TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010027-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: August 11, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Illlllll~iiimiuui~~llllllll~
TRENDS,
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
11 AUGUST 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 32)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by MIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
!eluded from euleeueUle
d.w,, vedin0 and
CONFIDENTIAL
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11 AUGUST 1971
CONTENTS
r
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Anniversary Documents Stress DRV Independence, Sovereignty . . .
1
DRV Scores U.S. Acts Since Tonkin Episode, Professes Optimism . .
2
Moscow Again Says Nixon Trip Helps U.S. Avoid. Reply to PRG . . .
3
DRV, PRG Press for U.S. Withdrawal, End to Support for GVN . . .
.5
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Scores U.S. Bombing of DRV . . . . .
6
NLHS Envoy Leaves Vientiane After Exchange Between Princes . . .
7
Commentaries on GVN Elections Raise Spectre of Ky Coup . . . . .
9
SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS
Arbatov Examines Impact of Peking Trip on U.S.-Soviet Ties . . .
10
CHINA AND DPRK
Kim Il-song Endorses Nixon Trip to Peking as Victory for PRC . .
13
KOREA
DPRK, PRC Demand U.S. Withdrawal from Scuth Korea . . . . . . . .
16
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PRC Rejects Soviet Proposal, Repeats Call for World Summit . . .
20
MIDDLE EAST
Sudan: Moscow Curtails Protests, Berates PRC for "Silence" . . .
22
USSR Speculates on Reported Israeli-PRC Contacts . . . . . . . .
24
Soviet Union, India Sign Treaty During Gromyko Visit . . . . . .
26
Parties Pledge "Appropriate Effective Measures" to Insure Peace .
27
Moscow Portrays Pact as Natural Step, Stabilizing Factor . . . .
28
Background on Soviet Treatment of Indian-Pakistani Tension . . .
30
(Continued)
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CONTENTS (Continued)
Moscow and Allies Publicize New Economic Integration Program . . 33
Belgrade Charges, Budapest Denies Pact Maneuvers Pose Threat . 36
Szechwan Provincial Radio Resumes Local Broadcasting . . . . . . 39
r+
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
11 AUGUST 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 AUGUST 1971
Moscow (2744 items)
Peking (1358 items)
Sudan
(15%)
8%
Domestic Issues
(33%)
304%
China
(5%)
6%
[PLA Anniversary
(16%)
11%]
[Sino-U.S.
(3%)
3%]
Indochina
(15%)
15%
Relations
[PEOPLE'S DAILY
(--)
4%]
CEMA Council
(5%)
6%
Commentator on
Session
Indochina
(9%)
5%
Sihanouk Message
China UN Seat
(0.1%)
6%
Tsedenbal in USSR
(--)
3%
Algerian Foreign
(2%)
5%
Salyut & Lunakhod I
(4%)
4%
Minister in PRC
Middle East
11%)
2%
PRC-Turkey Diplomatic
(--)
5%
Apollo 15
(--)
1%
Relations
PEOPLE'S DAILY
(--)
4%
Commentator on South
Korea
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestiz and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
xuent or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of vole mne are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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11 AUGUST 1971
INDOCHINA
Perhaps because of Vietnamese communist sensitivity on the i0sue of
Sino-U.S. relations, Hanoi and PRG media have maintained an unusual
week-long silence on President Nixon's )! August press conference in
which he spoke about his planned trip to China as well as about
Vietnam. Continued ree.ssertions of the DRV's resolve to decide its
own future and attacks on the President's "schemes" seem indicative
of Hanoi's unabated concern about Sino-U.S. developments. The
warning that the United States is trying to "sow discord among
socialist countries" appears currently in a 6 August NHAN DAN
article marking the anniversary of the dropping of atomic bombs on
Japan.
0
Moscow commentators continue to charge the United States with
procrastinating on a reply to tie PRG's 1 July peace plan and
reiterate the line that the Presid'ent's projected Peking trip aids
these dilatory tactics. A highly authoritative article by Georgiy
Arbatov in the 10 August PRAVDA complains that the announcement of
the President's PRC visit has created the "illusion" in some U.S.
circles that the Vietnam question can be settled behind the backs
of the Vietnamese; Arbatov also says the timing of the invitation
did "obvious damage" to the Vietnamese patriots' struggle.
Sihanouk's current raission to Pyongyang seems to have ,.:rved
Peking's purpose of reassuring its ally regarding the impact of
President Nixon's visit to the PRC. At a rally for Sihanouk on
the 6th, Kim 21.-song hailed the planned visit as "a great victory"
of the Chinese people and the world revolutionary forces and
observed that the PRC Government has made clea" its intention to
continue to support the revolutionary people. NCNA carried the
text of Kim's speech, which Li Hsien-nien on the 9th called "an
important speech."
Continuing Chinese elite-level support for the PRG's peace proposal
was voiced by Li Hsien-nien on the 9th in welcoming a DPRK economic
delegation. Li also included an endorsement of Sihanouk's five-point
declaration and the Pathet Lao's five-point proposal while again
calling for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from all of
Indochina totally and unconditionally.
ANNIVERSARY DOCIMENTS STRESS DRV INDEPENDENCE. SOVEREIGNTY
North Vietnam's concern to emphasize its independent line in the
wake of the announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking
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11 AUGUST 1971
is currently manifest in party documents released in preparation
for the anniversary of the August Revolution (19 August) and
DRV National Day (2 September). The slogans for the two
anniversaries, publicized on 5 August, are in most respects
similar to those released last year. But in the third slogan,
calling for perseverence and stepped-up resistance to achieve
complete victory, last year's reference to overcoming hardships
is :replaced by an appeal stressing independence: "Let us
uphold the spirit of independence and sovereignty, rely mainly
on ourselves . . . ."
This theme was given more prominence in the party Secretariat's
circular for the anniversaries, issued on the 4th and publicized
by Hanoi the next day. In a definition of three "main tasks,"
the circular includes a strong reaffirmation of independence
along with routine exhortations to strengthen economic and
defense forces and to carry out duties in combat and labor. The
circular proclait-s that "our party's revolutionary, independent,
sovereign line is the most important cause for all the achieve-
ments of our people" and adds pointedly: "Our people must
determine their own future." It goes on to claim that the
combatants and people, "unanimous and united behind our party,
thoroughly understand the correct, creative, independent, and
sovereign line and are determined ~o lead our people's
revolutionary cause to new successes."
DRV SCORES U.S. ACTS SINCE TONKIN EPISODE, PROFESSES OPTIMISM
The anniversary of the August 1964 Tonkin 5ulf incident is
marked, as usual, with editorials and other comment scoring U.S.
actions in Indochina. The 5 August NHAN DAN editorial, like
other propaganda, cites the Pentagon papers to substantiate
charges that the United States planned the incident. Turning to
the present, the editorial denounces the Nixon Administration as
"much more reactionary and insidious than its predecessors"
and echoes earlier Hanoi comment which seemed to reflect Hanoi's
displeasure over Sino-U.S. contacts. It charges that "extremely
cunning and wicked, the Nixon clique is seeking a thousand and
one ways to extricate itself from its impasse." The AdministratiOn,
it adds, is "pulling wires, devising schemes, and bragging about
peace in the hope of covering up its scheme to prolong and expand
the war" and to ward off the demand of public opinion "that it
respond to the seven-point PRG proposal, withdraw U.S. troops, and
stop supporting the Thieu administration."
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11 AUGUST 1971
The 5 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the Tonkin
anniversary is most notable for its optimistic claim that the
worst part of the struggle is over. Although Hanoi propaganda
normally avoids any suggestion that sacrifices required of the
people may be reduced, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial says
flatly that "the fiercest ordeals" have been overcome and that
"the most difficult stage of the revolution is over." It
cautions that there will be more "obstacles," but it states
that "we have a firm and steady base and fundamental advantages
for achieving the final goal."
Seeming to anticipate a new stage in the war, the QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN editorial comments that as a result of "victories of
strategic significance" in North and South Vietnam, the
"resistance struggle is opening a new prospect for our people."
Later it claims that the "victories" in southern Laos, on
Highway 9, and in Cambodia during the first half of 1971 "have
proven that both the position and strength of the revolutionary
people of the Indochinese countries are an the verge of a new
development." The editorial concludes with a call for the
armed forces and people to "overcome hardships and difficulties"
and score "glorious feats of arms" to "panic the enemy," along
with an avowal of the determination of the army and people to
"completely defeat" the allies.
MOSCOW AGAIN SAYS NIXON TRIP HELPS U.S. AVOID REPLY TO PRG
Moscow presses the line that President Nixon's projected trip
to Peking is helping the United States to put off a response
to the PRG's peace initiative and will not serve the cause of
ending the war. Brief Moscow radio reports of President Nixon's
4 August press conference say he "acknowledged" that the U.S.
Government is being criticized for failing to answer the PRG
proposal and note that he "refused" to say when the United
States would reply. The reports do not, however, acknowledge
the President's remark that the United States is pursuing
negotiations "in established channels." Where in response to a
question tie President said he would not speculate about the
effect of his trip on the Vietnam war but that he did not
expect the Peking visit to bring an immediate detente, the radio
accounts as well as a PRAVDA international review on the 8th
represent him as saying his talks with the Chinese leaders
"would not mean the immediate end of the Vietnam war."
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Moscow's reports predictably fail to mention the exchange at the
press conference on an Asian conference on Vietnam and the
speculation by a newsman that the PRC may favor such a forum.
