TRANSLATIONS FROM VOYENNAYA MYSL NO. 4 - APRIL 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 97
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 25, 1974
• Content Type: TRANS

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Translations From "Voyennaya )Vlyrl"
NUMBER 4 - APRIL 1971
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 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST NO. 0019 - 25 March 1974
TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSLNO. 4, APRIL 1971
Issue No. 4, April 1971, was signed to the press on 19 March 1971.
CONTENTS
On the Leninist Course (3-13) 1
Questions on the History and Theory of Military Science (14-23) 16
Maj Gen V. Zemskov
Military Strategy and Economics (24-34) 29
Col Gen M. Povaliy
Methods of Determining Road Network Requirements of Troops 44
During an Offensive Operation (35-40)
Col Yu. Parfilov
Artificial Earth Satellites in the Early Warning System (41-47) 52
Engr-Lt Col Yu. Yur'yev
Concerning the Subject Matter. Content and Structure
of a Course in Military Economics (48-53)
Capt 1st Rank A. Pozharov
the Training Process (53-58)
Col I. Vakurov and Professor Col A. Butivchenko
Programmed Learning -- an Effective Way to Improve
61
69
On the Question of the Science of Troop Control (58-65) 76
Capt 2d Rank K. Dubravin and Col P. Shemanskiy
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Soviet Military Organization and Its Historical Forms (66-79)
Col A. Timorin and Maj V. Terent'yev
Limited Warfare in U.S. Foreign Policy (80-90) 105
V. Perfilov
The Problem of Combat Against Nuclear Submarines (90-96) 121
Capt 1st Rank N. V'yunenko
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These days the eyes of all Soviet citizens and our millions of friends
abroad are again turned toward the capital of the homeland of the October
Revolution -- Moscow, toward the great party of Lenin, which is confidently
guiding the mighty ship of state -- the Soviet Union, along the proven
Leninist course.
Our country's outstanding success in fulfilling the Eighth Five-Year Plan
and grandiose plans for further progress by the USSR along the road to com-
munism, presented for discussion at the 24th CPSU Congress, constitutes
new evidence of the revolutionary-transforming force of Marxism-Leninism,
the potential of the socialist system and loyalty of party and people to
the behests of Lenin.
At all stages in the history of the Soviet Union Communist Party congresses
have played a special role in the life of party and people. They have
always been major landmarks in the selfless struggle for implementation of
the general line of the CPSU and Lenin's deathless doctrine on building
socialism and communism. The 24th CPSU Congress, which signals the nations
entry into a new stage in the building of communism, will take its rightful
place in their ranks.
The party has come to this congress as a solid detachment of people of like
mind, a party enriched by the experience of guiding a multimillion army
of builders of communism. The CPSU is guided by a scientifically elaborate1
Marxist-Leninist program of action and is unswervingly carrying out a
policy aimed at further strengthening the economic and defense might of
the state, at strengthening the cause of peace and security of peoples.
The Soviet people is solidly ranked around its party, totally dedicated to
its ideals, and is firmly following it toward new accomplishments in the
name of the triumph of communism.
The building of a communist society is an extraordinarily complex and all-
encompassing process. It encompasses all aspects of societal affairs:
economics, politics, ideology, culture, and international relations. The
CPSU has a masterful command of the Leninist art of finding the main
element, determining at each stage in history the central task and mobiliz-
ing the inexhaustible energy of the masses for successfully accomplishing
these tasks.
The famous five-year plans constitute a concrete expression of the party's
economic and social strategy, The idea of five-year planning was born
during the course of building socialism. It was anticipated by Lenin. In
one of his last articles, discussing the prospects for the development of
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Soviet society and the problems of managing it, Lenin wrote: ",_We have
now received the opportunity, rather rare in history, to specify the
requisite timetable for producing radical social changes, and we now see
clearly what can be done in five years and what requires much more time..."
(Poln, Sobr, Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 45, page 385).*
Experience in successful implementation of the GOELRO Plan, drafted under
Lenin's guidance, as well as practical experience in planned management of
the economy during the first 10 years of Soviet rule constituted the basis
foz drafting the first and subsequent five-year plans for development of
the Soviet economy. Each five-year plan was a new, higher stage of
maturity of Soviet society; a major step on the path cf social progress.
The world-historic successes achieved by the Soviet people in building the
new society convincingly affirm the grandeur and vital strength of the
root tenets of Marxism-Leninism on the decisive role of the masses in the
sociohistorical process, the guiding and directing role of the Communist
Party -- inspirer and organizer of all our victories,
The scientific character of CPSU policy and the realistic nature of the
plans and tasks it puts forth are based on strict consideration and in-
telligent utilization of the objective laws governing societal development
as well as the inexhaustible creative energy of the toiler masses -- the
producers of material and spiritual goods, A Marxist, taught Lenin,
"must reckon with objective facts, the masses and classes..." (Volume 31,
page 157). Vigorously opposing spontaneity and inertness, he at the same
time sharply condemned voluntarism, separation from the masses, unfulfill-
able promises, and the advancement of tasks for the accomplishment of
which conditions are not yet right. "We value communism only," Lenin
stressed, "when it is economically well founded" (Volume 38, page 179).
He stated that "the party program cannot remain merely a party program.
It must be transformed into a program of our economic development-"
;Volume 42, page 157).
Lenin saw in increased labor productivity and organization of labor on
the basis of the latest scientific and technological advances a root con-
dition for creating a social system which would be higher than that of
capitalism. He considered the living productive potential of the masses
to be the mbst decisive and marvelous productive force of the socialist
society; new social being in the masses engenders new social consciousness,
which is transformed into a powerful material force. The Communist Party
relies on this in accomplishing all economic and sociopolitical tasks.
The party faithfully follows the instructions of Lenin, who formulated as
* Henceforth when referring to this source we shall indicate only volume
and page-
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follows one of the most important laws discovered by Marxism, governing
social development: "The greater the scale, the greater the breadth of
historical actions, the greater the number of persons participating in
these actions; the deeper the transformation we wish to effect, the
greater the extent to which it is necessary t: raise interest in it and
a conscientious attitude, to convince more anc more millions and tens of
millions of people of this necessity" (Volume 42, page 140),.
Constituting a well-organized, ideologically toughened vanguard of the
worker class and the entire people, closely bound to the masses, our party
gives a planned and purposeful character to the entire process of building
c o m m u nism. Unity of revolutionary theory and practice, word and deed,
i s a characteristic feature of the activities of the Communist Pe$rty,
which is armed with the all-conquering doctrine of Marxism-Leninism,
"Looking back at the path we have trod, one can state that our people, our
party have reason to be proud," stated L I., Brezhnev. "The Soviet
people has experienced many difficulties and much adversity. Enormous
historical responsibility has lain upon its shoulders. But it has
courageously and steadfastly withstood all trials and has honorably carried
out its great mission, Always and everywhere, at times of severe tests
and savage battles, at times of joyous victories and bitter setbacks, our
people has remained loyal to the Leninist banner, loyal to its party and
the cause of revolution."
