of
collu2ion with the U.S. imperialists." The current issue of the SovJ_et
weekly LIFE ABROAD, according to the Belgrade TANYUG on the 22d, directly
links the Warsaw talks with an intensification of Chinese hostility toward
the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
Soviet media fcr the first time point tc Chinese initiative for the resumption
of the Warsaw talks. For example, a 21 February commentary'in French over
Moscow's purportedly unofficial R&.dio Peace and Progress states that "it
is the Chinese side which specially insisted on holding this meeting as
quickly as possible"
After totally ignoring the 14 February anniversary of the 1950 Sino-Soviet
treaty of alliance for the fourth successive year, Moscow uses the 36th and
37th installments--on 20 and 22 February--of the continuing Radio Moscow
aeries in Mandarin on "Glorious Chapters in the History of Soviet-Chinese
Relations" to discuss the significance of the treaty, But the commentaries
begged the question of the treaty's current status by restricting the
discussion to the period of the early 1950's.
In Moscow's continuing portrayal of dissension at all levels of the CCP
in the course of efforts to rehabilitate the party organizations, a
23 February TASS report on public show trials in Peking places Mao and
Chou En-lai in the same camp by citing slogans and wall posters defending
them against "ultraleftists," class enemies, and counterrevolutionaries.
Mention of Lin Piao is notably absent. There had been occasional
indications in the past that the Soviets regarded Chou more favorably
than the other PRC leaders,
Of the Soviet materials on Armed Forces Day, an article by Marshal
Yaku:~ovakiy in SOVIET RUSSIA on 22 February brings up the situation in
the PRC after a review of the "imperialist" threat a:d before a passage
on the need to strengthen the USSR's defense might, Yakubovskiy takes
note of the "war psychosis" in China and the Peking leadership's proposal
that the Chinese people "prepare themselves 'in the event of hunger and war,
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25 FEBRUARY 1970
SINO-U1 S. RELATIONS
PEKING REPORTS WARSAW SESSION. CONTINUES RESTRAINED ATTACKS
Following the pattern set in January, Peking issued a brief, noncommittal
statement after the 20 February session of the Warsaw Talks, stating
only that the meeting had been held and that the next one would be
scheduled by mutual agreement. Anti-U.S. polemics are still being
aired, though with some elements of restraint. There has been no
Peking comment so far on the President's State of the World message;
and while attacks on the State of the Union message continue, PRC
media still avoid mention of the President's remarks about China.
The most pointed anti-U.S. statements to appear in PRC media during
the past week are contained in scattered references to the downing
of a U.S. drone over PRC territory on 10 February. A broadcast to
Taiwan on the 22d charges, for example, that the "Nixon government"
has stepped up the tactic of talking of peace while "continuing to
carry out military threats and war provocations." Concern over Japan's
potential as a major threat to the PRC is evinced in a 23 February
NCNA article which also brings in the USSR and the "Taiwan independence
movement" as parts of a U.S.-instigated plot to pave the way for
Japanese reannexation of Taiwan.
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STRATEGIC WEAPONS
ARMED FORCES DAY ARTICLES MENTION SOVIET ABM CAPABILITY
Articles by Defense Minister Grechko and Chief of the General. Staff
Zakharov marking the 52d anniversary of the Soviet armed forces
(23 February) break a two-year pattern of reticence on the question
of Soviet ABM capability. Grechko's article, appearing in PRAVDA on
the 23d, says that great 2hanges have taken place in the troops of the
USSR's air defense and that "the combat means we possess are capable
of reliably striking both enemy aircraft and missiles, regardless
of their altitude and velocity, at great distances from the defended
targets," In IZVESTIYA on 22 February, Marshal Zakharov says that
thn air defense forces have the latest means for insuring the
reliable destruction of "any aircraft and many rockets" of the enemy.
This formulation, introduced by the then Defense Minister Malinovskiy
in April 1966, was repeated in substance by key spokesmen through
early 1968 and appeared in comment surrounding the armed forces
anniversary that year.
Since the early-1968 period, Moscow has broached the matter of the
USSR's ABM capability with less frequency and in language, less
precise than the Malinovskiy formulation. Typically, Warsaw Pact
commander Marshal Yakubovskiy, in a 23 February 1969 RED STAR article
marking last year's armed forces anniversary, said Soviet forces were
equipped with "rocket antiaircraft complexes providing reliable
protective coverage for our Soviet skies." Commander of the Ground
Forces General Pavlovskiy, interviewed by TASS on 7 May 1969 on the
anniversary of V-E Day, stated that the "air defense forces . . .
are capable of reliably shielding the country's territory and
successfully destroying any air targets."
