TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010045-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: December 15, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIII~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~I
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
15 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 50)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is.based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published.
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, section 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amende . Its
transmission or revelation of its contents ti,
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
G*OUP I
be4,ded be. tu,sey&
dewe.,ei..1 ud
deelusweeliee
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15 DECEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
4
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Moscow Defends Policy as Peking Pc--trays Soviet Isolation . . .
I
Moscow Insists on Political Settlement in East Pakistan . . . .
2
Peking Sees Soviets, Indians in "Unprecedented Isolation" . . .
6
Paris Talks: U.S. Call for Postponement Labelled "Sabotage" .
9
DRV Spokesman Scores U..S. Air Strikes, Lauds Downing of Plane .
11
DRV Party Issues Instruction on Celebration of Anniversaries .
12
Vietnam Fatherland Front Holds First Congress in Ten Years . .
13
Cambodia: Victories Claimed Over ARVN, Phnom Penh Forces . . .
15
Asian Unity Stressed During Cambodian Visit to DPRK . . . . . .
16
Pyongyang Denounces ROK's State of Emergency Proclamation . . .
18
Kim Il-song Lends Personal Touch in Editing KCNA Items . . . .
22
Model Opera May Be Target of Article in RED FLAG . . . . . . .
23
Furge of Croatian Party Leaders Sparks New Zagreb Disorders . .
26
Party Strengthens Liberal image, Stresses Loyalty to Moscow . .
30
Warsaw-Bonn Pact Called "Chapter" of "Peace Treaty" . . . . . .
33
Poland Reacts to FRG Charges on German Resettlement Issue . . .
34
NATO COUNCIL SESSION
USSR in Stereotyped Attack Decries "Cold War" Philosophy . . .
37
MIDDLE EACT
Moscow Assails Israeli, U.S., Chinese Stards on Mideast . . . .
39
avW! P81 cleaP_@rW03M/22 : CIA-RDP85TOA875RU003OO&10046-5 ? .
41
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
15 DECEMBER 1971
Moscow (2804 items)
Peking (1655 items)
Polish Party Congress
(1%)
16%
India-Pakistan Conflict
(17%)
60%
[Brezhnev Speeches
(--)
9%]
Domestic Issues
(27%)
14%
India-Pakistan Conflic
t (3%)
12%*
Indochina
(11%)
7%
China
(6%)
9%*
[Cambcdia
(47)
6%]
Mars 2 & 3 Probes
(2%)
7%
Middle East
(5)
3%
Yemeni President in
(--)
3%
PRC-Senegal Diplomatic
(--)
3%
USSR
European Security
M)
3%
Relations Established
F.OK Declaration of
(--)
2%
Kosygin in Norway
(0.1%)
3%
National Emergency
Indochina
(3%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the pronaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the
Indo-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are counted in the
figure on India-Pakistan and amount to roughly a third of the
total on the conflict.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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15 DECEMBER 1971
INDIA-PAKISTAN
MOSCCW DEFENDS POLICY AS PEKING PORTRAYS SOVIET ISOLATION
Reacting to the political isolation reflected in its resounding
defeat on a UN General Assembly vote, Moscow markedly stepped up
efforts to defend its policy on the Indian-Pakistani conflict
and to counter Peking's polemical thrusts by charging the
Chinese with betraying the national liberation movement..
Moscow's intensified propaganda campaign coincided with new
consultations with the Indians and followed a possible top-
level Soviet review of policy to prepare for the next stage
of developments.
The Chinese in the meantime have greatly reduced their propaganda
attention to the conflict from the extraordinary level reached
during the period of three successive PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
articles from 6 to 8 December. In effect minimizing their stake
in the conflict while seeking to capitalize on Moscow's relative
isolation in the international community on this issue, the
Chinese have focused on the United Nations as a means of
bringing pressure in Pakistan's behalf. Significantly, the
most authoritative Peking comment in the past week, a speech
by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on 9 December and a
Commentator article on the 10th, directed attention to the
United Nations and called for Indian compliance with the U14GA
resolution.
The positions taken by Moscow and Peking represent the reverse
in certain respects of their respective stands at the time of
the 1965 Indian-Pakistani war. In 1965 the Soviet Union, not
the PRC, applauded the ceasefire and withdrawal proposals
sponsored by the United Nations; China, not the Soviet Union,
invoked the revolutionary rights of oppressed peoples to fight
for national self-determination (in Kashmir); and Moscow sought
to assume a neutral posture and to play a mediatory role. In
both 1965 and this year, Moscow's major moves took the form of
TASS statements and messages from the Soviet leaders. Moscow's
efforts in 1965 culminated the following January with the
Tashkent meeting mediated by Premier Kosygin.
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With the signing of a "friendship" treaty with India last August,
Moscow discarded efforts made earlier in the year to sustain a
neutral stance in the evolving conflict. Moscow his taken care,
however, to avoid citing the treaty--termed "a military
alliance" by Peking--in defining its interests in the present
situation, a reticence in accord with its demand that there
be no outside involvement in the conflict.
While Peking has bitterly decried Moscow's geopolitical interests
in the current conflict, the Chinese involvement in_the 1965 war
took a more authoritative and direct form. On 7 September 1965,
the day after open warfare erupted, the PRC issued a government
statement calling Indian actions "a grave threat to peace in
this part of Asia" and warning that "India's aggression against
any one of its neighbors concerns all of its neighbors." Citing
an alleged threat to Chinese territory along the PRC-Sikkim
border, the statement said the PRC Government was closely
following "the development of India's act of aggression" and
would strengthen its defenses. A series of foreign ministry
notes pressing charges regarding border violations included
an ultimatum demanding that India dismantle certain installa-
tions. In the current conflict, however, Peking has not reported
any official government statements or notes nor publicized any
diversionary moves against India.
MOSCOW INSISTS ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN EAST PAKIST"N
After offering little comment for several days after the intensifica-
tion of Indian-Pakistani hostilities on 3 Decemb~-:?, the Soviet
press since 9 December has carried a stream of co:nmsnteries
defending 11'oviet policy in great detail, charging Sino-U.S.
collusion, and edging ever closer to acknowledgment of Bangla
Desh as a government separate from Pakistan. Articles in
PRAVDA by senior Soviet commentators Mayevskiy (on the 9th) and
Zhukov (on tha 10th), both transmitted textual?.) by TASS, were
followed by thematically similar articles in 1'VESTIYA, RED STAR:,
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and TRUD crer the next se,.-era:. days.
