TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010035-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: October 6, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~
in Communist Propa -xnda
Confidential
6 OCTOBER 1971
(VOL. xxii, NO. 40)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
--- -
GROUP I
E? ludad 6e. vutMeeli,
aeWngrod(np and
de,la?if,elian
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 OCTOBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDOCHINA
DRV Propaganda on PRC Anniversary Is Standard'but Restrained . . 1
Podgornyy Visit Provides Peg for Stress on USSR-DRV Solidarity . 3
TASS Statement Belatedly Scores U.S. Air Strikes Against DRV . . 9
Heavy Air Strikes Scored in DRV Communique, Le Duan Speech . . .10
Hanoi, Front Hail "Victories" in Cambodian Border Area . . . . .11
PRG, Hanoi Assail Thieu Election, Pledge Increased Struggle . . 12
DRV Assembly Delegation Concludes Tour of USSR, East Europe . . 13
Low-Keyed National Day Without Top Leader Turnout or Editorial .16
Central, Provincial Propaganda Continues Much as Usual . . . . .17
Airplane Crash in Mongolia is Ignored in PRC Media.?.. . . . . .18
Haile Selassie Greeted by Chou, PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial . . .''.18
USSR-PRC
Moscow Couples Appeal for Better Relations with New Polemics . .19
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Delegation of Dietmen?s League Signs Joint Statement . . . . . .24
USSR-INDIA
Gandhi Visit Cements Pro-Indian Soviet Stance on East Bengal . 26
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Ignores Substance of Rogers, Eban Speeches on Settlement . 31
EASTERN EUROPE
BORBA Welcomes Thaw in Budapest Comment on Yugoslavia . . . . . 33
Poland and Czechoslovakia Stress Unity, Loyalty to Moscow . . . 35
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Moscow: Responsibility for Munich Damages Already Apportioned .37
(Continued)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 OCTOBER 1971
CONTENTS (Continued)
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Demiohev Switches Formulations on Economic Priorities . . . . . 40
TOPIC II. BRIEF
i
Grozyko Warning Against "Combinations of States" . . . . . . . . 41
ti
t
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
6 OCTOBER 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 SEPTEMBER - 3 OCTOBER 1971
Moscow (3367 items)
Peking (1477 items)
Indochina
(7%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(32%)
32%
[TASS Statement on
(1%)
4%]
National Day
(--)
27%
U.S. Bombing of DRV
Indochina
(29%)
17%
[Podgornyy in DRV
3%]
[Li Hsien-nien
(5%)
9%]
Yemen Premier in USSR (-- )
5%
Economic Delega-
Prime Minister Gandhi (1%)
5%
tion in DRV
in USSR
[Bombing of DRV
(10%)
Podgornyy Stopover in (0.1%)
India
4%
PRC Seat in UN
(9%)
6%,.
China (4%)
4%
UK Spy Charges Against (1%)
USSR
4%
Brezhnev in Yugoslavia (20%)
4%
Brezhnev in Bulgaria (0.3%)
4%
Brezhnev in Hungary (1%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 OCTOBER 1971
INDOCHINA
Hanoi's observance of the 1 October PRC National Day followed the
standard pattern with the usual congratulatory message, speeches,
and editorial comment. However, strains in Sino-DRV relations
seem reflected in some of Hanoi's anniversary propaganda, just as
they had been mirrored in its propaganda on the 211-28 September
visit of the Li Hsien-nien economic delegation. Both Pham Van
Dong's speech and the anniversary message are more restrained
than they were last year in thanking the Chinese and characterizing
the Chinese revolutionary struggle. The DRV congratulatory message
uses the term "proletarian internationalism"--after Hanoi had
studiously avoided it during Li Hsien-nien's visit--but there is
continued evidence that the DRV remains less willing than China to
describe their bilateral relations as based on this concept.
Propaganda surrounding Soviet President Podgornyy's official visit
in Hanoi stresses Soviet aid and solidarity between the two
countries. And Podgornyy at a banquet on the 3d pointedly said
that the CPSU and the VWP share a common ideology which they
defend against both revisionism and dogmatism. Hanoi avoids
openly polemical statements, but it does repeatedly describe
Soviet-DRV relations as being based on proletarian internationalism.
First Secretary Le Duan, at the meeting on the 4th, pledged that the
Vietnamese "will exert all their energy" to strengthen relations
with the USSR, China, and other socialist countries in crder "to
help restore and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and the
international communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism." The reiteration of this stand
seems particularly noteworthy against the background of Hanoi's
polemical charges in July and August that the United States (through
its overtures to Peking) was attempting to split the socialist
countries.
Hanoi a d Front media pursue standard propaganda themes in their
reaction to the 3 October GVN presidential election. The voting
is dismissed as a "farce" in a statement by a PRG spokesman and in
press and radio comment, which reaffirms communist determination to
bring about President Thieu's overthrow and maintains that the
election has only made his position more isolated.
DRV PROPAGANDA ON PRC ANNIVERSARY IS STANDARD BUT RESTRAINED
Hanoi observed PRC National Day with a "grand meeting" sponsored by
mass organization, on 29 September, a banquet at the Chinese embassy
on the 30th, and a NHAN DAN editorial on 1 October. In a departure
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from the practice of previous years, DRV speeches and. the
editorial marking the PRC anniversary all mention Soviet as
well as Chinese aid. Similar atypical references to Soviet
aid were interjected in propaganda on the visit of the
Li Hsien-nien delegation which signed the Sino-DRV aid agreement.*
The references square with Hanoi's general effort to assume a
scrupulously nonpartisan stance on the eve of Soviet President
Podgornyy's arrival in Hanoi.
Pram Van Dong's expression of thanks to the Chinese in his
speech at the banquet this year was more reserved than his
comments last year, when he voiced "profound gratitude" for
China's "heartfelt support and great and valuable assistance."
His only reference to Chinese aid this year was in a passage
declaring that the Vietnamese have relied mainly on their own
strength but have also "strived to win the sympathy and the
great and precious support and assistance of the PRC, the Soviet
Union, and the other fraternal socialist countries as well as of
the wMnle of progressive mankind." He also referred this year
to Vietnamese "profound gratitude" for the Chinese people's
"militant solidarity."
The annual DRV message of greetings to the PRC--as usual
addressed to Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai and signed
by Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truoag Chinh, and Pham Van Dong--is
.somewhat more subdued than last year's message. It does credit
the Chinese with achievements in "the struggle against U.S.-led
imperialism and colonialism, and neocolonialism and for peace,
national independence, democracy, and socialism." But the 1970
message was inuch more ebullient in its declaration that China
has been "holding aloft the banner of opposition to imperialism
headed by U.S. imperialism" and that it "has given powerful
support to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed people
and nations and has made tremendous contributions to the struggle
in the whole world for peace, national independence, democracy,
and socialism."
The reference to proletarian internationalism in the message
differs from last year's--a noteworthy difference against the
recent background of Hanoi's implications that China was
departing from this principle and the DRV's failure to respond
* See the 29 September TRENDS, pages 1-6, for a discussion of
the Li Hsien-nien trip.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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in kind to Li Hsien-nien's use of the term during his visit to
Hanoi. This year's message maintains that the people of
Vietnam and China have built up "an ardent love [as translated
by VNA] among 'comrades and brothers' on the basis of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." But it
drops the declaration in the message last year that mutual
friendship between the two peoples had been "unceasingly
consolidated and developed" on this basis.
Despite this change, there seems no lack of warmth in the
message when it refers to the "ardent love" (tinhf thawms
thieets) of "'comrades and brothers."' This appears to be a
paraphrase of a line in a Ho Chi Minh poem: "profound is the
friendship between Vietnam and China, who are both comrades
and brothers." Peking's versions of the message and Hanoi's
own Chinese-language broadcast of the greeting modify the phrase
to conform more closely with the Ho quotation, referring to
"profound friendship" instead of "ardent love." The reason for
the appearance of the. less usual term "love" in the message
as transmitted by VNA and in Hanoi's domestic service is not
clear.
The DRV's current sensitivity regarding the concept of
proletarian internationalism was also indicated by Hanoi radio's
failure to include some remarks at the 29 September "grand
meeting" by one Nguyen Van Huyen, a vice president of the
Vietnam-China Friendship Association, vwhich were reported by
NCNA. According to NCNA, Huyen said that the Vietnamese "are
determined to do their utmost to nurture the fraternal
friendship and militant solidarity between our two peoples
based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and
have it consolidated and developed with each passing day."
Elsewhere in his speech Nguyen Van Huyen hailed the friendship
of the two peoples since they "came under the leadership of the
proletarian parties," but these remarks too were reported only
by Peking.
PODGORNYY VISIT PROVIDES PEG FOR STRESS ON USSR-DRV SOLIDARITY
Soviet President Podgornyy was given a top-level, warm greeting
upon his arrival in Hanoi on 3 October, comparable to that
accorded Kosygin in February 1965 and Chou En-lai last March.
The entire VWP Politburo with the exception of Le Due Tho and
the long-absent Pham Hung met him at the airport, and most of
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the Politburo members also attended the banquet that evening
and the Hanoi rally the next day.
r addition to the banquet and rally, Podgornyy's activities so
fp..r have included talks with Ton Due Thang on the 3d and with
most of the members of the Politburo on the kith and 5th. Moscow
has repeatedly described the talks as being marked by "complete
mutual understanding" and "unanimity," while Hanoi has avoided
these characterizations.*
TASS described Podgornyy's talks with Thang a- having taken place
in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship, solidarity, and
complete mutual understanding," while VNA said they wera
characterized by "fraternal friendship and militant solidarity."
The talks on the 1th, according to VNA, were "permeated with
brotherly friendship and militant solidarity." TASS' brief
report on the 4th did not characterize the talks, but on the 5th,
reporting their "completion," TASS said they were held in an
atmosphere "of brotherhood characteristic of the relations
between the CPSU and the VWP" and that they "reaffirmed full
unanimity and mutual understanding of the sides on all problems
under discussion." VNA's brief report on the 5th merely said
that the talks "concluded successfully." In his 4 October rally
speech, according to VNA's text, Podgornyy said again that
"complete mutual understanding" was manifested on "all questions
brought up" and that "good decisions.have been reached." Le Duan
did not however, mention the talks in his speech on the same
occasion.
