TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010034-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: September 29, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~IIIIIIIi~uum~iiiii~~llllll ~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
29 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 39)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
alour 1
Included tram auMatli
derepedle few
~etlerrlRaliee
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CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
PRC Delegation for Aid Accord Shows Concern to Reassure DRV . . .
1
DRV Foreign Ministry Protest Over Air Strikes. Endorsed by PRG . .
6
PRC.-Foreign Ministry ;"PEOPLE'S,-DAILY Scorett'Air..::Raids on DRV . . .
8
Moscow.Radio,=.Press Condemn Strikes-Against ]RV, Promise Aid. . .
9
Sihanouk, RGNU Members Attack USSR on Aid, Settlement Issues . .
12
HUNGARY-KOREA
Hungarian President Warns DPRK Against Socialist "Dissension" . .
14
CHINA
Peking Remains Mum on Reason for National Day Changes . . . . . .
17
Broadcasts to Chuang Minority Resumed by Nanning Radio . . . . .
18
Background of the Visit: The 1955-56 Documents and After . . . .
19
Joint Statement Sets Current Basis for Party, State Ties . . . .
22
Tito, Brezhnev Speeches Reflect Fundamental Differences . . . . .
24
Aftermath of the Visit: Reassurance to Moscow's Bloc Allies . .
28
GERMANY
FRG, USSR Sustain Cautious Approach to Finnish Proposal . . . . .
31
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Husak Repeats Stand on Munich; Third Exploratory Talks Held . . .
33
UNITED NATIONS
Gromyko Draws on Stock Themes in Foreign Policy Review ...... . .
35
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
USSR Reports Helsinki Accords; Gromyko Stresses ABM Problem . . .
140
(Continued)
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C 0 N T E N-T S (Continued)
JAPAN CP
JCP Ends Moscow Visit as Quarrel with. CCP Intensifies.. ., . . . . 42
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Young Kazakh Poet Protests Against Conformist Atmosphere . . . . 44
TOPICS IN BRIEF
Brezhnev Visit to Cuba . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
UK Spy Charges, . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
29 SEPTEMBER 197].
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 SEPTEMBER 1971
Moscow (3142 items)
Peking (1429 items)
Brezhnev in Yugoslavia
(1%)
20%
Domestic Issues
(40%)
32%
Indochina
(4%)
7%
Indochina
(23%)
29%
[DRV National Assembly(--) 3%]
[Bombing of DRV
(--)
10%]
Delegation in USSR
[Penn Nouth in
(10%)
7%]
UNGA Session
(1%)
5%
Northwest China
[Gromyko Arrival
(--)
3%]
[Li Hsien-nien
(--)
5%]
Statement
Brandt-Brezhnev Talks
(6%)
5%
Economic Delegation
in DRV
China
(7%)
4%
PRC Seat in UN
(1%)
9%
International Trade Union
(1%)
3%
40th Anniversary of Japan
(3%)
4%
Conference in Moscow
Action in Manchuria
Mali National Day
(--)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
-ment .or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
The dispatch of the Li Hsien-nien economic delegation to conclude
the annual aid agreement in Hanoi rather than in Peking, where it
has always been signed in the past, seems clearly a part of the
PR 's effort to reassure and mollify the DRV in the wake of plans
for President Nixon's trip to China. PRC concern to offer such
reassurance was strikingly demonstrated when Li Hsien-nien, at a
banquet on the 24th, seemed to respond directly to the implicat3e~ns
in recent DRV statements--including those by Defense Minister Giap
and Premier Dong last month--that China was departing from a
proletarian internationalist path. Li dramatized the importance
of adherence to such a policy when, after avowing Peking's
intention to continue to assist Vietnam, he declared that "if
one fails to do so, he is not a proletarian internationalist and
not a communist."
Hanoi followed up the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement
on the preceding day's heavy U.S. air strikes against the North
with radio and press comment saying these strikes again exposed
U.S. hypocrisy and intent to continue the war. A NHAN DAN article
on the 23d is notable for a personal attack on the President: It
says that the latest U.S. action "has bared more clearly the true
face of Nixon--a very dishonest and wicked man, a reactionary who
is extremely warlike and perfidious, and a life-or-death enemy of
our people." This vitriolic language--reminiscent of some of the
attacks on the President following the 15 July announcement of his
plans to visit China--is not repeated in other current comment,
however.
Peking and Pyongyang also issued foreign ministry statements
protesting the air strikes against the DRV on the 21st. And
official statements were similarly issued by spokesmen for the
Sihanouk government's foreign ministry (RGNU) and for the NLHS
Central Committee. Comparable formal protests came from all of
these sources at the time of the heavy strikes last November, but
only Pyongyang supported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement in
March of this year with a statement of its own.
Moscow has issued no high-level protest, although the air strikes
against the DRV are condemned in some statements by Soviet public
organizations and in press and radio comment. -Gromyko in his UNGA
speech, as reported by TASS on the 28th, referred to "recently
stepped-up" air strikes against the North in the course of asking a
series of rhetorical questions on why the United States had not
responded to the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal.
PRC DELEGATION FOR AID ACCORD SHOWS CONCERN TO REASSURE DRV
The conclusion of the annual PRC-DRV aid agreements in Hanoi for
the first time is particularly intriguing against the background
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of the DRV's cessation in late August of the attacks on the
Chinese which had gone on for some six weeks following the 15 July
announcement of President Nixon's projected visit to China. It
appears that the halt in Hanoi's polemics coincided with
preliminary consultations on the agreement, since an "experts
delegation" arrived in Peking on 28 August headed by Ly Ban, a
vice minister of foreign trade and regularly a member of the DRV
delegation in talks on the annual aid agreement. There were no
reports of any talks in Peking, however, and there had been io
hint that negotiations would be held in Hanoi this year prior
to the 24 September announcement that the Li IIsien-nien
delegation had arrived to conclude the agreement on military
and economic aid for 1972. Ly Ban was among those reportedly
welcoming the Chinese delegation, but he was in Peking at
least as late as 16 September, when he greeted PRG Foreign
Minister Binh upon her arrival in Peking en route home from
Paris.
It is, of course, impossible to know which side took the
initiative regarding the unprecedented conclusion of the
agreement in Hanoi.* But it seems that along with Peking's
concern to reassure the North Vietnamese about its policies,
the imminent visit to the DRV by Soviet Chairman Podgornyy
may also have been a factor. The Podgornyy visit to the DRV
"in early October" was first announced on 30 August by Moscow
and Hanoi, and TASS on 23 September said he would be arriving
in India on 1 October en route to Hanoi. It is conceivable
that the annual Soviet-DRV aid agreement could be signed while
he is there.**
* The aid a rcement for 1971 was signed in Peking on 6 October 1970
by Li Hsien-nien and DRV delegation head Vice Premier Nguyen Con.
And from 1965 through 1969, DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi headed
the delegation which concluded the agreements annually in Peking.
The timing of the negotiation on the aid agreements has varied
from year to year; for example, the 1969 agreement with the PRC
was signed in September and the 1968 accord in July.
** While the annual Soviet-DRV aid agreement, like the agreement
with China, is usually signed by vice premiers, there is a
precedent for signing at a higher level: Pharr Van Dong and
Kosygin signed the annual agreement in October 1969 when the DRV
premier was visiting the USSR.
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DELEGATION For the most part, propaganda surrounding the PRC
ACTIVITIES delegation's 24-28 September visit vas standard
fare, with ceremonial activities closely
paralleling those in Peking in previous years. The aid agreement
was signed on 27 September by PRC Vice Premier and Politburo
member Li Hsien-nien and DRV Vice Premier and Politburo member
Le Thanh Nghi at a ceremony attended by Premier Pham Van Dong.
This accords with the practice in Peking, where Chou En-lai
has attended the signing ceremonies. Peking media describe the
accord as "the 1972 agreement on China's economic, military,
and material assistance," but VNA adds the qualification that
it is "nonrefund" aid. It has been the general pattern for
Hanoi but not Peking to describe the annual aid agreements as
"nonrefundable," although the NCNA report on a protocol on
supplementary military aid signed on 4 July followed Hanoi's
lead in referring to a "gratuitous" supply of equipment.
The Li Hsien-nien delegation was feted at a banquet given by
Le Thanh Nghi on the 24th; on the 26th the group was received by
Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, who also hosted a banquet that evening.
This parallels the treatmcnt last year in Peking of the Nguyen
Con delegation, which was received by Mao and Lin Piao as well
as by Chou En-lai. On 27 September DRV Defense Minister Vo
Nguyen Giap received military members of the PRC delegation--
Yen Chung-chuan, deputy chief of staff, and Lu Kuei, deputy
head of the PLA armaments department. Also on the 27th,
Li Hsien-nien gave a farewell banquet at the Chinese embassy
at which Pham Van Dong and Giap were the ranking DRV guests.
DRV statements during the visit for the most part contained
standard evaluations of PRC aid and of the relations between the
two countries. For example, Le Thanh Nghi at the banquet on the
24th voiced sentiments similar to Nguyen Con's at a banquet
welcoming his delegation to Peking last year. Thus, Nghi affirmed
that Vietnam has "always enjoyed strong support and great and
effective assistance" from China and expressed gratitude for
Chinese aid--particularly noting assistance to overcome damage
from the recent floods. Also in essentially standard terms, he
said that the DRV is "determined to make an all-out effort for
the further consolidation and development of the friendship and
militant solidarity between the Vietnamese and Chinese people."
And he went on to assert that the current Chinese visit and
talks "represe'.t a new, vivid manifestation of the militant
solidarity and fraternal, friendly relations between our two
parties, governments, and peoples."
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SINO-DRV Despite Li Hsien-nien's direct overtures in
RELATIONS assuring the DRV that Peking is committed to a
policy based on proletarian internationalism,
Hanoi did not respond in kind and its propaganda notably failed
to allude to the concept as the basis for Sino-DRV relations.
Speaking after Le Thanh Nghi at the banquet on the 24th,
Li Hsien-nien, in stressing the Chinese commitment to aid
Vietnam, paraphrased an instruction from Mao and in the process
provided a negative definition oP a proletarian internationalist.
He declared that if one failed to aid Vietnam "he is not a
proletarian internationalist and not a communist; this will
mean betrayal of the revolution." The Mao instruction,
introduced by Chou En-tai during his March 1971 visit to Hanoi,
had advised that "if anyone among us should say that we cannot
help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S.
aggression and for national salvation, that means betrayal,
betrayal of the revolution."*
The question of proletarian internationalism was again raised
by Li Hsien-nien in his 27 September speech at the farewell
banquet. He claimed pointedly that the visit had shown that
"Sino-Vietnamese friendship based on Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism is being consolidated and developed
with each passing day and that it is deep-rooted and no one can
undermine it." This statement accords with banquet speeches in
Peking last year by both Li and Nguyen Con. Le Thanh Nghi's
failure to respond in kind this year suggests that Li's remarks
on the 24th did not satisfy the North Vietnamese.
