TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010028-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 18, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
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FOREIGN
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in Communist Propaganda
DOCUMENT SERVCS BflANCH
FILE COSY
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Confidential
18 AUGUST 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 33)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by THIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 AUGUST 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . .
DRV Army Paper Broadens Polemic on Dealiigs With United States. 1
DRV Party Journal Uses Anniversaries to J'ress Polemical Lines . 4
Hanoi Publicizes DRV Leaders' Visits to Military Meetings . . . 8
DRV National Assembly Delegation to Visit USSR, East Europe . . 10
Moscow Reports DRV Polemical Article, Assails PRC Policies . 10
USSR Announces "Recent" New Agreement on Aid to DRV . . . . . . 12
PRC Ignores DRV Polemic, Repeats Support for Peace Proposal . . 13
Communist Delegates at Paris Urge U.S. Withdrawal Deadline . 13
Hanoi and Front Media Comment on South Vietnam Elections . . . 15
DTV Scores U.S. Strikes in DMZ, Threats Against North Vietnam . 17
CHINA FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Peking Urges Flexible Tactics to Isolate "Principal" Foe . . . 19
CHINA AND BURMA
Peking Gives Correct, Restrained Treatment of Ne Win Visit . . 23
BCP's Clandestine Radio Denounces Ne Win for Visiting PRC . . . 23
KOREA
DPRK and ROK Agree on Red Cross Contacts on Divided Families . 27
Peking Backs Korean Moves, Signs Economic Agreement With DPRK . 29
Moscow Minimizes Korean Contacts, Marks Liberation Anniversary. 30
SOVIET BLOC AND BALKANS
Moscow Warns Against Peking's "Hypocritical" Tactics . . . . . 33
Soviet Allies Stress Impermissibility of Neutralist Course . . 34
Budapest, Prague Pick Up Rumors of Chou Visit to Balkans . . . 35
Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania Respond to Soviet Bloc Pressures . 36
PRC Military Delegation Stops in Bucharest on Way to Tirana . . 38
Moscow Discusses West Berlin Link to Treaty Ratification . . . 40
GDP Backdates Brezhnev Doctrine to iJuilding of Berlin Wall . . 43
(Continued)
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18 AUGUST 1971
C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
Joint Statement, Rapid Treaty Approval Follow Groxyko Visit . . 45
Mutual Consultation Provision Stressed in South Aoyan Context . 46
East European Press Sees Treaty Aimed at Pakistan, PRC . 48
Peking,-Moscow Give Sparse Coverage to Pakistan Events . 49
AFRICA
Moscow, East Berlin Attack Banda Visit to South Africa
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Articles Continue to Stress Steel Priority Over Electronics . . 53
New Party Committee Elected fcr Ali Area in Tibet . . . . . 5;
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
18 AUGUST 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 AUGUST 1971
Moscow (3011 iterus)
Peking (1128 items)
CEMA Council Session (6%)
14%
Domestic Issues
(30%)
32%
USSR-Indian Treaty (0.4%)
12%
Indochina
(15%)
25%
China (6%)
6%
[Sihanouk in DPRK
(1%)
14%]
[Sino-U.S.
Relations (3%)
3%]
DPRK Economic
(--)
3%
DPRK Liberation
(--)
4%
Delegation in PRC
Anniversary
Ne Win in PRC
(2%)
3%
Indochina
(5%)
4%
PRC UN Seat
(6%)
2%
Middle East
(2%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecoxt commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
anent or -party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in pr-entheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
i other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi's pole.:.lcizing in the wake of Sino-U.S. moves to improve
bilateral relations took on new dimensions with the lengthy
3 August article published in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
under the pseudonym Chien Thang (The Victor). Expounding the
theoretical foundation for Hanbi's polemic, the article spelled out
a comprehensive indictment of all who would moderate their "struggle"
against the United States or shift the focus of that struggle from
the "main enemy." Such a line of argumentation, in some ways
reminiscent of polemics against revisionism in the Khrushchev era,
has not been pressed in Hanoi propaganda in recent years.
Unlike recent North Vietnamese comment directed against Peking's
flirtation with Washington, the Chien Thang article was not broad-
cast by Hanoi radio. And at sharp variance with the normal practice
of simultaneous publicity for items carried in more than one DRV
propaganda channel, VNA transmitted lengthy extracts eight days after
the artl^te appeared in the press. The belated VNA release suggests
that there may have been debate within the DRV leadership over further
dissemination of the article. And the timing of the release--on
11 August--suggests that the favorable reaction to Sino-U.S. develop-
ments from North Korea's Kim Il-song, normally the most militant of
revolutionaries, may have been a factor in the decision: At a
6 August rally for Sihanouk, Kim hailed President Nixon's planned
Peking visit as "a great victory" for the Chinese people and world
revolutionary forces. NCNA carried the text of Kim's remarks, which
Li Hsien-nien on the 9th called "an important speech."
Hanoi has also pressed its case, including the claim that a major aim
of the Nixon Doctrine is to split the socialist camp, in broadcasts on
the 15th of an editorial from the August issue of the party journal
HOC TAP keyed to the 26th anniversary of the August revolution and DRV
National Day.
Soviet propagandists continue to assail Peking's Indochina policies in
connection with Sino-U.S. developments, and on the 17th Moscow broad-
cast extracts of the 3 August Chieng Thang article in its Mandarin
service. The extracts reflected the essence of the article's polemic
against any relaxation in the anti-U.S. struggle but omitted passages
that could be aimed in part at Moscow.
DRV ARMY PAPER BROADENS POLEMIC ON DEALINGS WITH UNITED STATES
The theoretical base for Hanoi's polemic against moderating the
struggle against U.S. imperialism was laid in the Chien Thang article
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18 AUGUST 1971
in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.* Pointedly titled "The War in Vietnam and
the U.S. Imperialist3' Counterrevolutionary Global Strategy,"
the 3 August article set out to demonstrate that Vietnam is a
truly revolutionary country which thoroughly understands and has
continued to struggle against U.S. imperialism. And it spelled
out a comprehensive indictment against all who would moderate
the "struggle" with the United States or shift the focus of the
struggle from this "main enemy." The polemical nature, of the
article is pointed up by such devices as the use of quotation
marks to set off phrases that expresa offending concepts, with
the sources of the quotations left unspecified. Thus Chien
Thang declared at the outset that obviously the revolutionary
struggle in the world over the past years "has not 'cooled
down'" and that "the U.S. policy of 'reconciliation' with some
countries in some places is but a very perfidious ploy aimed
at damming up the offensive position of the revolutionary ftrces."
Defending Hanoi's right to ascertaii. the real main enemy of world
revolution, Chien Thang in effect dep,'cted the Vietnamese party
as a rival to the Chinese and others formulating communist
theory. He prefaced his discussion wi.a the reminder that
Vietnam has confronted "the U.S. imperialists" for.mcre than a
quarter of a century and therefore "is one of the countries
which has the best --onditions to shed light . . . on a number of
burning questions of the present epoch." Later, in the same
nationalistic vein, he maintained that the Vietnamese party's
early identification of the United States as the main enemy had
proved its "prescience and political insight" and that "the
Vietnamese people have never been taken by surprise by the U.S.
strategic maneuvers."
Chien Thang's discussion of U.S. imperialism was couched in
pointedly polemical terns. For example, he caustically declared
that "the target of the revolution in a given historic period is
an objective reality which one can neither invent nor recognize
or reject as one wishes." He also cited the successful Vietnamese
struggle against the United States to discount the views of .
* The Chien Thang pseudonym hss appeared periodically on articles
in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as,vell-va C.on articles published.-3ointiy.i-1-`-
in the army paper and the party raper NHAN DAN--for example, a
2 August article this year and a.}.o May 1969 article on the war.
Prior to the current article, all known writings attributed to
Chien Thang have dealt only w.:.th military questions.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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"a number of people" who "previously . . . thought the United
States could be defeated only by great countries." Similarly,
he claimed that the "victorious fight" of the Vietnamese has
"overturned" viewpoints on the balance of forces held by "many
countries and many military strategists."
Chien Thang repeated the warning--conveyed in Hanoi commentaries
in the wake of the announcement of the President's planned visit
to Peking--that the basic policy of the Nixon Doctrine aims at
dividing the socialist camp, and he went on at length to cite
U.S. "policies and maneuvers" toward this end such as the
expansion of economic, scientific, technical, and cultural contacts,
the stirring up of nationalism, and the propagation of "the
signboards of 'negotiation' and 'East-West detente."' He claimed
that these policies seek to divide the socialist camp, create
obstacles for revolutionary forces, and "minimize and prevent the
influence of the socialist camp upon the national liberation
movement."
Making clear Hanoi's concern that it is Vietnam which has the
most to lose from socialist disunity, Chien Thang later charged
that "Nixon has tried his hardest to divide the nations, restrict
and check the socialist countries' assistance to the resistance
war of the Vietnamese and Indochinese people in order to weaken
the revolutionary forces in Indochina, thereby discouraging the
'opponents' and creating a strong position for the U.S.
imperialists." The importance of other socialist countries to
the Vietnam war was underlined in another passage citing the
socialist camp as first among the factors which had compelled
the United States to limit the use of its forces in Indochina
as well as "the scale of war expansion and measures for
conducting it."
Chien Thang mentioned both the Soviet Union and China by name in
his discussion of the Nixon Administration's policies toward
communist countries, observing that the President must admit the
economic and military growth of the socialist countries, "especially
that of the Soviet Union and China (which Nixon names 'two communist
powers')." Later, in a discussion of U.S. policies in Europe and
Asia, Chien Thang pointedly endorsed the Soviet military posture
in Europe while ignoring China in his remarks on Asia. Thus he
asserted that the United States has concentrated its forces in
Europe because there "they have to confront the Warsaw bloc--
specifically Russia, their tough opponent, a powerful socialist
country that possesses colossal economic and national defense
potentials and that is superior to the United States in various
fields."
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Chien Thang said that the United States is confronted by the
"liberation struggle" in Asia and "bogged down" in the Vietnam
war and then went on to portray the "great powers" in Asia as
potential targets of U.S. domination. Saying President Nixon
has remarked that Asia has been subject to the "influence of
most great powers," he asserted that "the Americans therefore
have endeavored to dominate the other powers in order to
maintain their strong position and interest."
DRV PARTY JOURNAL USES ANNIVERSARIES TO PRESS POLEMICAL LINES
The themes prominent in propaganda over the past month bearing
on Sino-U.S. relations are also pressed in the editorial in the
August issue of the party journal HOC TAP, ostensibly marking
the 26th anniversary of the August revolution and DRV National
Day. It is unusual for these anniversaries to be marked
editorially in HOC TAP except on decennials or quinquennials,
and such an editorial w.,uld normally appear in the September
issue of the journal, not the August one.*
Hanoi radio broadcast the text of the editorial on the 15th,
both in its domestic service and in Vietnamese to South Vietnam,
and on the 18th VNA carried lengthy extracts. In addition to its
unexpected appearance in a routine anniversary year, its unusual
timing, and the publicity for it in various Hanoi media, the
editorial was exceptional in that its content did not follow the
pattern of past HOC TAP anniversary editorials, which have
reiterated standard North Vietnamese propaganda themes. Not
only did this one press Hanoi's polemic on the issue of relations
with the United States, but it omitted some basic themes of recent
DRV comment.,failing to even mention the 19th Central Committee
plenum and omitting the now standard description of military
victories earlier this year as being of "strategic significance."
* An editorial marking last year's 25th anniversary appeared in
the September HOC TAP. It was largel; internally oriented and
its attack on Victnamization was largely pro forma, with no
reference to the policy being the first test of the Nixon
Doctrine. The last previous HOC TAP editorial on the anniversary
had appeared in 1967--also in the September issue. An editorial
did appear in the August issue on the 20th anniversary in 1965,
and the September issue that year had a,.Zlicles by Ho and Truong
Chinh in addition to the usual text of Phan Van Dong's National
Day address.
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Pursuing the recent polemic, the editorial stressed the theme
of DRV independence and self-reliance and said that the Vietnamese
are accomplishing "their very important and glorious historic
mission of defeating the international gendarme in the present
era." Also like the other recent propaganda, it said that tha
Nixon Doctrine is aimed at "sowing disunity among the socialist
count'?es, pitting one component of the socialist camp
against another." It added that the Nixon Administration,
faced with "serious defeat" from a small country, "has stepped
up its perfidious diplomatic activities in the hope of
pressuring our people into accepting a solution that is
advantageous to the United States." And in even more pointed
though still implicit reference to the President's China
policy, it brought up the PRG peace proposal: "There is no
alternative but to talk directly with the genuine representatives
of the people of South and North Vietnam. Only those who are
fighting the Americans can raise the decisive voice regarding
the future of their own country."