This spate of press comment followed a possib".e top-Laval
assessment and formulation of Soviet policy at the present
juncture* and coincided with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov's departure for Delhi and the arrival in Moscow of an
Indian foreign affairs official. Consistent with ';,:,,,.s
current practice, Soviet reports or: these consult.t_ons did
* Brezhnev's apparent absence from the Polish party co.:gre~:I -
proceedings he was attending, giving rise to speculat !on than.
he was conferring on South Asia, is documented in the TRENDS
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not acknowledge that they were pursuant to provisions of the
Soviet-Indian treaty.
Also at this time, Afghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir.Shah
arrived in Moscow on 13 December for a previously unannounced
"unofficial friendly visit"--he was in Moscow only three months
ago for a five-day official visit--and immediately conferred
with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin on "the key problems of
the international situation, including the developments in the
Hindustan subcontinent." At a dinner for the king on the 13th,
Podgornyy noted the mutual concern of their two countries "in
direct proximity of the areas of the present conflicts" and
expressed pleasure "that Afghanistan displays a level-headed
and reasonable approach to the solution of complex international
questions, a striving for a political settlement of problems
arising in the Asian continent." In his reply, the Afghan
king thanked "our Soviet friends" for their understanding of
Afghanistan's concern "over tha sanguinary events and crisis
in the Hindustan subcontinent." The king arrived home on the
14th, the same day that Delhi radio reported "a recent
statement" by the Afghan prime minister expressing Afghanistan's
"full sympathy for the refugees and afflicted people of Bangla
Desh."
POLITICAL The principal press commentaries have repeatedly
SETTLEMENT and painstakingly detailed the historical back-
ground of the Indian-Pakistani conflict in an
effort to defend Moscow's stand in the wake of the overwhelming
UNGA vote llf4-11) on 7 December calling for a cease-fire and
withdrawal. The long-standing Soviet demand that the Pakistani
Government take "effective actions" with the aim of a political
settlement in East Pakistan, "immediately recognizing the will
of the population of East Pakistan that found expression during
the elections in December 1970," has been coupled with a call
for "all parties concerned" to cease all military actions
immediately. These two points are "inseparably connected,"
Soviet conanentators stress.
Defending the Soviet position, PRAVDA commentator Mayevskiy on
9 December a.serted that the original sin was that of "British
imperialism" while the "main reason" for the current conflict
was the actions of the Pakistani Government. Mayevskiy charged
U.S.-Chinese collusion at the United Nations in favor of steps
which would mean "perpetuation" of the conflict and would
"sidestep the main question--that of the position of millions
of people of East Pakistan."
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Noting that "a number of the UN members try to separate the
question about the ceasefire in Hindustan from the need for a
political settlement," Mayevskiy declared that "these two
questions form a single whole." In a similar vein, Zhukov
wrote the next day that although many UN delegates "voted with
the best of inter.tions" for the ceasefire resolution, the "hysteria
and misinformation that are being artificially whipped up in
the lobbies and in the hall of the UN" caused them to overlook
the fact that the resolution "actually contained the seeds of
further aggravation of the conflict by saying nothing about a
political settlement of the crisis in East Pakistan." Likewise,
Kudryavtsev in the 12 December IZVESTIYA declared that "the
question of an end to military operations cannot be separated
from that of a political settlement in East Pakistan," adding
that "the weakness of- the UN resolution" lies in seeking to
resolve "the first question while brushing the second aside."
Supporting the Soviet contention that a political settlement in
the East favorable to the Bengali population would alleviate
Indian-Pakistani tensions, TASS on 1C December cited a Press
Trust of India repc;:t that "the first groups of refugees are
beginning to return home in connection with the liberation of
East Pakistani villages and cities from West Pakistani troops."
And TASS in its own report from Delhi on 13 December cited a
plan for "the repatriation of East Bengali citizens" v. "the
liberated districts of East Bengal."
BANGLA DES,I While Moscow has given no formal indication
that it is prepared to follow India's lead in
recognizing the Bangla Desh regime, Soviet comment is not
averse to referring to the "government" of BanglaDesh.
Thus, both Mayevskiy and Kudryavtsev, in explaining the
development of the "national liberation movement" in East
Pakistan, noted that "the government of Bangla Desh emerged,"
and a participant in the 12 December Moscow radio observers'
roundtable program commented on the U.S. desire to suppress
the "liberation movement" by the people "of the state of
Bangla Desh." TASS on 15 December cited an ADN interview
with Abu Said Choudhury, "head of the delegation sent by the
Bangla Desh Government to the UN," for the Bangla Desh
Government's "main prerequisites" for the restoration of
peace in the region: "withdrawal of the Pakistani Army rom
the Bangla Desh territory, recognition of the Government of
Bangla Desh, and release of Sheik Mujibur Rahman." Similarly,
Soviet media have recently referred to "Bengalis" and "East
Bengal"rather than "East Pakistanis" and "East Pakistan" when
discussing the eastern wing of Pakistan.
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U.S., PRC ROLE While elaborately defending the Soviet stand,
Moscow has repeatedly attacked "Washington's
one-sided position" on the Indian-Pakistani conflict and "the
clearly 'anti-Indian line' followed by American officials."
Besides reporting mass anti-U.S. demonstrations in iedia and
domestic U.S. opposition--including press comment and
statements by Congressional leaders--to the Administration's
"allegedly 'neutral' policy," Moscow has sought to document a
pro-Pakistani bias on the part of Washington and has charged
the Administration with exerting economic and military pressure
on India. Thus, TASS reported from Washington on the 14th that
the United States "is making new efforts to assist Pakistani
authorities in the war against India," citing a Washington
POST report that a special White House group under Kissinger
"has been instructed to explore ways of assistance to Pakistan."
Moscow has taken particular note of the movement of U.S. Seventh
Fleet ships into the Bay of Bengal, characterizing this as "gross
blackmail" and "psychological pressure" on India. Dismissing
the "pretext" that they are being sent to insure "the so-called
evacuati(n of American and other foreign nationals from East
Pakistan," Moscow radio on the 14th pointed out that the U.S.
aircraft carrier Enterprise--among the ships approaching the
crisis area--has on board Phamtom fighters "that have taken
part in raids on Vietnam and Laos."
Thus far Soviet media have not mentioned Western news reports,
publicized by Delhi radio on the 15th, that President Nixon
has threatened to cancel his proposed visit to Moscow next
May unless the Soviet Government "changes its stand" on the
crisis "within the next few days." On L'?e other hand, Moscow
has sought to play on the theme of Gino-U.S. collusion by
taking note of Pakistan's role in connection with the President's
forthcoming visit to China. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article by
Yefremov on the 12th noted that Kissinger "made his secret
flight to Peking" from Pakistan, adding that Pakistani leaders
consider "they have a right to count on the special gratitude
of both Peking and Washington for Pakistan's participation in
their first political contacts." Also along this line both
Zhukov and a participant in the 12 December observers' round-
table program wryly noted that Pakistani President Yahya Khan
had recently invited President Nixon to visit Pakistan on his
way to Peking or on his return trip from China.