But LITERARY GAZETTE on 4 August, in a roundup of the foreign
press, cites the London ECONOMIST for a report that Australian
opposition leader Whitlam said Chou En-tai told him China is
willing to participate in a new Geneva-type conference on
Indochina provided it dispensed with the Soviet-British
cochairmanship and took on a more Asian character. The srane
paper cites other Western press sources as suggesting tnat the
PRC may help the President end the Vietnam war and that the
North Vietnamese are afraid a Sino-American agreement may be
reached behind their backs.
ARBATCV ON Georgiy Arbatov's lengthy, authoritative evkmina-
VIETNAM tion of the possible impact of the President's
planned Peking visit on U.S.-Soviet relations*
includes the observation that many people in America hope Peking
will help the United States end the Vietnam war on terms
"suitable to the American bourgeoisie"--a hope reinforced, Arbatov
saya,-by the announcement'- of the visit* dn`.a period when .a
deep "political rift" has developed in American public opinion
on the issue of the war.
With the PRO's 1 July peace initiative charting "a clear road to
peace" and prompting the American public to increase its pressure
on the Administration, Arbatov says, the announcement of the
President's decision to go to Peking was used to deflect attention
from the PRG proposal and to build up the "illusion" that it would
be possible to settle the Vietnam question over the heads of the
Vietnamese people. Commenting briefly on the PRC's position on
Vietnam, he said the timing of the invitation to the President
could not but inflict "obvious damage" on the Vietnamese patriots'
struggle. As for Peking's motives in "easing" the President's
situation, he. quoted the- -Nev York, POST as' daying? that this is a
problem for "China experts and Maoists."
* See the Soviet-U.S. Relations section of this TRENDS for a
general discussion of the article.
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11 AUGUST 1971
DRV. PRG PRESS FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL, END TO SUPPORT FOR GVN
Vietnamese media sustain their publicity for reports of worldwide
support for the PRG's 1 July proposal and devote no current
commentaries to the proposal or the Paris talks. The proposal is
endorsed in a joint DRV-Algerian communique released on the 9th,
following the 1-6 August Hanoi visit of a delegation headed by
Foreign Minister Bouteflika. The communique accuses the
Administration of blocking progress at Paris and of "seeking
ways and means to force the Vietnamese people to accept its
terms." It reaffirms Vietnamese determination in the face of
"these outbursts of violence" and "perfidious political maneuvers."
VNA's account of the 5 August session of the Paris talks indicates
that the communist delegates again pressed the seven-point PRG
proposal but does not report their references to specific parts
of the proposal's first two points, including the conditions for
separate cease-fires with U.S. and-GVN forces. VNA also
ignores DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's attack on the U.S. proposal for
a cease-fire.
VNA says Thuy supported the PRG's "correct, fair, and reasonable"
peace plan and "laid bare the Nixon Administration's dilatory
attitude in refusing to respond" to it--an attitude which
"reveals Nixon's real intention of prolonging the war." He
emphasized, according to VNA, that the Paris talks "could not
make progress so long as the Nixon Administration refuses to
respond" to the seven points. The account says the PRG's
Mme. Binh recalled the "essence" of the seven-point program
and "refuted all tortuous allegations of the Nixon Administration
aimed at delaying the negotiations." She stressed that "the
so-called will for exploration of all capabilities for peaceful
negotiations of the Nixon Administration is sheer hypocrisy" and
that "the first thing to be made clear" is whether the
Administration is really interested in ending the war.
In keeping with her practice in recent weeks, Mme. Binh again
scored the Thieu administration and the United States in
connection with the forthcoming elections in South Vietnam. The
VNA account includes her charge that the United States and its
"puppets" have "resortea to every fraudulent maneuver to prepare
for the forthcoming elections and have repressed at will all
those who oppose these ma^Au ers."
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Vietnamese communist media still have not reported Ambassador
Bruce's resignation as head of the American delegation, and VNA's
account of the 5 August Paris session neglects to mention that
deputy head Philip Habib represented the United States. Brushing
off the U.S. and GVN statements in a single sentence, it says
only that "at today's session, the U.S. Saigon puppets'
representatives again rehashed their threadbare allegations and
gave no serious response to the seven-point peat;: program of the
PRG."
DENIAL OF DRV VNA's account of the Paris session atypically
PRISONER RELEASE reports remarks by Xuan Thuy prior to the
session to refute speculation about a pending
DRV release of more than 180 American prisoners, prompted by a story
in a Swedish newspaper citing Scandinavian airline officials. Thuy
stated, according to VNA, that early on the morning of 5 August he
had heard news from "ur_known sources that in the very near futire a
great number of American prisoners will be released from Hanoi and
carried by some kind of aircraft." He remarked that the person who
"spread this news was very imaginative indeed," and he added that
point one of the 1 July PRG proposal deals with the practical way
for the Nixon Administration to obtain the release of its prisoners.
FOREIGN MIVISTRY SPOKESM SCORES U.S. BOMBING OF DRV
Protests issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 7 and
10 August denounced alleged U.S. actions against the demilitarized
zone and North Vietnam. Treatment by the media of the actions
protested on the 7th was routine, but the incident protested by
the spokesman on the 10th, in which U.S. jets allegedly attacked a
commune in Vinh Linh on 8 August, has been given atypical propaganda
attention.* The alleged attack was first denounced in a VNA report
on the 9th, and the official protest on the 10th was supplemented,
according to the VNA press review, by comment in both QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN and NHAN DAN.
0 The'U.S. Command in Saigon announced on 9 August that a
"protective reaction" strike was made the previous day six miles
north of the DMZ against antiaircraft guns that had fired on an
unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane and two fighter-bomber escorts.
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The 10 August foreign ministry spokesman's statement charged
that the United States on the 8th "sent its aircraft and launched
artillery attacks from positions south of the DMZ to bomb and
sh%11 Vinh Chap commune, Vinh Linh area, belonging to the
territory of the DRV." It claimed that "this mad act of war
by the U.S. imperialists inflicted heavy damage upon the local
people," but it used routine language in demanding an end to
U.S. "acts of war" against the DRV and to encroachments on DRV
sovereignty and security.
The VNA report of 9 August was more graphic than the spokesman's
protest. Charging that three U.S. F-4 jets "madly raided" the
commune, it says "the U.S. air pirates unleashed eight CBU's
and numerous delayed-action as well as instantaneous-action
steel pellet bombs, destroying three dwelling houses, a tractor,
and many crop fields and causing other losses to the local
population." It went on to score other alleged U.S. actions
against the DRV which the foreign ministry protest did not
mention, asserting that U.S. B-52's bombed Huong Lap commune
from 5 to 8 August while U.S. artillery "based on warships and
south of the Ben Hai demarcation river bombarded Vinh Quang,
Vinh Giang, and Vinh Son communes, all lying in the northern
part of the DMZ."
The 7 August protest charged that on the 5th U.S. aircraft
bombed Huong Lap village and shelled Vinh Son and Vinh Ciang
villages with artillery from south of the demilitarized zone.
It stated that the villages are in the demilitarized zone, north
of the 17th parallel. The protest also said that on the same
day U.S. aircraft "on several occasions strafed a number of
localities in Bo Trach district, Quang Binh Province."
NLHS ENVOY LEAVES VIENTIANE AFTER EXCHANGE BETWEEN PRINCES
Prince Souvanna Phouma's proposal, in a letter to Souphanouvong
dated 22 July, for meetings of plenipotentiaries to be held
alternately in Vientiane and in a neutralized area within a
30-kilometer radius--"and perhaps a little more"--of the Plain
of Jars airfield is denounced in a letter from Souphanouvong
on 4 August and in a statement from the "office" of the NLHS
Central Committee on the 7th. The central committee statement
also announces that SouphQ- rvong's special envoy, Tiao Souk
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11 AUGUST 1971
Vongsak, left Vientiane for Sam Neua to report.* The Path.+? Lao
response is couched in relatively restrained terms, however,
and there is no indication that contacts between the princes will
be discontinued.
Souphanouvong's current message is similar to his letter of 11 July
which attacked Souvanna Phouma's 5 July proposal for a cease-fire
in the Plain of Jars.** The message says the latest proposal is
merely a restatement of the previous one and a "trick" to avoid
acceptance of the 22 June NLHS proposal for a cease-fire throughout
the whole territory of Laos. Souvanna Phouma's proposal,
Souphanouvong adds, is aimed at covering up the military operations
of the U.S. imperialists and their "lackeys" in the Plain of Jars-
Xieng Khouang area and in southern Laos. He concludes by warning
that the Americans and their "flunkeys" will be held responsible
for "all serious consequences" of their -.ctions and that Souvanna
Phouma will "equally share" that responsibility. Souphanouvong's
11 July message had said Souvanna Phouma was "also heavily"
responsible for the actions for which the United States and the
"ultrareactionaries" were "fully" responsible.
The statement of the "office" of the NLHS Central Committee denounces
Souvanna Phouma's proposal in similar terms, although it attributes
only "heavy responsibility" for consequences of aggression to the
Prince and asserts that he made his proposal under U.S. "pressure."
I; concludes that the NLHS "unswervingly persevered'.in its stand
for a peaceful settlement in Laos but will not tolerate any U.S.
"se:botage" and will deal punishing blows to all enemy military
adventures. The NLHS position is echoed in a statement issued by
a r;pokesman of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee
on the same day.
