TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010037-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: October 20, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~I
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
FILE COPY
i q tl TO I E-61
Confidential
20 OCTOBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 42)
25X
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Moscow Insists Nixon Visit Will Not Prejudice DRV'z Interests . 1
Pharr Van Dong Pledges Efforts to Restore Communist Unity . . . . 3
Dong, Paris Delegates Assail U.S. Vietnamization Policy . . . . 4
"Cuu Long" Appraises Vietnamization, Strength of Main Forces . . 7
DRV Spokesman Scores U.S. Strikes in DMZ, North Vietnam . . . . 10
Hanoi, Front Note "Start" of U.S. Fall Antiwar Campaign . . . . 10
Broadcasts Continue to Avoid Any Mention of Lin Piao . . . . . 12
Attention to Minority Groups in China Is Stepped Up . . . . . . 15
Moscow Stresses Consistency with USSR's Negotiations Policy . . 17
Bucharest Hails Agreemenc on Visit as "Positive Step" . . . . . 20
Peking Notes that Gromyko Brought Invitation to Washington . . 21
Moscow Waits 18 Hours Before Noting Attack on Kosygin . . . . . 23
Kosygin: Bilateral Cooperation Not Aimed Against Anyone . . . 24
CUBA
Kosygin To Visit Cuba; Castro To Visit Chile? . . . . . . . . . 25
CPSU SLOGANS
Semiannual List Registers Few Changes from May Day . . . . . . 27
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Criticism of Voronov's Rural Construction Policies Voiced . . . 29
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
Moscow (2868 items)
Peking (1641 items)
Egyptian President
(0.2%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(34%)
33%
Sadat in USSR
Indochina
(8%)
20%
Indochina
(21%)
5%
[Laos Independence
(---)
15%!
[Podgornyy in DRV
(20%)
3%]
Anniversary
Planned Nixon Visit
(--)
4%
[South Vietnam
(3%)
1%]
to USSR
Kosygin in Morocco
(1%)
3;0
Elections
Haile Selassie in PRC
(17%)
10%
China
(2%)
3%
Romanian Industrial
(--)
3%
Coming Brezhnev Visit
(1%)
2%
Exhibit in PRC
to France
PRC-Burundi Relations
(--)
2%
Lunokhod Mission
(0.3%)
2a
Re-established
Completed
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
I N D 0 C H I N A
Vietnamese communist media have remained silent on the 12 October
announcement that President Nixon will visit the Soviet Union in
the latter part of May 1972. This silence was made the more pointed
at the Paris talks on the 14th when both the DRV and PRG delegates
attacked other remarks by the President at the 12 October press
confe-ence where he read the announcement. At the same time, Moscow
has shown concern to reassure the DRV that its interests will not be
prejudiced by the President's visit.
Premier Pham Van Dong, in an interview with the Italian communist
organ L'UNITA publicized by VNA on the 18th, echoed earlier propa-
ganda when he described President Podgornyy's 3-8 October Hanoi
visit as "a shining expression of the unshakable friendship which
binds the DRV to the Soviet Union and the VWP to the CPSU." Dong
also took the occasion to pledge again to continue working for the
"restoration" of unity among the fraternal parties.
Ongoing attacks on the President's Vietnamization policy include an
authoritative reiteration, in an article under the pseudonym "Cuu
Long," of the claim that communist military victories earlier this
year dealt a "fatal blow of strategic significance" to this policy.
Publicized in Front as well as Hanoi media, the article, in
evaluating the military situation, makes the unusually bald claim
that the communist main forces "can now defeat the southern puppet
army."
MOSCG; INSISTS NIXON VISIT WILL NOT PREJUDICE DRV'S INTERESTS
Against the background of Hanoi's vitriolic July-August anti-
Chinese polemic and of Moscow's charge that Peking's invitation to
President Nixon had eased the pressure for a U.S. response to the
1 July PRG peace proposal, Moscow propagandists now insist that
the President's planned visit to the USSR next May will not affect
Soviet support of the Vietnamese. An authoritative article in the
15 October PRAVDA by Vadim Nekrasov,* a deputy editor in charge of
foreign affairs, argues the need for U.S.-Soviet detente on the
basis of political realities and pragmatic mutual interests and
says such a development would not be prejudicial to the national
liberation movement and, particularly, to Hanoi's interests.
* The IUckrasov article and other Moscow comment is also discussed
in this TRENDS under the heading "Nixon Trip to USSR."
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20 OCTOBER 1971
The iekrasov article, entitled "The Demands of the Times"--
widely broadcast by Moscow radio in foreign languages, including
Vietnamese and Mandarin--says there are elements in U.S. policy
which contradict the notion of an "era of negotiations"; but it
states that such manifestations of aggressive policy as the war
in Vietnam and support of Israeli "expansionist" policy "have
received '.ad will continue to receive a decisive rebuff."
Nekrasov notes specifically that while. "people" in Washington
have started speaking of easing tensions and improving relations
with the USSR, "people" in the U.S. capital also try to defend
U.S. aggressive policy in Southeast Asia and keep silent about
"the DRV and PRG peace initiatives.' He goes on to assert that
"it is obvious that any attempts to build political relations
with the Soviet Union to the detriment of its fraternal relations
with the DRV, with other socialist countries, to the detriment of
its relations with its allies, and its commitments under treaties,
will not be successful."
Without explicitly mentioning Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi, Nekrasov
says the Soviet Union's "consistent" support for the Vietnamese
people against U.S. "aggression" was stressed again in "the
recent Soviet-Vietnamese statement." Declaring that the United
States must not expect to develop its relations with the Soviet
Union at the expense of other socialist countries, Nekrasov sees
as "obvious" the "bankruptcy" of hopes cherished by "certain
circles" in the United States of weakening the position of the
USSR and other socialist countries and of undermining the
national liberation movement.
An article by Mikhaylov in IZVESTIYA on the 16th, mainly devoted
to portraying "the tangible results" of Soviet foreign policy
"initiatives" since the 24th CPSU Congress, insists--as Nekrasov
does--that an essential ingredient of Soviet policy is support
for the national liberation movement. Citing Podgornyy's visit
to Hanoi and the resulting aid agreements as evidence of
unabated Soviet support for the DRV, Mikhaylov underlines the
assurance that Moscow will continue to aid the Indochinese
peoples in both "armed and peaceful labor." Mikhaylov reaffirms
the standard line that the way out of the war for the United
States is to withdraw its troops and give a "positive" answer
to the PRG proposals.
On 12 October--the day the President's Moscow visit was
announced--an editorial in the Soviet Defense Ministry organ
RED STAR defended Brezhnev's detente policy as "internationalism"
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CONFIDENTIAL PIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
in action based on "firmness, consistency, flexibility, and
realism." Although playing the stock theme of continued U.S.