Like the Chien Thang article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, the editorial
pictured the Vietnamese as in the forefront of the anti-imperialist
struggle and said that in "fighting and defeating the Americans
we have contributed toward protecting the socialist camp." It
also suggested that not all communist countries may have
appreciated this;
The Vietnamese people have had the great honor of
being the shock forces standing on the frontline
of the world peoples' struggle against U.S.
imperialism. The Vietnamese people's just under-
taking has enjoyed the sympathy and support of
ell progressive mankind. Many brotherly parties
have asserted that their attitude toward the
Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. national salvation
resistance is a touchstone of proletarian
internationalism . . . .
While insisting that the Vietnamese have relied mainly on their
own strength, the editorial acknowledged the "moral and material
support" from the socialist countries, naming the Soviet Union
and China. It went on to say that the Vietnamese have maintained
a policy of international unity, which it termed one of the
victorious factors of the Vietnamese revolution.
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FAILURE TO REFER The absence of any reference to the 19th
TO 19TH CC PLENUM Central Committee plenum, publicized at
the beginning of February this year, is
the more notable in view of the editorial's detailed recollection
of the September 1960 Third VWP Congress decisions in connection
with the two strategic missions of the revolution. It recalled
that the congress specified them as 1) to carry out the socialist
revolution in the North and 2) to liberate the South. Without
attribution, the editorial went on to quote other passages from
the congress resolution, including the assertion that the
"revolutionary missions in the two parts of the country are
carried out according to two different strategies."*
The editorial also recalled that after further U.S. intervention
in the war in 1965, the party pointed out that "resistance" was
the duty of people throughout the country and spelled out the
relationship between the northern "rear" and southern "front."
HOC TAP stressed that the "key to the success" of the anti-U.S.
struggle is the setting forth of the two strategic tasks and
correct delineation of the relationship between them.
HOC TAP's failure to mention the 19th plenum in this context
is puzzling, since the plenums decision on the party's
current tasks have been widely quoted elsewhere. The text
of the plenum resolution has never been released, but the
February HOC TAP editorial o'i the plenum, to cite one example,
described the anti-U.S. resistance as the common task of the
nation and the "'foremost task." Defining the tasks of the
South and the North, the February editorial said the South was
ad-ancing to win new victories while the North was strengthening
economic and national defense forces in order to defeat the U.S.
"aggressors" by fully and promptly meeting each need of the war.
Truong Chinh spoke of the different strategies in clearly
polemical terms in his major Marx anniversary speech in August
1968. He said that different conditions called not only for
different tactics but, more importantly, for "different
strategies for revolution in the two parts of the country.
If one fails to recognize this point, he cannot understand
either the spirit of the political platform of the NFSLV or
very realistic matters such as why the NFLSV has set forth the
slogan 'all for the frontline, all for victory' and why, in
the North, our party has set forth the slogan 'all to defeat
the American aggressors.'"
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NO REFERENCE TO 1971 The editorial in effect downgraded the
"STRATEGIC VICTORIES" importance of communist military
achievements this year in two separate
passages. In tracing the history of the revolution it listed as
"important milestones" the general uprising in late 1959 and
1960, the Binh Gia victory in late 196k, and the Tet offensive
in 1968, but it did not go on to cite "victories" this year,
likened to the Tat offensive in other Vietnamese communist
propaganda.* And in its sole reference to the communist
successes in Cambodia and against Lam Son 719, the editorial
failed to apply to them the standard label "strategic"
victories, instead calling them "fatal blows" at Vietnamization.
* See the 4 August TRENDS, page 15.
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HANOI PUBLICIZES DRV LEADERSI VISITS TO MILITARY MEETINGS
Several app8arances of fop DRV leaders at military meetings
have been publicized by Hanoi in the last month or more, the
latest one--noted in a 16 August report by VNA and Hanoi
radio--being a "recent" visit by Truong Chinh to a "course
for high- and middle-ranking cadres of the Vietnam People's
Army." On 14 August Hanoi mentioned a visit to naval units
by Pham Van Dong, and on 3 and 20 July it announced tLr.t
Le Duan had v' sited artillery troops and a military cadres
conference.
The radio account of Truong Chinh's visit to the course
for army cadres said he was accompanied by Col. Gen. Van
Tien Dung, the VPA chief of staff; Maj. Gen. Le Quarg Dao,
deputy director of the VPA's General Political Department;
and Maj. Gen. Vuong Thus, Vu, deputy chief of staff of the
VPA. There is no known text of Truong Chinh's remarks,'
which appear from the VNA and radio accounts to have pressed
themes prominent in the recent Hanoi polemical comment
emphasizing DRV sovereignty, independence, and self-rell.ance.
He was said to have told the army cadres that the Vietnamese
people are "foiling" Vietnamization and the global strategy
of the United States in Vietnam and to. have termed
Vietnamization, the application of the Nixon Doctrine in
Vietnam, "an extremely wicked and perfidious scheme" that
is doomed to defeat. He stated that the VWP, pursuing "a
correct and sovereign line," has led the revolution "to
overcome untold difficulties and hardships," and he asserted
that North Vietnam "has always relied mainly on its own
strength" while "trying its best to win the great assistance
of the socialist and friendly countries." Noting that the
Vietnamese people are carrying out the two "strategic tasks"
of resistance and building socialism, he recalled that the
19th Plenum of the Central Committee pointed out that
"resisting the U.S. aggression and saving the country is
the primary task" at present.
* VNA's review of the Hanoi press for 17 August led off with
a reference to a "report" on Truong's visit--presumably the
VNA report transmitted on the 16th.
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The brief report on 20 July of remarks by Le Duan on his visit
to the military cadres conference, where he was accompanied by
Defense Minister Giap, Van Tien Dung, Song Hao, and other
members of the Central Military Party Committee, had seemed
more routine. Le Duan was quoted as saying that the Nixon
Doctrine and Vietnamization "have'met with continuous failures
and increasing difficulties" and that the Administration "has
deceived public opinion while continuing its adventurous
acts." He urged the armed forces and people "to become
extremely vigilant." The 3 July report of Le Duan's "recent"
visit to artillery troops quoted him as praising their
important role in the armed forces and as urging them "to
review their precious lesson and to learn from the experiences
in the tactical, technical, and organizational fields in order
to better train the gunners, to build the artillery force
into an ever more powerful force." He told the troops they
must be both red and expert.
Pham Van Dong's visit to the naval units, according to the
14 August Hanoi reports, was in connection with the
observance of the 5 August anniversary of the navy. The
reports said Dong praised the navy's achievements and went
on to urge the units to "clearly realize the responsibilities
and tasks of our people's armed forces in the present
situation." Stressing that the United States is being
defeated but is "stubbornly struggling," he stated that
the armed forces and people must be "extremely vigilant"
and must raise their determination to fight and win. In
this context he called on the navy units to'step up their
studies and improve themselves in every field.
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DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION TO VISIT USSR. EAST EUROPE
VNA on 17 August publicized a DRV National Assembly Standing
Committee communique of that date announcing the composition
of an assembly delegation, headed by Hoang Van Hoan, which
would "pay friendship visits to four brotherly socialist
countries"--the USSR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia--at
the invitation of those countries' legislative bodies. Hanoi
radio or the 18th announced that the delegation left that day,
having ' 'n seen off by Standing Committee chairman Truong
Chinh and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh.
Hoang Van Hoan also headed a National Assembly delegation last
year which went on a similar tour of Bulgaria, East Germany,
Albania, and Hungary--the East European countries not included
in this year's itinerary. Whereas this year's announcement
indicates the delegation will make an official visit to Moscow,
last year the delegation merely had stopovers in the Soviet
as well as the Chinese capitals.
Plans for the 1970 visit were announced by a National Assembly
Standing Committee communique on 11 June, but the delegation's
composition was not revealed until its departure from Hanoi
on 23 June. The itinerary of the 1970 tour was not announced
in advance. A NHAN DAN editorial on 24 June 1970 described
the delegation's tour as "an event of important significance
for the further consolidation and development of the existing
relations of friendship between the DRV National Assembly and
people and the national assemblies and peoples of the brother
countries."*
MOSCOW REPORTS DRV POLEMICAL ARTICLE, ASSAILS PRC POLICIES
BROADCAST OF Beginning with the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial
CHIENG TI-IANG which first blasted the Nixon Doctrine for its
alleged aim of "dividing" the socialist countries,
Soviet media have reported in some fashion much of Hanoi's
propaganda polemicizing against Sino-U.S. developments.** And on
* See the TRENDS of 26 August 19'(0, pages 14-19, for a review of
the tour.
+-* For example, the 19 Jiily 'NHAN' DAN "editorial was, 'reprinted tex-
tually in NEW TIMES No. 31, in addition to earlier summaries by TASS
and Mcacow radio. The editorial in the 20 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
was excerpted in Moscow's Mandarin-language broadcasts, and the
22 July NHAN DAN ediiorial'wds summarized by Moscow radio in its
foreign languages, including Mandarin and Vietnamese.
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17 August Moscow radio in Mandarin carried extracts--some 1,000
out of 7,000 words--of the 3 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article
by Chien Thang.
Mc.zcow's extracts of the Chien Thang article include the essence
of his polemic against any relaxation of the "struggle" against
the United States. Thus, for example, the broadcast includes
his attack on the view that the revolutionary struggle has
"'cooled down"' and his claim that U.S. moves toward reconcilia-
tion with some countries are a ploy to obstruct revolutionary
forces. However, the excerpts do not include passages which
could be, in part, aimed at the Soviets: omitted are Chien
Thang's references to "people" who incorrectly held that the
United States could only be defeated by "great countries,"
and his observation that Vietnamese victories had overturned
viewpoints on the balance of forces held by "many countries and
many military strategists."
The Moscow broadcast also truncates Chien Thang's most detailed
discussion of the Nixon Doctrine's policy of dividing the
socialist camp. It omits a reference to President Nixon's
recognition of the military and economic strength of the USSR
and China as well as Chien Thang's castigation of the President
for holding up "the signboards of 'negotiation' ar.1. 'East-West
detente'" in order to realize his aims.
OTHER MOSCOW Continuing criticism in Soviet media of Peking's
PROPAGANDA Indochina policies in connection with
President Nixon's planned visit to China
includes TASS and Moscow radio reports on 13 and 14 August of
the U.S. CP organ DAILY WORLD's comments on Chou En-tai's
interview with the New York TIMES' James Reston.- According to
the Moscow radio report, broadcast in Mandarin, the DAILY
WORLD sees the interview as confirming the fears of those who
believe that the trip is aimed in part at scuttling the Paris
talks.
The broadcast notes the paper's further comment that the least
Chou could have done was to demand that the U.S. stop "sabotaging"
the Paris talks, make it plain that a "normalization" of China-
U.S. relations requires restoration of peace in Vietnam on the
basis of the PRG's seven points, and demand a U.S. withdrawal.
A Radio Peace and Progress Mandarin-language commentary on the
14th once again criticizes China for failing to acknowler?ge
Soviet aid and for trying to make the Chinese people believe
that the Soviet Union is "selling out."
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USSR ANNOUNCES "RECENT" NEW AGREEMENT ON ATO TO DRV
TASS reported tersely in an English-language item on 18 August
that "Soviet Vietnamese talks held in Moscow of late were
followed by the signing of agreements" on additional aid "to
strengthen the DRV defense potentialities." VNA has not yet
mentioned the agreements. TASS did not indicate the dates of
the talks or of the signing and did not name any of the
participants on either side except Vice Premier Novikov, who
it said "attended" the signing ceremony. Novikov had normally
signed the annual USSR-DRV aid agreements in the past; the
most recent one--on 23 October 1970--was signed by Vice Premier
Tikhonov.
The motives for Moscow's secretiveness about the circumstances
surrounding the latest agreements are unclear, but TASS'
failure to give any dates may have been contrived to obscure
the length of the interval between the talks and the signing
of the agreements that "followed" them. Although the brief
TASS report did not refer to "supplementary" aid, the new
accordaa may include a counte -part of the protocol on PRC
supplementary military aid to North Vietnam signed in Peking
on 4 July by PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Yen Chung-chuan and
DRV Vice Defence Minister Tran Sam, who headed a DRV military
delegation. VNA's report of that protocol--four days after the
fact--was Hanoi media's first mention of the military delegation's
activities over the preceding month, which had not emerged clearly
from NCNA's reports.
NCNA's reports had, however, revealed that the Tran Sam delegation
was in Europe before it signed the protocol in Peking on 4 July.
The first Chinese report of its activities, a 9 June NCNA account
of a Peking banquet honoring both it and a VWP delegation led by
Le Thuc Tho, noted that the "Vietnamese comrades" had stopped
over en route "for a visit abroad." On 11 June NCNA said both
delegations had left that day "to visit Europe." Le Due Tho's
delegation attended the East German party congress, after which
Tho went on to Paris to resume his post as adviser to the DRV
delegation at the peace talks; but Tran Sam's military delegation
received no further publicity until 24 June, when NCNA noted that
it had arrived in Peking that day on "a friendly visit to China."
The grout departed for home on 5 July after signing the protocol.