SOVIET AID Both the composition of the-Soviet delegation and
the remarks made by Podgornyy suggest that Soviet
aid has been a major topic of discussion. in addition to Politburo
member Mazurov, Party Secretary Katushev, and Deputy Foreign
Minister Firyubin, the delegation includes Vice Premier Novikov,
who customarily signs the-annual Soviet-DRV aid agreements,
Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
Skachkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense Gen. Sokolov, and
Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Grishin.
* When Le Duan met with Brezhnev on 9 May 1971, after attending
the CPSU Congress and spending several weeks in the USSR,
Moscow said that talks-.had taken place in an atmosphere of
''complete unanimity," a term Hanoi avoided.
CONFIDENTIAL
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6 OCTOBER 1,71
At the 4 October Hanoi rally, Podgornyy said that aid was
discussed in the talks and added that "we take into consideration
the fact that the war is continuing and that Vietnam needs arms,
ammunition, and various military materials." He also stressed
that the further development of "economic, trade, scientific,
and technical ties" was being discussed. Routine Moscow comment
on the visit reviews Soviet aid in the kind of detail that has
become common in recent Moscow propaganda. The current comment
includes assertions that more than 150 industrial, agricultural,
and other projects have been built in the DRV with Soviet
assistance and that more than 3,000 Vietnamese trainees and
4,000 students have received education in the USSR, with about
10,000 Vietnamese now studying and undergoing training in the
Soviet Union.
Hanoi spokesmen have repeatedly expressed gratitude for Soviet
aid and support, and a 3 October NHAN DAN editorial says
Podgornyy's visit shows the Soviet Union's determination to
"increase its support and assistance to the Vietnamese people."
Le Duan at the rally was typically effusive in saying that the
Vietnamese people "will forever engrave in their hearts the great,
valuable, and effective support" rendered them by the party,
government, and people of the Soviet Union. He said nothing
specifically about military aid but mentioned Soviet specialists
"in great numbers" and scientists who are training Vietnamese
scientific and technical workers. He went on to express
"heartfelt" sympathy for recent Soviet flood relief, thus
paralleling the expression of thanks for Chinese flood relief
during Li Hsien-nien's visit.
Podgornyy in his rally speech on the 4th made a remark which
could be construed as a slap at the Chinese stand on modern
warfare when he said: "You know better than anyone else that
the modern arms and modern war materials in the skillful hands
of the heroic combatants of the VPA, of the Vietnamese patriots,
play an important role in delivering thunder blows at the
aggressors." Peking and Hanoi both profess commitment to the
theory that men are more important than weapons, but Hanoi has
on occasion been more willing than Peking to acknowledge the
significant role of?idbdern weapons. Their different approaches
were reflected in propaganda during the Lam Son 719 operation
earlier this year: A 21 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article, for example, hailed alleged communist successes in
Laos as proof that "modern warfare still relies on bravery and
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political consciousness" and described battles in which the
"patriots" used "bayonets" to wipe out "whole battalions and
regiments" which were "armed to the teeth." By contrast,
Hanoi comment acknowledged the communist use of tanks and
other modern weapons and held that the Lam Son 719 engagement
demonstrated the importance of organizing logistics and
technological support.
USSR-DRV In his 3 October banquet speech, Podgornyy made
RELATIONS a reference to Soviet-DRV party relations which
seems particularly pointed against the background
of Hanoi's implications--in its polemics during July and
August--that China was departing from a proletarian internationalist
path. Expressing satisfaction with the strengthening relations
between the CPSU and the VWP, Podgornyy said:
We have a common ideological banner, Marxism-Leninism,
the purity of which we have upheld and will continue to
uphold from any attacks and revisionist or dogmatic
distortions. We are invariably loyal to the Leninist
princiy,le of proletarian internationalism of which HHo
Chi Minh, the great patriot and internationalist, was
a convinced advocate and champion.*
Speaking at the Hanoi rally on the Ith, Podgornyy said that "to
support unconditionally the Vietnamese people's cause is the
direct internationalist duty of all the revolutionary forces of
our time. There is every reason to say that the word Vietnam
today sounds like an appeal for solidarity and unity."
Vietnamese speakers repeatedly characterized Soviet-DRV
relations as being based on "proletarian internationalism," a
description they had been notably reluctant to use regarding
Sino-DRV relations during the Li Hsien-nien visit. And according
to VNA, one of the slogans decorating the city was: "Long live
the unity and friendship among the socialist countries on the
* In a general passage in his rally speech on the lth expressing
Soviet willingness to strengthen friendship and cooperation with
Asian countries, Podgornyy reaffirmed Brezhnev's 24th CPSU
Congress call for normalized relations with Peking "on the basis
of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism"-positions
which the Soviets maintain the Chinese leadership has abandoned.
See the USSR-PRC section of this TRENDS for a discussion of
Soviet comment on China in connection with PRC National Day.
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basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism!"
Ton Due Thang made a similar toast at the 3 October banquet and
called Soviet assistance to the DRV "a graphic manifestation
of proletarian internationalism."
Le Duan paid his usual glowing tribute to Lenin and the Soviet
revolution and declared that the peoples of Vietnam and the
Soviet Union "have long been closely bound together by profound
proletarian internationalist feelings." It was after he
interjected expreadons of thanks for aid from China* as well as
the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries" that he went on
to revive the pledge to work for socialist unity:
The Vietnam Workers Party and the Vietnamese people
will exert all their energy to consolidate and
strengthen their militant solidarity and their
relations of fraternal cooperation with the Soviet
Union, China, and the other socialist countries so
as to help restore and strengthen the unity of the
socialist camp and the international communist
movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism.
This is the first high-level DRV pledge to attempt to "restore"
and strengthen socialist unity in the period since the 15 July
announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking, which
elicited the vitriolic anti-Chinese polemic from Hanoi.
During the July August period, along with the charges that the
Nixon Doctrine was aimed at splitting the socialist countries,
Hanoi did refer to its belief in and efforts toward socialist
unity. But the last previous declaration comparable to
Le Duan's was in the 19 June 1971 DRV-Romanian communique
at the conclusion of Ceausescu's visit. Le Duan's assertion
now is in contrast to Hanoi media's silence on socialist unity
during the Japanese CP delegation's visit to Hanoi last month.**
Ton Due Thang also mentioned Chinese as well as Soviet aid.
This accords with Hanoi's gratuitous references to Soviet aid
during the Li Hsien-nien visit. Le Duan in speeches in Moscow
has also mentioned Chinese as well as Soviet aid--at the 24th
CPSU Congress in March 1971, the Lenin Centenary in April 1970,
and the 23d CPSU Congress in March 1966.
** See the 22 September TRENDS, pages 11-14.
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Presumably, Vhile the DRV is willing to make such a statement in
the presence of the Soviets, it did not wish to associate itself
in such a statement with the openly anti-Chinese Japanese CP
delegation.
POLITICAL Le Duan in his speech at the rally voiced the
SETTLEMENT standard sentinen+, that the PRG's seven-point
proposal, "which has the cbnplete support of the
DRV," is "the most appropriate way" for the United States to
get out of the war and that "the U.S. Government must give a
positive response to this logical, reasonable proposal." He
did not go into the details of the proposal, saying only that
U.S. troops must be withdrawn and that there must be "respect"
for the South Vietnamese people's right to self'-determination.
He concluded routinely that the United States must bear full
responsibility for the lack of progress at the Paris talks.
In his banquet speech on the 3d, Podgornyy, while avoiding any
mention of President Nixon, said that the "American ruling circles'
are stalling and undermining the Paris talk`s, resorting to
"different political maneuvers" and refusing to accept the PRG's
seven point proposal.* He characterized the PRG initiative as
"constructive," said that it opens up realistic prospects, and
declared that the Soviet Union regards it as a good basis for a
political settlement. In the rally speech the next day, Podgornyy
again briefly praised the seven point initiative as well as the
"constructive proposals" of the DRV.
Moscow had endorsed the 1 July PRG proposal in a PRAVDA editorial
on 5 July--the day after PEOPLE'S DAILY'S editorial endorsement.
It was subsequently endorsed in a statement by the Soviet trade
union council on 13 July.
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TASS STATEMENT BELATEDLY SCORES U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST DRV
The belated issuance on 1 October of the TASS statement denouncing
the U.S. bombings of the DRV was apparently designed to place
Moscow officially on record in support of the DRV before
Podgornyy's arrival in Hanoi. Moscow's failure to issue an
official statement earlier on the 21 September bombings had
been made the more conspicuous by the issuance of PRC and DPRK
Foreign Ministry statements and of official statements by
Sihanouk's RGNU and the NLHS. Moscow had promptly denounced
the 21 November 1970 raids with a TASS statement on the 23d,
but had scored the 21-22 March 1971 strikes only in routine
comment.
The tardiness of the current statement is obscured by its
denunciation of U.S. raids on DRV territory "toward the end of
September." It mentions that the bombings on the 21st caused
many casualties and much destruction, but it adds that U.S.
planes "repeatedly invaded DRV airspace" in "subsequent days."
The statement notes that President Nixon "personally approved"
the raids, and it once again denigrates U.S. arguments that they
were made as "protective reaction" and that the United States
had the "right" to make them. Asserting that neither "barbarous
bombings" nor "political maneuvers and diplomatic intrigues" can
break the will of the Vietnamese people, TASS says that the
Vietnamese people, "relying on the assistance of the Soviet Union
and other socialist countries," will give a strong rebuff to the
aggressor. It reaffirms that the Soviet people condemn the
bombings and that the USSR will continue its assistance and
support to the Vietnamese people.