"pursuit of aggression" against liberation movements,.the
editorial echoed Podgornyy's speech at a 4 October rali; in
Hanoi when, implying that the war is nearing a conclusion, it
said "the outlines of future victory are clearly starting to
emerge." Podgornyy had said that "the liberation movement of
the Indochinese peoples has been so successful that the future
victory is already well in sight, and the day of victory is not
far off."
Pi iAM VAN DUNG PLEDGES EFFORTS TO RESTORE COM?1UN I ST UNITY
In his 14 October interview with the Italian CP's L'UNITA, as
carried by VNA English on the 18th,* Pham Van Dong responded to
a question on the DRV's policy of unity within the socialist
world by pledging again to carry out Ho Chi Minh's last will and
testament. Observing that the DRV "has always pursued a policy
of unity toward all the Socialist countries," Dong asserted the
resolve of the Worth Vietnamese to carry out the testament of
"Comrade Ho Chi Minh, who wished that 'our party would do its
best to contribute effectively to the restoration of unity among
the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism in a way consonant with the
requirements of heart and reason."' Dong's new pledge to work to
restore unity among the fraternal parties comes in the wake of
a similar remark by Le Duan at the 4 October rally welcoming
Soviet President Podgornyy. Le Duan's remarks constituted the
first such high-level DRV pledge to work for the restoration of
unity since last June--before the July-August anti-Chinese polemic
in which Hanoi repeatedly charged that the Nixon Doctrine was
aimed at splitting the socialist countries.**
Unlike Le Duan in his 4 October speech, Dong referred neither to
the Soviet Union nor to the PRC in speaking of the restoration
of fraternal unity. But in responsing to L'UNITA's next question
* Pham Van Dong has had numerous interviews with both communist
and noncommunist media in recent years, but DRV media normally
have not carried them.
** See the TRENDS of 6 October 1971, pages 6-8.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
on the significance of Podgornyy's recent visit to Hanoi. the
Premier mentioned both countries' aid, in line with Hanoi's
general posture of neutrality vis-a-vis its two big allies.
Dong echoed other propaganda on Podgornyy's visit when he
called it "a shining expression of the unshakable friendship
which binds the DRV to the Soviet Union and the VWP to the CPSU."
A 19 October TASS report of Dong's interview highlighted his
remarks on Podgornyy's visit and Soviet-DRV relations.
Although TASS noted a number of the Premier's other remarks,
it did not mention his reaffirmation of the DRV's intention
to work for the restoration of communist unity.
DONG, PARIS DELEGATES ASSAIL U,S, VIETNM1IZATION POLICY
Pharr Van Dong, asked in his L'UNITA interview about the President's
"maneuvers" to elude a positive response to the PRG's seven points,
said that the fact that they had been warmly welcomed by world
public opinion--"particularly by the various political circles in
Washington and Saigon which regard them as reasonable"-is "a
considerable victory for our struggle on the diplomatic plane and
in the international sceae." He added cryptically that the
"evasive maneuvers deployed by Mr. Nixon" to counter pressures
from world opinion, particularly U.S. opinion, and to help him
continue his Vietnamization policy "will only push him further
into a blind alley . . . ." Dong said nothing about the
substance of. the PRG proposal in the interview, although in
his 31 August National Day speech he had noted the "basic"
points on U.S. withdrawal and cessation of U.S. support for
the Thieu regime.
Both PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi. and ARV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy
at the Paris session on 14 October* used the President's remarks
at his press conference on the 12th as a peg to attack Vietnamiza-
tion. The delegates, of course, did not acknowledge that it was
* Thi was again substituting for PRG Foreign Minister Mme.
Nguyen Thi Binh, who is still in Vietnam; Vy was standing in
for Xuan Thuy, who was absent for the third consecutive session.
After his initial absence, it was said that he had influenza.
VNA's service channel from Paris to Hanoi on 15 October carried
an item reporting that he had "left Paris to rest for a short
period of time in the GDR," but Hanoi media are not known to
have reported this.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
at that press conference that the President announced his planned
trip to Moscow. Their failure to do so was mace the more pointed
by Thi's reference to "Nixon's fallacy" that by Vietnamizing the
war while r.egotiating, the United States has made significant
progress which would enable it to end its involvement in South
Vietnam "by the middle of next year." The President had in fact
referred to progress on both tracks "by the time this meeting
[with the Soviets] takes place." Apart from VNA's report of
the Paris delegates' remarks, Hanoi media have carried no
comment on the President's press conference, presumably
because it was held to announce the Moscow trip; in a similar
departure from normal practice, Hanoi had totally ignored
the President's 4 August press conference at which he
discussed his planned trip to China in addition to commenting
on the Vietnam question. (TASS, perhaps in part in deference
to Hanoi, said nothing about any of the President's remarks
on Indochina in its 13 October account of his press conference
announcing the Moscow trip.)
The VNA account of the Paris session says that Thi "also
condemned Nixon for his overt intention to maintain for a long
period the presence in South Vietnam of U.S. forces, including
the Air Force, with the obvious aim of continuing the war and
protecting the bellicose clique of Nguyen Van Thieuu and carrying
out neocolonialism." It is not made clear that Thi was alluding
to the President's 12 October press conference in this regard.
But DRV delegate Vy, according to VNA, "analyzed the contradictions"
in the President's remarks "about his 'goodwill for peace"' at the
12 October press conference. Noting that the President said the
United States was continuing to negotiate but would at the same
time continue Vietnamization, Vy observed that "peace in Vietnam,
as Mr. Nixon sees it, means to feverishly carry out" Vietnamization,
to maintain the Thieu administration, prolong the U.S. military
occupation, continue to use the Air Force and "in other words,
to prolong indefilitely the war in South Vietnam and expand the
war to t:he whole of Indochina." VNA reports that Vy took issue
with the President's statement "that one of his key objectives
is to bring home the POW's," arguing that this is a question of
"an aftermath of war" and cannot be solved as long as the Nixon
Administration refuses to withdraw U.S. troops completely and
to end Vietnamization.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
VNA notes Thi's charge that U.S. representatives at more than
130 sessions in Paris have shown a consistently negative
attitude toward every communist proposal, including the PRG's
1 July seven-point proposal. But VNA does not go on to
report Thi's criticism of Ambassador Porter in the remark
that "at recent sessions the U.S. neocolonialist position
and its obstinacy to engage in negotiations from a position
of strength have been exposed in a more overt manner, thus
creating more difficulties and aggravating the deadlock of
the conference."