:he Moscow domestic service report of last November's October Revolution
anniversary parade in Red Square said that the soldiers of the
"antiair defense are always ready to thwart a sudden enemy strike
from the air, to destroy the enemy's means of attack, and to safeguard
the vital activities of the state and the fighting ability of our
armed forces." A Budapest report on the same parade had t.titated that
"antimissile missiles" were on display, "every one of them serving as
an argument to prove that not even the additional billions of dollars
invested in armaments can provide the U.S. Defense Department with
the desired strategic superiority."
On offensive weaponry, Grechko says routinely in PRAVDA that the
Strategic Missile Forces "are equipped with powerful missiles with
nuclear warheads capable of inflicting a crushing blow upon an
aggressor in any part of the planet." The Commander of the Strategic
Missile Forces, Marshal Krylov, says in an interview in TRUD on
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25 FEBRUARY 1970
20 February that the USSR has powerful nuclear weapons with "practically
limitless target-destruction range"--an observation he had also made
in a NEW TIMES article reported by TASS on the 18th.
MOSCOW SUSTAINS LOW-KEY ATTACK ON SAFEGUARD PROGRAM
Moscow continues to press its low-key attack on Administration plans to
move forward with the Safeguard ABM system, focusing on U.S. domestic
opposition. TASS on the 24th, for example, promptly reports
Secretary Laird's proposals for construction of a third ABM site in
the United States, noting that Laird again came forward with "hackneyed
assertions about the so-called 'Soviet threat." According to TASS,
the "American public strongly objects to the governnicnt's decision
to expand the Safeguard system. And really this system, in the final
count, will devour scores of billions of dollars so much needed for
solving acute domestic problems." An earlier dispatch on the 24th
had cited Senator Kennedy for the observation that construction of
Safeguard "is a senseless waste of money."
While predictably remaining silent on the possible effect of Soviet
missile and antimissile development on the strategic arms limitation
talks (SALT) which will open in Vienna on 16 April, Moscow continues to
publicize U.S. concerti over the consequences of Washington's weapons
programs for these talks. Thus, TASS reports on the 20th that at a
recent press conference former Ambassador Harriman indicated that the
United States' attempts to develop its "nuclear missile capability
make it more difficult for Washington to reach an agreement with the
Soviet Union for the limitation of strategic armaments." And TASS on
21 February, reviewing Secretary Laird's report on defense programs to
Senate committees the previous day, concludes that "it does not tally
with the declarative announcements by official Washington about the
aspirations of the United States to find ways and means of limiting
strategic nuclear missile weapons."
Otherwise, propaganda currently devotes little attention to SALT. TASS
on 20 February does report an interview granted its correspondent by
Senator Symington, who observed that the talks "provide an excellent
opportunity to start tackling the problem on which the destiny of
entire mankind largely depends." TASS quotes the Senator as saying
that "if we fail to stop the dangerous and costly race of missiles
and nucleax armaments, history might not give us another such chance."
He also noted, according to TASS, that the fact that the USSR and the
United States each "can destroy the other binds us to approach the
program of arms limitation with complete responsibility. . . ."
Soviet propaganda on President Nixon's 18 February report on foreign policy
has acknowledged his reaffirmation of intent to move ahead with the second
phase of the Safeguard program, but Moscow has not mentioned his remarks on
SALT.
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25 FEBRUARY 1970
WARSAW PACT
GRECHKO ARTICLE RECAPS DETAILS ON PACT ORGANIZATION
Marshal Grechko's armed forces day article in PRAVDA on 23 February is
nota'hle for a brief reiteration of details on the Warsaw Pact organiza-
tion which had been pointed out in an article by Pact Chief of Staff
Shtemenko in RED STAR in January. Shtemenko's article had evoked wide-
spread comment in the West and new gestures of defiance from Bucharest.
Included in the 23 February TASS report of the Grechko article, but
omitted from a summary broadcast the same day in Serbo-Croatian to
Yugoslavia, is the remark that "national armies [of the Pact members]
have assigned detachments and units" to the joint armed forces
"to ensure better interaction." The Serbo-Croatian version merely
reports the Defense Minister as "stressing the increasingly mutual
fighting cooperation" between the Soviet and Warsaw Pact members' armies.
Shtemenko's article had gone out of its way to emphasize the subordination
of the "allocated" forces to the "Joint" command rather than to the
"national" commands. It had left the impression that such "Joint" land,
sea, and air forces had been created at the March 1969 Pact summit
meeting in Budapest rather than at the inception of the Warsaw Pact
in 1955. Such an interpretation of Shtemenko's article was branded a
"Western canard" in a Leontyev article in the 5 February RED STAR.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
25 FEBRUARY 1970
POMPIDOU VISIT
MOSCOW CONTRASTS U1S, "HOSTILITY" TO FRANCE, SOVIET AMITY
Soviet propaganda surrounding French President Pompidou's visit to
the United States contrasts alleged U.S. "hostility" toward the
French President and French policy with the "friendship" and policy
of rapprochement prevailing in French relations with the USSR and its
allies. Reports of anti-French demonstrations said to be planned
throughout the country, particularly by "pro-Israeli" groups, get wide
Soviet publicity.
