TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010042-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: November 24, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

 2'r -clAAr.
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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Illlllilumu~u~iiilllllill ~
TRENDS
in Communist Pro
Confidential
24 NOVEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 47)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
oRou- I
Qduded Inge eviee,elk
dereprdled sed
d dss ii[aiee
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 NOVEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Pham Van Dong Leads Party-Government Delegation to PRC . . . . . 1
Political Settlement: Dong Hardens Terms of PRG Proposal . . . 5
President's Troop Withdrawal Announcement Scored by DRV, PRG . . 9
DRV Article Carries Assurance of Continued PRC, USSR Support . . 11
Hanoi Warns of "New U.S. Military Adventures" Against DRV . . . . 12
Spokesman Scores U.S. Strikes at DRV, Claims Plane Downed . . . . 14
Communists Acclaim Capture of Town West of Phnom Penh . . . . . . 15
USSR-INDIA-PAKISTAN
Soviet Media Press Indian Line on Current Developments . . . . . 16
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Explains Value of Political Settlement to Arabs . . . . . 20
CHINA
RED FLAG No. 12 Article Condemns Sectarianism in Party . . . . . 24
Second-level Leadership Rankings Show Some Shifts . ... . . . . . 25
Inner Mongolia Gives First Population Figure Since Split-up . . . 27
Moscow Uses Allies to Warn Against Peking's Aims in UN . . . . . 28
TASS Links PRC's Internal "Grave Crisis" to Maoist Policies . . . 29
Peking Announces Detonation in Unusually Brief Communique . . . . 31
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FOR OFFICIAL 1`*' ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
24 NOVEMBER 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 NOVEMBER 1971
Moscow (2672 items)
Peking (1190 items)
China
(4%)
5%
United Nations
(8%)
28%
Indochina
(4%)
5%
[PRC Delegation
(--)
9%]
Chilean CP-CPSU
(2%)
3%
Welcomed
Talks in Moscow
[Delegates Speeches (--)
8%]
Somali President
(--)
3%
[Chiao Kuan-hua's (--)
7%]
Barre in USSR
Middle East
(1%)
3%
15 November Speech
Indochina
(21%)
20%
Brezhnev in France
(3%)
3%
[Pham Van Dong in
(--)
11%]
October Revolu-
(25%)
2%
PRC
tion Anniversary
Domestic Issues
(24%)
18%
Rocket Troops &
(--)
2%
Asia-Africa Table
(13%)
15%
Aitillery Day
Tennis Tournament
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INP0CHINA
The visit to Peking of a DRV party-government delegation under
Premier Pham Van Dong has occasioned a major demonstration of
Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and Chinese assurances of continuing
support for Hanoi. The North Vietnamese have used the visit,
which began on 20 November, to spell out hardened negotiating
terms for a Vietnam settlement, in effect signaling to ally and
adversary alike that Hanoi is firm in its demands whatever
developments big-power summitry next year may bring. The
Chinese, with an eye to reassuring their allies regarding the
effects of President Nixon's visit, have dramatized their
commitment by declaring that failure to support the Vietnamese
against the United States would be a betrayal of internationalism.
Chou En-lai took the occasion to ascribe priority to the Indochina
conflict as posing the most urgent questions demanding settlement
today.
In his first speech in Peking, Pham Van Dong formulated a tough
line on political settlement which elaborated on the PRG's
seven-point proposal to demand cessation of all U.S. military
activity in both parts of Vietnam and an end of all support and
commitments to the Thieu government. Carrying forward other
recent DRV elaborations of the PRG proposal, most notably in
statements during the North Korean party-government delegation's
Hanoi visit in late October, Dong's reformulation of the
communist negotiating position is the most authoritative and most
categorical to date.
In his speeches in Peking Dong caustically attacked President
Nixon's 12 November statement on the further withdrawal of U.S.
forces, and the President's statement was also the focus of
attacks by the communist delegates at the Paris talks on
18 November.
PHAM VAN DONG LEADS PARTY-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO PRC
A DRV party-government delegation headed by Premier Pham Van Dong
arrived in Peking on 20 November for "an official friendly visit"
at the invitation of the Chinese party and government, the first
such visit since Dong's October 1969 trip to Peking and Moscow.*
* Dong's 1969 trip following Ho Chi Minh's death came during a
period when Hanoi was seeking to promote Sino-Soviet harmony
and when Moscow and Peking agreed to open talks on their border
dispute.
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The current trip, which returns Chou En-lai's visit to the DRV
last March, comes against the background of Hanoi's show of
disquiet over Peking's invitation to President Nixon as well
as in the wake of the recent leadership reshuffle in the PRC.
The visit was given only one day's advance public notice.
A massive welcome accorded the visitors was accompanied by
a turnout of all the Chinese leaders now making appearances
and was highlighted by a talk with Mao on the 22d in what
NCNA called "a most cordial and friendly atmosphere."
Activities thus far have included a welcoming banquet on the
20th and a Peking rally on the 23d, both addressed by Dung
and Chou. The composition of the two sides' delegations at
talks on the 21st and 23d suggest that further economic and
military aid may have been discussed. Buth groups included
officials responsible for foreign affairs, defense, and
foreign trade and aid. The Chinese taking part in the
substantive talks have been headed by Chou; by Yeh Chien-ying,
vice chairman of the party's Military Affairs Commission ar.d
a member of Chou's delegation last March; and by Li Hsien-nien,
who headed the Chinese economic delegation which concluded the
annual aid agreement in September, the first time the accord had
been signed in Hanoi rather than Peking.
In addition to Sino-Vietnamese solidarity, an accompanying
theme of Indochinese unity and Peking's solidarity with the
Indochinese was served by the presence at ceremonies of
Cambodian and Laotian representatives. The Cambodians included
Prince Sihanouk and Ieng Sary, the new prominent "special envoy"
from the frontlines who had himself just returned to Peking
on the 20th from a visit to the DRV as head of a delegation
of Sihanouk's front and government.*
CHINESE SUPPORT In a setting in which the North Vietnamese
would be expected to sound out Peking on
the implications of President Nixon's forthcoming visit and to
assess the effects of the Chinese leadership changes, the two
sides have sought to project a meeting of the minds based on
Hanoi's resolve to press its demands for a Vietnam settlement
and Peking's assurances of unflagging support. In his first
speech, at the banquet on the 20th, Dong pointedly recalled--in
* The Cambodian delegation's visit, which was marked by
copious testimony to 'Indbalithese. unity, is discussed in the
TRENDS of 17 November, pages 8-10.
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the context of an attack on the President's 12 November troop
withdrawal announcement--that the joint communique on Chou's
visit last March had dismissed the Nixon Administration's
talk.Labout peace and negotiations as "merely a smokescreen
for war expansion." Dong then proceeded to define the
hardened terms for a Vietnam settlement (discussed below).
The Chinese have sought to reassure Hanoi by reaffirming
support for its negotiating position while pledging continuing
support in the war effort. In his brief speech on the 20th,
Chou made a point of ascribing priority to the Vietnam
conflict among current international problems, a point
attributed to him in foreign interviews but not previously
reported in PRC media. In effect reassuring the North
Vietnamese that Sino-U.S. relations will n take precedence
over their cause, Chou stressed that "the Vietnam and
Indochina questions are the most urgent questions demanding
settlement in the world today." Repeating Peking's demand
that the United States withdraw its troops from Indochina
"speedily- totally, and unconditionally," Chou expressed
PRC support for the PRG's seven-point proposal, Sihanouk's
five-point declaration, and the NLHS' five-point plan.
Chinese support for this package of proposals was first
expressed in the joint communique on Chou's visit to the
DRV last March and has been repeated periodically since.