None of the official statements refers to Souvanna Phouma's ,&lusion,
in his latest letter, to Souphanouvong's 11 July assertion that it
is possible to order a cease-fire as was done in 1961. Souvanna
said the current situation in Laos is unlike that of 1961 and is
further complicated by the fact that "certain states" have
interfered in Lao affairs and by the relationship of the Lao
situation to the Vietnam war. However, a 4 August Pathet Lao radio
commentary did score Souvanna Phouma's "excuses" to the effect that
the current situation is not propitious for a cease-fire like that
of 1961; it also complained that he tried to conceal U.S. aggression
in Laos by charging "somebody else" with being the aggressor.
* The envoy had returned to Vientiane from Sam Neua on 8 May after
an absence of more than three months.
** See the 14 July TRENDS, pages 8-9, for a discussion of this
earlier exchange.
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COMMENTARIES ON GVN ELECTIONS RAISE SPECTER OF KY COUP
Nguyen Cao Ky's failure to qualify as a presidential candidate
is cited by Hanoi and Liberation Front media as further proof
of the "fraudulent" nature of the impending South Vietnamese
elections and of President Thieu's allegedly heavy-handed efforts
to insure his own reelection. Little attention has been given
to Thieu's only opponent, Duong Van Minh, although some reports
note indications that he is considering withdrawing from the
race.
A 7 August NHAN DAN article and other comment stress Ky's anger
at his failure to qualify and present what they describe as
evidence that he will not give in without a further struggle.
The article portrays Ky as "a powerful man who once headed a
cligre of unruly, hard-headed generals," and it speculates that
he will not let Thieu "bully" him. Among other things, it says
an opinion poll within the ranks of the ARVN has indicated that
60 percent are against Thieu; it quotes Fly as remarking after
his candidacy was rejected that "no one knows how the army will
react." In the same vein, a 10 August Liberation Radio
commentary predicts more directly that "Ky will surely stage a
bitter showdown" and adds--in an allusion to the exploits of a
literary hero--that "it is not difficult for Ky to achieve
something, because Icy not only has sabres but also iron horses
and iron birds."
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- 10 -
SOVIET-U, S. RELATIONS
ARBATOV EXAMINES IMPACT OF PEKING TRIP ONlJ,S,-SOVIET TIES
Moscow has given new force to its expressions of concern over
President Nixon's projected visit to Peking in a lengthy,
authoritative article in the 10 August PRAVDA by Georgiy
Arbatov, identified in the paper as director of the USA
Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.* Entitled "Questions
Calling for a Practical Answer," the article in effect cautions
the United States against engaging in any diplomatic maneuvering
in Peking at Moscow's expense which could undermine the
confidence necessary for the negotiation of sensitive issues
in U.S.-Soviet relations. It also in effect calls on the United
States to demonstrate that the visit is not based on anti-Sovietism
by taking "a more constructive" approach t'ward major
international issues. Arbatov thus goes beyond the initial
Soviet reaction in the I. Aieksandrov article in PRAVDA on
25 July by elaborating on the implications of the projected
Peking summit for the ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations. The
article is notable for its reasoned presentation and moderate
tone, its argument against any simplistic approach to the
planned visit--possibly addressed to Soviet hardliners--and its
advocacy of a wait-and-see attitude.
Arbatov's article appears against the background of the recently
concluded Crimea summit, minus Ceausescu, which apparently
discussed a coordinated Soviet bloc line on the Peking trip.
An indication of the importance Moscow attaches to the article
is the fact that TASS carried it in full in its international
services.
IF Arbatov is also a member of the CPSU Central Committee's
auditing commission. His writings in the past have appeared to
reflect relatively moderate views on U.S.-Soviet relations.
Most recently, he argued in the 4 May 1971 PRAVDA for U.S.-
Soviet detente. on the basis of political realities and
pragmatic mutual interests.
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In passages apparently designed mainly for communist con3umption,
Arbatov begins by rejecting any "simple" approach to the Peking
visit that au'-omatically ascribes it to anti-Soviet motives.
While acknowledging the standard line that the shift in U.S.
policy toward China has gone. hand in hand with Peking's
hostility toward the USSR, he adds: "But one cannot deduce
that all Americans who come out for improving relations between
the United States and China are motivated by aims hostile to
other socialist countries." He comments that "progressive
circles in the United States and some liberals have for a long
time been coming out against the cold war course, demanding an
improvement of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, including the PRC." And he goes on to
trace the shift in U.S. policy toward China to equally
pragmatic considerations--to American public opinion influenced
"not by Peking's loud worde but by its deeds." Peking's "deeds
convinced the Americans that China does not represent a real
threat to the United. States, and therefore one can do business
with it."
Also linking the President's acceptance uF. Peking's invitation
to domestic politics, Arbatov says that "evidently the upcoming
U.S. elections played a big role" in influencing the decision on
the trip, since the Administration "is particularly interested
in actions which would help to insure victory for the Republican
party." He cites as an additional factor in Administration thinking
the hope that Peking might be able to help end the Vietnam war,
and in this context he seeks to exploit Chinese vulnerability by
charging that the invitation to ,he President has eased the
pressure on Washington to respond to the Vietnamese communist
peace proposal of 1 July. But Arbatov declines to elaborate
on the possible long-term effects the Peking-Washington talks
might have on Hanoi's interests.
Registering concern over the visit's possible effects on Soviet
interests, the article suggests that if the talks in Peking
assume an anti-Soviet character they could adversely affect
U.S.-Soviet negotiations on sensitive issues. Any attempt to
drive a wedge between the USSR and the PRC or to step up
"anti-Soviet intrigues," Arbatov warns, "would. demonstrate
extreme political shortsightedness;" Taking note*xpt"tlfihq, -,.`
ongoing U.S.-Soviet "dialog on a broad range of problems," he
emphasizes that "confidence is needed for their successful
solution" and cautions that "there can be no stronger blow
at confidence than unscrupulous diplomatic maneuvers, backstage
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intrigues, and ambiguities." As in the Aleksandrov article,
Arbatov stops short of directly charging that the United States
harbors these designs, attributing such suspicions about U.S.
motives to "commentaries in the American press."
As if to challenge the President to live up to his statement
that the visit to Peking will be a journey for peace and not
detrimental to the interests of other countries, Arbatov insists
that such statements can only be verified by deeds. In this
context, he indicates that the United States can demonstrate
its good faith on Vietnam, the Middle East, European security,
limitation of the arms race, and U.S. relations with socialist
countries. Here Arbatov makes a general plea for U.S.-Soviet
detente on the basis of mutual interests: If American policy
combines the steps towards improving Sino-U.S. relations with
a turn toward a more constructive position on these major
East-West issues, he says, "then in this case grounds will
appear to take the statements about Washington's peace-loving
intentions and good will seriously. There is no doubt that
such a turn would be positively assessed in the Soviet Union."
Such a development, he argues further, "would be in the
interests of the USSR, the PRC, and the United States; and so
far as the Soviet Union's policy is concerned, the road is open."
Concluding on a note of open-mindedness tinged with skepticism,
Arbatov says there are "many grounds" for suspecting that U.S.
policy will not move in this direction and cautions that in
such oircumstnaces "events will suggest appropriate conclusions,
and these undoubtedly will be made . . . . for this is a matter
of grave consequence for the Soviet people %nd for socialism."
Taken as a whole, the Soviet response highlighted by the
Aleksandrov and Arbatov articles suggests a careful effort to
avoid an overreaction that would jeopardize Brezhnev's foreign
policy program as outlined at the 294th CPSU Congress. While
airing misgivings over recent Sino-U.S. developments, making
extensive use of the proxy of foreign comment, Moscow has sought
to avoid an impression that its policy lines have been seriously
disrupted and has indicated an intent to wait and see what
direction a further Sino-U.S. detente may take before altering the
basic lines of its own policy. Moscow's approach thus serves not
only to warn its partners in the triangular relationship against
prejudicing Soviet interests, but also to forestall any pressures
from hardline elements at home to move toward a tougher position.
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11 AUOI)f1T 1.9'j1
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CHINA AND DPRK
KIM IL-SONG ENDORSES NIXON TRIP TO PEKING AS VICTORY FOR PRC
Prince Sihanouk's visit to North Korea occasioned Pyongyang's
first comment on President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC,
rim endorsement of Peking's demarche by Kim Il-oong in a speech
tit a 6 August rally for Sihanouk. The latter, in his 24th
"message to the Khmer nation" on 30 July, had made the xiret
move in explaining that the invitation to the President did
not mean any wavering of Poking's support for its allies.KCNA
transmitted Sihanouk's message on 31 July. The sequence of
events suggests that Sihanouk's mission may have been designed
at least in part to convey Peking's reassurances and to put
on a show of solidarity. Peking disseminated the text of
Sihanouk's message and of Kim's speech, in the process
carrying PRC media's only mentions of the invitation to the
President since the original announcement. Li Hsien-nien,
speaking at a banquet for a visiting DPRK economic delegation
on 9 August, applauded Kim for having delivered an "important
speech" on the 6th in which he made "a penetrating analysis
of the current international situation." Li vowed that the
Chinese "will always unite" with the Korean, Indochinese,
and other Asian people to oppose U.S. and Japanese "schemes
of aggression."