As it has done on previous occasions, VNA obscures the fact
that the allied delegates spoke first at the session on the
14th. VNA again ignores GVN delegate Lam's presentation and
dismisses Ambassador Porter's remarks in one sentence: He
"used brazen fallacies in an attempt to conceal the Nixon
Administration's aggressive nature and shun a serious response
to the PRG's seven-point peace plan."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
"CUU LONG" APPRAISES VIETNAMIZATION, STRENGTH OF VAIN FORCES
The article by the military commentator "Cuu Long,"* entitled
"The U.S. Vietnamization Strategy Has Been and Will Certainly be
Defeated," was carried in two installments on 17 and 18 October
in both Hanoi and Front broadcasts and published in the North
Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Cuu Long's article is
reminiscent of comment following the Lam Son 719 operation which
broke with the general propaganda pattern of recent years when
it declared that a "military" victory is possible and seemed to
argue for increased action by main-force units. The last such
comment came in July and early August in reviews of the fighting
in the first six months of the year.**
According to Liberation Radio's introduction, the Cuu Long article
was written on the basis of a talk delivered by a PLAF command
representative at a "congress of heroes and emulation combatants"
of eastern Nam Bo and Saigon. Held from 20 to 23 September, the
congress was first reported by Liberation Radio on 8 October and
hailed in both Hanoi and Front comment, including editorials in
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 11 October. The PLAF command
representative's talk was summarized in the 11 October QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN, but it is not known to have been broadcast until Libera-
tion Radio carried it in installments on 17, 18, and 19 October.
The radio account was not translated in full because of poor
reception. The available portion of the talk dealt in large part
with individual heroic feats and the teachings of Ho Chi Minh.
Cuu Long repeats the claim, made in comment earlier this year,
that Vietnamization "received a fatal blow of strategic
significance in the 1970-71 dry season," and he maintains that
the ARVN is "facing the danger of collapse" while the Indochinese
"revolutionary force," have never been in "better shape." He
raises the threat of future large-scale attacks with the assertion
that the dry season "not only created favorable conditions for our
* Cuu Long is a pseudonym periodically signed to authoritative
commentaries on the war in South Vietnam. The last previous
article bearing this signature was a lengthy discussion of
ideological problems in the PLAF broadcast by Liberation Radio
at the end of April this year. Prior to that, Hanoi and Front
media in mid-April 1970 publicized an article attributed to Cuu
Long on the allied Vietnamization program.
** See the 4 August TREiiDS, pages 15-17.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
main forces to engage in large-scale operations but also opened
the prospect that we will certainly annihilate the Saigon puppet
main-force troops, thus completely defeating Nixon's Vietnamiza-
tion strategy militarily."
Later in his article, Cuu Long states flatly that "our main-force
army can now completely defeat Che southern puppet army." As he
has done in earlier articles,* Cuu Long claims that the ARVN was
almost completely put out of action in 1965 prior to the inter-
vention of U.S. troops. He goes on to draw a parallel between
its condition then and its position following "disasters" in Lam
Son 719 and Cambodia and questions the ability of "weakened" U.S.
forces to again "save the puppet army." He predicts that "like
a crippled person with no crutch, the puppet army will completely
collapse when the full war burden falls on its head."
Cuu Long portrays Saigon as facing a dilemma since it allegedly
has had to send main-force units to assist in pacification and
:ias thereby reduced its ability "to concentrate mobile forces
to form an outer protective shield" for pacification. This
dilemma is also stressed in a 19 October QUAN DOI NUAN DAN article
on the 1970-71 dry season. As reported by VNA, the article in
the army paper claims that the ARVN's strategic reserves are
spread thin on the battlefield and that "an important part of
it has to do the job normally done by local garrisons."
Both the Cuu Long article and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary
claim that the allies have failed to achieve the major objective
of pushing the PLAF main forces away from heavily populated areas
and preventing then from launching attacks. Concern with allied
efforts to force PLAF units out of their areas had seemed to be
reflected at the September heroes' congress where determination
to "maintain their footholds" was repeatedly cited as a primary
characteristic of t;t^ae honored at the meeting. As evidence that
the allies have been "outmaneuvered," QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cites the
communists' attacks on positions in northern Quang Tri, the
* Cuu Long's April 1970 article similarly referred to the
threatened collapse of the South Vietnamese army in 1965; and a
February 1967 article by Cuu Long, published in the QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN magazine, discussed problems created by the entry of
U.S. forces into the war when the communists were on the verge
of "completely defeating" the ARVN.
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20 OCTOBER 1971
highlands, and Cambodia, adding that the gairison in Krek,
Cambodia, is "now under siege" and that the PLAF is "operating
in force in Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces" and "pumping
big-gun fire into Gia Dinh and Saigon."
Touching on the situation in the cities, Cuu Long echoes other
communist claims that the "struggle movement" in urban areas
has been markedly stepped up in 1971. Going further to raise
the possibility of an even greater urban struggle, Cuu Long
asserts that "under certain conditions the struggle movement
of compatriots in southern cities may develop into a broad
revolutionary movement which, in coordination with other
attacks, will contribute to overthrowing" the Saigon government.
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20 OCTOBER 1971
DRV SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ. NORTH VIETNAM
Hanoi on 9 and 16 October publicizes two more DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statements in the continuing series of complaints
against U.S. air activity against the DRV. The spokesman's
statement on the 16th charged that from 12 to 15 October U.S.
aircraft including B-52's "repeatedly bombed" Huong Lap village
while U.S. artillery "from the southern part of the demilitarized
zone" shelled Vinh Giang and Vinh Son villages. The 9 October
statement claimed that the same three villages were attacked on
4, 5, and 7 October and that Vinh Giang and Vinh Son were shelled
by U.S. ships as well as by artillery. Both statements described
the villages as being "north of the 17th parallel in the
demilitarized zone."
The 16 October statement also claimed there were air strikes on
populated areas of Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces on the 14th
and 15th. And according to the statement on the 9th, U.S.
aircraft "struck at a number of localities in the western part
of Quang Binh Province" on 4 and 6 October. Both statements
routinely demand an end to all U.S. encroachments on DRV
sovereignty and security.
V\NUl, FrrUNT NOTE :START" OF U.S. FALL ANTIMR CAMPAIGN
Continuing Vietnamese communist attention to U.S. antiwar activity
includes comment from both Hanoi and the Front on the "fall
campaign." VNA on 15 October reports antiwar activities in
Washington, New York, and Seattle on the 13th sponsored by the
People's Coalition for Peace and Justice and the National Peace
Action Coalition. And comment from both Hanoi and the Front
says these demonstrations marked the start of the antiwar fall
campaign, which they both call "very significant."