Chou took the occasion of the rally on the 23d to assert
Peking's commitments in forceful terms, making clear at the
same time that a settlement in Indochina is a matter fir the
peoples in that region to decide for themselves. Again
affirming support for the PRG's seven points and the other
proposals, he declared emphatically, in an apostrophe to the
Indochinese people, that "you, and you alone, are entitled
to decide the.. affairs of your respective countries." In
another passage he charged that the United States "completely
tore up" tiie Geneva agreements in the course of its involve-
meat in Vietnam. This formulation, which became standard in
Peking comment after the war intensified in 1965, has
reappeared occasionally in recent months.
At the rally Chou pledged Chinese readiness to undertake even
"the greatest national sacrifices" in support of the Vietnamese,
a formulation also dating back to 1965 and revived by Chou
during his visit to Hanoi last March. This pledge was again
voiced by Li Hsien-nien during his September visit. Chou
added that "this firm stand of ours" is unshakable "no matter
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what happens in the would," an amplification that could be read
as a reassurance to Hanoi in view of the impending Nixon visit.
INTERNATIOPIALISM Concern to allay Hanoi's apprehension over
the presidential visit also seems reflected
in another formulation used by Chou in his rally speech. After
invoking the standard Maoist dictum regarding Chinese rear
area support for the Vietnamese, Chou declared that failure to
render this support would be "a betrayal of internationalism."
Chou thus paraphrased a formula he had introduced during his
Hanoi visit last March as a Mao instruction to the effect that
"if anyone among us should say that we cannot help the.
Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression
and for national salvation, that means betrayal, betrayal of
the revclution."
During the visit of the Chinese aid delegation in September,
coming in the wake of Hanoi's withering polemics implying. that
Peking's invitation to President Nixon was an act of
opportunism and a breach of proletarian internationalism,
Li Hsien-nien asserted that if one failed to aid Vietnam
"he is not a proletarian internationalist and not a communist;
this will mean betrayal of the revolution." Chou's
reformulation thus has the effect of further sharpening
Chinese assurances that developments in Sino-U.S. relations
will not take place at the expense of Peking's internationalist
commitments to its allies.
It has been on the issue of proletarian internationalism that
divergent Chinese and Vietnamese positions have been reflected
in recent months, but Dong's visit has apparently resulted in
a convergence of views. During Li's September visit to Hanoi
the Vietnamese had failed to respond in kind to his assurances
that Peking is committed to a policy based on proletarian
internationalism, and there were other indications of
Vietnamese misgivings on this score in the wake of the announce-
ment of President Nixon's visit.* This pattern was also
reflected at the beginning of Dong's current visit, with the
North Vietnamese maintaining some reserve in failing to match
Chinese claims that Sino-Vietnamese relations are based on
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Rather
than echoing Chou's assertion at the 20 November banquet that
* These indications are discussed in the TRENDS of 29 September,
pages 4-5.
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relations already rest on this basis, Dong on the same occasion
said the Vietnamese are resolved to "consolidate and develop
the relations of friendship and cooperation between our two
parties and our two peoples on the basis of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism."
In his speech at the rally on the 23d, however, Dong concluded
with a paean to Sino-Vietnamese relations in which he stated
that "our relations based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism have developFI daily and become all the more
unbreakable." Further, he tc,k the occasion to express "deep
and heartfelt thanks" to the Chinese for "their highly
valuable support and assistance filled with noble proletarian
internationalist sentiments."
SOVIET ROLE In the sole jab at the Soviets by the Chinese
thus far during the visit, Chou on the 23d
voiced Peking's line on the medium and small countries uniting
against "the power politics practiced by the superpowers."
Dong, on the other hand, made a point of linking China and
Vietnam with "the entire powerful socialist camp."
But where Dong on the 20th had followed Hanoi's recent
practice of singling out both the PRC and the Soviet Union in
expressing gratitude for aid, his strong expression of gratitude
for Chinese aid was not balanced by a bow to Moscow at the mass
rally on the 23d.*
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: DONG HARDENS TERMS OF PRG PROPOSAL
Pham Van Dong's remarks on political settlement in his 20 November
banquet speech carry forward the movement in recent weeks toward
a more intransigent DRV position by further spelling out points
which had previously been left deliberately vague. A decision
to move in this direction had seemed reflected, though less
sharply, in DRV statements at the end of October and may date
back to late August, when Pham Van Dong in his National Day
address expressed the judgment that "President Nixon does not
want to talk seriously to settle the Vietnam question on the
basis of the seven points . . . ."
* The only available Soviet acknowledgment of the visit is a
brief, factual 22 November TASS report on the delegation's
arrival and the welcoming banquet. TASS singled out Dong's
reference to Soviet aid.
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By September Hanoi may have been convinced that the United
States would not commit itself to a deadline for the withdrawal
of all its forces and would continue to support Thieu under
the Vietnamization program. Having concluded that Peking's
invitation to President Nixon had undercut the impact of the
1 July initiative, Hanoi may have decided to move to a
hardened negotiating position to insure its interests against
the effects of big-power summitry. It is noteworthy that
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's article in the October
HOC TAP, probably written in September, called for taking the
initiative and stepping up the diplomatic struggle. Dong,
in his 23 November Peking rally speech, seemed to reflect
a similar opinion when he spoke of the potential "role of
far-reaching significance" for the diplomatic struggle.
ELABORATION Describing the seven-point initiative as "an
OF 7 POINTS offensive to drive the other side into ^.
corner," Dong explained that the plan is "an
integrated whole in which two particularly important points
stand out." Detailing point one, he closely paraphrased
the July proposal in saying that "the United States must
completely stop its aggressive war in Vietnam, put a complete
end to the 'Vietnamization' policy, withdraw totally and
without condition all troops, military advisers and personnel,
weapons and war materials of the United States and of the
other foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam,
and liquidate the U.S. military bases in South Vietnam."
But he went on to say that the United States must "put an end
to all military acts, in any form and from any place whatsoever,
against the Vietnamese people in the two zones."
Foreign Minister Trinh's elaboration of the PRG proposal on
24 October, at a banquet honoring the visiting North Korean
delegation, demanded an end to all U.S. air and naval
activities. The joint communique signed at the close of
that visit called for an end to all U.S. air and naval
activities "in South Vietnam,"* and subsequent propaganda
echoed the communique's formulation. Dong's el.abo-.a.tion has
now broadened "air and naval activities" to cover all
military acts in any form," with the phrase "from any place
whatsoever" presumably encompassing planes, ships, and any other
military equipment stationed, for example, in Thailand, Okinawa,
and the Gulf of Tonkin; and it has broadened the locus to
include both North and South Vietnam.
* See the 3 November TRENDS, pages 11-13.
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In addressing himself to point one of the proposal, Dong did
not repeat the demand in Trinh's formulation for an end to
"U.S. military aid to the puppet administration in Saigon."
But in point two, which in the formal proposal called vaguely
for an end to U.S. interference in South Vietnam's internal
affairs and an end to U.S. support for the Thieu
administration, Dong added that the United States must
"relinquish all its commitments" to the Saigon administration,
a demand which could encompass economic as well as military
aid.
Don& pointed up the question of use of aid by the United
States to continue the war after troop withdrawal when he
emphasized the interrelationship between points one and
two: "These two points of very essential significance are
closely interrelated in the sense that the U.S. scheme of
Vietnamization means to withdraw U.S. troops but still
continue the U.S. war of aggression with the puppet troops
under the U.S. command and with very strong U.S. aid in
particular. Therefore, only should the U.S. withdraw the
totality of U.S. troops and at the same time cease the
maintenance of the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration
could the war be settled and peace restored in Vietnam."
