TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 11, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~IIIlllll~umumi-IIIIIIII~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confident:
11 February 1.9(,j
(VOL. XXI, NO. 6;
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, e.s amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
o.ou. I
GeNdd Lee .Weeelk
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A~ele~,ifite~Ne
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1]. FEBRUARY 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . .
VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW
Introduction . . . , . . . . . . 'a'
Paris Talks: 5 February Session . . . . . . . 0 Moscow on Vietnamization . . . . . . 4
Review of January "Victories" in the South . . . . . . . . o
Celebration of Tet in the South . . . . . . . . , , , , , 6
Tet Activities in the DRV . . . . . . . , . , , . , , , . . . o 6
New DRV Decree on Honorary Awards . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . 0 r
Moscow-Peking Polemic on Vietnam Policy . . . . . . . . , o o . a 8
Neutralisation of Plain of Jare Rejected by Hanoi, Pathet Lao , 10
Pathet Lao, Vietnamese Score U,S. Use of Thailand in Laos War . . 12
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Rejects "False Theory" of Mideast Balance of Power . 13
WEST GERMANY
Moscow Breaks Silence on Gromykc-Bahr Discussions . . . . . . 16
USSR Warnrs Bonn Against Further '~Illega1" Berlin Actions . . . . 16
Moscow Disappointed With Brandt's First Hundred Days.-. . . . . . 17
Natural Gas Deal Seen as Boon to East-Wes?j Detente . . . . . . . 18
Warsaw Calls First Talks with Bonn "Useful, Businesslike" . . . . 19
Kirilenko: USSR Seeks Normalization, Firm on Ideology . . . , . .20
Peking Again Attacks Soviet Leadership on German Question . . . . 21
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Depicts United States as Declining Power . . . . . . . . . 23
PH..LIPPINES
Moscow, Peking Liffer on Motive fo: Anti-Marcos Riots . . . . . . 25
WARSAW PACT
Moscow Denies Tightening Pact Integration; Ceausescu Defiant . 26
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
11 FEBRUARY 1970
Peking (2674 items)
(7%)
11%
Domestic Issues
(43%)
48%
(0.2%)
7%]
VWP Anniversary
(0.4%)
8%
Middle East
(3%)
14%
(10%)
5%
[Chou En-lai
(--)
7%]
(6%)
4%)
Letter to Nasir
(0.1%)
5%
[Nixon Statements
(--)
5%]
Anniversary of Mao
(15%)
3%
(4%)
5%
Statement on Japanese
(4%)
4%
People's Struggles
(1%)
4%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
ATTENTION 2 - 8 FEBRUARY 1970
Moscow (3583,items)
Vietnam
[VWP Anniv-
emery
Czechoslovakia
[CP Plenum
French CP
Congress
Middle East
Criticism of China
Battle of Stalingrad
Anniversary
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- 1 -
VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Vietnamese communist attention to the Paris talks is confined to VNA's
account of the 53d session on 5 February* 'which typically,focuses on
the PRG and DRV delegates' statements and dismisses those by the GVN
and U.S. delegates with a single sentence each. Both Mme. Nguyen Thi
Binh and Ha Van Lau leveleC, the usual attack on the Vietnamization
policy, which also continues to be derided in other Hanoi and Front
propaganda. Opposition to Administration policy within the United
States is noted in Hanoi reports of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearings and of the resolution on Vietnam issued by the
Democratic Party Policy Council.
Monitored Vietnamese communist media have not carried the addresses at
the French CP congress by DRV delegate Le Duc Tho and NFLSV delegate
Dang Quang Minh. Le Duc Tho referred routinely to the United States
having been "forced" to halt the bombing of the DRV and agree to the
four-power talks, but he mentioned their current status only in saying
that the United States is trying to reduce the scope of the talks while
car:/ing out Vietnamization. Dang Quang Minh, on the other hand,
charged that the United States at the conference "continues to stand
on its position as an aggressor, failing to make a serious response
to the NFLSV's 10-point overall solution." He added the standard charge
that "recently" the United States has "downgraded the conference and
sought to sabotage it."
Moscow continues to score Vietnamization and stresses that the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearings are mainly concerned with criticism
of that policy. Soviet media promptly report the statement adopted by
the Democratic Party Policy Council calling for troop withdrawal in
18 months. Commentators assert that Secretary Laird's trip to Saigon
is aimed at showing Vietnamization in the best light possible in order
to assuage criticism at home. Speaking at the French CP congress on
5 February, Kirilenko remarked briefly that in the year the present
U.S. Administration has been in office any "illusions" concerning its
intentions in Vietnam have been dispelled and the "course of events"
has shown that the U.S. Government "does not want a peaceful, political
solution of this problem."
* Liberation Radio did not carry Mme. Binh's formal statement at the
conference last week. A dramatization of Tet preempted the broadcast
at 0500 GMT on 6 February which would normally have carried the text
of the PRG delegate's speech.
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Front propaganda on the PRG's four-day Tet cease-fire makes the usual
claims of allied violations, with LPA charging that on the 5th the
United States bombed areas in 14 provinces. It is also charged that
"sweep operations" took place during the truce period. As usual, the
allies are said to have been "appropriately punished" for the violations.
Other attention to military action includes reviews of "victories" in
January.
Tet holiday greetings from various organizations in the South include
an unusual one from the Central Committee of the Vietnam People's
Revolutionary Party (PRP)* to all members of the party and the People's
Revolutionary Youth Group which refers to recent study of "the PRP
Central Committee Resolution 9." Like greetings from the PRG Council
of Ministers, the Vietnam Alliance, and the Saigon Alliance, the letter
hails 3.969 "victories" and expresses hope for greater ones in the
coming year,
Tet activities in the ARV include a 5 February meeting organized by the
Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee. President Ton Duc Thang,
Truong Chinh, and Nguyen Van Tien, head of the special representation
of South Vietnam to the DRV, were reported present. Thang and Tien
delivered greetings on the occasion. Other propaganda include.. 'ports
of visits to troops and the people by DRV leaders Ton Duc Thang, e
Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le That.'t Nghi.
In addition to the complaints at the Paris talks about U.S. "provocations"
against the DRV, Hanoi claims that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance
plane was downed on 7 February over Ha Bac Province near Hanoi,
bringing the total of downed planes to 3,332.