Peking had used a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on
3 August pegged to Sihanouk's message to reassure its allies
of continuing support despite developments in Sino-U.S.
relations. The Commentator article, while carefully skirting
the subject of the invitation to President Nixon, expressed
support for Sihanouk's claim that the Indochina question can
be solved only by the Indochinese people themselves and for
his denunciation of an alleged U.S. "plot" to convene a new
Geneva conference.
Until it disseminated Sihanouk's message, Pyongyang had
remained silent about the President's projected visit but,
unlike Hanoi, refrained from comment implicitly critical
of the move. Like Hanoi, Pyongyang never reported the
April visit of the American table tennis team to the PRC.
Kim's endorsement of President Nixon's visit, seconded in
a NODONG SINMUN editorial on 8 August, hailed the event as
"a great victory" of the Chinese people and of the world
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CON V1 1) ENT IA L, 101310 THYNDO
.1.1. /tUCH101.' 1,97:1
revolutionary .toroeo, implicitly including the North Korerura.
Kim sought to portray the visit in tough anti.-U.G. terms,
claiming that the President is going to Peking--as the
United States went to Panmunjorn-"with a white flag" and
that the visit will be not a "march of a victor" but a "trip
of the defeated." According to Kim, the projected visit
shows that Washington's "hostile policy" toward the PRC for
more than 20 years has become bankrupt and that the United
States has succumbed to the pressure of the world revolutionary
forces. Expressing support for Peking's diplomatic drive,
both Kim and the editorial perceived an "irresistible trend"
in the world today to recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate
government of China and to establish diplomatic relations with
it.
The NODONG SINMUN editorial is notable for addressing itself
to issues raised in the international communist movement over
the invitation to President Nixon. In effect answering
criticism from Moscow and other communist capitals, the
editorial aivanced an analogy between the Soviet Union's
success in emerging from isolation and Peking's current
drive. Describing the establishment of Soviet-U.S, diplomatic
relations as a victory for Soviet foreign policy "pursued by
Lenin and Stalin" and a "surrender" by the United States,
the paper pointedly added: "The Soviet people won then,
and the Chinese people are winning now." The editorial
was carried in full by NCNA.
Kim may have been alluding to the misgivings expressed by
Moscow--and perhaps responding to Hanoi's disquiet--when
he noted in his speech that the invitation to the President
"has aroused a wide variety of public opinion in the world
today," but he did not elaborate. (He made a remark
more point,odly critical of the Soviets in another context
when he said it was natural that those countries which
"truly support the national liberation struggle" should
recognize Sihanouk's government and reject the "Lon
Nol-Sirik Matak clique," an allusion to Moscow's failure
to recognize Sihanouk's RGNU and its maintenance of its
embassy in Phnom Penh).
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Both Kim and the editorial atreaued that Poking romaine it
"reliable pillar" of 1oian revolutionary fob;oa and faithful
to "proletarian internationalism" in supporting people
fighting U.U. imporialiem. Kim suggested that official
cwouraucen have bou made, noting that the PItC Government
"makes it clec.r" that Poking will "continue to actively
support and encourage the fighting revolutionary people."
Both Kim and the editorial recalled that the, recent
celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the PRC-DPRK
mutual defense treaty--which were taking place during
the Kissinger mission to Peking--attt cod to the solidarity
of the two countries.
While endorsing the invitation to President Nixon, Pyongyang
at the same time has put the projected-visit in the'perspective
of hardline anti-U.S. interests. Kim declared that the
situation makes it incumbent on the revolutionary forces
"to unite more closely and mount a more violent attack on
the imperialists," warning that the enemy will become more
? vicious during a period of apparent cetente.
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KOREA
DPRK? PRC PRESENT DEMAND FOR UPS1 WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH KOREA
A seven-point demand for U.S. withdrawal from South Korea was put
forwsrd on 29 July by the North Korean representative at a
meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), speaking,
according to Peking, for "the Korean-Chinese side." The meeting
was the second to be held since the PRC's senior MAC representative
returned to his post after a five-year absence. T:~ Chinese
presumably participated in the formulation of the seven-point
demand, which has drawn authoritative backing in a PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article. Pyongyang, after giving the MAC meeting
routine coverage, reported the PEOPLE'S DAILY article but so far
has not commented on its own.
The first six points of the presentation contained no surprises,
but the seventh was a new call for the United States to "stop
preventing people of North and South Korea from tra-gling in
their own land, in their own country across the military
demarcation line." The other points routinely called on the
United States to get out of South Korea, stop bringing in
"Japanese militarists," remove its weapons and military equipment
from South Korea, end provocations s.nd "aggressive acts" against
the DPRK, remove illegal heavy weapons and military personnel
from the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and insure security and order
in the joint security area of Panmunjom.
The presentation of these demands may have been interded as a
formal elaboration in the MAC forum of the first point of the
DPRK's eight-point program on peaceful unification, calling for
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea as a "prerequisite"
for unification. It may also presage a campaign to reopen
negotiations on the Korean question. The presentation at the
MAC meeting did not, however, mention the eight-point program.
That program, put forward by Foreign Minister Ho Tam at the
Supreme People's Assembly last April, broke no new ground but
served to codify the North Korean position on unification and
has been repeatedly cited in subsequent propaganda.
The timing of the presentation of the new package may have been
related to the 27 July anniversary of the signing of the
armistice agreement. The North Korean MAC representative
repeatedly pointed out in his statement that U.S. activities
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violate the agreement and called upon the Americans to observe
its provisions. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the armistice
anniversary, which recalled the role of negotiations in the
"tit-for-tat struggle" leading to the armistice, quoted Kim Il-song
e pointing out the signing of the armistice agreement was but a
first step to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.
NORTH-SOUTH The new point demanding that the Korean people be
CONTACTS allowed to cross the military demarcation line is
consistent with the stock North Korean position
favoring various kinda of contacts between the people of North and
South Korea as first steps toward unification. It may be
responsive to the proposal by the UN side at a 12 June MAC meeting
that negotiations be held on peaceful civilian use of the DMZ.
The North Korean representative at the 29 Jul''' meeting recalled
derisively that the United States had put forth a "'proposal' to
use the DMZ for 'civilians' livelihood." Pyongyang had shown
considerable sensitivity over this proposal, denouncing it in
a 16 June DPRK Foreign Ministry statement as well as in a NODONG
SINMUN article on 14 June. The foreign ..inistry statement called
the proposal a "political trick and propaganda" and charged
that the U.S. side was the one which had fortified the zone in
the first place. It claimed that the problem would automatically
be resolved if the United States stopped violating the armistice
agreement.
The seventh point seems aimed at growing sentiment in South Korea
for North-South contacts and may be intended to anticipate ROK
President Pak's forthcoming National Day Address on 15 August, an
occasion on which he customarily reviews the ROK position on
unification. An attempt to play on the growing desire for
contacts also seemed reflected in a major 6 August speech by
Kim Il-song which included an unprecedented offer of readiness to
make contacts regarding unification at any time with "all
political parties including the Democratic Republican Party (DRP)
of South Korea, public organizations, and individual personages."
In the past, as in the eight-point program on unification,
Pyongyang had not gone beyond a vague proposal for a consultative
meeting of "all" political parties and public organizations of the
North and South to negotiate steps bu-:? ' unification, and that
proposal was qualified by an expression of North Korean willingness
to talk only with "patriotic-minded new figures" who would come to
power after the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the ouster of
"traitor" Pak Chong-hui.
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in
While holding out the prospect of contacts with the DRP, Pak's
party, Kim avoided criticizing him by name. However, Pak was
once again attacked in an 11 August letter concerning
reunification sent ry the Committee for the Peaceful Unification
of the Fatherland on behalf of Kim Il-song in reply to a message
from Ko Pyong-chol, President of the United Front for Korean
Democracy in New York. The letter agreed to a proposal by Ko
to convene a"'conference of overseas Korean compatriots for
reunification" in a third country, the time and venue to be
decided upon later. The committee's message repeated Pyongyang's
standard line that a dialogue should be opened among "all"
political parties, public organizations, and "patriotic personages"
but added that since the Pak "clique" opposes any contact or
travel between North and South, the venue for the dialogue must
be a third country. It also reiterated that "we cannot discuss
at all the question of the country's reunification with the
traitorous Pak Chong-hui clique."
PRC SUPPORT PRC media carried the KCNA report on Vie meeting
in full. Peking has normally carried only brief
reports on the MAC meetings or ignored them altogether; the
previous two meetings, including the first one after the return
of the Chinese representative, were not reported by NCNA.
Authoritative Chinese endorsement of the seven-point demand has
been expressed both in the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article,
on 3 August, and in a speech by Li Hsien-nien on the 9th welcoming
a DPRK economic delegation in Peking. Ch_.._.,. propaganda says
that the DPRK delegate at the MAC meeting.re:presented the "Korean-
Chinese side"--a formulation Peking has not used since December
1966--while Pyongyang's reports, in the customary manner, merely
referred to "our side."
While expressing support for the North Korean demands and rebuking
the United States for rejecting them and again revealing itself
as the "ferocious" enemy of the Korean people, Peking has
characteristically stopped short of fully associating itself
with Pyongyang's strongest denunciations of the United States.