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PRC IGNORES DRV POLEMIC, REPEATS SUPPORT FOR PEACE PROPOSAL
Peking has continued to ignore Hanoi's polemicizing about the
correct way to deal with U.S. imperialism,* but it has periodically
repeated its support for the PRG's seven-point proposal. For
example, a 13 August Peking domestic service commentary repeated
that the Chinese government and people "resolutely and completely
support" the PRG initiative. The commentary also cited evidence
of worldwide endorsement of that proposal--from Cuba, Algeria,
the UAR, Sudan, Chile, and Yugoslavia as well as from the Asian
communist countries.
Again calling the proposal "a new and significant effort," the
commentary chastised the United States for refusing to respond
to it while "intensifying its military actions," instigating
rumors about holding a new Geneva conference, and singing the
"old tune" of implementing a cease-fire throughout Indochina.
NCNA also transmitted the text of the RGNUC-DPRK joint statement
on Sihanouk's visit to North Korea, including its endorsement
of the PRG's 1 July proposal.
COM+AVIST DELEGATES AT PARIS URGE U.S. WITHDRAWAL DEADLINE
Preoccupied with attacks on the Nixon Doctrine since the President's
announcement of his planned trip to China, Hanoi media give minimal
attention to the Paris talks. There are still some pickups of
favorable world reaction to the PRG's 1 duly seven-point peace proposal,
and LPA on the 17th carried PRG President Hunyh Tan Phat's "recent"
PRENSA LATINA interview in which he noted the worldwide 'harm welcome,
approval and support" accorded the proposal.
At Paris in an unusually brief session on 12 August, the communist
delegates continued to press for serious negotiations on the part of
the United States and a positive U.S. response to the seven-point
proposal. PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and ?)RV delegate Phan Hien
* Peking has ignored the flurry of Hanoi press comment since the
15 July announcement of the President's plan to visit China. However,
NCNA did carry the text of the 21 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement
which included the charge that the United States in an attempt to
pressure the Vietnamese people was resorting to "insidious tricks" to
sow divisions among the socialist countries.
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urged that the United States set a troop withdrawal deadline and
cease all support to the Thieu administrLcion. (VNA said DRV
delegation head Xuan Thuy was absent from the session,* but the
DRV press spokesman in the post-session press briefing said he
was "slightly indisposed." It was thus left unclear whether
Thuy was ill or whether he was indeed boycotting the session in
the absence of a chief U.S. delegate. Vietnamese media have yet
to mention the appointment of Ambassador William Porter to
succeed Ambassador Bruce.)
Speaking first, Mme. Binh scored the .'Tixon Administration for
"bragging that it is actively negotiating" at Paris while
"eluding a serious response" to the peace initiative. She again
addressed the issue of the upcoming elections in South Vietnam
and even more harshly charged U.S. interference: According to
VNA, she said that while the United States "has ceaselessly spoken
of its fence-sitting position regarding the upcoming puppet"
presidential election in October, the U.S. Ambassador is "actually
orchestrating and masterminding" the election in order to keep
Thieu in power.
Both of the communist delegates scored alleged recent U.S. war
activities in the Indochina arena. Mme. Binh denounced the
Administration for claiming that the war is ending and U.S.
troops "are going to stand down from their combat role," while
U.S. and puppet troops are "continuir; terror raids against the
people."
Charging that the Nixon Administration "is talking peace "but
continues to make war," DRV delegate than Hien concentrated his
fire on various U.S. activi':ies in South V1el;nam, Laos, and
Cambodia and against the DRV's "sovereignty and security."
Like last week, the VNA account again dismisses the statements
of the U.S. and GVN delegates in one sentence, saying that they
"continued to stick to their absurd stand as before." There is
no acknowledgment that Ambassador Habib took exception to the
communist charge that the United States has failed to give a
serious response to the PRG proposal and that he again asked for
clarification of its ambiguities. Nor is there any mention that
both allied delegates again pressed the proposal for a cease-fire
in place.
* Nguyen Minh Vy, deputy head of the DRV delegation, left Paris
for Hanoi with Le Due The last month.
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HANOI AND FRONT MEDIA COMMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS
The main thrust of the continuing Vietnamese communist comment
on the upcoming South Vietnamese lower house and presidential
elections is that Thieu will successfully "rig" the elections
with the support of the United States. But two Liberation
Radio broadcasts, on 15 and 16 August, raise the possibility
that Thieu's efforts can be thwarted. Other propaganda takes
note of reports that Thieu's only opponent, Duong Van Minh,
may withdraw from the election and claims that Washington is
attempting to forestall such a development. Comment also
continues to speculate that Nguyen Cao Irv, having failed to
qualify as a presidential candidate, may attempt a coup.
The 15 August Liberation Radio commentary declared that the
present situation is not favorable for Thieu to "realize his
fraudulent designs as he did in 1967." "Our compatriots,"
it asserted, are determined to check these maneuvers and
create conditions to use their votes "to discard the extremist,
bellicose, U.S. lackeys" in the coming elections and to support
"those people of good will" who will strive for independence,
democracy, peace, and a better life. In the same vein, an
article attributed to Ngoc Phu, broadcast by Liberation Radio
on the 16th, appealed to the people to "correctly use their
democratic right to vote in order to foil Thieu's szheme in
the election" to the lower house. It observed that in so doing
our people will have more favorable conditions to further
isolate" Thieu in the coming presidential election.
Comment claims that the United States is concerned about
Thieu's heavy-handed dealings with his opponents and speculates
that Ambassador Bunker's consultations in Washington during the
second week of August were prompted by this concern. A
Liberation Radio commentary on the 17th credits the United
States with spreading a rumor that it would "cut its military
and economic aid and would withdraw all U.S. troops from South
Vietnam by the end of this year if Thieu did not agree to
renounce his intention to exert pressure on and to eliminate
all opponents in order to be the only candidate in the forth-
coming election."
Communist media have taken note of demands by opponents of the
Thieu regime that Duong Van Minh withdraw from the presidential
race because of Thieu's alleged rigging of the voting. Both
Hanoi and the Front reported on 12 August that this demand was
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voiced at a meeting of opposition groups outside the An Quang
Pagoda on the 10th. The reports also note that Ngo Ba Thanh,
leader of the Women's Movement for the Right to Live, addressed
the meeting, denouncing Thieu's maneuvers. The possibility of
Minh withdrawing was r.lso raised in a Liberation Radio commentary
on the 11th which remarked that he had not yet decided whether
to take such an action. The commentary, which recalled Minh's
role as the leader of the coup which ousted Ngo Dinh Diem, cited
the BBC as observing that Washington wishes Minh to run in the
election in order to strengthen Thieu's victory.
Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the 14th broadcast accounts of
an AFP report that Duong Van Minh met on the 12th with U.S.
Deputy Ambassador Berger to show him "Thieu'c secret
instructions to province chiefs" delineating what must be done
to "prepare for the fraudulent elections." VNA on the 12th
had quoted Minh as saying that his aides were holding "secret
documents, including Thieu's instructions to the provincial
governors to paralyze all activities of the 'opposition groups."'
Communist media continue to raise questions about possible
action by Nguyen Cao Ky since he failed to qualify as a
presidential candidate. The Saigon government's order
restricting air flights over the capital is said to be related
to Thieu's fears of a possible coup, and a Libere+ion Radio
commentary on the 11th, speculating that Icy would lead a coup,
remarked that Diem also forbade planes from flying over Saigon
"yet this order did not save him." It added that "Thieu's
order is one thing and the airmen's loyalty to him is another
thing."
Hanoi and Front media also raise the possibility, as they had
earlier, that Ky has documents he may make public to condemn
Thieu. A 12 August VNA item referred specifically to a "black
book" denouncing Thieu which it said Icy was preparing to
publish. On the 14th LPA quoted a Saigon paper as claiming
on 9 August that Fly woulC soon publish this "black book," which
would include "many secrets related to the 'land to the tillers
law' and Thieu's personal affairs."
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DRV SCORES J.S. STRIKES IN DMZ. THREATS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
In the latest in its series of protests against U.S. bombings of
North Vietnamese territory, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
on 16 August routinely denounced U.S. activities against the DRV.
But it is left to subsequent radio and press comment to hint that
recent U.S. strikes in the demilitarized zone were prompted by
enemy activity.
The foreign ministry spokesman scored the United States for
using B-52's on the 15th against Huong Lap village, described as
being north of the 17th parallel and within the demilitarized
zone. The spokesman further charged that on the same day, U.S.
planes "bombed and strafed" Vinh Thuy village and Ho Xa township
in the Vinh Linh area, causing "heavy damage to the local people."
The protest claimed that prior to these actions the United
States "on many occasions" from 11 to 15 August had launched
artillery attacks from positions south of the 17t} parallel
against Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, and Vinh Son villages in the
DMZ and against Vinh Thach and Vinh Thuong villages.
The protest, in language reminiscent of that used at the time of
the ARVN invasion of southern Laos and massing of U.S. troops
below the DMZ, scored the U.S. military high command in Saigon
for "brazenly advancing arguments aimed at preparing public
opinion for their scheme to step up the war against the DRV."*
In a commentary on the 17th pegged to the foreign ministry
spokesman's statement, Hanoi radio explained that because the
United States has "recently received painful blows on the
southern battlefield," it has "wantonly and successively
conducted air bombings and strafings against DRV territory."
An 18 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary broadcast by Hanoi
* This seems to allude to a statement issued by General Abrams'
headquarters on the 15th which viewed with "deep concern" North
Vietnamese activity along the DMZ and threatened retaliatory
action. The U.S. command also announced a U.S. strike inside
North Vietnam that day--after enemy antiaircraft fired on a
reconnaissance plane--35 miles southeast of Dong Hoi, approximately
five miles above the DMZ. On the 17th, the U.S. command acknowledged
that B-52 bombers were striking targets inside the southern half of
the DM7, and that the missions would continue whenever allied forces
along the DMZ were endangered.
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radio that day puts recent DRV complaints against U.S. bombing
in the DMZ in a clearer context, but still obscures the fact
of increased DRV military action in the western part of the DMZ.
Dealing with recent exploits of the northern Quang Tri armed
forces, the commentary says that according to UPI, Abrams,
"puzzled by waves of attacks" by the northern Quang Tri armed
forces and people, on 15 August "adventurously had many
aircraft--including B-52s--and artillery guns aboard the
warships continuously and intensely bomb and shell the DMZ
and many areas in Vinh Linh and Quang Binh. He also insolently
threatened to 'retaliate.'"
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CHINA FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PEKING URGES FLEXIBLE TACTICS TO ISOLATE "PRINCIPAL" FOE
In the wake of the invitation to President Nixon to visit the
PRC, Peking has taken steps to prepare the ground for practicing
its "revolutionary diplomatic line," which might be defined as
a line on negotiation as the continuation of revolution by
other means. Having previously invoked Maoist scripture to
justify negotiating with an adversary as a form of "tit-for-tat
struggle," Peking has now delved further into the Moist canon
to explain the new Sino-U.S. developments in the context of
its triangular relationship with Moscow and Washington.
At the same time, Peking has been blunting the edges of its
continuing attacks on U.S. policies and refraining from
personal attacks on the President in an evident effort.to
avoid spoiling the atmosphere surrounding his projected
visit. While publicizing foreign comment in support of
the PRC's case on the UN representation question, Peking's
direct reaction to Secretary Rogers' 2 August statement on
the U.S. position has been confined to two NCNA reports.
This low-level response, focusing its attack on the Secretary
and on "the reactionary Sato government" of Japan, contrasts
with Peking's reaction to State Department spokesman Bray's
remarks in April on Taiwan's status, which included an
authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article as well
as an NCNA report mocking the Nixon Administration's recent
gestures toward improving relations with the PRC.
In another dimension of the Chinese demarche toward the
United States, Peking's purpose of reassuring its allies
regarding the impact of the President's visit seems to have
been served by Sihanouk's mission to Pyongyang in late
July and early August. Endorsements of the invitation to
the President were contained in Sihanouk's 24th "message to
the Khmer nation," issued during his Visit to Pyongyang, and
in a 6 August speech by Kim Il-song which the Chinese have
hailed as an "important" address giving "a penetrating
analysis of the current international situation." Peking
carried the text of Sihanouk's message, Kim's speech, and a
NODONG SINMUN editorial which in effect answered criticism
of the invitation to the President. Apart from disseminating
these texts, Peking media have not mentioned the invitation
since carrying the original announcement on 16 July.
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TIT-FOR-TAT While seeking to sustain a propitious atmosphere
STRUGGLE for the projected visit as well as reassuring
its allies of unwavering support for their
anti-U.S. struggles, Peking has undertaken the task of preparing
the ground ideologically by explaining how the dialectic of
"tit-for-tat struggle" can lead to shifts of line. In the
first comprehensive policy statement since the announcement on
the President's visit, a joint editorial on the 1 August PLA
anniversary offered a significant ideological cue in propounding
"Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line." Calling on the
Chinese to concern themselves with affairs of state (and thus
to understand shifts of line), the editorial urged study of
"the historical experience of our party in carrying out tit-for-
tat struggles" against enemies--an allusion to Mao's 1945
report "On the Chungking Negotiations," a work that figured
in the authoritative review of the party's historical experience
contained in the 1 July joint editorial article on the CCP's
50th anniversary.