DRV implications last month that Peking was in fact departing
from a proletarian internationalist path were conveyed in
Defense Minister Giap's message on the 1 August anniversary of
the Chinese army and in Pham Van Dong's 31 August DRV National
Day address. Giap for the first time failed to characterize
Chinese assistance as being in the spirit of "proletarian
internationalism,"** and Pham Van Dong pointedly referred to
* It is possible that Peking first advanced this formulation
last March--just prior to moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations--
in order to give advance assurance to Hanoi that Peking's support
for its struggle would not falter. Since March the Mao
instruction has been recalled on only two occasions: by Chief of
Staff Huang Yung-sheng at a 5 June reception on the PRG
anniversary and by Fang I, minister for economic relations with
foreign countries, at a bangr.et welcoming a Vietnamese study group.
** See the 4 August TRENDS, page. 2-, for a'discuision of the Giap
message.
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the proletarian internationalism of the Vietnamese people but
made no such characterization of other communist countries.
PRC WILLINGNESS In his promise of support for Vietnam at
TO "SACRIFICE" the 24 September banquet, Li Hsien-nien used
a formulation which Chou En-lai had revived
on 6 March during his trip to Hanoi but which has not appeared
in high-level statements since then: Li said the Chinese "will
not flinch from the greatest national sacrifices" in aiding
Vietnam. Willingness to sustain great sacrifices is first
known to have been vowed by Pang Chen in his 1 October 1965
PRC National Day address; it was not mentioned again until a
22 July 1966 speech by Liu Shao-chi. Peking media continued
to repeat this pledge during the summer of 1966, and Lin Piao
voiced it in his national day address that year. The pledge was
labeled an "instruction" from Lin Piao in some subsequent
propaganda. Prior to Chou's revival of it, the statement had
last appeared in Peking propaganda in late 1967.
Li Hsien-nien did not stress Chinese support in his final
speech on the 27th and, in fact, implicitly played down the need
for assistance by characterizing the war situation as
"unprecedentedly fine"--an evaluation that has marked Peking's
assessment since Operation Lam Son 719 in southern Laos.
DRV REFERENCES Both Le Thanh Nghi, in his 2I September
TO SOVIET AID speech: and the 29 September NHAN DAN
editorial on the new PRC aid agreement
gratuitously mentioned assistance given the DRV by the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries. Hanoi comment on aid
agreements with China has not normally referred to Soviet aid,
although aid from "socialist countries" has sometimes been
cited. It is not clear whether the references to the Soviets
at this time are a further indication of Hanoi's continuing
pique with China in the wake of Sino-U.S. developments or whether
they were included in anticipation of Soviet President Podgornyy's
forthcoming visit. Hanoi's long-standing effort to maintain a
balance in its treatment of the Soviets and Chinese was well
illustrated in the VNA press review on the 29th: The review
noted the prominent attention given the Chinese aid agreement,
but it added later that "in view of the coming visit of a
Soviet party and government delegation to Vietnam" and of the
PRC's national day, the papers carried reports on economic
developments in the USSR and China.
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DRV references to Soviet aid at meetings with the Chinese are not
without precedent, and it is possible that the North Vietnamese
leaders feel less reluctant to make such references in Hanoi
than when they are guests of the PRC. Thus, while Nguyen Con did
not cite Soviet aid in his speech in Peking last year, Pham Van
Dong did mention it in his 6 March speech welcoming Chou En-lai
to Hanoi. NCNA duly carried the full texts of both Dong's
speech in March and Nghi's 211. September speech, along with their
references to the Soviets.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTEST OVER AIR STRIKES ENDORSED BY PRG
The assertion in the 22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement
that the heavy U.S. air strikes against the North on the 21st
"threaten" the Paris talks is echoed in a supporting PRG
Foreign Ministry protest on the 23d as well as in a NHAN DAN
commentary that day. The statements by the communist delegates
in Paris serving notice that in protest they would postpone the
weekly session of the talks until the 30th have been duly
reported by Hanoi and Front media, but no point is made of the
postponement in comment on the strikes.
U.S. air strikes against the North since the heavy ones on the
21st prompted a standard protest at the lower level of the DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman on 27 September. The spokesman said
that following "the extremely serious acts of war" on the 21st,
the United States sent planes including B-52's and "used
artillery from south of the demilitarized zone and warships in
the open sea to continuously strafe Huong Lap, Vinh Giang,
Vinh Son, and Vinh Thach villages in the Vinh Linh area" from
22-25 September. He charged further that U.S. planes "str.fed
a number of localities in the western part of Quang Binh
Province."
The minittry statement on the 22d was fclloaed the next day by
articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as well as radio
comment. NHAN DAN's aftitle'. is at variance with the other
propaganda in its vicious personal attack on the President.
It says that "the new military adventure has bared more clearly
the true face of Nixon--a very dishoneot and wicked man, a
reactionary who is extremely warlike.eaid perfidious, and a
life-or-death enemy of our people." This attack is reminiscent
of a passage in the 22 July NHAN DAN editorial that displayed
Hanoi's disquiet over the President's planned trip to Peking.
The editorial called the President "the worst anticommunist,
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bellicose, and reactionary element" and added that "in more than
20 years as senator and vice president, he always proved to be a
frenzied anticommunist, advocating settling international problems
by force . . . ." The current NHAN DAN article is also atypical
in calling the President a "military adventurer" and in stating
that for this reason the army and people of North Vietnam "must
remain vigilant day and night." Other comment on the strikes
makes more pro forma references to DRV readiness to deal with the
"aggressor."
The QUAN DOI KHAN DAN article does not attack the President
personally, but it does go beyond the foreign ministry statement in
another regard. While the statement called the air strikes "an
insolent challenge to peace- and justice-loving public opinion in
the world and the United States," the army paper says the latest
"act of war" is a "brazen act of provocation against the socialist
countries and progressive worldwide public cpinion." (The 3 March
foreign ministry statement, issued at the time the PRV was
expressing concern about the Laos operation, also claimed that U.S.
acts against the DRV constituted "an impudent challenge to the
socialist countries, peace- and justice-loving countries, U.S.
people, and people the world over." The same assertion appeared
in other propaganda at that time, including remarks by Defense
Minister Giap at a reception marking Soviet Armed Forces Day on
23 February.)
Both the press articles as well as radio comment take issue with
U.S. statements that the strikes on the 21st were part of the
policy of "protective reaction." For example, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
says that to "shamelessly" defend the strikes, the U.S. spokesman
in Saigon repeated the "old arguments of self-defense reactions
which on many occasions have been rejected by worldwide public
opinion." A Hanoi radio broadcast in Mandarin on the 24th called
the U.S. labeling of the strikes as "a security measure" to
protect U.S. troops "false reasoning" that exposes the United
States' "extremely obstinate and bellicose nature."
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d titled "Nixon's Hawkish
Nature Has Not Changed" goes further than other comment in linking
the strikes with U.S. "opposition" to a negotiated settlement.
Like the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 21st--the first
substantial Hanoi comment on negotiations since a 25 July
NHAN DAN Commentator article--Hanoi radio says that the replacement
of Ambassador Bruce by Ambassador Porter does not appear to have
changed the "obstructionist" U.S. attitude.
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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY. PEOPLE'S DAILY SCORE AIR RAIDS ON DRV
The PRC Foreign Ministry statement and the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article on 24 September, reacting to the large-scale U.S. bombing
of the DRV's Quang Binh Province on the 21st, express "great
indignation at this criminal act of U.S. imperialism." Peking's
reaction to the strikes seems in tune with the general effort to
reassure the DRV. Chinese media carried the text of the
22 September DRV Foreign Ministry statement and summaries of the
23 September PEG Foreign Ministry statement, as well as of the
statements issued by the DRV and PRG delegations to the Paris
conference. The PRC statement is similar in tone and substance
to the 24 November 1970 PRC Foreign Ministry statement protesting
U.S. bombing raids against North Vietnam on 21 November. U.S.
bombing missions against North Vietnamese targets in March 1971
did not evoke a PRC Foreign Ministry statement, although Peking
media reported the DRV Foreign Ministry protest at the time.*
Condemning the "wanton bombing raids" and expressing "firm
support" for the DRV stand as represented by its statement on
the 22d, the PRC Foreign Ministry statement--and the PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article, which simply rephrased the principal
points of the Statement--took the "Nixon government" to task for
talking abou.G ending the war in Vietnam while "in fact constantly
intensifying" it. The foreign ministry specifically charged the
U.S. Administration with refusing to answer the PEG's seven poir:G
proposal of 1 July and to fix a time limit "for the complete
and unconditional ;iithdrawal of troops from South Vietnam," with
"propping up" the Thieu government and directing the "farce of
'presidential elections"' in South Vietnam, and with arming
South Vietnamese troops through the "Vietnamizing" plan. In a
similar context, the 24 November 1970 PRO Foreign Ministry
statement had accused "the Nixon government" of "continuously
expanding the war" while "glibly talking" about seeking peace in
Indochina and respecting the Geneva agreements. (That statement
had been preceded by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 22d.)
* Events connected with the Laotian incursion early this year
brought foreign-ministry-level statements on 25 January and 4 and
8 February and a PRC Government statement on 12 February. Those
statements portrayed a more serious threat directed toward China
itself and used stronger language than did either the current
foreign ministry statement or that of 24 November 1970.
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The current statement, like the one last November, did not raise
the notion of a threat to China. But both reaffirmed that the
Vietnamese people's struggle is "our struggle," that the
Chinese government "has been closely watching the moves in the
U.S. imperialist aggression against Vietnam," and that as long
as that aggression continues the Chinese people will "go all
out in giving support and assistance" to the Vietnamese
comrades "until complete victory."
MOSCOW RADIO. PRESS CONDEMN STRIKES AGAINST DRV. PROMISE AID
Moscow has denounced the 21 September bombings of the DRV with
routine-level press and radio comment and some protest statements
by public organizations. It had similarly condemned the
21-22 March 1971 raids with only routine-level comment, although
a TASS statement had scored the bombings of 21 November 1970.
Criticism of the 1-2 May 1970 bombings was included in the 4 May
USSR Government statement--read by Kosygin at a Moscow press
conference--which was directed chiefly at the U.S. operation in
Cambodia.
Soviet commentators assert that the bombing does not square with
the President's promises to scale down the war and undermines the
commitments undertaken by the United States in 1968 to end the
bombing. On 24 September TASS and Moscow radio reported that
White House spokesman Ziegler that day said President Nixon personally
took part in the decision on the bombing. The reports repeated the
line that the bombing violates commitments undertaken by the United
States in 1968, and TASS quoted Ziegler as saying the raids do not
mean that the United States has altered its decision to end the
bombing.
Moscow has reported the Vietnamese communist reaction, including
the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements and the statements by
the two communist delegations at the Paris talks. Moscow comment
has not brought up the cancellation of the Paris session on the
23d in protest against the bombings, but on 22 September TASS did
cite the New York TIMES as saying that "the resumption of full-scale
air war against North Vietnam destroys all the existing chances at
the talks in Paris." An IZVESTIYA article by Ilyinskiy, reported
by TASS on the 28th, says the bombings "inflict an undoubted blow
on the real possibilities of a political settlement of the Vietnam
problem" and indicate new U.S. attempts "to hold up progress" at
Paris.