Dong's remarks included no reference to a U.S. troop
withdrawal deadline or the pr.soner-of-war issue. He
concluded his discussion of a political settlement by
stating that if the United States "really wants to reach a
peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, it must respond
to the seven points at the Paris talks."
Dong's stress on the interrelationship between points one and
two, while at the same time toughening the demand for
cessation of American support to Saigon, represents a notable
departure from Hanoi's practice of obscuring the relationships
between the key military and political provisions of the PRG
plan and sidestepping U.S. demands for clarification. There
was never any acknowledgment in Vietnamese communist. media
of Le Duc Tho's remarks in his interview with the New York
TIMES' Anthony Lewis on 6 July regarding the question of
settling points one and two separately. At that time, Tho
reportedly took the flexible position that point one could be
settled separately "to show our goodwill." In reply to a
question on whether the United States could provide military
and economic assistance to South Vietnam after withdrawal,
Tho said that after a "total" withdrawal, other questions
would be discussed.
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Hanoi media also failed to report remarks on the relationship of
points one and two by Xuan Thuy at the 16 September Paris session
which suggested the tougher position Hanoi has cubsequently
assumed. In response to a call by Ambassador Porter for a
clarification of the PRG proposal, Thuy asked the U.S. delegate
whether the United States is willing to announce a troop
withdrawal and an end to the "maintenance" of the Thieu regime
"at the same time."
ATTACK ON It may h.ve been by design that Pham Van Dong's
PRESIDENT definition of the hardened communist stand on
political settlement was timed after President
Nixon had made his 12 November announcement on further troop
withdrawals. Dong scored the President's statement in his
speeches both on the 20th and the 23d, holding that the
President's "roundabout and embarrassed statements prove that
the 'Vietnat-ization' of the war will surely become bankrupt"
and "distinctly prove the bellicose, obdurate, and perfidious
nature of the U.S. imperialist aggressors." Charging'that
"the U.S. pirates" aim at "maintaining perpetually U.S.
occupation troops and the Saigon puppet administration any.`
carrying out neocolonialism in South Vietnam," Dong asserted
on the 20th that these "dark designs" were being exposed
by U.S. and world public opinion and had been laid bara in the
Joint communique at the time of Choi,. En-tai's visit to Hanoi
last March.
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PRESIDENTS TROOP WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT SCORED BY DRV, PRG
In addition to Pham Van Dong's criticism of President Nixon's
12 November troop withdrawal announcement, attacks on the
announcement were made at the 18 November Paris session and
in commentaries broadcast by Liberation Radio--two on the
17th and one on the 18th.
At Paris, PRG deputy head Nguyen Van Tien--again substituting
for Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, who has not attended a session since
12 August--echoed earlier comment* in claiming that the announce-
ment demonstrated the President's intention to continue the war,
accusing him of trying to "elude" a withdrawal deadline by
"ballyhooing about an 'increased troop withdrawal." DRV dele-
gate head Xuan Thuy--returning from a month's "rest" in the GDR--
also scored the President for refusing to set a troop withdrawal
deadline, as well as for "only" declaring a withdrawal of 45,000
men. The fact that U.S. forces will be down to 140,000 by
1 February 1972 has not be acknowledged specifically in any of
the Vietnamese communist comment except for the initial Liberation
Radio commentary of 17 November. Tien obscured the point by
charging that there will still be nearly 200,000 U.S. and allied
for:es in South Vietnam, "not including tens of thousands . . .
in the Seventh Fleet and at U,S. bases in Thailand who directly
take part in the Vietnam war."
Both Tien and Thuy took exception to the factors the President
said would determine future withdrawals--the level of enemy activity,
progress in Vietnamization, and progress in the release of POW's
and a cease-fire. Previously, in outlining the third factor,
only the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 15th had noted--
without comment--that the President spoke of progress toward a
cease-fire as well as on the POW issue. Tien and Thuy at Paris
addressed all three factors in some detail, although VNA's
account reports Thuy's comment only in general terms, noting
that he scored the President for proposing "many" conditions
for future withdrawals; the account does not include Thuy's
statement that the prisoner issue is a question of the after-
math of the war and that the .'RG's seven-point solution takes
care of the cease-fire question. But VNA's account specifically
quotes the PRG's Tien as stating, in the course of his "severe"
See the 17 November TRENDS, pages 1-4.
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criticism of the President's three factors, that the Vietnamese
people's stand on both the POW and cease-fire issues is contained
in the seven-point solution.
As in the earlier comment, both delegates failed to-mention that
the factor of the level of enemy activity includes heightened
levels of infiltration into South Vietnam. Both ridiculed the
notion that the Vietnamese people will "give up their fight."
VNA reports Tien as saying that the fact that the. President is
waiting for progress in Vietnamization "refutes the boasts of
the U.S. Defense Secretary about t:he 'astonishing progress' of
that ,program."
Although both communist delegates denounced the President's
"threat" to ccntinue or even step up air strikes, VNA reports
only Thuy's remarks. Neither delegate, of course, acknowledged
that the subject was raised in the context of heightened communist
infiltration into South Vietnam. Noting recent "massive bombing"
throughout Indochina since .Secretary La.-:rd's early-November visit,
Thuy said the President's statements and the current bombing
make it clear that the United States "not only does not stop
the war but is stepping it up. It hatched new military
adventures and is plunging deeper into the war in Indochina."
He also ridiculed the President's statement that American troops
had ended their "offensive posture."
Thuy took issue with the President's statement that the United
States had not given up on the negotiating track and was still
pursuing negotiations, remarking caustically that "Nixon's
negotiating pattern consists in seeking every means to force
the South Vietnamese people to accept a lackey administration"
and to demand a solution conforming to its stand. "Facts have
shown," Thuy said,. "that no threat can intimidate the ..
Vietnamese people" and that if the Administration wants a
negotiated settlement in Vietnam, it should "respond
positively" to the PRG's seven points. The PRG delegate
commented in a similar vein.
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DRV ARTICLE CARRIES ASSURANCE OF CONTINUED PRC. USSR SUPPORT
Hanoi's misgivings about President Nixon's China trip were conveyed
with unusual candor in an article recently available from the
12 November issue of the North Vietnamese weekly paper THONG NHAT
(REUNIFICATION). The author, writing under the pseudonym "Me
Giang," purported to be answering a letter from a friend in South
Vietnam who had expressed anxiety about Western news reports of
"Nixon's sensational diplomatic activities and their relationship
with the Vietnam issue." Me Giang set out to assuage concern
expressed by the "friend" that international support for Vietnam
would lessen as a result of these activities. The friend also
questioned, according to Me Giang, whether the President
would be successful in "disengaging himself from Vietnam as he
wants."
Hanoi media have never reported the President's plans to visit
Peking and Moscow next year, and the Me Giang article accordingly
failed to spell out the nature of the "activities" causing concern.
It is not clear why the article was published at this time--more
than two months after Hanoi halted its polemic against rapproche-
meiit with the United States--but its publication may be an
indication of widely felt apprehension in the DRV over the
President's projected trips.