Peking has now turned to still another canonical work to justify
its opening toward the United States as part of the triangular
power rivalry. The Peking domestic radio and PEOPLE'S DAILY
on 17 August carried an article appearing in RED FLAG No. 9 by
"the writing group" of the Hupeh provincial party committee
which calls for study of Mao's 1940 work "On Policy,"
recommended as excellent guidance for achieving tactical
flexibility in the present international situation. Mao's
1940 report, the article points out, helped the party to
"remain sober-minded in the thick of an extremely complex
situation." The article makes it clear that such a purpose
animates the current study of Maoist scripture.. A link
with the earlier invocations of Mao's 1945 work on negotiations
is suggested by the RED FLAG article's call for "tit-for-tat"
struggle, a formulation not appearing in "On Policy" itself.
THE PRINCIPAL The RED FLAG article provides a rationale for
ENEMY negotiating with the United States by arguing
the need for distinguishing among adversaries
in order to isolate "the principal enemy"--identified as Japan
in 1940 and, by implication in the current context, the Soviet
Union today. The article quotes the 1940 work as saying the
CCP "opposes all imperialism, but we make a distinction
between Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression
against China and the imperialist powers which are not doing
so now." Updated, such a distinction would justify negotiating
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with the United States in order the better to cope with the
more menacing Soviet Union, whose military pressure along the
border is a source of major tension and bitter resentment on
the part of the Chinese.
Following this distinction, RFD FLAG adds a distinction between
different policies adopted by "imperialist powers" in different
conditions at different times. Where the first distinction is
quoted directly from "On Policy," the second one telescopes a
passage which includes references to China's attitude toward
the United States. That passage distinguishes between U.S.
policy in an earlier phase--when the United States "followed
a Munich policy in the Far East"-and its abandonment of this
policy by 1940 "in favor of China's resistance." A reader
following RED FLAG's advice to turn to "On Policy" for
current guidance would thus find a reason for Peking's
opening to the United States as a Leans of strengthening
its hand against the Soviets.*
USE OF CONTRADICTIONS The current triangular relationship
is addressed most explicitly in RED
FLAG's discussion of the "important tactical principle" of
making use of contradictions among one's adversaries. The
article calls for "a concrete analysis" of the situation in
order to seize opportunities to exploit "loopholes and
contradictions in the enemy camp" as a means of combatting
the principal enemy. After taking note of the four "major
contradictions" in the world today (authoritatively
formulated in Lin Piao's April 1969 report to the CCP
Ninth Congress), the article singles out the Soviet-U.S.
relationship in order to analyze current tactics for
exploiting these contradictions. While using the standard
" Lin Piao's September 1965 tract on people's war similarly
made use of the Sino-Japanese war as a means of propounding
current strategy. In the implicit analogy used by Lin, Japan's
role in the Sino-Japanese war was played by the United States
in 1965, and the U.S. role in that war by the Soviet Union at
the later date. Lin charged that the United States during the
war against Japan had plotted a Far East Munich and offered to
help China as part of a sinister design of turning Chiro into
its colony. This was Lin's way of charging that tit the time
of his tract Moscow's policy on aid to Hanoi was designees to
turn Vietnam into a Soviet colony. By the time of the current
RED FLAG article, the S.,viet Union had become the analogue of
Japan during the Sino-Japanese war as the principal enemy.
CONFIDENTIAL
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formula on "social imperialism" and the United States
"colluding and contending" with one another, the article
makes a point of observing that their rivalry "is becoming
more acute with each passing day." In this context the
article invokes Mao's 1940 analysis of contradictions among
China's adversaries as guidance for the present international
situation.
RED FLAG's discussion in effect elaborates on Mao's "revolu-
tionary diplomatic line," explaining that the tactics outlined
represent a dialectical unity of "firm principles and great
flexibility." The purpose of flexible tactics, the article
states, is "to adhere to firm revolutionary principles." While
acknowledging the dogma that "the nature of imperialism" can
never change, the article stresses that this is but one side
of the picture and that "objective difficulties" facing the
enenpr afford opportunities for flexible "tit-for-tat struggle"
and "revolutionary dual tactics." These difficulties are
what the PLA anniversary editorial meant in portraying the
United States as "now declining just as the star of the
British Empire did" and what Peking's propaganda seeks to
document in depicting crises enveloping the United States
at home and abroad.
The article concludes this section on current tactics with
a discussion of the role of a united front in the effort to
"force our principal enemy into a narrow and isolated
position." Though the "anti-Japanese united front" of the
time of Mao's 1940 work would seem analogous to Peking's
current campaign to rally the "small and medium-sized nations"
against the two superpowers, the RED FLAG article's treatment
of Soviet-U.S. rivalry and of "the principal enemy" seems
designed to account for Peking's opening toward the United
States in the context of the triangular relationship.;
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CHINA AND BURMA
PEKING GIVES CORRECT, RESTRAINED TREATMENT OF NE WIN VISIT
While Chou En-lai offered the judgment that relations between
Burma and the PRC "have returned to normal," Peking's treat-
ment of Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win's 6-12 August visit
suggested that there was no major breakthrough on substantive
issues beyond further clearing the atmosphere of the bit-sr-
ness of recent years. Peking's dual approach toward Burma
was illustrated by continued support for the insurrectionary
Burmese Communist Party (BCP) at the same time as Ne Win was
invited to Chinese soil. Also during this time the BCP's
clandestine radio, which propagates a Maoist line of armed
struggle against the Rangoon regime, attacked Ne Win's China
visit as a trick to escape his difficulties.
The visitor was accorded high-level protocol honors: Chou,
PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, Vice Pi-?mier Li Hsien-
nien, and Kuo Mo-jo met him on arrival, and he held talks in
"a friendly atmosphere" with Chou and Li; he was granted an
audience with Mao for "a friendly conversation"; and he was
accorded the courtesy of being accompanied by Chou on a trip
to Canton. During his previous visit to China, from 24 July
to 1 August 1965, Ne Win received extensive fanfare, with
NCNA reporting that "hundreds of thousands" of "singing and
dancing" people lined the streets and jet fighters saluted
him on arrival. PEOPLE'S DAILY published editorials marking
both his arrival and departure in 1965, and a lengthy 16-point
communique was issued.
In contrast, during the recent visit Peking all but avoided
any praise for Burma's policies while expressing satisfaction
over the return to diplomatic normality and the development
of trade. There was no communique--none was required in view
of the "informal" nature of the visit--and no editorial or
other form of comment in PRC media. Reflecting Peking's reluc-
tance to endorse Ne Win's policies, reportage on his visit made
no mention of the customary chorus shouting slogans voicing
support for the guest's country.
The only Chinese comment of substance to appear in PRC media
during the visit was contained in NCNA's brief summary of
toasts by Chou and Ne Win at Chou's 6 August banquet. Although
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Chou referred to the "profound, traditional friendship" between
the Chinese and Burmese peoples and noted that under Ne Win's
first tenure as prime minister the two countries "successfully
settled the border questions left over by history," he was
restrained in his assessment of current Sino-Burmese relations
and limited his praise for Burma's policies to an expression
of support for Rangoon's "policy of peace and neutrality."
Crediting the Chinese Government--but not the Burmese--with
"consistently pursuing a friendly and good-neighbor policy,"
Chou expressed pleasure that "over the past two years" Sino-
Burmese relations "have returned to normal, the two,govern-
ments have exchanged new ambassadors, and the trade between
the two countries has developed." He suggested without ela-
boration that with joint efforts "of the two sides" Sino-
Burmese relations "will improve further."
Notably absent from Chou's remarks were any references to
the five principles of peaceful coexistence or to-the Sino-
Burmese treaty of friendship and nonaggression, the first such
treat-ir negotiated by the PRC. These subjects, as well as those
of opposition to imperialism and colonialism, seating of the
PRC in the United Nations, and the Vietnam conflict, were all
raised repeatedly in the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials and in the
communique in connection with the 1965 visit.
A similar restraint marked Ne Win's toast. As reported by NCNA,
he noted that he had "cordially held talks on questions of
common concern" with Chou and other "Chinese friends," comment-
ing vaguely that such talks are "greatly beneficial to our
friendship, mutual understanding, and cooperation" and will
further consolidate and develop "the existing understanding
and cooperation." Neither side referred to economic aid
relations. Fang I, the Chinese aid minister, was present on
protocol occasions during the visit, but he did not take part
in the talks between the visitors and Chou and Li Hsien-nien.
NCNA did not provide even a summary of toasts by Ne Win and
Chou at the 8 August banquet given by the guest. There was no
report of an invitation for a return visit to Burma by the
Chinese. In 1965 Ne Win extended, and Chou and then head of
state Liu Shao-chi accepted, an invitation to visit Burma.
SUPPORT FOR BCP In parallel wit 'a its development of
correct state relations with the Burmese
Government, the Chinese have continued to publicize support
for the BCP by acknowledging the presence in Peking of Thakin
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Ba'Thein Tin, identified as "leaser of the delegation" and
vice chairman of the BCP Central Committee. NCNA reported
on 31 July--the same day as it carried the announcement of
No Win's pending visit to the PRC--that Ba Thein Tin had
been among the "distinguished guests on the seats of honor"
at the reception in Peking marking the PLA anniversary.
Ba Thein Tin had also been noted by NCNA as among the
"distinguished guests on the rostrum" with Mao and Lin Piao
on 1 May at Peking's May Day calebrations.
Otherwise, however, official Peking media during the past
year have given only miniscule propaganda support to the
BCP and its armed insurgency activities, relying on the
clandestine Voice of the People of Burma for propaganda
support for the insurgents.* The last Peking-originated
commentary on the BCP's exploits was in September 1970;
Chinese media have disseminated only two BCP messages
in the past 15 months, one on the 3 March 1971 PRC
satellite launching and one on the 50th anniversary of
the CCP. Transmitted by NCNA on 3 July, the latter message
hailed "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" as guiding
the BCP movement, attacked "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet
revisionism," and proclaimed that by "seizing power by
armed force" the BCP "will surely defeat the Ne Win
military regime"--a term that Peking has not used in its
own name since September 1969 but which is common in
commentaries of the Voice of the People of Burma.
BOP'S CLANDESTINE RADIO DENOUNCES NE WIN FOR VISITING PRC
In contrast to the restraint shown by official PRC media,
the Voice of the People of Burma has been unremitting in
its criticism of the Rangoon government and in-'-.its call for
* Peking has not acknowledged the existence of the Voice of
the People of Burma, inaugurated on 28 March 1971. In contrast,
PRC media replay comment attributed to the other two Chinese-
sponsored clandestine stations, the Voice of the Malayan
Revolution and the Voice of the People of Thailand. On at
least two occasions, however, on 26 June and 18 August, the
Voice of the Malayan Revolution has rebroadcast commentaries
attributed to the Voice of the People of Burma. The inaugural
broadcasts of the Burmese clandestine station are discussed
in the TRENDS of 14 April 1971, pages 27-29.
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a BCP-led. armed uprising to overthrow the "Ne Win military
clique." The clandest:!ne radio's unabating hostility toward
Ne Win was underscored by commentaries it broadcast specifically
denouncing his trip to the PRC. A commentary on 5 August,
observing that "Ne Win's visit to China stems from the
foreign policies of the PRC and No Win's military government
in Burma," po-;,rayed the visit as "an attempt to relieve
the general .rises" in Burma which are "about to explode"
and contended that it "indicates absolutely no change in. his
class nature, nor does it imply that he has given up; ,his
anticommunis,;, antipopular poll^ies. His reactionary,
nature can n.ver cruinge." Describing difficulties in Burma
resulting frc.'m Ne Win's policies, the commentary concluded
that the only solute,on is "to complete-the people's.
democratic revolution which, is,being waged under the
leadership of the BCP" and to establish "people's
democratic power" by destroying "Ne Win's military
government by an armed uprising." An extensive summary,
of this commentary was rebroadcast, with attribution, by
the Voice of the Malayan Revolution on 18, August.
Ne Win's trip was also attacked in a 15 August commentary
over the Voice of the People of'Burma marking the 32d
anniversary of the founding of the BCP. Complete with
broadbruah attacks on Khrushchev, L1u :?BhIo cbi,. ~8rezhnev
and his "modern revisionist clique," and the "treacherous
clique" of BCP revisionists Ba Tin and Maung Htay, the
commentary accused Ne Win of using "sly tricks, such, as
transformation of the cadre party into the people's party,
return of power to the people, and visiting the PRC," in an
effort to escape from his difficulties. It accused Brezhnev
of "praising the fake socialism of Ne Win's military
government but concealing the people's hardships" and of
"actively helping" Ne Win. Hailing the road of "armed
struggle and power seizure" laid down by Chairman Thakin
Than Tun, assassinated in September 1968, the commentary
called the prospects for Burma's revolution "very good" if
the Burmese people will adopt the policies of concentra-
tion on military affairs, (2) peasant base, (3) form
alliance with nationalities, (4) expand the united front, and
(5) party construction is the key factor."