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Similarly, Soviet comment on UN deliberations on the Indian-
Pakistani question has taken pains to portray.Sino-U.S.
collusion in obtaining UN action favorable to Pakistan and
ignoring the realities of the political situation on the
subcontinent:. Commentator Nikitin, in TRUD on 12 December,
stated that "it is no accident that in the first voting in
the UN Security Council with the PRC participating the Peking
delegate was in the same camp as the U.S. delegate." Contending
that the Chinese have "betrayed the cause of the national
liberation struggle," Atlivannikov in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
on 11 December sought to score points in the third world by
observing that the first PRC veto in the UN, used to reject
a Soviet resolution, "has aroused profound indignation not
only in Delhi but also in the capitals of other developing
countries, among whom Peking claims 'special authority."'
Besides depicting Sine-U.S. collusion, Moscow's attack on
Peking's role in the South Asian conflict has hit hard at what
Moscow terms the Chinese "betrayal of the national liberation
movement" in East Bengal. Moscow has repeatedly charged,
particularly in Mandarin broadcasts to Chinese listeners,
that Peking media have igncred the mass repression of civil
rights in East Pakistan by the Pakistani authorities. According
to PRAVDA's Mayevskiy, Peking has followed a two-faced policy
toward the events of the subcontinent, "advocating 'people's
war"' in East Pakistan while concurrently "advertising its
support for the mili'sry regime in Pakistan, striving to turn
it into an instrument of its chauvinist, great-power course in
Asia." TASS commentator Kharkov on 13 December said "the
present struggle of the population of East Pakistan has all
the features of a national liberation movement of a people
agr.,?nst its oppressors." He wcrt on to argue that in opposing
this movement the Peking leaders demonstrated that they are
"absot4*ely indifferent to the fates of the oppressed peoples"
and are "worrying only about subjugating to their hegemony
the national liberation movements." Nikitin in TRUD on
12 December concluded that the policy of the "Maoists" in
Hindustan is that or "setting Asians on Asians and fulfilling
the main thesis of the 'Nixon doctrine."'
PEKING SEES SOVIETS. INDIANS IN "UNPRECEDENTED ISOLATION"
In a situation in which its client is suffering military
reversals but in which the Chinesa are notably loathe to
increase their commitment in the conflict, Peking has .
directed attention to the United Nations in sr effort to
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bring pressure on India and the Soviet Union to end the fighting.
Thus, both the 10 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--
the most recent comment on this level--and Chi Peng-fei's
speech on the 9th focused on the UNGA resolution calling for a
ceasefire and withdrawal. Sounding a major theme in Peking's
comment, Chi declared at a Tanzanian embassy reception that
the UNGA vote "has landed social imperialism and Indian
expansionism in unprecedented isolation."
Both Chi and Commentator lectured India on the wisdom of
complying with the majority will of the world body. Chi
advised India that "it had better honestly accept the resolu-
tion" and "not alienate itself from the people of the world."
The Commentator article, entitled "Just Cause Enjoys Abundant
Support While Unjust Cause Finds Little Support," warned "the
Indian expansionists to sober down and carry out honestly the
resolution." Acknowledging that Pakistan has met with "some
temporary difficulties," Commentator found solace in the fact
that Peking's friend "is winning more and more extensive sympathy
and support." As for Peking's support, Commentator did not go
beyond affirming that the Chinese Government and people "will
resolutely carry out our duties inside and outside the.United
Nations" in supporting Pakistan's efforts to defend its "national
sovereignty and territorial integrity." Peking's obligations
were not specified.
An NCNA dispatch disseminated on 15 December, reporting the
renewal of Security Counci. consideration of the conflict at
the request of U.S. representative Bush, denounced Moscow for
"abusing" its veto power by once again vetoing a resolution
calling for an immediate ceasefire. NCNA duly noted that the
United States presented the resolution and that the PRC voted
for it, though the dispatch also cited the Chinese-delegate's
reservations concerning this "highly unsatisfactory" resolution.
SUPERPOWER Apart from reporting diplomatic moves. in the
POLITICS United Nations, Peking has largely ignored the
U.S. position in the South Asian conflict.
However, there have been occasional references to the United
States--identified only as "another superpower"--in the context
of discussions of the Soviet Union's geopolitical interests in
the area. According to Peking, Moscow's aim in aiding India is
to gain control over the entire subcontinent and the Indian
Ocean in order "to contend with another superpower for world
hegemony."
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The reference to Soviet-U.S. rivalry is a variation on Peking's
standard formula on "collusion and contention" between the two
superpowers. Variaticns on this formula, turning on the relative
weight placed on the collusive and contentious elements, have
been a significant indicator of Peking's policies toward the
superpowers. Where Peking perceives a relative dominance of
contentious elements, it takes a more flexible line toward one
of the superpower rivals in order to maneuver between them.
But in situations in which Peking portrays a Soviet-U.S.
convergence of interests--as in the middle of 1969 when Peking
said the two superpowers were Jointly engaged in encircling
the PRC--the Chinese are inclined to take a hard line toward
both Moscow and Washington.*
Some of the themes in the Sino-Soviet border conflict have
appeared in Peking's attacks on Moscow's geopolitical interests
in South Asia. Thus, Huang Hua, addressing the Security Council
on the 6th, said one of the Soviet aims is to encircle China
and to establish "a great empire which the old tsars craved
after but were unable to realize, a great empire controlling
the whole Eurasian continent." An NCNA report on the 11th,
detailing the history of Soviet aid to India, recalled the
1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes in charging that India at
that time had made "unbridled attacks" on China in coordina-
tion with the Soviets. The Sino-Soviet border also figured
in an Albanian article on the Indian-Pakistani conflict which
NCNA summarized on the 10th. NCNA quoted the article as saying
the Soviets seek to create tension along China's southern
border in order to encircle China with a ring of fire "not
only from the north but also from the south."
Consistent with its references only to Soviet-U.S. contention
and not to collusion, Peking's charges of Soviet encirclement
have not accused the United States of abetting the Soviet
effort.
* During the same recent period that PRC delegates were
referring to Soviet-U.S. contention for hegemony in connection
with South Asia, Chiao Kuan-hua's address to the UNGA on the
Middle East question said "the two superpowers are contending
and colluding with each other" in that area.