Hanoi Radio in a commentary on the 18th asserts that despite the
Administration's "maneuvers" and "deceitful allegations," the
Vietnam problem will remain a burden to the United States as
long as it refuses to withdraw all troops. Similarly, a
Liberation Radio commentary on the 15th notes the importance
of this campaign in light of the President's "tricks" to
appease the American people's struggle. It describes the
current offensive as a continuation of previous movements, and
other propaganda recalls in passing the antiwar demonstrations
last spring.
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In the only reference to President Nixon's 12 October press
conference--other than by the Paris delegates--on the l4th?--
Liberation Radio cites as psychological pluys the President's
remark that there is s. prospect for ending the U.S. combat
role in mid-1972 and his new economic measures. The broadcast
declares that "all of Nixon's deceits cannot lead U.S. public
opinion astray." It also scores the President for "purposefully
dodging" the PRG's seven-point proposal.
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CONF:CDENTTAL FI3T.S TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1.971.
CHINA
BROADCASTS CONTINUE TO AVOID ANY MENTION OF LIN PIAO
Lin Piao has not been mentioned in available radio broadcasts
or NCNA reports during the past week. The last time he was
mentioned in monitored provincial media was in a 8 October
Kirin broadcast; except for foreign-originated messages and
toasts he has not been mentioned in Peking broadcasts since
15 September. The continuing failure to mention Lin and the
absence from public view of most active military leaders on
the Politburo, including Huang Yung-sheng, Li Tso-peng, Wu
Fa-hsien anc. the Nanking regional commander Hsu Shih-yu, make
it clear that China's current crisis is related to problems in
the military leadership.
.X f
On the basis of their behavior during the cultural revolution,
Wu Fa-hsien and Li Tso-peng can be placed among the "leftists"
on the political spectrum, Huang Yung-sheng and Hsu Shih-yu
among the "moderates." Thus it seems unlikely that all would
fall together as a single faction; after the struggle subsides,
some may reappear. Yet media examination is beginning to suggest
that another scenario is possible: since all were dependent on
Lin for their positions, Lin's disappearance has somehow shifted
the power balance in favor of civilian leadership, whether
"radical" or "moderate" -- which would explain the continuing
appearances of civilian Politburo members of various leanings.
considerable dimiauation in power, there have been two campaigns
The question of party control over the army has been an issue
of discussion in the CCP since the formation of tl:e Red Army.
During the cultural revolution the slogan that the "party
commands the gun" was given frequent lip-service as the army
extended its control over all aspects of PRC life. Since the
second plenary session of the Ninth Central Committee ending
in September 1970 at which leftist civilian leader Chen Po-ta
was apparently severely criticized and Kang Sheng suffered a
which were aimed at insuring party control over
During late January and February of this year a number of
provinces broadcast rather general articles advocating party
control of the army; these were issued during the spring
festival period, a traditional time for comment on relations
with the PLA, and the campaign soon died out. It reappeared
in a major way only in the second traditional annual period
for comment on army-civilian relations, around Army Day on
1 1 August.
CONFIDENTIAL
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20 OC'T'OBER 1971.
ARMY DAY The Army Day pronaganda this year varied significantly
from the cultural revolution era, with the joint
editorial especially notable for diminishing the status of Lin
as the loader currently in control of the PLA. For the first
time since the beginning of the cultural revolution, the editorial
contained no quotation from Lin, not even his injunction Lo
study Mao. In addition the editorial depersonalized the control.
of the army by noting that the army places itself "under the
party's absolute leadership, going where the party directs."
For the first time since 1967, when radical leaders with power
over the media used separate editorials in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED
FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY to urge closer control over the
military, the editorial this year noted Mao's dictum "the party
commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command
the party."
The injunction probably reflected the near-completion of party
rebuilding and the feeling of some that the PLA, no longer
essential to the maintenance of order, could return to its
previous role.
The Army Day editorial was complemented by an NCNA article on
31 July which sounded the theme that the army is infallible
only so long as it follows Mao, that "whenever Chairman Mao's
revolutionary line is interfered with, the army suffers losses."
The featured losses included those caused by "left" deviations,
both within the army and in incorrect civilian leadership of
the army, and also by rightist deviations within the army.
This article did not, however, indicate that on local levels
the army must look to its civilian party counterpart for
guidance. Most of the provincial articles lauding party
control during this period also carried few hints that a
serious campaign to insure organizational control by the
civilian party might be underway. For example, a 29 August
Harbin broadcast was unusually frank in indicating that the
party apparatus within the army was in a position to dominate
the civilian party. The broadcast discussed problems experi-
enced by the party branch of a PLA "support-the-left" team
party branch in exercising control over its scattered members,
many of whom "are assuming leading positions in party organi-
zations" at various levels in the civil sphere. The article
stated that controls had been tightened by various measures,
including the addition of "the positions of full-time secretary
and deputy secretary" to the PLA team's party orgrnization.
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20 OCTOBER 1971
,rho. Harbin broadcast suggests that an attempt to reassert party
e.ontrol, if its strengthened political PLA cadres, could find a
nrimber of allies within the army. (The reconstituted General
Political Department is led by Li Ta-sheng, one of the army
leaders whose public appearances have continued unabated.) The
number of articles advocating party control by county armed
forces departments, which are under provincial command and have
been most heavily involved in the civilian structure, may indi-
cate strength in this area for revived party control, especially
since most of these PLA cadres also hold civil party posts. On
the other hand, if current arguments reflect such issues as
allocations priorities, those in the PLA who depend on advanced
weapons, such as the air force leaders and commanders at the
field army level, might be more resistant to a reassertion of
civil party authority.
CURRENT Current broadcast items on the PLA's relationship to
COMMENT the party focus attention on county-level organiza-
tion but may be applicable at higher levels as well.
The sort of propaganda item now fairl; common is exemplified by a
Kwangsi radio broadcast on 12 October which quotes a county
leader who is also a PLA leader as saying: "We have treated
the local cadres' confidence in the PLA as capital for arrogance.
We have not paid attention to asking for instructions from and
reporting work to thr local CCP committee."
Similarly, a Shansi -roadcast on the 18th hails a county secre-
tary PLA cadre for "taking the lead in heeding the party's
discipline." The article lays down the principle that the
"individual must obey the organization" and secretaries must
follow the collective leadership. The secretary who is praised
was once complacent and arrogant, it is said, but he has
learned more recently that local cadres must be consulted.
ROLE OF Dissension over the role of the militia may figure
MILITIA in the current infighting. There has been new
emphasis on the importance of party control of the
militia and on the role of the militia in case of war.
The most authoritative provincial voice on these themes was a
22 September report of a militia conference in Anhwei, home base
of Li Te-sheng. The article not only laid down the general
principle of civilian party control over the militia, but also
the organizational injunction that militia work must be placed
under the purview of specific mem')ers of the party committees
at each level. To insure that the correct political line is
observed in the militia, the committee is to select demobilized
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soldiers "who are young and able-bodied" to fill the holes in
militia leadership ranks. In addition, the article praised
"some" PLA units that had worked closely with the militia in
military training activities.
