TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010044-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: December 8, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
II IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~I
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
II~IIIIIIII~~~~I ~~~~~~~IIIIIIIII
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
8 DECEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 49)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
[.deded heie eee.e,lt
de.e0,edieg e.d
dabu4181ism
COI`'FIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
8 DECEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moscow Defines Security Interest; Peking Decries "Blackmail" . 1
TASS Cites Pakistani Repression, Soviet Security Interest . . . 2
Peking Portrays Soviet Role as Main Cause of Tension . . . . . 5
Sino-Soviet Polemics Mark Security Council Debate . . . . . . . 8
Communists Assess Cambodian "Victories," Role of Big Bs~ttles . 10
DRV Spokesman Scores U.S. Bombing; Press Exhorts DRV Air Force. 11
PRG Announces Details of Holiday Cease-Fires in South Vietnam . 13
PRG Puts DRV Elaboration of Seven-Foint Plan on Paris Record . 14
PRC-DRV Trade Agreement, Protocols on Aid Reported . . . . . 16
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
PRAVDA Article Dissects Maoism, Notes Lin Piao's Fall . . . . . 18
CHINA
Article on "Prairie Fire" Letter Seems Directed at Lin e . ~ . 22
"Bourgeois Military Line" Pushed by "Swindlers" Is Attacked . . 22
Peking Popularizes New Type of Neighborhood Store . . . . . . . 26
EUROPEAN SECURITY
Pact Communique, Soviet Leaders Press Conference Proposal . . . 28
Kosygin Hints Troops Reduction Could be on Conference Agenda . 29
GDR Blames West for Delay in Signing of Inner-German Accords . 31
Commentaries Disclose Details of Senat-GDR Agreements . . . . . 34
POLISH CONGRESS
Impact of December Events Pervades Opening Speeches . . . . . .36
(Continued)
CONFIDEpTI
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
8 DECEMBER 1971
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C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
Tito Rebukes Croatian Leaders, Calls for Party Crackdown . .
. 39
Republic Party Leaders Differ on Federal Party's Role . . .
.42
Moscow Says Israel, U.S. Obstruct Peace Sought by Arabs . .
~ 44
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
8 DECEMBER 1971
Moscow (2961 items)
Peking (1594 items)
European Security
(2%)
7%
Domestic Issues
(13%)
27%
[Warsaw Pact
(0.1%)
3%]
[Joint Editorial
(--)
3%]
Foreign Ministers
Conference
on Leadership
Indian-Pakistani
(3%)
17%
Kosygin in Denmark
(--)
7%
Conflict
China
(3%)
6%
Albanian National Day
(3%)
12%
CPSU Central C ,tunittee
(13%)
5%
Indochina
(40%)
11%
Plenum
[Pham Van Dong in
(32%)
4%]
USSR Constitution Day
(--)
5%
PRC
Supreme Soviet Session
(21%)
4%
[Cambodia
(4%)
4%]
Yugoslav National Day
(1%)
3%
UN Disarmament Debate
(3%)
6%
UK-Rhodesian Agreement
(1%)
3%
Middle East
(0.2%)
5%
Indian-Pakistani Conflict (1%)
3%
Peruvian Foreign Trade
(1%)
3%
Indochina (4%)
3%
Delegation in PRC
Yugoslav National Day
(1%)
2%
These statisti :s are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking comestic and international radio services. The term 'commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
!n other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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8 DECEMBER 1971
INDIA-PAKISTAN
MOSCOW DEFINES SECURITY INTEREST; PEKING DECRIES "BLACKMAIL"
Deepening expressions of support by Moscow and Peking for their
respective friends in the Indian-Pakistani conflict have been
overlaid by polemical exchanges between the two communist powers
that mark South Asia as a major arena of the Sino-Soviet
rivalry. A TASS statement on 5 December, the most authoritative
Soviet policy statement since the intensification of hostilities
on the 3d, defined a Soviet security interest in the conflict
and implicitly warned the Chinese against deeper involverent.
A vitriolic Chinese retort in the form of a PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article on the 7th, the seccnd of three successive
commentaries on this level, charged that the TASS statement
"smacks of gunpowder" and represents "barefaced blackmail and
intimidation." Pointing to questions of power politics
invclved in the conflict, Commentator claimed that the Soviets
are seeking to take advantage of the situation to expand their
influence in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.
The divergence between the positions taken by Moscow and Peking
has broadened as the two sides have taken firmer stands on the
East Pakistan separatist movement. Though Moscow has not as yet
followed New Delhi's lead in recognizing the Bangla Desh
government, the Soviets have conferred a measure of legitimacy
on the separatists by saying they are leading a "national
liberation movement." Peking, on the other hand, has flatly
dismissed the Bangla Desh regime as a "puppet" set up by India
to realize its aim to "annex" East Pakistan. The PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article on the 8th, devoted to India's
recognition of the Bangla Desh government two days earlier,
ridiculed the Bengali separatists as a "small handful of Pakistan
national outcasts."
While Moscow and Peking have thus dug in deeper in supporting
their friends, both sides continue to show caution regarding
the broader security implications of the conflict. Moscow,
unlike New Delhi, has not cited the Soviet-Indian treaty and
has not gone beyond the TASS statement in specifying the USSR's
stake in the developments. While Peking has made repeated
references to the treaty, depicting it as an instrument of
Soviet expansion in the region and an encouragement of Indian
aggression, the Chinese have avoided portraying a threat to
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their security interests and passed over the warning conveyed
in the TASS statement. Chinese pledges of support for Pakistan
against aggression have been formulated in the same terms and
on the same level as before the recent intensification of
hostilities.
TASS CITES PAKISTANI REPRESSION. SOVIET SECURITY INTEREST
The TASS statement of 5 December enunciated in familiar terms
the Soviet position on the Indian-Pakistani crisis, outlined
the evolution of that crisis, and called for a rapid cessation
of hostilities, a political settlement in East Pakistan, and
restraint by all other countries. Contending that "the main
cause" of Indian-Pakistani tensions was "the situation created
in East Pakistan as a result of the Pakistan Government's
act!ons against the population of that part of the country,"
the statement noted that the Soviet Government had "repeatedly
expressed" its concern over the situation to Pakistani
President Yahya Khan and had called for "the renunciation
of the policy of repressions, the release of [Awami League
Leader Mujibur] Rahman, and the immediate resumption of talks
with the aim of finding such a solution tho` would accord
with the will expressed by the population of East Pakistan
at the elections in December 1970.1' Since the Pakistani
Government did not take measures for a political settlement
and continued its military buildup against India, the state-
ment continued, "the Soviet leaders informed. President Yahya
Khan that Pakistan's armed attack against India, under
whatever pretext, would evoke the most resolute condemnation
in the Soviet Union."
Raising the issue of a threat to Soviet security, TASS
declared that "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to
the developments, considering also the circumstances that
they are taking place in direct proximity of the USSR's
borders and, therefore, involve the interests cf Its
security." The Soviet Government, TASS said, "finds it
necessary to state to the Pakistan leaders with all clarity
about the grave responsibility that they assume following
this dangerous course." Tile statement called for "the
speediest ending of the bloodshed and for a political
settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the
lawful rights and interests of its people."
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The statement concluded with a warning against outside involvement
in the conflict. The Soviet Government, according to TASS,
urges "the governments of all countries" to "refrain from steps
signifying in this way or that way their involvement in the
conflict and leading to a further aggravation of the situation
in the Hindustan peninsula."
The TASS statement stands as the most authoritative exposition of
Soviet policy on the intensified conflict. On 8 December, in fact,
TASS disseminated the statement again without explanation. Soviet
concern has also been expressed in briefer terms by the Soviet
leadership troika. CPSU chief Brezhnrv, speaking at the Polish
party congress on the 7th, called for cessation of the bloodshed
and a peaceful political settlement, taking particular note of
"the events which engendered this conflict: the bloody suppres-
sion of the basic rights and clearly expressed will of the
population of East Pakistan, and the tragedy of 10 million
refugees." President Podgornyy made similar remarks in
speeches on the 7th and 8th.
Premier Kosygin, speaking in Denmark on 4 December, expressed
"great concern" over the emergence of "a dangerous seat of
conflict" between India and Pakistan and called for liquidation
of the conflict. He placed the onus directly on Pakistan,
observing that "it is necessary above all to overcome a
dangerous domestic policy crisis that formed in East Pakistan
as a result of wholesale reprisals" by the Pakistani authorities.
Kosygin declared that "the will of the people of East Pakistan
expressed in the December 1970 elc,:tions" must be implemented
and security guaranteed for the return of the refugees.
Relatively limited Soviet comment has been keyed largely to
the TASS statement. Thus, the commentators on the Moscow
domestic service observers' roundtable on the 5th and a PRAVDA
commentary on the 6th said the crisis resulted from "the armed
repressions" against the East Pakistanis as a reprisal for
their election of Mujibur's Awami League and its advocacy of
autonomy for East Pakistan. They also highlighted Pakistan's
"military action on a very wide scale" and took particular
note of past warnings to Pakistan cited in the TASS statement
as well as the statement's reference to a Soviet security
interest.
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SOVIET-INDIAN The TASS statement did not mention the Soviet-
TREATY Indian treaty of peace, friendship, and
cooperation signed in August, and Soviet media
have all but ignored the treaty in current comment. Indian
media on 4 December reported that Article 9 of the treaty had
been invoked; it provides that in case either party "is
attacked or threatened wil-h attack," the two countries will
"immediately start mutual consultations with a v.ew to
eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective
measures to insure peace and security for their countries."
A report carried by Delhi radio on the 6th--but not monitored
in Soviet media--said that the Indian ambassador had met that
day with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to
"review the latest developments in the Indian subcontinent
and the debate in the Security Council on the subject." A
rare Soviet reference to the treaty appeared in a TASS report
on the 7th replying to the Chinese contention that the pact
encouragFJ Indian aggression.
REBUTTAL OF Neither the TASS statement nor the Soviet
CHINESE leaders' remarks mentioned the Chinese
position in tl-,e crisis, but Moscow has been
driven into polemical jousting with the Chinese by their
drumbeat of attacks and the exchanges taking place in the
United Nations. Previously the anti-Chinese polemics were
concentrated in broadcasts to China over the purportedly
unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, but by 7 December
Moscow felt obliged to respond to Peking's production of
"one anti-Soviet statement after another."