Following Lenin's behests, the CPSU in its Program adopted at the 22nd
Party Congress, scientifically defined the triune main task in building
communism: creation of a powerful material and technological base, further
improvement of societal relations, and indoctrination of the new man. The
resolutions of the 23rd Party Congress and a number of Central Committee
plenums have specified the scale, timetable, ways and means of accomplish-
ing
this world-historic mission, taking into account the present
situation
and
our nations realistic potential- The results of the Eighth
Five-Year
Plan
are of great importance for its implementation, It is well
known
that
this last five-year plan was successfully fulfilled in the
major
economic and social indices-
Implementing the resolutions of the 23rd CPSU Congress, the Soviet people
has written a new and brilliant page in the chronicle of struggle for
the triumph of communism and for a bright future for mankind, The
principal result of this past five-year plan has been the fact that the
Soviet state has become stronger and more powerful in all respects. Its
economic and defensive might have increased, while its political foundation
and international prestige have become even stronger. Major success has
been achieved in development of all branches of the economy, in accom-
plishing social tasks and in raising the material and cultural living
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standards of Soviet citizens. The moral and political unity of our society
has become strengthened, and socialist democracy has obtained further
development
We are pleased first and foremost by achievements on the main bridgehead of
the struggle for communism -- in economic development The economy has
grown at a rapid rate and more effectively than in the preceding five-year
pion The rate of improvement in living standards has also substantially
accelerated, Industrial output volume rose 50 percent in the five years,
while national income has risen 41 percent, Those branches of industry
ensuring technological progress in the economy and improved efficiency
~_t prc-du;.tion have grown particularly rapidly: electric power engineering,
machine building and metalworking, instrument engineering and electronics,
chemicals and the petrochemical industry. All modes of transport and
communications have experienced further development. We have seen an im-
provement in farm crop yields and livestock productivity Average annual
gross output volume in agriculture was 21 percent higher than in the
preceding 5-year period. The nation's economic potential has grown;
fixed productive capital in the economy has increased by 50 percent.
The Soviet economy has acquired impressive strength. In 1970 alone in-
dustrial output was almost double that of all the prewar five-year plans
combined. Growth in fixed productive capital during the last 5-year
period exceeds the volume of all Soviet fixed productive capital at the
end of 1955. In the last year of the five-year plan this country produced
the biggest grain and cotton harvest in the history of our nation's
agriculture. The USSR now produces almost 20 percent of world industrial
output The following figures constitute practical embodiment of Lenin's
ideas on national electrificationt in 1970 we produced 740 billion kilowatt
hours of electric power, or 148 times as much as in 1928, at the beginning
of the First Five-Year Plan. This is equal to the combined electric power
output of such highly-developed capitalist nations as England, France,
West Germany, and Italy.
Soviet science has made a major contribution toward solving the vital
problems of development of social production, Achievements in the basic
sciences have made it possible successfully to accomplish many scientific
and technological tasks: adoption of high-productivity machine complexes,
new industrial processes, automated systems of enterprise management and
control of complex production processes with utilization of computer hard-
ware, etc. New and outstanding achievements by the Soviet space program
constitute persuasive evidence of the high level of development of Soviet
science and technology. On 12 April 1971 all progressive mankind will
celebrate the 10th anniversary of a signal event, when the spacecraft
Vostok, piloted by cosmonaut Yu. A, Gagarin, accomplished the world's
first manned orbital flight.
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The party and people have successfully coped with the difficult task of
combining further development of the economy and strengthening of the
nation's defense capability with a substantial acceleration in the rate of
consumer goods production and growth in toiler living standards.
Scientific and technological progress, improvement in economic management
and adoption of new methods of planning and economic incentive have
promoted improved efficiency of social production and increased labor
productivity. On this basis we have secured a substantial improvement in
living standards for Soviet citizens. Real per capita income rose 33 per-
cent during the 5-year period; average monthly wages of blue-collar and
white-collar workers rose 26 percent, while kolkhoz member earnings rose
42 percent, which exceeds the targets specified by the 23rd CPSU Congress
for these items. The population's consumption of consumer durables and
foodstuffs has risen substantially. Housing has improved for almost 55
million citizens. The service industry has experienced further development.
Payments and benefits to the population from public consumption funds,
which comprised 262 rubles per capita in 1970, increased by more than 50
percent.
The general educational and cultural level of Soviet citizens is rising
steadily. We are steadily achieving a transition to universal secondary
education of our young people and are building new schools and preschool
facilities. During the 5-year period we produced 2.6 million specialists
with higher education, 4.5 million with secondary specialized training,
while 7 million skilled young workers were produced by our trade schools.
Medical services and organized recreation. facilities for the public im-
prove year by year. We are building more and more motion picture theaters,
recreation clubs, libraries, and the total number of privately-owned
radios and television sets is increasing. There has been an appreciable
increase in reader demand fo r books, newspapers, and magazines.
The selfless labor of the worker class, kolkhoz peasantry and popular in-
telligentsia, guided by the Communist Party, is producing abundant fruit.
Together with substantial economic growth, development of science and tech-
nology, the decisive foundations of the Soviet governmental and societal
system -- the alliance of workers and peasants, friendship among the
peoples of the USSR and their moral-political unity -- are bec.:_ling
stronger. Celebration of the Lenin Birth Centennial and preparations for
the 24th CPSU Congress constituted a wonderful demonstration of the
monolithic solidarity of the Soviet people behind the Communist Party and
its Central Committee, The toilers have expressed and are expressing with
new force an unshakable loyalty to Leninist ideals, our party, and
resolute determination to continue following the path of Lenin under party
guidance.
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Success by the Soviet people in building the material and technological
foundations of communism and implementation of the Directives of the
23rd CPSU Congress are of enormous international significance, They
srrengchen the position of the world socialist system, enhance the inter-
national authority of the USSR and promote intensification of the
struggle by the forces of peace and democracy against imperialism, for
national independence and socialism, These successes graphically demon-
strate the indisputable advantages of the socialist system over the
capitalist and serve as an inspiring example for the toilers of all
nations
Implementing Marxist-Leninist doctrine, developing and enriching it under
new historical conditions, the CPSU is elaborating a scientific policy,
an, integral and well-balanced system of effective measures, implementation
of which brings the Soviet people closer tc the victory of communism,
With each new stage in the development of the socialist society, realistic
possibilities develop for accomplishing increasingly large-scale economic
and sociopolitical tasks, Lenin's prediction has come true that "socialism
harbors gigantic strength and that mankind has now advanced to a. new
stage of development which contains unusually excellent potential" (Volume
45, page 402),.