Hanoi continues to publicize the Vietnam Workers Party's 40th anniversary
in propaganda including editorial comment and the broadcasting of routine
speeches by representatives of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central
Committee, the Democratic Party and the Vietnam General Federation of
Trade Unions at the "grand" meeting marking the anniversary. The speeches
are broadcast on the 4th, 5th, and 6th, respectively.**
* The PRP, the communist party in the South that was formally established
on 1 January 1962, has rarely been mentioned in propaganda over the last
four years. However, it did get some attention when the PRG was
established last June and during the September activities surrounding
Ho Chi Minh's funeral. Liberation Radio in the last month has carried
two articles from the PRP journal TIEN PHONG.
** VNA's 2 February reports of the meeting and Le Duan's speech did not
indicate the date, but these later broadcasts indicate that the meeting
was held on 1 February.
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? domestic service roundtable discussion says the hearings concluded that
Vietnamization will not alter the present situation in Vietnam and that
the presence of American forces will be maintained even after implementa-
tion of the Vietnamization plan. Moscow cites calls at the hearings by
Senators Goodell and McGovern for a total withdrawal by the end of
the year and by Senator Mathias for a repeal of the Tonkin Resolution,
as well as criticisms of U.S. "chemical warfare" and of the Phoenix
pacification program. A 4 February domestic service commentary says
"political observers" have noted that the hearings mark "the end of
the temporary truce between the government and its critics in Congress."
On 8 and 10 February TASS reports briefly and without comment the
statement drafted by the Democratic Party foreign relations consultative
committee and adopted by the party's Policy Council calling for
withdrawal of all troops within 18 months and criticizing the Administration
for delaying appointment of a new head of the American delegation to
the Paris talks.
Moscow's reports of Secretary Laird's trip to South Vietnam emphasize
that the visit, coming at the time of the Senate hearings, is connected
with "growing opposition" to the war among the American public.
Commentators assert that Laird will try to cast the Vietnamization policy
is the best possible light in order to calm critics, but they recall
that past visits by Pentagon leaders to Saigon have usually led to
further escalation and they speculate that this visit will be no
exception.
REVIEW OF JANUARY "VICTORIES" IN THE SOUTH
On 4 February LPA claims that attacks during the month "on many important
bases and strategic communication lines" put out of action 1,200 allied
troops, including 259 Americans. And an article in the DRV army paper
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast on the 8th, claims that 7,000 troops were
"put out of action" during three weeks of fighting in the Mekong Delta
and that 3,500 troops were killed or wounded during 10 days of fighting
in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Da Nang, and Binh Dinh.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, in discussing the alleged allied casualties
in the Delta from 3 to 22 January, claims that "the puppet Marine brigade A,
far from fulfilling its role of reinforcing and supporting pacification
operations in Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, and Each Gia, was annihilated." The
article says that "Nixon and Abrams want to prop up the puppet troops
in order to carry out their Vietnamization scheme," but that these troops
have "disintegrated further." The paper alleges that in the past month,
in addition to civil guards, militiamen, and armed policemen being
"punished," regulars of the "puppet" army were repeatedly hit everywhere.
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It adds that the Marines and paratroopers of the "puppet" strategic
reserve forces in particular were dealt "painful blows in the Mekong
Delta. and in the outer defense line nor+hwest of Saigon."
CELEBRATION OF TET IN THE SOUTH
Propaganda, on the celebration of Tet is marked by stress on the past
year's "victories" and optimistic forecasts for the coming year. A
Liberation Radio commentary on the 8th ridicules President Thieu's
Tet greeting, branding as "shameless and impudent" his "ballyhooing
that he will strengthen democracy." The anniversary greetings from
various organizations contrast the "people's victories" with alleged
allied setbacks, and some of them specifically discuss Vietnamization:
The policy is scored in the message to the Vietnam Alliance from the
Fatherland Front Central Committee, and the Vietnam Alliance greeting
says that Vietnamization "will be foiled."
Other messages* include the PRG Council of Ministers greetings to the
people, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 6th; greetings from the
Saigon Alliance signed by its chairman, Le Van Giap, to the people in
the region, noted by LPA on the 5th; and a Thich Thien Hao message to
Buddhists, broadcast by Hanoi on the 5th, which attacks allied "crimes."
TET ACTIVITIES IN THE DRV
HANOI Hanoi radio reports on 6 February that the Vietnam Fatherland
MEETING Front Central Committee held a "cordial" meeting the
preceding day to greet "the new spring," attended by
President Ton Duc Thang and Truong Chinh, a member of the Vietnam
Fatherland Front Central Committee. President Thang, conveying greetings
on the occasion, urged everyone to "eagerly advance, united around our
party, with a determination to realize . . . President Ho's sacred
testament to completely defeat" the United States and successfully
develop socialism.
On behalf of South Vietnam's special representation to the DRV, the
NFLSV Central Committee, the PRG and its advisory council, and all
southerners, Nguyen Van Tien "presented New Year's wishes for good
health to Uncle Ton." He expressed determination of the southern armed
forces and people to carry out Ho's testament, "to fear no hardships and
sacrifices, to stage successive attacks and uprisings, to fight until
the Americans get out and the puppets are toppled . . . ." On behalf
* The PRP Central Committee letter will be discussed in the FBIS SURVEY
of 12 February, along with an editorial from the PRP journal TIEN PHONG
which, like the letter, discusses resolution 9.
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of the southern compatriots, he presented New Year's wishes for good
health to the northern compatriots, "hoping that they will
enthusiastically emulate in stepping up production and will over-
fulfill the 1970 state plan, the first plan to comply with President
Ho's sacred testament."
DRV LEADERS' A succession of brief VNA items from 6 to 9 February
TET VISITS report the visits of DRV leaders President Ton Duc Thang,
Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh,
and Le Thanh Nghi to various units of the People's Armed Forces, to
families of workers and cadres, and to South Vietnam's special
representation to the DRV. Visits to various localities and army units
on the occasion of Tet were reported last year to have been made by
President Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Ito Nguyen Giap,
and Nguyen Duy Trinh.
NEW DRV DECREE ON HONORARY AWARDS
On 9 February Hanoi radio reports that on 27 January President Ton Duc
Thang signed an order, in accordance with Article 63 of the DRV
constitution and a decree passed by the DRV National Assembly Standing
Committee on 15 January,* establishing the "honorary state titles
of Labor Hero and Hero of the People's Armed Forces?" The broadcast
also carries the National Assembly Standing Committee decree, issued
in accordance with Article 53 of the constitution. *%K' The broadcast
says the decree is designed to recognize "outstanding services" of
the people and armed forces in production; fighting, and public works.