A TASS report on that date rebuked the Chinese for "totally
ignoring the unanimous support given by the East Pakistan
population to the Awami League at the elections in December
1970" and accused them of "whitewashing mass repressions and
terror by the Pakistan authorities against the population
of the eastern part of the country." Noting that Chinese
media "portray the genuine representatives of the East
Pakistan population as 'Pakistani splitters,"' TA?S cited
PRC opposition to hearing "representatives of the East
Pakistan population" at Security Council meetings. TASS
concluded that Peking's propaganda "is added proof that the
Chinese leadership couldn't care less about the destinies
of the national liberation movement and the interests of
anti-imperialist struggle."
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Driving home the point, TASS less than an hour later reported
a statement by "the foreign minister of Bangla Desh" in which
"he denounced the 'exceedingly threatening role of the two
superpowers, the United States and the PRC,' in discussing
the Indo-Pakistani conflict in the Security Council."
For several days prior to the TASS attack of the 7th, Peace
and Progress broadcasts in Mandarin had vigorously condemned
the Chinese role in the subcontinent. Countering Peking's
increasing attacks on the role of the Soviet-Indian treaty as
an encouragement of Indian aggression, the commentaries
portrayed Peking as an instigator of Pakistani extremists and
reactionaries in the heightening of tensions and stressed the
Soviet themes that the basic issue is repression in East
Pakistan of a genuine "national liberation struggle." The
commentaries have also stressed that the Soviet position has
been one of encouraging a peaceful political settlement of
the problem.
A commentator on 6 December asserted that the Chinese leaders
sought "the expansion of military action so as to drag new
countries into the conflict" and said the Chinese "try to
provoke regional wars anywhere in the world." Referring to
the possibility of the expansion of a regional war into a
large-scale nuclear war, which would "annihilate the peoples
of all countries, including the Chinese people," the commentary
took note of Mao Tse-tung's "unabashed statement" that "the
death of hundreds of millions of the Chinese people in a
nuclear war would be a healthy blood transfusion."
PEKING PORTRAYS SOVIET ROLE AS MAIN CAUSE OF TENSION
The 5 December TASS statement acted as a catalyst which has
turned Peking's comment on the Indian-Pakistani conflict
into a withering anti-Soviet campaign. While Peking previously
had been using the circumlocution "social imperialism" in
referring to the Soviets and had directed the rain thrust
of its attack against India, the 7 December PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article on the TASS statement accused "Soviet
revisionist social imperialism" of being the main source
of the tension in the subcontinent. Peking has launched a
massive propaganda campaign devoted to the South Asian conflict,
accounting for some four-fifths of Radio Peking's output during
the first half of the week beginning on the 5th.
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The 7 December Commentator article, saying the TASS statement
"smacks of gunpowder," took sharp exception to the statement's
assertion "with ulterior motives" o. a Soviet security interest
in the Indian-Pakistani conflict, Recalling the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia and noting that the statement
cited the proximity of the USSR's borders to the region of
current tension, Commentator asked the Soviets if they are
"going :o take action." The TASS statement represents
"barefaced blackmail and intiahi.ation," according to Commentator.
Pursuing a theme developed in the Commentator article on the 6th,
the article on the 7th claimed that one of the main aims of the
Soviet-Indian treaty is to support India in "annexing" East
Pakistan and to gain further control over India in order to
expand Soviet influence in the subcontinent and the Indian
Ocean. But while Peking has thus expressed concern over the
Soviet role in the region, Chinese pronouncements have not
defined a threat to the PRC's own security interests or taken
direct note of the TASS statement's warning against outside
involvement.
support the Pakistani Government and people
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CHINESE LEADERS At o 4 December reception given by the
Mauritanian ambassador, Acting PRC Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei, the only Chinese leader to have discussed
the Indian-Pakistani conflict since the intensification of
hostilities on the 3d, charged that the Indian Government,
"supported and encouraged by social imperialism," had continues
"to expand its armed aggression against Pakistan." Noting that
"an Indian leader"--he did not name Indian Premier Indira
Gandhi--had made "the truculent detrand for Pakistan troops to
withdraw from East Pakistan," Chi termed this "a brazen demand"
which "completely revealed India's expansionist ambitions."
Chi declared: "We strongly condemn India for its subversion
and .ogression and reaffirm that the Chinese Government and
people firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in
their just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and
territorial integrity and oppose foreign aggression."
Chi's comments on the Indian-Pakistan crisis were excerpted
by NCNA and carried some four hours prior to NCNA's report
on the Mauritanian ambassador's reception. Chi made no
reference to any implications for Chinese security. He did
not elaborate on the existing Chinese commitment--as enunciated
by Chi himself on 7 November during Ali Bhutto's visit to the
PRC--that "should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression,
the Chinese Government and people will, as always, ~esolutely
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Chou En-lai, in the undated interview with author. Neville
Maxwell which appeared in the London SUNDAY TIMES on 5 December,
noted that Chi on 7 November had "already stated our principles"
on the Indian-Pakistani issue, adding: "We firmly support
Pakistan against India's subversive and aggressive activities."
Contending that the draft of the Soviet-Indian treaty "had
lain for two years in a drawer in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union," Chou asserted that "after the
announcement of Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Union
hastily concluded this treaty with India," a treaty designed
"to realize Brezhnev's 'Asian collective security system,'
which is directed against the countries to which Russia is
hostile." Chou did not comment on Maxwell's statement that
"there is a genuine Bengali nationalist movement in East
Pakistan." Peking media did not carry the interview.
BANGLA DESH In the series of PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
articles the Chinese have taken a tough stand
against the Bengali separatists, overcoming an earlier
reluctance to discuss the independence movement. Commentator
accused India of trying "to inject" the Bangla Desh "puppet
regime" into Pakistan through "open, direct invasion by
Indian troops, so as to achieve its long-planned aim to
annex East Pakistan." Commentator likened the East Pakistani
refugee issue to the Tibetan refugee question more than a
decade ago and described "the 'Bangla Desh' of today" as
"simply a reproduction of the 'Manchukuo' of the past."
Consistent with Peking's line over the months, Commentator
ignored the details of the events in East Pakistan
precipitating the crisis and reiterated the position that
internal affairs "should be settled by the people of the
country themselves" and disputes between countries "should
be settled through consultations by the countries concerned."
Asserting that the Chinese government and people "are closely
following the developments of the situation in the sub-
continent," Commentatcr called the Pakistani struggle "a
just one" and said "the Chinese people resolutely support
the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to
defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity and to
counter foreign aggression."
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SINO-SOVIET POLEMICS MARK SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE
The UN Security Council deliberations on the conflict have
provided a forum for Sino-Soviet skirmishing, s'ith the Chinese
being especially vitriolic in pressing the attack. Joining
issue with the Soviets on the question of inviting a Bangla
Desh representative to the Security Council session, PRC
delegate Huang Hua contended that to do so would be "tantamount
to asking the Security Couucil to interfere directly in the
internal affairs of Pakistan" and that the Soviet proposal was
simply an obstructionist and delaying tactic. Huang called
the Bangla Desh Government. a "neo-Quisling government, a neo-
Manchukuo government," and suggested that following India's
recognition of it the Soviet Government "probably" will also
"declare its recognition of that 'government' tomorrow or
the day after tomorrow." Huang concluded his statement to
the Security Council on the 6th with this statement: "I
wish only to address a few words of-good intention to
Mr. Malik: Please bear in mind the fate of 'Manchukuo'
Quislings and their behind-the-scenes boss!"
Huong's speech at the 5 December Security Council session
was particularly vehement toward the Soviets. Charging
Moscow with "connivance, support, and shielding" of India's
armed aggression with the objective "of gaining control over
the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and
enlarging its sphere of influence in its contention with
the other superpower for hegemony," Huang touched on such
subjects as a "counterrevolutionary rebellion" engineered
by the Soviet Union in 1962 in Sinkiang and the subsequent
forcible detention of "several tens of thousands" of Chinese
civilians by the Soviet Union; the "so-called Soviet-Indian
treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation which is in
fact a treaty of military alliance;" the 1968 Czechoslovakian
"occupation;" and the Soviet Government's "plot to subvert
the legal government of an African country this year."
Soviet reportage on the Security Council discussions has
highlighted the Soviet proposal to invite "the representatives
of.the national liberation movement of East Pakistan (Bangla
Desh)" to the sessions, charged the United States and China
with obstructionist tactics, and pressed the Soviet contention
that UN action must deal with "the fundamental cause" of the
crisis, which is "the situation created in East Pakistan as
a result of terrorizing the population of East Pakistan by
the Pakistani authorities."
CONF DENT L
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A TASS account an the 6th, which cited the Chinese veto of
the Soviet resolution "for a political settlement in East
Pakistan that would inevitably result in cessation of
hostilities," took note of the Sino-Soviet polemics
enlivening the Security Council debate. TASS pointed out
that the Chinese representative "used his speech for
slandering the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union
and the policy of India" and for launching attacks on "the
national liberation movement of East Pakistan." Moscow had
not until the past few days referred to the separatist
movement in East Bengal as a "national liberation movement."
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I ND0CHI":A
COMMUNISTS AS"ESS CAMBODIAN "VICTORIES." ROLE OF BIG BATTLES
Communist media predictably praise the capture of Cambodian
Government positions at the towns of Baray and Kompong Thmar--
on Route 6, north of Phnom Penh. The official account of the
action is presented in a communique of "the Route 6 front
command" of the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed
Forces (CNPLAF), dated 2 December but first publicized on
the 5th.
The communique claims that the "the CNPLAF and the people"
have inflicted 12,000 casualties and captured thousands of
troops in the fighting along Route 6 since the Phnom Penh
government's operation Chenla 2 began on 20 August. It also
maintains that five brigades and more than 30 battalions were
"seriously mauled" and "huge amounts of war mater-lal" seized.
In the final four days of fighting, according to the communique,
more than 3,000 government troops were killed, wounded, or
captured. It says that the commanders of the Chenla 2 operation
"deserted their troops" and that "several other brigade and
battalion commanders were either mauled or captured."
The communique acclaims the military achievements on Route 6
as "the biggest feat-of-arms" of the CNPLAF, but the battle
is given greater significance in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial
and a similar LPA commentary on the 6th. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial, acclaiming the Route 6 engagements as "strategically
important" and a "major campaign of annihilation," is at
variance with a NHAN DAN editorial on the same day which limits
its praise to references to the CNPLAF's "great victory" and
"glorious exploit." The army paper seems quite deliberate in
its effort to magnify the significance of the CNPLAF's achieve-
ment, noting that the Cambodian forces were able to launch
"large-scale attacks involving concentrated forces," that they
fought "big battles," and that "such major battles of
annihilation are of very important significance" and have
"substantially changed the balance of forces of both sides on
the battlefield." The victories on Route 6, according to QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN, "reflect further improvement of the CNPLAF's
ability to fight big battles involving massive forces."