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HEAVY AIR STRIKES SCORED IN DRV COI+1UN IQUE, LE DUAN SPEECH
Hanoi media continue to pick up foreign reports of "worldwide
condemnation" of the intensive 21 September U.S. air strikes
against the North. And on 2 October the DRV War Crimes Commission
issued a special communique which repeated earlier allegations
regarding civilian casualties and destruction caused by the strikes.
First Secretary Le Duan, in his speech at the 4 October meeting
welcoming Podgornyy, denounced the U.S. strikes by "a great number
of aircraft" against "many areas" in language largely identical
to that of the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement. Thus,
he called the action "an extremely serious act of war which
blatantly violates" the U.S. bombing halt and "an Impudent
challenge to the peace- and justice-loving nations in the world."
He went on to warn that Vietnam is an independent state, that
DRV territory is inviolable--language that was not used in the
foreign ministry statement but that did appear in supporting
comment at the time. Le Duan did not specify that the heavy
strikes were on 21 September, referring instead to the attacks
"in the last days of September"--a phrase similar to that
contained in the belated 1 October TABS statement and perhaps
used for that reason.
The last available Hanoi comment on the strikes came in a brief
VNA review of a 30 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article. According
to VNA, it complained that following the strikes on the 21st,
U.S. aircraft continued "to reconnoiter and strafe various places
in North Vietnam in defiance of worldwide condemnation." VNA
also says the article denounced the dispatch of the U.S. aircraft
carrier Enterprise "to the South China Sea close to Vietnam from
the Indian Ocean."
At the Paris session on the 30th,. DRV delegate Nguyen Minh
Vy--filling in for Xuan Thuy, who reportedly had influenza--
echoed earlier comment on the air strikes when he rejected
"the absurd and arrogant" explanations by the Nixon Administration
such as "protective reaction" and "defense of U.S. soldiers'
security." Although PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi--again substituting
for PRG Foreign Minister and delegation head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh,
who is currently on home leave--also scored the 21 September
strikes, the VNA account did not report his remarks.
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FOREIGN MINISTRY Hanoi radio on 5 October publicized the
SPOKESMAN'S PROTEST latest of the continuing statements by the
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. This one
"severely condemned" U.S. strikes against North Vietnam from
26 September to 3 October. (Following the DRV Foreign Ministry
statement on 22 September protesting the large-scale raids the
previous day, a spokesman's protest on 27 September had scored
U.S. strikes from 22 to 25 September.) The current protest
charges that U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, bombed Huong Lap
village and that U.S. artillery "south of the DMZ and naval
gunfire" attacked Vinh Son and Vinh Phu villages from 26 September
to 3 October. It says that "all these villages are located
17 kilometers north of the demilitarized zone." The statement
also claims that U.S. aircraft strafed a number of villages in
Quang Binh Province from 26 to 28 September and on 2 October.
HANOI, FRONT HAIL "VICTORIES" IN CAMEODIAN BORDER AREA
Communist media have given moderate attention to recent heaNy
fighting along Highway 22 in the South Vietnamese province of
Tay Ninh and along Highway 7 in the Krek area of Cambodia.
Hanoi comment was highlighted by articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN on 2 October which praised alleged communist
victories in Tay Ninh, in particular lauding a 20 September
attack on the ARVN's Trang Lon base. Hanoi claimed that the PLAF
completely destroyed the base and annihilated more than 600 troops,
and the army paper asserted that the destruction of the base
pierced "Saigon's northwest defense line" and cut off ARVN
elements in Cambodia from their rear.
According to QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, the Trang Lon "victory" was
followed by "a series of victories" along a 50-kilometer stretch
of Highway 22. It maintained routinely that feats in Tay Ninh,
along with "recent and repeated victories" in the Krek area and
elsewhere in Cambodia, have "lowered the fighting morale of the
U.S.-puppets and will lead them from defeat to defeat." An
LPA commentary on the 4th similarly praised alleged achievements
in Tay Ninh and "well-coordinated" attacks launched in the border
area by the "Cambodian People's Liberation Army."
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PRG, HANOI ASSAIL THIEU ELECTION. PLEDGE INCREASED STRUGGLE
The PRG officially denounced they 3 October GVN presidential
election in a statement by a government spokesman on the 5th
charging that the election was a "farce" which was "rigged"
through the use of "brutal, repressive measures and brazen,
fraudulent methods." Dismissing Thieu's administration as a
"bellicose and rotten ruling group" of "traitors" which is
"fostered and commanded by the United States," the statement
reiterated the communist position that, so long as U.S. troops
remain in Vietnam and Thieu is in power, the South Vietnamese
cannot exercise their right to self-determination. Pledging
continued struggle, the statement routinely predicted that the
Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine will fail and
"the traitorous ruling clique headed by Nguyen Van Thieu will
certainly be toppled." The election was also condemned in a
statement by the PRG delegation spokesman in Paris, released at
a 4 October press conference.
DRV First Secretary Le Duan, speaking at the 4 October meeting
welcoming Podgornyy, also dismissed the election as a "farce" and
went on--in the manner of other communist comment in recent
months--to speculate on the possibility of a coup in Saigon.
Le Duan warned: "Let Nixon and his like be reminded that even
though the United States had staged a similar farce to make
Ngo Dinh Diem win with 'over 90 percent of the votes,' Diem
could not hide his face of a traitor and finally took the
punishment he deserved."
A 5 October NHAN DAN article on the elections commented in this same
vein, predicting that the election would plunge Thieu's administration
"deeper into a crisis of disintegration" and that opposition factions
would have even more reason to oppose him. The article speculated
that Thieu will "try to punish Ky" for his recent attacks and then
observed that "Ky will certainly not let himself be subdued easily,
nor will many other persons and organs that have firearms." It
added, in line with Le Duan's remark, that a tense situation will
prevail and "a collapse of the Diem-Nhu type" may happen to Thieu.
Prior to the election, a call for a broad struggle against Thieu and
the United States was voiced in a letter from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen
Huu Tho, dated the 27th and broadcast on the 29th. The letter
enjoined "compatriots," as an "immediate objective" of this struggle,
to "resolutely oppose the fraudulent, deceitful election farce."
Front media subsequently publicized a 28 September letter from Vietnam
Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao and a statement by Alliance Vice
Chairman Thich Don Hau which also advocated continued struggle and
opposition to the presidential election.
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DRV ASSEMBLY DELEGATION CONCLUDES TOUR OF USSR, EAST EUROPE
On 28 September VNA announced the return to Hanoi that day of the
DRV National Assembly delegation led by Politburo member Hoang
Van Moan after a tour which included "friendship visits" to
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the USSR. The delegation,
which left hrme on 18 August, made stopovers in Peking and
Moscow before arriving in Warsaw on 23 August. It again stopped
in Peking from 25 to 28 September en route to Hanoi from Moscow.
Publicity for the tour, which began at the time of Hanoi's
shrill polemical attacks direc"ed at the PRC, has been in the
same low key as that for a sinilar Hoan delegation visit last
year to Bulgaria, East Germany, Albania, and Hungary.* Thus,
according to VNA on 30 September, the delegation reported on its
tour to a meeting of the National Assembly Standing Committee
convened on the 29th. Following last year's pattern, the tour
was described as having contributed to the strengthening of
friendship and solidarity between the Vietnamese people and the
peoples of fraternal countries "on the basis of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism." Since this is s. standard
formulation its presence here is notable only because of Hanoi's
implication--following the 15 July announcement of the President's
planned trip to Peking--that China was departing from a
proletarian internationalist path.**
PEKING Consistent with the PRC's general effort to
STOPOVERS reassure the DRV during the past two months,
Peking media reflected the warm welcome given the
Hoan delegation during both its 18-22 August and 25-28 September
stopovers in Peking.*** According to NCNA's report, at a banquet
* Last year's tour is reviewed in the TRENDS of 26 August 1970,
pages 14-19.
** Li Hsien-nien's direct overtures--during the conclusion of the
aid agreement in Hanoi--in assuring the DRV that the PRC is committed
to a policy based on proletarian internationalism brought no response
from Hanoi. See the TRENDS of 29 September 1971, pages 1-6. Hanoi's
treatment of the concept in its propaganda on the 1 October PRC
National Day is discussed above.
*** See the TRENDS of 25 August 1971, pages 8-9, for a report of the
delegation's initial stopover in Peking.
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-1II-
hosted by Chiu Hui-ten and Kuo Mo-jo on 26 September, the two
sides toasted the "constant strengthening and development of
their great friendship and militant unity" and reaffirmed that
they would always "unite, fight side by side, and win victory
together" in the struggle against the "common enemy, U.S.
imperialism." NCNA described the banquet as having been held
in a "warm atmosphere of friendship." (NCNA somewhat more
effusively had described a banquet during the first stopover on
19 August as being "permehied with an atmosphere of revolutionary
friendship between the people of China and Vietnam 'who are both
comrades and brothers."') Chou En-lai, as reported by NCNA,
received the delegation on both occasions for "very cordial and
friendly conversations." VNA's brief reports noted only that
Chou "warmly received" the delegation and gave no substance of
the banquet speeches.
MOSCOW VISIT Hanoi and Moscow media on 24 August had briefly
noted that on its 22-23 August stopover in the
Soviet capital, the delegation was met at the airport and hosted
at a banquet by Central Committee member and Chairman of the
Soviet of the Union Shitikov. (The Moscow stopover last year
had also been handled at a low level; the delegation was hosted
by Chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group Spiridonov and went
sightseeing in the capital.)
During the subsequent 13 to 24 September "official friendship
visit," the delegation toured Volgograd, Kazan and Kishinev,
held talks with Supreme Soviet officials, was greeted at a
Moscow meeting of "representatives of the capital's working
people" on the 22d, and had talks with Podgornyy on the 24th.
As reported by TASS and Moscow radio--including its Mandarin-
language ser-,rice--Podgornyy and Hoan had a "heartfelt, friendly
conversation" during which Podgornyy promised continued Soviet
aid and support and Hoan expressed "profound gratitude."