Some PLA leaders may object --as did Peng Te-huai a number of
years ago -- to any increased military training for the militia.
Such opposition at a lower level was noted by Kansu radio on
30 September: "Some comrades have looked on the militia as an
instrument for maintaining social order . . . and held that in
time of war all the militia can do is carry stretchers." The
article called for grasping militia work "as a measure for dealing
with any possible sudden attack by imperialism," and demanded
further study of the military role played by the militia during
the revolutionary war.
ATTENTION TO MINORITY GROUPS IN CHINA IS STEPPED UP
Evidence that the bureaucracy is making a new effort to improve
communications with China's minority groups continues to
accumulate. Such endeavors wLee more or less quiescent during
the cultural revolution and for some time thereafter, and indeed
there was considerable backsliding for several years during
which restrictions were placed on radio broadcasting and news-
paper publication. Last May, however, P.^dio Peking's domestic
service inaugurated broadcasts in Uighur and Kazakh, and on
1 October the Kwangsi regional service began to carry programs
in Chuang dialects for the most numerous of China's minority
groups.
Now the Hulunpeierh and Chelimu meng (leagues) have instituted
local broadcasts in Mongolian. These areas were detached from
Inner Mongolia in 1969 and placed under the jurisdiction,
respectively, of Heilungkiang and Kirin provinces. Since then,
the meng radios, located at Hailar and Tungliao, have relayed
the Mandarin service of their respective provincial radios; but
up to now the substantial Mongolian populace of these areas has
been supplied with its propaganda rations via relay by the local
radios of the Inner Mongolia regional service in Mongolian.
This practice has probably been less than satisfactory, however.
With Inner Mongolia's main radio service in Mandarin restricted
for nearly two years to relays of Radio Peking, its Mongolian-
language service has been permitted only to translate and
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rebroadcast items from the Radio Peking and NCNA file -- with
a resultant scarcity of items explicitly about Mongolians.
Now, starting this month, the Nailar and Tungliao radios
are going to be able to braodcast localized propaganda materials
for their Mongolian listeners.
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20 OCTOBER 1971
N I X 0 N TRIP TO USSR
MOSCOW STRESSES CONSISTENCY WITH USSR'S NEGOTIATIONS POLICY
The President's planned visit to Moscow next Nay is discussed
on an authoritative level in articles by Nekrasov in PRAVDA
and Hikhaylov in IZVESTIYA on 15 and 16 October, respectively.
As in initial comment by TASS' Kornilov on the 14th, the
articles depict Soviet policy as combining a quest for the
negotiated settlement of international problems with maintenance
of military strength. But the stress is clearly on the former,
and both the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles assume a confident
stance in reviewing recent Soviet foreign policy accomplish-
ments. In an apparent division of tasks, it is left to the
party organ to explicitly reassure Moscow`s allies in the
widely broadcast Nekrasov article that relations with the
United States will not be developed at the expense of
relations with the socialist countries, particularly the DRV.*
There is no direct address in any Soviet comment on the trip
to the question of the triangular relationship among Washington,
tioscow, and Peking.**
Entitled "The Demands of the Times," Nekrasov's PRAVDA article
takes note of recent developments in Soviet foreign policy,
from the treaties with Egypt and India to the recent flurry
of high-level Soviet contacts with other countries. Nekrasov, a
PRAVDA deputy editor, goes on to present the invitation to the
President as clearly justified in light of this documented
evidence of the efficacy of a policy of negotiations. He
asserts that the importance of the state of relations between
the USSR and the United States in the international arena is
"perfectly clear." He says it is apparent from the 12 October
announcement that the agreement on the visit "was reached in
* See the Indochina section of today's TRENDS for a discussion
of this aspect.
** While TASS initially reported the President's 12 October
press conference in a single sentence on the same day, a later
account on the 13th did note his observe ion that the trip to
Moscow will be independent of the visit to Peking and that
neither trip has the aim of exploiting Sino-Soviet differences.
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the course of an exchange of opinions over the past year," and
he recalls the "positive results" which have created a proper
atmosphere for the meeting--the Berlin accord and the two
agreements achieved at the strategic arms limitation talks.
Nekrasov finds it a hopeful sign that "wide public circles in
different countries, including the United States, even more strongly
reject the policy of militarism and aggression," calling this "the
spirit of the times" and adding that "every sane political leader
cannot but cake this into consideration." At the same time, he
takes note of "zigzags" in U.S. foreign policy in recent years--
phraseology used in Brezhnev's 30 March report to the CPSU
Congress. Citing "aggressive manifestations" in Indochina and
the Middle East, he affirms that "these manifestations will
continue to receive a decisive rebuff." He concludes that a
realistic basis for developing bilateral relations is "the sober
regard for the processes taking place in the world and an under-
standing of the basic direction of the course of events."
The Mikhaylov article in IZVESTIYA, which Radio Moscow did not
broadcast, emphasizes that in agreeing to a U.S.-Soviet summit
meeting the Soviet Union was guided by principles set forth in
the Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress--including
the pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the development of
mutually advantageous ties. In reviewing recent foreign policy
developments, the IZVESTIYA article cites the Berlin agreement
as "graphic proof" that even the most complex problems which
adversely affect international affairs can be resolved when there
is "a common aspiration to do so and when the sides do not shun
sensible compromises but take mutual interests into account."
Like Nekrasov, Mikhaylov does not specify topics that may be
discussed with the President, registering only the hope that the
summit meeting will result in "mutually acceptable solutions."
He makes the point earlier in the article that "serious prepara-
tory work must precede" the talks. While Moscow comment on the
trip avoids any discussion of agenda topics, TASS' 13 October
account of President Nixon's press conference the preceding day
did report that in answer to reporters' questions he said such
matters as "the negotiations on the limitation of strategic
weapons, the Near East, and others" would be discussed.
Moscow media have not been heard to acknowledge Premier Kosygin's
remarks to eight visiting U.S. governors on the 15th when, according
to Western reports, he said the President's USSR visit. will be
aimed at improving U.S.-Soviet friendship, without which world
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peace "is difficult." Kosygin reportedly added that the best
preparation for the visit would be the ending of the war in
Vietnam and Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories.
The TASS account of this meeting simply said Kosygin discussed
"questions of Soviet-American relations" with the governors.
In an 18 October rinner speech in Ottawa on the first day of
his visit to Canada, reported by TASS, Kosygin observed that
the trips by Soviet leaders to other countries and "visits by
foreign statesmen to the Soviet Union" serve to implement the
USSR's peace-loving policy.