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A 25 September PRAVDA article by Kuznetsov says the bombing
shows U.S. unwillingness to respond to the PRG's seven-point
plan and determination to adhere...to its "old stand" on troop
withdrawal. Aleksey Leontyev in RED STAR on the 26th,
denouncing the "lie" that the purpose of the bombing is to
protect American troops in South Vietnam, once again suggests
that the simplest way to protect the troops would be to
withdraw them. The "crux" of the matter, Leontyev adds, is
that the United States still hopes for a military victory.
SOVIEi `iD Some of the propaganda on the bombings,
including the statements by public organizations,
reaffirms that the USSR will continue to give the Vietnamese
support and assistance. Other publicity for Soviet aid includes
reports by TABS on 24 September and PRAVDA on the 25th of a
message from the VWP Central Committee, the DRV National Assembly
Standing Committee, and the DRV Government, thanking the CPSU
Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the
USSR Council of Ministers for their "kind message and timely
assistance" in connection with the recent floods in the DRV.
This Soviet message had been sent on 30 August. On 17 and
18 September TASS and PRAVDA had similarly reported a message
from Le Duan thanking Brezhnev for r. sympathy message of
2 September and for the relief aid sent by the USSR.*
ANTI-CHINA POLEMICS Low-level attacks on Peking's Indochina
policies continued in Radio Peace and
Progress broadcasts in Mandarin on 25 September. Pegged to the
latest bombing of the DRV, the commentaries once again charged
that Peking's splittist stand had encouraged U.S. aggressive
action. One broadcast said the United States felt sure that
the bombing would have no "undesirable effects" on the President's
projected visit to Peking because of "the change in Peking's
stand" on the question of U.S. aggression in Indochina and on
troop withdrawal. The commentary said that demands for U.S.
* On 23 September NCNA reported a similar message from Ton Due
Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong to Mao, Lin Piao,
and Chou En-lai thanking them for their "timely aid" to the
flood-stricken Vietnamese people. This was Peking's only mention
of relief aid since PRC leaders' message. of 2 September. , However,
on 19 September VNA had announced thearrival.of both Chinese-and
Soviet: relief shipments.
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withdrawal have gradually disappeared from Chinese leaders'
speeches, and it noted a CPUSA comment that the question of
troop withdrawal assumed "only minor importance" compared with
other issues discussed by Chou En-lai in his interview with
the New York TIMES' James Reston. Another Radio Peace and
Progress commentary that day said routinely in the context of
the bombings that if Peking had accepted the Soviet proposal
for a united front to support Vietnam, the Vietnamese people's
struggle would have been more effective.
More generalized calls for unity appear in the joint communique
on the Japanese Communist Party delegation's 19-26 September
visit to Moscow, as reported in the Moscow domestic service on
the 27th.e The communique does not specify socialist unity when
it calls for a stepped-up international movement to aid and
support the peoples of Indochina, adding that this requires a
"broad international front" and "international cohesion of
anti-imperialist and democratic forces." However, it does call
for "Joint actions" of the "fraternal parties" against the
"forces of aggression and war, primarily against American
imperialism," saying this is possible "despite the differences
of opinion between indiv'.dual parties on these and other
questions."
N See the Japan CP section of this TRENDS for a discussion of
the JCP visit.
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SIHANOUK, RGNU MEMBERS ATTACK USSR ON AID, SETTLEMENT ISSUES
Dissatisfaction on the part of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) with
the results of the 1-10 September visit to the USSR of a delega-
tion of Sihanouk's Front (FEMK)'seems to be reflected in pointed
remarks made by RGNU Premier Penn Nouth and RGNU "special envoy"
long Sary during a recent tour of northwest China.# In a
22 September speech in Yenan reported by NCNA, Ieng Sary con-
demned the "design of certain big powers to control Cambodia
under the pretext of extending aid." He complained that "they
want us to negotiate with the enemy, to compromise with and
capitulate to the enemy, and give up our struggle," and he went
on to affirm that "we will resolutely refuse such aid."
Commenting at a banquet in Yenan on 22 September, according to
NCNA, Penn Nouth said that the Cambodian people are willing to
accept "unconditional, sincere aid," both material and moral,
but that "the highest and most important aid" is the recogni-
tion of the RGNU._ He went on to assert that the Cambodian
people "resolutely oppose the scheme of U.S. imperialism to
work in collusion with one or two big powers to bring about a
compromise, hatch a peace-talks fraud.and split Cambodia's
territory." The Cambodians are determined, he said, to
decide their own destiny; "big powsa's absolutely are not
allowed to manipulate Cambodia's destiny."
Earlier, in a 12 September speech in Urumehi, reported by NCNA,
Penn Nouth accused "some countries" of "seriously harming" the
Cambodian people's struggle by refusing to recognize the RGNU
on the pretext that It is a "government in exile" or somehow
divided from the "government at home." This "subversion and.
interference" in the country's internal affairs is "intolerable,"
he said. Speaking in Lanahaw on the 18th, he charged that U.S.
imperialism has been "working in collusion with certain powers
which call themselves friends of the Cambodian people" to "make
a bargain through negotiations to solve the Cambodian question
by means of compromise." He added that the United States and
its "big-power collaborators" are also. resorting to "subversion"
* The USSR visit by the delegation led by Gen. Duong Sam 01,
Front Politburo member and RGNU Minister of Military Equipment
and Armament, is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 September, pages
11-13, and of 15 September, pages 11-13. long Sary, a "special
envoy of the interior part" of Sihanouk's government, arrived
in Peking from the "frontlines" in Cambodia in mid August to
demonstrate the unity of the Khmer patriots at home and abroad;
see the TRENDS of 1 September, pages 8-10.
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to "split our National United Front from the inside," trying
to "dispatch enemy agents and plant them in our Front both in
our country and abroad so as to create contradictions and
confusion."
Prior to these speeches in northwest China, the periodic RGNU
rejections of the idea of a conference had apparently made
no polemical reference: to "big-power collaborators." The
RGNU animadversions were directed against the United States
and its Phnom Penh "lackeys," or against those Western or
Asian states that had made proposals for a conference. A
10 October 1970 PRC Government statement denouncing the for-
mation of the Khmer Republic in Phnom Penh had scored the
efforts "of U.S. imperialism and its collaborator" to
sabotage the Cambodian people's struggle through the United
Nations or other means, but Sihanouk did not echo such
remarks in his denunciations at the time of U.S. efforts
to make sure the Lon Nol government represented Cambodia in
the UN.
SIHANOUK'S In his 27th "message to the Khmer nation,"
27TH MESSAGE carried by NCNA on 24 September, Sihanouk
once again rejected the notion of a new
Geneva conference or any other international conference on
Cambodia. Peking supports this stand and the legitimacy
of the RGNU, he stressed, in contrast to "certain European
powers" who propose a compromise solution. He denounced
Sirik Matak for having said, while visiting Washington in
mid-August, that Cambodia must be included in any Ir..dcchina
settlement and that Peking would soon drop its support of
Sihanouk. Stressing continued PRC support, Sihanouk quoted
the 10 October 1970 PRC Government statement's expression of
opposition to the efforts "of U.S. imperialism and its
collaborator" to sabotage the Cambodian people's struggle.
As he had done in a previous message (his 24th), Sihanouk
asserted that President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking
will not cause the PRC to change its position on Cambodia.
He recalled that Chou En-lai, in his interview with James
Reston, had reiterated Chinese opposition to a new Geneva
conference and pointed out that Sihanouk had rejected such
a conference in his 24th message. "Categorically refusing"
any international conference once again in the current
message, Sihanouk said that peace can be realized in Cambodia
only by the installation in Phnom Penh of the legitimate RGNU,
and he scored those "rightists" who "jump at the promise of
a 'third solution' to the Khmer problem by certain European
powers, accomplices of U.S. imperialism."
CONFIDENTIAL
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HUNGARY AND KOREA
HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT WARNS DPRK AGAINST SOCIALIST "DISSENSION"
Against the background of intensified Soviet bloc efforts to
counter Chinese diplomatic initiatives and concern over Peking's
invitation to President Nixon to visit the PRC, Hungarian
President Pal Losonczi used his 15-21 September "official
friendship visit" to the DPRK to warn the North Koreans about
the dangers of attempts to foment "dissension" among the
socialist countries. His warning came in the wake of Kim
I1-song's characterization of the President's projected visit
as a victory for the PRC in a speech at a 6 August rally for
the visiting Prince Sihanouk.* An indication that Losonczi
may have been playing a surrogate role for Moscow in warning
of divisive activity was reinforced by reports that the
Hungarian president stopped off in the Soviet Union on his
way to and from the DPRK, meeting with Podgornyy in Moscow
on his way home on 22 September.
In a banquet speech on the 20th Losonczi, according to MTI,
the Hungarian news agency, said that the visit had been
"successful" and that a communique had been prepared that
"faithfully reflects the agreements of our aims." Yet no
communique on the visit has been made public, which may
indicate that the results w~:re less than satisfactory. And
although KCNA's brief reports of Losonczi's talks with Kim
II-song and'Choe Yong-kon characterized them as being "friendly,"
they did not mention comradeship or fraternity. KCNA also
supplied only summaries of Losonczi's speeches--which MTI
carried in full--omitting his polemical remarks, and the
Korean speakers themselves similarly avoided polemics..
The sequence of events during Sihanouk's 22 July to 11 August
visit to the DPRK suggested that the Prince's trip had been
designed, at least in part, to convey Peking's reassurances to
Pyongyang in the wake of the invitation to President Nixon.
Sihanouk, in his 24th "message to the Khmer nation" issued
on 30 July in North Korea, made the first move in explaining
that the invitation did not mean any wavering of Peking's
support for its allies. See the TRENDS of 11 August, pages
13-15.
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In his first toast at a banquet on the 15th, as reported by
MTI, Losonczi implied that the forthcoming talks would be
difficult: "We should have an exchange on views on all
problems regarding the unity of action of the world's
anti-imperialist forces. The idea of proletarian inter-
nationalism and our common struggle make it imperative for
us to exchange ideas and make our stands clear."
Speaking in Hamhung on the 18th, according to MTI, Losonczi
said that socialist unity is "particularly necessary now"
when "intern::tional reaction led by U.S. imperialism is doing
everything to weaken socialism and the forces fighting for
national liberation and to foment dissension, thus trying
to reverse the wheel of history." He added that "the most
striking example of all this" is U.S. aggression in Indochina.
KCNA's summary blandly noted that Losonczi said that "we
attach very great importance to the unity and mutual cooperation
among the socialist countries based on the lofty principles of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," and that
he "expressed support" of the Indochinese peoples' struggle
against U.S. aggression.