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It is possible that the army paper merely has more license
than NHAN DAN to analyze military matters. But it is also
possible that QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's stress on the communists'
ability to fight major engagements reflects an argument with
more conservative forces represented in MEAN DAN's relatively
reserved evaluation.
An earlier QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN editorial, on 4 December, commented
on "strategic victories" this year to similarly make the point
that the balance of forces had shifted favorably. It described
the allied position as "unstable" in South Vietnam, "highly
alarming" in Cambodia, and "ver; precarious" in Laos. Voicing
what could be viewed as an argument for large-scale attacks,
the editorial stated that "in the process of war, a period of
slow development must be followed by a phase of outstanding
progress." It went on, however, to state that the armed
forces and people "must be determined to undergo a protracted
war." An article earlier this yea.., published in the January-
February issue of TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), had
been much more direct in maintaining that protracted warfare
"is not protracted guerrilla fighting" and that there must
also be "sudden leap-like developments."*
Suggesting at another point that it anticipated large-scale
fighting, the 4 December editorial urged: "It is necessary
to constantly heighten the quality of the people's armed forces
in all fields and to improve their tactical skills so they can
stage effective, large-scale combined attacks against the
enemy." The editorial warned that there would be further
"difficulties and hardships" and, among other things, specifically
cautioned that "it is possible that the enemy will embark on
new military adventures against the North in an attempt to
intimidate our northern armed forces and people and to prevent
the vast rearbase from bringing assistance to the great frontline."
DRV SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. BOMBING; PRESS EXHORTS AIR FORCE
The most recent in Hanoi's continuing series of foreign ministry
spokesman's protests, issued on 6 December, condemns U.S. raids
against the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Quang Binh Province
* Other Vietnamese communist propaganda on the issue of the
role of large-scale combat was discussed in the TRENDS of
20 October 1971, pages 7-9, and 4 August 1971, pages 15-17.
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from 22 November to 5 December. (Spokesman protests of 8,
13, 20 and 22 November had protested U.S. action against
various areas of North Vietnam from 7 to 21 November.) The
current protest charges that U.S. planes including B-52's
conducted "daily ferocious air raids" on Huong Lap village
in the DMZ, and that during the same period U.S. planes hit
localities in Quang Binh Province "causing losses in lives
and property."
Routinely condemning these "acts of war" and demaLiding that
the United States end all acts "infringing upon DRV sovereignty
and security," the spokesman "flatly rej'cted the 'protective
response' argument so often repeated by the U.S. Administration
to plead for its piratic acts." (DRV media, of course, have
not mentioned recent U.S. press stories and statements by U.S.
spokesmen on DRV air activity over Laos or the acknowledgment
that air strikes on 8 November, initially described by U.S.
spokesmen as falling in the protective reaction category, were
aimed at an unoccupied North Vietnamese air field.*)
Recent U.S. statements on increased DRV air defense over Laos
and North Vietnam this winter come in the wake of notable
Hanoi propaganda on tasks of antiaircraft troops and the air
force. A 20 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial--just available
in full translation from the press--urged both the antiaircraft
troops and the air force co be vigilant and "annihilate the enemy
when he comes." It is more usual for Hanoi media to discuss
vigilance and combat readiness in terms of the requirements
of the local forces--the militia and self-defense troops.
However, the major propaganda campaign calling for vigilance
and combat readiness last fall following the 21 November 1970
massive U.S. air strikes and the prisoner-rescue attempt at
Son Tay did, of course, stress antiaircraft and air force
tasks.
Hanoi radio on 20 November had broadcast a brief version of
the editorial in the army paper, but that version emphasized
the threat of "new U.S. military adventures" and only broadly
* The strikes on 7-8 November prompted the usual foreign
ministry spokesman's statement, rather than the higher level
foreign ministry statement, but the spokesman did, however,
call the strikes "particularly serious." Moreover, atypically
there was supporting press comment. See the TRENDS of
10 November 1971, pages 17-19.
/ZZ
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discussed vigilance.* The full text of the editorial, however,
notes that the antiaircraft troops and the air force are "the
core force to annihilate the enemy, to deutroy all enemy
air strikes and to insure safety for out forces, positions,
and routes." The primary task to successfully fulfill combat
readiness, says the editorial, is to "constantly train
ourselves to heighten vigilance and fighting spirit, any time,
any place--whether close to the demarcation line and border
or far behind the front, whether there are enemy aircraft
or not--we must be ready."
The editorial says antiaircraft and air force units "must
train intensively to heighten fighting abilities . . . assure
that enemy aircraft are hit as soon as the antiaircraft units
open fire and that outstanding exploits are scored once the
aircraft take off." It warns that "conservative thinking and
reluctance to make progress" must be overcome, and it urges
that "the enemy's law of operation and combat tricks" be
studied and that "good fighting methods" be invented. The
editorial states that each antiaircraft and air force unit,
"no matter when and where it is stationed and whether it is
conducting an operation or on the battlefield, must have a
combat plan to be ready to attack and annihilate the enemy.'
PRG ANNOUNCES DETAILS OF HOLIDAY CEASE-FIRES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Following the pattern set in previous years, Liberation Radio
on 3 December broadcast a PRG statement and an order from the
PLAF Command on the suspension of military attacks on the
occasion of the upcoming holidays.** The statement and the
order, both dated the 3d, indicate that, like last year, the
communists' cease-fires will last for three days at Christmas
and over the New Year and for four days at the time of Ter
(the lunar new year). Providing the details, the PLAF order
stipulates that all attacks should be suspended for Christmas,
from zero hour Indochina (Hanoi) time on 24 December to zero
* A flurry of comment warned of "new U.S. military adventures"
at that time. See the 24 November TRENDS, pages 12-14.
** Similar PRG and PLAF cease-fire announcements were broadcast
on 1 December 1970. For a discussion of that propaganda see the
2 December 1970 TRENDS, pages 12-13.
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hour on the 27th; for the New Year, from zero hour on
31 December to zero hour on 3 January; and for the Nham Ty
Tet, from zero hour on 14 February to zero hour on 18 February.
Adhering closely to last year's PLAF order, the present one
specifies that the allies will be allowed freedom to carry
out holiday activities and to visit "1iiierated areas" during
the truces, as long as they do not travel in groups or carry
weapons or spy equipment. As in previous years, it warns
that allied violations of the cease-fires will be "duly
punished." The PRG statement and subsequent Front propaganda
maintain that if the "obdurate, perfidious, and bellicose"
Nixon Administration would seriously respond to the PRG's
seven-point proposal the war would end and the allied forces
could all go home to their families.
A Liberation Radio commentary on the 7th ridiculed recent
"vague remarks" by President Thieu about holiday cease-fires,
commenting that the latest ARVN incursion into Cambodia
renders meaningless any call for a truce by Thieu. The radio
does not specify that Thieu, in a 4 December speech before
a class of graduating officers, reaffirmed that the Saigon
government would as usual enact holiday cease-fires, adding
that he would decide on the times of the truces.
PRG PUTS DRV ELABORATION OF SEV.N-POINT PLAN ON PARIS RECORD
DRV elaborations of the demands in the PRG's seven-point
proposal--spelled out by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in his
20 November speech in Peking and in the PRC-DRV joint communique
on the visit--wets put on the record at the 2 December session of
the Paris talks by PRG deputy delegation head Dinh Ba Thi.*
Both the VNA and LPA accounts note that Thi specified that under
point one on U.S. "cessation of aggression" and troop withdrawal
the United States "must cease all military acts, including
those of the air force and navy, against the people in both
* For a discussion, see the TRENDS of 24 November 1971, pages
5-8. Because of the Thanksgiving recess the 2 December session
of the Paris talks is the first held since Dong's visit to
China.
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zones of Vietnam."* And he-explained that point two means that
the United States "must renounce all support and commitments to
the bellicose Nguyen Van Thiou clique . . . ." Both VNA and
LPA also note that Thi repeated that the seven points form a
"single entity."
DRV delegate Xuan Thuy referred only briefly to the seven
points and did not spell out any of the sub-tance. Moreover,
VNA glosses over some of the remarks he dia make. T19-sus, it
reports him as saying that the seven-point plan "still offers
the most correct basis" for peacefully settling the Vietnam
problem--as opposed to the Nixon Doctrine and Vietna.mizaeion.
But VNA ignores his further remarks that the PRG deicgate
"explained how points one and two are inseparable and thi
delegate of the DRV has also expressed his views."
VNA neglects to report that the PRG's Thi acknowledged some
of the substance of the other five points of the 1 July
proposal, saying that they offered "appropriate solutions"
also to the questions of the Vietnamese armed forces in South
Vietnam, ..eaceful reunification, relations between the two
zones of Vietnam, South Vietnam's external policy of peace
and neutrality and such "concrete problems" as cease-fire
and the total release of military men of all parties. It has
been more usual in recent months for the Paris delegates to
mention the substance of only points one and two, if that.
The VNA account notes, however, that Thi said if the United
States does respond positively to the proposal "the war will
be ended, peace will be restored, all U.S. military men including
those captured will be able to return home soon in safety and a
new relation will be established between the United States and
South Vietnam."
* This closely parallels the formulation in the joint communique.
Dong in his 20 November speech had demanded an end "to all
military acts, in any form and from any place whatsoever, against
the Vietnamese people in the two zones." Foreign Minister Nguyen
Duy Trinh in his 24 October speech during the DPRK delegation's
visit to Hanoi had referred to an end to "all U.S. air and naval
activities," and the joint DPRK-DRV communique had specified air
and naval activities "in South Vietnam." Subsequent propaganda
echoed the latter formulation, and it was voiced by PRG delegate
Nguyen Van Tien at the 4 November Paris session, buz this was not
reflected in the VNA account.
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VNA ignores much of Thi's lengthy documentation of his complaint
that the United States has attempted to achieve a "military
victory" through Vietnamization rather than respond to the PRG
proposal. But the account reports that Xuan Thuy took issue
with the President's statement--in his 12 November press
conference announcing the withdrawal of 45,000 more troops
in the next two months--that "Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine
in its purest form." Thuy scored U.S. involvement in Cambodia
from the March 1970 anti-Sihanouk coup to the recent move of
more ARVN troops into the country. Thuy also called
contradictory the President's "repeated statements that he
was furthering 'Vietnamization' while negotiating."
POW ISSUE The VNA account of the session totally ignores
the substance of Ambassador Porter's remarks;
in which, among other things, he again questioned the decreasing
volume of mail from U.S. POW's in the DRV. VNA says only that
the U.S. delegate "remained very stubborn and again resorted
to odious provocative allegations."