Following Lenin's behest to proceed steadily forward, to achieve greater
victories and to move from less difficult to more difficult tasks, the
Communist Party at its 24th Congress is opening up new and inspiring
prospects for the further movement of Soviet society along the road to com-
munism, An important stage on this journey will be the 1971-1975 Five-Year
Plan for Development of the Soviet Economy.
The main task of the Ninth Five-Year Plan is to secure a substantial up-
swing in material and cultural living standards on the basis rf a high
growth rate for socialist production, improvement of production efficiency,
scientific-technological progress and acceleration of labor productivity
growth.
The Leninist party, guided by the objective laws of societal development,
has scientifically formulated both the fundamental goals of social
production at the new stage of its maturity, as well as realistic ways,
methods and means of achieving these goals. A central element in the new
five-year plan is the task, defined by the CPSU Program, of all-out develop-
ment of the material and technological foundation of Soviet society, a
steady growth of the socialist economy and securement on this basis of a
substantial. improvement in toiler living standards.
It is planned to increase industrial output by almost 50 percent over the
1970 level, Thus the average annual industrial growth rate will be
more than 8 percent. With the present industrial output volume this will
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produce substantial growth in all basic areas of heavy and light industry?
As regards consumer goods output, in the forthcoming five-year period the
growth rate will be somewhat higher than for means of production. This
corresponds to the principal task of the new five-year plan.
6,:~put of the major categories in heavy industry will reach even higher
levels in the five-year plan presei.tiy under way: steel, petroleum, coal,
and electric power, The growth rate in machine building and metalworking,
chemicals, the petrochemical industry and other branches determining tech-
nological progress throughout the economy will be higher than the overall
average level: The bulk of industrial output growth will be achieved as a
result of a substantial increase in labor productivity,
In the area of agriculture a program for further growth in crop and live-
stock production has been specified and is being implemented., The target
calls for a substantial increase in the average annual volume of agri-
cultural output in comparison with the preceding 5-year period, securing
fuller satisfaction of the public's growing requirements in foodstuffs and
industrial demand for raw materials, Agriculture will be given substantial
material and technical assistance to achieve this target, assistance which
will promote a rise in labor productivity on kolkhozes and s o v -
khozes.
Transport and communications will grow in close coordination with the new
upswing in industry and agriculture. The overall capacity and flexibility
of the transportation system will improve; freight traffic will increase
for all modes of transport, and much will be accomplished to improve the
operations of communications, radio and television broadcasting.
The principal goal of party plans is further improvement of living stan-
dards and comprehensive development of the socialist society, A substan-
tial growth in national income, achieved by means of increasing labor
productivity, will make it possible substantially to increase per capita
real income, average earnings of blue-collar and white-collar workers as
well as kolkhoz member earnings in the communal farm operation, Public con-
sumption funds will rise substantially by the end of the five-year plan,
which will have a very palpable effect on improving Soviet living standards,
Health services, public education, training of specialist cadres and
toiler pension benefits will rise to a new level, There will be consider-
able increase in commodity resources and retail trade, with improvement in
variety and expanded public services, Housing comistruction will continue
to grow and expand.
For satisfaction of the people's growing intellectual needs, there will be
further development of the press, literature and art, radio and television
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broadcasting, growth in the network of cultural-educational establishments
and the entire system of cultural services for our citizens; with an
enhancement of its aesthetic and ideological-indoctrinational role,
Economic and sociopolitical problems are resolved in an organic unity in
the program of building communism, drafted and carried out by the party.
This is in full conformity with the root tenets of Marxism-Leninism on the
closest objective interlink between material and spiritual factors in
societal affairs. Economic and social tasks are also organically combined
in the new five-year plan. Development of socialist social production is
exerting decisive influence on the social being of Soviet citizens, which
in turn defines their spiritual countenance, social consciousness, and
promotes the forming of "comprehensively developed and comprehensively
trained individuals," as Lenin predicted (Volume 41, page 33)-
Such targets of the new five-year plan as acceleration of the pace of sci-
entific and technological advance, improvement in the effectiveness of
social production, adoption of improved forms and methods of economic
management, and solution to problems of placement of productive resources
and territorial economic links are not only of enormous economic but also
of social importance. Further development of the material and technological
foundation constitutes a decisive condition for raising the people's
living standards and cultural level, the principal foundation for improving
communist social relations, This is particularly important for overcoming
the differences between city and village, between mental and physical labor,
for producing a harmoniously-developed builder of the new society,
Development of the economy and culture of the union republics and en-
hancement of the role of local soviets are specified, in the spirit of
the overall economic strategy and Leninist nationalities policy of the
CPSU.
Successful solution of sociopolitical problems, growth in Communist
consciousness and culture of Soviet citizens, increase in their general
and specialized knowledge, skills, improvement in living, working, housing
and recreation conditions in turn have a most beneficent effect on the
people's productive activities, labor productivity and in the final
analysis on speeding the pace of economic development. Conscientious,
well-organized, highly-productive labor is the source of the nation's
wealth, of all material and spiritual goods,
Harmonious development of all aspects of the material and spiritual af-
fairs of Soviet society in the interests of man is dictated by the nature
of the socialist system, by its advantages over an exploiter system. It
is a well-known fact that the high level of economic, science and tech-
nology development achieved in a number of imperialist nations not only is
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failing to improve the situation of the toilers and their material and
sociopolitical conditions, but is leading to even greater enslavement and
oppression? The capitalist, the rich farmer and banker reap all the
major benefits of scientific and technological progress and the improved
labor productivity of the industrial and farm worker. To the former goes
the lion's share of the material goods created by the efforts of the
toilers. The dleories of "popular capitalism" and "unified industrial
society" widely, publicized by bourgeois ideologues are aimed at carrying
the class command of the monopolists -- to embellish capitalism, to play
down its antipopular, exploiter essence. The poverty and suffering of
millions of people in the capitalist nations refute such "theories."
The advantages of socialism, objectively contained in its socioeconomic
nature, are not manifested spontaneously and automatically. Their
realization is the result of the selfless labor of millions of toilers,
the organized and purposeful development of social production and the
intellectual activities of the people, carried out under the scientific
guidance of the Communist Party, The colossal scale of the nation's
economy and the new, magnificent prospects of its mighty upsurge insistent-
ly demand further improvement of the system and methods of management and
planning in the interest of intensification of production and improvement
of production efficiency. This is the fundamental line of Soviet economic
growth both for the immediate and more distant future.