At a Pyongyang rally on the 20th, according to MTI, Losonczi
noted that the Korean and Hungarian people are fighting shoulder
to shoulder against imperialism, and pointedly added that in
this struggle "a particularly important'role is played by the
first and strongest socialist power in the world, the Soviet
Union." Referring to the need for socialist unity, he said
that "our party does everything in its power to attain this
goal and opposes every disrupting attempt which weakens our
anti-imperialist struggle." He reiterated that Indochina
is now one of the "principal theaters" of the anti-imperialist
struggle and remarked that Hungary and the DPRK are united by
the fact that they "both are doing their utmost to support"
the Indochinese people. KCNA reported his assertion that the
Korean and Hungarian peoples are fighting shoulder to shoulder
against imperialism, but predictably omitted his reference
to the Soviet Union as well as his warning against "disrupting
attempts." It did report his assertion that Indochina is the
"main arena" of the struggle against imperialism and that
Hungary and the DPRK are united in supporting the peoples
of Indochina.
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0
MTI reported that at a Pyongyang banquet on the 20th Losonczi
pointedly L,ought Korea's own security interests into the
picture, saying that the. importance of strengthening, socialist
unity "is underlined by the fact that not too far from your
homeland, in Indohhina," U.S. aggression is in full swing.
KCNA reported only that Losconzi "underscored the importance
of strengthening the unity of all the anti-imperialist forces."
At the same time, while warning of the danger of socialist
disunity in the face of imperialist aggression, particularly
in Indochina, Losonczi took pains to defend the Soviet Union's
moves toward a detente with the West. In his speeches in
Hamhung and at the Pyongyang rally as carried by MTI he
recalled that both world wars started in Europe and asserted
that the Soviet and Polish treaties with West Germany and the
recent four-power agreement on West Berlii are important in
preventing another such war. He added that these treaties
have also opened the way for convening a European security
conference. KC".:A's summaries omitted h :LE references to the
agreements on Germany and Berlin and reported that at the
Pyongyang meeting he "referred to the problem of the convocation
of a European security meeting," thus couching his remarks
in negative terms.
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CHINA
PEKING REMAINS MUM ON REASON FOR NATIONAL DAY CHANGES
Through the evening of the 29th (Pekin3-time) , there had'teenw
confirmation in official Chinese media of the statements by
Foreign Ministry spokesmen to Western newsmen regarding the
less elaborate celebration of National Day this year. Western
press speculation, that a Canton TV annoimeement of an upcoming
Peking relay presaged' important relelatioas proved false when
the-'relay only transmitted' a Chines-Albania. .igymnae:tics.*1neet
Several military leaders who are Politburo members, and usually
active, have still made no public appearances in the nearly
three weeks since anomalies in Peking's usual behavior became
evident.
A 28 September NCNA account of preparations for National Day
in the city of Peking indicates that a festive holiday, with
rejoicing celebrants, is still planned--which makes it most
unlikely that any grave announcement concerning the health of
Mao or Lin is to be expected. While the item makes no mention
of the traditional parade, it does note that the Tienanmen
rostrum has been newly painted and the usual collection of
huge potraits of historical personalities from Marx to Mao is
in place. Theatrical performances to be given will include
not only the old revolutionary classics such as "The Red
Lantern" but also several new operas and a new ballet.
MOSCOW'S The anomalies in China drew no propaganda attention
REACTION from Moscow until 24 September when a TASS dispatch
seized on rumors published in the Japanese press
to accuse the Chinese o again using the threat of a Soviet
"attack on Chinese territory" to cover up "acute internal
political problems." TASS said that the campaign is a new
tem t to "inflame anti-Soviet feelings among the population"
and part of a new pre~r_eyouurself for war" drive in the PR
The only hard evidence given for the allegation is an ASAHI
report that leave for servicemen had been canceled. Soviet
broadcasts to Southeast Asia and to China have also picked up
the theme that the Chinese are using the Soviet threat to hide
internal difficulties, but the Soviets have not initiated a
major propaganda campaign around the issue.
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BROADCASTS TO CIIIANG MINORITY' RESt .D'' - BY NANN I NG 1 RAD I0
Nanning radio, Kwangsi' region]:. service,.. has announced that
starting 1. October it. will resume broadcasting iri. Chuang,
with separate progrr.,ms for the northern and. southern dialects.
The Chuang are a Tai-speaking tribal people numbering-some
nine million, the largest of China's minority groups but
one strongly influenced by Chinese culture.
Nanning radio discontinued broadcasts in-Chuarg during the
cultural revolution, apparently ih- .l'ate 1'961' or 1968.
Resumption of broadcasting at-this time follows closely on
Radio Peking 's inauguration of broadcasts last May in
Uighur and Kazakh, the principal minority languages of
China's Northwest.
CONFIDENTIAL'
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BREZHNEV IN YUGOSLAVIA
Brezhnev's 22-25 September "unofficial, friendly" fence-mending
visit to Belgrade produced what Tito, at the airport departure
ceremony on tie 25th, described as "a thorough review of our
entire relations" and a joint statement registering both
sides' desire to relegate their differences to the background
in their mutual pragmatic interests. The joint statement
puts on record the two sides' readiness to develop interstate
and, more cautiously, interparty relations--severely strained
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and, more recently, by Soviet
pressures on Romania and by what Belgrade has viewed as Soviet
meddling in Yugoslav affairs.
On Moscow's side, the rapprochement goes hand in hand with a
general effort to shore up relations with as many countries
as possible in preparation for a European security conference;
and the Soviet decision to grant ideological concessions, in
form if not in substance, registers the depth of Moscow's
concern over Chinese inroads in the Balkans. At the same
time, Brezhnev's visit served to demonstrate to Peking and
its allies that the USSR can still exert leverage in the area.
Belgrade gained a new--if watered down--assurance from Moscow
that interparty cooperation must be based on equality, as well
as a new--if qualified--Soviet reaffirmation of Yugoslavia's
right to develop its own brand of socialism. The visit opened
up for Tito the prospect of improved economic relations with
Moscow, as well as a lessening of Yugoslav-Soviet tensions
that could enhance domestic stability during the critical
period of phaseout of his personal leadership.
BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT: THE 1955-56 DOCINIENTS AND AFTER
Yugoslavia has consistently held that the documents signed
in Belgrade in 1955 and Moscow in 1956 encompass its basic
minimal conditions for the development of state and party
relations with the Soviet Union. Signed on 2 June 1955 by
the then Soviet Premier Bulgsnin sndPresident Tito, the
Belgrade declaration represented the first major fruition
of IQirushehev's effort to patch up the relations of open enmity
that had followed Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the
Cominform in 1948. The document pledged "reciprocal respect
for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and
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equality of the states in their relations with each other and
with other states." It also called for "mutual respect and
noninterference in one another's internal affairs for whatever
reason, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature,
inasmuch as questions of internal organizations, difference of
social systems and difference in the concrete forms of socialist
development are exclusively the concern of the peoples of the
respective countries."
The 1955 document made no mention of party relations, the basis
for which was subsequently spelled out in the Moscow declaration
signed by Tito and I4irushchev in their capacities as party
leaders.. The key passage of the 1956 declaration reads:
Believing that the ways of socialist development vary in
different countries and conditions, that the wealth of
forms of the development of soc.Lalism contributes to its
strength, and proceeding from the fact that either side
holds alien any tendency to impose its views with regard
to the ways and forms of socialist development, both
sides have agreed that the aforesaid cooperation should
be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly
criticism, and comradely exchange of views on the
contentious issues between our parties.
Dealt a sharp setback by the Hungarian upheavel in November
1956, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were again on the upturn in
the early 1960's, when Khrushchev reaffirmed the policy of
noninterference during a visit to Yugoslavia in 1962. The
policy was reaffirmed in behalf of the post-Khrushchev
leadership after an official Tito visit to Moscow from
18 dune to 1 July 1965: Loyalty to principles of noninter-
ference as enunciated in the 1955 declaration was repledged
in a communique signed by Brezhnev as CPSU First Secretary,
Mikoyan as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium,
and Tito as Yugoslav party secretary and president.
Three years later, relations plummeted to their lowest point
since 1948 after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Four
months before the Warsaw Five moved into Czechoslovakia,
during a period of blatant Soviet pressures on the
Czechoslovaks, a Tito visit to Moscow--en route home from
Iran--produced no formal communique; TANYUG noted
cryptically that "viewpoints" on party relations were
exchanged. Yugoslav propagandists were vocal after the
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intervention in decrying what they, like the West, termed the
"Brezhnev doctrine" of limited sovereignty enunciated as an
ex post facto rationale for the invasion--the concept that the
socialist community has the right to intervene when it sees
socialism threatened in any socialist country. At the highest
level, Tito commented at the 11-15 March 1969 Yugoslav party
congress: "In the name of the alleged higher interests of
socialism, attempts have been made to justify even the open
violation of the sovereignty of a socialist country and to
resort to military force to prevent its independent development."
The USSR and all of its East European allies except Romania
boycotted the Yugoslav congress, against the background of
polemical exchanges between Moscow and Belgrade.
Moves to dispel the hostility began with a state visit to
Yugoslavia by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in- the fall of
1969 which produced a joint reaffirmation that the 1955 Belgrade
document--on noninterference at the state level--was still
valid. The then Yugoslav Premier Ribicic visited Moscow in
June 1970, and a joint communique on that visit again endorsed
the principles set forth in the Belgrade declaration. But the
issue of party relations was still avoided.
Yugoslav propaganda over the past year has registered concern
over Soviet pressures on the Romanians and in recent months
has reacted sharply to what Belgrade viewed as Soviet moves to
capitalize on the turmoil generated in Yugoslavia by Tito's
governmental reorga,-ization. In June of this year the Yugoslav
Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest against anti-Yugoslav
activity by "Cominformist emigres" in the Soviet Union. A
measure of restraint in the media of both sides--dating from
Gromyko's 1969 visit--persisted through the c,sriod of such
incidents. But the freewheeling unofficial press and radio
organs in Yugoslavia, particularly Zags-eb media, continued to
air comment critical of Soviet bloc attitudes and behavior.
Virtually on the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade, a Zagreb
radio commentator sharply attacked an East German party
Politburo report of 16 September, which warned Balkan communist
countries against trafficking with the Chinese, as symptomatic
of efforts by the Soviet "camp" to interfere in the Balkans.
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JOINT STATEMENT SETS CURRENT BASIS FOR PARTY, STATE TIES
The 25 September joint statement signed by Tito and Brezhnev
caps the gradual, uneven progress toward a Yugoslav-Soviet
r.apprinhement in the wake of the Czechoslovak events with a
qualifL.ed reassertion of. principles-of equality in party ae: yell
as state relations. But the new modus vivendi for the current
period falls short of that outlined in the Moscow declaration
of 1956.
The new document emerges as a compromise worked out in
accommodation to post-Czechoslovakia realities. It defines as
the basis for cooperation "the closeness of historic destinies,
identity of the foundations of social order, proximity of
approaches to many international problems, loyalty to principles
of socialist internationalism, the general struggle for peace,
independence, and equal international cooperation and the
struggle against imperialism." The bow to "socialist inter-
nationalism"--a concession from the Yugoslav side; the term
did not appear in the 1955-56 documents--is balanced from the
Soviet side by an affirmation that the development of
bilateral relations "is based on the principles set forth"
in the 1956 document on party relations as well as in those
of 1955 and 1965.