The radio's comment on Ne Win's visit to the PRC avoided any
criticism of Peking or even speculation on Peking's motives
for the invitation.
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KOREA
DPRK AND ROK AGREE ON RED CROSS CONTACTS ON DIVIDED FAMILIES
Contacts between the Red Crops Societies of North and South
Korea to discuss the fate of families separated by the division
of the country were agreed to on 14 August, when the North
Korean organization accepted a 12 August proposal for talks
by the South Korean society. This agreement on the first
North-South bilateral contacts since the end of the Ko.'ean
War came in the wake of several nev North Korean pronounce-
ments on the question--pronouncements which, taken together,
may constitute the initiation of a campaign to reopen
negotiations on the Korean question. A seven-point demand
on U.S. withdrawal from South Korea, put forward by the
North Korean representative at the 29 July meeting of the
Military Armistice Commission (MAC), included a new demand
that the United States stop preventing people of North and
South Korea from traveling across the military demarcation
line. In a 6 August speech Kim Il-song for the first time
held out the prospect of contacts with Pak Chong-hui's Demo-
cratic Republican Party (DRP). An 11 August letter from the
DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland
agreed to a proposal by Ko Pyong-chol, president of the
United Front for Korean Democracy in New York, for a third-
country conference of overseas Koreans for reunification.*
On 18 August KCNA reported a statement by the chairman of
the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan
supporting this proposal and offering to send representatives
to such a conference.
The North Korean Red Cross statement, carried by Pyongyang
media on the 14th, came in a letter to the South Korean
organization replying to its 12 August proposal to initiate
a "movement" to find separated family members and to hold
preliminary talk.a in Geneva before the end of October. The
North Korean letter--devoid of proplagandistic epithets--said
that the suggestion accords with the DPRK's "reasonable
proposals" to rejoin kinsmen and called it a "very fine
thing," a "little bit late" but a "matter of great joy and
*See the 11 August TRENDS, pages 16-19, for a discussion of
these proposals on North-South contacts.
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18 AUGUST 1971
pleasure." The statement recalled that at the Supreme People's
Assembly last April the DPRK put forward its eight-point
program for unification, and pointed out that on 6 August Kim
11-song declared that the DPRK Government is ready to contact
"any South Korean political parties, including the DRP." (This
was the first explicit mention in Pyongyang propaganda of Kim's
proposal since the a August speech itself; a 15 August NODONG
SINMUN Observer's article on the Red Cross letter also briefly
recalled Kim's remarks.)
The North Korean Red Cross reply said that a movement for finding
separated family members is "insufficient," and proposed dis-
cussion also of the questions of free travel and mutual visits
and free correspondence between separated family members, rela-
tives, and friends. These suggestions have long been a part of
Forth Korean proposals on various North-South contacts as first
steps toward unification. The letter further suggested that
the preliminary meeting be held in September in Panmunjom
rather than Geneva, in a foreign country. It concluded by
announcing that it is sending two messengers to Panmunjom on
20 August with an official letter containing this proposal.
On 17 August a North Korean Red Cross Central Committee spokes-
man complained that although the South Korean organization has
agreed to send representatives to Panmunjom to accept the North
Korean letter they are not bringing an official letter of their
own containing the initial 12 August proposal. The spokesman
expressed the dope that the South Koreans will agree to an
exchange of official documents, saying that one cannot rely
on press agency transmissions and radio announcements alone.
The North Korean Red Cross letter was heaviiy,rsp.lsyed by
Pyongyang radio and was further publicized in a Pyongyang
press conference held on the 15th by the chairman of the
DPRK Red Cross. The 15 August NODONG SINMUN Observer's
article praised the initiative, as did statements released
by leaders of various North Korean public organizations.
Pyongyang's propaganda treatment of Pak Chong-hui currently
is somewhat inconsistent. Followup comment on the led Cross
letter, like the letter itself, was generally couched in
moderate language and avoided epithets, referring merely to
"South Korean authorities," although some personal attacks on
President Pak persisted. The NODONG SINMUN Observer article
did once mention the obstructive machinations of the "Pak
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Chong-hui puppet clique," and a statement by the Agriculture
Union chairman used atypically strong language in referring
to obstructionism by "such despicable traitors as Pak Chong-
hui."
A vicious attack on Pak and his administration appeared,
however, in a 17 August KCNA commentary attacking the presi-
dent's 15 August National Day speech. Among other things,
it said that his comments on unification were "rubbish" since
he said nothing specific about what should be done and how;
it added that it is foolish to expect anything concrete on
peaceful unification from this "fascist hangman." The cum-
mentary a3serted that when the question of contacts and talks
between the Red Cross organizations of North and South arose,
Pak "cunningly worked to foil them," even instigating his
Premier to warn against pinning much hope on a dialog.*
PEKING BACKS KOREAN MOVES, SIGNS ECONOMIC AGREEMENT WITH DPRK
NCNA on the 16th promptly reported the Pyongyang press confer-
ence at which the chairman of the North Korean Red Cross
publicized the letter to the South Korean organization, but
Peking has not thus far commented. Peking backed the earlier
Korean moves, and presumably had a role in their formulation.
Peking media reported that the seven-point demand was made by
the "Korean-Chinese side" at the 29 July MAC meeting and
supported it with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. NCNA
carried Kim Il-song's 6 August speech in full, and Li Hsien-nien
on the 9th, at a banquet for the visiting Korean economic dele-
gation, praised it as an "important speech" although he did not
mention the Korean unification question. A "leading member" of
NCNA, speaking at a 13 August banquet for a visiting Korean
journalists' delegation, echoed Li's praise for Kim's speech,
again without mentioning any substance.
* According to Seoul's HAPTONG, President Pak said that the
ROK is ready to open a dialog if the communists abandon their
plot to communize the South by violent means and come up with
a "sincere attitude." He further expressed his "best wishes"
for the success of the Red Cross talks.
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ECONOMIC China's efforts to reassure the DPRK of its
AGREEMENT continuing support in spite of the Sino-U.S.
developments are carried forward by the
15 Avgust signing of a Chinese-Korean agreement on "economic
cooperation." The economic agreement complements Peking's
recent attention to the question of negotiations on?'the
Korean issue.
Both Peking and Pyongyang announced that an "agreement on
economic cooperation" was signed without elaborating on its
nature. The Korean delegation, which arrived in Peking on
8 August, was headed by Vice Premier Chong Chun-taek and
included officials concerned with state planning, cotton
textiles, land and Bea transport, and fuel oil administration.
Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien hosted the group in Peking.
The most recent agreement for Chinese "economic and technical
aid" to Korea was signed last October, with Choug'Chun-taek
leading a delegation to Peking for the purpose after signing
an aid agreement in Moscow in September.* At the dame time
a Smno-Korean trade agreement for 1971-1976 was signed as well
as a trade protocol for 1971. The last known previous Sino-
Korean aid agreement, signed in October 1960, provided for
Chinese loans for 1961-1964 and for supply of Chinese equip-
ment and technical aid.
MOSCOW MINIMIZES KOREAN CONTACTS. MARKS LIBERATION ANNIVERSARY
Moscow has thus far given minimal attention to the issue of
North-Sc?"th contacts in Korea. A brief TASS report of the
29 July MAC meeting reported some of the demands but did not
acknowledge that they were part of a seven-point program and
failed to mention the seventh point regarding civilian travel
across the military demarcation line. On 12 August TASS
reported without comment the letter from the DPRK Committee
for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland agreeing to
the proposal on a conference of overseas Koreans. TASS has
not been heard to mention the exchange between the Korean
Red Cross organizations, although a Korean-language Moscow
* See the 26 October 1970 FBIS TRENDS Supplement, "DPRK Aid
Agreements with PRC and USSR."
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radio broadcast on the 17th did comment that "the public in
various countries" welcomes the agreement with "satisfaction,"
and pictured it as a first step toward Korean unification.
LIBERATION The 26th anniversary of Korea's liberation
ANNIVERSARY from Japanese domination (15 August) was marked
in low-key fashion by both sides. The usual
leaders' greetings messages were exchanged, wreath-laying
ceremonies were held in Pyongyang, and film shows were held by
friendship societies in both capitals and by the USSR charge
d'affaires in Pyongyang. Moscow, however, has apparently not
reported the usual reception by the DPRK !unbassador in Moscow.
Pyongyang failed to issue the usual NODONG SINMUN editorial
although both sides carried routine level comment. The more
important 25th anniversary last ycnr had been given higher
level treatment, including a visit to Pyongyang by a Soviet
party-governmen~ delegation led by Mazurov and public meetings
in both capitals.
The congratulatory mei.sage from Kim Il-song and Choe Yong-kon
to the Soviet leaders praised the Soviet Army in customary
terms for its help in liberating Korea. It said, much like
last year's message, that in the present situation of intensi-
fying U.S. and Japanese aggressive maneuvers "further strength-
ening" of Korean-Soviet friendship and solidarity "is of very
great significance," and it reiterated the hope that traditional
friendly relations will further develop on the basis of the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
The message to the Korean leaders from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and
Kosygin was almost perfunctory, however, perhaps reflecting
Soviet displeasure with Kim Il-song's approval of Sino-U.S.
developments. The message praised the development of relations
of "fraternal friendship and cooperation" between the two
peoples but did not make the customary references to Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and unlike last
year's message it did not recall that the USSR had given and
continues to give the DPRK aid in the building of socialism.
The current message blandly said that the friendship between
the two peoples contributes toward "uniting closer the forces
of peace and socialism in the struggle against the aggressive
wild ambition of imperialism," but it did not add, as did
last year's message, that it strengthens the socialist coun-
tries' cohesion in the struggle for strengthening peace and
security in Asia and the world. The 1969 message was even
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0
stronger, saying that the friendship maintains peace in the Far
East and is "an obstacle to U.S. aggressive designs."
Routine Moscow comment, however, did as usual point to Soviet
economic and technical assistance to Korea and recall that the
two countries' treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual
assistance guarantees their security. Like last year, a
Radio Moscow Mandarin-language commentary used the occasion to
criticize Peking's "splittist" policies. It recalled that
U.S. aggression in the Korean War was defeated by-concerted
actions by the USSR and PRC in support of the DPRK, but that
current intensified U.S. and South Korean provocative
activity along the DMZ is the result of Chinese failure to
take united action with the USSR and other socialist countries
in the anti-imperialist struggle.
There was no mention in the anniversary comment of the current
moves for North-South contacts in Korea. But on 14 August KCNA
did briefly report that the DPRK-supported General Association
of Korean Residents in Japan proposed to the ROK-sponsored
Korean Residents' Union in Japan that they celebrate the
anniversary jointly and promote a struggle for Korean unifica-
tion.
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SOVIET BLOC AND BALKANS
Registering apparent fears that other countries might be
responsive to Peking's more flexible tactics in the wake of
the announcement of the President's PRC visit, Soviet media
have mounted an intensified effort to discredit the Chinese
and to iml,ugn the motives behind present and possible
future Peking international overtures. Concurrently,
Moscow has continued to use the proxy of its hardlining
allies to indict the Chinese and to apply psychological
pressure on the Romanians. Commentaries in the East
European bloc press have carried new lectures on the
impermissibility of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
along with warnings against violations of proletarian
internationalism and against the sin of nationalism--
codewords for the Romanian deviation from Marxism-
Leninism as interpreted in Moscow.
Against the background of these commentaries, the Hungarian
Government organ MAGYAR HIRLAP on 13 August warned against
any effort to build up a Belgrade-Tirana-Bucharest-Peking
axis, and C;echoslovak media promptly publicized th,:
Hungarian article. Pegged to the "rumor" of an impending
Chou En-l:Li visit to the three Balkan capitals, the article
drew an i?_idignant rejoinder from Belgrade. Bucharest, true
to form, has reiterated its independent principles along
with its dedication to communist unity. And Tirana has
just as typically denounced Moscow's efforts to keep its
recalc.,;rant "vassals" in line. On the 15th Romanian media
reported that a high-ranking Chinese military delegation
had "stopped over" in Bucharest that day on its way to
Tirana; NCNA said the group was to make "a friendly visit
to Albania and Romania" at the invitation of the two
countries' defense ministries.
MOSCOW WARNS AGAINST PEKING'S "'HYPOCRITICAL" TACTICS
As part of the Soviet campaign to discredit the Chinese, a
Lukovets article in PRAVDA on 15-August used Chinese
rejection of the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the five
nuclear powers to demonstrate that Peking is still on its
adventurous course of intensifying international tensions."