According to a Hanoi radio Vietnamese-language broadcast on the
26th, Podgornyy also stressed that the coming visit of a soviet
Party-Government delegation to the DRV would contribute to the
strengthening of Soviet-DRV friendship and unity.
The remarks at the Moscow public meeting by Vice Premier and
Chairman of the Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Society Kalashnikov
are not carried textually by available Soviet or DRV media.
VNA reports that in addition to referring to the USSR's policy
of "all-sided aid" to the Vietnamese, he noted Soviet support
for the DRV's "correct stand" and the PRG's seven-point initiative.
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Reports in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA highlight his remarks on aid
with no reference to a political settlement. A Moscow radio
version in Vietnamese quotes him as elaborating on Soviet aid,
but does not mention a political settlement, although other
radio versions, including Mandarin- and English-language
broadcasts, report him as referring to Soviet support for a
peaceful settlement as well as to aid.
VISITS TO The publicity of the Hoan delegation's visits
EAST EUROPE to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania largely
consisted of reportage of activities, which
included receptions in each country by party first secretaries
and officials of legislative bodies. There were standard
references to support and aid by the hosts and expressions of
gratitude by Hoan.
TASS on 30 August briefly reported the delegation's arrival in
Prague and a TASS-attributed report in PRAVDA on 24 August
reported the arrival in Warsaw, but there is no known Moscow
acknowledgment of the group's visit in Romania. On the other
hand, the only NCNA report of the delegation's activities in
Eastern Europe was a 14 September report describing the visit
to Romania.
Limited propaganda on the visits was generally devoid of
polemical overtones. However, the Czech organ RUDE PRAVO, in
an 8 September comment on the Hoan visit attributed to CTK,
echoed some of Hanoi's earlier anti-Chinese polemic. It said
that "no one but the DRV Government and the PRG has. the right
to make decisions concerning the destiny of the Vietnamese
people. The Paris peace conference, and possibly Hanoi, are
the only two places where American representatives can hold
responsible and binding negotiations. 'The keys to peace in
Vietnam certainly do not lie outside Vietnam and out of the
reach of its legitimate representatives.'"
Prague's CTK on 2 September and the labor organ PRACE had
reported that Hoang Van Hoan, at a meeting with Czechoslovak
CP Secretary General Husak, interjected a reference to the
Soviet Union in expressing appreciation for socialist aid.
RUDE PRAVO, however, like VNA and NHAN DAN, quoted Hoan as
thanking "the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia."
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CHINA
LOW-KEYED NATIONAL DAY WITHOUT TOP LEADER TURNOUT OR EDITORIAL
For the first time since 1949, there was no National Day parade
reviewed by Mao and other major PRC leaders from the Tienanmen
rostrum. Officials had told foreign reporters earlier that
the parade had been canceled, although there was no prior
announcement in the public media. The top official present at
National Day activities was Chou En-lai; but Chou did not
deliver his usual speech on the eve of National Day, with the
traditional state banquet being replaced by a Foreign Ministry
reception. This and three other receptions for foreign
vistors on 30 September and 1 October, plus a walkthrough at
the Summer Palace grounds, were the only formal celebrations.
In attendance at one or the other of these affairs were Polit-
buro members Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao,
Yao Wen-yuan, Li Hsien-nien, Yeh Chien-ying (senior PLA leader
currently in public view) and Tung Pi-wu.
The ceremonial changes are in line with regime pronouncemerts
favoring frugal celebrations--and in keeping also with the un-
expectedly low-keyed observance of the CCP's 50th anniversary
last summer, on 1 July. No doubt more crucial to the nature
of the celebrations, however, is the fact that elimination of
the final obligatory appearance this year for Politburo members
in good standing effectively screens off any sure knowledge of
Politburo changes.
In yet another, and even less explicable, break with tradition,
there was no editorial hailing the anniversary. There had
been joint RED FLAG - PEOPLE'S DAILY - LIBERATION ARMY DAILY
editorials since 1967, and before that separate editorials in
the central journals. The National Day period also offered
further opportunities for downplaying the adulation of Mao,
with the PEOPLE'S DAILY omitting its usual frontpage picture
of Mao or of Mao and Lin. References to Lin seem fewer than
normal, but perhaps no less than would accord with the somewhat
fewer references to Mao. The 50 color photos of Mao, and
Mao with Lin--reported by NCNA on 12 September as ready for
distribution throughout the country but never again mentioned
in central media--were hailed in rally reports from Szechwan
and Shantung but nowhere else (they had been referred to
previously in Fukien and Kwangsi broadcasts also).
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PROVINCIAL Rallies in seven provinces, among those reporting
RALLIES so far, were attended by provincial chiefs.
(Data is based solely on local broadcasts; NCNA
did not release its customary detailed account telling who was
present where.) In Liaoning Politburo member and Military
Region commander Chen Hsi-lien spoke to Korean visitors. Hsu
Shih-yu, the other Politburo member who commands a military
region, did not show up in his Nanking base; a 22 September
Anhwei broadcast had referred to Hsu's deputy Liao Jung-piao
as "head of the PLA Nanking units," raising the possibility
that Hsu has been purged or perhaps transferred to replace
one of three military chiefs on the Politburo--Huang Yung-
sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, and Li Tso-peng--who have now been out of
public view for nearly a month. Hsu, however, has not appeared
publicly since June.
CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL PROPAGANDA CONTINUES MUCH AS USUAL
The daily propaganda in official media continues to provide
scant help in suggesting policy issues that might have led to
the current anomalies in Peking. That portion of the propaganda
which is issue-oriented reveals no notable shifts in such
areas as cultural and economic affairs; but the continuing
flow of such propaganda does suggest that the leadership could
easily have agreed on a series of bland pronouncements foi a
National Day editorial had it chosen to do so. Release of a
2 October article by the writing group of the Ministry of
Commerce makes it less likely that agricultural policy is at
issue, because the article simply reiterated the theme that the
peasants' living conditions must be improved as output rises.
The article did perhaps hint that some cadres and peasants
are unhappy at the continual accumulation of surpluses; there
was unusual attention to the need for surpluses, including the
explanation that "in case enemies of a foreign country invade
us and a war breaks out, grain reserves will be available
everywhere."
A HEILUNGKIANG DAILY editorial of 26 September may reflect some
of the current tensions in the course of rhetoric which seems
aimed at Chen Po-ta and the former Heilungkiang chief Pan
Fu-sheng. Noting that the struggle in Heilungkiang "has been
extremely fierce and acute," the editorial states that under
the leadership of Mao and the Central Committee those under-
mining the cultural revolution in Heilungkiang had been
repudiated and the "opportunist line that was 'left' in form
but right in essence" had been destroyed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The continuing nature of the struggle in Heilungkiang is
emphasized by the editorial's insistence that even "after the
founding of the new provincial CCP committee" the left op-
portunist line "has brought damage to our cause" and must be
wiped out. One tactic with which the enemy is credited--as
is usual in this type of propaganda--is trying to split
revolutionary ranks, in this case "the unity between the army
and people and between the army and government." The editorial
calls for closely following Mao's strategic plan, and may be
indicating a larger area than Heilungkiang in placing an
injunction against "independent kingdoms" in the context of
disunity between the army and the people and government.
AIRPLANE CRASH IN MONGOLIA IS IGNORED IN PRC MEDIA
PRC media have not referred to the crash of a PRC airplane in
Mongolia on the night of 12 September, which was reported by
Mongolia's MONTSAME agency and by TASS on 30 September. These
accounts indicated that the plane was a jet belonging to the
PRC airforce, that the Mongolians had issued a formal protest,
and that the Chinese had been allowed to send observers to
view the wreck. Chinese spokesmen in Peking confirmed the
crash to Western newsmen, but said it was a civilian flight.
There have been no media indications that the crash was
connected to the various anomalies in PRC behavior since then.
HAILE SELASSIE GREETED BY CHOU, PEOPLES DAILY EDITORIAL
NCNA on 6 October reported the arrival of Haile Selassie in
Peking after a short stop in Canton. He was greeted at the
airport by Chou En-tai and at the guesthouse by Vice Chairman
Tung Pi-vu. The only other Politburo members reported in
attendance were Li Hsien-nien and Yeh Chien-ying, both of whom
have been making frequent public appearances. At his Canton
stop Haile Selassie was greeted by almost all the top local
leaders. The three heads of state who visited Peking previously
during the past year were each received by Mao at some point
in their visit.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing the visit followed standard
forms, praising the Ethiopians for their valiant stand against
fascist invaders in the 1930's and for supporting the PRC in
restoring "her legitimate rights" in the United Nations. As
highlights of past friendly relations, the editorial mentions con-
tacts at the 1955 Bandung Conference and the 1964 visit by Chou
En-lai.
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0
USSR - PRC
MOSCOW COUPLES APPEAL FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH NEW POLEMICS
Moscow has again used the PRC's 1 October national day to
call for normalization of Sino-Soviet state relations, but in
contrast to its behavior last year it has coupled this call
with new polemical attacks designed to discredit the Chinese
leadership among the Chinese people and in the world com-
munist movement.
The call for better relations came, as it did last year, in
a message sent impersonally from the Supreme Soviet Presidium
and the Council of Ministers to "the president of the PRC"* and
leading governmental organs, as well as in signed articles
in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. But where both articles last year
had shied away from attacks on Maoism, reflecting a calmer
period in Sino-Soviet relations and perhaps higher hopes for
the Peking border talks, both this year attack Maoist policies
and the one in PRAVDA portrays the Peking leadership as ag-
gressive, divisive, and anti-Soviet.