But the statement backs into the question of party equality by
saying that the two governments and parties "strive for
developing broad cooperation based on equality between countries
and peoples," where the 1956 document had forthrightly endorsed
the view that cooperation between the two parties should be
based on "complete voluntariness and equality." And the new
statement calls only for "exchanges of views and consultations"
between the two parties on bilateral relations and foreign policy,
where the 1956 document had provided expansively for "comradely
exchange of views on contentious issues between parties and
friendly criticism"--a proviso the Yugoslavs could cite as
justifying their 1968 criticisms of the Soviet move into
Czechoslovakia.
In a tortuous passage straddling the line between Moscow's rigid
ideology and Belgrade's more flexible approach, the document
affirms that "the LCY and the CPSU proceed from the fact that
only the teaching of Marx, Engels, and'Lenin,-applied creatively
and developed in consonance with the'distinctive characteristics
of each country, can be the indispensable foundation,' both now
and in the future, for the policy of the cummunist:and workers'
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parties . . . ." Where the 1956 Moscow Declaration referred to
"the wealth of forms of socialist development," this one states
in more measured language that "the methods [not "forms"] used
in constructing socialism, which reflect the experience and
the specific aspects in the development of individual countries,
are a matter for the peoples and working classes in individual
countries and need not contradict each other."
Both sides register their desire to develop cooperation in the
economic, scientific, and cultural fields. Both also register
their desire to develop relations "on a reciprocal basis" in the
fields of press, radio, television, and culture--an earnest of
intent to remove a major irritant in bilateral relations.
FOREIGN POLICY Capitalizing on bong-standing areas of
agreement on foreign policy, the statement
supports the struggles of the Arab peoples against "Israeli
aggression" and condemns U.S. "aggression" in Indochina. It
also registers both sides' support for a European security
conference and for "lasting peace and security in the Balkans,
an important element of which would be the establishment of a
nuclear free zone in the area." Soviet support for a nuclear-
free zone in the Balkans dates back to 1959. On 30 May 1959,
Khrushchev stated in a speech in Tirana that the USSR "and all
socialist countries believe it is from here, from the Balkans,
that the peoples must start a struggle with a view to preventing
the establishment of rocket bases and the siting of atomic
weapons on Balkan soil and in the Mediterranean basin."* Elite
and routine Soviet propaganda has continued to endorse the idea,
but with decreasing frequency in recent years. Prior to the
Soviet-Yugoslav statement, the last high-level USSR endorsement
of a nuclear-free Balkans appeared in an 8 September 1969 message
from the Soviet leadership on Bulgarian National Day. The last
joint Soviet-Yugoslav document to endorse the proposal was the
30 June 1965 communique on Tito's visit to Moscow, which said
both sides favored nuclear-free zones in central Europe and
the Balkans and--like the current statement--supported the idea
of a European security conference.
* Romania has also long been on record as supporting a nuclear-
free zone in the Balkans, as part of a package of measures to
make the Balkans an "area of peace and cooperation."
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Glossing over areas of discord on foreign policy insues, the
joint statement resorts to a stock Soviet formula on nonalint-
ment: "The Soviet side supports the anti-imperialist
orientation of the policy of nonalined countries . . . and
positively assesses their role in the struggle against
colonialism and neocolonialism." This is the theme Moscow
customarily plays in its comment on nonalined summit meetings,
while in comment on the behavior incumbent on socialist states
it argues that there can be no neutrality in the class struggle.
Beyond an expression of support for restoring the PRC's
rights in the United Nations, there is predictably no mention
of China, with which Yugoslavia has recently developed cordial
state relations.
TITO. BREZI-1EV SPEECHES REFLECT FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES
Differences between the two countries were acknowledged and their
differing concepts of socialist relations were brought into
particularly sharp relief in an exchange of toasts between Tito
and Brezhnev at a dinner on the 22d.
TITO The Yugoslav President reiterated Belgrade's desire for
"friendly, all-round and permanently stable relations"
with the Soviet Union despite past "misunderstandings and
differences," but he made it clear that such relations could not
be at the expense of Yugoslav's sovereignty or nonalinement.
Noting that there are possibilities for developing economic,
scientific, and cultural cooperation--pointedly leaving out
"political," which Brezhnev just as pointedly said "could be more
substantial and regular"--he said these relations could develop
"above all on the basis of mutual respect for independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in inter-
nal affairs..., principles embodied in the UN Charter... and deeply
embedded in Yugoslavia's entity as an independent and nonalined
country."
In effect rejecting the Soviet view of "socialist internationalism,"
Tito remarked that the current "ferment" in international relations
points up "the untenability of monopolistic positions, outdated
forms of economic and political relations." With Romanian as well as
Yugoslav interests clearly in mind, he went on call on the socialist
countries to "set an example" in international relations through
actions "in which the use of force, pressure, and interference in
internal affairs will be eliminated, while the free development
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of peoples and countries and their participation on an equal
basis in the activities of the wider international community
will be mane possible." He added pointedly: "International
cooperation cannot make progress if based on any monopoly or
negation of the legitimate interests and rights of individual
countries," and he lectured that "all countries should take
part in the affairs of the international community, irrespective
of their strength or size, since this is their inalienable
right. .. ."
Reaffirming the Yugoslav and Romanian view of European security,
Tito declared: "It goes without saying that lasting peace and
security in Europe presuppose a system of relations which insure
for all European countries full independence and inviolability
of frontiers and protection against aggression, the use of
force, pressure or the threat of force." In this context, he
went on to reaffirm Yugoslav support for a European security
conference in which "all European countries should take part
on an equal footing."
Turning to the domestic scene, Tito assured his guest that
Yugoslavia's self-management brand of socialism has been
strengthened by. the recent coiititytiorial -,ehwges and?=that.:W
party is in firm control in implementing them. During the
period of political turmoil preceding the governmental
reorganization last summer, Brezhnev had told the 24th CPSU
congress in March that "the Soviet people wanted to see
socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened and her ties with the
socialist community grow stronger."
BREZHNEV The Soviet leader remarked in his answering toast
that "we would not be realists if we did not see
that the heritage of the years when Soviet-Yugoslav relations
were seriously clouded continues to affect certain things today"
and that "the task.- facing us are not simple." Alleging that
unnamed "forces" were trying to exacerbate Yugoslav-Soviet
differences, Brezhnev sought to counter the idea that the
Soviet Union harbors aggressive intentions in the Balkans. In
line with earlier Soviet leadership statements, he said it was
these unnamed forces that "circulated the fable about a so-called
doctrine of limited sovereignty and spread rumors about Soviet
armies allegedly being prepared to move into the Balkans and
many other tales."
Insistence that the Soviet Union adheres to a policy of
noninterference has from the outset gone hand in hand with
enunciation of what has come to be known in the West as the
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doctrine of limited sovereignty. Advancing the concept in a
speech to the fifth Polish party congress on 12 November 1968,
Brezhnev declared that the socialist states stand for "strict
respect for sovereignty and nonynterference in internal affairs,"
and then went on to argue that "military aid to a fraternal
country" is justified because "when a threat to the cause of
socialism" in that country occurs, "it is no longer only a
problem for the people of that country but also a common concern
for all the socialist states." Foreign Minister Gromyko engaged
in similar semantic sleight of hhnd in his speech to the USSR
Supreme Soviet on 10 July 1969: Decrying the "slander" that
the socialist states "advocate some kind of limited sovereignty,"
he went on to argue that "the content of the term sovereignty"
is fully expressed in "the people's right to lean on the support
of their friends who are faithful to their international duty."
The most recent denial by a Soviet leader came from Kosygin in
a preelection speech on 10 June 1970, when he denounced "the
inventions concocted by the bourgeois press and radio . . .
about a rejection of other socialist countries' sovereignty."
Brezhnev thus drew on a long-standing background of Soviet
leader statements--echoed in routine propaganda--in his denial
in Yugoslavia that the Soviet Union puts limits on sovereignty.
Citing the same unnamed "forces" which he said had circulated
the "fable" about the limited-sovereignty doctrine, he derided
the view "that Yugoslavia is some sort of grey zone and that
it is 'going over to the West,'" stopping short of calling
Yugoslavia "socialist." He declared: "I do not think it is
worth wasting time refuting all these slanderous concoctions;
however, they remind us that the cause of Soviet-Yugoslav
friendship needs to be defended . . . time and time again."
He reaffirmed that "Soviet-Yugoslav" relations are based on
the 1955 and 1956 joint documents, but he in effect qualified
his support for the substance of the documents by stating that
"what matters now is how these principles, under present
conditions, can be implemented in a fuller and broader way."
He did not generalize on the principles that should govern
relations among all socialist states--the point of Tito's
remarks in the toast to which he was replying.
Addressing Yugoslav workers at a factory on 23 SepteLiber,
Brezhnev made a stronger affirmation of party equality than
was agreed to in the joint statement, declaring that cooperation
between the Soviet and Yugoslav states and parties is based on
"full equality and mutual respect." And on the sensitive issue
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of differing types of socialism, he acknowledged in that speech
that the Yugoslav variety "does not appear acceptable to the
Soviet communists . . . because we have our own traditions and
experience, and they suit both our concept of socialism and
our conditions." He went on in effect to qualify the formula
on different approaches to socialism in the joint statement,
referring to the "general laws" governing the building of
socialism without which "there can be no socialism."*
Granting that "the selection of concrete forms of organization
of social life is, however, an internal affair of each
communist party and people," Brezhnev assured the Yugoslav
workers that the Soviet Union opposes anyone's effort to
"impose his own concrete methods of development on others."
But elsewhere in the speech he came close to reasserting
the right to monitor socialism that is at the heart of the
doctrine he denied existed: Stating that the Soviet Union's
foreign political line is clear, he said "we firmly protect
the interests of socialism against all its enemies."
In concluding remarks at the airport on the 25th, Brezhnev
said "we have done some good and useful work" and pronounced the
visit "a success." The Yugoslav leader remarked less categorically
that the talks had "cleared up many things," that "the documents
adopted reflect the talks we held and much more," and that "we
have reached a united view as to what we still must do . . . ."
A brief communique on the visit issued simultaneously with the
joint statement says Tito accepted an invitation to visit Moscow
at an unspecified future date.
* He had gone on to enumerate the "laws" in addressing the
Polish party congress on 12 November 1968. Asserting the right
of socialist countries to correct deviations from "the common
laws governing socialism" wherever they may occur, he explained
that socialism can only be victorious "if the communist party, as
the guilding force of society, firmly carries through a Marxist-
Leninist policy in the development of all spheres of public life;
only if the party indefatigably strengthens the defense of the
country, the defense of its revolutionary gains; if it maintains
itself and propagates amidst the people vigilance with regard to
the class enemy, irreconcilability to bourgeois ideology; only
if the principle of social4.st internationalism is being sacredly
observed and the unity and fraternal solidarity with other
socialist countries is being strengthened."