An additional goal is to encourage the development of revolutionary
heroism, the patriotic emulation movement, socialism, defense of the
fatherland, and defeat of the United States.
VNA's special domestic transmission for elite cadres had reported
on 17 January that the National Assembly Standing Committee met on the
lith and approved the decree on "national honorary titles of Labor
Heroes and Heroes of the People's Armed Forces."
** Article 63 of the DRV constitution gives the President the power
to promulgate laws in pursuance of the decisions of the National
Assembly or its Standing Committee. Article 53 of the constitution
gives the National Assembly or its Standing Committee the power to
adopt decrees and to institute and decide upon the award of state
orders,medals, and titles of honors.
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Signed by Truong Chinh as chairman of the National Assembly Standing
Committee, the decree contains dine articles spelling out the qualities
necessary in recipients of the honorable titles. The procedure for
awarding the titles is spelled out in article five, which says that
the National Assembly Standing Committee, basing itself on proposals
of the Council of Ministers, will decide on the awards.
On the 10th, Hanoi radio broadcasts a NHAN DAN editorial of the same
day which hails the decree as demonstrating party and state concern
for the collectives and individuals "who have made outstanding
contributions to the people and the country." The decree, NHAN DAN
says, "contributes toward motivating and mobilizing our armed forces
and people to strive to the best of their ability to overcome every
hardship and difficulty . . . ."
In acclaiming Vietnamese revolutionary heroism, the editorial recalls
that in the 22 years since President Ho launched the patriotic
emulation movement the state has cited 85 heroic units and 289 heroes
for outstanding achievements.
MOSCOW-PEKING POLEMIC ON VIETNAM POLICY
In his 5 February speech to the French CP Congress Kirilenko reiterated
that the USSR will give the Vietnamese people "the aid--and the scale
of aid--that the interests of their struggle demand." And in another
response to the denigration of Soviet support for the Vietnamese in the
3 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the VWP anniversary, Radio
Moscow on the 5th reviews for Chinese listeners the aid the USSR has
given the Vietnamese over the past years.
In LIFE ABROAD (No. 5, 30 January), Shchedrov interjects an attack on
Chinese obstructionism into a discussion of 50 years of Soviet-
Vietnamese relations. Shchedrov says that in making the decision to
attack the DRV the Americans took into account the PRC leadership's
"hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union," and he recalls that they
refused Soviet suggestions to create, "in acco,--dance with the DRV
Government's request," a "united front" for aiding Vietnam. Shchedrov
also points out that "1:e only land routes" from the USSR to the DRV
lie through Chinese territory. Although he does not explicitly charge
the Chinese with obstructing deliveries of aid, this is the first
known 9ovict allusion to the subject since last summer, when routine-
level radio commentaries occasionally referred to aid obstruction.
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Peking includes a criticism of the USSR in its only comment this week
on Vietnam, a 7 February NCNA summary of an attack on Vietnemization
in that day's issue of the Albanian paper BASHKIMI. Accusing the
Americans of trying to push the Vietnam issue into the "notorious
pitfall of 'peaceful settlement," it charges that in this connection
they have made use of the "counterrevolutionary stand of Soviet
revisionist social imperialism." The commentary also asserts that
through Vietnamization President Nixon is trying to draw in more ARVN
and "satellite" troops to gill the vacancies left by U.S. withdrawals,
and it concludes with the assertion that the Vietnamese know they can
defeat the United States only by fighting to the end.
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I AOS
NEUTRALIZATION OF PLAIN OF JARS REJECTED BY HANOI, PATHET LAO
Hanoi and the Pathet Lao promptly and authoritatively reject Souvanna
Phouma's proposal on the neutralization of the Plain of Jars, discussed
by him in a press interview on 31 January and officially proposed to
the DRV by foreign office representative IOzamphan Panya on 3 February.
HANOI A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman in a 6 February citatement
scores Souvanna Phouma's 31 January remarks on neutralization
without getting into details. It merely notes that he has made
neutralization of the Plain of Jars "a condition for cessation of U.S.
bombing of this area," and does not mention that a withdrawal of DRV
troops is involved. Neither does the statement acknowledge that the
proposal has been formalized. The DRV spokesman elaborates on the
alleged "intensified" U.S. aggression in Laos and demands that the
Americans end their aggression and bombing, allowing the Laotians to
settle their own affairs. And he assails President Nixon for making
"slanderous accusations of the DRV" in his 30 January press conference.
(In his press conference President Nixon had noted that there are 50,000
DRV troops in Laos.)
A Hanoi domestic service commentary acknowledges that Souvanna offered
to go to Hanoi to negotiate the neutralization, but fails to report
the proposal's substance, merely asserting that it is a "trick" to
"legalize" the U.S. and RLG "occupation" of the Plain of Jars, the
recovery" of which is the Laotian patriotic forces' "Just right."
Since August, says the commentary, the Vientiane troops have "illegally"
attacked and occupied the area and now are faced with the possibility
of defeat and retreat. It notes that since 5 February U.S. aircraft
have been used to airlift 20,000 residents out of the area. The commentary,
in pointing to intensified U.S. aggression, recalls that President Nixon,
in his press conferences of 26 September and 30 January, "although forced
to admit a very small part of U.S. military activities in Laos, slandered
the DRV."
A VNA report on the 10th also denounces the airlift of residents of the
Plain of Jars and recalls a UPI report that "the U.S. had advised
Vientiane "not to make any major military stand in the Plain because
the patriotic forces probably could defeat them." A 5 February Pathet
Lao news agency commentary had also briefly referred to the UPI report.
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PATHET LAO The Pathet Lao responded with an NLHX Central Committee
spokesman's statement dated the 5th which simi?,arly
calls the proposal a trick aimed at "slandering and vilifying the DRV
and hoodwinking public opinion" and at "legalizing" RLG attacks in the
Plain of Jars-Xieng I4zouang area, which is "an important stratL^-ie area
attached to the Laotian patriotic forces' free zone." The proposal,
says the statement, is an effort to "reject the NLHX'u right to retake
the area," although Vientiane had "reluctantly recognized the legal
status and role" of the NLHX and its "legitimate right to stay in the
Plain of Jars."