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INDOCHINA
Ambassador Porter's proposal at the Paris talks on 9 December that
the next session be held on the 23d instead of the 16th is
assailed in a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 12th--the first
comment on the tal's since a 21 Septembcr NHAN DAN article
complained that Potter's taking over as delegation head had not
improved the prospects for progress. Commentator say.: the
Ambassador's explanation that he was suggesting a postponement
because the communist delegates had not replied to U.S.
proposals was merely another attempt to avoid responding to the
PRG's seven-point proposal.
A DRV Party Secretariat instruction on celebration of the
December anniversaries--"Resistance Day," the founding of the
NFLSV, and DRV Army Day--echoes recent propaganda in its
confident evaluation of the military situation. T?ius, claiming
that the Indochinese people have achieved "very big victories':
and are "facing bright prospects," it says that the Nixon
Doctrine and Vietnamization have "sustained heavy setbacks and
are heading toward .total bankruptcy."
Vietnamese communist media report the convening on 14 December
of the Third Congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front--the first
congress in 10 years. The decision to hold it some time in 1971
was taken at the 21st enlarged session of the Front Central
Committee on 5-6 March this year. Truong Chinh addressed the
congress, and Hoang Quoc Viet delivered the political report.
Peking support of the Vietnamese is again voiced in an NCNA
report of a 13 December banquet hosted by the PRC Ambassador for
Pham Van Dong upon his return from his visit to China--protocol
consistent with that following Chou En-lai's Hanoi visit last
March. According to the NCNA summary the PRC ambassador praisEL
the visit as a new contribution to the "great friendship and
militant unity" of the two countries. Reminding the Chinese of
Vietnam's vanguard role, Pham Van Dong said the Vietnamese are
keenly aware that their fight "is an important and direct
contribution to the weakening of U.S. imperialism" which creates
favorable conditions for all revolutionary causes. Inexplicably,
VNA has not yet reported the banquet.
PARIS TALKS: U,S, CALL FOR POSTPONEMENT LABELLED "SABOTAGE"
Ambassador Porter's proposal that the Paris talks be suspended--
as he put it, to give the communists time "to develop a
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15 DECEMBER 1971
constructive approach" and to allow "communication with
leaders in Hanoi"--prompted the first substantial Front as
well as Hanoi comment on the talks in almost three months.*
The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 12th was followed
by an LPA commentary on the 13th. And in addition to the
criticism of Porter's postponement suggestion by the delegates
at the session on the 9th, Xuan Thuy assailed it in a message
reporting on the Paris talks to the Third Congress of the
Vietnam Fa_herland Front currently meeting in Hanoi. Thuy's
message was transmitted to Hanoi via VNA's service channel
but at this writing has not been carried in DRV media.
The VNA account of the Paris session on the 9th totally
obscured Porter's explanation of his call for postponement:
It said only that the U.S. delegate "proposed to postpone
the 139th session to December 23 under the pretext that it is
unnecessary to meet on December 16." The NHAN DAN Commentator
article, carried by VNA and Har.3i radio, purported to
acknowledge Porter's reasoning when it represented him as
having asked for the suspension "because the Vietnamese
delegates did not reply to the U.S. proposals." Thus glossing
over details of the Ambassador's remarks, the article
concentrated on Xuan Thuy's rebuttal, saying he "pointed out
that the 'proposals' to which Porter requested a reply were
old ones: The problem of 'cease-fire' while the U.S.
expeditionary troops continue occupying South Vietnam, the
'prisoner-of-war' problem-which the United States has used
to fool public opinion, and the problem of maintaining
Thieu . . . ." Commentator observed that these "proposals"
advanced by the President in October 1970 "have been exposed
and rejected by the Vietnamese people and world opinion."
The LPA commentary ignored Porter's statement when it said
that "in an attempt to make black white, the U.S. chief
delegate propcsed to postpone the next. plenary session :'to
December 23." The LPA commentary, which was also carried by
VNA,' echoed NHAN DAN in ridiculing "Nixon's worn-out 'on-the--
spot cease-fire' proposal which has already been rejected."
LPA said it was ridiculous to resort to tortuous arguments to
* The 21 September NHAN DAN Commentator article, which
charged that neither the replacement of Bruce by Porter nor
recent statements by the-President had indicated any change
in the U.S. attitude, is discussed in the TRENDS of
22 September 1971, pages 1-3.
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avoid answering the "logical" PRG proposal, and NHAN DAN's
Commentator observed that the PRG proposals "put forward a
correct solution to the problems of general concern,
including a cease-fire and the release of captured U.S.
military men."
NHAN DAN's Commentator was again critical of President Nixon's
12 November press conference remarks, saying he "brazenly
declared" that he would"continue the 'Vietnamization of the
war' plan and maintain the Saigon puppet administration."
But it was left to the LPA commentary to go into the
"contradictions" between Vietnamization and negotiations.
LPA, like Xuan Thuy at the session on the 9th, said that
these are "two contradictory" policies. The commentary
observed that "as the American press has put it,
Vietnamization of the war and negotiations are two
contradictory points in Nixon's policy, and since such
contradiction has not yet been solved, he is finding himself
in an impasse." The VNA account quoted Xuan Thuy as asking
at the Paris session: "Since from a policy point of view,
Vietnamization means prolonging and expanding the war, how
can it get along with serious negotiations on the settlement
of the Vietnam issue?"
The NHAN DAN Commentator article took the same tuck as the
one of 21 September in insisting that the Nixon Administration
has consistently sabotaged the Paris talks. Thus, Commentator
now recalled than in 1970 the Administration had "for months"
refused to appoint a chief delegate and remarked that when
Bruce was finally appointed he came with an empty suitcase.
Commentator concluded that "on Nixon's orders" Porter has now
"openly sabotaged" the Paris talks.
DRV SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S, AIR STRIKES, LAUDS DOWNING OF PLANE
In the latest of Hanoi's continuing series of protests, the DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman on 11 December charged that U.S.
aircraft had struck at a number of places in Quang Binh and
Ha Tinh provinces on the 10th, and at Huong Lap village in the
demilitarized zone "belonging to the DRV" from the 6th to the
10th. Claiming that the attacks caused "losses in lives and
property," the spokesman "severely condemned U.S. war acts"
and demanded an end to all acts of encroachment upon the DRV's
sovereignty and security.