The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator charged that the United States
wants to perpetuate its "occupation" of South Korea and obstruct
peaceful unification of the country, adding briefly that the
United States carries out ceaseless "military provocations and
sabotage" against the DPRK and is turning the DMZ into a
"springboard for launching a new war." But again, as it had
done on the occasion of the anniversary of the Sino-Korean treaty
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11 AUGUST 1971
of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance,* Peking
failed to echo Pyongyang's most belligerent anti-American
charges. PEOPLE'S DAILY did not, as the North Korean MAC
representative did in his statement, elaborate on the history
of alleged U.S. aggression or recall such incidents as the
Pueblo, the downing of the EC-121 reconnaissance plane, and
overflights by SR-71 reconnaissance planes.
In his 9 August speech Li Hsien-nien once again expressed Peking's
support for the DPRK's aspiration for "peaceful unification,"
praising both the eight-point program on unification and the
"seven-point strong demand" presented at the MAC meeting. He
referred briefly to Kim Il-song's 6 August "penetrating analysis
of the current international situation," but he did not elaborate
on the Korean unification question.
* See the TRENDS Supplement of 23 July 1971, "Tenth Anniversaries
of North Korean Treaties with USSR, PRC."
0 CONFIDENTIAL
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NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PRC REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSAL. REPEATS CALL FOR WORLD S11+1IT
Peking waited until 7 August to publicize the text of the 30 July
PRC Government statement rejecting the USSR's proposal for a
conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarma-
ment. Until the release of the statement PRC media had been
totally silent on the 15 June Soviet proposal, first publicized
by Moscow on the 22d of that month, although as early as 21 June
Chou En-lai had indicated "personal reservations" about the
proposal in remarks to Western newsmen. NCNA transmitted the
text of the Soviet proposal in Chinese minutes after the release
of the PRC statement, but it has not been carried in NCNA's
English transmissions or by Radio Peking.
The PRC statement presses the stock Chinese position that all
the nations of the world should participate in talks on nuclear
disarmament, arguing that "a few nuclear countries have no right
to brush aside the majority of countries in the world and
arbitrarily hold a conference to consider and decide upon"
such matters. Reviewing disarmament measures from the 1963
partial nuclear-test-ban treaty to the strategic arms limitation
talks, it observes that none has in any way restricted the
nuclear-arms race between the United States and the USSR. The
peoples of the world, according to the statement, have lost
confidence in disarmament talks between the nuclear powers, and
they rightly hold that it is impossible to settle the quec ion
of nuclear disarmament by depending upon two "nuclear superpowers"
or by adding more nuclear powers to the talks..
Peking has long excluded itself from the ranks of the "superpowers,"
and the statement takes the occasion to assert that the PRC--whose
weapons are still in the "experimen-l;a1" stage--will never be "a
'nuclear superpower' practicing the policies of nuclear monopoly,
nuclear threats, and nuclear blackmail." It insists that China
develops nuclear weapons purely for defensive purposes in the face
of "imperialist nuclear threats."
The statement repeats the long-standing Chinese proposal--revived
in PRC media after the Soviet Union advanced its f_ve-power
conference bid--for a summit conference of all countries of the
world to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to reach an agreement on
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non-use of nuclear weapons. It also reaffirms the Chinese pledge
to seek the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons and the PRC's commitment not to be the first to
use nuclear weapons.
On the non-first-usp question, the statement goes on to challenge
the United States and the USSR, which "possess large quantities of
nuclear weapons," to issue statements "separately or jointly to
openly undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons at ::ny time or in any circumstances," to dismantle all
nuclear bases on the territories of other countries, and to
withdraw all nuclear weapons from abroad. Such steps, the state-
ment observes, would be a test of Washington's and Moscow's
desire for nuclear disarmament. The challenge to the USSR is
new; but in the wake of its first nuclear test in October 1964,
Poking had suggested that the United States and the PRC issue
statements pledging not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.*
61
MOSCOW'S Having anticipated the negative Chinese response in
REACTION a 30 July PRAVDA article, Moscow promptly reported
the PRC's 7 August statement and has criticized it
in broadcasts in Mandarin. A Radio Moscow commentary in Mandarin
on the 9th rejected the arguments that a conference of the five
nuclear powers would ignore the majority of the countries of the
world and that the peoples of the world have lost confidence in
disarmament talks among the nuclear powers. A Radio Peace and
Progress commentary, also on the 9th, took note of "the thicit
fog of silence" which preceded the negative Peking response.
Disputing the PRC's contention that discussion of nuclear
disarmament can be conducted "only at a world conference attended
by all countries," Radio Peace and Progress pointed out that rich
a conference would include representatives of the South African
and Rhodesian "fascist regimes" and of the Saigon and Seoul
"puppet regimes": The solution of mankind's most important
problem would thus depend on "the good will of the politicians
who . . . oppose all things progressive, create international
tensions, and provoke military conflicts."
* For background see the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC PROPAGANDA,
7 January 1965, page 6.
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11 AUGUST 1971
MIDDLE EAST
SUDAN: MMOSSC V CURTAILS PROTESTS. BERATES PRC FOR "SILENCE"'
Moscow's protest campaign against Sudanese "repression" of
communists has markedly diminished, with continuing propaganda
providing no indication of the formal status of Soviet-Sudanese
relations and almost nothing in the way of reportage or comment
on actual developments in Khartoum. Broadcast propaganda since
the release of the second TASS statement on 31 July has
consisted almost entirely of reportage on Soviet workers'
statements and protest meetings and roundups of worldwide
reaction, along with rebroadcasts of a 2 August foreign-
language commentary by Glazunov deploring anticommunism. But
foreign-language broadcasts have indicated some sensitivity
to the PRC's attitude toward Sudan and Sudanese Chairman
an-Numayri's overtures to Peking.
Moscow has still failed to acknowledge Khartoum's withdrawal
of its ambassador from Moscow and its action in declaring
the counselor of the Soviet embassy in Khartoum persona
non grata. TABS on the 5th did report that the Bulgarian
embassy had again denied assertions of Bulgarian intervention
in Sudanese domestic affairs and had protested the expulsion
of the Bulgarian ambassador.
The only Soviet expression of continued "displeasure" over
"new manifestations of hostility" toward the Soviet Union
came in a 9 August broadcast which claimed that imperialist
propaganda methods, such as "the charge of so-called 'Soviet
imperialism,'" were employed in these "crude attacks." But
after routinely assailing Israeli-imperialist efforts to
sabotage Soviet-Arab cooperation, the commentary launched
into a defense of the "principled character" of Soviet policy
and aid, asserting that the present Sudanese leaders
themselves had more than once referred to this characteristic.
Remarking that the anti-Soviet campaign in Sudan had aroused
serious concern in the Arab world, the commentary recalled
a statement by UAR President as-Sadat "not long ago" c he
permanence of Egypt's friendship with the USSR and added
that "other Arab leaders" had similarly assessed Soviet-Arab.
relations.
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BELYAYEV Recounting the events in the week of the coup and
COMMENT countercoup, panelist Belyayev, on the domestic
service commentators' roundtable on the 8th,
suggested lingering approval of the 19 July action. The "new
authorities," he remarked, had announced their program to the
people and said they would follow "democratic standards of
government." While avoiding any explicit criticism of
an-Numayri, Belyayev said that after at:-Ninnayri's radio
announcement that he was back in power there followed the
assertion, "completely out of the blue," that the 19 July
coup was the work of the Communist Party, and then came the
arrests and mass repressions that "upset the entire world."
Belyayev concluded that "someone" from among the "extremely
reactionary rightwing elements" tried to exploit the
22 July countercoup to repress progressive and democratic
elements. This "outburst of nationalistic feelings," in
Belyayev's assessment, led to anticommunism and Sudanese
press attacks on the USSR, a development serving neither
the cause of the revolution in Sudan nor the cause of the
Arab national liberation movement and the struggle against
Israel.
PRC-SUDAN Soviet reportage on Khartoum developments is
RELATIONS confined to brief reports relating to PRC-
Sudanese relations. Thus TASS on the 5th
noted that an-Numayri had received the PRC ambassador and
handed him a message to Mao and Chou, and conveyed gratitude
for China's position on the 19 July coup. And on the 9th
TASS reported an-Numayri as telling a Western correspondent
that Sudan's relations with China and the United States would
improve as a result of the 22 July countercoup, and calling
PRC-Sudanese relations "remarkable." A broadcast in Mandarin
on the 6th had cited Khartoum papers as saying an-Numayri had
decided to send a high-ranking delegation to China to further
strengthen and develop relations.
A commentary in Arabic on the 6th took Peking to task for its
"inappropriate attitude" in maintaining silence about the
"bloody terrorism" in Sudan and "even welcoming" those whose
hands were stained with blood. As in other foreign-language
broadcasts, the commentary cited the Italian CP organ
L'UNITA's charge that maintaining silence in these
circumstances was tantamount to "a manifestation of not
only a dangerous insensitivity but also indifference to the
most important question of the anti-imperialist struggle."
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And the broadcast, in line with past Soviet criticism of
Peking vis-a-vis the Middle East, accused the PRC of doing
"nothing tangible" to help the Arabs but rather of joining
Zionist and Western imperialist quarters in efforts to
undermine Arab-Soviet cooperation, acting in its own
selfish interests. Broadcasts in Mandarin have also called
attention to Peking's silence on Sudan.