MOSCOW'S ALLIES East German, Czechoslovak, Hungarian,
Polish, and Bulgarian radio and press media
continue to hail the agreement on the President's trip, for the
most part following Moscow's lead. They characterize it as an
agreement fully consistent with the USSR's "constructive" foreign
policy, at the same time pointing to Soviet awareness of Washington's
"aggressiveness and adventurism" as manifested by the war in
Indochir' and continuing support for Israel. In the words 't an
East Bei ~u domestic service commentary by Leuschner on the 17th,
"withou any illusions about the character of imperialism," the
Soviet Union and its allies must probe every possibility of
achieving political solutions of controversial issues.
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev commented briefly on the trip
announcement in his 13 October UNGA speech, calling it symptomatic
of "the fresh winds . of reduction of tension and detente"
which have recently developed in t%e international arena.
Bashev's remarks represent the only comment on the trip from a
high-level East European spokesman so far.
While the East European comment essentially parallels Moscow's,
some 'cast European commentators have continued to pursue angles
Moscow could not or would not broach--speculating on the probable
agenda, for example, and pointing to the timing of the planned
visit on the eve of the U.S. presidential election campaign.*
On the latter theme, for example, Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the
14th said the trip "is already referred to as an 'election trip'
by some Western commentators, that is, as a 'great trump card'
for the U.S. presidential election"; the same day's Bratislava
PRACA remarked on "the domestic policy significance of Nixon's
trip, particularly at a time preceding the climax of the presi-
dential electior campaign."
* See the TRENDS of 14 October for earlier East European reaction.
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BUCHAREST HAILS AGREEMENT ON VISIT AS "POSITIVE STEP"
Romania registered its warm approval of the announcement of the
President's Moscow visit in a 15 October SCINTEIA article by one
of the paper's leading political commentators, Caplescu, entitled
"A Positive Step in the Progress of Soviet-American Relations,
a New Confirmation of the Universal Validity of the Method of
Political Contacts." The same commentator had coauthored the
21 July SCINTEIA article in which Bucharest had welcomed the
15 July announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking.
Quoting from the President's 12 October press conference, Caplescu
cites his remark that the Moscow and Peking visits are independent
of each other and that neither is aimed at exploiting Sino-Soviet
differences. Here Caplescu adds that the President "also stressed"
that "desri.te differences of opinions with the countries to be
visited, 'one must admit at the same time that today there is no
alternative to negotiation"'--lifting out of context a remark made
by the President specifically in connection with U.S.-Soviet negotia-
tion of differences at a time when further escalation of the arms
race could not benefit either side.
Caplescu is careful to treat the Moscow visit in terms parallel
to those he had used in July in regard to the projected Peking
trip. He says the Romanian people view the agreement on the
President's visit to the Soviet capital as "an act of political
realism," much as the July article had viewed the decision on
the Peking trip as "the firs: step toward giving up the unrealis-
tic policy" the United State:; had pursued for more than 20 years
toward China. The article elso stresses that major world problems
today cannot be solved without the participation of "the socialist
countries," and "in this respect it is known that the Soviet Union
is a big socialist state which . . . makes an outstanding contribu-
tion to strengthening the world socialist system, the forces of
progress and peace." In a similar vein, the July article, citing
the increasing number of countries establishing diplomatic relations
with the PRC and voting for its admission to the United Nations,
said "these facts prove the increasingly strong conviction that
no effective settlement of any of the big problems facing mankind
today could be conceived without the participation of the People's
Republic of China."
Viewing the visit as part of the ongoing "comprehensive process
of normalizing" international relations, Caplescu underscores a
stock tenet of Romania's independent policy in adding that "each
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state, big or small, regardless of its potential, should make its
own contribution" to solving "major" contemporary problems.
Utilizing the opportunity to demonstrate agreement between
Bucharest and the other East European countries on a major
international development, the article notes that "from sources
of the communist and workers' parties, the first released
commentaries or taking of stands express positive appreciation
concerning the importance of the announced visit" and of "the
method of contacts" and peaceful coexistence.
PEKING NOTES THAT GROMYKO BROUGHT INVITATION TO WASHINGTON
While .voiding direct comment, Peking has reported the announce-
ment on President Nixon's projected visit to Moscow in such a way
as to contrast that development with its own invitation to the
President. Peking's sole reference to the Soviet-U.S. summit
meeting, a report datelined 14 October ^nd carried early on the
15th by the NCNA domestic service and the Peking domestic radio,
cited the identical announcements by TASS and the President and
briefly quoted from the President's press conference. The NCNA
international service and Radio Peking's foreign services have not
carried the report.
Peking's tr-;...unent of the Soviet-U.S. announcement, including its
failure to report the development in its international services,
reflects Chinese concern and distrust regarding relations between
the two superpowers. The NCNA report omitted the final sentence of
the TASS announcement indicating that the purpose of the Moscow
summit meeting was to improve bilateral relations and strengthen
world peace--a goal that might seem parallel to the purpose of
the President's visit to Peking. NCNA's announcement on Peking's
invitation to the President had said the projected Sino-U.S.
meeting was intended to seek the normalization of relations between
the two countries and to exchange views on questions of concern to
the two sides. NCNA selected one brief passage from the President's
12 October press conference, quoting him as saying that discussions
on a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting had been taking place on and off--
"not at my level"--until Foreign Minister Gromyko brought a formal
invitation to Washington. An implicit contrast was thus drawn
between Peking's invitation, extended to an American emissary
dispatched to the PRC, and the Kremlin's invitation delivered by
an envoy going to Washington from Moscow.
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In keeping with its-general olemical restraint toward the
Soviets, Peking ha~ggely avn{ded rho former t
f Soviet-U.S. collusion in its-nngoin mment. But
e e ort to -contrast its relations %rith Washington and
those between Moscow and Washington, e;rident in the report
on the President's forthcoming meeting vith the Kremlin
leaders, was also reflected in Peking's response to a TASS-
reported Japanese account of the first Kissinger mission to the
PRC. Reacting sharply to claims in the account that Kissinger
attempted economic bribery of the Chinese, an NCNA dispatch on
8 September sought to turn the accusation back on the Soviets
by charging that they did not hesi.- - to "send im.ortant per-
sons to capitalist countries . . . to beg obsequiously" for
funds to build a truck plant, thereby obtaining equipment from
the United States. The 8 September NCNA dispatch, like the
14 October report on the Soviet-U.S, summit meeting, did not
mention the Prsident's projected visit to Peking. The latest
reference to that visit in PRC media was the 20 October announce-
ment of KissinF,er's arrival in Peking that day for the purpose
of making arrangements for the President's trip.