The party intends to carry out during the new five-year plan important
measures aimed at improving management of the economy, planning and
economic incentive for production, employment of advanced hardware,
economic-mathematical methods, and automated systems in this area. Im-
provement of scientific organization of labor, even more extensive involve-
ment of toilers in economic management, and strengthening of state dis-
cipline at all levels will substantially promote successful accomplishment
of material-technological and social tasks.
The tasks of Soviet science, its role in organizing socialist production,
efficient solution to the vital problems of economic development, develop-
ment of social relations and education of the new man are becoming im-
measurably more important at the present stage of building communism, with
its gigantic scope and increased demands, under conditions of an in-
tensifying scientific and technological revolution. Basic and applied
scientific research and rapid incorporation of research results in the
economy are acquiring enormous significance. It is planned to achieve
further elaboration of problems of theoretical and applied mathematics,
cybernetics, nuclear physics, solid state and semiconductor physics,
quantum electronics, and low temperature physics. The space program will
be continued, as will scientific effort in the fields of geology, geo-
physics and geochemistry, oceanography, atmospheric physics and geography,
biology and medicine.
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The increased role of the social sciences and the need of their further
development constitute an objective pattarn and natural law. The party and
workers on the scientific theory front are doing much in this area. The
theoretical and political documents of the party Central Committee pertain-
:Lng to the 50th AnniveL'sary of the October Revolution, the sesquicentennial
of the birth of Karl Marx, the Lenin Birth Centennial, proceedings of
party congresses and Central Committee planums constitute a major contribu-
tion tow?rd creative synthesis of the wealth of experience in building com-
munism in this country and scientific elaboration of its development
prospects- The well-known Central Committee CPSU decree entitled "Measures
for Further Development of the Social Sciences and Enhancement of Their
Role in Building Communism" constituted a vivid manifestation of party con-
cern for improving ideological-theoretical effort.
One of the most vital tasks of the social sciences is organization of com-
prehensive research on modern processes of social development, improvement
of the system and methods of scientific guidance of the economy for the
sake of more successful and rapid solution to the problems of building com-
munism
In connection with the increased role and tasks of Soviet science, the
rapid growth of scientific establishments, centers and scientific cadres,
organization and planning of scientific researcl, experimental design
efforts; and the concentration of scientific manpower, material and
financial resources primarily on major areas of science for solving the
most important scientific-technological and sociopolitical problems is
acquiring particular importance. The party demands an all-out strengthen-
ing of the bond between science and production, practical activities, as
well as effective measures to incorporate and adopt new technology on an
accelerated schedule, with a closer watch on progress and fulfillment of
scientific effort plans,
Building history's first communist edifice and developing the economy,
science, technology and culture in the interests of the toilers, our party
and people are carrying out their international duty and are making an
important contribution toward strengthening the entire community of social-
ist nations, the forces of peace and democracy. Economic and scientific-
technological ties with the socialist nations in the area of strengthening
their alliance and consistent economic integration of the economies of the
CE'U member nations will develop further during the new five-year plan.
Soviet foreign trade volume will increase by at least one third.
The CPSU Program states that the party views the building of communism in
the USSR as a great international task of the Soviet people, corresponding
to the interests of the entire world socialist system, the interests of
the international proletariat and all mankind. Implementation of the
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Ninth Five-Year Plan and further growth in the economic and defense might
of the Soviet Union will be of enormous international significance, will
serve to multiply the strength of the world socialist community, will once
again demonstrate the advantages of a planned economic system and will
strengthen the position of all. progressive forces struggling for peace,
democracy and socialism.
One of the fundamental laws governing the developn::nt of Soviet society is
an increase in the guiding and directing role of the Communist Party. This
is dictated by a number of objective factors: growth in the scale and com-
plexity of the tasks of building communism; an upsurge in the productive
activity of the masses and involvement of more and more millions of toilers
in management of the affairs of state and of production; further develop-
ment of socialist democracy, enhancement of the role of public organiza-
tions, and broadening of the powers of the union republics and local orga-
nizations; enhanced significance of the theory of scientific communism, its
creative development and propaganda, as well as the necessity of in-
tensifying communist indoctrination of toilers and the struggle to overcome
the vestiges of the past in people's consciousness. This is dictated also
by a broadening of the international ties and tasks of the Soviet stace, by
aggravation of the struggle between two systems -- socialism and capital-
ism -- in the world arena, and by the necessity of ensuring favorable ex-
ternal conditions for building communism.
History persuasively confirms that our Communist Party, loyal to the
behests of Lenin and the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, is honorably carry-
ing out its leadership and guiding role, Supported by the broad masses,
which are accomplishing world-historic reforms, it is successfully
achieving program goals, perspicaciously gazing into the future, revealing
to the people scientifically-substantiated ways to move forward, is
arousing enormous energy in the masses and is boldly leading them toward
the accomplishment of new tasks.
The period between the 23rd and 24th CPSU Congresses was characterized by
a further ideological and organizational strengthening of the party and
its local organizations, by a broadening and consolidation of their bond
with the masses, and by a new upswing in political and labor activity on
the part of Communists and all Soviet citizens. This was vividly expressed
in successful implementation of the resolutions of the 23rd CPSU Congress,
the economic and social targets of the Eighth Five-Year Plan, in a new up-
swing of toiler socialist competition for honorably moving toward the
24th CPSU Congress, and in unanimous approval by the entire party and
people of the draft Congress Directives on the 1971-1975 Five-Year Soviet
Economic Development Plan. Ideological activities of party organizations
and their ideological efforts with the masses have become substantially
activated.
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On the eve of the Congress report-election meetings in primary party orga-
nizations, at which approximately 3 million Communists spoke, rayon, city,
oblast and kray party conferences, and union republic Communist Party
congresses were held in a highly businesslike atmosphere, in an atmosphere
of a high-principled approach to accomplishing vital tasks, with extensive
development of intraparty democracy, criticism and self-criticism., They
graphically demonstrated the solidarity of the multimillion-man detachment
cf Communists behind the Leninist Central Committee; their readiness and
ability successfully to accomplish the new and magnificr;nt tasks of build-
ing communism,
The Soviet people has become convinced on the basis of vast historical
experience that everything it has achieved in building a new society -- the
economic and defense might of the Soviet Union, radical improvement in
toiler living conditions, the solid position and great authority of the
state in the it.;ternational arena, and inspiring prospects for the future --
all this is inseparably linked with the tireless activities of the Com-
munist Party, its all-conquering ideals and policy, its loyalty to the
behests of the great Lenin.