While the Chinese pledge themselves to wage a persistent
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struggle against nuclear weapons on the one hand, Lukovets
said, they r~hyyoeritiil ]y`t egici~- he .prpppiaj~toi~~~lioldit>~ a
conference of five nuclear powers.
An article in the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES on the 13th,
calculated to blacken Peking's communist credentials in the
international communist movement, portrayed the PRC as "a
tool of the imperialists" who are seeking to soften up and
split the movement. Dwelling in this context on Peking's
use of Tirana, the article added that the imperialists
believe the way to achieve their aims "is for China and
Albania, basing their actions on nationalism, to drift
away from the socialist community." NEW TIMES sustained
Moscow's cautious approach to the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement,
remarking vaguely that "anticommunist elements of all types"
and the present Chinese leaders are using anti-Sovietism
as a lever to split the movement. After elaborating at
length on the economic and political deficiencies of Chinese
communism, the article suggested that Peking's divisive
tactics have also "hampered the socialist development" of
its Albanian ally, making the point that socialist success
is guaranteed only by alliance with the Soviet Union.
Another article in NEW TIMES on the 6th reflected apparent
Soviet concern that Bonn might follow Washington's lead by
sending a delegation to Peking. Noting that the West
German press and some Bonn politicians are pressing for
improved relations with Peking in the wake of President
Nixon's initiative, the article cautioaod against any
attempts to assert "pressure" on the Soviet Union by
making a deal with the Chinese. The positions of world
socialism, it concluded confidently, "are growing stronger,
and it can be forseen with complete assurance that this
process will not be hindered by any involved deals."
SOVIET ALLIES STRESS IMPERMISSIBILITY OF NEUTRALIST COURSE
The East Germans, who in recent months have given Moscow only
limited propaganda support on the Chinese issue, coined the
ranks of the current Soviet proxy commentators in the wake
of the Crimea summit in an article in the party organ NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND on 14 August. The article called for an
uncompromising Soviet bloc stand on China's "splittist"
policy. In remarks clearly directed at the Romanians, it
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lectured; "No community is possible" with the platform of
the Chinese leaders . . ..,and anyone who pursues a policy of
tolerance and concessions toward Mao's group encourages its
splittist policy, violates the fundamental principles of
proletarian internationalism, and hinders the fight against
imperialist.." The paper went on to call for an intensified
struggle against"all aspects of opportunism, anti-Sovietism,
and nationalism." TASS carried an ADN summary of the article
on the day it appeared.
The NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article was in the same vein as an
earlier warning, also evidently directed at the Romanians, in
Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on 30 July. Moscow:s LITERATURNAYA
GAZETA published an account of the TRYBUNA LUDU article on
11 August, including its admonition that "there must be no
ambiguity or attempts to take a neutral stand on Peking's
:.ti-Soviet and splittist line."
The most notably blunt and specific warning to Bucharest
appeared in the official Slovak youth paper SMENA on
11 August in an article directly criticizing the Romanians'
failure to attend the Crimea summit. SMENA argued that at
a time when unity is needed to combat China's "anti-Soviet
campaign," Romania's absence was "not a contribution toward
the development of concord and strength." The paper went
on to warn pointedly: "The policy of walking a tightrope
will be paid for sooner or later."
BUDAPEST, PRAGUE PICK UP RLIIORS OF CHOU VISIT TO BALKANS
Pursuing Hungarian media's role as leading proxy spokesman
for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet polemic, an article in the
Hungarian Government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on 13 August
warned Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia against any attempt
to form "an anti-Soviet axis in the Balkans." The paper
cited the "rumor" that Chou En-lai might visit Tirana,
Bucharest, and Belgrade as evidence that Peking is already
"exercising influence" in the area. The article stopped
short of claiming that such an axis--"beginning in Peking
and ending in the Balkans"--is in fact being developed,
but it sought to head off any movement in that direction
by warning that any such undertaking would be "doomed to
failure" and could produce "an extraordinarily dangerous
situation in the Balkans." It concluded With the hope that
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"sober reality will reduce this pessimistic assumption to
sheer speculation."
A CTK account of the MAGYAR HIRLAP article appeared the
next day in the Bratislava PRAVDA, and on 17 August CTK
quoted the Czechoslovak youth paper SMENA as stating that
Chou's "approaching visit to the Balkans can be looked upon
as an action by Peking to exert indirect pressure on the
Soviet Union and thus to improve its position in regard to
this area." SMENA added: China's new foreign policy
course is aimed at extricating Peking from its isolation "even
at the price of the .unity of, the:' communist movement, and th1a, fully
corresponds with Washington's policy of a differentiated
approach to the individual socialist countries."
YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA. ALBANIA RESPOND TO SOVIET BLOC PRESSURES
BELGRADE Yugoslav media expressed indignati6n',ii the MAGYAR
HIRLAP article. In an "editorial note" on the
16th, the semiofficial Belgrade daily BORBA declined to
speculate on Hungary's motives, but commented: "It is
hard to fail to note how incorrect, if not even provocative,
it is to link the possible visit of a foreign statesman to
our country with such groundless conclusions and impermissible
warnings." BORBA added that such an attitude is the more
egregious "when it is a question of a country such as
Yugoslavia, which is open to all foreign statesmen and
to cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect."
Radio Zagreb's freewheeling political commentator Milika
Sundic, also on the 16th, observed that the view expressed
by MAGYAR HIRLAP is "palpably not its own" and saw overtones
of the Brezhnev doctrine in its warning about the danger
of an anti-Soviet axis in the Balkans. The implication
of this line, Sundic said, is that if the warning is ignored,
"measures envisaged by the doctrine of limited sovereignty
of socialist countries could be invoked." Sundic?concluded
with advice to "both our neighbors and others to leave
Yugoslavia alone," for "such 'concern' for us really worries
us--not only the concern manifested in a variety of articles
and commentaries, but in the demonstrations of strength along
our borders as well."
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BUCHAREST In characteristic response to the Soviet bloc
propaganda pressures, Ceausescu has underscored
Romanian resolve to resist them by voicing repeated, measured
reaffirmations of his country's independent principles. At
the same time, he has prudently reaffirmed Romania's solidarity
with the national liberation movement and its concern for
communist unity, in assurances typically contrived to fend
off charges that Romania is defaulting on the obligations
imposed by socialist internationalism and is abetting
Chinese devisive activities.
As in past periods of tension, Ceausescu has gone out to the
provinces to drum up support for his policies among the
national minorities and to demonstrate to interested
foreign parties that his country is unified. In an
address in Harghita County (inhabited by Magyars) on the
l)Lh, he repeated his stock formulations on independence
and stated that although Romania is mainly concerned with
its own internal development, "we do not forget for a moment
the international problems and our obligation to participate
actively in the struggle for the unity of the socialist
countries." In an apparent swipe at Hungary, which recently
expressed concern over the "socialist" status of the Hungarian
minority in Romania, Ceausescu declared that the Balkan
countries must do all they can to insure that no problem
arises between them, "so that nobody can use these countries
against each other, so that the Balkans can become a center
of peace and cooperation."
In a series of speeches in the same county on the 16th, as
reported by AGERPRES, Ceausescu strongly reaffirmed
Romania's determination to resist outside pressures.
Insisting on the right of each people to decide its own
fate, Ceausescu said it is "inadmissible for anybody in
any way to attempt to dictate to another people how to
organize its life, how to secure its economic and social
development." He concluded another address on a militantly
patriotic note: "We have at the cost of great sacrifices
won the right to build socialism, and we are determined
to defend our revolutionary gains, our socialist homeland."
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TIRANA Albania has reacted with typically defiant rhetoric.
A 14 August Tirana radio commentary on the Crimea
summit heaped abuse on the Soviets and their "vassals" and
interpreted the meeting as an attempt to bring deviant.-elements
into line. The radio said that "the call to the Crimea after
the outbreak of differences at the CEMA session and Moscow's
simultaneous saber-rattling along the borders of other countries"
indicates that "the new Russian Czars are trying to further
tighten the screws on their vassals--to tell them that if
need be Moscow will not hesitate to embark on ar operation
of the type undertaken in Czechoslovakia."
PRC MILITARY DELEGATION STOPS IN BUCHAREST ON WAY TO TIRANA
Against the background of the Soviet bloc warnings about Chinese
maneuvering in the Balkans, Bucharest radio announced on
15 August that a Chinese military delegation headed by
Li Te-sheng, alternate Politburo member and head of the
PLA's general political section, had "stopped over" in
Bucharest that day en route to Tirana. The radio said
the delegation was greeted by Romanian Defense Minister
Ionita and other high-ranking officers. Peking's NCNA
reported on the 16th that the group was making "a friendly
visit to Albania a:~ Romania" at the invitation of the
Albanian and Romanian defense ministries, thus raising
the possibility that it may return to Bucharest for a
full-scale visit after its stay in Tirana.
Tirana and Peking media have played up the delegation's
stay in Albania, underscoring the militant solidarity
between the two allies. Tirana radio said the group was
welcomed on its arrival at the airport on the 15th by Petrit
Dume, alternate Politburo member and ' chief ` of the-.army's
general staff, and set the propaganda theme for the visit
in noting that one of the welcoming banners read: "Long
live the militant unity and fraternal friendship between
the armies of Albania and China!"
Following talks with Defense Minister Balluku, the delegation
attended a banquet hosted by the minister in the Central
House of Army Men, where the after-dinner speakers played
similar themes. Dume emphasized the "great fighting
friendship which links our parties, forged in the struggle
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against imperialism, modern revisionism, and their running
dogs." In another allusion to the Soviets, he added that
"despite encirclement by various cunning and savage enemies,
our people and army have smashed all imperialist-revisionist
plans, provocations, and blucicades."
Li Te-sheng's speech in reply contained a similar anti-Soviet
thrust as well as some anti-imperialist rhetoric apparently
designed to assure the militant Albanians that Peking's
flirtation with Washington does not mean it has gone soft
on imperialism. Wailing the Albanians for their fight
against "imperialism, revisionism, and reaction," Li went
on to express confidence that "no matter how desperately
U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism may struggle, they
cannot extricate themselves from their doomed destruction."
Pledging loyalty to proletarian internationalism, he
concluded: "We shall always be together like blood
brcthers, in sunny days or in difficult times."
Meanwhile, Peking's broadcasts to the USSR have been bringing
the same point home to the Soviets. A broadcast,,on the 16th
opened with a declaration of revolutionary friendship between
the PRC and Albania and followed up with an NCNA report on the
delegation's stopover in Bucharest and the warm welcome it
received in Tirana.
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GERMANY AND BERLIN
A week during which the first anniversary of the signing of the
USSR-FRG treaty and the l0th anniversary of the construction of
the Berlin Wall were celebrated, and in which the four-power
negotiations on Berlin Moved for tie first time into intensive
consecutive multi-day sessions,brought a spate of comment from
Moscow and its allies on issues surrounding ratification of the
treaty and the Brandt government's linkage of ratification to
a Berlin settlement. The greater part of the comment strongly
criticizes West German opposition forces for delaying ratifica-
tion of the Moscow treaty, and thereby also the Polish-West
German treaty. In reiterating the standard complaints on this
score and recapitulating the standard arguments, the comment
has sustained its restraint toward the Bonn government and
Brandt personally. An article by IZVESTIYA Chief Editor
Tolkunov is noteworthy for its measured tone and for its
depiction of progress in the development of Soviet-West
German relations. And for the first time, a Soviet bloc
source--the Polish daily ZOLNIERZ W(;LNOSCI on 14 August--
has taken note of President Nixon's remark at his 4 August
press conference that the Four Powers are making "very signi-
ficant progress" in the ambassadorial negotiations on Berlin.
The GDR, meanwhile, took the occasion of the Berlin Wall
anniversary to unde'score the solid protection afforded by
the Warsaw Pact against any inroads on itr; "socialist" inte-
grity.
MOSCO,q DISCUSSES WEST BERLIN LINK TO TREATY RATIFICATION
Two articles in the Soviet central press on the 13th summarized
the development of relations between the USSR and the FRG since
the signing of the Moscow treaty on 12 August 1970, with empha-
sis on the issue of Bonn's linking of a Berlin settlement to
West German ratification of the treaty. The lengthy article by
IZVESTIYA Chief Editor Tolkunov, who had visited West Germany
in June to attend a West German-Soviet colloquium on bilateral
relations, cited statements made at the colloquium by both Soviet
and West German participants summing up achievements in the year
since the signing, including increased economic, scientific,
and technical contacts.