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Prior to the release of the protest, Hanoi radio on the 10th
had reported the downing of an F-4 that day, bringing Hanoi's
total of claimed downed planes to 3,403. And the foreign
ministry spokesman's statement said that the "U.S. aggressors
had been duly punished" by the downing of a plane by the
"armed forces and people of Quang Binh." The broadcast on
the 10th recalled Hanoi's claim that two U.S. planes were
downed last month in Dghe An.* Hanoi has of course made no
reference to the massive rescue attempt involving more than
40 aircraft which rescued the injured pilot of the downed
plane. Neither has it mentioned a missing second crewman.
DRV PARTY ISSUES INSTRUCTION ON CELEBRATION OF ANNIVERSARIES
Hanoi media on 12 Decembcc publicized an instruction issued the
previous day by the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat on
the celebration of three upcoming anniversaries: Resistance
Day on 19 December, the 20 December anniversary of the founding
of the NFLSV, and DRV Army (VPA) Day on 22 December. A
similar instruction was issued by the Secretariat on
6 December 1969, but none appeared last year. Propaganda on
the anniversaries last year was centered on the 10 December
appeal for stepped-up efforts from the VWP Central Committee
and the DRV Government--issued in the wake of the heavy
November U.S. air attacks on the DRV and the unsuccessful
effort to rescue U.S. prisoners at Son Tay.
The current instruction is prefaced with a routine, confident
evaluation of the communist position--claiming that the
Indochinese people have "recorded very big victories" and are
"facing bright prospects" and that the Nixon Doctrine and
Vietnamization have "sustained heavy setbacks and are heading
toward total bankruptcy." It warns that the United States is
still carrying out Vietnamization and "prolonging" the war,
but maintains that the allies are "in a losing and passive
position" while the communists "are in a winning and offensive
* U.S. press reports cn the shooting down of the U.S. plane
on the 10th said that it was the first in more than eight
months--a reference apparently to the 21-22 March period of
concentrated U.S. air strikes. See the TRENDS of 24 March
1971, pages 9-11. Since that period, Hanoi has claimed a
total of 17 planes downed over the DRV.
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posture and are on the upswing." It calls for the anniversaries
to be used to mobilize the people to persist and "record
bigger victories" leading to "total victory." The 1969
instruction was briefer and more reserved in its appraisal of
the communists' "great and comprehensive achievements" and
promise to "persevere in and step up our fight until complete
victory."
Listing military as well as propaganda tasks for the
anniversaries, the instruction calls for increased combat
readiness and effcrr3 to "bring assistance to the frontline
and to strengthen the rear base." It declares, among other
things, that "in the immediate future it is necessary to
properly carry out the conscription, communications, and
transportation tasks to serve the frontline" and "to properly
carry out the air defense task." The 1969 instruction made
no specific reference to conscription and only referred to
the frontline in urging activities to "encourage everyone to
look to the frontline." Like the 1969 instruction, the current
.,ne also calls for fulfillment of the annual state plan and
preparation for next year's plan.
VIETNAM FATHERLAND FRONT HOLDS FIRST CONGRESS IN TEN YEARS
Hanoi media are publicizing the convening of the Third Congress
of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) on 14 December, with no
indication so far of how long it will last. The decision to
hold the congress some time in 1971 was made at the 21st
enlarged session of the VFF Central Committee in early March
this year.* Propaganda at that time observed that it had
been 10 years since the Second Congress. This is recalled
now in a brief history of the VFF, carried by VNA on the
14th, which also notes that the first congress was held in
September 1955. The first available propaganda indication
that the congress was convening came on 11 December in VNA's
review of the Hanoi press, which said the papers "announced
the holding of the preparatory meeting of the Third Congress
of the Vietnam Fatherland Front." A report in VNA's Vietnamese-
language transmissions on the 14th said that on the previous
* The VFF Central Committee session is discussed in a
16 March 1971 Supplement to the TRENDS, page 8.
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day the Front Central Committee held its 22d session under
Chairman Ton Duc Thang to adopt the plan to hold the
Third Congress, which would be attended by some 460 delegates.
Hanoi reports on the proceedings of the opening session of
the congress on the 14th say that the purpose of the congress
is "to review the Front's activities over the past decade
since its second congress, draw experiences," determine
future tasks, and appoint a new VFF Central Committe,.
Opening remarks at the session were made by DRV President
Ton Duc Thang, who is also chairman of the VFF Central
Committee. Politburo member Truong Chinh read the message
of greetings from the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central
Committee. Premier Pham Van Dong is the only other VWP
Politburo member mentioned as attending the congress.
Hoang Quoc Viet read a political report to the congress entitled
"Strengthen Unity and Be Determined to Compl::tely Defeat the
U.S. Aggressors and Successfully Build Socialism," the text of
which is only partially available in translation at this
writing. Part One of the three-part report reviews various
achievements of the Vietnamese people and scores President
Nixon for being "increasingly stubborn, bellicose, and
crafty" and "putting forth the so-called peace initiative aimed
at deceiving public opinion" while carrying out Vietnamization.
The report also expresses gratitude for socialist countries'
"many-sided and effective assistance" and specifically names
the Soviet Union and China in this context.
The VWP Central Committee message, read by Truong Chinh, also
scores the "bellicosity" of the Nixon Administration and the
continuation of Vietnamization. The "foremost task" of the
nation, the message reaffirms, is to fight against U.S.
aggression. This task, it says, "requires that our entire
people make intense efforts to materialize President Ho's
sacred testaament, persist in the struggle on the three fronts,
military, political, and diplomatic, push forward the anti-U.S.
resistance for national salvation until complete victory,
with a firm resolve to liberate the South, defend and build
the socialist North, and proceed to the peaceful reunification
of the fatherland."
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DELEGATES FROM VNA reported on the l.',th that delegations to
SOUTH VIETNAM the congress from the NFLSV and the Alliance
had arrived in Hanoi, without indicating the
date of arrival. VNA noted, however, that they were received
on the 12th by President Ton Duc Thaug, Truong Chinh, and Hoang
Quoc Viet. The delegations are headed, respectively, by
NFLSV Central Committee Presidium member Nguyen Van Plgoi and
by Lam Van Tet, vice chairman of the Vietnam Alliance Central
Committee and member of the PRG advisory council. Liberation
Radio announced the composition of the delegations in reporting
on the 13th that they had "left for Hanoi."