In a spirit of Leninism the party is innovatively solving all problems,
including tl'ose related to defense. To be constantly on guard, to ensure
the naticn's defense capability and to strengthen the army at all costs
are instructions issued by Lenin which have been and remain for the party
and people a lodestar in organization of the armed defense of the con-
quests of the October Revolution and securement of our nation's security
against the aggressive intrigues of Imperialism, The strength of the
Leninist doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland has been confirmed
by the rich experience of history, It has withstood the test in severe
battles against the enemies of our homeland during the Civil War and Great
Patriotic War,
In drafting plans for building communism, our party does not forget for
a single moment that a solid peace and favorable external conditions are
necessary for the Soviet people to implement these plans, Other peoples,
all progressive mankind are vitally interested as well in preserving and
strengthening peace, But under conditions of the stepped-up aggressiveness
of imperialism, headed by U.S. reactionary ruling circles, a desire for
peace would constitute a pacifist illusion if this desire were not
supported by the growing economic and defense strength of the Soviet Union
and the other socialist nations as well as their ability to defend the
cause of peace. Carrying out the demands of the CPSU Program and the
resolutions of the 23rd CPSU Congress, the Central Committee CPSU and
Soviet government are firmly and unswervingly moving t.,?iard strengthening
peace and international security, toward consolidation and support of all
peace-loving forces,
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The increased combat might of the Armed Forces and their high degree of
combat readiness constitute a decisive means of ensuring the peace and
security of our homeland, alongside the consistent peaceful foreign policy
of the USSR, An inseparable bond with the people and the total guidance
exercised by the Communist Party constitute the main source of the
strength and invincibility of the Soviet Army and Navy.
Tireless concern by the party, government and people for strengthening na-
tional defense, as well as success in developing the Soviet economy, sci-
ence and technology make it possible to achieve a high level of techno-
logical sophistication of all branches and arms of the Soviet Armed Forces,
as well as maintenance of their combat efficiency with consideration of
the demands of modern warfare. This applies first and foremost to
strategic weapons.
Marxism-Leninism teaches us that the military strength of the state and
its defense strength are organically dependent on the nature of the nations
social system; the level of development of its economy, science and tech-
nology, and the degree of unity between army and people. This relationship
is becoming even stronger today. This is why our party always bears in
mind the necessity of strengthening the defense capability of the USSR in
elaborating the main directions of development of the economy and implemen-
tation of plans for economic and social reforms, which are of a peaceful,
productive nature- This has also found expression in the directives for
the Ninth Five-Year Plan. It is emphasized that the new five-year plan
will ensure further growth to the defensive might of the Soviet Union,
and this will make it possible even more reliably to defend the Soviet
people and all nations in the socialist community against the danger of
imperialist aggression, and will strengthen the position of peaceful and
liberation forces throughout the world,
The Soviet Army and Navy constitute a mighty force which presents an
ominous barrier to our enemies. They are armed with first-class weapons
and the most sophisticated combat equipment, But their main force and
strength is comprised of people, our outstanding soldiers and sailors,
sergeants and petty officers, officers, general officers and admirals --
ardent patriots and internationalists who are totally dedicated to the
homeland, the cause of the party and the great ideals of communism,
Our fighting men are solid with the people, They unanimously approve
and actively support the wise policy of their party and are making a worthy
contribution toward building a communist society through their selfless
labors and reliable defense of the conquests of socialism. Army and navy
combat training and combat readiness have risen to a new and even higher
level in the Lenin centennial year, in the period of preparation for the
24th CPSU Congress,. The number of outstanding performers, proficiency-rated
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specialists, and outstanding s?~bunits, units, naval ships and large units
has grown substantially. Cony; 'gists and Komsomol members, comprising more
than 80 percent of personnel, constitute the vanguard of military col-
lectives, This is an enormous cementing and inspiring force, skillfully
guided by commanders and political officials toward successfully accomplish-
ing complex and responsible missions assigned the Armed Forces by party
and government?
Minister of Defense USSR Mar SU A, A. Grechko states that the principal
cask of the men in our army and navy is all-out improvement in the combat
readiness of each and every subunit, unit, naval ship and large unit -- the
entire Armed Forces as a whole, To achieve this we must constantly im-
prove military and political knowledge, learn even better mastery of
weapons and equipment, learn to utilize them efficiently under complex
situation conditions, and we must constantly improve vigilance, All in-
doctrinational effort in the army and navy should be directed toward this
end,,
There is no doubt whatsoever that the great work, permeated with deep
ideological content, which is presently being undertaken by commanders,
political officials, party and Komsomol organizations in connection with
study and dissemination of the materials of the 24th CPSU Congress will
prcmote a new upsurge in the political and productive activity of our
fighting men, as well as a further increase in the combat readiness of the
armed Forces.,
Military science, an intensification of military scientific research
and their close link with current problems of military organizational
development, its immediate and long-range prospects are acquiring increas-
ing significance in improving the combat might of army and navy, Lenin's
statement that a modern army cannot be built without science is highly
applicable today as well, It is particularly important to elaborate a
system, forms and methods of scientific troop control, troop training and
indoctrination, taking into account the demands of the scientific and
technological revolution, The science of management and control is to a
large extent the modern science of gaining victory. This is why mastery
of this science and its development constitute a vital task for military
cadres, They are being given inestimable assistance in this effort by a
thorough study of the Lenin military theory legacy, party decisions and
other CPSU documents.
The Soviet people and its fighting men are in an excellent, joyous mood.
They are bursting with patriotic pride in the great accomplishments of
past five-year plans and are firmly convinced that the new and magnificent
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party targets will be met. Unswervingly following the path of Lenin,
party and people have achieved world-historic success in building so-
cialism and defending our homeland against aggressor encroachments.
We shall stridi to a total victory of communism by following the Leninist
course and under the tested and proven guidance of the party!
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QUESTIONS ON THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF MLLITARY SCIENCE
Maj Gen V, Zemskov, Candidate of Military Science
Under conditions of further aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism
and the progressing military-technological revolution, CPSU military policy
and military science are playing an increasing role in the efficient ready-
ing of our nation and army to repel and defeat the aggressive fortes of im-
perialism.
The article entitled "Scientific Foundations of Party Policy in Military
Aifairs"examined the tasks and content of military policy, its correla-
tion and links with military science and doctrine,
This article continues an analysis of certain aspects of the history and
theory of Soviet military science.
From the History of the Development of Mi.litary Science
The military science of the first proletarian state did not develop out of
thin air, As in other fields of knowledge, military science also possesses
its sources of an objective and subjective type, Soviet military science,
brought to life by the historical necessity of defending the conquests of
the Great October Socialist Revolution, was born in the class battles of
the Russian proletariat, which preceded the GreaL October. Revolution. It
was formed in the course of savage battles between the old and new world
in the period of foreign military intervention and civil war, 1918-1920,
and received further development during and after the Great Patriotic War.