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AFTERMATH OF THE VISIT: REASSURANCE TO MOSCOW'S BLOC-ALLIES
Brezhnev made unheralded stopovers in Budapest on 25-26 September
and in Sofia on the 26th and 27th en route home from Belgrade,
apparently to fill in his bloc allies on the Soviet interpretation
of the new Belgrade statement and the discussions with Tito.
Communiques issued after both visits were predictably vague on
the substance of the talks, recording "full identity" of views
on,"international" questions and unspecified questions relating
to the world communist movement.
Against the background of the strains in Belgrade-Sofia relations
over the perennial question of Macedonia, which has recently
resurfaced in the media of both countries, the communique on
the Sofia visit refers twice to "complete unity" between the
Soviet and Bulgarian parties. It also contains what seems a
gratuitous assurance, in view of Sofia's closeness to Moscow,
that relations between the two parties are marked by "profound
trust." There is no reference to Brezhnev's Belgrade visit in
either the Sofia or the Budapest communique.
MOSCOW Followup Soviet comment on the Brezhnev visit to
COPWIENT Yugoslavia has been restrained, pointing to the
existence of past differences and forecastinga
more "stable" basis now for the development of Soviet-Yugoslav
cooperation. The term most frequently used to characterize the
visit is "useful." A low-keyed PRAVDA editorial on the visit
on the 27th avoided the sensitive question of "limited-sovereignty,"
rather stressing Moscow's dedication to "socialist internationalism"
and cautiously describing the USSR and Yugoslavia as "two sovereign.
states" belonging to "a single sociopolitical formation." Other
Soviet comment echoed Brezhnev's 23 September remark that "the
principal thing is that our countries belong-to the same socio-
economic formation"; a 27 September domestic service report on
a Moscow meeting of the Soviet-Yugoslav commission:for scientific
and technical cooperation saw enhanced. prospects for cooperation
"in the CEMA framework" arising from the Soviet-Yugoslav joint
statement.
In routine-level radio comment, Moscow has repeated for the
domestic audience Brezhnev's remarks on the 23d about "general
laws" governing the building of socialism and has reiterated
to domestic and foreign audiences--including the Romanians--
denials of "cock-and-bull stories" about the limited-sovereignty
doctrine and Soviet readiness to move troops into the Balkans.
Moscow has been at pains to highlight Romania's favorable reaction
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to the visit, noting SCINTEIA's "satisfaction" and quoting
ROMMIA LIBERA to the effect that the visit will "make a
substantial contribution to the strengthening of European
and international security."
EAST EUROPEAN Hungary and East Germany, the two countries
COMMENTARIES whose media have been the chief purveyors of
warnings to Balkan communist countries about
trafficking with the Chinese, have been vocal in denouncing
inventions about "the so-called doctrine of limited sovereignty."
One Budapest broadcast on the 23d, to Western Europe, said that
in stressing the validity of the 1955 and 1956 Soviet-Yugoslav
declarations, "Brezhnev with a single gesture swept away the
favorite fabrication" of "imperialist propaganda" limited
sovereignty.
East German propaganda includes attacks on the West Germans as
authors of "fairy tales" about limited sovereignty. An East
German commentary by a correspondent in Belgrade on the 24th
observed that the USSR's "correct attitude" on the question of
sovereignty "has been appreciated from the Yugoslav side, and
it is to be hoped that this objective assessment will be
generally communicated." The commentary went beyond PRAVDA
and Brezhnev in observing that "Yugoslavia has its natural
hinterland in the socialist community" and that "this is
objectively independent of the degree to which the thinking
of the Yugoslav leadership goes in this direction." Echoing.
Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU congress, the commentator concluded
with a reference to Moscow's desire "to strengthen socialism"
in Yugoslavia.
Sofia's comment on the Soviet leader's Belgrade visit has been
limited. Comment from Prague and Warsaw has skirted the
issue of limited sovereignty, indulging largely in platitudes
about the failure of hostile elements to sow seeds of
dissension in the Balkans.
ROMANIAN The major available comment on the visit from
REACTION Bucharest media was contained in an inter-
national review by foreign affairs commentator
Caplescu in SCINTEIA on the 25th, largely devoted to the UN
General Assembly session. The article restructured the emphasis
in Brezhnev's factory ,3peech of the 23c , reporting that "the
Soviet leader pointed out that taking into account the existence
of general laws" of socialism "is an internal question of each
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communist party, of each people, declaring himself . . . against
the imposition from the outside of concrete development methods."
It registered Romanian "satisfaction" with the visit as in
keeping with 8U harest's advocacy of leader-to-leader discussion
of differences on a basis of equality and "regardless of the
diversity of stands," As reported by?AGERPREB,-the article did
not relate Brezhnev's visit directly to the jituation in the
Balkans but said it will serve "the general cause of peace."
Romanian coverage reflected concern not to seem to overplay the
visit. AGERPRES' review of the Romanian press on the 27th
mentioned only at the end of a long list of topics that "the
newspapers carry passages from the Yugoslav-Soviet statement
and report on Leonid Ilich Brezhnev's visits to Hungary and
Bulgaria."
9
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GERMANY
GDR. USSR SUSTAIN CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO FINNISH PROPOSAL
Very limited East German and Soviet comment on the 10 September
Finnish Government proposal to establish full diplomatic relations
with both German states continues to reflect caution. East Berlin
and Moscow both still avoid any reference to the call in the
proposal for negotiations on settlement of damages causenl by
German troops in Finland in 1944-45, and both continue to ignore
Helsinki's stipulation that its treaties with the two German
states must come into force simultaneously.* In keeping with
the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of receptivity
to the proposal on 11 September, asserting East German readiness
to enter into negotiations without: mentioning the FRG, both
have also ignored Bonn's "provisional" reply on the 27th that
the Federal Government will continue to study the proposal.
Moscow has publicized the GDR reaction but has avoided committing
itself. A favorable official Soviet attitude was made known
only indirectly in a 17 September Helsinki radio interview with
Finnish Defense Minister Gestrin after his return from a five-day
visit to the USSR, during which he met with Podgornyy. Asked if
they had discussed the proposal, Gestrin replied: "This matter
was also discussec.; President Podgornyy expressed his appreciation
for thia initiative and mentioned that the Soviet Government takes
a very positive stand on this." Moscow media gave no details on
the substance of the Podgornyy-Gestrin talk.
An approach that would apparently be congenial to Moscow and
East Berlin was enunciated at an 18-19 September plenary meeting
of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) Central Committee which,
according to the Helsinki radio, called on the Finnish Government
not to make normalization of relations with the GDR dependent on
the stand Bonn takes toward the Finnish proposal and urged that
each German state be dealt with separately. Moscow's reluctance
to get into any details of the Finnish Government proposal was
manifest in its coverage of the party plenum: Soviet reports
highlighted the SKP stand on a European security conference and
its pro-Soviet stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute, mentioning other
international issues but leaving out the question of the Finnish
proposal entirely.
" See the TRENDS of 15 September, page 21.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Two authoritative PRAVDA commentators, Yuriy Zhukov on the 14th
and Viktor Mayevskiy on the 24th, referred to the Finnish proposal
without indicating the issues involved. In a discussion of
prospects for European detente and East-West cooperation following
the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, Zhukov merely said "a
widespread response" had been aroused by the proposal to establish
diplomatic relations between "Finland and the two German states--
the FRG and the GDR--and to reach agreement on a number of other
questions." In a discussion of the Brezhnev-Brandt talks in the
Crimea, Mayevskiy remarked in a similar vein that the Finnish
"readiness to normalize fully relations with the GDR and PEG has
had widespread repercussions" and that the GDR has agreed to
begin such negotiations. Only in two routine Moscow radio
broadcasts--both in Finnish--has Moscow offered any actual
comment: One radio commentator on the 15th told Finnish listeners
the proposal was a "very important event" corresponding to the
reality of two German states; another on the 23d said Helsinki
had made another "contribution" to the improvement of European
relations in offering to establish diplomatic relations with the
GDR.
OFFICIAL GDR REPLY Following up the GDR Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement of the 11th, the GDR
Council of Ministers on the 15th officially "welcomed" the
Finnish decision "to enter into negotiations with the GDR
Government on regulating relations between the two states" and
said it had "decided to inform" the Finnish Government of the
GDR Government's "official consent" to such negotiations. NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND on the 16th buried this report at the end of an ADN
dispatch publicizing GDR endorsement of the Soviet proposal for
a world disarmament conference; the report was not "Mid ity
monitored ADN transmissions. On the 20th, however, ADN reported
that the acting head of the GDR trade mission in Helsinki had
passed on East Berlin's answer to the Finnish Government. In his
report to the SED Central Committee plenum on the 16th, Politburo
member Hermann Axen simply stated that the GDR had "welcomed" the
Finnish initiative and declared its readiness to open talks.
In the only available GDR commentary on the proposal, the East
Berlin daily NATIONAL ZEITUNG on the 17th maintained, in the
course of a discussion of the German phase of the Berlin negotia-
tions, that it represented another recognition of the postwar
"territorial changes."
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FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUSAK REPEATS STAND ON MUNICH; THIRD EXPLORATORY TALKS HELD
CPCZ General Secretary husak repeated the basic, long-standing
Czechoslovak stand on the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement
ab initio at a joint meeting of the CPCZ Central Committee and
the CSSR National Front on 17 September--in a speech containing
his first endorsement of the four-power Berlin accord signed on
the 3d and his first public discussion of FRG-Czechoslovak rela-
tions since the signing. His formulation on Munich was in
keeping with the pattern followed since the release of the
2 August communique on the Soviet bloc summit talks in the
Crimea, which modified the Czechoslovak call for West German
recognition of "the nonvalidity of the Munich agreement
ab initio and all the consequences arising therefrom" by
dropping the underlined phrase. A spate of Czechoslovak
press articles since the signing of the Berlin agreement
had either modified the formulation on the pattern of the
Crimea communique or omitted any reference to the Munich
agreement in discussing FRG-Czechoslovak relations.*
Welcoming the "agreement on West Berlin" and the effect it
may have on ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties
with Bonn, on a European security conference, and on relations
between the FRG and the socialist countries, Husak said on the
17th: "We believe these circumstances could also favorably
influence our talks with the FRG, which will be continued in
Prague at the end of this month. However, th, normalization
of our relations with the FRG requires that the FRG Govern-
ment adopt an unequivocal attitude with regard to the
nonvalidity ab initio of the shameful Munich diktat."
(Curiously, a TASS summary of Husak's speech, delivered
while Brandt was meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea, failed
to mention the remarks on Munich and the Prague-Bonn talks,
although it reported the other details of Husak's foreign
policy comments.)
In keeping with Husak's avoidance of the Munich agreement
issue in his several previous speeches following the 3 September
signing of the Berlin agreement, Strougal also ignored the
issue in an 11 September speech in which he suggested that
* See the TRENDS of 9 September, pages 25-26.