A Schlenovv commentary broadcast by Moscow for French listeners on the
23d typifies Soviet media's handling of the visit. Schlenov notes
that France's withdrawal from NATO had an importance far beyond the
military framework and marked the starting point for "crucial measures
adopted by French foreign policy," the "essential" measure being the
improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries. He states that U.S. attempts to change French policy have
ranged from "successive attacks by the United States and Federal Germany
against the franc," designed to undermine the French economy and thereby
force France to alter its "independent foreign policy," to "gross
interference" in French election campaigns. Schlenov suggests that
recently U.S. tactics have been changed, and "American propaganda speaks
in every key" of traditional French-American friendship while in reality
there has been "no noticeable change" in U.S. policy toward France. The
commentator refers to French-U.S. differences still persisting on the
issues of a European security conference, the question of military blocs,
a po15.:y of detente, creation of a European security system, and the
Middle East, adding that in the latter case "pro-Israeli American
propaganda" practically treats the French Government's sale of jets to
Libya "as a treacherous blow inflicted on Israel."
A 25 February Moscow domestic service report on the Pompidou visit says
U.S. "political circles" have displayed "visible irritation for some time
now" and at times "even open hostility" toward French foreign policy.
It adds that while Washington publicly asserts a desire to "disperse
the so-called distrust" and improve relations, it "is actually striving
to obviate all hindrances and difficulties" which France's "independent
policy" creates for the "aggressive and long-outdated foreign policy
course" of the United States.
Several Soviet reports call attention to the "fierce anti-French
campaign" allegedly being waged in the United States by Congressmen,
big business, and various Zionist organizations. A domestic service
report on the 22d alleges that "some political figures close to the
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CONFIDENTIAL I"13I TRENDS
25 FEBRUARY 19'(0
White House" are urging a boycott of Pompidou'a visit and demonstrations
as an expression of "open hostility to France" because of its~ifldupendent
course "in all cardinal foreign policy problems." A PRAVDA report on
the 22d says "favorable conditions are being created for all kinds of
provocations on the part of influential pro-Israeli circles" in the
United States.
A Moscow broadcast for French listeners on the 23d reassuringly quotes
a comment by LA NATION, "w%ich is close to the French Government," as
indicating that Pompidou's trip "does not mean a renunciation of the
policy of rapprochement with the countries of Eastern Europe, and
primarily with the Soviet Union."
Moscow's only coverage of Pompidou's Press Club speech so far is a brief
TASS report, devoid of editorial interjections, noting that the French
President expressed deep concern about the Middle East situation and is
seeking :formalization of the area, adding that he said Israel needs
peace, and reporting without elaboration that he said there axe differences
between Washington and Paris "in the approach to different questions of
international life."
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2 T'EBRUARY :1.9'(0
WEST GERMANY
GDR MEDIA DISPLAY DOUBTS STOPH-BRANDT TALKS WILL BL FRUITFUL
East German media have begun laying groundwork for propaganda that
would blame Chancellor Brandt for any breakdown in the forthcoming talks
between Brandt and GDR Premier Stoph, in evident anticipation that the
talks may be abortive. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentaries and editorials
draw on the whole catalog of GDR complaints against the FRG in a tone
that has become increasingly vituperative and angry following Brandt's
18 February message to Stoph and the 20 February announcement of
agreement to hold low-level preparatory talks. GDR and Soviet media
report "complete agreement" in the opening discussions Ulbricht and
Stoph. had with USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko, who arrived in Berlin
for a "detailed exchange of views" on the 24th.
Consistent with past practice, GDR media have not publicized the text
of Brandt's 18 February letter to Stoph proposing preliminary low-level
talks in early February, to be followed by top-level talks in March, or
Brandt's statement "I cannot accept preconditions." GDR media have
also ignored the West German Chancellor's suggestion that a second
meeting between Stoph and himself take place 3.. Bonn. Soviet media
have acknowledged the latter suggestion.