Soviet military science, from the very outset formed on the basis of the
philosophy and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of the revolu-
tionary experience of a rising class, at the same time creatively imbibed
the achievements of domestic and foreign military thought and practice from
the very first.
It is appropriate in this connection briefly to mention several key moments
in the history of military science. Its sources reach far into the past?
Originally, when the societal practices of ancient times, the level of know-
ledge and conditions of its dissemination were limited, when the printing
press did not exist, military science was of an extraordinarily narrow
empirical nature, Works on war were almost not even differentiated from
general philosophic and historical literature, and most frequently were
limited to a description of various military campaigns. A certain con-
tribution to the development of military affairs in those tiu:es was made by
the nations of the East, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, Friedrich Engels cites
information on the Greek armies from ancient sources characterizing the
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development of military theory. Engels wrote that they were the first
about whose organization we possess extensive and precise data (Izbrannyye
voyennyye proizvedeniya [Selected Military Writings], Voyenizdat, 1958,
page 139). One can state that the history of tactics, and particularly
infantry tactics, begins with these sources,
The age of feudalism in Europe encompasses a very long period, several
centuries. Although within the framework of this period one can dis-
tinguish a number of unique features in the development of military af-
fairs, on the whole development proceeded slowly, right up to the appear-
ance of firearms in Europe in the 14th century. Of the works on military
theory from the late feudal era, we should mention the Treatise on the Art
of War by the Florentine Machiavelli. This work, however, and other
writings did not signify the formalization of military science as a system
of knowledge. They constituted preparatory materials for subsequent
theoretical synthesis and conclusions.
The genesis and formalization of military science took place essentially in
the 18th century. The development of productive resources, the growth of
sciertific knowledge on nature and discovery of a number of laws demonstrat-
ing the universal linkage of phenomena made it possible for the development
of a method of comparative-historical approach to such societal phenomena
as war. It is true that this method was primarily of a metaphysical
character, but cevertheless it did promote a certain cognition of military
phenomena.
At the end of the 18th century the works of Lloyd and Billow were published,
the first to view military strategy as the core of military science.
Billow, for example, was the first to demonstrate that "political strategy
applies to military strategy just as the latter applies to tactics." He
defined strategy and tactics.
The French bourgeois revolution exerted great influence on the development
of military science. Lenin stated: "Just as the French revolutionary
people displayed on the domestic scene a maximum of revolutionary energy
which was unprecedented in history, so it displayed in the war at the end
of the 18th century the same gigantic revolutionary creativity, creating
an entire system of strategy, departii_g from all the old laws and customs
of war and creating a new, revolutionary, popular army and a new method
of warfare in place of the old" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works],
Volume 32, pp 79-80).
The birth and establishment of bourgeois military science was also closely
linked with the names of Napoleon, Jomini, Clausewitz and other mili-
tary leaders.
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1mpcftant landmarks also marked the development of Russian military theo-
retical thought, Substantial influence on its formation was exerted by
the military reforms of Peter the Great, the writings of P. A, Rumyantsev,
the activities of A. V. Suvorov, M, I. Kutuzov and other generals. We
knew, for example, that at this time Russian military -theoretical thought
had already expressed the idea of the link between military affairs and
politics, that politics gives "the helm to tae military," Long before
Clausewitz, a Russian military theorist, the Decembrist Burtsov, not only
pointed to the connection between war and politics but even specified the
necessity for military science not to limit itself to the narrow framework
of the art of war but to include the study of other factors as well. By
the middle of the 19th century the writings of Russian military theorists
had formulated fairly precisely certain fundamental principles of the art
of war., A study by A. I., Astaf9yev entitled 0 sovremennom voyennom is-
kusstve (Modern art of war), published in 1856 and 1861, stated quite
plainly that the theory of the art of war constitutes a science, We later
find this idea in the writings of Leyer, Mikhnevich and others.
Every science has an applied significance, This is particularly true of
military science. Military science, however, finds broad practical appli-
cation only following fundamental elaboration of its principles, discovery
of the laws and patterns of war, cognition of which enables one to predict
the development of military phenomena and to elaborate rigorously sci-
entific principles of the art of war, The applied character of science is
di:tated by objective necessities, a unity of theory and practical action.
The true power of science is manifested when it functions not only as a
product and process of cognition but also as a scientific guide to action,
as a method of this action. Precisely such qualities are possessed by
Scviet military science, which is constructed on a foundation of Marxism-
Leninism. Successes of course are also obvious in development of bourgeois
military thought, One cannot, however, help but see its weak points, which
reflect the flaws of the capitalist system, the detriment of a metaphysical
and idealistic way of thinking.
Nonmaterialist methodology inhibited the development of bourgeois, includ-
ing Russian military thought, which on the eve of World War I, although
possessing a comprehension of a number of laws of warfare, nevertheless
remained captive to obsolete concepts and idealist delusions,
The theoretical foundations of the military science of the proletariat
began to be laid in the depths of capitalist society in the latter half of
the 19th century,
Speaking of these aspects or stages in the development of military sci-
ence (empiricism, theoretical generalizations, practical application), one
of course must take into consideration the somewhat arbitrary nature of
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such a division, for each of these aspects can be presented in pure form
only theoretically, only in the interests of a more graphic elucidation of
the specific features of a given period of its development. In actuality,
here as in any science, the laws of materialist dialectics prevail, and
the entire process of cognition is carried out with its inherent contradic-
tions, All processes occur, one might say, in a unified expression,
reflecting as a whole the extremely complex path of progressive develop-
ment of military theory.
The Birth and Development of Military Science of the Proletariat
The founders of Marxism theoretically substantiated the role and signifi-
cance of military problems pertaining to the proletarian revolution in
connection with defense of its conquests against the forces of counter-
revolution. They believed that the victorious proletariat should be even
prepared to defend with weapon in hand the cause of the socialist revolu-
tion and to crush the resistance of the exploiters. Revolutionary violence
against the exploiters, constituting a response to violence on their part,
is the sacred right of the toilers, who have risen up in struggle for their
social liberation, Marx and Engels initiated a genuine doctrine on war and
army as a component part of historical materialism. This constituted
establishment of the ideological-theoretical principles of the military
science of the proletariat.
For the first time in history, Marxism discovered the most important laws
governing the development of military affairs, their dependence on the
level of development of productive forces and the nature of societal
relations. These latter, in the opinion of Marx and Engels, always func-
tion as a precondition for every new, major improvement in military af-
fairs, in the development of military science. Consequently, they had re-
vealed the dialectical relationship between methods of warfare, organiza-
tion of the army, its arms, strategy and tactics and the character of the
economic system, the level of development and capabilities of the economy
and the political superstructure of society.