Me Giang stressed at the outset that the "most critical period"
of the war has "long passed" and that recent events must be
judged against the background of the allegedly advantageous
communist position. In this context, Me Giang reiterated that
the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal provided "an honorable
way out" for the United States. He plainly indicated that
efforts to press the PRG proposal were undermined by the moves
in Sino-U.S. relations, but he saw this as a passing phenomenon:
"Nixon's hectic moves at any rate could only temporarily ease
the pressure of the public demand that the Americans accept the
seven points." Me Giang maintained that "Nixon can neither
ultimately reject the seven points . . . nor evade the two
fundamental issues embodied in these seven points: the
Americans must leave and the puppets must fall." Repeating an
argument made in Hanoi's polemic against Peking in July and
August, Me Giang asserted that "the Americans' hectic moves
have been partially aimed at splitting the solidarity between
our people and the fraternal socialist countries." He rejected
this possibility, declaring that "reality" is at variance with
President Nixon's hope to break socialist solidarity and citing
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as evidence the recent aid agreements signed by Hanoi with
Peking and Moscow. He also specifically recalled statements
of Chinese backing offered by Li Hsien-nien when he was in
Hanoi in September to conclude the Sino-DRV aid agreement
and affirmations of Soviet support in the joint statement
issued at the end of President Podgornyy's 3-8 October visit.
Me Giang observed: "Thus, I think it can be stressed that
the political support of the Soviet Union, China, and other
socialist countries for the Vietnam problem is thorough and
clear."
He Giang may well have been anticipating Pham Van Dong's
trip to China and his-enunciation of a hardened position on a
settlement when he predicted, in a concluding hentence, "I am
confident that soon other deeds on the military and diplomatic
fronts will help you, brother, solve even more satisfactorily
your questions about current events."
WANOI WARNS OF "NEW U.S. MILITARY ADVENTURES" AGAINST DRV
In the wake of Defense Secretary Laird's 3-6 November visit to
Saigon and the heavy U.S. air strikes against Quang Binh and
Nghe An provinces in North Vietnam on 7-8 November,* Vietnamese
communist propaganda continues to warn of "new military
adventures" allegedly planned by the United States. In
particular, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on 19 November,
broadcast by Hanoi radio to South Vietnam, scored remarks by
Secretary Laird at his 17 November press conference concerning
use of U.S. planes against North Vietnam, Cambodia, or South
Vietnam. It cited AP as reporting that Laird "also threatened
that he would not hesitate to use the U.S. air force to
support any new attacks" by the ARVN forces against Laos.
The commentary said this statement "exposes the Nixon clique's
dark scheme of preparing public opinion prior to embarking
on new military adventures," and it cited recent U.S. air
activities to buttress the charge that these have been
increased. Accusing Laird of statements "constituting a very
brazen and insolent challenge to socialist countries and
progressive people throughout the world," the commentary went
on to remind him of recent alleged defeats of the United States
* For a discussion of the Laird visit and the U.S. air strikes
on 7-8 November, see the 10 November TRENDS, pages 20-21 and
17-19 respectively.
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and its allies and to assert that "no evil scheme. no cruel war
act and no military strength can save the U.S. puppetry from
being totally defeated."
QUAN DOI NFAN DAN on the 20th, urging combat-readiness and
vigilance in the North, claimed that the United States and
its allies have been "sustaining heavy blows and bitter
defeats" and that with the onset of the dry season "they are
fearfully trying to ward off the furious offensive blows that
will rain on them." The paper warned that the ignited States,
"with an extremely obdurate and warlike nature," is continuing
the war and "carrying out military adventures in an attempt
to save the dangerous situation on the battlefield" and to
"calm" its Saigon allies. Pointing to recent U.S. strikes
in North Vietnam as well as the dispatch of more U.S. aircraft
carriers and ships to the area, the army paper pictured the
President as "impude-ttly threatening" at the 12 November press
conference to continue air strikes in Indochina and Laird as
"brazenly clamoring" on the 17th that he would use the air
force to strike at North Vietnam. While declaring that "these
words and extremely serious acts of war", of the Nixon
Administration "can in no way intimidate our people," QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN declared that "we must be constantly rigilant."
It expressed the resolve of the northern armed forces and
people "to be ready to strike back fiercely at all the U.S.
war adventures no matter from where, when, and how they may
come." A brief Hanoi radio report cn the 17th touched on
regional preparedness, noting that the population in Quarig
Binh Province has "adopted a wartime way of life in order to
fight and defeat the enemy under all circumstances."
Some comment sees the "new military adventures" as resulting
from failure of the Vietnamization policy. For example, a
recorded statement by Tran Duc Tieu, member of the Thai Binh
provincial party standing committee and political commissar
of the Thai Binh military forces, broadcast in the domestic
service on 16 November, said that the United States, faced
with the "imminent failure" of Vietnamization, "has indulged
in new and extremely serious military adventures." Ha:...i
radio on the 22d carried a statement by the commander of the
Ha Tay provincial armed forces warning that the United States
has "repeatedly bombed and strafed a number of areas in Vinh
Linh, Quang Binh, Nghe An, and Lai Chau" and is "going to
embark 3n new military adventures." The Ha Tay commander
added that these actions "are very serious . . . frantic
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-14?.
squirmings" resulting from the defeat of Vietnamization and a
change in the balance of power on the battlefields. Both
statements expr#saged resolve to heighten vigilance and combat-
readiness to "smac:h all U.S. schemes and acts of war."
SPOKESMAN SCORES U1S, STRIKES AT DRV. CLAIMS PLANE DOWNED
The two most recent DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements,
on 20 and 22 November, condemned U.S. strikes at North Viet.iam
from 12 through 21 November. The protest on the 20th charged
that from the 12th to the 19th. U.S. planes "attacked a number
of populated areas in the western part of Quang Binh Province,
causing losses in lives and property to the local population."
It also claimed that during this period U.S. planes, including
B-52's, "made repeated and savage raids against Huong Lap
village in the demilitarized zone belonging to DRV territory."
The 22 November protest similarly alleged that U.S. strikes
had caused casualties and damage to property and said that
Huong Lap village continued to be the target of U.S. strikes
on 20 and 21 November. In addition, it charged that on the
21st U.S. aircraft "hit a number of localities" in Nghe An
Province,* where one plane was downed by the Nghe An armed
forces and people. A radio report earlier on the 22d said the
plane was a A-i and that its downing brought the total of U.S.
planes downed over the ORV to 3,402.
C04IUNISTS ACCLAIM CAPTURE OF TOWN WEST OF PHNOM PENH
Cambodian and Vietnamese communist media have predictably hailed
the "liberation" on 16 November of the town of Tuol Leap,
16 miles west of Phnom Penh. Hanoi's comment includes articles
in NHAN DAN and QU1.N DOI NHAN DAN on 21 November which also
* The U.S. command in Saigon announced that four A-7 planes
struck an antiaircraft gun site near Vinh, a city in Nghe An,
on the 21st after an unarmed reconnaissance plane had been
fired on. Results of the strike were unknown, but there was
reportedly no damage to the planes. In an earlier strike on
the 21st, according to the U.S. command, American planes knocked
out two antiaircraft positions 80 miles north of the DMZ. On
the 16th the U.S. command had reported that U.S. planes
attacked an antiaircraft battery 70 miles inside the DRV.
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praise the Cambodian National People's LiberaLion Armed Forces
(CNPLAF) for successfully intercepting and turning back
Cambodian Government forces attempting to retake the town.
(The Phnom Penh Government has announced that it ...3ained
control of Tuol Leap on 20 November.) Both papers claim that
the Tuol Leap etgagement demonstrates the growth of the
CNPLAF and mairtain that Phnom Penh itself is now threatened.
The threat to Phnom Penh was raised in more dramatic terms in
a Liberation Radio commentary on the 19th which stressed the
proximity of Tuol Leap to the Cambodian capital and its
Pochentong airfield and declared: "In capturing Tuol Leap,
the CNPLAF is ready to thrust a sharp knife into the
enemy's throat--the last lair of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son
Ngoc Thanh lackeys." The Front radio commentary alleged that
Lon Nol has bee forced to "scrape up troops from other
regions to defenu Phnom Penh" and to ask for Saigon troops to
come to its aid. Ridiculing the notion that the ARVN can be
of assistance, the commentary maintained that "the northwest
defense line of Saigon" has also been cracked and that "if
Thieu obeys his American boss and sends troops to Phnom Penh,
he will be like a drowning man trying to save a drowning man."