USSR SPECULATES ON REPORTED ISRAELI-CHINESE CONTACTS
Along with criticism of the PRC for its attitude on Sudan,
Moscow takes some cautious swipes at the Chinese in
connection with Israeli reports, beginning on 26 July,
of contacts in Paris between Chinese diplomats and a
representative of the Israeli leftwing party Mapam, which
belongr to the government coalition. TASS on 3 August
and an Arabic-language broadcast on the 4th picked up
London and Beirut press reports on the contacts; comment
is thus far confined to the purportedly unofficial Radio
Peace and Progress and to circuitous publication in the
Czechoslovak press of a Demchenko commentary released by
NOVOSTI. This indirect approach might stem from reluctance
to engage in outrig}^t attacks on Peking for dealings with
the Israelis, a charge which the Chinese could hurl back
at Moscow. The Soviets have failed to acknowledge Israeli
press speculation on Soviet-Israeli contacts over the past
two months, including journalist Victor Louis' June visit to
Israel, and have taken no public note of Israel's position--
stated by Foreign Minister Eban in the Knesset on 14 July--
that it is prepared to discuss resumption of Soviet-Israeli
relations.
A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to Africa on the 5th,
citing the reported contacts, concluded that Peking was
Joining forces with "the most reactionary" anti-African and
anti-Arab forces, conducting a policy which benefited only
imperialism. A Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin
on the 7th depicted Tel Aviv as seeking a change in China's
attitude toward Israel in light of the Chinese leaders'
"vociferous anti-Sovietism," which has drawn the Peking
leaders into the camp of the imperialists and reactionaries,
and speculated that such a Chinese trend had emerged from
the informal contacts.
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The Demchenko commentary, published in Bratislava PIiAVDA on
5 August, remarked that the Chinese press was at:Ll.l discreetly
quiet about the reported Paris contacts, although the Israeli
papers were openly discussing thom, with the Jerusalem POST
speaking of the possibility of establishing diplomatic
relations. Demchenko speculated whether the main issue in
the contacts was a political sounding of the situation or
"a secret agreement which has already made great progress."
It could not be excluded, he said, that Peking could make a
180-degree turn, for the sake of "narrow nationalist interests,"
and betray those whom it recently assured of its support and
eternal friendship. Demchenko here recalled Peking's
declarations that it would always support the Palestine
liberation movement, asserting that during the recent events
in Jordan the Chinese leadership "cooled very palpably
toward the Palestine movement" and forgot its promises.*
Now, he added, Peking has started a flirtation with the
"Israeli aggressor," and he noted that reports on the
Israeli-PRC contacts appeared immediately after agreement
on President Nixon's trip to Peking had been reached.
* Along with customary NCNA coverage of the Jordanian
authorities' "suppression" of the Palestine guerrillas, a
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 23 July had expressed
the Chinese people's "indignant condemnation" of this "new
bloody crime" and firm support of the Palestinian guerrillas'
"Just action of counterattack."
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INDIA
SOVIET UNION1 INDIA SIGN TREATY DURING GROMYKO MIT
At a time of acute Indian-Pakistani tensions against a back-
ground of great-power rivalry in South Asia, Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko on 8 August made a hurried trip--announced
only three days earlier--to New Delhi where on the next day
he signed a 20-year Soviet-Indian treaty of "peace, friend-
ship, and cooperation." While Moscow has depicted the event
as a natural fruit of a long growth of bilateral bonds, the
signing of the pact marked a maJor turn from Moscow's four-
month-long tightrope walk on tho East Pakistan question and
a departure from India's long-standing line of neutrality in
international affairs. Where previously Moscow had sought to
project an image of the deeply concerned honest broker in the
tradition of the January 1966 Tashkent mediation, the sharpen-
ing threat of hostilities evidently prompted the Soviets to
formalize their close ties with India in order to strengthen
their influence at a crucial juncture.
The treaty will enter in force upon the exchange of the instru-
ments of ratification in Moscow "within one month." TASS
reported on the 10th that both the USSR Council of Ministers
and the Supreme Soviet Presidium had already approved the treaty
and that it had been submitted for endorsement to the foreign
affairs commissions of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet.
When it comes into force the treaty will take its place behind
the USSR-UAR treaty of "friendship and cooperation" of 27 May
1971 as only the second friendship t-.aty between the Soviet
Union and a noncommunist, noncontiguous country. The Soviet-
FRG treaty signed on 12 August 1970--which Soviet media refer
to simply as "the treaty" without further characterization--is
still pending ratification.
The Soviet Union has treaties of "friendship and good-neighbor
relations" with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey which date back
to 1921, and a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual
assistance"--the same designation as the bilateral treaties
with the Soviet bloc countries--with Finland, signed on
6 April 1946 and extended on 20 July 1970 for an additional
20 Saws.
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The Soviet-Indian treaty covers a range of bilateral concerns
and takes note of a number of international issues, reflecting
give and take on some points and convergence of views on others.
In large moaaure the treaty is fashioned along the Lame lines as
the Soviet-UAf treaty--Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11 of
the treaty with India have, with minor differences, comparable
passages in the earlier treaty and both consist of 12 articles.
There are also significant variations reflecting the different
situations in the Middle East and in South Asia and, the differ-
ing nature of Soviet relations with the two countries. The
only direct comparison noted in Soviet media between the two
treaties was made by Radio Moscow observer Yuriy Soltan on the
9th when he said that both treaties were "concrete examples"
of the 24th CPSU Congress' emphasis on "the importance of
strengthening cooperation with the developing countries." The
connection is also implicitly pointed u.~ by a 10 August Cairo-
datelined TASS dispatch--the only reaction cited by Moscow apart
from Soviet and Indian sources--quoting a Cairo newspaper's
assessment; of the Soviet-Indian treaty as going "fr,r beyond
the framewo:n of the relations between the two countries" and
constituting "a stabilizing factor in the cause of preserving
peace and security on the Asiatic continent."
PARTIES PLEDGE "APPROPRIATE EFFECTIVE MEASURES" TO INSURE PEACE
While Moscow is pressing the line that the Soviet-Indian treaty
represents a natural development in a long history of Soviet-
Indian relations rather than a response to transitory events,
the substance of the treaty is clearly designed for the current
Indian-Pakistani confrontation, with the specter of China
looming in the background as Pakistan's patron. Soviet
comment, however, has not made a point of stressing the
provisions relevant to hostilities. These provisions are con-
tained in Articles 8 and 9, which provide for a mutual non-
aggression agreement and pledge the sides to take "appropriate
effective measures" in case of hostilities without commiting
them to military assistance. The treaty is not strictly a
mutual defense pact, such as the Soviet Union has with its
communist allies, and it falls short of the Soviet-Finnish
treaty in its degree of Soviet commitment in case of attack.
In the treaty with Finland the Soviets are committed to
"extend to Finland any necessary assistance." In the mutual
defense treaties with its communist allies, Moscow is pledged
to provide "every assistance," specifically including military
aid.
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While comparable in many respects to the Soviet-UAR treaty, the
one with India ij more specifically oriented to the danger of
an outbreak of hostilities. A sense of this danger is reflected
in the addition of the term "peace" in the title of the treaty
with India and in wording more tailored to military contingencies.
Thus, the Soviet-Indian treaty provides that the two parties
renounce participation in "any military alliances" directed
agaientthe other and refrain from giving any assistance to any
third party taking part in "an armed conflict" with one of the
two sides. The comparable passages in the Soviet-UAR treaty
make no direct reference to armed conflict and provide that the
two parties "will not enter into alliances and will not take
part in any groupings of states" directed against the other.
More important in this respect is the provision of the Soviet-
Indian treaty that in case either party "is attacked or threatened
with attack" the two countries will "immediately start mutual
consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking
appropriate effective measures to insure peace and security for
their countries." The more vaguely worded comparable passage in
the Soviet-UAR treaty, omitting any reference to military
activities, provides that "in the event of development of situa-
tions" which "in the opinion of both sides" constitute a "danger
to peace or violation of peace," both parties "will contact each
other without delay in order to concert their positions with a
view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing
LP9C6'."
The Soviet-Indian treaty does not contain a provision on
continuing routine military assistance such as that included
in the Soviet-UAR treaty, which provides for cooperation in
military training and the supply of equipment to the UAR armed
forces.
MOSCOW PORTRAYS PACT AS NATURAL STEP, STABILIZING FACTOR
Anticipating the charge that the treaty is aimed at Pakistan
and indirectly at China,* Moscow has been at pains to portray
? Just. such a charge was immediately made by Tirana on the 9th.
Contending that the Soviet Union and India were "directing the
edge of'their joint activity against their neighbors," a.Tirana
broadcast quoted AFP for the observation that. the treaty "is
actually.*a military agreement directed against China and Pakistan."
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the pact as the natural culmination of many years of warm
Soviet-Indian relations and as a stabilizing force in Asia,
Soviet comment on the Meaty has touched on all of its
substantive points withoub placing particular stress on any
one. The same general pattern was followed in Soviet propa-
ganda on the treaty with the UAR.
Gromyko, in a speech at the signing ceremony summarized by
TASS on the 9th, characterized the treaty as one of those
"significant events that ripened through decades and that was
prepared by the entire previous development" of Soviet-
Indian relations. He termed it "an important landmark" that
"crowns a principled and consistent line of our countries
for cooperation and friendship," adding that "it is hard to
overestimate the importance of this treaty." Citing Nehru
and Lenin as the founders of the respective countries' foreign
policy courses, Gromyko declared that "we have been together
in all times, good and bad" and explained that "lying at the
bedrock of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union
and India are not some transitory factors but lasting vital
interests of our peoples and states and their concern in the
preservation of peace." Similarly, PRAVDA on the llth
contended that the treaty was foui.ded not on "transitory
motives" but on "the deep-rooted vital interests of both
states." This line was echoed by commentator Soltan, in
a broadcast beamed to both domestic and foreign audiences
on the 9th and 10th. He asserted that the treaty was "a
natural result" of Soviet-Indian relations which "are based
not on transitory factors, but on a community of aims in
the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, on vital,
long-term interests and a constant desire to strengthen
peace."