Unlike Hanoi, the NLHX does acknowledge in its statement thac the
proposal was formalized, noting that "some days ago the Vientiane
powerholders sent a letter concerning the problem to the DRV charge
d'affaires in Vientiane." A similar statement issued by th,9 PatriotIc
Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee dated 6 February is carried by the
Pathet Lao radio on the 8th, The statements do not acknowledge the
substance of the proposal, but they are preceded by a 5 February Pathet
Lao news agency commentary which points out that the agreement "would
involve a halt to U.S. bombing" of the re;;ion and placing it "under the
control of the two neutralist forces." The commentary does not, however,
acknowledge that the withdrawal of DRV troops is involved.
MOSCOW Moscow has not yet acknowledged the neutralization proposal,
but a number of current commentaries discuss the fighting
in the Plain of Jars area. An 8 February PRAVDA article by Shchedrov
expresses concern with the intensified operations since last September
and concludes that the "provocative acts by the American military
aggravated the situation in Laos and created a situation fraught with
dangerous aftermaths." He says that this "cannot but cause concern
of all those who are interested in the relaxation of international
tension and in the cessation of imperialist plunder by the United States
on the Indochinese peninsula." Some comment acknowledges the evacuation
of residents of the Plain of Jars, asserting that the United States intends
to move some 10-15,000 people from their homes to "strategic villages,"
eventually moving over 600,000 persons into such villages.
PEKING The only available reaction from Peking thus far is a
10 February NCNA report summarizing the statements of the
NLHX Central Committee spokesman and of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces
Alliance Committee.
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PATHET LAO, VIETNAMESE SCORE USE OF THAILAND IN LAOS WAR
An earlier flurry of official cothnent on Laos had been occasioned by an
NLHX Central Committee "memorandum" or. the use of the territory and
forces of Thailand by the United States in the war in Laos. Dated
13 January and carried by the Pathet Lao news agency an the 16th, the
memorandum reviews U.S. use of Thai air bases and Thai combat troops
in Laos and calls upon "all members of the 1962 Geneva conference on
Laos, especially the cochairmen," to take measures to force the U.S.
imperialists and their puppets to stop the war of aggression, first
and foremost ending the bombing, and allow the Laotian people to settle
their own affairs "on the basis of the 1962 Geneva agreement and the
concrete situation in Laos." Hanoi and the PRG offered the NLHX their
usual support with foreign ministry statements dated 29 and 30 January
respectively. The only available Moscow acknowledgement was a brief
TABS report of the DRV statement. On 21 January Peking's NCNA reported
the NIIHX memorandum, and on 8 February an NCNA commentary condemned the
"Bangkok reactionaries" for serving U.S. imperialism i:, its aggression
in Laos.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSOOW REJECTS "FALSE THEORY" OF MIDEAST BALANCE OF POWER
Soviet propaganda hews to established lines in calling for a political
settlement that revolves around the "key elem-)nt" of Israeli withdrawal;
Commentators express concern that the crisis may flare into a war
affecting not only the Middle East, an?i they deride the "balance of
forces" formula through which the United States, it is charged, intends
to increase arms deliveries to Israel. Soviet arms deliveries are
again defended as aid to the "victims of the aggression," and there
are referencca to "continuing" Soviet "all-round support" and assistance
to the Arabs,
Soviet comment on the 7-9 February conference in Cairo of the "frontline"
countries--the UAR, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Sudan--cites continuing
Israeli military actions, a Tsoppi commentary on the 10th branding
Israel the cause of all clashes along the cease-fire line. Terming
the conference a success, Moscow routinely underlines the importance
of Arab unity and coor& nation. An Arabic-language commentary on the
10th calls the conference communique of "special significance" in that
it points to "additional ways and means of struggle," adding that oil is
among the effective means of "strongly influencing" those who support
the "aggressors."
Concurrently, for the first time since October, there are specific
reaffirmations oL' Israel's right to exist--in foreign-language
commentaries by Tsoppi on 4 and 6 February and by Kt shnir on the 9th,
and in remarks, reported by TASS on the 4th, by the head of the Soviet
delegation to an international parliamentary conference in Cairo. TASS
quotes nim as saying that the only reliable way to solve the Middle East
crisis is through Israeli withdrawal and simultaneous recognition of the
rights of all Middle Eastern states, including Israel, to independent
national existence.
ARMAMENTS A Belyayev article in PRAVDA on the 7?th, asserting that
DELIVERIES President Nixon "has now stated that Tel Aviv has been
offered" more planes, says Washington considers that
"the 'balance of arms' in the Middle East has allegedly been violated"
and consequently has decided to increase its aid to the "aggressor."
On the 5th, in an Arabic-language commentary, Radio Moscow denounces
any "talk about the so-called balance of power" as a "terrible double-
cross and hypocrisy" and asserts that if the United States were really
interested in the balance of power in tha Middle East, it would have
ceased aid to Israel and "forced" it to withdraw. Unless this happens,
the commentary says, there is no ground for serious talk about any
balance of power.
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11 FEBRUARY 1970
Panelists in the 8 Febru,W Moscow domestic service commentators
roundtable assort that the decision to supply more fighter planes
to Israel was made last year, during Israeli Prime Minister Golda
Meir's visit to Washington. But "American propaganda," they say,
has portrayed the sale of more planes to Israel "almost as a reply"
to the French sale of Mirages to Libya, although the French agreement
"will only come into effect in 1972" while Israel will got its Phantoms
"immedi ately." Commentator Druzhinin observes that President Nixon,
in his 25 January message to fA conference of American Jewish leaders,
said the United States "is a%legedly concerned with the preservation
of the balance or equilibritim of forces" between the Arabs and Israel
(the President expressed preference for restraint in arms shipments
to the area); the balance-of-forces formula, Druzhinin says, is a
"kind of cover" for increased deliveries to Israel.
The roundtable commentators praise the "clear and precise" Soviet
proposals for a settlement. They single out Moscow's position on
withdrawal and termination of the state of war--as in the Tsoppi
commentary on the 6th--and note that the United States "insists that
the schedule and order" of troop withdrawal be decided during direct
Arab-Israeli talks, thus "putting the cart before the horse." The
"just" solution would be withdrawal to the pre-5 June 1967 lines, the
panelists conclude, while the U.S. proposals seek to let Israel "include
in its territory some of the land seized" in the June war.