The 7 December Liberation Radio commentary on implementation of
the PRG's call for holiday cease-fires labeled as "hypocritical"
both Thieu's remarks on a cease-fire and the "U.S. Paris
delegate's plea" that POW's be allowed to send letters to
their families. It asked whether the U.S. claim that it is
concerned "about the U.S. troops' feelings regarding Christmas"
has any meaning when it has "stubbornly rejected" the PRG's
seven-point initiative.
The prisoner issue was also raised in a "current events" talk
broadcast by Hanoi radio in Mandarin on 2 December. Pressing
the standard line that the way to allow the prisoners to rejoin
their families is to accept the 774 proposal, the broadcast
deprecated the President's remark in his 12 November press
conference that further U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam
would depend, among other things, on progress in the problem
of releasing U.S. prisoners of war. It suggested that the
President sees the Christmas season as an opportunity to placate
public opinion and pave the way for next year's elections.
PRC-DRV TRADE AGRE'EVENT. PROTOCOLS ON AID REPORTED
Further publicity for Chinese assistance to the DRV came with
the signing on 5 December of a Sino-DR.V trade agreement and
protocols on the supply of materials. NCNA and VNA reported
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that an agreement on "mutual supply of goods and payments for
1972" and two protocols on China's supplying of "general goods"
and "complete projects" in 1972 were signed. According to the
reports, the protocols were in accordance with the 27 September
Sino-DRV agreement on economic and military assistance. The
signators were, as usual, PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Trade
Li Chiang and his DRV counterpart, Ly Ban. PRC Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien attended the ceremony, as he did last year, and
members of a DRV "experts delegation" were present. An
"experts delegation," led by Ly Ban, had arrived in Peking
on 28 August. Ly Ban had returned to Hanoi to participate
in the talks during Li Hsien-nien's visit when the aid
agreement was signed, and he was again present in Pekiag
when the Pham Van Dong delegation visited from 20 to 27
November.
The signing of a trade agreement some time after the annual
PRC-DRV aid agreement has been standard practice, but last
year was the first time protocols on economic cooperation had
also been publicized.* The accords last year, signed on
31 October, included four protocols. Three were concluded
between the two governments, dealing with Chinese supply to
the DRV of materials, aid in the form of "complete projects,"
and the living standard and working conditions of Chinese
technical personnel sent to Vietnam. A protocol on Chinese
delivery to the DRV of equipment and materials for "complete
projects" was also concluded between the PRC Commission for
Economic Relations with Foreign Countries and the DRV Ministry
of Foreign Trade. The same individuals, Li Chiang and Ly Ban,
signed all the agreements.
There is no report this time of a protocol regarding Chinese
technicians, but they continue to receive publicity in other
propaganda. For example, aid personnel were reported as being
present at activities during the visits to North Vietnam of
Li Hsien-nien in September and Chou En-lai in March.
* See the TRENDS of 4 November 1970, pages 10-11.
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FBIS TRENDS
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PRAVDA ARTICLE DISSECTS MAOISM. NOTES LIN PIAO'S FALL
Moscow has provided its most comprehensive analysis of the China
problem since the recent Peking leadership reshuffle. A lengthy
theoretical disquisition in PRAVDA on 5 December by leading
academician P. Fedoseyev carries forward the Soviet ideological
offensive against Peking's flexible policies by taking account
of the purge of Lin Piao and other important figures in the
Chinese military hierarchy. While taking a notably sanguine
view of the prospects of anti-Maoist forces in China in the
long term, the article's basic message is that the communist
movement under Moscow's aegis must sustain its ideological attack
designed to discredit the Maoist leadership and to check Peking's
growing influence in world affairs.
The use of the theoretical approach in providing an account of
the Chinese purge reflects the sensitivity of the subject,
which Moscow has handled cautiously since tell-tale anomalies
began appearing in the PRC. It is also in keeping with the
use of quasischolarly methods for conducting Moscow's
ideological campaign against the Chinese. On 1 December
Moscow reported that a conference on Soviet Sinology ending
that day had noted the "importance of the tasks of unmasking
the anti-Marxist essence of Maoism." Previously, PRAVDA on
14 November announced that a new quarterly on "Problems of
the Far East" would be started next year to deal with Soviet
policy in that area.
The Fedoseyev article ends with the claim that "exposure of
the anti-Leninist chauvinistic ideology and policy of
Maoism is seen by genuine Marxist-Leninists as an
indispensable condition" for strengthening communist unity.
Citing the 24th CPSU Congress' line on Sino-Soviet relations,
Fedoseyev observes that Moscow's effort to normalize state
relations with the PRC "is also served by the ideological-
political struggle against 'left' revisionism."
CRITIQUE OF Fedoseyev's article, "On the Ideological-
PURE MAOISM Political Essence of Maoism," pursues its
task with an intransigence that consigns Mao
beyond even the bounds of d~viationism. It is impossible,
according to Fedoseyev, to accommodate the Maoist interpretation
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of Marxism-Leninism within the framework of "a dogmatic-
sectarian, 'leftist' interpretation." Worse than that,
"Maoism is Sinicized social chauvinism of which Chinese social
militarism constitutes the nucleus"--a charge contrived to
turn back on Peking the type of labels it pins on the Soviets
for practicing "social imperialism" and "social fascism.`
Fedoseyev dismisses Maoist doctrine as an eclectic farrago
of views, theories, and concepts in which great-power
nationalism is the underlying motif. The use of whatever
serves nationalistic and "great-Han chauvinist purposes''
demonstrates "the narrowly utilitarian and pragmatic nature`:
of the theory and practice of Maoism, according to Fedoseyev's
analysis. Though his argument is developed mainly on the
theoretical plane, this line of analysis serves Moscow's
purpose of discreu{.ting the more flexible policies Peking has
been pursuing, such. ae its invitation to President Nixon.
Thus, in an allusion to this flexibility, Fedoseyev charges
that the Maoists advance those tenets which serve their
utilitarian needs at a given historical stage without con;:ern
for logic and continuity. In another passage, alluding to
Peking's use of the theory of contradictions to justify new
approaches to the United States as a means of isolating the
Soviet Union as the main enemy, he claims teat the Maoists
posit relations of unity or struggle depending on whatever
serves their great-power aims.
Fedoseyev does single out one issue, Indochina, in presenting
his theoretical indictment. He charges that "Mao's group"
hinders unity of action on Indochina, "in essence" pursuing
"a policy of compromise with the imperialist forces on an
anti-Soviet basis." Ile also complains that the Maoists are
creating an atmosphere of war hysteria in China.
CHINESE PURGE The Fedoseyev article is notable for its
account of the recent Chinese leadership
upheaval, which may in fact be the occasion for this
theoretical exercise. According to Fedoseyev, the role of a
gendarmerie given to the People's Liberation Army in the
cultural revolution led to ferment within the army and to
disaffection toward Mao. The army thus became ''a dangerous
hotbed of anti Maoist feelings," and for this reason "the
Maoists at present are conducting purges" aimed at
"mercilessly nipping in the very bud the anti-Maoist movement"
in the PLA.
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In taking brief note of Lin Piao's disappeara?ie--he "no longer
figures as Mao's successor"--Fedoseyev recalls that the PTA had
been prepared before the cultural revolution for the major
role it was to play in that upheaval. It had been Lin, in fact,
who was in charge of fashioning the army into an instrument
serving Mao's political purposes. Fedoseyev explains that
having completed the cultural revolution, in which the PLA
played a decisive part, Mao then turned on the military
leadership. "The meaning of this maneuver is obvious,"
Fedoseyev points out cryptically.
Fedoseyev's caution is characteristic of Moscow's reaction to
thr Chinese leadership reshuffle. Instead of coming to terms
directly with the issues and implications, Moscow has had
recourse to foreign comment for assessments of the significance
of recent developments in China. Thus, LITERARY GAZETTE on
1 December carried excerpts from an Italian article on Lin
Piao's disgrace which traces the conflict between Mao and Lin
to questions involving foreign policy, mainly relations with
the United States and the Soviet Union, resources allocated to
the army, and the army's role in running the country.
"GENUINE" COMMUNISTS Fedoseyev's article concludes with a
relatively confident portrayal of the
strength of anti-Maoist forces in China and of the effects of
pressure from the international communist movement. While
acknowledging that Mao's "great-power chauvinist group" is
maintaining its control in Peking, Fedoseyev claims that
"powerful social, political, and sociological forces" within
China and abroad are working to defend the country's
socialist achievements and to restore Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism. The "genuine" communists in
China have suffered a temporary reversal, Fedoseyev notes,
"but they have not laid down their arms."
The invocation of the "genuine" communists opposing Maoism
has been a recurrent theme in Moscow's ideological campaign
for the past five years. It serves, among other things, to
legitimize Moscow's effort to mobilize collective pressure
within the communist movement against the anathematized
Maoist faction. Thus, Fedoseyev claims that Mocow's "principled
Leninist policy" and the international communist movement are
influencing developments in China, citing in this connection the
"condemnation of Maoism" at the June 1969 world party conference
and at congresses of the fraternal parties. These pressures
"cannot fail to take effect on the situation in China," he asserts.
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ANTI-CHINESE ATTACKS The current Polish party congress, which
AT POLISH CONGRESS opened a day after Fedoseyev's article,
exemplifies his point about polemical
pressure on the Chinese at such forums as party congresses.
Polish First Secretary Gierek's report on the opening day
included an indictment of Peking's "scissionist course." While
Brezhnev on the 7th ignored the Chinese-, party chiefs of: Moscow's
loyalist allies weighed in with attacks on Peking's policies.
However, there was no discussion of the recent leadership
developments in the PRC.
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C H I NA
ARTICLE ON "PRAIRIE FIRE" LETTER SEEMS DIRECTED AT LIN
An article in RED FLAG No. 13, authored by the Yunnan Provincial
CCP Committee, examines the "revolutionary truth" of one of Mao's
most renowned works, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire."
The title alone, all that is available so far, suffices to
indicate that the current drive against "political swindlers"
is being directed more explicitly against Lin Piao.
The piece by Mao, written in January 1930, Teas published in early
collections of his works under the title, "Letter to Comrade Lin
Piao." In the letter, Mao warned Lin against the danger of
defeatism and instructed him that, although the outlook at the
time appeared bleak, disunity among its enemies would result in
victory for the CCP. The title was presumably altered in order
to save Lin from embarrassment, and the editor of Mao's "Selected
Works" notes simply that the piece "was a letter written by" Mao
"in criticism of certain pessimistic views then existing in the
party." The letter, somewhat avuncular in tone, was frequent.LJ
cited during the cultural revolution, often--or so it seemed--
as an implicit example of the longterm teacher-student
relationship between Mao and Lin.