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Addressing himself to the West, Berlin.issue, Tolkunov
said it was'"difficult"'t6:unUretand whsb.L',the Went
German representatives understood to be a "satisfactory
solution" because of the varied views expreiised. But many
West German representatives believed, he continued, that
"without concessions from the Soviet Union" on West Berlin
th.1 Bonn government would not be able to garner sufficient
public support for ratification. Asserting that "one could
sense the artificial nature" of a linkage between ratifica-
tion of the treaty anO. the West Berlin problem, he reiterated
the Soviet position that the "question of West Berlin is with-
in the competence of the Four Powers" and pointed out that
West Berlin is not mentioned in either the Moscow or Warsaw
treaties. Tolkunov said these arguments are "somehow for-
gotten and are occasionally simply cast aside by those who
are striving at any cost to get a solution of the West Berlin
question with unilateral benefits for themselves."
In a similar vein, Tolkunov wrote that at the colloquium the
Soviets, "relying on the facts," showed those who oppose the
treaty and maintain West Germany had conceded too much in
signing both the Moscow and Warsaw treaties that "the FRG
had made no concessions" and that the treaties "reflect a
balance of the countries' interests." He added that both
the FRG and the USSR "observed this principle," recalling
parenthetically how difficult and long the talks preceding
the signing had been.
Reviewing both the support for and the opposition to the
Moscow treaty within West Germany, an article by PRAVDA Bonn
correspondent Grigoryev asserted that the "overwhelming
majority" of the West Germans in.fact support ratification.
Citing West German papers for the view that conditions in
the FRG are now "ripe" for the Federal Government to submit
both the Soviet and Polish treaties to the Bundestag for
ratification, he added that, "as is well known, the FRG
Government has tied ratification to the achievement of a
'satisfactory settlement' on West Berlin." This approach,
Grigoryev said, has caused considerable dissatisfaction in
the FRG, and the delay in ratification has given the "rightist
forces" led by the CDU/CST time to form a bloc opposed to
the treaty.
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But Grigoryev pointed out here that even the CDU/CSU ranks
are not united in their opposition to the treaty. Citing
statements of support for the treaty by CDU officials, the
PRAVDA correspondent quoted an article by CDU Bundestag
Deputy Majonica as saying "it would be illusory to believe
that improvements can be achieved in the West Berlin
situation while simultaneously rejecting the treaty."
Majonica, acknowledging in his article that the Federal
Government has insisted on a satisfactory Berlin settlement
as a precondition for ratification of the Soviet-West
German treaty, had gone on to ask rhetorically whether,
once a Big Four settlement is reached, the Soviet Union
might not turn Bonn's tactic around and make ratification
of the treaty a precondition for implementation of the
settlement. The passage Grigoryev cited came immediately
after this rhetorical question, which the PRAVDA correspon-
dent of course ignored.
FOUR-POWER TALKS, Moscow has sustained its pattern of
POLISH COMMENT terse, factual reports on the four-
power ambassadorial sessions, con-
fined to paraphrases of the sessions' official communiques.
There has been no Soviet comment on the negotiations.
Moscow's Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak allies, how-
ever, have commented at some length on the developing
situation surrounding the Big Four negotiations, with much
of their comment pegged to Bonn's linkage of the talks to
ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty. The most
substantial discussion of the negotiations themselves has
come from Warsaw, which in April was the instrument of
publicity for the Soviet draft proposal presented to the
Big Three on 26 March. Referring to the coming second phase,
or "German phase," of the Berlin talks, PAP noted on the
16th, for example, that "West Berlin observers give priority
to the problem of reaching an understanding among the GDR,
the FRG, and the West Berlin Senat." The PAP report said
"it is being anticipated that talks will be conducted between
the parties directly concerned and that appropriate solutions
will be worked out on questions falling within the scope of
their powers." It added that after these German talks end,
the four-power agreement will be implemented "simultaneously
with agreements concluded among the GDR, the FRG, and the
West Berlin Senat"--a formulation that gives eque1 weight
to the government of West Berlin with Bonn and East Berlin.
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On 11 August, the day after the intensive ambassadorial sessions
began, Warsaw radio had stated that the multi-day sessions "con-
firm the rumor" that the negotiations were "entering a final
stage." In a similarly optimistic portrayal of the atmosphere
surrounding the negotiations, the Polish daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
on the 14th quoted President Nixon as stating at his It August
press conference that the Four Powers have made "very substan-
tial progress." But the paper also mentioned that there was a
total embargo on news of the negotiations and cautioned that
comment would only be based on "guesswork."
GDR COMMENT In a 12 August editorial calling for ratifica-
tion of the Moscow-Bonn treaty, the East German
party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reasserted the GDR's dedication
to the goal of European security and pointed to "a growing
public realization that the technical talks" between GDR State
Secretary Kohl and FRG State Secretary Bahr will serve that
end. The editorial made no mention of the Big Four negotia-
tions, as if to divest the Bahr-Kohl talks of any connection
with them.
SED Politburo member Verner, in a wide-ranging foreign policy
speech markiag the centenary of the birth of the German revo-
lutionary Karl Liebknecht, reiterated the GDR's hope that the
four-power talks would continue in the interests of European
"detente" and would put "an end to West Berlin's role as a
troublemaker." Recalling that the GDR had submitted proposals
to the West Berlin Senat to normalize relations between the GDR
and West Berlin, Verner repeated the East Berlin line that an
agreement on these proposals "presupposes the good will of
all partners; any reasonable person will have to understand
that an agreement on these proposals requires the recognition
of realities and of the legal position that West Berlin is a
city with a special politicE,l status which has never belonged
and will never belong to the FRG and must not be governed by
the FRG."
GDR BACKDATES BREZHNEV DOCTRINE TO BUILDING OF BERLIN WALL
On the o%~^asion of the 10th anniversary of the building of the
"antifasci8t protective" Berlin Wall, East Berlin propaganda
has stressed that 13 August 1961 marked the first opportunity
to test the "unbreakable unity and cohesion" of the peoples and
countries of the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union. GDR
Defense Minister Hoffmann, writing in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the
13th, in effect invoked the Brezhnev doctrine retroactively to
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describe the actions taken in Berlin 10 years ago: "The
issues which affected the life of a fraternal country, the
GDR, were declared to be the community's very own concern."
The thrust of GDR comment on the anniversary was that the
construction of the "secure border" had stopped "economic
pillage" of the GDR and prevented a West German frontal
attack against East Germany, with Hoffman going so far as to
charge in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND that Washington and Bonn had been
preparing "an aggressive adventure across the only open
border of the socialist community." Cautioning routinely that
the socialist community must - rain on guard against West
German "imperialism" and its "aggressive nature," a NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND e~.itorial on the '3th stated that West German
tactics, "which are to some ex,ent adjusted to changed condi-
tions and which use more cleverly designed methods," call for
"constant vigilance in the interests of peace and detente."
East Berlin held a public parade of militia workers on the
13th in honor of the Wall, in violation of the four-power
agreements on Berlin. It was attended by Honecker and Soviet
Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov. Both GDR and Soviet media
followed standard practice in failing to take note of the
protest made by the Big Three military commandants in West
Berlin over the East German military parade. East Berlin
held a second military parade on the 13th, to honor the
Liebknecht centenary, at which Honecker and Abrasimov were
also present.
TASS failed to report either of the parades, and PRAVDA on the
14th reported only the one honoring Liebknecht. IZVESTIYA on
the 15th alone mentioned the military parade commemorating
the Wall. TASS did take note of the Wall's anniversary in
summarizing a speech made by SED Politburo member Verner on
the 12th, at a meeting marking the Liebknecht centenary, in
which he praised the construction of the Wall as the decisive
step in preventing the "rollback" of socialism and in combat-
ting the Adenauer government's "revanchist" policy. On the
other hand, the TASS report on a 10 August DPA interview with
Brandt omitted all the Chancellor's remarks on the Berlin
Wall, as well as his comments linking a Berlin settlement to
treaty ratification and to a conference on European security.
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INDIA
JOINT STATEMENT, RAPID TR:ATY APPROVAL FOLLOW GROMYKO VISIT
The hurried nature of Foreign Minister Gronyko's 8 August
trip to India and the signing the next day of a 20-year
Soviet-Indian treaty of "peace, friendship, and cooperation"
has been matched by the rapidity of ratification procedures
by both India and the Soviet Union. In transmissions only
10 minutes apart TASS announced on 13 August that Indian
President Giri and Soviet President Pbdgornyy had each
signed the decrees of ratification. The-treaty entered into
force on the 18th .with?the. exchange' iiht-MbAcow 8f (.instruments
of ratification. In contrast, the 27 May Soviet-bmR treaty
was not ratified by the UAR until 13 June and by the
Soviet Union until 28 June; the exchange of ratification
documents occurred on 1 July.
The joint Soviet-Indian statement issued at the end of
Gromyko's 8 to 12 August official visit to India highlighted
the treaty, terming it "an outstanding historic event"
that "opens up wide prospects for raising fruitful
cooperation between the USSR and India to a still higher
level." While withholding comment on "other points [of
the treaty] referring to bilateral Soviet-Indian
relations," the statement took particular note of the
provisions for maintaining regular bilateral contacts
on major international problems and for "holding mutual
consultations in order to take appropriate effective
steps to safeguard the peace and security of both countries."
It declared that "the treaty is not directed against
anyone."
Nothing that their positions on various problems discussed
"are identical or very close," the statement specifically
cited the issues of "East Pakistan," Indochina, and the
Middle East. Giving prominence to the problem of more
than seven million refugees from "East Pakistan"--the
selection of nomenclature reflecting Soviet restraint--
both sides declared that "there can be no military
solution of this problem" and deemed it necessary that
"urgent steps be taken in East Pakistan for the achievement
of a political solution and for the creation of conditions
of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes."
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The renunciation of a "military solution" encompasses both
Indian oppbeition to Pakistan's imposition of a military
solution on East Bengal and a Soviet interest-in defusing
tensions on the Indian subcontinent. The call for a
"political solution," without further elaboration, falls
short, however, of the joint GDR-Indian statement, carried
by TASS on 24 June, which declarad that a solution to-the
basic political problem must be "in accordanc' with the
will of the people of East Pakistan and in consultation
with their elected representatives." Soviet commentators
have on several occasions since that 24 June statement
contended that a political settlement must give "due account
to the legitimate rights and interests of the population of
East Pakistan."
The Soviet-Indian joint statement also stated that all
international problems "including border disputes"--
applicable to Sino-Indian, Sino-Soviet, and Indian-
Pakistani points of contention--must be settled by
peaceful negotiations and that the use of force or threat
of force "is inadmissible."
MUTUAL CONSULTATION PROVISION STRESSED IN SOUTH ASIA''! CONTEXT
Soviet propagandists have continued to play on the themes
Moscow orchestrated immediately following the signing of
the treaty on 9 August. They have stressed that the "peace"
treaty is a stabilizing force in international affairs,
that it was not precipitated by any particular international
situation--PRAVDA on the 11th echoed previous, Soviet
contentions that the conclusion of the treaty resulted
from the natural evolution of bilateral relations and was
not based on "transitory factors or considerations dictated
by expediency"--and that it is not directed against any
third party. In general, Soviet comment on the treaty--
the 11 August PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials are examples--
has proffered essentially balanced treatment of most, of the
substantive points without placing particular emphasis on
any of them.
Some discussions, however, have put special emphasis on the
treaty's provision; for mutual consultations in case of
attack or threat of attack, and some of these have pointed
to specific geographical areas affected by the treaty.
While there has been no direct Soviet treatment of the
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treaty's applications to the acute Indian-Pakistani tensions,
Moscow sources have made unmistakable allusions to that
situation. For instance, the 13 August discussion of the
treaty by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as
reflected by the TASS account, consisted exclusively of
comments by Ponomarev and Gromyko, who focused almost
entirely on the treaty's security implications. Both
speaker=s elaborated in detail on the treaty's provision
for mutual consultations and the taking of "appropriate
effective measures" in case of attack or threat of attack.
Gromyko declared that "the entire treaty is keynoted" by
the two states' desire to insure security "in Asia and the
whole world," adding pointedly that the treaty is particularly
important "in the light of the present international
situation, and, in particular, in the light of the situation
developing south of the borders of the Soviet Union." "Of
particular significance in this respect is the commitment
contained in the treaty for consultations in case of attack
or threat of attack," Gromyko stressed, noting that "this
provision of the treaty has already drawn attention in many
capitals and corresponding conclusions are being drawn from
it." Gromyko's comments were broadcast in English to South
Asia on the 13th.
Echoing virtually identical views, a commentator on Moscow
Radio's domestic service rrundtable program on 15 August--
which largely ignored all"but the treaty provision dealing
with mutual consultation and appropriate action--followed
his explanation of the consultation provision, by quoting
an Indian paper's contention that the treaty "is aimed at
securing peace and stability in Hindustan and in all of Asia."
With similar emphasis on the treaty's provision for concerted
action in the case of hostilities, Ponomarev in the Presidium
discussions singled out U.S. activities in Indochina as the
object of the treaty's focus. He declared that the treaty
has obvious application "against the background of the
aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism" in Indochina, and he
expressed confidence that the treaty "will help the heroic
struggle of the patriots of Indochina." According to the
TASS account, Ponomarev addel., abtost as an afterthought,
that the treaty will become an historic landmark "also for
bilateral Soviet-Indian relations." U.S. presence in
Indochina was also focused on by a commentator on the
roundtable program who cited a Japanese newspaper's contention
that the treaty "will contribute to strengthening the Soviet
Union's role in insuring security in Southeast Asia."