FOUR-POWER There are suggestions, both in the roundtable discuss ion
CONSULTATIONS and in an Osipov IZVESTIYA article on the 7th, that
Moscow is interested in a continuation of the four-power
talks in New York. The roundtable panelists charge that thanks to U.S.
and other "imperialist" support, Israel "does not consider it necessary"
to carry out the November 1967 Security Council resolution. This
circumstance, they say, gives rise to "a whole range of problems that
could be solved with the help of the great powers," and "it is to this
end" that the talks are directed. According to Osipov, the situation
demands that "all governments interested in restoring a just peace in
the Middle East adopt the most urgent measures, including measures
within the framework of the consultations of the four great powers,"
to put an end to Israeli military actions and "compel" it to implement
the Security Council resolution.
Moscow has nevee acknowledged the Kosygin letters to the three Western
powers and their replies, although TASS on 6 February did report without
explanation that Kosygin had received the French and British ambassadors
separately. But the exchange is the subject of comment by Polish,
Hungarian, and Yugoslav media. The Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG
on the 5th calls the Kosygin message a warning to the United States and
an affirmation of solidarity with the Arabs; commentaries broadcast by
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Warsaw radio on the 5th and 6th point to a statement by thu Soviet
embassy in London as indicating that the Soviet Union regards the
situation as serious but believes it can be solved by political
means.
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WEST GERMANY
MOSCOW BREAKS SILENCE ON GROMYKO-BAHR DISCUSSIONS
Moscow's first direct acknowledgment of the preliminary negotiations
between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German State Secretary
Egon.Bahr comes in a foreign' ministry announcement carried by TASS
late on 10 February and broadcast to domestic listeners the next day.
The brief announcement notes only that "a number of meetings and
conversations" between the two have been held and that Bahr recently
arrived in Moscow "to take part in the exchange of opinions that
began earlier on matters of interest" to the two states. The announce-
ment thus implicitly refers, also for the first time, to the
exploratory talks held in early December between FRG Ambassador
Allat?dt and Grondko. It adds that the exchange of views is continuing.
The! West German DPA reports on the 10th that Gromyko became the first
Soviet foreign minister to visit the FRG Embassy in Moscow sinua 1955
when he spoke at a luncheon given by Ambassador Allardt for the
negotiating delegations. DPA adds that Gromyko stressed the "sincerity"
of the Soviet side in the talks, expressed hope that they would be
fruitful, and acknowledged "difficulties we must overcome." Soviet
media so far have not reported the luncheon.
Prior to the foreign ministry announcement there had been only two
Moscow references--both vague--to Soviet-FRG negotiations. A
25 December 1969 Moscow broadcast in Mandarin, reacting to Chinese
charges of a "sellout" of the GDR,* described "the negotiations
between the Soviet Union and the FRG in Moscow" as a "routine thing
following the birth of the new administration in Bonn." An even
vaguer reference appeared on 3 January 1970 in a Vasilyev review of
1969 political developments beamed to German listeners: In the
course of a recital of successes in Soviet foreign relations with
European countries, Vasilyev noted that "contacts were also establiehed
with the FRG."
USSR WARNS BONN AGAINST FURTHER 'ILLEGAL" BERLIN ACTIONS
Soviet propaganda protesting the West German parliamentary meetings
in West Berlin has dropped off sharply following the conclusion of the
meetings and the release of a 1 February statement from the Soviet
* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a discussion
of a new Peking attack on Moscow in connection with Soviet-West ^?erman
relations.
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embassy in the GDR. The embassy spokesman's statement, carried by
TABS, implicitly acknowledges Soviet-GDR responsibility for travel
"difficulties" from West Germany to West Berlin and warns of future
such difficultics if Bonn again holds West German Bundestag meetings
in Berlin.
Noting that the U.S., British, and French ambassadors to West Germany
had sent identical lettei,s to the Soviet embassy in the GDR expressing
"concern over the recent difficulties in civilian travel," the spokes-
man declares that "there would have been no corresponding reaction on
the part of 'the Soviet Union and the GDR" had there not been "continuing
provocative actions of the Bonn authorities" in West Berlin, particularly
the "recent unle.wful" sessions of Bundestag bodies there. "Proceeding
.from the known four-sided responsibility for West Berlin," the
spokesman says, "the Soviet side will further duly react to attempts
by Bonn authorities to spread unlawfully their competence to West Berlin."
A 1 February foreign-language commentary by Inev on the Berlin question
reaffirms Soviet readiness to negotiate on Berlin in standard terms:
"The Soviet Government has stated it is ready for an exchange of views
with its wartime allies c- how to prevent complications over West Berlin,
now and in the future." Inev adds that the USSR "would never agree
to any steps prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the GDR or
damaging to the special status of West Berlin." The "West Berlin"
question, he adds, must take into account "the interests of European
security."
MOSCOW DISAPPOINTED Wllh BRANDTIS -.IRST HUNDREP DAYS
Soviet commentators assess Chancellor Brandt's first 100 days in office
in tones of manifest disappointment. They suggest that Brandt still
has not found ways to implement his early promises that would be
acceptable to opposition "reactionaries," and they pointedly advise
Brandt to "pla'y,, both feet solidly on the ground of reality"--by
recognizing the GDR, for example--if he wishes to achieve a detente
with the socialist countries.
These views are summarized in a Melnikov article in the 27 January issue
of the journal NEW TIMES. Reflecting on Brandt's 14 January state of
the nation speech, Melnikov stresses the "many contradictions" in
Brandt's speech and laments that "every step in the direction of
realism is accompanied by such reservations that its value is in effect
? nullified." He refers to Brandt's recalcitrance on recognition of
the GDR and calls Brandt's January statement on a European security
conference "an outright departure" from his October position by its
linking of this question with the achievement of progress in inter-German
relations.
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11 FEBRUARY 1970
A 27 January Sakharov commentary, broadcast to German listeners, assails
Brandt for stressing in his January Bundestag speech that his government
is "aware of its strength" and "has good friends" in NATO. Sakharov
views these remarks as in contradiction to Brandt's avowals favoring
renunciation of force and detente with the East and compares the Brandt
regime to the p.re-Nazi Strcucmann regime in the Weimar Republic period.