A recent broadcast by the Shensi provincial radio, referring
to the "Prairie Fire" article, suggests that it is to be part
of the indictment against Lin, evidence that his unreliability
extends back some 40 years. The 27 November broadcast reported
that a PLA company had read "Prairie Fire" in the course of a
study of the history of the civil war. All members of the unit,
it was said, noted that just as the revolution met with temporary
difficulties "a number of opportunists in the party spread
certain pessimistic ideas . . . in a vain attempt to weaken
party morale and slow down the revolution." "Precisely at this
moment," the broadcast observed, Mao countered the attack by
writing "Prairie Fire."
"BOURGEOIS MILITARY LINE" PUSHED BY "SWINDLERS" IS ATTACKED
Some lessening of the PLA's direct control over local administrative
work--possibly one of the issues involved in the struggle in which
Lin Piao fell--is seen in recent press articles which stress the
need for the army to lay more attention to improvement of military
skills. Such a stress departs sharply from the norms of the
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cultural revolution, when propagandists singled out the PLA's
role in revolution and production and appeared to assume that
military affairs could take care of themselves. While
complete withdrawal of the PLA from its civilian tasks is
certainly not being suggested now, the injunctions to
increase attention to military skills would seem to load
inevitably to a lowered attention to politics. Also, along
with the calls for greater attention to military skills, there
are indications that PLA influence on party committees and
revolutionary committees is being eroded through injunctions
to follow "unified leadership" rather than allow dominance
by the (usually military) leading members of the committees.
Radio Peking on 3 December told how a PLA unit within the
Shenyang Military Region had "correctly" handled the relationship
between politics and military affairs. The report noted that
while "politics must be put in command of military affairs . . .
it cannot be substituted for m:litary affairs." It was
specifically argued that "giving prominence to politics
does not mean that it is no longer necessary to solve many
concrete problems in military training." Recalling the
historical lesson to be learned from Lo Jui-ching's mistaken
attempt to ignore politics and concentrate only on military
development, the report declared that criticism of "the purely
military viewpoint" is "not aimed at opposing military
training." It was forcefully asserted that "the fallacy of
totally separating military affairs from politics runs
counter to Chairman Mao's line cn army building."
The report then described in some detail how a gun captain
within the unit who once "overemphasized politics without
being realistic in target practice" had overcome this
shortcoming and learned to handle correctly the relationship
between politics and military affairs. After studying.past
attempts to "undermine Chairman Mao's line on army building
from the extreme left," he "realized that to carry out
ideological-political work without being realistic is also
incompatible with Chairman Mao's line on army building."
With this deepened understanding of the relationship between
politics and military affairs, he was able to do a "good
job in carrying out ideological-political work" and also in
"arousing the enthusiasm of the comrades for mastering
military skills."
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The same theme was utilized in P. 22 November 11ofei radio report
:.r the ideological progress of me^ibers of the party committee
of model PLA unit 6408--which is commanded by Li Te-sheng,
Anhwei's first party secretary and an alternate politburo
member, who has been making regular appearances in Peking
in his post as chief of the General Political Department.
While studying ways to strengthen his ability to "distinguish
between genuine and sham Marxism," one of the party committee
members discovered that because of the "bourgeois military
line" promoted by Liu Shao-chi and "other political swindlers . . .
some comrades were afraid to go all-out in grasping military
affairs." After intensifying their study of works by Marx,
Lenin and Mao, other members of the party committee were soon
able to "see clearly the new form of struggle between the two
different military lines under the new situation and to under-
stand the unity between politics and military affairs." This
understanding helped overcome the "erroneous idea of being
afraid to grasp military affairs" and thus "set in motion
military training and further stimulated political work."
A Chengtu press article on 16 November recalled that while
"sham Marxist political swindlers like Liu Shao-chi" negated
the commanding role of politics over military affairs from
the right by advocating "big contests of arms" they also
appeared later with "ultraleftist features and pursued empty
politics divorced from reality, setting politics and military
affairs against each other." The article urged emulation of
the example of Lu Hsun, who discovered "in good time and
mercilessly exposed sham Marxism of all hues," in order to
obtain a "good grasp of genuine Marxism" to help in "seeing
through and smashing" those enemies who "disguise themselves
as Marxists."
The need to find the proper balance between military work
and political studies was discussed in some detail in an
article by a PLA unit in Harbin broadcast by the Heilungkiang
provincial radio on 6 November. The article criticized
those within the unit who learned military skills but
neglected political studies as well as those who paid "great
attention to political studies and maintained that military
skills might be learned gradually later." It was firmly
warned that if this went unchecked "military skills, no
matter how good, could not serve their proper purposes and
political studies would be divorced from reality."
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After conducting education on Mao's line on army building,
members of this unit were able to criticize and struggle
against the "bourgeois military line" pushed by Liu Shao-chi
anu "other political swindlers." It was claimed that deeper
ideological work produced the realization that "substituting
politics for military affairs, or divorcing military affairs
from politics, is merely the reflection of the bourgeois
military line." With this new understanding the commander
of the unit was able to overcome his fear that "by grasping
military training, he would be labeled as having purely
military concepts," and he found it possible to "draw a
clear line of demarcation between grasping training well for
preparedness against war through putting politics in command,
and grasping military training alone."
COLLECTIVE Those PLA leaders who hold leading positions on
DECISIONS local revolutionary and party committees are now
under specific instructions to strengthen their
own party concept and to listen obediently to the collective
decisions of committee members. This thesis was argued in
some detail by Radio Peking on 3 December in a report on the
activities of Chin Ko-min, a secretary of the Yutien county
party committee in Hopei who is also head of the county's
armed forces department. The report stated that because of
Chin's efforts to carry out Mao's "revolutionary line while
doing 'three supports and two militaries' tasks" during the
cultural revolution "he was elected chairman of the county's
revolutionary committee, and when the .;ounty's party committee
was formed he was elected secretary of the committee."
Immediately following the formation of the new party committee,
however, veteran party members, "afraid they might make
mistakes" in carrying out their work assignments, would do
their work "only after getting the nod from Chin." Young
cadres with poor concepts of the party's organization "came
to Chin for consultations on the matters handled by them
more often than they went to report the matters to the
county's party committee."
Chin, aware of the need to be "modest and seek opinions" from
others, held that as secretary of the party committee "he
must place himself within the commitree and not outside it,
still less above it, so that the centralized leadership of
the party would not be weakened." He also recalled that
the fact that other committee members sought advice from
him instead of participating in collective leadership "was
an expression of their poor party concept."
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Chin attempted to correct those shortcomings by performing
exemplary actions which manifested his own party spirit. On
one occasion, for example, the standing committee had adopted
a resolution presented by him on using the county's working
capital to purchase production equipment for the county's
industries. Some members of the party committee, however,
opposed the resolution when the budget was submitted to the
plenary session of the committee. Chin then "immediately
withdrew the proposal"; another resolution "calling for self-
reliance was adopted, and the production equipment was
produced by the county itself."
PEKING POPULARIZES NEW 1YPE OF NEIGHBORHOOD STORE
An innovation on the commercial front is indicated in a recent
Radio Peking broadcast that tells of an experiment with small
neighborhood stores in a district of Peking. The 5 December
report explains that neighborhoods and factories are being
allowed to buy goods from the state commercial department and
sell them in neighborhood and factory canteens. It is said
the system results not only in more convenient service to the
people but in savings for the state as well. The broadcast
article outlines the system in such detail that it appears to
be offering the experimental stores as a national model.
The procedures for the neighborhood canteens include a number
of safeguards to forestall any .:esurgen..e of smallscale
capitalism. Nonetheless, the very existence of such stores,
providing a buffer between the purchaser and the .:tare?
constitutes a retreat from the purer forms of communism.
The rationale for the stores is that the state commercial
network has been unable to keep up with the needs of the
district, whore population has rapidly increased; some
found it necessary to walk a mile to buy basic necessities
such as food, thread, and cigarettes. This was not only
inconvenient, especially for people who worked during the
hours stores were open, but there are also hthts that it
may have interfered with factory production, causing some
factories to set up small shops on their own.
From this beginning, the decision was made to let factories
and neighborhoods set up stores using their own personnel and
equipment. The article notes that it was done over the
objections of some workers in commerce.
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The report specifies taut the stores should not be envisioned
as a retreat to the cooperative store or to a practice of
letting the neighborhoods run state commerce. Commercial
departments will exercise business controls and are to make
sure that the neighborhoods "adhere to the state unified
price policy"; goods in the canteens are not to cost more
than elsewhere. The neighborhoods will in theory only manage
the canteens under state guidance, and will arrange for the
commissions paid the store for selling goods to be correctly
distributed among those working in the store. As a further
safeguard, the stores are prohibited from selling any items
noc procured from the state, from bartering, or from credit
transactions. They cannot even shop around for better state
prices, but must buy at nearby sta.e stores at retail prices.
Yet there is an incentive for the canteen employeesto sell
more goods, an incentive not offered state employees.
Commissions paid to t1w- store (and thus to the employees)
increase as the volume grows; furthermore, the article
specifies that the percentage of commission paid will vary
with the volume of sales.
The new system of neighborhood canteens offers several clear
economic advantages to the state, and loopholes which would
allow bourgeois deviations are at least legally closed. The
state saves the capital expense of L,ilding large stores,
and it saves on salaries paid from government funds; it
wins popular favor, and it probably sells more goods, not
only because the stores are more convenient but because
the salespeople have an incentive to sell more.
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Va
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EUROPEAN SECURITY
PACT COMNUNIQUEo SOVIET LEADERS PRESS CONFERENCE PROPOSAL
Soviet bloc pressures for the convening of a European security
conference were sustained with the release on 2 December of
the communique on the meeting of the Warsaw Pact foreign
ministers in Warsaw. The communique on the 30 November-
1 December meeting--like the communique on the last Warsaw
Pact foreign minister:,' meeting in Bucharest in February--
endorses the November 1970 Finnish proposal for the opening
of multila..eral preparatory consultations among all states
concerned and announc s that the Pact governments have
decides; to appoint plenipotentiaries to take part in
preparatory meetings. The communique says that such meetings
should consider, among other things, the agenda of an all-
European conference.