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Broaching the subject of big-power rivalry in the Indian
Ocean, a commentary for South Asia and Africa by the
purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress contended
that "it goes without saying" that the treaty "strikes a
serious blow at the plans of the imperialists everywhere,
and in particular in the Indian Ocean region." The
commentary went on to denounce U.S. designs in the Indian
Ocean area.
Moscow's sensitivity to charges that the treaty is directed
against some particular third party was reflected in a
commentary for Japanese listeners on the 14th, reacting
to "certain Japanese newspapers' interpretations of this
treaty and their strange speculations about it." Citing
one paper's contention that the treaty "is aimed at
eventually strengthening the encirclement of China"--
this is the only direct reference to the PRC in connection
with the treaty noted in Soviet media--the commentary
expressed tale view that "it would be futile to try to
offer any refutation to those who cling to such an opinion."
In contrast to such stress on the military-security
implications of the treaty, some discussions had a
different focus. The extensive domestic service and
PRAVDA accounts of the 11 August discussions of the treaty
before the joint session of the foreign affairs commissions
of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet, in particular the
comments of Kuznetsov and Ponomarev, focused on the treaty's
contributions to the deepening of Soviet-Indian relations
and on points of bilateral agreement on various
international problems--arms control and disarmament,
and the fight against colonialism and racism. These
accounts contained no references to the treaty's
provisions concerning hostilities and no allusions to
the acute tension on the Indian subcontinent.
EAST EIROPEAN,PRESS SEES TREATY AWED AT PAKISTAN. PtiC
Despite Soviet professions to the contrary, the East European
media see the Soviet-Indian treaty as precipitated by
heightening Indo-Pakistani tensions and as directed toward
Pakistan with Peking as its patron. Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG
said on the 10th that the treaty was prompted by an
atmosphere on the Indian-Pakistani border "so strained
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that it threatened to explode," Bratislava's SMENA on the
12th cited the importance of the treaty's provisions renouncing
military alliances with or aid to any third party in view of
the Indian-Pakistani border conflicts and "the support and
one-sided encouragement of Pakistan in this conflict by
Peking." Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 12th contended that the
treaty had already had "a moderating" influence on the
Indo-Pakistani border confrontation. Asserting that the
treaty "has a rather clear meaning," Belgrade's BORBA on
the 11th expressed the view that "it should compensate
for possible negative repercussions [from Nixon's visit to
the PRC] on the strategic position of the USSR in the world
play of big powers."
PEKING, MOSCOW GIVE SPARSE COVERAGE TO PAKISTAN EVENTS
From its initial 3 April NCNA report on the Pakistan situation,
Peking virtually ignored the internal situation in East Bengal
and chose to paint a picture of Indian, and to a lesser extent
U.S. and Soviet, interference in the internal affairs of
Pakistan. NCNA has periodically carried Rawalpindi-datelined
dispatches reporting on alleged armed Indian intrusions into
East Bengal, the defeat and capture of such "aggressors" by
Pakistani forces, and Pakistani notes of protest to India
over the incidents. Other Peking items on Pakistan focus on
events reflecting closer PRC-Pakistan ties such as trade and
aid agreements, visits by various Pakistani groups to China,
and festivities marking anniversaries. For instance, NCNA
on 16 August reported celebrations in Pakistan marking its
24th anniversary and it cited President Yahya Khan's appeal
for unity in the face of "internal subversion and the threat
of external aggression." After citing celebrations in
Rawalpindi and Karachi, NCNA noted that "the people of
East Pakistan also celebrated the independence day with
enthusiasm," demonstrating their "indomitable will" to
"defend their country's honor, sovereignty, and integrity."
Monitored Peking comment has not yet taken note of the Soviet-
Indian treaty.
While Soviet media in recent weeks have given little direct
attention to events in Pakistan--the domestic service on
11 August did report on a soiree in Moscow devoted to
Pakistan independence day--Moscow has continued to report
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developments in regard to East Pakistan Awami League leader
Mujibur Rahman.* TASS on 11 August reported 4 tat Indira Gandhi
had appealed to the heads of government of 2;, countries "to
influence the government of Pakistan and save the life of
the eminent statesman and public figure," noting that he is
to be tried by a special military court "on a charge of
unleashing military action in Pakistan." It also reported
Indian Foreign Minister Singh's appeal to U Thant "to take
urgent steps to prevent the trial and insure the safety"
of Mujibur.
* Soviet treatment of the development of the current crisis
in Indian-Pakistani relations was updated in the TRENDS of
11 August, pages 30-32.
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A F R I C A
MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN ATTACK BANDA VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA
Denunciations from Moscow, seconded by East Berlin, have accompanied
the start on 16 August of the controversial visit by maverick Malawi
President Hastings Banda to the Republic of South Africa--the first
official one by a Black African head of state. The visit had been
announced by the Malawi and South African foreign affairs ministries
on the 11th and is in return for Pretoria Prime Minister John
Vorster's visit to Malawi last year. Dr. Banda last month had
announced his intention to go to South Africa in line with his
policy of "contact and dialog."
Moscow first commented on the 14th, in a Tarasov article in PRAVDA
which charged that Dr. Banda, "deliberately or not, is turning
the state of Malawi into the racists' Trojan horse." Moscow
broadcast summaries of the Tarasov article to African audiences in
English, French, and Portuguese, and TASS on the 16th carried a
commentary by Snegovskiy calling the visit "a challenge to
independent Africa." Radio Moscow has also recently denounced a
visit by a lower-level Malagasy Republic delegation to South Afr::..a,
headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Raharijona, which left for home
on the 12th.
Peking media, which have recurrently denounced the movement for
"dialog" with South Africa, have yet to mention the Malawi
president's visit to Pretoria. But on 16 August, reporting a
dinner given by Congo Brazzaville President Ngouabi for visiting
Equatorial Guinea President Nguema, NCNA noted that "on the
question of a 'dialog' with South Africa, President Ngouabi once
again made it clear that for the People's Republic of the Congo
to accept a 'dialog' with South Africa would be a very grave
absurdity."
MOSCOW The article by PRAVDA's Tarasov, covering about half
COVENT a column in the 14 August issue of the paper, charged
that Dr. Banda had "long ago" tied his country to
South Africa in return for millions of dollars in subsidies--a
friendship with Pretoria running counter to the position of thf
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and regarded "in Africa as a
betrayal of the interests of the peoples of the continent."
Pretoria, PRAVDA said, intends to uc rapproachment with "countries
like Malawi or the Ivory Coast to launch an economic offensive
against independent Africa."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 AUGUST 1971
The TASS commentary by Snegovskiy deplored the visit "by an
African, head of an independent African state, to a country
whose official doctrine classifies men like Banda" as "second-
class people, a race doomed to be oppressed." Like Tarasov,
Snegovskiy stressed the "high political price" Dr. Banda has
paid for his "pompous welcome" in Pretoria. Pursuing PRAVDA's
line in declaring that Malawi had "always" been out of step
with the policy of the majority of African states in the OAU
toward "the South African racialists and the Portuguese
colonialists," the commentator observed that Pretoria was
staking ito hopes on "the splitters of African unity."
EAST BERLIN In a similar vein, the East Berlin domestic
radio on the 16th reviled Dr. Banda for
"enjoying the status of a white man 'honoris causal" during
his stay in "the country of apartheid." The commentator
remarked that Malawi has made "the greatest leap forward" in
accommodation with South Africa, in contrast to the police
of "the most progressive stated of Africa such as Somalia,
Guinea, the People's Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania." Like
the TASS commentary, it cited examples of Malawi-South African
military cooperation #nd charged in addition that South
African advisers are working in the Malawi radio station "so
that a transmitter--made in West Germany--with a capacity of
100 kilowatts can broaauast agitation against neighboring
Tanzania and Zaibia." Calling the visit a "betrayal of
12 million oppressed Africans and of the Malawi people," the
commentator noted that it was starting "on the very day when
a terror trial against 14 South African resistance fighters
will be opened in Pietermaritzburg."
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CONFIDENTIAL FRIG T13ENDS
18 AUGUST 1971
0
- 53 -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
ARTICLES CONTINUE TO STRESS STEEL PRIORITY OVER ELECTRONICS
The list of those opposed to taking the electronics industry as
the key to China's industrial development has been increased by
one, to include the electronics industry itself. In an article
in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 12 Auauat, the writing group of the elec-
tronics industry criticized those who preach that "China should
make the electronics industry the center of its industries in
order to advance the development of the national economy as a
whole." As usual, "Liu Shao-chi and company" get the blame for
fomenting the erroneous line, but criticism of this erroneous
line has surfaced in PRC media only in the past few months,
indicatingthat there have been recen a emp s o rev ve e
'thesis.
This article and other earlier ones (by the writing group of
the Ministry of Metallurgical Industiy on 12 May and a signed
PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 1. June) affirm that electronics are
of importance, but stress the priority of basic industries
which produce raw materials, especially iron and steel. The
articles firmly adhere to the theory that it is necessary to
increase the output of products used to produce means of
production before increasing production of consumer resources;
in Mao's words "if we have grain and iron and steel, everything
else will be-easy."
The emphasis on iron and steel apparently also assists the
machine-building industry. The 12-Lune PEOPLE'S DAILY article
stressed the priority of machine building, pointing out the
symbiotic relationship of this industry with mining. The
electronics industry article highlights machine building Li
noting that the "development of our country's machine-building
industry and national economy as a whole urgently necessitates
a rapid development of the iron and steel industry." The
article warns, however, that no industry, even machine tool
building, can replace iron and steel manufacture at the center.
Indicating that the argument over priorities does not apply
only to steel versus electronics, the article by the elec-
tronics industry stresses that Liu and his ilk felt free to
treat as the "center" anything which attracted their attention:
sometimes electronics, sometimes electronics and chemicals,
at other periods the machinery industry or even shipbuilding.
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14C
Any vacillation which detracts from steel as the center is said
to frustrate efforts to build "industry into an independent and
integrated system."
V he fact that the stress on ion-and steel affects weapons
evelopment is frankly acknowledged in the electronics industry
article, although it is hazy as to actual policies being imple-
mented. The article states that electronics technology,
"to ether with atomic technology and jet engine technology,
is generally regarded as a criterion used tomeasure the
bevel- of-development of a country's industry," but it warns
tha a'T dvanced and special technology is one thing, while the
foundation and center are another; the two cannot be mixed
together." Only after the fundamental industry, supplier of
raw materials, has been developed can other industries follow
suit. Thii convoluted formulation, stressing basic industry,
seems designed to in'" ov till
a
P
p er s unresolved areas of dis-
cussion, but at least opens the possibility that the PLA is being
askedt0_._dvfer. aomA i nru .8 into a.dvanrad Lem g
.. P _-p~mZ
The ideological aspects of the electronics-versus-steel question
were discussed in another .12 August PEOPLE'S DAILY article by
an author who seemed extraordinarily unskilled at polemical
argumen+. Revealing that Lenin and Stalin are among those who
can be quoted to the effect that steel need not be placed above
all else, he criticized advocates of a rapid development of
advanced technology for having distorted and "blatantly
tampered with" Lenin's formula that "communism consists of
the soviet system plus nationwide electrification."
According to the article, the electronics advocates have misused
the theory for their own ends by changing it to include not only
electrification but also advanced electronics, thus implying
"that Lenin's formula has long since been outdated." The author
fails to explain, however, why Lenin, and Stalin also, indicated
that electricity rather than steel was the central factor.
The author then does just what he accuses the Liuists of doing,
by arguing that Lenin's nationwide electrification "means not
only electricity, but th-: availability of materials for
economic construction, including electronics, atomic power,
and jet propulsion technology." Without explaining how steel
f? a into the center, the article argues that Lenin's plan was
not really technical at all, but a political plan whose funda-
mental aspect was insistence on a soviet state, that is, a
Maoist continuing dictatorship of the proletariat. Indicating
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18 AUGUST 1971
that the championing of electronics is only a ploy engaged, in
by,-...those opposed to Mao;.~,F,c au or c9osee with the fervent
declaration ~ha~ these tricks only expose those persons who,
".frantically attempting to pose as che.mpions--of Leninism are
actually schemers pro~t3ng usurp party and state authority."
NEW PARTY CCt"VII TTEE ELECTED FOR ALI AREA I N TIBET
A party congress held frc.. 26 to 29 June elected a new party
committee for the vast but thinly populated All area in Tibet,
according to Lhasa radio on 15 August. India's Western border
with China faces on Ali for three-fourths of its length.
The Ali area CCP committee is the first party committee to be
formed at the area (district) level in Tibet. Tibet is one
of the four provincial-level units in China that have not yet
established their top party organs. .
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