On 11 February TASS summarizes a review of Brandt's first 100 days by
the West German communist paper UNSERE ZEIT, which concludes that this
period was notable for "further consolidation of the rightist and
extremist forces in the FRG" and that no far Brandt has made "no
cardinal changes" in FRG foreign or domestic policies.
NATURAL GAS DEAL SEEN AS BOON TO EAST-WEST DETENTE
TASS reports on 2 February the signs ; the preceding day in Essen,
West Germany, of a major 20-year agreement between West German firms
and Soviet foreign trade organizations whereby the Soviet Union will
supply natural gas to West Germany in exchange for large-diameter pipes
and West German credits to pay for the pipe and equipment.
Initial followup comment includes a 6 February Afonin commentary for
Japanese listeners which cites the Soviet-FRG deal as a good example
for forthcoming Soviet-Japanese trade talks. Afonin praises the agreement
as proof that the USSR and the Western powers can attain "great
achievements" in economic exchanges despite the different social
systems. He citez the recent Soviet signing of a similar gas agreement
with Italy as evidence that the USSR pursues a policy of peaceful
coexistence and reciprocal cooperation with nonsoci alist countries,
adding defensively--with recent Peking criticism of such deals
evidently in mind--that Lenin himself established this policy. Recall-
ing earlier Western efforts to bloc steel pipe exports to the USSR and
harm the Soviet economy, Afonin declares that the current agreements
demonstrate the "complete failure" of Western attempts to obstruct
Soviet economic development.
A 6 February SOCIALIST INDUSTRY article on the Soviet-FRG transaction
stresses that it shows the "utterly senseless" and hopeless nature of
the Western policy of embargo and trade restrictions against the
socialist countries. The agreement is also said to focus attention
on unused opportunities and potential reserves for developing USSR-FRG
trade and economic ties, which would "undoubtedly be a sizeable
contribution to the development and improvement of relations between
our countries."
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WARSAW CALLS FIRST TALKS WITH BONN "USEFUL. BUSINESSLIKE"
Polish media announce that the first "exchange of views" with West
Germany on "political subjects" on 5 and 6 February was "useful"
and proceeded in "a direct and businesslike manner." Warsaw's PAP
briefly chronicles each step of the first round in the Polish-West
German exchange without amplifying on the subjects discussed. It
notes in its 6 February report on conclusion of the first round of
talks that they will continue in Warsaw in the second week of March.
PAP also provides reportage on the participants from each side in
the individual sessions and notes the arrival and departure of FRG
spokesman Duckwitz. A ZYCIE WARSZAWY article on 3 February,
immediately prior to the talks, declined to restate Poland's views
at length, saying it is well known that definitive FRG recognition
of the Oder-Neisiie frontier remains Poland's primary aim.
While Soviet media so far have been eilent on the Polish talks with
the FRG, the East Berlin ADN reports the departure of the West German
delegation from Warsaw after the exchange of views. The East Berlin
radio had carried a lengthy summary of the 3 February ZYCIE WARSZAWY
article, prefacing it with references to "rather ambiguous statements"
by Bonn spokesmen and the "open aversion" to this dialog displayed by
the Kiesinger opposition.
Favorable Czechoslovak interest, arising from Prague's own declared
desire for negotiations with the Brandt government, is evident in a
5 February RUDE PRAVO comment summarized by CTK. The paper calls the
opening of the Warsaw talks a "success" for Polish policy and also
gives credit to the Brandt government for responding to Gomulka's
May 1969 initiative.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
11 FEBRUARY 1970
KIRLILENKO: MOSCOW SEEKS NORMALIZATION1 FIRM ON IIJEOLOGY
In the first Politburo-level comment on Sino-Soviet relations since
Brezhnev's conciliatory, guardedly optimistic remarks of 27 October,
echoed by Podgornyy on the October Revolution anniversary, Kirilenko's
speech to the French CP congress on 5 February reaffirms Soviet resolve
to persevere in the talks in Peking despite the polemical climate.
After a month of critical appraisals of PRC policies and rebuttals
of Chinese charges, the Soviet central press has initiated no new
commentaries on China for a week. The formulation of Moscow's policy
as combining efforts to restore links with the PRC and "a firm rebuff
to all possible provocations," contained in an AUCCTU plenum resolution
published on 29 January, is reiterated in a Komsomol plenum resolution
carried in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 5 February. Continuing low-level
polemics, including rejoinders to Peking's swipes at Soviet policies
on Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, are currently confined to the broadcasts
to China.
Published in the Soviet press on 6 February, Kirilenko's speech points
up a distinction between party and state relations. On the one hand,
it underscores the deep anxiety of the CPSU and other fraternal parties
over the Chinese leaders' policy and invokes the widespread criticism
of Peking at the June 1969 international party conference in this
connection. Kirilenko declares that the CPCU, like "other Marxist-
Leninist parties," cannot keep silent about the political and
ideological aims of the Peking rulers. He counterbalances this
notice of implacable ideological struggle with a reference to Soviet
governmental initiative in getting the border talks started and with
a pledge that Moscow will continue to seek normalized relations "between
the USSR and the PRC, to restore good neighborliness and friendship
bet:!een the Soviet and Chinese peoples," despite Peking's "malicious
anti-Soviet campaign" and fanning of a war psychosis.
Moscow uses the proxy of French CP Politburo member Georges Marchais
in an effort to garner international communist a:.pport in the
ideological struggle against Peking. A TASS report of Marchais' speech
to the French party congress--carried on the 5th in PRAVDA and in
briefer form in IZVESTIYA--notes Marchais' reference to the aid "the
Maoist line" is giving imperialism. The Soviet reports quote him as
saying the dispute is not one that pits the USSR against China or a
quarrel over some ".special 'interpretation' of Marxism," but a conflict
over "a policy that breaks with scientific socialism, a chauvinist-%
and adventuristic policy of splitting the communist movement and the
anti-imperialist forces." Marchais is quoted as recalling the Maoi'it
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leaders' "dangerous armed provocations on the Chinese-Soviet frontier
last year" but as expressing hope that the Peking talks--begun at
Soviet initiative--will bring positive results.