Examining military problems in the interests of the proletarian revolu-
tion, Marx and Engels demanded the scrapping, the destruction of the
bourgeois war machine and the creation of a new, socialist military orga-
nization for armed defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat against
its enemies.
Marx and Engels were clearly aware of the fact that great historical
questions, particularly liberation of the proletariat from capitalism,
under specific historical conditions are settled by force. Precisely for
this reason they ascribed great importance to a mastery of military
knowledge and saw in military theory a powerful weapon of the proletariat
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i.n its struggle against capitalism. Extension of the dialectical method
tc the area of military phenomena was without question a most important
..::hLevement of Marxist military-theoretical thought.
With the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the military
ties in the hands of the toilers for the first time in history, and armed
iu.rces as a mee.ns of coercion began to be employed in the interests of
defense of the conquests of the socialist revolution. The Soviet state set
..p in opposition to the imperialist armed forces and bourgeois military
Erience a totally new, particularly in a sociopolitical respect, army and
an incipient Soviet military science.
'Lenin developed and applied general methodology of Marxism to elaboration
;f the foundations of Soviet military science. The Marxian prediction
th,t military science of the proletariat "will be just as essential a
p:?cduct of the new societal relations as military science created by the
..evolution and Napoleon constituted an inevitable result of the new
relations engendered by the revolution" (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch.
[Writings], Volume 7, page 510) received practical embodiment in Russia.
Marxist-Leninist methodology of solving military problems played a deter-
role in the creation and elaboration of Soviet military science.
Exposing the class nature of imperialist wars as reactionary and unjust,
Lenin scientifically substantiated the historically logical and just
nature of revolutionary wars of the toiler masses raised up in struggle for
their liberation, for revolution -- civil wars, wars of national libera-
ticn, wars in defense of the revolutionary conquests of the proletariat.
Lenin thoroughly analyzed the fundamental laws and features of contemporary
war and the determining factors for achieving victory.
Describing the Marxist approach to phenomena of war, Lenin wrote: "As
applied to wars, the fundamental tenet of the dialectic... states that
war is simply a continuation of politics by other' (violent) 'means'...
This was always the position of Marx and Engels, who viewed each war as
:he continuation of policies of given interested powers -- and different
'asses within the nations -- at a given time" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume
26, page 224).
in this Leninist definition is expressed the indissoluble link between
politics and war. Politics operates here as a whole, and war as a part
of that whole, as one of the means of achieving the aims of politics
primarily by force of arms. "War," stated Lenin, "is a part of the
whole... This whole is 'politics"' (Leninskiy sbornik [Lenin Collection],
XII, page 433).
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it is essential thereby to emphasize Lenin's idea that politics is a re-
lationship of classes, particularly within the state. It is a concentrated
expression of economics, the economic interests of the ruling class. And
since this is so, naturally the class struggle in the capitalist countries
does not terminate during the course of the war. Therefore politics as a
whole of course cannot be equated with war, although the content of war
includes not only military but also nonmilitary policy means. As for the
socialist countries engaging in a war, that war of course does not con-
stitute their enti e politics, for during the course of the war civilian
production continues to exist alongside military, the development of soci-
etal relations continues, ties are established with neutral states, etc,
in short, even during war there exist traits and manifestations of politics
inherent in peacetime development,
The founders of Marxism-Leninism highly praised Clausewitz's On war, which
played an important role in the development of bourgeois military thought.
This work constituted a first attempt at a scientific philosophic examina-
tion of war and its categories. In his Sotsializm i voyna (Socialism and
War) Lenin wrote: "War is a continuation of politics by other (specifically:
violent,;) means. Thin famous statement was made by one of the most profound
writers o n military topics, Clausewitz. Marxists quite rightly always
considered this tenet a theoretical foundation of views on the significance
of each given war. Marx and Engels always viewed various wars precisely
from this position" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 26, page316),
Lenin emphasized that Clausewitz's ideas on the history of wars "were made
fertile by Hegel," In contrast to the metaphysicians, Clausewitz utilized
the dialectical method (on an idealist basis, to be sure) to describe mili-
tary history and theory, and was the first to initiatie a study "of the
history of wars and to deduce philosophic lessons from this history" (Polno
Sobr, Soch., Volume 32, page 79). He was the first to realize that al.l
the principal lines along which military events develop are drawn by
politics, which influences the character of a war, Politics is the corner-
stone of all theory of war, But Clausewitz viewed politics in an ideal-,
istic manner, divorced from ecc..omic factors, the class struggle, from
the type of social system; he reduced politics Lo intergovernmental rela-
tions?
The founders of Marxism-Leninism, proceeding from revolutionary materialist
dialectics, offered a concrete historical, class understanding of war and
demonstrated the necessity of studying each war separately, Thus the
Marxist-Leninist comprehension of politics and war differs basically from
the views of the idealist-dialecticians. A genuine scientific revelation
of the dialectics of politics and war proceeds from the main point -- con-
sideration of their class character.
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F_Lir.i.cs engenders war. In any case the origination of war depends on
profound economic and political processes taking place within a class-
antagonistic. society, on the activities of the class in whose interests
the war is being waged, on the correlation between social and political
fc)rces, According to Lenin, every war is inseparably linked with that
pciit:ical system from which it derives. Therefore in order to comprehend
r.he essence ci war it is necessary to study the politics which preceded it,
ci which it constitutes the result and continuation,
reiitics, however;, does not solely "give birth to war." it defines its
ct,je_.cwes and influences the methods of waging war, "The character of
t.I pclitical aim," wrote Lenin, "possesses decisive influence on the
waging of war,,," (Leninskiy sbcrnik, XTI, page 429)
Tw,: elements presented in the Leninist definition of the essence of war --
znuation of politics" and "violent means"' -- express two inseparably
litk.ed aspects. On the one hand, the more profound, determining aspect,
war is a continuation of politics, while on the other hand, a subordinate
aspect --- it constitutes violence, that is continuation of politics by
v'iclent means, Consequently for the sake of completeness in revealing the
esse.nc.e of war it is always necessary not only to emphasize its determining,
pclitical aspect (continuation of politics) but also to indicate the form
of func_c.ioning of politics, that is utilization of violent means. As a
whole the dialectical unity of politics and violent means creates such a
societal phenomenon as war. Without politics there is no war, just as
t.hare is no war without employment of violent means, and armed forces in
--ZIar?