The IZVESTIYA article takes a more conciliatory tack than the
one in PRAVDA, avoiding direct attacks on the Chinese leader-
ship. Against the background of President Nixon's impending
visit to China and the prospect of improved U.S.-PRC relations,
a defensive insistence in the article on Moscow's "tireless"
efforts to normalize relations with Peking seems calculated to
justify the USSR's China policy for domestic and foreign com-
munist audiences and to underscore the idea that the full
burden of responsibility for the present state of relations
rests with Peking. The softer tone of the article as compared
with the one in PRAVDA is in keeping with IZVESTIYA's role
as government organ, against the backdrop of the ongoing state
negotiations with the PRC on the border question. IZVESTIYA,
but not PRAVDA, refers to these negotiations, as was the case
* Last year's message was similarly addressed to "the president
of the PRC," an office which has not been filled since Liu
Shao-chi was purged in late 1966 during the cultural revolu-
tion.
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last year; and it was IZVESTIYA, but not PRAVDA, which last
year called for the settlement of disputed questions through
"talks and consultations."
PRAVDA's attack on the Peking leadership fits generally with
the pattern of the continuing, concerted Soviet bloc polemical
charges keynoted by the I. Aleksandrov article in the party
organ on 4 September. It also accords with a new blast at the
Chinese leadership by CPSU ideologue Suslov at a party con-
ference on Marxism-Leninism.
In keeping with this pattern, Moscow chose the eve of the
PRC's national day to publicize a report, credited to the
Mongolian news agency, that a Chinese air force jet, after
violating Mongolia's airspace, crashed in Mongolian territory
on the night of 12-13 September. The Soviet news agency
also, on 1 October, picked up a Tokyo report that Liu Shao-chi
had defected to the Soviet Union, ridiculing it as "fantasy"
but underscoring the portrayal of PRC leadership instability
by publicizing it while in effect dissociating the USSR from
involvement in the Liu.Shao-chi affair.
OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, Despite the polemical cast of the com-
GREETINGS MESSAGE ment, the Soviet Union was represented
at the same level at Chinese national
day functions as it was last year. TASS briefly reported that
Deputy Ministers Nikolay Rodionov and Nikolay Smelyakov,
Engineer Colonel-General Komarovskiy, "and others" attended
the PRC embassy reception in Moscow. Last year Soviet media
reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Rodionov attended the
reception but did not report who else was present. NCNA
noted that Ilichev and Lubin, "the head and deputy head of the
Soviet Government delegation to the negotiations on the Sino-
Soviet border question," attended a foreign ministry reception
in Peking. Following its customary practice, NCNA mentioned
the Soviet guests at the tail end of a long list of participants
at the festivities; last year, Ilichev and his then deputy
Gankovskiy were similarly listed last among hundreds who
watched the national day parade from the reviewing stand.
The Soviet message, frontpaged in PRAVDA on 1 October, follows
a theme of Brezhnev's 24th CPSU Congress speech in calling
for normalization of state relations with Peking, but it
adjusts to the present Soviet polemical line by dropping a
call in last year's message for united efforts agai%:st "the
forces of war": Where last year's message urged that the
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Soviet and Chinese peoples unify their efforts in the struggle
with "the forces of imperialism, reaction, and war," the
current one merely calls for unified efforts to struggle
against "international imperialism and reaction." The change
accords with PRAVDA's portrayal of the Chinese as part of
the aggressive, anti-Soviet forces: Where last year's com-
ment on the occasion had sought to shift the blame to the
West for seeking "to poison the atmosphere" and to exploit
tensions between the USSR and China, this year's PRAVDA
article--in tune with comment generally over the past month--
depicts the Chinese leadership and their policies as themselves
constituting a danger to world peace and sustains a cautious
line toward the West.
VIKTOROV The PRAVDA article, by Viktorov, charges that
IN PRAVDA the Chinese leaders have "set the task of prepar-
ing for war" as the PRC's main goal and "stress
in every possible way that a threat from the north hangs
over the country." Viktorov adds that "anti-Sovietism--the
poisonous weapon of the enemies of socialism--has now been pro-
claimed the Peking leaders' long-term policy." In a possible
allusion to Peking's invitation to President Nixon and its
diplomatic maneuvering in the Balkans, Viktorov says the
Chinese leaders have also "initiated hostile activity against
world socialism and the international communist movement," add-
ing that "the Marxist-Leninist parties are aware of all the
danger of the Chinese leadership's course and are dealing a
resolute rebuff to its hegemonist and chauvinist pretensions."
Underscoring the benefits accruing from friendship with
Moscow, Viktorov goes on to explain that history has demon-
strated that the PRC's successful development could be assured
only when it sought to strengthen its "cooperation and friend-
ship with the Soviet Union." He reaffirms Moscow's desire
for normalized relations with Peking while in effect charging
that the present Chinese leadership is not acting in the
best interests of its people by practicing anti-Sovietism.
The implication is that a change in the present leadership,
"whose voice is now heard in unison with that of the Kuomingtang
reactionaries," would open the door to restoration of good
relations with Moscow, with attendant benefits to the Chinese
people.
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PAVLOV IN The IZVESTIYA article, by Pavlov, credits Moscow's
IZVESTIYA "tireless" diplomatic efforts with having
prevented a further exacerbation of Sino-Soviet
relations despite continuing Chinese efforts to fan anti-
Soviet sentiments and to foment divisions in the world com-
munist movement--the later themes being left to PRAVDA to
develop more fully. Asserting that the Soviet Union has
been a model of "restraint and self-control" in the face of
PRC efforts "to distort Marxism-Leninism and to drive a
wedge in the ranks of the fighters against imperialism,"
Pavlov emphasizes the point that "the Soviet Union has done
its utmost to strive to normalize relations with the PRC."
It was "thanks to the Soviet Union's tireless efforts," he
adds, that "success has been achieved in halting the process
of progressive deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations."
Reaching for documentation of this "success," Pavlov notes
that ambassadors were exchanged, that there has been some
increase in trade, and that the border talks "are continuing."*
He adds without elaboration that Moscow has "also made other
principled and constructive proposals which correspond to
the national interests of both peoples and the adoption of
which would promote a change for the better in Soviet-Chinese
relations."
The Pavlov article repeats the stock formulation that pointedly
expresses the Soviet party's respect only for "the Chinese
people." While avoiding attacks on the leadership, it
assails Chinese propaganda and policies, playing some of the
Viktorov PRAVDA article's themes in lower key when it remarks
that "one cannot fail to see that the anti-Soviet line in Chinese
propaganda and policy continues to conflict with the cause
of socialism and the Chinese people themselves." Pavlov
says this is indicated by "fresh attempts to fan anti-Soviet
sentiment among the population." He adds that "as before,
Peking is making flagrant attacks on the CPSU and the
* Where this year's PRAVDA article does not mention the
border talks at all, both the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles
last year had made the point that the talks resulted from
Soviet initiatives and were "continuing." The IZVESTIYA article
had indicated that some progress was being made, reporting for
the first time in Soviet media that the Chinese had agreed
to-assign an ambassador to Moscow.
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Soviet Union ..., which by no means facilitates an improve-
ment in relations between the two countries."
Pointing to the "unwavering" policy toward the PRC defined
at the 24th CPSU Congress, Pavlov reaffirms its principles as
"cohesion of the socialist countries on a Marxist-Leninist
basis" (the principle Moscow charges the Chinese leadership
with discarding), defense of the national interests of the
Soviet State, and normalization of relations with Peking.
Maintaining that this "Just and positive" position "meets with
the understanding and approval of the socialist countries,"
Pavlov invokes as evidence the "high assessment of the USSR's
peace-loving foreign policy" at the 1969 Moscow international
communist conference.
SUSLOV The harsher line expressed in PRAVDA was predictably
taken by party ideologue Suslov in an address
to a conference at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism on 29 Sep-
tember. According to TASS, Suslov condemned "the anti-Soviet
line of the present Chinese leaders" as "a great danger to
the cause of socialism and rejected "the slanderous inventions
concerning the policy of the CPSU that are circulated by
Peking." He added "at the same time," TASS said, that "we
have always striven and are prepared now to contribute in
every way toward reestablishing and developing good neighborly
relations and friendship between the Soviet Union and the
PRC."
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SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
FBIS TRENDS
6 OCTOBER 1971
DELEGATION OF DIETMENIS LEAGUE SIGNS JOINT STATEMENT
Judging by the contents of a Joint communique issued on 2 October
by the China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation of the
Japanese Dietmen's League for Promoting the Restoration of
Japan-China Diplomatic Relations, the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan
and the Taiwan straits area is no longer a major roadblock to
the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and. Japan.
U.S. military presence on Taiwan was listed as one of the five
major issues preventing improvement of relations between the
two countries in a joint statement issued in July between the
China-Japan Friendship Association and a delegation of the
:Comeito Party, Japan's second larepAst opposition party. In the
latest communique, the issue of U.S. military presence in the
Far East is mentioned only in the context of a joint call for the
"two superpowers" to "withdraw their troops stationed in foreign
countries and dismantle their military bases abroad."
Aside from the one omission, the communique essentially repeats
the remaining four points contained in the July Kc-aeito communique
as the "basic principles for the restoration of Japan-China
diplomatic relations." It denounces the "absurdity" of "'two
China's, 'one China, one Taiwan,"' argues that Taiimn is Chin:-Is
internal affair, calls for abrogation of the "illegal and invalid"
1952 Japan-Nationalist China treaty and declares that the "lawful
rights of the PRC in all organs of the UN" must be restored and
that the "representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique" must be
expelled. The Japanese side expressed its determination to work
through the Diet to "urge the Japanese Government to accept these
principles" and begin negotiations with the PRC "to end the state
of war between Japan and China, restore diplomatic relations and
conclude a peace treaty."
In an apparent effort to assist the League's drive to pass an
antigovernment resolution on the question of restoration of
relations with China, Peking appears to have made a tactical
decision to soften its line on "Japanese militarism." The Chinese
side noted with unusual confidence that the Japanese people "will
absolutely not allow Japanese militarism to take the road of
aggression again." It also noted that since "it is the Japanese
people who determine the destiny of Japan" they will "certainly
realize their aspirations to establish an independent, democratic,
peaceful, neutral and prosperous new Japan."