While stressing that the treaty is not directed against any
particular third party, Soviet media have raised the issue
of Indian-Pakistani relations in the context of the Soviet-
Indian treaty. The 9 August TASS report of the signing
ceremony cited Indian Foreign Minister Singh's contention that
the treaty was "an important stabilizing factor in the area";
it further noted his observations that Gromyko's visit to
India "coincides with the developments in this part of the
world" and that the visit "is evidence of our common resolve
to defend peace and avert war." PRAVDA said that Soviet-Indian
relations--meaning the treaty "are producing a favorable influ-
ence on the settlement of urgent international problems--includ-
ing acute problems in Asia." Citing the mutual consultation
commitment in the event-of an attack or a.threat of attack,
PRAVDA imaediately added that "the treaty is not directed agE.inst
any third party."
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A more pointed reference to tensions in South Asia was contained
in a Moscow radio broadcast in English to the area on the 10th.
Citing the provision on mutual consultation and appropriate
measures in case of attack or threat of attack, the commentary
asserted that "this provision knocks the ground from under the
feet of those eggressl.,e elements who would like to capitalize
on the complicated situation in Asia to spread the flames of
war to still vaster areas of the continent."
A TABS report on Prime Minister Gandhi's speech to a Congress
party rally on the 9th noted that she "pointed to difficulties
brought about by the influx of East Pakistan refugees into
India." TABS did not mention her remarks about the possibility
of recognizing Bangla Desh--a possibility that presumably was a
key factor in the timing of Gromyko's mission.
In another reference to the East Pakistan problem, TASS on
9 August--during a period when the agency was transmitting
several items on the treaty--carriel a Rawalpindi-datelined
dispatch announcing that Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman
would stand trial in a special military court "on charges of
'launching military activities' in Pakistan." TASS added,
without further comment, that "the Awami League, led by Mujibur
Rahman, has secured at the elections to the national assembly
of the country 160 seats out of a total 162 East Pakistan was
given in this constituent assembly."
BACKGROUND ON SOVIET TREATMENT OF INDIAN-PAKISTANI TENSION
The Soviet line on the crisis in Indian-Pakistan relations
sparked by the onset of civil war in East Pakistan on 26 March
has taken a number of turns.* After initial fence-straddling
on the Pakistan domestic crisis, Moscow took an official
position in a 3 April message from President Podgorny to
President Yahya Khan expressing Soviet concern over the
"continuation of repressive measures and bloodshed" in East
Pakistan and appealing to Yahya for "a peaceful political
settlement." By mid-April Moscow had pulled back to a less
visible stance, seeking to appear as a nonpartisan peacemaker.
Soviet media's sparse reportage balanced Western news reports
of "fierce" battles with official Pakistani Government claims
* For the evolution of the Soviet and Chinese lines see the
TRENDS of 7 April, pages 24-27; 14 April, pages 30-33; and
28 April, pages 26-28.
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that the situation in East Pakistan had "fully returned to
normal." By late April, reflecting an apparent judgment that
the rebellion was winding down and that Soviet interests lay
in good relations with the Pakistan Government, Moscow limited
'ts coverage to official Pakistani sources portraying a return
to normalcy and a complete rout of the secessionist forces in
East Pakistan.
During May and June Moscow's infrequent references to the East
Pakistan situation highlighted the plight of the Pakistan
refugees and Soviet assistance to India's massive efforts to
care for them. A Soviet-Indian communique, carried by PRAVDA
on 9 June at the end of Indian Foreign Minister Singh's visit
to Moscow, stressed concern over the refugee problem, expressed
Indian gratitude for Moscow's "frank and clear understanding
of the gravity of this situation," and underscored a need for
"immediate measures to be taken in East Pakistan to insure the
cessation of the stream of refugees from East Pakistan" and for
the "restoration of peace" to enable the return of the refugees.
Speaking at an election meeting on c, June, Kosygin took note
of the "increased tension" between India and Pakistan and called
on the Pakistan Government to undertake immediate measures
leading to "the creation of conditions for the return of the
refugees to their homes."
Going even further and enunciating a line which Moscow later
adopted, a joint GDR-Indian statement at the end of a visit to
East Germany by an Indian minister, carried by TASS on 24 June,
declared that the end of the flight and the return of the
refugees is possible "only if a solution is found to the basic
political problem in accordance with the will of the people of
East Pakistan and in consultation with their elected repre-
sentatives."
Since early July Soviet media have continued to highlight
refugee problems while increasingly portraying heightened
military tensions between India and Pakistan, particularly
in border areas. One device utilized is a single TASS dispatch
juxtaposing reports from Delhi and Karachi containing charges
that the other party initiated a military attack or denials
that such an attack occurred. IZVESTIYA on 10 July expressed
the hope that "even at the present tense moment it will be
possible to avoid a situation which could lead to the further
complication of relations between India and Pakistan."
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Moscow's increasing concern over the possibility of an outbreak
of hosti.Li'ties was indicated in TASS reports on the 1st and 2d
of August. Citing foreign news sources, TASS reported that four
Pakistani divisions were deployed near the East Pakistani border
with India and quoted President Yahya as saying that "Pakistan
is very close to a war against India." This was juxtaposed to a
Delhi report that Pakistani authorities were evacuating the
civilian population from areas along the border and that there
had been a "growth in the number of armed incidents" along the
border. The next day TASS reported Singh's warning to Pakistan
"against the use of any pretext to unleash a war with India,"
promising "a worthy rebuff" to any such attack.
That Moscow had decided to commit itself to India was reflected
in the 8 August TASS report on Gromyko's arrival in India, which
cited the Delhi newspapers as stressing "the identity of stands
of India and the Soviet Union on the main problems of today."
A commentator on Moscow's domestic service roundable program
on the same day declared that "to let matters come to a clash
between Pakistan and India . . . is in effect saying that in
the very near future we shall have yet another hotbed of inter-
national tension." He added that "world public opinion should
not allow that. India and Pakistan can and should live in peace."
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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
MOSCOW AND ALLIES PUBLICIZE NEW ECONOMIC INTEGRATION PROGRAM
The text of the long-range economic integration program adopted
at the 25th CEMA Council seesion in Bucharest on 27-29 July,
published on the 7th in PRAVDA and the other member countries'
major papers, largely confirms indications in the session's
communique and surrounding comment that the document amounts
to a formalization of existing practices in CEMA, with future
goals sufficiently general and long-range to allow the member
countries considerable freedom of maneuver. On another level,
however, the emphasis in the comment from Moscow and its hard-
core allies on the document's embodiment of "socialist
internationalism" and of political and military as well as
economic unity further underscores Moscow's inten-~ to use
Romania's endorsement of the CEMA program as a lever to
exert pressure for greater conformity.
A joint meeting of the CPSU Politburo and the USSR Council
of Ministers--customary following CEMA Council sessions--was
held on the 9th to examine the report of the Soviet
delegation on the results of the CEMA session and approve
the delegation's activity. TASS reported that the party
and government regarded the "unanimously" adopted
integration program as a document "of great political
importance," whose implementation will strengthen the
CEMA countries' "economic and defense potential" as well
as the "further unity and cohesion of the socialist
community. "
Hungary, continuing to spearhead the Soviet bloc polemics
against Romania's freewheeling behavior, held a party-
government meeting on the CEMA session five days before
the Soviets did, and MTI's report of the Hungarian meeting
pointed up more sharply the theme of the Crimea gathering
of Soviet bloc first secretaries--minus Ceausescu--in the
wake of the CEMA session. The Hungarian party and
government, MTI said, approved the work of that country's
CEi4A delegation and called for re je-tion of "any attempt
aimed at disrupting" the unity and cooperation among
members of CEMA, the Warsaw Pact, and the world socialist
system.
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THE NEW PROGRAM As foreshadowed in the 29 July communique
on the CEMA meeting, the integration
program states at the outset that "socialist economic,
integration is taking place on the basis of true voluntariness,
is not accompanied by the creation of supranational organs,
and does not affect questions of internal planning or of
organizations' financial and financially autonomous
activity." The document thus puts into a perspective
acceptable to the Romanians the key aspects of the long-
range program relating to joint planning and the evolution
of the long-discussed "transferable ruble" into a "collective
currency" of the CE34A countries.
On the score of Joint planning, the document says in low-
keyed terms that "at the initial stage the CEMA countries
will implement joint planning with respect to a small
number of sectors and types of production processes and
will gradually extend this planning in the future as --
experience is accumulated in the joint planning sphere."
While providing for "contracts and agreements" to legalize
plan coordination, it appears to envisage continued
cooperation on the basis of "exchanges of experience"
and "multilateral consultations," short of spelling out
a future transition from national economic plans to a
single integrated economic plan for the CEMA countries.
The program discourses at length on the setting up of
"international economic organizations" by "interested"
CEMA countries in the spheres of production, trade,
scientific and technical cooperation, and so on. These
organizations--presumably not viewed by the Romanians as
conflicting with the program's ban on "supranational
organizations"--are to be dealt with in a "multilateral
agreement" among the CEMA countries in 1971-72.