Listing the steps contributing to an easing of tension in
Europe, the communique c.tes the four-power accord on Berlin
and the "deepening of political cooperation" between the USSR
and France. Additionally, it points to 1972 as the year in
which the convening of a conference is possible, a line that
has appeared frequently in propaganda since Brezhnev's October
visit to France. Both Brezhnev in Warsaw, in his 7 December
speech at the Polish party congress, and Kosygin during his
visits to Denmark and Norway have raised the possibility of
holding the conference next year. Speaking in Copenhagen on
the 3d, Kosygin said a conference could be held in 1972 "if
no obstacles are raised artifically"; in the same speech, he
cited the 1 December Pact communique on readiness to appoint
plenipotentiaries to take part in preparatory meetings.
The communique appeals; to the governments of all European
states, as well as to those of the United States and
Canada, to begin preparations for a conference in order
to insure its convocation in 1972. While the February
communique did not name the United States and Canada, the
memorandum following a Pact fore.'^n ministers' meeting in
June 1970 had formalized the bid to both countries, and
subsequent propaganda has regularly included Washington and
Ottawa among the likely participants.
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8 DECEMBER 1971
KOSYGIN HINTS TROOP REDUCTION COULD BE ON CONFERENCE AGENDA
The 2 December Pact communique failed to mention the Brezhnev
proposal--surfaced in his 31 March 1971 report to the CPSU
Congress--for the opening of talks on force and armaments
reductions in central Europc'. But Kosygin in his 3 December
speech in Copenhagen intimated that the force-reduction
proposal might be discussed at a European security conference.
As reported by TASS, he noted Soviet interest in seeing the
governments of all European states exerting their efforts at
ensuring lasting security in Europe, "at reductions of armed
forces and armaments," at disarmament, and at pursuing a
policy of peace; he concluded that it is "particularly these
questions" that the USSR and its allies hope to solve at a
European security conference. AFP cited Kosygin as telling
newsmen in Oslo on the 7th that if the European security
conference were held soon, "problems surrounding the mutual
and balanced force reduction question could be incorporated
into the meeting."* The TASS account of this press conference,
while noting Kosygin's endorsement of a European security
conference, did not broach the force-reduction issue.
Brezhncev in Warsaw mentioned the force-reduction proposal
only in passing, observing that a radical improvement in
the political climate in Europe and a solution of "all-
European problems, including a cut in armed forces and
armaments, would correspond to the interests of all mankind."
Both the 5 December Soviet-Danish and 7 December Soviet-
Norwegian communiques note the importance of achieving
practical results on the problem of mutual reduction of
armed forces and armaments in Europe "where the military
confrontation is particularly dangerous," adding that
reductions must be made without detriment to the interests
of participating states. This formulation, which first
* The memorandum of the 21-22 June 1970 meeting of Pact
foreign ministers in Budapest had proposed that a European
security conference discuss as an agenda item "the establishment
of a body concerned with questions of European security and
cooperation." It added that in the Pact members' view, it
would help to promote security in Europe if the reduction of
"foreign" armed forces on the territory of European states
were discussed, either in the newly proposed permanent body
"or in other ways acceptable to the states concerned."
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appeared in the 18 September 1971 communique following
Chancellor Brandt's meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea,
has since been widely repeated in routine Soviet propaganda
and in subsequent communiques with NATO members. (The
30 October Soviet-French declaration, however, did not treat
the problem of force reductions.)
While Soviet propaganda in early October had acknowledged
that former NATO Secretary-Gen,ira1 Brosio had been selected
as the alliance's emissary to discuss force cuts in Moscow,
subsequent propaganda not unexpectedly has remained silent
on his unsuccessful efforts to meet with Soviet representatives
on this question.
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GERMANY AND BERLIN
FBIS TRENL `3
8 DECEMBER 1971
GDR BLAMES WEST FOR DELAY IN SIGNING OF INNER-GERMAN ACCORDS
The East Berlin press, radio, television, and ADN launched a bitter
propaganda barrage on 4 December accusing the West in general and
the West Berlin Senat and Governing Mayor Schuetz in particular of
"torpedoing" plans for ceremonies that day to initial draft accords
worked out in the inner-German phase of negotiations following the
3 September Big Four agreement on Berlin. Noting that the negotia-
tions between FRG and GDR State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl on an
East-West German transit agreement were "successfully" completed
on the 3d, East Berlin media have professed "incredulity" over FRG
willingness to permit a linkage between the Bahr-Kohl talks and
the stalled negotiations between Senat representative Mueller and
GDR State Secretary Kohrt on travel and visits by West Berliners
to the GDR and on the question of enclaves.
East Berlin's comment has been at pains to underscore the GDR's
"accommodating attitude" in botli.sets of talks, against the
background of evident Soviet pressures for their conclusion in
November--prior to the 9-10 December NATO Council session, in
light of. NATO's position that the Berlin problem should be
solved before the West can move ahead to consideration of a
conference on European security and cooperation.
Buttressing the insistent portrayal of GDR good will and anxiety
for completion of the inn'-,r-German phase, East Berlin media dis-
closed on the 4th that the GDR had offered a "special concession"
if the agreements had been, initialed that day. According to
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 5th, West Berliners would have been
able to visit East Berlin and "other areas of the GDR" during
the coming Christmas holidays for the first time since 1966.
Other GDR media emphasized that this would have been allowed
even if the final protocol putting the Berlin agreement into
effect had not yet been signed by the Big Four. (Chancellor
Brandt confirmed the GDR's Christmas-visits offer on the 8th.)
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND declared on the 6th that the GDR was still
"prepared to initial the agreements without delay." Ignoring
the Senat's call for further discussion on remaining differences
in the Muller-Kohrt talks, ADN reported of the 7th that State
Secretary Peter Florin would replace Kohrt--who had "fallen ill
and has to undergo hospital treatment"--to conduct talks with
the Senat "for the final preparation of the initialing of the
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8 December 1971
agreements." ADN reported the upshot of the Florin-Kohrt meet-
ing, which materialized in the early hours of 8 December, In an
announcement later that day that "the talks showed again that
there is complete agreement between the two sides" on the two
agreements under negotiation but that the Senat representative
"again was not ready or authorized to initial these documents."
Ignoring the West German charges made public earlier in the day
that the GDR Government had repudiated its own representative's
tentative agreement to a resolution of the remaining differences,
ADN claimed that the Senat representative "raised further
unacceptable demands which he wanted inserted in minutes already
agreed on." The ADN report concluded with the stock assurance
that the East German side affirmed its readiness to sign both
agreements "without delay,"
NOVEMBER DEADLINE The mounting Soviet pressures on the East
Germans to wind up the negotiations had
come sharply into focus in East German and Soviet media during
Brezhnev's brief stopover in East Berlin on 31 October-1 November
en route home from France. Although both he and Honecker
referred in luncheon speeches to "full unanimity" of views;
the joint communique on the visit included no such formula.
It did state that Honecker informed Brezhnev about the "progress"
of the inner-German talks and that Brezhnev "expressed support
for the businesslike and constructive position" of the GDR and
for GDR "efforts directed at the quickest possible conclusion" of
the talks--something less than unqualified Soviet approbation.
Honecker had said in his luncheon speech that the GDR was doing
everything possible to reach a "positive conclusion" as soon as
possible.
Four days later, in a speech at a reception marking the October
Revolution anniversary, Honecker specified that the GDR was
"interested in concluding the negotiations . . . in November
if possible.' And the GDR's "interest" in a November conclusion
was reiterated by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Chief Editor Herrmann in an
article in PRAVDA on 16 November, as well as by Foreign Minister
Winzer in a speech at a diplomatic dinner in East Berlin on the
17th. The intensity of the Soviet pressures behind these avowals
was brought into sharp relief the next day when PRAVDA political
commentator Zhukov misquoted Honecker. According to Zhukov, Honecker's
statement that "the current talks among the GDR, the FRG, and
the West Berlin Senat can and must be successfully concluded
this November st_'l1 further intensified hopes for the construc-
tive development of events in Europe."
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On the 19th, the East Germans further escalated their assurances
that they were making all-out efforts to conclude the talks,
while attempting to shift the onus for the delays to the West.
The SED Politburo report to the Central Committee plenum that
day stated that the GDR has "repeatedly stressed" that it was
"ready to make concessions" in the talks in the interests of
European peace and security, adding that the FRG and the Senat
must be "equally willing to show realism" if the talks were to
succeed.
As the momentum increased in the inner-German talks in the latter
half of November, Winzer stated in a Dresden speech on the 25th
that the GDR was "showing an accommodation to achieve an understand-
ing" in the talks with the FRG within the limits of the GDR's
sovereign rights. The CPSU Central Committee plenum resolution
on the party's international activity, released by TASS on
23 November, glaringly omitted any reference to the Berlin
agreement in listing European developments. However, the "West
Berlin" agreement was duly cited as one of the "milestones"
leading to an improved European political situation in the
2 December communique of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers'
meeting. The communique also said that the ministers expressed
"satisfaction" at the GDR stand contributing to a "successful
course" in the talks. The 30 November communique on FRG Foreign
Minister Scheel's visit to the USSR and the communiques on
Kosygin's visits to Denmark and Norway, issued on 5 and 7 December
respectively, routinely expressed hope that the talks would be
concluded shortly.
With the November deadline imminent, the GDR Government's
programmatic statement read by Premier Stoph on the 29th again
conveyed the sense of urgency about winding up the talks.
Noting that the talks "recently advanced a good deal," Stoph
said "it is necessary and possible to conclude them soon; this
requires that all parties proceed constructively to solve
related questions."
In his speech to the Polish party congress on 7 December,
Brezhnev limited his remarks on the subject to the statement
that the "working out of an agreement between the GDR and the
FRG and the West Berlin Senat on questions relating to" West
Berlin, along with the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn,
GDR and FRG membership in the United Nations, and a settlement
of problems between Prague and Bonn, "will bring the postwar
period of European development to an end." Brezhnev left it
to Polish leader Gierek to state that ratification of the
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Moscow and Warsaw treaties "will also facilitate the effective
implementation of the important agreement of the Four powers on
West Berlin"; at the elite level, Moscow has scrupulously avoided
suggesting this "reverse linkage," the notion'that the treaties
must be ratified before the final Berlin protocol can be signed,
turning around Bonn's insistence that signing of the paotocol is
a precondition for ratification.
WVTIENTARIES RELEASE DETAILS OF SENAT-GDR AGREEMENTS
The SED Politburo announced on the evening of 3 December that it
"fully and entirely" approved reports by Kohl and Kohrt "on the
conclusion" of their respective negotiations and recommended to
the GDR Council of Ministers that both be authorized to initial
the respective agreements. Referring on the 4th to the "success-
fully" concluded Bahr-Kohl agreement, the media divulged no
details. But details on two prospective Senat-GDR accords,
still held up in the Mueller-Kohrt negotiations, were made public
for the first time in GDR media in the course of the concerted
propaganda assault on West Berlin Mayor Schuetz for allegedly
undermining plans to get all the agreements initialed that day.