GDR media concentrate primarily on charges that the Brandt government
has been guilty of evasion, revanchism, and rejection of recognition
for the GDR. Stress is laid on Brandt's "failure" to respond to
Ulbricht's earlier proposal, renewed in the 11 February Stoph letter to
Brandt, calling for an agreement on "establishment of equal relations
between the GDR and the FRG." By "refusing to take up this proposal,"
ADN reports on the 18th, Brandt "in effect is trying to evade the
basic question of the safeguarding of peace." An ADN commentary on the
19th denounces Brandt for dragging out "the old text of so-called
preconditions" and seeking to "disguise the clear facts" and to raise
a "completely unacceptable condition, based on the old revanchist
claim to sole representation," by demanding that the GDR renounce
"normal relations under international law and thereby equality." It
also berates unnamed West German politicians for speaking of "intra-
German relations" between the GDR and FRG, arguing that such "new
vocabulary" cannot render palatable for the GDR "anachronistic and
presumptuous claims" by "West German imperialism" to sole
representation.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 24th accuses the FRG of making "maximum demands"
for negotiations with the GDR and denies that the GDR's proposals are
of maximum scope, calling the GDR draft treaty proposed in December
"only a minimum program." The paper adds that if the Brandt government
does not wish to grant the GDR recognition, "then one cannot take its
promises seriously."
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25 FEBRUARY 1970
SED Politburo member Paul Verner casts doubt on the feasability of a
GDR-FRG renunciation-of-force agreement, as proposed by Brandt, in an
18 February speech reported by ADN. Verner says such an agreement
would be "so much worthless paper" if the FRG refused to recognize
the territorial status quo and the GDR under international law.
GROMYKO VISIT GDR and Soviet media report that Gromyko came to the
GDR on the 24th at the invitation of the GDR
Government for "several days" of consultation to "define point policy
for the defense of peace." The inclusion in the Gromyko delegation of
Soviet Foreign Ministry officials involved in Gromyko's recent talks
with West German State Secretary Bahr appears to confirm that Gronyyko's
main task is to inform the GDR on the state of the Soviet-FRG talks.
Following talks with Ulbricht and Stoph on the 24th, Grromyko is
reported on the 25th to have talked with GDR Foreign Minister Winzer
on "intensifying" GDR-Soviet relations, "problems of international
policy," and European security issues, according to ADN.
East German sensitivity to West German charges that the GDR operates
under Soviet tutelage is evident in a 21 February NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
report. The paper denounces as "primitive lies and mental contortions"
a Wect German press report, "fabricated in Hamburg and disseminated in
Bonn," to the effect that the GDR's draft treaty proposing equal
relations between the two German states "had been formulated upon
'Moscow's' initiative!" NEUES DEUTSCHLAND calls this "news concoction"
a "lie from beginning to end" and "more proof of the value of news
eme.nating from Bonn, including DPA news."
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CONFIDENTIAL 1113IL3 TRLNDS
25 FEBRUARY 1970
-27-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA
FRICTIONS PERSIST DURING ZHIVKOV VISIT TO PRAGUE
Bulgarian-Czechoslovak animosities dating from the Czechoslovak
liberalization persisted close to the surface of propaganda materials
on Bulgarian First Secretary and Premier Todor Zhivkov's 17-19 February
visit to Prague. The communique released on the 18th, mentioning full
identity of views on all "basic questions" during talks held in "a
very cordial and comradely atmosphere," is generally restrained in
tone. And Moscow's PRAVDA, commenting on the Zhivkov-Husak talks on
the 20th, says they were marked by cordiality "and frankness." During
the pre-invasion liberalization, in April 1968, the atmosphere of
Zhivkov's discussions with Dubcek in Prague had been sternly described
as one of "sincerity and comradely frankness." Husak's visit to
Sofia in July 1969--in the first flush of his takeover as CPCZ First
Secretary--was the occasion for "warm and cordial" talks.
Zhivkov appeared to vent his spleen on the Czechoslovaks in a press
conference carried in RUDE PRAVO on the 19th, as if in revenge for the
way he had been treated on his arrival in Czechoslovakia in April 1968.
On that occasion the liberal Prague radio had broadcast Zhivkov's
evasive written answers to questions submitted to him in advance
regarding the scanty coverage given the Czechoslovak liberalization by
Bulgarian media. Now, Zhivkov indulged in overkill in taking his cue
from a question by Bratislava PRAVDA chief editor Nittman on the
"counterrevolution." The Bulgarian leader replied that "the defeat of
the counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia was received with great joy and
relief by our party and our people," and "we are proud that in
August 1968 we could, together with the other fraternal socialist
countries, help the people of Czechoslovakia retain the positions of
socialism and destroy the counterrevolution." He added, for good
measure, his conviction that in time "all honest people throughout the
world will realize how great an act was done on 21 August 1968" for
Czechoslovak socialism and world peace.
Husak characteristically skirted the issue of the counterrevolution and
the August intervention in his interview with Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO
DELO, published on the 20th. He merely recalled the failures of the
"weak, rightist-inclined" post-January 1968 leadership and added that
"everyone is aware of the critical situations" which resulted; he
stressed his own restorative efforts as party leader since April 1969.
On Zhivkov's visit itself, Husak expressed himself as only "very
pleased" and noted that "we quite frankly discussed the issues."
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