In announcing the publication of the CERA program in the
next day's PRAVDA, TASS on the 6th said that "one of the
main tasks" was developing "the over-all legal regime"
for deepening cooperation and developing integration. At
the same time, TASS reiterated that integration would
be on the basis both of "socialist internationalism" and
of respect for state sovereignty, noninterference in
internal affairs, and "complete. equality." It said that
under the program the CEMA countries "will be perfecting
coordination of national economic plans and will expand
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cooperation in planning, while combining this with widening
us!.. of commodity-money relations." TASS also noted that the
program provides for cooperation in development of trade "with
socialist countries that are not CEMA members and with other
countries."
FOLLOWUP COI+ENT PRAVDA's editorial on the 8th stressed
that the integration program "is
permeated with the spirit of socialist internationalism"
and will strengthen the "economic and defensive might of
the world socialist system." The editorial also underscored
"the single ideology, Marxism-Leninism," of the CEMA member
countries and cited the Crimea meeting and the CEMA session
as "new major steps to strengthen political and economic
unity and cohesion of the countries of socialism." A
participant in the Moscow domestic service roundtable on
the 8th emphasized the continuity inherent in the new
integration program, based "primarily on the more than
20 years' experience of the cooperation of the CEMA
member countries," bu.l also defensively denow.iced as
"either ignoramuses or liars" those "bourgeois commentators"
who contend that there is "nothing unusual in the
integration of CEMA countries."
The main lines of the Soviet comment were echoed by the
GDR's CEMA representative in an ADN interview reported
by TASS on the 10th. The new program, the East German
delegate said, will strengthen the CEMA countries' defenses
by enhancing their position in the world economy and will
strengthen the socialist countries' unity in "the inter-
national class struggle." It is "a continuation of the
cooperation cultivated and proven in the past," he
added, "but on a higher level." An article in the Warsaw
Catholic paper SLOWO POWSZECHNE on 9 August characterized
the program as "a road between obsolete economic autarky,
which stands no chance of survival in the contemporary
world, and a supranational integration whose material
progress is achieved at the expense of national sovereignty."
Bucharest duly published the text of the program in SCINTEIA
on the 7th, having already expounded the Romanian interpreta-
tion of it in an authoritative -rticle by I. Fintinaru on
1 August. , ; ,i:a :c~?
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BELGRADE CHARGES. BUDAPEST DENIES PACT MANEUVERS POSE THREAT
In commentaries on 4 and 7 August denouncing the 2-5 August
"Opal 71" maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia and rumored impending Pact exercises in
Bulgaria, the Yugoslav press has expressed more than
usual concern over threatening aspects of the maneuvers
and has specifically given voice to concern in behalf of
Romania, in the process underscoring Yugoslav-Romanian
.affinities. Indirectly responsive to such comment as well
as to discussion of the maneuvers in the Western press,
leading Hungarian papers on the 8th and 9th emphasized
the "routine" nature of Opal 71 and decried speculation
that the maneuvers were aimed at "neighbors."
YUGOSLAV COMMENT The Yugoslav comment went beyond routine
reaction to Pact maneuvers, which has
normally taken the form of generalized condemnations of
exercises staged by both "military blocs," East and West,
as a threat to peace and to Yugoslavia's own security.
This time, in addition to the press comment delineating
a wider threat specifically enccmpasaing Romania, TANJUG
atypically reproduced a full TASS report of the communique
on Opal 71, including the statement that the participating
Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian troops carried out
"a joint advance on a river under war conditions." The
Prut River forms a large part of the border between the
USSR and Romania.
On 4 August, while the Opal 71 maneuvers were still in
progress, a commentary in the Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJE
noted Western news reports of "still officially unconfirmed"
forthcoming exercises in Bulgar . involving three Soviet
and two Bulgarian divisions. The article quoted the
London TIMES to the effect that the exercises will thus
take place in an area in which are located "independent
Romania and nonalined Yugoslavia; Bulgaria, the most
loyal member of the socialist alliance; Albania, which
is oriented toward China; and two NATO members, Greece
and Turkey." It added that according to the Paris
FIGARO, "the Soviet army has req.iested Bucharest to
allow passage through Romanian tee-ritory."
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Condemning such "demonstrations of force," th., article
commented that "Romania and Albania, each for reasons of
its own, probably share the feeling of unpleasantness
caused by these maneuvers,"* It added that "Romania
continues to play an extremely favorable role,"
particularly in its efforts to have the Balkans declared
a zone of peace, not to mention "the similar activities
on the part of Yugoslavia." The commentary concluded
ambivalently that while the reported maneuvers in Bulgaria
"acquire an unpleasant taste, in the final analysis this
is a matter which does not deserve special anxiety," as
if to suggest that in practical terms they constitute
nothing more alarming than pressure tactics.
A commentary by Teslic in the 7 August BORBA, the Belgrade
daily most closely reflecting party policy, focused more
sharply on Romania as the target of the Pact exercises,
noting "world news agency reports" of "multilateral
military maneuvers" currently underway or "about to
begin in several Warsaw Pact countries on both sided
of Romania." The commentary added that "such practice
does not cause concern to Romania only" and "grossly
insults and undermines the national independence and
autonomy of every country in this region."
The BORBA commentator prefaced his attack on the maneuvers
with praise for the Romanian representative's proposal
at the Geneva disarmament conference two days earlier
that the Balkans be tra.isform.;d into a zone free of
nuclear weapons and foreign bases. He emphasized in
this connection "the position of Romania, whose membership
in the Warsaw Pact does not present an obstacle to its
broadly working at the same time against the logic and
practice of military blocs, . . . threats, and restrictions
of the national independence and sovereignty of each
individual country." The article went on to stress that
the Romanian Government has "specifically expressed
itself against military maneuvers on territories of other
countries, against the stationing of foreign bases and
forces, as well as against the pressure" of military blocs.
* On 3 August a Tirana broadcast briefly attacked the Opal 71
maneuvers and those reportedly to take place in Bulgaria as
"aggressive" exercises "being arranged within the framework
of the policy of expansion and pressure pursued toward other
countries by the Soviet social imperialists."
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CONP'J.I)I!IN'.PJA1:, I0.li:i:u 11'1t1INU1)
.1..1 AUGl1U'I' 1971.
- 38 -
HUNGARIAN COMMENT Reminiscent of Soviet bloc propaganda
surrounding the mid-1968 Pact maneuvers
in Czechoslovakia, an article in the Budapest NEPSZAI3ADSAG on
8 August scored "the contemptible intentions of Western
military columnists" who had conjectured. that if the planned
Opal 71 exercises "did take place, they would be aimed 'against
some neighbors of Hungary,' and if they were canceled it
would be because those neighbors had protested." Stating
that there were no such protests, the article asked blandly
"Who could protest because of ordinary maneuvers on the
territory of our sovereign socialist country?" In a
similar vein, an article entitled "The Canard Exposed"
in the government paper MAGYAR HIRLAP the next day denounced
the rumor "from the West" to the effect that the armies
involved in Opal 71 "planned a demonstration of military
strength in Hungary toward the south and southeast"--
unmistakably Yugoslavia and Romania, respectively. The
maneuvers, it said, were "the normal annual routine
test" of the troops' level of training and "did not
represent any aggressive intentions against anyone."
In the same issue of MAGYAR HIRLAP the speech by Hungarian
Deputy Defense Minister Olah at the parade ending Opal 71
echoed the current emphasis in Soviet propaganda on the
roles played by CEMA and the Warsaw Pact in "unity" above
and beyond the economic and military spheres. Maj. Gen.
Olah declared that "in addition to the immediate military
goals, these maneuvers also definitely serve political
interests."
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SZECHWAN PROVINCIAL RADIO RESUMES LOCAL BROADCASTING
The provincial radio of Szechwan, China's largest province, has
broken away from its solid relay of Radio Peking--sustained
since 19 November 1969--to broadcast local news and commentary
in the Szechwan dialect. The local broadcasts 1),.f-an on 3 August.
The content of these local programs, the first in nearly two
years, has been of minor significance so far, with no intimation
that establishment of a Szechwan provincial. party cc: raw i utee is
imminent. Most items have concerned the activities of local
mines and factories. One broadeast, on the 6th, reported on a
"recent" provincial conference "on grasping revolution and
stimulating production in the capital construction field." It
was said that Hsu Shih, a vice chairman of the provincial
revolutionary committee, presided over the meeting; and reference
was made to a decision of the CCP core group of the provincial
revolutionary committee on learning from Taching.* (The Szechwan
party core group had not been mentioned in the occasional NCNA
items on Szechwan at least since the beginning of this year.)
The last such "silent" provincial-level radio to resume local
broadcasting, the Kweichow provincial service, did so on 18 May,
the day after NCNA announced formation of the Kweichow Provincial
CCP Committee. Among the initial items broadcast was a KWEICHOW
DAILY editorial welcoming formation of the new party committee.
Inner Mongolia, which set up its regional party committee last
May, is now the only provincial-level unit whose radio is still
on solid relay of Radio Peking. The radio has originated no
local political materials since 5 January 1970.
A later local broadcast, on the 10th, reported that Chang
Kuo-hua and Li Ta-chang spoke at a "recent" provincial symposium
on learning from Tachai convened by the provincial revolutionary
committee. Chang and Li, chairman and vice chairman of the
provincial revolutionary committee, were identified only as
"responsible persons of the CCP core group." They last appeared
publicly on National Day 1970.
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