ALBANIAN COMMENT Comment from Peking's A1ba_nian ally, white
sparse thus far, has been characteristically
more outspoken, describing the President's forthcoming visit to
Moscow in terms of Soviet-U.S. collaboration in opposition to
revolutionary forces. A Tirana broadcast on 14 October viewed the
summit meetii.g as part of an effort by the two superpowers to
establish world hegemony and to undermine the national liberation
movement. Tirana's comment to date has not mentioned China in
connection with the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. A vitriolic
ZERI I POPULLIT editorial on 7 October, in the course of an attack
on Podgorryy's visit to the DRV, had mads much of what it described
as the anti-Chinese motives underlying Moscow's current diplomatic
campaign.
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- 23 -
KOSYGIN IN CANADA
MOSCOW WAITS 18 HOURS BEFORE NOTING ATTACK ON KOSYGIN
Moscow media waited more than 18 hours to report the attack on
Soviet Premier Kosygin as he walked with Canadian Prime a-~..ister
Trudeau on the Parliamentary grounds Just after they concluded
their first round of talks on 18 October. Not until the after-
noon of the 19th did Moscow radio, in a news item for the
domestic audience, report that a "provocation was perpetrated"
against Kosygin as he was leaving the Parliamentary building
with Trudeau. In its reports on the Kosygin visit on the
evening of the 18th, Moscow radio and TASS remained silent on
the incident, which occurred just before 5 p.m. Moscow time.
A dispatch from Ottawa read in Moscow radio's late evening
international news roundup said typically that "Canadians
express joy over the arrival . . . of the head of the Soviet
Government."
Without identifying the attacker as a Hungarian refugee, the
radio report on the 19th said that the man "broke through the
guards . . . and tried to commit an act of hooliganism" and
noted that the police were conducting an investigation. The
report also said Trudeau had "expressed deep regret at what
had happened," without specifying that the Canadian leader
had made this public apology at a session of the House of
Commons later in the afternoon during which he called the
attack "a very humiliating event for Canadians" and expressed
shame in the name of the Canadian Government and people.
At a dinner given by the Canadian hosts on the evening of the
18th, Kosygin expressed his "sincere appreciation for the
hospitality accorded" his delegation and for the "friendly
sentiments of the Canadians for the Soviet people." He added
that the Soviet people "also entertain sentiments of sympathy
for the people of Canada, a country of amicable and industrious
people."
A PRAVDA report on Kosygin's visit by correspondents Mayevskiy
and Geyvandov, summarized by TASS on the 19th, ignored the
attack on the Soviet leader but did point out that the
developing Soviet-Canadian relations "are not to the liking
of some elements" in Canada which "stint no efforts in
inventing 'p-oblems' and hindering a development of these
relations." Tnt PRAVDA correspondents said "most Canadians
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understand well that these are people of the past who got
stuck in the trenches of the Cold War." Apart from this single
general reference to opposition to the Kosygin visit, Moscow
media have remained silent on the numerous protest actions
taken by various groups of Ukrainians, East European ethnic
organizations, and Jews.
KOSYGIN; BILATERAL COOPERATION NOT AIMED AGAINST ANYONE
As at the time of Trudeau's May visit to the USSR, Soviet
propaganda surrounding Kosygin's return visit has scrupulously
avoided any effort to play off the developing Soviet-Canadian
relationship against the United States. Moscow media have
carried news reports of the difficulties arising between
Washington and Ottawa over the scheduled Amchitka nuclear test
and the U.S. 10-percent surcharge, and TASS reported Trudeau's
comment at a press conference on 15 October that it was "possible
that Canada would have to reorient its trade to other areas of
the world." But contentious issues in U.S.-Canadian relations
have been unmentioned in commentaries pegged to Kosygin's visit.
In his reply toast to Trudeau at the dinner on 18 October, the
Soviet Premier declared pointedly that "Soviet-Canadian coopera-
tion is not directed against anybody. It serves, and we want it
to serve even more, the cause of international security. We
have no concealed aims whatsoever." Regarding bilateral
relations, according to TASS, Kosygin attached "great signifi-
cance" to the protocol on political consultations signed during
Trudeau's visit to the USSR.
TASS transmitted a virtual text of Trudeau's toast on the 18th
in which the Canadian leader expressed his country's readiness
to develop a "soundly based" friendship with the Soviet Union
while at the same time continuing "the long relationship with
its oldest friends," adding that "however uncertain may be the
consequences from time to time of short-term events, the long
run consists of a climate of understanding and cooperation."
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20 OCTORI R 1971
CUBA
KOSYGIN TO VISIT CUBA; CASTRO TO VISIT CHILE ?
Both Moscow and Havana have announced that Soviet Premier
Kosygin will pay "a friendly visit" to Cuba at the invitation
of the Cuban Communist Party and Government. Moscow radio on
the 19th said that the visit would take place "at the end of
this month"; Havana's domestic service on the 20th noted that
Kosygin would arrive on 26 October. Neither mentioned that he
would be coming from Canada, where his official visit is
scheduled to end on the 25th; neither specified the duration
of his stay in Cuba.
The announcement of the evidently belatedly arranged visit
comes less than a month after speculation that Brezhnev would
visit Cuba in December. Prompted by Chilean Foreign Minister
Almeyda's remark on 21 September--in an interview in the
Santiago ULTIMA HORA--that a long-rumored Castro visit to Chile
"must take place before December, since Brezhnev's visit to
Cuba has been announced for that date," the speculation was
neither confirmed nor denied by Moscow or Havana, although Cuba
media made at least one noncommittal reference to the "rumor."*
No top-level Soviet official has visited Cuba since Kosygin's
26-30 June 1967 stopover in Havana on his way home from a
special emergency UNGA session and the Glassboro talks with
President Johnson--at a time when Soviet-Cuban relations were
relatively cool. That visit was not announced by Moscow until
Kosygin's departure for Cuba from the United States, or by Cuba
until his arrival in Havana.
Widespread speculation continues in Chilean media on the specific
dates of Castro's anticipated visit to Chile, with most sources
conjecturing that a brief Castro visit will be timed for the
celebration of the first anniversary of Allende's Popular Unity
government on 4 November. Citing "foreign ministry sources," the
Chilean communist paper PURO CHILE said on the 19th that Castro
"has directly informed President Allende" that his arrival will
be "prior to celebrations marking the first year of the popular
government." In an information dispatch to Havana on the 16th,
* Reported in the TRENDS of 29 September, page 46.
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(:OW il)Ii;N'CI:AI, J Ii18 'T(END)
20 OCTOBER 1971
IMtENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent advised his home office
that Allende himself had told Chilean students, in Impromptu
remarks that day, that Castro would arrive in Chile "within a
few weeks--sooner than you expect."