ADN on the 4th for the first time reported the titles of the two
prospective Senat-GDR agreements--on "Alleviations and Improve-
ments in Travel and Visits" and "The Settlement of the Question
of Enclaves by Territorial Exchanges." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the
next day discussed in detail the visit and travel provisions of
the first agreement, without acknowledging the two outstanding
Senat demands that visits be allowed 365 days a year on demand
and that they be made by private car if desired. On the 6th the
paper took note of these demands and rejected them.
Rebutting Schuetz' statement to the effect that he considered
the Mueller-Kohrt agreements "unacceptable," the SED paper on
the 5th revealed the following allegedly agreed provisions of
the travel accord, with a prefatory "as we have learned":
West Berliners could receive permission to visit once ~.ir
several times a year, for an annual total of 30 days, "the
GDR capital" and all of the GDR for purposes based on "humani-
tarian, family, religious, cultural, and tourist grounds." A
personal identification document and GDR entry and exit permits
would be required, and the latter two could be obtained on
application to the authorized bodies. West Berliners, the
paper said, could receive entry permits at the border crossing
points but must produce vouchers or telegrams confirmed by
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competent GDR organs. Thus the GDR version contained no pro-
cedure for possible immediate entry on demand, which Schuetz
in a statement on the 6th had maintained should flow from the
four-power agreement's stipulation that West Berliners should
be allowed to travel to East Berlin on the same basis as West
Germans.
The next day, in coming directly to grips with Schuetz' "absurd"
demands "that West Berliners be guaranteed entry permission--by
car--on all 365 drys on the year," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND argued that
there is not "a single word" about 365 days or about "promised
entry by car" in the four-power agreement. Maintaining that the
GDR as a "sovereign state" decides the mode of entry into its
territory, "in what way, for how long, and often," the paper
remarked caustically that for a stay of 30 days West Berliners
can use the railroads, aircraft, subways, streetcars, taxis, and
other means of ;transport--"they should suffice to get West
Berliners into the GDR."
Regarding the agreement on enclaves, the paper specified on the
5th that West Berlin would receive "a link, belonging to West
Berlin, between Steinstuecken and West Berlin" and that an
exchange of other parcels of territory between West Berlin and
the GDR was to take place.
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POLISH CONGRESS
FBIS TRENDS
8 DECEMBER 1971
IMPACT OF DECEMBER EVENTS PERVADES OPENING SPEECHES
Following First Secretary Gierek's opening report to the Sixth
Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) Congress on 6 December, which
spelled out an elaborate program to remedy the "bitter" experiences
of December 1970, Brezhnev the next day endorsed Gierek's
corrective efforts and conveyed a veiled warning that orthodox
principles must continue to be observed. The 70 foreign party
delegations to'the congress include all the Warsaw Pact country
first secretaries--including Romania's Ceausescu, who had sent
lower-ranking figures to the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East
German party congresses this year after attending the CPSU
congress in April. Attendance at the congress of the softer-
lining Polish party provides Ceausescu with a convenient means
to counteract the impression of Rc-nania's growing isolation
within the Warsaw Pact.
BREZHNEV SPEECH Attending his fourth East European party
congress this year, Brezhnev used language
reminiscent of his remarks at the May CPCZ congress, with
reference to the Czechoslovak 1968 events, when he invoked
"historical experience" in noting that "individual omissions
and mistakes, sometimes serious ones, are not ruled out in
the great work of socialia- construction." He added: "But
what is important is that they stem not from the nature of
socialism as a social system" and its basic principles but
occur "when there is some departure from these principles,
some violation of them." In this connection, the Soviet
leader warned that "we communists are answerabl:: for the
destinies of our country, for a correct course of socialist
development."
Brezhnev registered generally low-keyed approval of the Gierek
regime's reform measures, which are mainly concerned with a
greater voice for the workers in party decision-making and a
better lot for the consumer: "We respect the principled and
courageous approach of the P-alish United Workers Party to
correcting negative developments that have taken place." He
noted further "a great and sincere concern for the interests
of the working people, for a constant strengthening of the ties
with the working masses, concern which is displayed by your
party and its Central Committee led by the true son of the
Polish working class, our friend and comrade Edward Gierek."
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The Soviet leader's tribute to Gierek fell somewhat short of his
accolades for Kadar, Zhivkov, and Honecker at their respective
party congresses. In Budapest in November 1970, he hailed "that
true son of the Hungarian people and outstanding and respected
figure in the international communist and workers movement,
Comrade Janos Kadar." In Sofia in April 1971, he praised
"the eminent leader of the international communist movement,
our great friend, Comrade Todor Zhivkov." And in East Berlin
in June, he said "our respected friend and comrade Erich
Honecker, a steadfast antifascist, an outstanding organizer
of the party and state construction of the republic, enjoys
the great confidence of communists and of all working people
of the GDR." In May at the Prague congress Brezhnev avoided
a personal tribute to Husak, praising instead the CPCZ and
"its leaders, Comrade Gustav Husak, Ludvik Svoboda, and
others" and voicing thanks for the praise of the CPSU by
"Comrade Gustav Husak and other comrades who have spoken here."
Brezhnev stopped short of reiterating the limited-sovereignty
concept that he had spelled out at the Polish party congress
in November 1968, but he reminded the Poles that their
"irrevocable" entry onto the path of socialism and into the
"unified family of socialist countries" meant that their
"freedom and independence are guaranteed once and for all
and without conditions." He prefaced this statement with a
reference to the protection Poland enjoys by virtue of its
membership in the Warsaw Pact.
GIEREK REPORT The PZPR leader balanced his denunciation
of the negative legacy of Gomulka's
leadership with praise for the fallen leader in a historical
context. He recalled that "great services were rendered to
the party in the final -tage of the struggle against the
Wazi invader and in the first years of the people's power by
Wladyslaw Gomulka," praising also the early "contribution"
by the purged Stalinist Bierut.
In preparing the present congress, Gierek declared, the PZPR
"bore in mind the bitter and painful experience of the social
conflict which our country went through one year ago." He
went on to recall that the seventh and eighth plenums of the
PZPR, in December and February, respectively, had "formulated
a correct and exhaustive evaluation of the essence and
causes of the December events." He added: "Our party has
drawn the indispensable lessons and conclusions from the
December events."
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Without making any new direct attack on Gomulka's leadership,
to judg,_ from PAP's sum:iary of the report, Gierek said "the
errors in policy and deformations in the methods of management"
which his regime had to overcome "arose first of all. from the
infringement of the general Leninist norms of the construction
of socialism." Further underscoring the orthodoxy of the
present Polish course, he said his regime had "restored the
Leninist principles, overcome serious diffa.sulties, carried
out a great work, and led the country onto the correct road."
And he asserted Poland's "deep gratitude" to the fraternal
parties, "particularly to the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, for having understood the essence of the difficulties
we encountered."
Gierek insisted that the Polish socialist state "under the
existing conditions fulfils the function of the dictatorship
of the proletariat" and declared that in party cadre policy
and in "inner-party democracy," the observance of "Leninist
teachings is the basic guarantee that socialist development
will be continued correctly, without important errors and
tremors." Again underscoring fealty to the USSR, he stated
that Poland's international policy has as its "cornerstone"
fraternal relations with the Soviet Union.
The PZPR leader's commitment to improve conditions for the
populace was underscored by his preoccupation, during the
bulk of the speech, with prospects in the 1971-75 plan for
such features as increased consumer goods production, higher
real wages, larger old-age and disability pensions, better
housing, and increased agricultural production--still F5
percent in the private sector in Poland, in contrast to
generally complete collectivization in the other East
European Warsaw Pact countries. "The whole nation,"
Gierek declared, "wants a more affluent and better life,"
and "we have no right to frustrate those hopes and
expectations."
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YUGOSLAVIA
TITO REBUKES CROATIAN LEADERS, CALLS FOR PARTY CRACKDOWN
President Tito used h'9 keynote speech at the 21st League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Presidium meeting on 1-2 December
in Karodordevo, Vojvodina, to denounce supporters of the Zagreb
student strike and to make his harshest public attack to date on
the Croatian party leadership. Characterizing the strike--which
began on 23 November as a p-otest against the foreign exchange
system--as "a counterrevolutionary" act, he criticized the
Croatian leaders for failing to take action to prevent it and
for tolerating the existence of counterrevolutionary groups
and activities in the republic. In an evident effort to muster
public support, particularly among the workers, for Tito's hard-
line attitude toward the students and nationalist elements, the
Yugoslav press gave the speech frontpage publicity and followed
up with reports of widespread approval for it.
In a windup speech the next day, however, Tito pulled back to a
more conciliatory stance; and the Presidium's formal conclusions,
while expressing "full support" for the assessment offered in
Tito's keynote speech, made no reference to "counterrevolutionary"
activity in Croatia and expressed confidence in the Croatian party
leaders' ability to cope with their own "difficulties." The
Presidium's decision to adjourn the two-day meeting without taking
action and to let the Croatians put their own house in order seems
to reflect the reluctance of the major republican party leaders to
set a precedent that might later be used against them. It also
points up the erosion of the federal party's authority in the wake
of the decentralization process that has given unprecedented power
to republic party leaders.
Apparently capitulating to Tito's warning and to other pressures
to end their walkout, the Zagreb students decided to return to
class at a rally on the 3d. But the Radio Belgrade account of
the rally reported that the student leaders--in rebuttal to Tito's
assessment of the strike--ina isted that it was not motivated by
nationalism or chauvinism and "was not organized in conjunction
with forces outside the country."
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TITO SPEECHES In his introductory speech to the Presidium on
1 December, Tito revealed that he had met with
the Croatian party leadership the day before and he,,, accused them
of not having taken effective measures to prevent the student
strike. It was not just students who were responsiLle for the
strike, Tito said, but also "negative elements whose trail clearly
leads abroad" --an evident allusion to Croatian emigre groups.
Accusing the Croatian leaders of "passivity" in the face of these
"counterrevolutionary" activities, Tito angrily asserted that any
attempt to make "excuses" for auch activities would amount to "a
lack of vigilance, complacency, and rotten liberalism toward such
elements." More specifically, he went on to charge that the
Croatian leadership was in effect tolerating the existence of
"counterrevolutionary groups" where it should be taking "the
sharpest action" against them. In this context he mentioned the
nationalistic cultural organization Matica Hrvtska and assailed
the Zagreb daily VJESNIK for publishing "anticonstituttonal"
statements. He also singled out anti-self-management activities
of "the revolutionary committee of 50" as "counterrevolutionary."