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6 OCTOI)Irn 1971
Since the Nixon-Sato talks in 1969, Poking's propaganda line on
Japan has fully exploited the theme of an irrevocable revival of
military-im in Japan under the influence of "Marxist laws." Some
softening of this line was reflected recently in an 18 September
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the 40th anniversary of the
"Manchurian Incident"; the United States was portrayed as
chiefly responsible for leading Japan down the military road
and confidence was expressed that "farsighted people in
Japanese economic and political circles" would successfully
counter the influence of a "handful of pro-U.S. monopoly
capitalists" and guide Japan down the path of "independence,
peace and neutrality."
The communique contains specific blasts at Sato's China policy.
The Japanese side expressed its "deep regrets" that the "Sato
cabinet, in disregard of opposition by public opinion," has
acted as a cosponsor of the draft resolutions for dual UN
membership for Taiwan and the PRC. The Chinese side condemned
the Sato Government for "stubbornly pursuing the policy of
following the United States and of hostility toward China" and
predicted that "it will surely meet with irretrievable defeat."
The communique was signed by Wang Kuo-chuan, head of the China-
Japan Friendship Association, and Aiichiro Fujiyama, senior
LDP Diet member and leader of the delegation, which was composed
of Diet members from the ruling LDP as well as opposition members
from the Komeito, Socialist and Democratic Socialist Parties.
Kuo Mo-jo, vice-chaixinan of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress and honorary president of the China-Japan
Friendship Association, attended the signing ceremony. Chou En-tai
met with the delegation once during its 17 September-4 October visit.
JCP REACTION KYODO on 4 October reported that JCP Chairman
Kenji Miyamoto characterized the League
delegation's visit to Peking as "kowtow diplomacy" in a 3 October
speech at the Japan Press Club. Miyamoto also charged that the
League committed a "grave error" by transgressing "its
suprapartisan position" to side with China in an "united anti-U.S.
and USSR front." Reflecting sensitivity to the failure of his
party to participate in the delegation, Miyamoto asserted that
the JCP was maintaining "splendid isolation" from other Japanese
opposition parties in the "race to approach China."
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6 OC!L'013ER 3.971
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USSR - INDIA
GANDHI VISIT CEMENTS PRO-INDIAN SOVIET STANCE ON EAST BENGAL
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's 27-29 September state
visit to the USSR, six weeks after the ratification of the
9 August Soviet-Indian treaty of peace, friendship, and
cooperation, has moved Moscow's public position on the East
Bengal crisis toward closer alinement with Delhi's. It has
also produced a significantly increased level of Soviet
propaganda attention to the burdens imposed on India by the
continuing flow of refugees from East Pakistan, coupled with
critical comment and reportage on alleged activities of the
Pakistani authorities contributing to the exodus and violating
the "human rights" of the East Pakistanis. Soviet mass meetings
on the East Pakistan situation, resulting in appeals for an end
to "reprisals" and "atrocities," were reported by TASS for the
first time on 5 October and are continuing.
The joint statement issued at the close of Mrs. Gandhi's visit
on the 29th, Moscow's publicity for the visit, and remarks by
the Soviet leaders register in general a further consolidation of
Soviet-Indian relations. Mrs. Gandhi had talks with all three
of the top Soviet leaders, and the joint statement announces a
decision to set up an intergovernmental commission on economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation.
On the question of East Pakistan, while Moscow continues to press
for a political solution--the substance and mechanics le:.gely
unspecified--it has now laid the blame for the crisis squa-ely
at the door of Pakistani President Yah;,ra Khan. In the ha:?s4lest
terms yet used by a Soviet leader, Kosygin declared in a luncheon
speech on 28 September that "it is impossible to justify the
actions of the Pakistani authorities" which led to the "wholesale
flight" of over eight million people from East Pakistan The
exodus, he said, "can only be explair.,ed by unbearable living
conditions created for them there." Kosygin called on President
Yahya Khan--by name--to take "the most effective steps for the
liquidation of the hotbed of tension that has emerged."
The Soviet leadership has also endorsed the legitimacy of India's
concern with events in East Pakistan, in effect gainsaying
Pakistan's claim that India is meddling in a purely internal
affair. In remarks keyed to the refugee flight, Kosygin declared
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6 OCTOBER 197].
on the 28th that "the task is to prevent aggravation of the
relations between India and Pakistan," adding that "we
distinctly perceive the intricacy of the questions that emerged
as a result of these events in the relations between India and
Pakistan." More directly, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
asserted in his UNGA address on the 28th that the East Pakistan
crisis is "not simply an internal question" and declared that
"one cannot but admit that India has grounds for displaying
uneasiness in connection with the turn. that events have taken
in East Pakistan."
THE JOINT "The grave situation which has arisen on the Indian
STATEhENT subcontinent as a result of the recent events in
East Bengal" is the principal issue dealt with in
the joint statement of the 29th, as publicized in full by TASS
in English. The use of the term "East Bengal" throughout the
TASS English text, as in the text disseminated by India, is a
departure from consistent Soviet practice--an evident concession
handled with kid gloves by the Soviets and not generally reflected
in Soviet propaganda. Notably, in an abbreviated version
transmitted by TASS in Russian, in the text published in PRAVDA,
and even in the versions broadcast by Radio Moscow in Hindi as
well as in Urdu, Punjabi, and Bengali, the term "East Pakistan"
is consistently substituted for "East Bengal." Kosygin, as well
as Soviet comment and reportage, consistently used "East Pakistan."
The joint statement broaches the events in East Pakistan with an
acknowledgment of the burdens imposed on India by the more than
nine million refugees who have fled from the eastern region of
Pakistan, mentioning India's "humane approach" to the problem.
These passages preface a statement that the Soviet side "took
into account" the Indian prime minister's statement that India
is "fully determined to take all necessary measures" to stop
the flow of refugees and to ensure that those refugees who are
already in India "return to their homeland without delay."
Clearly not prepared to concur in such an open-ended statement
of intent, the Soviet side merely "reaffirmed its position
regarding the problem of refugees and other questions"
relating to the situation "as laid down in" Podgornyy's
2 April letter to Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The letter
had in fact made no reference to the refugee problem, which
had not at the time assumed major proportions, but had merely
called for adoption of "the most urgent measures to stop the
bloodshed and repressions against the population in East
Pakistan" and for recourse to "methods of a peaceful
settlement."
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Calling again for "urgent measures" to achieve "a political
solution," the statement now stipulates that such a solution
must show regard for--in the words of the TABS English text--
"the wishes, the inalienable rights and lawful interests of the
people of East Bengal as well as for the speediest and safe
return of the refugees to their homeland in conditions safe-
guarding their honor and dignity." While this falls short of
what Mrs. Gandhi may have sought by way of an explicit call
for President Yahya Khan to deal directly with the elected
Awami League leaders in East Bengal, it amounts to the strongest
Soviet demand yet made on the Pakistani Government. The last
Soviet-Indian joint statement, issued on 12 August at the close
of Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to New Delhi, had simply
called for "a political solution" and "the creation of conditions
of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes,"
without elaboration.
The formula used in the 12 August statement had remained the Soviet
position, as registered in authoritative pronouncements, until
Podgornyy on 14 September--during the visit of the King of
Afghanistan--foreshadowed the current demand that the "wishes"
and "inalienable rights and lawful interests" of the people of
East Pakistan be respected. Podgornyy called for a political.
settlement "taking account of the legitimate interests of [East
Pakistan's] population" and the creation "of secure conditions"
for the return of the refugees.
Kosygin,picked up Podgornyy's line on the 28th, during Mrs.
Gandhi's visit, when he called for "an early political
settlement in East Pakistan which would consider the legitimate
interests of its population, would safeguard its normal
development and eliminate the threat of further aggravation of
Pakistani-Indian tensions." It is "necessary above all,"
Kosygin said, "to offer the refugees an opportunity to return
home, to give them a full guarantee on the part of the Pakistani
authorities that they will not be persecuted and will have an
opportunity to live and work peacefully in East Pakistan." On
1 October at a luncheon in Delhi, Podgornyy called for "a just
political settlement with due consideration for the lawful
rights and interests of the peoples of this region."
CALLS FOR END Since 30 September, TASS has carried daily
TO REPRISALS reports of statements by Soviet organizations--
peace committees, trade unions, factory and
office workers, Journalists, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee,
and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies--urging the Pakistani
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authorities to "end mass reprisals against the population of
East Pakistan," to cease the "mockery of justice over Mujibur
Rahman"--described as a "legitimately elected leader of the
Pakistani people, fighter for civil rights and freedom"--and
to bring about a political solution "taking into account the
will, rights, and aspirations of the people of East Pakistan"
and enabling the refugees to return from India.
A particularly strong statement came from the Soviet Peace
Committee, which declared that the Pakistani Government's
actions "cannot be described otherwise than a violation of
the lawful human rights of the population of East Pakistan
and disregard of the clearly expressed will of the Pakistani
people." And the Soviet Red Cross expressed "wrathful
indignation" at "the continuing reprisals and the gross
violations of the human rights declaration and universally
recognized standards of human morality." On 5 October TASS
reported statements in the same vein by the World Federation
of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and
the Women's International Democratic Federation. TASS has
carried previous statements on the situation from the WFTU,
but there had been no publicity for statements by Soviet
organizations before the 30th.
Mass meetings throughout the Soviet Union, first publicized
by TASS on 5 October, are said to be adopting statements and
resolutions demanding an end to "wholesale reprisals in East
Pakistan" and cessation of "the disgraceful trial" of Awami
League leader Mujibur.