CAMBODIA: VICTORIES CLAIMED OVER ARVN. PHNOM PENH FORCES
Communist media continue to report "victories'' in Cambodia, among
other things acclaiming the capture on 11 December of the Phnom
Penh government position at Baset Hill--eight miles northwest
of the capital--and the seizure on 6 December of the town of
Bat Doeng. Feats of the Cambodian People's National Liberation
Armed Forces (CNPLAF) over ARVN troops have also been claimed
and were given particular attention in the Hanoi press on
14 December. An article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN that day praised
the CNPLAF for having "completely routed" an ARVN task force,
on 10 December, in the Dam Be-Wat Thmey area of Kompong Cham
Province. The paper and other propaganda claimed that more
than 550 Saigon troops were "exterminated," 14 aircraft downed,
and 70 tanks and armored cars destroyed. The "new heavy setback"
for the ARVN, according to the QUAN DOI NHAN DaN article, 'has
aggravated the critical situation of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak
clique, has dealt a heavier blow at the declining morale of the
Phnom Penh and Saigon puppet armies, and has seriously foiled
the U.S.-puppets' defense-in-depth tactic in South Vietnam."
Sihanouk's clandestine radio continues to call upon Cambodian
Government soldiers to defect and upon citizens to evacuate to
"liberated areas." A particularly inflammatory broadcast on
the 10th opened with the prediction that the "doomsday" of the
Lon Nol regime is drawing near and with the claim that the
government's troops "have been routed and killed like flies
on all fronts throughout Cambodia." It later raised the
specter of attacks on the cities: "Our armed forces have
arrived at the gates of Phnom Penh. They are surrounding Kompong
Cham town. Kompong Thom and Siem Reap towns are isolated, while
Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, and Battambang towns are being cut off
frrm Phnom Penh by our armed forces. Kampot, Takeo, Svay Rieng,
and Prey Veng are under siege."
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At the same time, Gierek took a further swipe at Gomulka's
authoritarian style of leadership in stressing big party's
rejection of "the deformation in the methods of leadership"
and enunciated anew his liberalized concept of the party's
leading role based on consultation with the rank and file:
"The supreme principle" of the party's leading bodies, he
declared, "will be the links with you, comrades, the activists
of our party. When fulfilling our duties, we will consult
with the whole party." Such policies, he insisted, constitute
"restored Leninist principles" and "a Marxist-Leninst line."
EDITORIALS TRYBUNA LUDU on the 13th, in an editorial on
the congress, took a more disciplined view of
the party's leading role: While stressing "the expansion of
its function in the service of the working class," it called
for full observance of the principles of democratic centralism,
"which guarantee the harmonizing of discussion with action,
collective decision-making with personal responsibility."
The editorial stressed the importance of the Soviet-Polish
alliance and the results of the 24th CPSU Congress and
welcomed the "high appraisal" of the PZPR's policies ana of
Gierek's leadership in the address delivered by Brezhnev on
the 7th.
PRAVDA's 13 December editorial on the Polish congress,
entitled "Loyalty to the Ideals of Socialism," pointedly
recalled Brezhnev's remark in his congress speech that "we
communists are answerable for the fate of our country, for
the correct progress" of socialist development and that
responsibility for overcoming difficulties rests with "the
ruling communist parties." It further echoed Brezhnev in
praising the PZPR's ''principled and courageous approach" to
overcoming "the negative manifestations" and, on the score
of the adopted party program, linked "improvement of the
people's well-being" with "strengthening the positions of
socialism in the country." PRAVDA also noted that Gierek had
said in his main congress report that "the boundlessly rich
and creative decisions of the 24th congress of the Leninist
party were used by the PZPR when rormulating the program
for the further socialist development of Poland."
WHEREABOUTS There was no report of Brezhnev's whereabouts
OF BREZI-NEV or activities in communist media during the
period between his speech at the Polish
congress on the morning of 7 December and his attendance at a
meeting on the 11th between the Polish party leaders and the
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foreign party delegations. The silence on Brezhnev's whereabouts,
coupled with Kosygin's return home from Norway on the 7th--two
days earlier than scheduled--suggests the possibility that a
top-level meeting of Soviet policymakers on the Indian-Pakistani
crisis was held during that period. Polish media and a
correspondents' report in the Moscow domestic service on the
8th reported a speech that day by the second-ranking member
of the CPSU delegation, Politburo candidate member Masherov,
at the Mazowsze Petrochemical Combine in Plock--one of the
usual. visits by foreign delegation leaders following their speeches
at party congresses. The fullest available version Masherov's
speech, in the Warsaw domestic service, quoted him as speaking
"on behalf of the delegation of the CPSU"; it included a
reference to Brezhnev's speech at the Polish congress, but
none of the reports explained the Soviet leader's absence from
the Plock meeting.
On the 11th, PAP reported Brezhnev's toast at the reception
with the Polish leaders in Warsaw that day, spoken "on behalf
of the nearly 70 delegations" of the visiting parties. The
media reported his departure for home by rail on the 11th
and his arrival in Moscow the next day, where he was met by
a long list of top leaders, including Kosygin and Podgornyy.
PRAVDA on the 9th and 11th published roundups of worldwide
favorable reaction to Brezhnev's 7 December speech. The
11 December issue also carried on the front page a photo of
Brezhnev standing between Gierek and Honecker, with no indication
of when the picture was taken.
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FRG-POLAND
WARSAW-BONN PACT CALLED "CHAPTER" OF "PEACE TREATY"
The Polish press has used the first anniversary, Gn 7 December,
of the signing of the FRG-Polish treaty to adva-ice the concept
of an imminent final settlement of postwar European territorial
issues--a figurative "peace treaty" in which the Moscow and
Warsaw treaties with Bonn and the Big Four accord on "West Berlin"
are the "basic chapters." Articles on the 7th in the Catholic
daily SLOWO POWSZECFNE and on the 14th in the Polish Government
daily ZYCIE WARSZAW.' both went beyond prior propaganda from the
Soviet bloc in spelling out the notion that what is now in the
offing is a de facro German peace treaty that will legalize the
permanence of the postwar status quo in Europe.
Calling the Warsaw-Bonn treaty a "breakthrough" in the relations
between Bonn and the socialist bloc, the SLOWO POWSZECHNE
article described "the whole series of already concluded or
quickly ripening agreements"--from the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty to the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, the four-
power accord on "West Berlin," the subsequent "agreements
between the two German states," and the talks between Bonn
and Prague--as removing, "section by section, all the basic
ingredients of the historical dispute over Germany."
Poland's concern about its security interests, expressed
clearly and repeatedly in Polish media in the period since
the signing of the four-power agreement, was reflected in
the Catholic paper's article. It pointed out that the
recognition of existing borders and of the existence of
two German states, as well as "the barring of the Germans
from gaining access to nuclear weapons," are in fact "the
basic chapters of the peace treaty" and signposts of "the
closing of the postwar epoch in Europe, stage by stage."
The "new epoch" would be opened with the convening of a
European security conference, the paper said.
ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 14th, pointing to the GDR-FRG transit
agreement as the first between the governments of the two
German states, declared that "we are coming nearer to the
legal-international settlement of the 'German issue."' As
quoted by PAP, the article also called the transit agreement
"the first step" toward recognition of the GDR by the FRG
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under international law, a sine qua non for the development of
other "processes of vital importance for relations between the
East and West."
Both papers went beyond Brezhnev's presentation, in his
7 December speech to the Polish party congress, of progress
toward bringing "the postwar period of European development
to an end" and layi,g the basis for "Europe's transition to
a new historical phase which we believe will develop under
the sign of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous
cooperation." Brezhnev took note of the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties with Bonn, the "West Berlin" agreement, and the
ensuing inner-German phase of negotiations as moves in that
direction. He cited the need for GDR and FRG membership in
the United Nations but did not specifically call for West
German recognition of GDR sovereignty under international
law, and he expressed "hope" that Prague and Bonn would be
able to settle "the problems existing between them." The
Polish press articles, more sweeping and less cautious in
their prognosis of a de facto "peace treaty," seemed in tune
with the spirit if not the letter of these remarks.
POLAND REACTS TO FRG CHARGES ON GERMAN RESETTLEMENT ISSUE
West German press comment impugning Polish good will in
carrying out the "family reunion" program, the program for
resettlement in the FRG of ethnic Germans still residing
in the former German lands east of the Oder-Neisse and in
East Prussia, has drawn heated rebuttals in the Polis:i press.
Articles in both the party's TRYBUNA LUDU and the government's
ZYCIE WAISZAWY have been at pains to underscore the point that
Poland has undertaken the repatriation efforts of its own
volition, out of humanitarian motives and to show good will
in the matter of normalizing relations with the FRG, and that
complaints about Poland's conduct of the program are tanta-
mount to an affront against Polish sovereignty.
In the recent press articles, as in past references to the
program in Polish media, there was no acknowledgment of the
fact that a formal understanding on the program was reached
at the time the FRG-Popish treaty was signed in December 1970.
But the articles were at pains to document Poland's readiness
to do its part in normalizing bilateral relations despite the
fact that the Polish-FRG treaty remains unratified a yea-
after its signing.
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Registering Poland's sensitivity on the matter of its sovereignty,
the more recent of the two articles, by the authoritative foreign
affairs commentator Ryszard Wojna in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 5 December,
insisted that all decisions regarding the family reunification
program are "exclusively dependent on the sovereign Polish
Government" and that the question of the status of Polish citi-
zens is a matter solely for the Polish Government to decide,
"not one of coordination with the FRG,"
In the process of documenting Polish good will, both articles
were notably revealing of the scope of the repatriation program--
a sensitive, emotionally charged subject seldom discussed in
Polish media. TRYBUNA LUDU's article on 27 November recalled
that repatriation had in fact been going on for more than two
decades. It said that some 250,000 people had left Poland for
the FRG in the fifties and another 150,000 in the sixties. In
a slap at the former CDU/CSU governments in Bonn, it remarked
that "these moves never met with the least positive response
on the part of the FRG." Despite this lack of response by
Brandt's predecessors, it continued, Poland "agreed to comply
with the Brandt government's request to consider the applica-
tion of persons who, as described by the West German side, have
expressed the wish to leave Poland 'as a result of' changed
family conditions or a change of mind." Departures consequently
increased in early 1971, the paper said., and reached a total for
the year of more than 20,000 people by the end of October.
The TRYBUNA LUDU article appeared a week after West German Red
Cross Secretary General Kurt Wagner had been in Poland for
discussion of the current family reunion program, administered
by Red Cross representatives of the two countries. And the
Wojna article was directly responsive to subsequent West
German radio commentaries based on statements by West
German Red Cross representatives "who recently held talks
with the Polish Red Cross" on the family reunion program--an
evident allusion to Wagner. Stopping short of aiming the
criticism directly at Wagner or the West German Red Cross, the
article said the West German commentaries either were based on
erroneous information or were indulging in "intentional
ambiguities" in order "to blur the essentially clear results"
of the Red Cross talks.
Echoing TRYBUNA LUDU on the fruits of the Polish efforts
undertaken unilaterally out of humanitarian motives over the
last two decades, Wojna also cited--without attribution--
statistics on the recent repatriation efforts which Wagner
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had given in an interview over the West German radio on
26 November: Some 26,000 Germans would be resettled this
year, and an average of 4,000 a month would be resettled in
1972. ~,~jna added that, in addition, "several thousand"
people are leaving Poland for the GDR: "The problem of
reunifying families . . . applies to people of German origin
in general, and therefore to the populations living in both
German states."
Both the TRYBUNA LUDU and the ZYCIE WARSZAWY articles ascribed
criticism of the Polish effort to West German opposition
elements bent on blocking the progess of FRG-Polish normaliza-
tion and trying to pressure Brandt into further stalling
ratification of the FRG-Polish treaty. Wojna said Poland
appreciated the difficulties faced by the FRG Government
because of the narrowness of the Brandt-Scheel majority in the
Bundestag; Warsaw, he said, had sought to demonstrate its
good will by making family reunions possible without waiting
for ratification of the Polish-FRG treaty. To the West German
charges of Polish ill will, Wojna countercharged that West
German elements' efforts to "misuse our good will" are contrary
to the spirit and letter of West German assurances at the
time the bilateral treaty was signed in December 1970.
Unacknowledged in Polish media was a public discussion of the
German resettlement issue over the West German radio on
26 November, the day before the TRYBUNA LUDU article appeared,
by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz--in Bonn to give
a lecture to a West German foreign affairs organization. The
West German DPA quoted him as pledging that "we will keep our
word" but that resettlement posed difficult organizational
problems requiring patience and tact.
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NATO COUNCIL SESSION
USSR IN STEREOTYPED ATTACK DECRIES "COLD WAR" PHILOSOPHY
A low volume of Moscow propaganda on the 9-10 December NATO
Council session in Brussels and the preliminary meetings on
the 7th and 8th follows a familiar script in claiming sharp
disunity among NATO members and in indicting the organization
for its "cold war" philosophy. Thus the TASS account of the
10 December communique on the session said that the document
dealt in "time-worn allegations" about the intensification
of Soviet military efforts and the worldwide character of
Soviet naval operations.
Secretary Laird is typically a target of criticism. A TASS
report on the 8 December meeting of the Defense Planning
Committee, for example, said Laird's call for a further
buildup of NATO naval strength in the Mediterranean "intensified
the atmosphere of distrust and tension." And a TASS report
noted his "satisfaction" over the decision of the 10-nation
"Eurogroup," meeting on the 7th, to increase military budgets
in 1972 by a billion dollars.