Complementing Kirilenko's reassertion of Moscow's desire to normalize
state relations, a commentary in Mandarin on 5 February reviews CPSU
initiatives over the past six years to improve Sino-Soviet relations
and places blame for the present situation on "the anti-Sovietism
adopted by the Chinese leadership in the 1960's,." In other Mandarin
broadcasts, particularly over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace
and Progress, Moscow again denies Chinese allegations about a Soviet
threat, insisting that the Soviet Union has never threatened and does
not intend to threaten or attack China. Typifying nostalgic appeals
to Chinese audiences, a Peace and Progress broadcast in Mongolian
on the 7th introduces a concert with an expression of hope that the
Inner Mongolian people will recall the traditional happy spring
festivals of "the old days."
PEKING AGAIN ATTACKS SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON GERMAN QUESTION OV
While refraining from a sustained polemical campaign against the
Soviets, Peking has again raised a sensitive issue in Moscow's
foreign affairs and has taken another shot at the Brezhnev leadership.
An NCNA report on 9 February details recent contacts between the
Soviets and West Germany to support a charge that Moscow is seeking
"a dirty deal" with Bonn and has tacitly consented to the annexation
of the GDL and West Berlin by West German "militarism." The report
concludes with an attack on "Brezhnev and his gang" as "despicable
renegades."
Since the opening of the Sino-Soviet talks Peking has avoided its
former attacks on Soviet domestic policies while choosing various
international issues on which to castigate the Kremlin leadership.
The German question has previously figured in a scathing attack at
the authoritative level of a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on
22 December. In more recent attacks, Peking on 30 January denounced
the Soviets for their behavior in Czechoslovakia and on 3 February
:.~cused them of selling out the Vietnamese, in each case asss.iling
Brezhnev by name,
Although maintaining a correct stance in not broaching the border
question while the talks are in progress, Peking has continued to
raise the spectre of a Soviet threat in its war preparedness campaign,
mainly in provincial and local media. Border tensions have been
reflected in current propaganda on the theme of army-people unity
during the spring festiva~. An NCNA report on 7 February recounts
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several heart-warming cases of mutual support between the frontier
guards and the populace in the Chenpao Island area, where "the Soviet
revisionist renegade clique last March flagrantly carried out an
armed intrusion" into China. The Chenpao incidents are also recalled
in an NCNA report on 9 February, describing activities of popular
support for the army in border areas around the country, which mentions
a combat hero who earned an award for "his exploits in battle" on the
island. On the same theme, an Urumchi broadcast on the 6th refers to
"crimes of Soviet revisionist social. imperialism" and cites demobilized
veterans along the Sinkiang frontier as promising to take an active
part in militia activities and to go to the frontline to wipe out any
invaders.
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SING - U, S, RELATIONS
PEKING DEPICTS UNITED STATES AS DECLINING POWER
President Nixon's State of, the Union address and subsequent messages to
Congress have occasioned a spate of PRC comment depicting the United
States as skidding irreversibly from positions of dominance after
World War II to a current state of crisis at home and diminishing power
abroad. As in comment last year during the period surrounding the
presidential inauguration and before the aborted session of the Warsaw
talks in February, Peking has studiously avoided foreclosing its
options toward the United States on fundamental issues directly affect-
ing Sino-U.S. relations. Against this background, Peking's portrayal
of the United States as encumbered by mounting liabilities suggests a
view that the Nixon Administration, while persisting in its
predecessors' aggressive intentions, is subject to powerful pressures
to accommodate itself to changing realities in which U.S. global
ambitions are vastly overextended and resources severely strained.
Peking's comment has been marked by a confidently mocking tone,
contrasting a formerly preeminent U.S. power basking in the "American
Century" with present cond"Ltions in which the President is constrained
to deliver low-key messages pervaded with a sense of decline and
trouble. There has been no authoritative editorial comment. The
material consists mainly of NCNA reports on various aspecte of the
President's messages plus comment carried in the "Worker-Peasant-Soldier
Battlefield" column of NCNA's domestic service--a column frequently
used as a channel for comment on the United States which is not
carried in NCNA's international service.
Following NCNA's 31 January commentary picturing the State of the
Union address as a confession that the sited States faces a "terrible
mess" at home and abroad, NCNA reports on 5 and 7 February discuss the
President's economic report and budget presented on the 2d. According
to NCNA, a new economic crisis is looming at a time when U.S. resources
are inadequate to meet the demands of American domestic and foreign
policies. Analyzing the budget, NCNA interprets the President's
reference to "difficult choices" in allocating resources as indicating
that the United States is locked in a series of dilemmas arising out
of conflicting desires to expand its military capabilities while
alleviating its economic woes. Despite these dilemmas, the agency adds,
the President "does not want to give up his ambition of aggression"
and has stressed that the United States wants to maintain sufficient
military power to meet its international commitments. NCNA also
observes that, the Administration intends to expand its nuclear force
and to engage in "nuclear blackmail." Peking has not mentioned China
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in discussing U.S. nuclear arms polic:,r and has not reported the
President's 30 January press conference in which he announced a new
phase in ABM construction as a defense against a PRC nuclear
capability.
Two articles in NCNA's "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Battlefield" column, on
3 and 7 February, are pegged to the President's State of the Union
address, The first article, claiming that the U.S. descent from its
postwar hegemony confirms a prediction by Mao in 1947 that American
might was only superficial and transitory, draws a picture of U.S.
political isolation, military defeat, and economic crisis. While
thus providing a picture which would serve to explain to the Chinese
people how Peking might now find it auspicious to negotiate with its
old adversary, NCNA also takes a, precautionary -linein-advising "all
revolutionary people" not to lower their vigilance and in repeating
the prominent slogan calling for preparations against any war of
aggression.
The 7 February article takes the President's enunciation of a "new
partnership concept" in U.S. relations with other countries as further
evidence of the decline of American power. The article describes
French and West German independence of U.S. policies in Europe, and
it echoes the 31 January NCNA English report on the State of the
Union address in expressing concern over Japan's role in the Administration's
new Asian policy and in noting the, President's hopes for "collusion with
social imperialism." Like the 31 January report, the article ignores
the Presiucnt's references to Vietnam and Sino-U.S. relations, though
it contains a passing mention of Vietnam as a battleground on which the
United States has been "badly beaten."