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the agreement had brought an improved atmosphere for the develop-
ment of FRG-Czechoslovak relations. Noting that the talks with
Bonn "on normalization of mutual relations" would resume at the
end of September, Strougal added: "We hope that the relatively
hopeful attitude which has prevailed in Europe in the past few
months will favorably influence the course of these negotiations
as well."
Following the Brezhnev-Brandt talks in the Crimea, the Czecho-
slovak press has repeatedly expressed hope that the Crimea talks
would help create "better conditions" for the exploratory talks
with Bonn. The Bratislava PRAVDA on the 20th hoped for a demonstra-
tion of West German "realism" in the Prague talks on the lines of
Brandt's approach in his meetings with Brezhnev. MLADA FRONTA on
the 22d looked forward to the next round in the exploratory talks
"with a certain degree of optimism." Only the Prague trade union
daily PRACE on the 25th brought up the Munich issue: It remarked
that West German elements opposing ratification of the Moscow and
Warsaw treaties--neglecting to mention that Brandt is holding up
ratification pending implementation of the Berlin accord--are in
the "front ranks of the defenders of Munich." It argued that to
recognize the Munich agreement as legal and valid under law, if
only "at the moment of the signing," is to acknowledge that
Czechoslovakia was "legally and validly smashed" and that the
suffering endured by the Czechoslovaks at the hands of the Nazis
was also legal and valid under law. Maintaining that "a
politician who wants to be regarded as realistic cannot demand
such a thing," PRACE went on to say that Brandt "has repeatedly
shown recently that he wants to be regarded as a realistic
politician," as demonstrated by his trip to the Crimea.
THIRD SESSION OF The CTK report on the third session of the
EXPLORATORY TALKS FRG-Czechoslovak "exploratory talks," held
in Prague on 27-28 September between FRG
State Secretary Frank and--participating for the first time--
Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Jiri Gotz, said the meeting
was held in "an open, businesslike atmosphere." It noted both
sides "affirmed their readiness to conclude a treaty on
normalization of relations between the two countries," adding
that a date will be set later for the next round. The West
German DPA reported on the 28th that Frank told newsmen the
next meeting wouJ"1 "probably" be held in Bonn at the beginning
of November. He also said the two sides had not found "a
common formula" on the Munich agreement, although there was
"a certain meeting of the minds."
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UNITED NATIONS
9
GROMYKO DRAWS ON STOCK THEMES IN FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW
In his annual foreign policy review before the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA), Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on
28 September draws on stock propaganda themes in stressing the
peaceful orientation of the USSR's "Leninist" foreign policy.
(While text of the speech is not yet available, it has been
summarized and excerpted by TASS.) Gromyko observes that the
general line of Soviet policy was most recently affirmed at the
24th CPSU Congress last spring when "a broad program of peace
and international cooperation, dealing with all the major facets
of the task of preserving peace," was outlined. He pays the
usual obeisance to the policy of peaceful coexistence; at a
later point in his address he stresses the importance of
preventing a new world war, noting that this task is dependent
on the state of relations among nations of all regions of the
world. And he points to the urgency of sustaining the struggle
for disarmament and against the burgeoning arms race which is
resulting in massive expenditures.
On U.S.-Soviet relations, Gromyko says that the USSR is ready to
develop contacts and to seek mutually acceptable solutions, but
will not adapt its fundamental line in the international arena
or its "firm policy of peace to various considerations of a
temporary nature." And he deplores the efforts of "powerful
states to impose their will upon those whom they consider
weaker," concluding that such actions are responsible for the
events in Indochina and the Middle East.
DISARMAMENT Gromyko follows up his letter of 6 September to
U Thant, in which he requested that the issue of
a world disarmament conference be placed on the UNGA agenda, by
introducing a draft resolution stressing the urgency of such a
conference. The draft document and Gromyko in his introductory
remarks note the desirability of agreement on the date and the
agenda for the conference before the end of 1972. (In his
24 September 1965 UNGA address Gromyko said that such a con-
ference should be convened "in the middle of 1966.") Going
beyond his letter to U Thant, Gromyko suggests that the con-
ference could be made "a permanent forum or . . . a forum
operating over a long period of time. Its sessions may be
called periodically, say once in two or three years." He urges
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that the conference be held outside the framework of the United
Nations to assure its universality. As routine propaganda has
done over the past three weeks, Gromyko assures his audience that
the convocation of the conference "should in.no way diminish the
significance of the forums and channels for disarmament negotia-
tions which are now being used," including the 26-.ration Geneva
disarmament talks.
In addition to his remarks on a world disarmament conference,
Gromyko recalls the Soviet proposal formalized last June for a
conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarma-
ment. He notes that France supported the Soviet initiative but
that "another nuclear power" took a negative position and the
other two powers contended that under these circumstances the
question of a five-power conference was academic. Gromyko does
not identify the PRC as the nuclear power taking the negative
position although Soviet propaganda has not been reticent on
this matter since release of the formal Chinese rejection of
the proposal in early August.
Gromyko mentions past arms control agreements, including the
nonproliferation treaty and the partial test-ban treaty, observing
that it would be wrong to believe that nothing has been done
to curb the arms race. He goes on to touch on partial disarmament
measures which have been advanced by the USSR, citing specifically
the call for a ban on underground nuclear tests, the creation of
nuclear-free zones "in various regions of the world," the closing
of foreign military bases, and the banning of bacteriological and
chemical weapons. Pointing to growing recognition of the need
to take measures to prevent accidental or deliberately provoked
incidents involving nuclear weapons, Gromyko notes that this
goal "is served by a corresponding accord recently achieved
between the USSR and the United States."
While Gromyko does not acknowledge that the U.S.-Soviet agreement
concerning incidents in which nuclear weapons are involved was
reached at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in
Helsinki, he follows his remarks on this agreement with a
brief discussion of SALT, now in recess until 15 November.*
For a review of Gromyko's remarks as well as of Soviet treat-
ment of the wind-up of the fifth session of SALT on 24 September,
see tbe...SALT-section. of this TRENDS.
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EUROPEAN In his rundown of developments in Europe, Gromyko
SECURITY welcomes the 3 September signing of the four-power
agreement on "West Berlin," the^.onclusion by Bonn
of treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, and the developing under-
standing between Francs and the USSR. But he goes ?.)n state
that what has been achieved in Europe and what is being done,
while substantial, by no means solve all the problems. Questions
remain which should be solved by joint efforts and for this
reason, he observes, the time is ripe for the calling of a
European security conference, as proposed by the socialist
states. As he had done in his speech before the Assembly last
year, he affirms that the United States and Canada could
participate.
Gromyko says convening of a conference would serve to hasten
the disbanding of military blocs in Europe. And he repeats
the longstanding Soviet pledge of readiness to agree "without
delay" to the liquidation of military blocs or, as a first
step, "at least their military organizations." Gromyko had
affirmed this pledge just over two months ago in a 13 July
letter to U Thant; and Brezhnev had stated it in his 30 March
report at the 24th CPSU Congress.
Gromyko briefly mentions the Soviet proposal -- surfaced by
Brezhnev in his 30 March report -- for the opening of talks on
troop and arms reductions in Europe, noting that "many agree"
to this proposal. Consistent with routine and elite propaganda
since March, he does not cite the proposal as an agenda item at
a European security conference, thus leaving the question of a
forum open.
MIDDLE Gromyko treats the Middle East situation in largely
EAST routine fashion and in far less detail than in last
year's address. He levels the customary attack against
Israel and its "patrons" who stand in opposition to the "legitimate
rights" of the Arab states and the return of the "forcibly
seized" territories. He charges that Israel is interested only
in an "annexationist peace" and notes that it has gone "too far
in baring its plans for the seizure of occupied territories to
obtain support in the international arena." And he declares
that Israel has paralyzed the Jarring mission.
Gromyko says that the United Nations is still in a position to
make a contribution to a Middle East settlement "provided it does
not limit itself to the adoption of yet another resolution
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expressing good desires without reinforcing them with effective
measures, and provided it utilizes the full scope of its
capacities" in accordance with its Charter. On the question
of assuring Israel that its security would not be endangered
by withdrawal from all occupied territories, Groniyko says that
"appropriate guarantees, including guarantees by the Security
Council, can be provided . . . . These are the strongest
guarantees conceivable in the modern world." While Gromyko
stops short of reaffirming Moscow's readiness to participate
in such guarantees, routine propaganda has noted the USSR's
willingness to take part.
MEMBERSHIP In line with current routine propaganda, Gromyko
ISSUE reaffirms Soviet support for Peking's representa-
tion in the United Nations. According to him,
the USSR has opposed "unlawful actions with regard to the
Chinese island of Taiwan," the denial of China's "lawful rights"
in the United Nations, and the "so-called two China's concept
and any concepts of 'double representation of China."' This is
.'a position of principle," he says, and the USSR will follow it
at the UNGA session.* Gromyko had called for the restoration of
the PRC's rights in the United Nations in his speech last year
and in all previous years except 1969.
In addition to his call for PRC representation in the world body,
Gromyko routinely repeats the long-standing call for the
admission of both the GDR and the FRG.
/ to
* Extensive Peking propaganda on the Chinese representation issue
focuses currently on the U.S. "maneuvering" to retain a seat for
Taiwan. The propaganda fanfare is highlighted by a widely publi-
cized PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 25 September. Taking
up the theme of the 20 August PRC Government statement on the
representation issue, it says flatly that the PRC "will absolutely
have nothing to do with the United Natioais if a situation of 'two
Chinas,' 'one China, one Taiwan,' 'the status of Taiwan remaining
to be determined,' or any other similar situation should occur."
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KOREA Judging by the TABS summary, Gromyko passed over the
Korean issue briefly. Calling for an end to inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the Korean people, he said
the United Nations should stop serving as a "screen to cover
up the foreign occupation of South Korea." His failure to make
the usual demand for the withdrawal of "all foreign troops in
South Korea" and the disbanding of UNCURK stems apparently from
the pact that this year, in a departure from past practice, the
item on the "Korean question" has been deleted from the UNGA
agenda.
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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
USSR REPORTS HELSINKI ACCORDS. GROMYKO STRESSES ABM PROBLEM
In keeping with its low-keyed.treatment of the negotiations over
the past two months, Moscow has devoted limited propaganda to the
wind-up of the fifth round of the strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT) on 24 September. Soviet media on the 24th promptly
transmitted the text of the joint communique announcing that U.S.
and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki, in accordance with the 20 May
agreement,* studied the possibility of reaching an accord on
ABM's as well as questions concerned with limiting offensive
strategic weaponry. The communique also stated that "other
related questions" were studied and that the latest rc'lnd of
talks, which began on 8 July, resulted in a clearer understanding
of questions to be solved when the negotiations resume in Vienna
on 15 November.