Citing Indian press sources and other unspecified "reports,"
TASS dispatches from Delhi on 30 September and 4 October
portrayed "India's great role in alleviation of the sufferings
of those who fell victim to the events in East Pakistan" and
went on to describe those events in terms of "unending
repressions by the West Pakistani Army against the citizens
of East Pakistan," "deliberate physical extermination" of
the youth and intelligentsia, "atrocities," "terror,"
"barbarity," "lawlessness," and "oppression." The dispatch
on the 30th cited "reports" that "special detachments in East
Pakistan are destroying foodstuffs, burning down dwellings., and
abusing in every way the civil population." With reference to
'.'data cited by Indian and international press," the 4 October
dispatch claimed there was "no doubt that fear of reprisals is
the most important factor preventing the earliest return home
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of the refugees, and there is abundant proof that reprisals are
really taking place." TLS added that the very fact of the
presence of over nine million refugees in India was "irrefutable
proof of brutal treatment by the East Pakistani authorities of
the people of that province."
Soviet media had given little attention to the events in Pakistan
in the weeks prior to Mrs. Gandhi's visit. There were occasional
reports on developments relating to Mujibur Rahman, and Moscow
sporadically reported--in carefully neutral fashion--the
persistence of tensions on the Indian-Pakistani border. Soviet
reports had taken note of the refugee problem and the burden it
imposed on India, but had not emphasized it.
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR IGNORES SUBSTANCE OF ROGERS, EBAN SPEECHES ON SETTLEMENT
A continuing low volume of Moscow propaganda on the Middle East
situation draws on stock themes in pressing for a peaceful
settlement on the basis of the 22 November 1967 Security Council
resolution and in indicting Israel--as supported by its "patrons"
in Washington--as the opponent of an accord. At the elite
level, Premier Kosygin at a 3U September dinner speech honoring
the visiting Yemeni Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir Muhammad urged
unity of action of all forces in the Middle East struggling
againsL~ "imperialist aggression." He pledged support to the
just cause of the Arab peoples and their efforts aimed at
restoring "their flouted rights, at insuring a just political
settlement in the Near East, and at defending the legitimate
rights of the Arab people of Palestine."
At this writing, Moscow has not acknowledged the substance of
Secretary Rogers' remarks in his 4 October UNGA address in
which he called for an interim Suez Canal agreement. The
TASS report of the speech noted only that Rogers "placed
himself, in fact, in the position of Tel Aviv's defender,
calling on the Arab countries to give up their demand for
the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the foreign territories
occupied by them."
On 28 September, a TASS report of ARE Foreign Minister Riad's
remarks on television that dV said he expressed puzzlement
over the fact that the United States, which is "trying to pose
as an 'impartial international mediator' in the efforts to
solve the question of opening the Suez Canal, has been ignoring"
the ARE Government for over two months. Riad went on, TASS
said, to observe that neither Rogers nor Assistant Secretary
Sisco has raised the question of opening the canal with Cairo.
The TASS report of Riad's remarks after his meeting with Rogers
on the 30th did not mention the canal issue, instead noting
only that Riad told journalists that the Jarring plan of last
February constitutes the "best plan" for a Middle East settlement.
At the same time, the account continued, Riad "held the door
open for any new possibility that will lead to peace."
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In the pattern of its handling of the Rogers speech, Moscow
media have ignored the substance of Israeli Foreign Minister
Eban's 30 September address to the General Assembly on a Middle
East settlement in which he proposed an interim Suez agreement.
A brief TABS dispatch on the 3d on the ARE's rejection of Eban's
proposals said merely that Eban has "again shown that Israel
continues to oppose all efforts of the United Nations aimed at
establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The
Israeli ruling circles are exerting every effort to legalize
their bossing on the seized Arab lands." And a domestic service
broadcast on u October observed that Eban in the General Assembly
"loudly stated" that Israel is seeking ways for a peaceful
settlement, at the same time making "an intolerable attack on
the Arab states and on the decisions of the General Assembly
itself." Against this background, the broadcast concluded,"one
is not amazed" by reports that Eban has raised new demands for
the delivery of Phantom aircraft to Israel from the United States.
Other propaganda echoes the complaint that Israel is stepping up
its pressure for delivery of additional aircraft from the United
States. And an Arab-language broadcast on 3 October, citing
Cairo's AL-AKHBAR, said that "a large number of American military
experts and technicians" arrived in Tel Aviv in recent weeks and
was. immediately granted Israeli nationality. According to the
broadcast, the Americans joined the Israeli army where they will
serve in rocket and air force units and will be used in servicing
military electronic equipment.
Further documenting their charge that Israel is bent on blocking
a peace accord in the Middle East, propagandists have seized on
the Israeli cabinet's rejection of the 25 September Security
Council resolution urging Tel Aviv to discontinue its actions
aimed at annexing Jerusalem. A domestic service commentary on
28 September, for example, called the decision "impudent" and
assailed Tel Aviv's efforts since June 1967 to carry out "the
so-called Israelization of Jerusalem." On the same day, a RED
STAR article said that the cabinet's decision is fresh evidence
that the Israeli rulers "are in fact prepared for any extreme
measures in order to hang on to the occupied territories."
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EASTERN EUROPE
BORBA WELCOMES THAW IN BUDAPEST COMMENT ON YUGOSLAVIA
The semiofficial Yugoslav BORBA on 1 October expressed gratification
at the cordial tone of a 25 September article in the Hungarian
Government organ MAGYAR HIRLAP, contrasting it with comment during
August in which Budapest had served Moscow as leading proxy
spokesman in warning the Balkan communist mavericks against
receptivity to Chinese overtures.
The MAGYAR HIRLAP article used the occasion of the 25th anniversary
of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations for a prompt shifting of gears in
the wake of Brezhnev's fence mending visit to Belgrade. It
appeared on the day the Soviet-Yugoslav Joint statement was
released and on the first day of Brezhnev's 25-26 September
stopover in Budapest, presumably to fill in the Hungarian
leadership on the substance of his talks with Tito and on the new
ground rules for relations with Yugoslavia.
The BORBA commentary, signed by Zoran Mandzuka, is entitled
"A Good Road" in response to the title of MAGYAR HIRLAP's
article, "A Rich Content." It welcomes the contrast between the
tone of the Hungarian article and that of the some paper's
article on "a previous occasion"--a clear allusion to the
13 August article in which MAGYAR HIRLAP had warned Albania,
Romania, and Yugoslavia against any attempt to form an "anti-
Soviet axis" in the Balkans under Peking's aegis. "As is known
to our readers," BORBA recalls, MAGYAR HIRLAP "on that occasion
made a surprising and willful statement dealing with the Balkan
situation in an unacceptable manner and even with a tone of
warning."
BORBA comments approvingly that the new Hungarian article, while
noting that periods in the past hfidl. been marked by "misunder-
standing," said it could "now" be noted with satisfaction that
the two countries are linked by "the common aims of building
socialism and the even development of Hungarian-Yugoslav
relations." It also cites the Hungarian paper's conclusion that
the two countries have built "a rich content" into their relations
and that those relations "have never represented a mere formal act."
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On its own authority, BORBA goes on to expound the thesis that
"methods" of building socialism are the affair of the individual
countries, in harmony with the passage in the new Soviet-
Yugoslav joint statement granting that "the methods of constructing
socialism . . . area matter for the peoples and working classes
in individual countries and need not contradict each other."
BORBA recalls that Hungarian Premier Fock, on a visit to Belgrade
last year, had noted that existing differences between the two
countries concerned only "the methods of solving essentially
similar problems." The Yugoslav paper further underscores the
"good direction" of relations between the two countries which,
"while striving for the same aims, have chosen different methods."
MAGYAR HIRLAP's 25 September article, cordial but relatively
restrained, stated that relations with Belgrade were developing
on the basis of "mutual respect and understanding." BORBA goes
beyond this to declare that "both sides" have stressed that
their relations are also based on respect for "full sovereignty
and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries
in practice" and on "full equality."
Publicizing a further gesture of rapprochement, TANJUG on the
30th reported that a notably high-level Yugoslav party figure--
Stane Dolanc, member of the LCY Presidium's Executive Bureau--
had paid a visit that day to "the first world hunting exposition"
in Budapest, which included a large Yugoslav exhibit.
KADAR SPEECH Possibly to keep a rein on the new cordiality,
MTI on the 2d, the day after the appearance of
the BORBA-commentary, released further details of a 29 September
speech by Kadar in Tolna County in southern Hungary. Where
recorded excerpts of the speech carried in the Budapest domestic
service on the 30th included only a brief passage devoted to
Hungary's loyalty to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and CEMA
in its dealings with capitalist countries, the MTI summary adds
gratuitous remarks by the MSZMP leader which could be read as an
admonition to those socialist countries which failed to follow a
consistently pro-Soviet line, aimed chiefly at the Romanians but
in part also at Yugoslavia. In such dealings, MTI reports Kadar
as having, said, "socialist Hungary does not 'wobble' this way
and that," and "in international life more respect is given to
one of whom it is known where he stands," just as in everyday
life "cooperation is impossible with the sort of person who
keeps changing his mind and position all the time." Also in the
MTI report, but not in the 30 September recorded excerpts, is
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Kadar's remark that as a measure of Budapest's solidarity with
the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, "Just recently we had a friendly
and comradely exchange of opinions in Budapest with-Comrade
L.I. Brezhnev," a type of consultation which "advances our united
struggle for our common goals and interests."
HUNGARY & ROMANIA In another development evidently flowing
from the Soviet-Yugoslav accommodation,
Romanian and Hungarian media on 2 October publicized a meeting
that day in Bucharest between visiting NEPSZABADSAG Chief Editor
Istvan Sarlos and Paul Niculescu-Mizil, RCP Secretary and member
of the party Executive Committee and Permanent Presidium--foremost
spokesman for the RCP's independent policy in relations with the
other ruling communist parties. The meeting, also attended by
SCINTEIA Chief Editor Alexandru ionescu, was characterized by
both Budapest and Bucharest as "cordial and comradely."
Niculescu-Mizil had authored a 9 July SCINTEIA article directly
attacking remarks by Hung&rian party Politburo member and Secretary
Komocsin, in a 24 June Hungarian National Assembly speech, which
transparently criticized Ceausescu's trip to Peking and conveyed
overtones of a threat to disrupt the political situation in
Romania by voicing concern over the status of "socialism" among the
Hungarian minority in Transylvania.
POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA STRESS UNITY. LOYALTY TO MOSCOW
A lengthy communique on the 1-2 October visit to Warsaw of a
Czechoslovak party-government delegation led by CPCZ General
Secretary Husak and Premier Strougal, and including arch-conservative
figures Vasil Bilak and Vaclav Hula, presses the cause of Soviet bloc
unity and orthodoxy and calls for consistent opposition to "splitting
tendencies" as well as "any anti-Soviet tendencies." The document
praises "the results of the recent negotiations between the leading
representatives of the Soviet Union and other European countries,"
specifying only last year's Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn
and ignoring the Soviet-Yugoslav Joint statement.
A large segment of the communique is devoted to economic integration
under CEMA. Underscoring continuity in Polish-Czechoslovak
coordination, the document recalls with satisfaction the visits
of Polish leaders Gierek and Jaroszewicz to Prague in January and
of Premier Strougal to Warsaw in August.
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TABS, reporting briefly on the communique, says the two sides
discussed bilateral and international topics with "full unanimity."
The Soviet news agency adds that they stressed the importance of
friendship and cooperation with "fraternal socialist countries,
particUlarly the Soviet Union."
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FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA
MOSCOW: RESPONSIBILITY FOR MUNICH DAMAGES ALREADY APPORTIONED
A Moscow radio commentary on the eve of the 33d anniversary of
the signing of the Munich agreement suggested that the FRG need
not concern itself with the "legal responjibility" for damages
inflicted on Czechoslovakia as a result of the Munich agreement
if it recognizes the agreement as invalid ab initio. The
commentary by Aleksandr Galkin, broadcast only to German
audiences on 28 September and repeated in German on the 29th,
coincided with the windup of the third session of the Prague-
Bonn exploratory talks on the normalization of relations, held
27-28 September in the Czechoslovak ca?ital.
The Moscow commentary reflected the amendment of the official
Czechoslovak position apparently worked out at the 2 August
Crimea meeting of bloc leaders. The communique on the meeting
for the first time modified Prague's hitherto consistent
demand for FRG recognition of the invalidity of the Munich
agreement nb initio "and all the consequences arising there-
from" by dropping the final phrase. Although Czechoslovak
elite and official statements since then have consistently
registered this change, two Czechoslovak press articles
following the exploratory talks restored the dropped phrase
to the formula and generally took a hardened line. Thus the
Moscow commentary may have been symptomatic of Soviet pressure
on reluctant elements in the Czechoslovak regime to move ahead
more vigorously in the talks with Bonn, as well as to reassure
the West Germans.
A hardened line was expressed in both the Slovak and Czech
party organs. The Slovak PRAVDA said on 29 September that
"the socialist countries unconditionally support" Czechoslovakia's
demand that the Munich agreement be recognized by Bonn as
invalid ab initio, along with "acts" ensuing from it.
Similarly, in citing Foreign Minister Marko's expressed hope
in his UNGA speech on the 30th that "the present developments
in Europe will favorably influence . . . negotiations with
the FRG" and that Czechoslovakia is "sincerely interested in
the successful conclusion" of the negotiations, a RUDE PRAVO
commentator on 4 October added editorially that this success
will depend "primarily on the FRG attitude toward nonvalidity
of the Munich diktat ab initio with all the consequences arising
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therefrom." In reporting Marko's speech on the 30th, CTK had
noted that he spoke of nonvalidity ab initio of the "diktat,"
with no address to the question of ensuing "consequences."
At the top official level, West German recognition of the
invalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio--with the former
final phrase duly absent--was demanded in the 3 October joint
communique on the Warsaw visit of a Czechoslovak delegation
led by Husak and Strougal. It was also demanded by Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko in his UNGA speech on the 28th.
Noting in the course of his discussion of European developments
the recertly signed four-power agreement "on questions relating
to We&;1 Berlin," the inner-German phaze of the Berlin negotiations,
and the expectation that the Moscow and Warsaw treaties will be
ratified "in the near future," Gromyko said the normali-.ation of
Czechoslovak-FRG relations is "next on the list."
SOVIET EFFORT TO The Galkin commentary over Radio Moscow set
REASSURE THE FRG out to debunk arguments that make Bonn
hesitant to recognize the nonvalidity of
the Munich agreement ab initio along with all the consequences
arising from it--a move that would raise a myriad of legal and
technical questions concerning such issues as the validity of
German civil acts and citizenship in the Sudetenland between
September 1938 and March 1939, when Hitler occupied Bohemia and
Moravia, as well as possible Czechoslovak war damage reparations
claims and, in turn, Sudeten German compensation claims.
Pointing to "ambivalence" in the West German "official position"
on the Munich issue, Galkin remarked that Bonn "is said" to
recognize the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement "for the
present" while rejecting Prague's "Just demands" for recognition
of the accord ab initio, adducing "juridical reasons" for the
latter. It is asserted in Bonn, Galkin continued, that the
Munich agreement "is perfectly legal because it was concluded
by the legitimate heads of government," while "unofficially"
it is argued that "to declare that the Munich agreement was devoid
of all legality from its inception would be to provide the
juridical justification for instituting proceedings against
those persons who were responsiblq for those measures."
Concluding that "this whole line of argument is totally
untenable," Galkin directly discounted "references to possible
legal consequences if the Munich agreement is declared invalid
ab initio." In fact, he said, "the legal responsibility for
the damage inflicted on the Czechoslovak republic during the
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occupation has long since been apportioned by international
accords on war criminals and by Czechoslovak laws which provide
punishment for collaborationism."
The Moscow commentary may possibly have been contrived to lay
public groundwork for a more "pragmatic" approach in tha coming
November session of the Prague-Bonn talks. According to the
West German DPA on the 29th, FRG Government spokesman Ahlers
announced that FRG negotiator Frank had told the federal cabinet
the most recent talks in Prague had passed from the stage of
exchanging basic thoughts to "a more pragmatic" search for a
mutually acceptable formula regarding the Munich agreement, and
that this approach would be pursued in November. A spate of
authoritative Soviet press articles in the wake of the
16-18 September Brandt-Brezhnev meeting in the Crimea had been
marked by warm praise for the "realism" of Brandt's Ostpolitik.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FT3IO Tfl1 NI)t3
6 OCT'013Tli 1.971
DEMICHEV SWITCHES FORMULATIONS ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES
Reporting on 29 September to a high-level conference on the 24th
party congress and questions of theory, P.N. Demichev, Central
Committee Secretary for ideology, referred to the need to
"preserve the preferential growth of subdivision I of public
production as a whole . . . ." (PRAVDA, 30 September).
"Subdivision I" in this formulation, which has long been
utilized in economic literature, includes not only heavy industry
but also significant categories of construction, transportation
and agricultural production. The formulation is apparently
designed to replace the traditional obeisance to the
"preferential development of heavy industry," which has become
increasingly nonsensical in recent years as the growth rates
for industrial consumer goods (Group B) drew even with and
surpassed the rates for heavy industry (Group A).
Demichev appears to be the first Soviet leader to use the
"subdivision I" formulation. Recently the leaders have for the
most part avoided use of the term "preferential" and have used
vaguer terms, describing heavy industry as the "foundation" of
economic expansion (Podgornyy, Kirilenko and Kapitonov in their
May-June 1971 election speeches) or "basis of bases" (Shcherbitskiy
in his June 1971 speech). Shelepin alone among the top leaders
spoke of "retaining preferential. development of heavy industry" in
his 1971 election speech. Brezhnev has not recently repeated h3.s
June 1966 statement that "the unchanging principle of our economic
policy was and remains preferential development of heavy industry
The decision to accelerate Group B at a faster rate than Group A
in the draft 1971-1975 plan obviously necessitated doctrinal adjust-
ment designed to allay fears among party propagandists that Lenin's
law of the preferential development of the means of production was
being ignored. By reverting to the broader Marxist concept of
"subdivision I" Demichev has squared the new policy with Lenin's law.
In their numerous 1971 speeches Brezhnev and other leaders had
passed up the opportunity to use the broader formulation, leavar.
the propagandists in some confusion. Demichev's reformulation of
economic policy, coupled with Suslov's condemnation of a "purely
consumer" approach to raising welfare in his speech at this same
conference, should reassure propagandists that Soviet policy remains
oriented to traditional goals.
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6 OCTOBER 1971
TOPIC IN BRIEF
GROMYKO WARNING AGAINST "COMBINATIONS OF STATES"
For the eighth year running, the fullest version of Foreign
Minister Gromyko's speech before the United Nations General
Assembly appears in the central press, with TASS and Radio
Moscow carrying excerpts and summaries. But a key passage in
this year's address, which appears in a TASS excerpt of
Gromyko's remarks on China as well as in the TASS summary of
the 28 September speech, is not included in the press versions.
According to the TASS excerpt, Gromyko followed his remarks on
U.S.-PRC relations and Chinese representation in the United
Nations with the observation that in the past there have been
"combinations" of states directed against others which have
caused international tension and sometimes even wars.
Ultimately, Gromyko added, these have "always backfired against
their initiators and participants." He concluded that "the
generation that witnessed such combinations is still among the
living." Both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA--which carried the longest
versions of the address--ignored this passage, moving from the
foreign minister's remarks on Chinese representation in the
United Nations to his remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations.
Gromyko's warning against the creation of "combinations" of
states against others appears to go beyond earlier authoritative
Moscow comment on President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the PRC,
although the I. Aleksandrov article in the 4 September PRAVDA
approached this formulation in asking rhetorically if a "deal
against socialism" was being prepared behind the scenes in
Peking and Washington. The exclusion of the "combinations"
warning from the central press versions of the speech accords
with Moscow's current cautious, restrained treatment of Sino-U.S.
relations. PRAVDA's article on the PRC's 1 October national
day this year contains no reference to Sino-U.S. relations. And
the TASS account of Secretary Rogers' 4 October UNGA speech
mentions none of his comments on U.S. relations with Peking
or on the China representation issue.
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