In contrast, NCNA on 1 March 1969, reporting the President's press
conference two days earlier, denounced the proposed ABM system for
having "its spearhead pointed at China." In that period, following
cancellation of the scheduled Warsaw session and at a time of Sino-Soviet
border clashes, Peking had shifted to a markedly tougher line reflecting
a view that the new Administration was implacably disposed toward the
PRC and was intent on improving relations with Moscow at Chinese
expense.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 FEBRUARY 1970
MOSCOW, PEKING DIFFER ON MOTIVE FOR ANTI- MARCOS RIOTS
In a moderate volume of comment, Moscow and Peking provide differing
propaganda interpretations of the anti-Marcos demonstrations in the
Philippines.
Peking sees "a gigantic wave of demonstrations" directed against "U;BS.
imperialism and its Philippine agents." The "Philippine authorities"
are said to be acting under American orders to persecute the people.
But the people, Peking assures its listeners, "will certainly break
everything shackling them and advance rapidly toward liberation."
Moscow differentiates between current demonstrations and those of a
few weeks ago. Where previously student unrest had been "definitely"
anti-American, Moscow declares, now it is directed against the Marcos
government., Citing the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Moscow explains
that the shift can be ascribed to CIA takeover of student organizations
and a planned effort to turn the youth against the government. The CIA,
it is said, wants the "too independent" Marcos rc.,aoved from power and
replaced by a more pliable regime.
Earlier Moscow articles accused the CIA of interfering in the Philippine
elections to prevent a Marcos victory, and the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC
REVIEW charge of CIA infiltration into youth groups was aired in a
16 December 1969 SOVIET RUSSIA article. A 28 January IZVESTIYA article
reviewed Marcos' program for the Philippines, noting his intention
to reconsider "inequitable" agreements with the United States and his
desire to develop relations with socialist countries. IZVESTIYA concluded
that Marcos' program "to a certain degree" reflected the dosire of the
people to rid themselves of American control.
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WARSAW PACT
MOSCOW DENIES TIGHTENING PACT INTEGRATION; CEAUSESCU DEFIANT
An article in the 5 February RED STAR dismisses as a "canard" alleged
Western insinuations that an article in that paper some two works
earlier, by Shtemenko, had spelled out ri.dical changes in the direction
of tightening up the integration of the Pact joint forces since the
March 1969 Budapest Pact summit meeting. Also on the 5th, Ceausescu
assured a Bucharest audience that the Romanian armed forces would be
commanded by no one but the Romanians themselves. Both these develop-
ments occurred as Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was winding up a
four-day visit to Czechoslovakia--preceded and followed by vtsits
to the GDR and Poland, respectively.
SHTEMENKO In the 24 January RED STAR, Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff
ARTICLE Shtemenko had followed up a reference to the "very
important decisions" taken at Budapest with the statement
that the Pact member states "now possess not only first-class national
armies" but "have created mighty joint armed forces," imbued with
Leninist "socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism."
In Moscow's most explicit terms on this score since the start of the
seven-year feud with the Romanians, he went on to say that "allocated
to them from the national armies, by the decisions of their governments,
are formations and units and also control and rear organs." Further
strengthening the implication of recent innovations, Shtemenko added
that the joint forces "now include ground forces, air and naval forces,
and also air defense forces," with the socialist community's security
gaarded by "the nuclear missile might of the Soviet Union's armed
forces"
Repeatedly mentioning "allocated" troops, he stressed that while their
"daily" training is planned by the national commands, their "Joint
operations"--exercises and maneuvers--are carried out "according to
the plans of the joint command." Reasserting the "great importance" of
"further improving the mechanism" of the Pact, Shtemenko noted, as
Soviet propaganda had done before, that the Budapest decision on
establishing a "committee of defense ministers" had already been
implemented.
LEONTYEV The briefer article by Col. A. Leontyev in the 5 February
ARTICLE RED STAR, entitled "The Story of a 'Canard,'" is
vitriolic in rejec,.ing alleged Western insinuations that the
newly integrated Pact forces are to be used not only within but also
"beyond" the socialist camp. Leontyev describes the "canard" as designed
by NATO circles to throw a scare into NATO dissidents, to bring France
back into the fold and to "take Canada and other partners in hand."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBI0 TItENDJ
11 FEBHUABY 1970
Taking umbrage at such efforts to "besmirch the Soviet Union" and not
it at odds with the other Pact momboro, Loontyev denies that Shtemenko'a
article had said the combined armed forces were formed during the
Budapest conference. "Everybody known ," he says, that these forces
were formed "after the signing of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955." lie
adds that this in not merely "a alight error" by Western news common-
tatora and mi'_ttary experts, but a calculated implication that the
combined forces are to be used for a new episode like events in
Czechoslovakia," for "invading the European socialist countries,"
SPEECH BY In apparent response to Shtemenko's article, aomania's
CEAUSESCU Ceausescu registered new defiance of Soviet pressures in
a Bucharest speech to basic cadres of the Romanian armed
forces, also on the 5th. AOERPRES summarized the speech at length, and
SCINTEIA published it in full on the 6th. The speech came the day after
the 22d anniversary of the still unrenewed 20-year Soviet-Romanian friend-
ship treaty--observed in pro forma fashion by Moscow and Bucharest--and
three days after the appearance of an article in the February LUPTA DE
CLASA vigorously defending Romania's right to "economic and political
autonomy."*
While duly noting that "in a possible war Romania will not fight alone"
and that "we are members of the Warsaw Treaty," Ceausescu stressed
repeatedly--as he had done in the past more specifically with regard to
economic integration in CEMA--that the Romanians would carry out "the
spirit of the Budapest agreements" by cooperating not only with the other
Pact members but with "the armies of all the socialist countries." He
thus seemed in effect to rule out any use of his country's forces again3t
China, Albania, or Yugoslavia and at the same time to convey a low-key
reminder that Romania has socialist friends outside the Pact.
To long applause, according to SCINTEIA, Ceausescu went on to declare
that "the sole leader of our armed forces is the party, the government,
the supreme national command," and "only they can give orders to our
army; only these orders can be carried out in the Socialist Republic
of Romanial" He coupled an acknowledgment of the "obligations" to take
part in joint training with the Pact allies, in accordance with proletarian
internationalism, with an assertion that "our army has everything it needs
to always fulfill its duties to the people" as well as to "our allies and
friends in the fraternal socialist countries." The Romanian army, he
declared, "will always be at its post-,"and "if the need arises it will
perform its duty to the full."
* Discussed in the I February issue of the TRENDS.
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