A 22 November report by Sihanouk's news agency (AKI) sums up
the results of the fighting in the Toul Leap area: It
claims that since fighting began at Tuol Leap on the 13th,
the CNPLAF have put out of action four battalions and three
companies and have inflicted heavy losses on another battalion.
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USSR-INDIA-PAKISTAN
SOVIET MEDIA PRESS INDIAN LINE ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Soviet media have dropped all vestiges of nonpartisanship in the
tense Indian-Pakistani confrontation, while continuing to call
for a political solution in East Bengal and the creation of
secure conditions for the return home of the more than nine
million Bengali refugees as a preliminary step toward defusing
the situation. Having fixed the blame for the crisis with
Pakistani President Yahya Khan,* Moscow has continued to press
hard on that point while contending that Yahya holds the key
to--and bears the primaz5 responsibility for--a political
settlement of the East Pakistan situation and the prevention
of Indian-Pakistani hostii{ties.
In keeping with this scenario, Moscow has portrayed India as
the aggrieved party, desiring peace and engaging in purely
defensive protective reactions to numerous and increasing
Pakistani provocations. Where through October TASS was still
using the technique of a single dispatch juxtaposing reports
from New Delhi and Karachi trading charges of hostile military
acts, TASS has been reporting only New Delhi's versions since
2 November. On 16 and 18 November, for example, TASS
reported Indian official spokesmen as charging Pakistani
provocations and border violations, with no counterbalancing
references t Pakistani denials or countercharges. President
Yahya Khan's proclamation of a state of national emergency
was briefly reported by TASS on the 23d, but with no mention
of his claim that the action was responsive to "the threat
of external aggression."
EAST PAKISTAN Obscuring the apparent outbreak of large-
SITUATION scale hostilities in East Pakistan on
22 November, Soviet media have adopted
New Delhi's line that Indian forces are not involved in what
is pictured simply as a successfully developing offensive by
* See the TRENDS of 6 October, pages 26-30, for an examina-
tion of changes in Soviet treatment of the East Bengal
situation immediately following Prime Minister Gandhi's
27-29 September state visit to the USSR. A followup article
appears in the 28 October TRENDS.
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the Mukti. Bahini "liberation forces" against the Pakistani army
in East Pakistan. Soviet media did not report Radio Pakistan's
charge on the 22d that India had launched an "all-out offensive
against East Pakistan," but on the 23d TASS reported an Indian
statement "categorically denying allegations spread by
Pakistani sources that Indian troops had infiltrated into
East Pakistan territory in the Jessore sector"; the statement
noted, TASS said, that Indian troops had "a strict order not
to cross the frontier." Altio on the 23d, TASS carried an
Indian report of "bitter fighting waged by guerrillas of the
'Mukti Bah1ai' insurgent army against the forces of the
regular Pakistani army in various parts of East Pakistan,"
adding that the Mukti Bahini "is inflicting upon the regular
army considerable losses in manpower and materiel."
Echoing Politburo member Grishin's comments in the October
Revolution anniversary speecn of 6 November, PRAVDA articles
on the 9th and 23d and an IZVESTIYA article on the 16th
pictured West Pakistani actions in East Pakistan as the focus
of the current crisis. Grishin said that "mass repressions
by the Pakistan authorities" led to the refugee flow into
India; Kondrashov, in IZVESTIYA on the 16th, blamed the
Bengali exodus on the initiation by "government troops" last
spring of "cruel punitive operations against the peaceful
Bengal population"; and Mezentsev similarly wrote in the
23 November PRAVDA that the "repressive actions by the
military authorities in Rawalpindi" precipitated the tension
in the subcontinent.
The articles all stressed that the situation is continuing to
deteriorate because of West Pakistan's persistence in its
repressive policies. Kondrashov Impugned the veracity of
Pakistan Government assertions that "active steps are being taken
in Islamabad aimed at settling the situation in East Pakistan,"
calling such claims "at variance with the actual state of
affairs." He commented that "the so-called general amnesty
in fact proved extremely limited" and that "the attempt to
create an outward semblance of a civilian administration in
East Pakistan has failed." Mezentsev depicted the "much
publicized amnesty" as a farce, reflected in the fact that
"thousands of East Pakistanis continue to cross the border
into India every day."
The Soviet commentators portray India, by contrast, as
displaying "humanism" in shouldering the burden of concern for
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the fete of the millions of refugees, a burden which hav forced
India o divert resources from its own "progressive" socioeconomic
reforms.
POLITICAL Warning that the East Pakistan situation could
SETTLEMENT develop into military conflict between India and
Pakistan, Moscow has reiterated the position that
war will not solve East Pakistan's problems and that a political
settlement must be achieved. The CPSU Central Committee
resolution of 23 November calls for "achieving a peaceful
settlement of the conflict on the Asian subcontinent," noting
that the Soviet-Indian treaty is "of great importance for the
consolidation of pence and international security."
Pakistan is portrayed as the provocateur on the border, and the
onus is placed on Pakistan to take steps to settle the problem.
Orestov in PRAVDA on the 19th charged "reactionary elements
in Pakistan" with "decorating their cities with placards
calling for crushing India and provoking daily clashes on the
border"; and Kondrashov noted that "an anti-Indian campaign
developed by chauvinist circles has recently been growing
considerably more active in Pakistan," adding that "peculiar
formations of a paramilitary nature are being created these
days in certain political parties of Pakistan."
Like Grishin on the 6th, Soviet commentators urge a halt to
the "repressions" of East Bengalis ant' the creation of secure
conditions enabling the refugees to return home from India.
Moscow has also repeatedly publicized Indian demands for the
release of Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman and--as in a
TASS report on the 18th--for "talks between the military regime
in Islamabad and the elected leaders of East Bengal."
Sustaining Moscow's call for the Pakistani Government to
implement a political settlement that would "take into account
the will and the inalienable rights and legitimate interests
of the people of East Pakistan," Soviet media have only once
repeated the added proviso--in the 8 October Soviet-Algerian
joint statement--that a settlement should preserve
Pakistan's "national unity and territorial integrity."
TASS on 10 November, reviewing NEW TIMES (No. 46), cited an
article by A. Ulanskiy as pointing to "the persistent demands
of the Soviet and all peaceloving people for urgent measures
toward a political settlement in East Pakistan, with account
of the will and interests of its population and based on the
preservation of the territorial integrity of the state of
Pakistan."
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Soviet media have not mentioned a need for "mutual" restraint
since the 26 October Soviet-Canadian joint communique. But
Moscow's reportage, in playing down the scope of present
hostilities, has tended to suppress indications of what might
appear to be a lack of restraint on India's part. Thus on
the 22d TASS reported that four intruding Pakistani Air Force
jets had been compelled by Indian planes to leave Indian
airspace, but it failed to mention India's cln:lm to have shot
down three of the Pakistani aircraft.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW EXPLAINS VALUE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO ARABS
Moscow continues to praise Egypt's "constructive" stand and to
portray the Arabs as seeking a peaceful solution to the Middle
East problem. In line with this approach, Soviet media obscure
the thrust of Egyptian President as-Sadat's 19 November speech in
which he declared there is no hope for a peaceful solution and
announced his "final decision--the battle." At the same time,
Moscow underscores its own adherence to a political settlement
and goes to some pains, in commentaries broadcast in the Arabic-
language service, to explain this Soviet attitude which it s.ys
is not understood by all Arabs. And it pointedly recalls that
Israel has exploited "irresponsible statements" made by "some
Arab leaders."