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CONI?11)ENIJAI, F111.8 'I , 'RENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
CPSU SLOGANS
SEMIANNUAL LIST REGISTERS FEW CHANGES FROM MAY DAY
The treatment of international affairs in this year's list of
October Revolution anniversary slogans, released 18 October,
is largely unchanged from the May Day list. The two slogans
on Indochina are identical to the May Day versions. Word and
phrase changes in three slogans reflect propaganda lines
responsive to current international situations:
+ The penultimate slogan which in the May Day version hailed
the USSR as the stronghold of "peace and friendship of the
peoples" now describes it as the bastion of "the forces of
peace and socialism," pointedly underscoring Moscow's claim
to represent the genuine forces of socialism and peace in the
face of the Chinese challenge. The slogan also takes on a
more patriotic cast with a new reference to "our great mother-
land."
* A slogan addressed to the peoples of European countries,
calling for a struggle to achieve peace and cooperation in
Europe, is reworded slightly to reflect the stepped-up Soviet
propaganda drive for a European security conference in the wake
of the four-power Berlin agreement. It now calls not just for
a "stable peace" but for a "lasting stable peace," and a refer-
ence to "the people's security" is added to the goals. A word
of caution against "intrigue- of the forces of reaction and
revanchism" is retained. The signing of the Berlin agreement
prompts no direct reference to Germany.
4- The greeting to peoples of Arab countries, previously a call
for "unity and cohesion in the struggle against imperialist
aggression," now urges unity and cohesion of "all revolutionary
and national democratic forces" in the Arab countries in the
struggle against imperialism "and reaction." The new elements
reflect Moscow's concern over recent developments in the Arab
world that have operated to the detriment of communist and
leftist forces--most notably Sudan's execution of communist
leaders, Libyan strictures against communism, and the Egyptian
trials of former regime officials. Soviet concern had been
indicated in the communique on Ponomarev's July visit to Cairo
in which both sides expressed the conviction that anticommunism
damages Arab national interests and aspirations for "liberation."
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CONFIDENTIAL HIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
Moscow won an even more forceful statement from the Egyptians
in the communique on as-Sadat's October visit, which expressed
both sides' "strong condemnation" of anticommunism and anti-
Sovietism.
The slogans concerned with domestic affairs are almost exactly
like those of last May Day and last October, with no alterations
of any significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1971
-29-
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CRITICISM OF VORONOV'S RURAL CONSTRUCTION POLICIES VOICED
At an All-Union rural construction conference in Kiev from
4 to 9 October, the RSFSR was singled out for criticism for
its poor work in rural construction and its negative atti-
tude toward the program to rebuild villages. The costly
program to consolidate the Soviet Union's 700,000 villages
into 110-120,000 was initiated in 1967; it has been promoted
c.nd supervised by U6SR First Deputy Premier Polyanskiy.
The current criticism may reflect on the standing of Politburo
member and former RSFSR Premier Voronov. Voronov's opposition
to the village program was suggested previously by his delay
in creating a separate RSFSR rural construction ministry which
would guarantee construction resources for agriculture (the
RSFSR was sharply attacked on this point by RURAL LIFE in 1965,
1966 and 1967), by his stress on local financing of rural
construction rather than state financing, and by his November
1970 criticism of defects in the village reconstruction program.
Voronov was removed as RSFSR premier in late July 1971, shortly
after the ouster of his two top assistants in supervising rural
construction: RSFSR First Deputy Premier for agriculture
K. G. Pysin (retired in February) and RSFSR Deputy Premier for
construction A. Ye. Biryukov (removed in May).
The attacks on the RSFSR, ignored in the initial accounts of
the Kiev conference, were revealed in a lengthy 13 October
RURAL LIFE article by RURAL LIFE construction editor P. B. Vaynshteyn.
Vaynshteyn, hardly a neutral reporter, had been the most bitter
assailant of the village reconstruction program's foes in 1967
and 1968 when opponents exposed defects in the program and brought
about a slowdown in its implementation. In his current article,
Vaynshteyn praises Belorussian officials (who developed the pro-
gram's prototype in 1965-1967) and claims that RSFSR construction
committee chairman D. Basilov and RSFSR rural construction deputy
minister M. Pilipchuk were forced to concede shortcomings in the
RSFSR's work at the conference.
Vaynshteyn reports that the RSFSR had planned poorly for many
model villages, had delayed construction (instead of the planned
130 model farm villages only 64 were begun), and had failed to
provide financing and material resources ("financing was not
arranged properly--the RSFSR Agriculture Ministry entrusted it
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CONFIDENTIAL F13T.S TRENDS
20 OCTOBER 1973.
to local organs," and special material resources were not planned
for construction of the model villages). "The impermissibility of
such an attitude toward this important matter was stressed" at
the conference, Vaynshteyn writes. Judging from Vayushteyn's
account, the RSFSR was the only area criticized at the conference.
A shift of the resource burden to local sources does indeed
appear to have been encouraged by the RSFSR leaders. In an
August 1966 .,eech Pysin stressed that "the most important
source of financing of cultural and everyday life construc-
tion is internal reserves and local sources" (SOVIET RUSSIA,
17 August 1966). In a July 1969 speech on housing Voronov
stressed the recent rise in rural income and urged that more
local resources for rural construction be sought, since the
state was already allotting "big sums" for such construction
(SOVIET RUSSIA, 31 July 1969).
In contrast, Polyanskiy in a 10 June 1967 speech had called for
a national effort to reconstruct Soviet villages, and in his
October 1967 KOMMUNIST article he had appealed for "large efforts
and significant funds" for rural construction and a speedup in
the village reconstruction program. However, the program was
slowed down in the latter part of 1968, after a July 1968 con-
ference recognized defects in village plans and housing designs
(RURAL LIFE, 2 July 1968) and a 12 September 1968 Central
Committee decree criticized the program for ineffective use
of funds and poor architectural and planning decisions (PRAVDA,
2 October 1968).
In an apparent attack on Polyanskiy's program, Voronov in a
24 November 1970 speech recalled the September 1968 Central
Committee decree criticizing defects in the village recon-
struction program and declared that these defects were far
from eliminated even now (SOVIET RUSSIA, 25 November 1970).
Now that Voronov has been demoted, his criticisms have been
tacitly confirmed by a 26 August 1971 Central Committee decree
on improving planning and construction of agricultural pro-
jects (published in the 21 September PRAVDA) and by the
October Kiev conference. The purpose in calling the Kiev con-
ference was to "bring about a basic change" in rural construc-
tion, according to the main speaker, Gosstroy Chairman Z.T. Novi-
kov, who admitted serious shortcomings, including poor use of
investments ("expending huge funds, we receive slower and less
return from them than we should receive"), unnecessarily rising
construction costs, and defects in village construction plans
and housing designs (RURAL LIFE, 5 October 1971).
CONFIDENTIAL
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