EUROPEAN SECURITY The differences among NATO members
CONFERENCE manifested themselves most acutely,
according to Moscow, over the question
of a European security conference, a question the Council
was "compelled" to consider. Remarks by commentator Polyanov,
participating in the 12 December domestic service commentators'
roundtable show, typify this propaganda: Polyanov said
two sides emerged clearly at the Council session, the group
of the "so-called Atlanticists" headed by the United States,
which sought to delay preparations for a European security
conference, and "an ever growing group" including France,
Norway, and Denmark that favored the convening of a
conference "as soon as possible." In the most authoritative
comment to date on the 3russels gathering, a 14 December
PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy, reviewed by TASS, took the
United States and Britain to task for raising obstacles to a
conference and for hoping to turn it into a meeting between
opposing blocs, "in practice leaving no room for neutral and
nonalined countries."
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The TASS report of the NATO Council communique and ensuing
radio comment noted that the document again made convocation
of a European security conference dependent on the final
conclusion of the agreements on Berlin. But the TASS English
report also mentioned that the NATO governments "approved"
the November 1970 Finnish proposal for the opening of
multilateral negotiations preparatory to a conference among
heads of missions accredited to Helsinki.* A commentary by
Levin in the domestic service on the 11th stated that the
NATO representatives, in a departure from the language of
past communiques, have declared their readiness to begin
multilateral talks aimed at convening a conference and have
not set preliminary conditions for the inception of
preparatory talks. The commentator tempered his optimism,
however, by observing that "one can still read conditions
between the lines"; he cited REUTER for the statement that
NATO continues to hold that preparatory talks can begin
"only after the coming into force of the agreement on West
Berlin."
* The English-language text of the NATO communique in fact
said that the governments "appreciated" the Finnish proposal; the
French version said they were "favorable" toward it.
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1i I T)) P LE EPP,5T
MOSCOW ASSAILS ISRAELI, U1S,1 CHINESE STANDS ON MIDEAST
Diminishing Soviet comment on the Middle East* continues to
hold Israel, together with its "patron" the United States,
responsible for the impasse in Ambassador Jarring's mission
and for the failure to implement Security Council Resolution 242.
Again stressing Cairo's "peace-loving line" and readiness for a
political settlement, Moscow characteristically portrays
Israeli Prime Minister Meir's U.S. visit as strengthening
Israel's militaristic stance, with Washington's support.
Moscow also attacks Peking's "most improper" stand on the
Middle East question. TASS on the 14th, for example, reporting
on UNGA adoption of the Afro-Asian resolution on the Middle East,
pointed out that the Chinese, "in the same camp with the sworn
enemies" of the national liberation movement, had abstained
along with the United States, Israel, and six other states.
On this score, Moscow has for some months been rebutting, in
Mandarin broadcasts, Chinese charges that the USSR is selling
out the Arabs by colluding--and contending---with the United
States in the region. Currently, Moscow broadcasts in Arabic
reiterate previous Soviet protestations to Arab audiences of
the purity of Moscow's aims in supporting the Arabs and swipe
at the "propaganda ambitions and selfish aims" of Peking's
policies in the region.
Moscow has for the first time directly addressed the question
of Chinese participation in the hitherto '-Big Four'" discussions
on the Middle East. Soviet delegate Malik, in his UNGA speech
reported by TASS on the 10th, pressed for resumption of the
Jarring mission and called for resumption of the consultations
of "the permanent members of the Security Council." A Sturua
dispatch from New York in the 11 December IZVESTIYA accused
the United States of paralyzing the Jarring mission and blocking
* Soviet attention to the 'ziddle East, just three percent of
total comment in the week of 22 November, the anniversary of
Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, dropped to a mere
1.4 percent of total comment in the week ending 12 December
despite the intermittent UNGA debate, which has been
interrupted by the Indian-Pakistani crisis.
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1.5 i)EC6,Pi.1IIrR 1.971
M
the work of "the four" permanent Security Council members.
But Sturua went on to complain that not only is the United
States opposing resumption of these meetings, but "another
permanent Security Council member -rthe PRC--is ol,together
refusing to participate in the consultations and to promote
the success of the Jarring "ntssion." Reaffirming "broad"
Soviet assihtance to the Arabs, Sturua reiterated the
USSR's readiness to participate, "together with the other
powet3 which are permanent members of the Security Council,"
in creating international guarantees for a political
settlement.
SOVIET-ISRAELI While tescow continues officially to play
RELATIONS up an image of a peace-.loving Egypt and to
brand Israel as the aggressor blocking a
peaceful settlement in the 'fiddle East, a trial balloon on
the possibility of the establishment of Soviet and Israeli
interest sections in respective caretaker embassies.--the
Dutch in Moscow and the Finnish in Tel Aviv-has been
unofficially floated by Soviet journalist Victor Louis. The
London EVENING NEI-IS reported on the 13th that Louis, its
''well-informed correspondent in Moscow," reported that current
Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel "might require` some
Israeli diplomats in the Dutch embassy in Moscow and Russian
diplomats in the Finnish embassy in Tel Aviv. The story was
also reported by Jerusalem radio the same day, citing an
"exclusive report'' to the Israeli paper YELIOT AE:A ONOT.
While Soviet propaganda has become slightly less reticent
on the subject of Soviet Jewish emigration in the past
several months, Moscow has not acknowledged Israeli Press
speculation and official denials of Soviet-Israeli contacts,
and it ignored reports of Louis' June visit to Israel.
Soviet media did, however, exploit the visit in early
September of a "group of progressive Israeli public figures"
in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the
Defense of Peace.
CCL FIIXYTIAL
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1.5 IPJ;CEMAER 1971
TOPIC IN BRIEF
GERMAN CP
The 6-11 December Polish United Workers Party Congress produced
yet another indication that the illegal Communist Party of
Germany (KPD) has fi all practical purposes become inoperative.
Polish First Secretary Gierek made no reference to the KPD in
listing the foreign parties represented at the congress,
mentioning only the DKP delegation led by Chairman Kurt
Bachmann. Gierek's listing accorded with PAP's roster of the
70 foreign delegations attending. KPD as well as DKP
deleegations had been present earlier this year at the Soviet,
Czechoslovak, and East German party congresses.
The de facto death knoll of the KPD had been sounded in late
September when KPD First Secretary Max Reimann announced his
decision to join the DKP, stating that he now belonged to
that party alone while. claiming that this did not mean a
replacement of the KPD by the legal DKP.*
* For background see the TRENDS of 1 December 1971, pages 24-27.
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