The Arabic-language talks by Maksimov, broadcast on
22 and 23 November, justified the Soviet attitude toward a
political settlement by saying that the USSR's position does
not mean peace at any price, since a peaceful settlement
must provide for Israeli withdrawal and will obstruct Israel's
"expansionist policies." Stressing the importance of world
public opinion in isolating Israel, Maksimov argued that there
was a considerable change in Western public opinion when the
attitude of some Arab countries to the settlement question
was "clearly defined" after they officially agreed to a
political settlement. Citing the example of anti-Arab
tendencies in France just after the 1967 war, Maksimov
recalled--in what might be construed as an admonition to'
as-Sadat--that no small part of this attitude was due to
irresponsible statements by some Arab leaders which are
exploited by "Zionist propaganda," which "naturally also
resorted to direct falsification." Here he reminded his
listeners that words were attributed to Nasir in a May 1967
press conference which he never uttered. But "in all fairness,"
Maksimov added, "there were Arab leaders who made extremist
statements which helped the attack by Israeli propaganda on
the Arabs."* He maintained that the course toward a peaceful
* Moscow has occasionally in the past chided the Arabs for
rash and irresponsible statements, as in a PRAVDA series by
Belyayev and Primakov in August 1967. And in the summer of
1970, after Nasir accepted the U.S. initiative for a cease-
fire, Moscow defended his action and criticized Arab "extremist
sentiments" and opposition to-Cairo's move.
CONFIDENTIAL
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settlement in itself creates an international atmosphere
unfavorable to Israeli policy, an atmosphere which the USSR
takes into consideration "as it works for reaching a political
solution."
Similarly, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to
Africa on the 23d declared that the Soviet Union considers
that a solution to the Middle East conflict "by peaceful means
without the use of arms is possible and should be utilized."
This stand of the Soviet Government, it said, is fully supported
by the Soviet public. The commentary added that while the USSR
is extending aid to the Arabs which has helped consolidate
their "defense potential," at the same time it advocates a
solution "through negotiations."
AS-SADAT Giving minimal attention to as-Sadat's 19 November
SPEECH speech during his two-day tour of the front, Moscow
obscures his rejection of "peaceful or other
solutions" and his decision for "the battle." Thus Soviet media
cited him as stressing that "in the absence of a political
settlement," the Egyptian armed forces have no alternative
but "to carry out their duty." TASS represented as-Sadat as
saying that Egypt in the past eight mouths had exerted maximum
efforts "for a political settlement"--evidently TASS'
interpretati a of his remark, as reported by Cairo radio on
the 20th, that Egypt in that period ha-' "made the utmost
effort for the one percent hope our forces would cross the
canal without an assault battle." TASS also aoted that
as-Sadat said .he.had.informed the United States that there
"is no room for dis.c.ussion" until Israel answers Ambassador
Jarring's 8 February memorandum and accepts complete withdrawal..
UNGA Moscow anticipates criticism of the United States
DEBATE and ".isolation" of Israel during the forthcoming
debate on the Middle East but avoids predicting
the outcome. A Ryzhikov commentary on the 17th concluded that
it is difficult to foretell how the debate will end. A
domestic service commentary by NOVOSTI observer Katin on
the 22d said the discussion must promote a peaceful settlement,
and the Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on the 23d pledged
that the USSR would "employ its whole authority to advance
the cause of peaceful settlement" in the debate. But Belyayev,
in the 21 November domestic bervir_e commentators' roundtable,
said only that the debate "should prove very interesting."
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Belyayev did bring up the possibility of sanctions against Israel,
a subject touched on from time to time in 1969 but broached only
infrequently since. One isolated mention, in an INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS article this June, maintained that there was every
justification for considering the use of political and economic
sanctions against Israel and recalled that Article 6 of the UN
Charter provides for expulsion of members that persistently
violate charter principles. Gromyko may have had these charter
provisions in mind when, he said, in his 28 September UNGA
address, that the United Nations could contribute to a Middle
East settlement provided it used "all its opportunities in
accordance with the UN Charter."
Moscow's first known. public allusion co PRC participation in
the four-power talks on the Middle East came in a Paris-datelined
TASS dispatch on the 19th decrying "anti-Soviet fabrications" by
Israeli Government circles. Citing AFB, TASS said the Israeli
paper MAARIV alleged that the United States had informed Israel
"that the United States reached agreement with the Soviet Union
not to admit" the PRC to the Big Four talks. TASS typically
avoided outright denial, merely adding that the purpose of the
"newly invented fraud" is aimed at frustrating efforts for a
political settlement.
ARMS ISSUE Propagandists take note of Israel's ins.-LstLsnce
on renewed Phantom deliveries, reporting Premier
Golda Meir as saying the purpose of her forthcoming visit to
the United States is to obtain another large shipment of the
planes. Koryavin in the 19 November IZVESTIYA claimed that
Israel's "Phantomania".shows that Tel Aviv's aim is .got to
solve the crisis but to obtain still more armaments. And
Belyayev, in the panelist.,' roundtable, declared that there
is "no need at the moment" to provide Israel with any additional
military aid; there is no need, he added, for further proof
that the United States has equipped Israel's armed forces with
Phantoms and other up-to-date offensive military equipment.
Moscow also picks up reports--emanating from an 11 November
speech by Senator Dole--on a recent U.S.-Israeli agreement on
the production in Israel of armaments and other equipment. A
Rassadin commentary on the 18th claimed this agreement coincided
with stepped-up military preparations by Israel, which hoped by
aggravating the situation to destroy the Arabs' diplomatic
initiative to achieve a speedy settlement, and to perpetuate
its occupation of Arab territories.
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In the only available Soviet reference to reports of new
deliveries of .TU-16 Badger planes to Egypt, TASS on the 20th
cited the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH as saying that to Justify its
efforts to build up Israel's military potential, the United
States is spreading "rumors that a new batch of Soviet
aircraft was allegedly delivered to Egypt."
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CHINA
RED FLAG NO. 12 ARTICLE CONDEMNS SECTARIANISM IN PARTY
An article in. the 12th issue of RED FLAG (released 2 Novemter)
written by the writing group of the Kiangsu CCP Committee has
given new momentum to the developing propaganda attack against
unidentified leadership cliques that have allegedly sought to
split the party. Under the pretext of discussing the party's
"work style," the article assails current indications of
"sectarianism" in the party and demands that those "renegades"
guilty of a "criminal conspiracy to split and corrupt the party"
be completely exposed and "knocked down."
The "renegades" are said to be "very few" in number, and the
limited nature of the current purge is further indicated by
Passages that draw a distinction between those consciously
guilty and those temporarily misled. "The sectarian tendency
manifested by a few comrades in our party is different in
essence from the sectarian splitting activities carried out by
ambitionists and schemers who sneaked into our party." The
former, comrades still, are required only to undergo "rectifica-
tion" and to "?sarn from past mistakes."
The RED FLAG article suggests publicly for the first time that
cadres have been given some explanation of the recent purge of
Lin Piao and several other top military leaders. After review-
ing several historical examples of those who "engaged in sectarian
activities" and attempted to split the party, the article stated
that these anti-party activities, including those carried out by
Liu Shao-chi and "other political swindlers," have "already been
laid before the party and the people."
Other propaganda items, following on reports of discord between
PLA and part) cadres, indicate a continued effort to readjust the
division of power between the party, the PLA and the revolutionary
committees. Judging by a Kweiyang press article on 14 November,
for example, the PLA's dominant role in civil affairs, a carryover
of tasks entrusted to the army during the cultural revolution, may
be giving way co the revived authority of civilian party members.