Noting in a broader context that the LCY is being "reorganized,"
Tito repeated the familiar theme that the party has many members
who should have been removed, and he recommended--as in the past,
without naming them--that such people be expelled as soon as
possible and that all "counterrevolutionary organizations" be
dissolved.
In his concluding speech to the Presidium on the 2d, Tito renewed
his call for firm action against nationalist elements and "counter-
revolutionary tendencies," but this time he assumed a generally
more defensive posture and a more conciliatory stance toward the
Croatian leadership. Maintaining that he as not calling for a
return to the past and the launching of "a campaign," he expressed
concern about what might happen in the future if present trends
toward ideological erosion, particularly among the youth, continue.
In an effort to spread the blame for present developments more
broadly and to explain why he had singled out the Croatian party,
he observed that it is not only the Croatian leaders who are
responsible for recent developments. Strikes, he said, have
occurred in other republics, and "what happened in Croatia is
the most drastic example."
Leaving it to the present Croatian leaders to put their house in
order, at least for the present, Tito stated that the reply to
the strike can "primarily" be given by the Croatian party leaders
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themselves. He acknowledged that his call for taking "adminis.-
trative" measures against dissident elements had met with some
opposition in the Presidium debate, declaring that those who
object to his proposed actions as "undemocratic" and "cannot
bear such action against counterrevolutionaries should get out
of the League of Communists."
LCY CONCLUSIONS The LCY Presidium conclusions publicized on
2 December, as reported by TANYUG, express
support for Tito's attack on nationalism and chauvinism but take
a far more positive attitude toward the Croatian party's ability
to solve its own problems and a more conciliatory tack toward
the students. The Presidium expresses complete confidence in
the ability of the League of Communists of Croatia and its Central
Committee to overcome "existing difficulties, vacillation, and
certain deviations with regard to ideological and political
actions against nationalism of various colors and political
tendencies taking cover under the guise of nationalism."
The conclusions emphasize that it is the full responsibility of
all Yugoslav communists, but primarily of republican &:.d provin-
cial Central Committees, "to undertake, each in its own environ-
ment, resolute ideological-political action against antisocialist
trends." They also stress that it is the responsibility of all
communists in positions of authority to apply constitutional
regulations without hesitation and to undertake "legal" measures
against all individuals and groups which oppose the Yugoslav self-
management system. In a conciliatory gesture toward the students,
the Presidium calls on republic central committees to create more
favorable conditions for the functioning of democratic institutions
and for efforts to overcome delays in solving economic problems.
Avoiding any reference to "counterrevolutionary" activities or
trends in Croatia, the TANYUG version of the document also fails
to repeat Tito's charge that the strike was instigated from abroad.
SOVIET REPORT The 4 December PRAVDA ccrried a TASS report on
Tito's 1 December address to the LCY Presidium,
including his statement that counterrevolutionary groups and
individuals are active in Croatia. The account also singled out
his statement that the most dangerous class enemies are chauvinism
and nationalism. Treating the LCY Presidium's conclusions very
selectively, PRAVDA noted in one sentence that "the Presidium
fully supports the assessments and position of Comrade Till and
adopts his speech as a component part of its decision."
CONFIL aTIAL
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CROATIAN MEETING As reported by TANJUG on the 6th, the
Croatian party executive committee met
that day and issued a statement with mild overtones of self-
criticism, vowing that the Croatian party and people are
resolved "to remove shortcomings and to solve problems that
have arisen in keeping with the policy of the LCY and the
League of Communists of Croatia."
Reporting to a party aktiv on the 7th, Dr. Vladimir Bakaric,
a LCY Executive Bureau member and leading Croatian party
official, Lnformed his audience that Tito's criticism of nation-
alistic manifestations in Croatia was "nothing new," but "it
happened . . . that he had to tell us publicly that he did not
agree with us." TANJUG quoted Bakaric as remarking that it
would "not be easy" to implement Tito's proposals.
REBPUBLIC PARTY LEADERS DIFFER ON FEDERAL PARTY'S ROLE
Differing views on how to deal with nationalist manifestations
in the republics and on the role of the federal party were
reflected clearly in comment at the republican level folliwing
the two-day LCY Presidium session. At a party aktiv meeting
in Novi Sad on the 6th, praise for the "clear and sharp" approach
in Tito's 1 December Presidium speech came from Mirko Caradanovich,
head of the provincial committee of the League of Communists of
Vojvodina, whom Tito had quoted approvingly in his second speech
to the Presidium. But Canadanovich remarked that the debate on
the problem of nationalism had not been sufficiently "concrete,"
As quoted by TANJUG, he noted that "the Presidium did not denounce
anyone, nor did it endorse anyone's responsibility or further
poi1L.. -il work." Defending his concurrence in the Presidium
decision to let the Croatians handle their own problems, he main-
tained that any other course would have been "incompatible with
our socialist relations" and would have played into the hands of
Croat nationalists, who would have used any federal action as
evidence that Croatia is not independent and that its policy is
"in foreign hands."
A more hardline approach to the federal party's role was taken
by Bosnia-Hercegovina Executive Committee member Hasan Grab4anovic
in an address to a local party conference on the 6th. While
granting that the principle that everyone should keep his own
house in order is a good one, he added that "republics are not
isolated islands, and it has been demonstrated that often we must
keep our common house in order wt*h joint forces."
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In sharp contrast, the powerful Serbian party chief Marko Nikezic
was quoted by TANJUG as malting a strong pitch for republican
party autonomy in a speech to a group of local communists on the
same day. Nikezic stated that "nationalism in Croatia and any-
where in Yugoslavia could only be beaten along democratic lines,
not the line of bureaucratic centralism or conservatism or by
a return to the earlier relations." He added: "Nobody can
construct socialism in Croatia but the working class and communists
of Croatia."
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW SAYS ISRAEL. U,S, OBSTRUCT PEACE SOUGHT BY ARABS
Moscow comment pegged to the UNGA debate on the Middle East and
Israeli Prime Minister Meir's 2 December meeting with President
Nixon in Washington hews to the established line that the Arabs
are seeking peace while Israel and its American supporters are
thwarting these efforts. Soviet commentators reiterate that
Egypt's "initiative" in requesting the UNGA debate demonstrates
its concern for a political settlement, while Mrs. Meir's U.S.
visit illustrates Israel's focus on American military deliveries.
Typifying the low-volume propaganda on the UNGA discussion and
the Meir visit, a domestic service commentary on the 6th by
former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Belyayev concluded that
Israel has "stubbornly ignored" all UN and Arab efforts for a
political settlement due to the support it has received from
the United States. Belyayev routinely charged that the United
States, while verbally advocating peace and talking about
mediation to reach a settlement, simultaneously supplies Israel
with "modern offensive armaments." He observed that Mrs. Meir
"reached agreement" with the President "providing for Israel's
long-term requirenents for modernizing and maintaining the level
of its armed forces." Washington, he said, justifies ouch
actions; by the theory of balance of power, which means military
superiority over the Arab forces. Belyayev asserted that the
United States, by its "ambiguous actions," is delaying a just
settlement and also concealing its efforts to realize its own
ambitions in the Middle East.
Moscow continues to Firtray Israel as threatening Egypt with a
new war. Koryavin maintained in the 2 December IZVESTIYA that
Tel Aviv intends to continue basing its policy on a military
solution. Touching on the possibility of further fighting, a
commentary in Arabic on the 3d laid the blame for current
tension on Israel's stubbornness which "may have a tragic
result--the resumption of military operations." Warily
broaching Egyptian President as-Sadat's "request that 1971
be a decisive year," a formula Moscow only belatedly and
cautiously acknowledged, the broadcast called this "a natural
anF'1er" to the Israeli attitude. It rejected the U.S. and
Israeli "noisy propaganda campaign" to present as-Sadat's
position as the cause of the present tension:
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UNGA DEBATE Reporting Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmud
Riyad's 3 December speech on the opening ea.,
of the UNGA Mideast discussion, TASS on the 4th noted that he
called, in conclusion, for the application against Israel of
"coercive measures provided for by the UN Charter." A Soltan
radio commentary on the 4th referred to the possibility of
the application of sanctions in concluding that there are
many opportunities open to the United Nations, "including the
use of sanctions," and that the time has come to make use of
them.
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's speech on 6 December was briefly
reported by TASS, which described it as another confirmation
of "the Israeli extremists' aggressive aspirations." TASS said
Eban declared Israel would make no pledges "beforehand" as to
withdrawal from the occupied territories and that he cast doubt
on the importance of Resolution 242.
An unusual Soviet reference to differing interpre':ations of the
November 1967 resolution appeared in an article by PRAVDA's
Demchenko in the monthly 20TH CENTURY AND PEACE, reviewed by
TASS on the 3d. Asking rhetorically if the prolongation of the
crisis could be ascribed to "a different interpretation" of
the resolution, Demchenko acknowledged that "no doubt the
resolution was the outcome of a compromise, and its paragraphs
can be interpreted in various ways." But it is still the
recognized formula which can restore justice and peace in the
area, he said, and it must be implemented without delay "before
the situation boils up again."
SOVIET LEADERS Brezhnev, addressing the Polish party congress
on 7 December, merely reiterated that the
socialist countries are doing everythi.ng to "upset the plans of
the Israeli predators and their patrons" and to help the Arabs
"defend their lawful rights" and promote the establishment of a
just peace. In a speech on the 7th at a banquet for the visiting
Yemeni leaders, Podgornyy voiced standard Soviet support for the
Arab struggle and expressed confidence that the Arabs' efforts
for a political settlement wou]jd be successful. Podgornyy also
reiterated charges, last made in October, of "imperialist
and Zionist" efforts to split the "national patriotic forces"
in the Arab countries, stressing that such intrigues should not
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disturb the Arabs if they join efforts in their common struggle,
if "the interests of each agree with the interests of all,"
and if "sincere willingness" to strengthen unity is shown.*
Moscow radio announced on the 7th that Defense Minister Grechko
would be paying an "official friendly visit" to Iraq, Syria,
and Somalia--no mention of Egypt--in the second half of
December. The IRAQI NEWS AGENCY had reported in mid-May
that Grechko had accepted an invitation from his Iraqi
counterpart to visit Iraq toward the end of the year.
* The importance of Arab unity and warnings of "imperialist"
efforts to disunite the Arabs and disrupt their friendship with
the USSR were pressed by Soviet leaders and in Moscow propaganda
in October, during Kosygin's Algerian and Moroccan visits and
the visits of the PDRY prime minister and Egyptian President
as-Sadat to Moscow. Emphasis on these themes had diminished
since as-Sadat's visit.
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