A brief TASS dispatch on the 24th, some six hours after the release
of the communique, noted without comment that the talks in Helsinki
resulted in two understandings: one concerning adoption by the
two sides of measures to prevent accidental or unsanctioned use
of nuclear weapons under their control, and the other concerning
measures to improve the U.S.-Soviet hotline through the use of
earth satellites. These agreements, TASS said, will be signed on
30 September when Foreign Minister Gromyko meets Secretary Rogers
in Washington. A domestic service commentary cn the 27th,
reviewing the USSR's "peace program" outlined at the 24th CPSU
Congress last spring, took brief note of the agreement aimed at
preventing accidental use of nuclear weapons but said nothing
about the one on the hotline. Soviet propaganda had ignored a
13 September New York TIMES report that U.S. and Soviet experts
at SALT had reached agreement on the handling of nuclear
accidents and the improvement of the hotline.
Gromyko, in his 28 September, speech before the United Nations
General Assembly, took note of a "recent" U.S.-Soviet agreement
concerning measures to prevent accidental or deliberately
provoked incidents involving nuclear weapons, but he did not
* Unlike the current communique, which was issued in Helsinki by
the U.S. and Soviet delegations, the 20 May agreement in Vienna
was read by President Nixon to a national radio and TV audience.
The USSR routinely carried the agreement in its newscasts, and
only on the following day did it acknowledge that the President
had announced the accord.
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acknowledge that the accord was reached at SALT. He did,
however, promptly follow these remarks with a brief discussion
of SALT, the first elite reference to the negotiations since
Brezhnev's 11 June pre-election speech. He said the negotiators
are concentrating on an agreement on ABM's, warning that if an
extension of this defensive system is not stopped now, a chain
reaction of competition between offensive and defensive weapons
will "inevitably" be triggered off. As elite spokesmen have
done in the past, Gromyko concluded that the talks must be
conducted on the basis of "equal security."
Chief Soviet negotiator Semenov, in his departure statement in
Helsinki on the 26th reported by TASS, failed to mention either
of the two agreements reached at SALT, confining himself to the
general observation that "useful work" has been carried on and
the negotiations are of "growing importance."
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JAPAN CP
JCP ENDS MOSCOW VISIT AS QUARREL WITH CCP INTENSIFIES
A joint CPSU-JCP communique, published on 28 September in PRAVDA
and AKAHATA, marked the end of a week's discussions between
delegations of the two parties. The Moscow visit was the last
leg of a six-week official trip which had already taken the JCP
delegation, led by Chairman Kenji Miyamoto, to Romania, Italy
and North Vietnam in an apparent effort to lessen the JCP'3
isolation from major communist parties amid continuing
deterioration of official relations with the CCP.
Talks between Miyamoto and Politburo member Suslov were held
from 19-26 September; Brezhnev met with the JCP delegation
on 20 September. The communique stated that the talks were
held in a "frank and comradely atmosphere," the same phraseology
used to describe talks held between the two parties last March
when the JCP decided to attend the 24th CPSU Congress in Moscow.
In keeping with the tone of recently issued joint statements
with the Romanian, Italian and Spanish communist parties, the
communique with the CPSU stresses the need for "independence,
equality of rights and noninterference in each others internal
affairs." It also calls for "joint actions against the forces
of aggression and war, and primarily against American
imperialism"--which will in turn, it is argued, serve to
strengthen "the unity of the international communist movement."
(As reported in the TRENDS last week, the communique on the
talks between the JCP and the Vietnam Workers Party failed to
mention the issue of communist unity.)
SPLIT BETWEEN Just before the JCP delegation left Tokyo on
CCP AND JCP 19 August, AKAHATA stepped up its attacks on the
CCP. On 16 August, for example, AKAHATA
complained of continuing "great-power chauvinist intervention
in the democratic movement in Japan by a certain group in the
CCP." On the 18th AKAHATA responded to the "slanderous"
charges made against the JCP by Chou En-lai in his 10 August
New York TIMES interview with James Reston and firmly argued
against Chou's assertation that the JCP was the only Japanese
opposition party refusing to recognize the danger of a revival
of militarism in Japan.
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Just one day before the JCP delegation arrived in Hanoi, AKAIIA.TA,
on 9 September, published a lengthy treatise, setting forth the
thesis that full responsibility for the deterioriation of
interparty relations rests with the CCP. The article reviewed
the beginning of the quarrel with the CCP in the spring of 1966
when PRC media began portraying the JCP as "antirevolutionary"
and a "revisionist gang" after Miyamoto refused to support a
Chinese call for a "united anti-American, anti-Soviet front"
made during talks held in February and March 1966. The CCP's
demand that "Japan's revolutionary movement take the armed
insurrectionary line and accept Mao Tse-tung's deification"
also contributed to the ideological gap which now separates the
two parties, the article declared. Not surprisingly, the article
couples its refutation of CCP charges with a vigorous defense
of the JCP's use of parliamentary means to achieve national
power and buttresses its argument by pointing to the new Allende
government in Chile.
One of the issues raised in the 9 September AKAHATA article--
Peking's support for the JCP (Left)--was underscored on
20 September when a JCP (Left) delegaiton, led by party
Chairman Masayoshi Fukuda, was feted at a Peking banquet
attended by Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao
Wen-yuan, all full politburo members.*
Reacting to this sensitive issue, AKAHATA on 23 September
published a statement released by Ichiro Sunama, JCP Presidium
member, which denounced Chou by name for meeting with "Japanese
antiparty elements, self-styling themselves the JCP (Left)."
Sunama blasted the "Fukuda faction" as a band of "blind
antiparty followers of a foreign power engaging in subversive
activities under Mao Tse-tung Thought against the Communist
Party of Japan." Sunama concluded that "it is unpardonable
big-power chauvisionistic interference toward the JCP for
Chou En-lai to invite the antiparty band of the Fukuda
faction to China."
* After ties between the CCP and JCP began to weaken in 1966,
disatisfied pro-Maoists within the Yamaguchi Prefecture branch
of the JCP organized a splinter group--the National Council of
the JCP (Left)--in 1968. AKAHATA charged this group with
"mechanistically applying Maoism to a Japanese revolution" in
an article reporting its assumption of the name JCP (Left)
in December 1969.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
YOUNG KAZAKH POET PROTESTS AGAINST CONFORMIST ATMOSPHERE
In a speech Cilivered to the Kazakh writers congress last May,
but not published until last month, a young Kazakh poet of some
renown has criticized the current atmosphere of complete
suppression of controversy in the literary field--something the
Soviet regime has worked long and hard to achieve. Rather like
Yevtushenko, who at the USSR writers congress challenged the
control of the older, conservative authors, poet 0lzhas
Suleymenov decried the efforts to censor young writers and
squelch all debate, and he called on the leaders of the writers
union "to create an atmosphere of free criticism."
Suleymenov's speech is one of only three Kazakh writers congress
speeches selected for publication in the August issue of the
unorthodox Kazakh literary journal PROSTOR--the other two being
the main report by the writers union first secretary, Anuar
Alimzhanov, and the speech of PROSTOR's liberal editor Ivan
Shukhov. Shukhov, himself a critic of dullness and conformity,
evidently singled out the speech of Suleymenov from among the
rank-and-file congress speakers in order to save his controversial
message from being silenced by the censorship. (The Kazakh press
coverage of the 26-27 May writers congress had reduced
Suleymenov's speech to two innocuous paragraphs.)
Suleymenov makes clear his preference for the period of the early
and mid-1960's before the authorities had managed to clamp on the
lid. He praises the previous heated debates over young poets
Yevtushenko, Voznesenskiy and Rozhdestvenskiy--both the criticism
and the rebuttals--as helpful to poetry, and he declares that
literature, especially poetry, "cannot exist in quietness." "I
sincerely regret that in recent years no decadent or formalist
[author] has appeared in Kazakh literature," he continues; "it
is too positive and quiet," which is "harmful" and leads to
"atrophy."
Recalling that some young Kazakh literary critics had tried to
imitate Russian critics and open sharp debates, Suleymenov says
that they were attacked so harshly that they quit literary
criticism altogether. "All it took was for a young critic to
offend some authoritative person, and he was declared a
formalist . . . and they stopped publishing him." The elders'
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power to destroy young writers has left "the mark of this fear
on all our young criticism and, c',nsequently, on literature,"
and as a result "everything here is quiet, everything is on an
even keel, everything is excellent, even the dullness."
Suleymenov also criticizes the writers' dependence on the
authorities, complaining that authors are writing not for the
reader but mainly for the "bureaucrat on whom the fate of your
book depends."
One of the best-known of current Kazakh poets, Suleymenov is no
stranger to controversy. As Alimzhanov stated in his opening
report, "His every book evokes lively debate both in our local
press and in the central press." Alimzhanov expressed,
nonetheless, his personal support for Suleymenov: "For my part,
I am an admirer of his creative work, which is always searching"
(KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 May).
PROSTOR's version of first secretary Alimzhanov's report also
contains interesting revelations about "unhealthy phenomena"
within the Kazakh union. Proclaiming that he is not afraid to
wash dirty linen in public, Alimzhanov complained that Kazakh
writers have been circulating anonymous letters containing
gossip and threats in order to settle literary feuds.
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TOPICS IN BRIEF
BRfZHNEV VISIT TO CUBA
Neither Soviet nor Cuban media have confirmed speculation on a
planned Brezhnev visit to Cuba in December, prompted by Chilean
Foreign Minister Almeyda's remark--in an interview published in
the 21 September issue of the Chilean paper ULTIMA HORA--that a
long-rumored Castro visit to Chile "must take place before
December, since Brezhnev's visit to Cuba has been announced for
that date." PRENS\ LATINA's Santiago correspondent transmitted
the text of the interview to Havana on 21 September, but PRENSA
LATINA has not distributed any report on it.
Moscow media have ignored the speculation, while Havana has
mentioned the "rumors" in a single broadcast in the domestic
service on 25 September. In his feature program built around
the device of a "letter from Freddy"--purportedly an itinerant
journalist--Havana' commentator Guido -'Garcid,.Inclan'.g;uoted "Freddy"
as writing from Miami: "The rumore,.we..hear here have it that
Fidel will go to Chile in November and that Brezhnev will visit
Cuba in December."
UK SPY CHARGES
Available Moscow media reports and comment on the British Govern-
ment's decision to expel a large number of Soviet diplomats for
spying and espionage activities have not mentioned the
25 September remarks made by Secretary Rogers to newsmen at the
United Nations to the effect that Soviet espionage activities
will be a "factor" in NATO's decision on whether to agree to a
European security conference. Several East European sources
immediately picked up the remarks made by the Secretary to
suggest that the United States was involved in a well-coordinates
plan with the British Government to impose another "obstacle"
in the way of convening a European security conference now that
the NATO "condition" of a satisfactory settlement on Berlin has
been reached.
Soviet media have charged, without referring to Rogers' remarks,
that London is seeking with its "malicious anti-Soviet provocation"
to increase tension in Europe and thus hamper the convening of a
European conference. This is an apparent response to the UK charge
in its aide-memoire of the 24th that there is % contradiction between
the level of Soviet operations against UK sec-city and the Soviet
call for a conference on European security.
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