The Kweiyang article, written by the "support-the-left" office of
the PLA units stationed in Tsunyi municipality (site of the 1935
conference which placed Mao in control of the party), discussed
the need to strengthen the concept of the party and uphold the
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party's unified leadership. The urticla stated that, prior to
creation of the new municipal party committee, "certain local
cadres were not bold enough in their work" and "the cadres and
masses looked to us to solve all problems, big and small." PLA
representatives complained that local civilian cadres "always
let us make our attitude known first," which "hindered the
unified leadership of the party." In order to correct this
situation and also to strengthen their concept of the party,
the PLA representatives "handed over to the municipal CCP
committee for atudy and discussion all major problems of the
'three supports and two militaries' work." Complying with the
"party's organizational. principles" and the need to "uphold
the prestige of the CCP committee," all "support-the-left"
personnel then followed the decisions made by the municipal.
CCP committee.
At the same time, however, it. was clearly stated in the Kweiyang
article that the PLA must not rompletely withdraw from its
administrative duties. PLA members were warned that "retreat-
ing to the second line means retreating from the frontline of
the 'three supports and two militaries' work"--which would
"depart from Chairman Mao's line on army-building."
A parallel effort appears underway to reassert party authority
over revolutionary committees. In a 16 November report on the
relationship between the party committee and the revolutionary
committee in a local Chengtu factory, the Szechwan provincial
radio declared that in matters regarding party principles and
major questions of r.?evoiutton and production, "the party committee
makes a decision first, and the revolutionary committee then makes
specific arrangements for implementing it." Party decisions are
to be submitted for discussion to the revolutionary committee,
but all amendments must be approved by the party committee before
they are carried out. Enlarged party committee meetings, held "in
the light of the tasks assigned by the central authori.tfes,"
allow members of the revolutionary committee a chance to participate
as "observers to discuss the problem" and then "implement whatever
decisions are reached."
SECOND-LEVEL LEADERSHIP RANKINGS SHOW SOME SHIFTS
Led by Chou. En.-lai, Chiang Ching, and Yeh Chien-ying, the nine
currently active Politburo members whi appeared together at the
Albanian rally on 8 November have made further appearances as a
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 CON IFIDIIN'I'1AL IIII[8 TIII(NUN
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group In connection with the current visit to Peking of North
Vietnam's party-government dul:egat[on. Mao himself mad one
of his rare ui puereneos on the 22d to receive the delegation
in the company of Chou En-lul, Yeh Chinn-ying and Li Ilsion-nien.
Peking's listing of the leaders present at the airport to wel-
come the North Vietnamese delegation seemed to indicate a mea-
sure of uncertainty regarding the placement of those leaders who
are just below the top lavs!. Recant shifts in rank, over the
past two weeks,seem likely.
The initial report of the airport arrival was broadcast by Pewlrg
domestic radio at 1200 GMT 20 November. Following the list of
Politburo members present, plus Kuo Mo-jo, the broadcast named
International Liaison Department head Keng Piao, Peking municipal
deputy chief Wu Te, and acting foreign minister Chi Pang-fei no
leaders present. NCNA accounts of the arrival, starting with
an. NCNA English account at 1503 GMT on the same day, inserted
the name of Hunan first secretary Hua Kuo-feng after Kuo Mo-jo,,
placed Wu above Keng, and added PLA deputy chief of staff Chang
Tsai-chien. (When Hue Kuo-feng first appeared in Peking, seeing
off the UN delegation on 9 November with "members of various
departments," his name followed that of Keng Piao. Also, in
that listing Chang was ranked after navy commanded Hsiao Ching-
kuang in the list of PLA personnel present.)
The Hanoi account of the arrival offers yet another order for
the Chinese leaders; if it was based on a list earlier supplied
by the Chinese, it indicates further last-minute changes. Hanoi
listed Kuo Mo-jo followed by Keng Piao, Hsiao Ching-kuang,
vice-minister of forign trade Li Chiang, and Wu Te; Keng and
Chang were not listed. The placement of Li seems an obvious
mistake, but traditionally Hanoi has been well enough informed
to follow Peking's order of ranking.
An NCNA account released at 2242 GMT on the 20th of an evening
meeting between the delegations was in accord with the earlier
NCNA rankings. After Kuo, the "leading members of departments
concerned" were Hua, Wu, Keng, Chi, and Chang.
Hua's sudden rise may indicate that he has taken over a depart-
ment of the Cential Committee, but his known background offers
few clues. His career before the mid-50's is not known; at
that time he became a Hunan vice-governor and later a party
secretary. He rose to the top position in Hunan last year after
Li Yuan was either purged or trantferred.
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26 No1Vl;MllI-H 197.1
Chang Teal.-ehiun is the junior vice-cht.uf of rteff, Ii-at Identi-
fied in the post at the end of June this year; he began appearing
regularly In Peking In May. lie served previously as a deputy
commander of the Nanking military region under Politburo member
lieu Shill-yu, who has not appeared since June.
There may be other casualties among the active deputy chiefs in
addition to those who disappeared with Iluang Yung-shong in early
September. Chen Chi-to and Yen Chung-chuan have not appeared
since the and of September. Yen last appeared on his return from
Hanoi with Li lisien-nien,and his role as a member of that delega-
tion makes his failure to appear for Pham Van Dong's arrival note-
worthy. Two other deputy chiefs, Peng Shao-hui and Wang Hein-ting,
have appeared in November.
INNER MONGOLIA GIVES FIRST POPULATION FIGURE SINCE SPLIT-UP
An INNER MONGOLIA DAILY editorial of 19 November, broadcapt by
Huhehot radio the same day, pllced the region's population at
"seven million people of all nationalities." Before parts of
the region were divided among its neighbors two and one-half
years ago, Inner Mongolian media claimed a population of
.l3 million.
in the summer of 1969, in what appeared to be an effort to conso-
lidate border lines of communication against the Soviet threat,
the neighboring prcvinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning
took over, respectively, the mengs of Hulunpeierh, Chelimu and
Chaowuta. To the west, past of Payennaoerh meng was split off
and given to Kansu. In August 1969 the population figure cited
for Heilungkiang went up by two million; the other provinces
that gained territory have never advanced any new population
totals.
Inner Mongolia's borders now seem to b. stable, with no further
changes. Since the Huhehot radio resumed local. broadcasting on
3 November, it has frequently made reference to the mengs it
still controls, including Payennaoerh, but not to any of the
areas it lost in 1969.
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24 NOVEMBER 1971
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SINO - SOVIE'r RELATIONS
MOSCOW USES ALLIES TO WARN AGAINST PEKING'S AIMS IN UN
Moscow has reacted wltli restraint in its own name to the PRC
policy statement delivered in the UN General Assembly on
1.5 November by Peking's delegation head Chiao Kuan-hua. The
Soviet central press has ignored the statement, but Moscow
broadcasts to China--chiefly over the purportedly unofficial
Radio Peace and Progress--as well as comment emanating from
the USSR's close allies in Eastern Europe register concern over
the prospect that Peking may use the United Nations as a forum
for Sino-American "collusion" and for harsher attacks on Soviet
foreign policy.
A Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 19th aired an
article in the Czechoslovak party organ RUDE PRAVO which took
Chiao to task for his anti-Soviet statements, particularly for
putting the "reactionary" United States in the same category as
the Soviet Union. The broadcast quoted the Czech daily as
remarking that the United States took "an indifferent attitude"
toward the Chinese delegate's criticism of the U.S. policies
because Washington believed it was "offset by his attacks
against the Soviet Union." Purporting to provide "the inside
story" of present Sino-American contacts, the paper was quoted
as saying "the United States is trying to make use of the
anti-Soviet trend of the policy of the present Chinese leader-
~chip." The broadcast also cited RUDE PRAVO's remark that
"U.S. ideologists" hope "the Chinese leaders will open their
second battlefronc in the United Nations and launch a struggle
against the Soviet Union."
In its own name,. Radio Peace and Progress told listeners in
China on the 20th that Chiao's UNGA speech was an indication
"that. Chinese diplomacy is aimed at using the UN podium for
propagating Peking's antisocialist foreign policy." The
broadcast objected in particular to Chiao's criticism of the
USSR's Middle East policy and his more general "slander that
the Soviet Union is using the United Nations for attaining
stealthy ends."
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24 NoVEN11b0i( 1971
In an npparunt vl iort to put thoMO who would conimrt. w.l.th the
Cliinuue dt the' Un I.ted Nut lone on thu I r guard, 8oUin'H m1.11.tary
daily NARUUNA ARMLYA--whtell Iias froquuntiy served as a vehicle
for ant I..-Chinn polem.Lcs--wnrnod of Puk.l.ng'H tr.oublomaki.ng
potential Li the world forum. Inti.cLud "Are There Reasons
for, Alarm?", the 1.8 Novombur article by Col. Gancho Ranchav
cited as 9v.ic!ence of possible things to come the "anti-Soviet"
statements that accompanied Poking's entry into the United
Nations. Noting that the.PRC's official statement condemned
the "two superpowers," the Bulgarian commentator said "there
is no doubt that by mentioning a second country in their
declaration, they mean the USSR." In an elaborate portrayal
of the PRC as a danger to world peace, Ranchev assailed Mao's
doctrine on revolution, "which is inevitably linked with war."
It is obvious, he. concluded, that such views "cause real alarm
among the public."
Another article in NARODNA ARMLYA on the. 20th, written
"especially for the paper" by PRAVDA's po 1.i.tical. commentator
Korionov, did not mention the Chinese UNGA statement but
pressed the attack on the Peking leadership's "splitting"
tactics and its rapprochement with the United States. Korionov
observed that in the light of "the current flirtation between
Peking and Washington," it becomes particularly clear why the
Chinese leadership firmly rejected the proposals of the CPSU
and other parties which called for united support for the DRV.
Even in those years, he added, "people in Peking worked on
plans to establish contacts with U.S. imperialism."
TASS LINKS PRCIS INTERNAL 'GRAVE CRISIS" TO MAOIST POLICIES
Moscow has continued to react cautiously to developments in
China but has sought to convey the idea that the present crisis
can be traced to high-level dis.:ension over Maoist foreign
policy and, by implication, its anti-Soviet line and rapprochement
with the United States. A TASS report on recent Chinese internal
developments, p.ublished in the central press on the 20th,
concluded that "there is a grave crisis in the Chinese leader-
ship." Citing foreign reports based on Peking sources, TASS
said that Lin Piao is being denounced and that he and some of
his followers have disappeared; it also noted that provincial
purges are underway. Although acknowledging that there is no
consensus among observers in Peking on the reasons for the
crisis, TASS said pointedly: "Most agree that the strife in
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2p, NOVI;MliIP,lh 1911
the Puking luudar.ahLp is it mani.fuutntion of thu general crisis of
Lite Mao tut political. line [and l.s] now evidence of ;,rave and
duel) differences between Ch,inoue lenders on major problems of
domestic and foreign policy."
Where 'L'ASS did not elaborate on the "major problems" allegedly
in dispute within the Chinese leadership, Moscow's "unofficial"
Radio Peace and Progress in a broadcast to China on the l7th
cited a UPI report that "diplomatic sources are saying the
recent events in China are the result of a disagreement over
the treatment of the United States and Russia." UPI quoted
diplomats, tike radio added, as saying that "a small group of
{7eople capable of decisive action and occupying secure positions
in the CCP and army have resolved to bring about a reconciliation
between Peking and Moscow." Other Soviet media have not used
the UPI report.
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24 NOVI;MIII;It 1971
." 31 -
PRC NUCLEAR TEST
PEKING ANNOUNCES DETONATION IN UNUSUALLY BRIEF COMMUNIQUE
In a stagment on the 19th, NCNA announced that the PRC the
preceding day had conducted another of the "necessary and
limited nuclear tests . . . for the purpose of defense." By
far the briefest and most modest of the statements on any of
the PRC's 10 announced tests,* the statement said only that
China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and
repledged the Chinese Government and people to a continuing
struggle for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons.
The announcement did not mention the long-standing PRC proposal
for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament.
While the proposal had appeared in the announcements only of
the first three tests, it has been broached in elite propaganda
ove: the past year--most recently in UN delegate Chiao Kuan-Hua's
15 Ncvember speech before the General Assembly. Also absent
from she latest announcement are the customary obeisance to Mao's
thought, the declaration that the Chinese tests encourage those
struggling for independence, and the observation that such tests
are a blow to the nuclear monopoly of "U.S. imperialism and
social imperialism."
To date Peking media have carried no followup comment or reports
of nationwide celebrations. Central press editorial comment
had accompanied the announcement of the first test in October
1964 and hailed two subsequent ones that marked major advances
in weap~..:ry--the test of a nuclear missile in October 1966 and
of a hydrogen bomb in June 1967. Publicity for jubilant
celebrations in China and for alleged worldwide acclaim
followed the release of the announcements of the first seven
tests, but not the 4 October 1969 announcement of tests eight
and nine (on 23 and 29 September, respectively).
* Two tests detected by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission have
gone unannounced by Peking--those of 24 December 1967 and
14 October 1970.
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C"UNIsr MoNcow departed I.'r.om Ito uormu.l priteLic-0 of waiting
REACTIONS for Pukfng's announcement and then '.arrying a brief
report citing NCNA. This time TASS reported nearly
seven hours before the NCNA announcement that the PRC had carried
out an atmospheric test in Sinkiang. TASS want on to report that
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued an official
statement expressing regret over the test and that the Japanese
Government was watching for "possible fallout." The item was
repeated in a Mandarin-language broadcast on the 20th, which
noted that it liar] been carried in the Soviet press. Also on
the 20th, Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and
Progress in i'Iandar'l% expressed "understanding" of the Japanese
people's concern over the test and quoted the General Secretary
of the World Peace Council as saying the test was "by no means
a more humane act" than the "arrogant" 6 November U.S. test on
Amchitka in the Aleutians.
The only comment available so far from Moscow's East European
allies appeared in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 19th. The paper
noted that the test was the 12th carried out by the Chinese. It
pointed out that the test took place three days after Chiao
Kuan-Hua in the General Assembly had declared that the PRC
would not take part in the Soviet-proposed conference of the
five nuclear powers. And it concluded that the world public
will undoubtedly "take a critical attitude" toward the Chinese
experiment.
The test has drawn predictable accolades from Albania,.with an
article in ZERI I POPULLIT on the 22d calling the detonation
another step toward breaking the "imperialist-revisionist
nuclear monopoly." Pyongyang's KCNA on the 22d carried the
text of Kim I1-song's congratulatory message of the 20th,
addressed to Mao and Chou En-lai; Kim had also sent a message
on the September 1969 experiments, his first such message since
the May 1966 test. While the customary congratulatory message
from the DRV leaders has not been reported, Premier Pham Van
Dong, in speeches in Peking on the 20th and 23d carried in
full by NCNA, hailed the latest test and noted the PRC's
rapid advance in.the nuclear and space fields. In the latter
address, he went on to state that the tests have strengthened
the. PRC's defense capabilities.
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