B, :L this is t,' he in cv inoic expression of the term "war. " The content of
the term "war" is broader, richer in substance, Marxist-Leninist science
-:iews war as a social phenomenon which under present-day conditions is
waged not only by armed forces and other organizations '(for example, of a
paramilitary nature), but also by a people as a whole, by a nation's en-
tire material and spiritual resources. Lenin directly emphasized that
modern warfare constitutes a comprehensive test of a nation's economic and
organizational resources, that victory in war is won by the side with the
greater reserves, the greater sources of power, greater staying power with-
in the masses (Poln. Sobr, Socho, Volume 39, page 237). By dint of this
the content of war includes nonmilitary political means eccnomics ideo-
Zoy;',~oZ,, diplomatic and others, while war itself is viewed as a special
state of society0
But inclusion in the content of the term war of nonmilitary political
means, and consequently nonmilitary forms of struggle, does not signify
that they are of equal significance with armed forces and armed combat.
Armed fcrces constitute the principal instrument of policy in war, and in
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this sense armed combat is the main content of war. Nonmilitary forms of
struggle are essentially for the purpose of supporting successful prosecu-
tion of the war. Lenin stated that "if things have gone to the point of
war, then everything should be subordinated to the interests of the war"
(Poln, Sobr. Soch., Volume 41, page 117). During the course of the war
the role of all nonmilitary forms of struggle and each form separately may
change, and consequently their specific weight and significance in respect
to armed combat and in the war as a whole may also change, They possess a
certain independence in carrying out their tasks.
Thus the Marxist-Leninist position on this question is quite clear. One
cannot help noting, however, that in theoretical studies one sometimes
encounters assertions which boil down to the following: nonmilitary politi-
cal means are utilized in peacetime, and therefore it is wrong to include
them in the content of war. One should be able clearly to see the one-
sidedness of such an approach in assessment and utilization of the great
diversity of political means. To reason in this manner means to reduce
war to utilization of armed forces and thus to ignore the statements of
Marxism-Leninism on the essence of violence as a totality of utilization
of diversified forms (measures) of compulsion (economic, ideological,
diplomatic, administrative, etc), and of course military as well. In flee
second place, armed forces as an instrument of policy also exist in peace-
time, Although they are not directly utilized until a war begins,
through the very fact of their existence they constitute an important
means of implementation of policy between wars.
Ideological-Theoretical Foundations of Soviet Military Science
Since war is a specific historical phenomenon, a social category, a partic-
ular state of society, it will obvious 1 y be correct to state that
contemporary war is investigated by many sciences -- some to a greater
degree than others.
The sociopolitical aspects of war are investigated by the social sciences,
and in particular by historical materialism and its major component in
relation to the subject under discussion -- Marxist-Leninist doctrine on
war and army.
The military aspect proper of war in all its links and relations with its
sociopolitical aspects is also investigated by many sciences, and in
particular by military science and a number of relatively independent
military-technical sciences. It is important to emphasize at this point
that this investigation is not an isolated but rather a unified process.
The social sciences cannot properly examine the sociopolitical aspects of
war without support of the data and conclusions of military science and
without penetrating to a certain degree into an analysis of its
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specifically military aspects. And military science in turn cannot suc-
cessfully investigate the military aspect of war without support from the
data And conclusions of the social sciences, particularly Marxist-Leninist
doctrine on war and army. In addition, military science investigates pre-
cisely the military aspect of war, and particularly utilization of means
~)i armed violence in war, in the light of the political aims and political
:Urtenr. of war, that is it studies and investigates within its framework
ir,:.?in;i:ic ctpredr+ion of war a centinuat ton of politics by violent
means- Thus at the level of our analysis one can conclude that war consti-
tutes the subject of investigation of many sciences (to varying degrees
and ccmpleteness), naturally including military science. Only by cogniz-
ing war as a social phenomenon, an exceptionally complex and diverse
phenomenon, can military science properly conduct elaboration of its subject
Thus u?ar is the object of cognition by military science., At this point one
can logically ask: what is the subject of contemporary military science?
it is a well-known fact that the object of a science's cognition and its
subject are not. identical terms. The subject of a science is narrower than
its object of cognition.
Why are the terms "object" and "subject" not identical: Why is the subject
of science narrower than its object of cognition? Because in the first
place the object, objective reality, is always richer; broader than ac-
quired knowledge; the subject of a science comprises that which has already
been specifically determined by experiment and has been included in the
pto,:ess of scientific activity. Cognition, stated Lenin, is an eternal,
infinite approximation of thought to object (Poln? Sobr. Soch,, Volume 29,
page 177)? He emphasized time and again that in cognition it is essential
to strive toward a fuller and more comprehensive study of an object, and
this is possible only by means of a sequential transition from the study
of certain specific aspects, properties and relations to others, from cog-
nition of certain, less profound substances to other, more profound sub-
stances, Such is the dialectic and logic of any scientific cognition of an
object by means of its study via the subject of science. In the second
place, the subject of military science in particular is narrower than its
object of cognition also because war, as was stated above, is investigated
by other sciences as well, which also have their own subject.
in contrast to the subjects of other sciences, the subject of military
science expresses the main content of war, that is armed combat. Herein
lies the ssence of its specific features,
Thus military science comprehensively considers knowledge on war provided
by various sciences, but the specific subject of its investigation is
armed combat in all its connections and relations with socicpclitical, eco-
ncmie and other factors of war? Its subject also includes knowledge of
armed forces, Armed combat and armed forces are examined by it through the
prism of cognition of corresponding laws, and patterns,2
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It seems to us that such an approach to the subject of military science on
the one hand does not permit its narrowing to the framework of the study of
military operations, that is "pure" art of war, which constitutes an
organic flaw of bourgeois military science. On the other hand it does not
permit military science to enter into the functions of other sciences, that
is to monopolize (to the detriment of the cause at hand) the investigation
of such a complex social phenomenon as war.
From that which has been stated about the object and subje;,t of modern
Soviet military science one can conclude that it encompasses specifically
military, mcraZe-political, military-economic and scientific-technical (in
that part connected with weapons and combat equipment) topics. Of course
their investigation is based on the history of wars and the art of war in
general, and wars in defense of the socialist homeland in particular.
Soviet military science is based on a rigorously scientific foundation of
Marxism-Leninism and all its component parts. It finds its philosophic
foundation in dialectical and historical materialism.
Military science, on the basis of general philosphic tenets and conclusions,
cognizes such a multifaceted and complex social phenomenon as war, in-
vestigates armed combat and armed forces as an instrument of politics. The
Marxist-Leninist principle of objectivity focuses theorists and practical
experts in military affairs on cognition of the real processes of war, a
comprehensive estimate of reality, the making of substantiated, optimal
decisions, the elimination of subjectivism and voluntarism, The principle of
partymindedno s orients military cadres toward unconditional defense of the
interests of the worker class and all toilers, an approach to all social
phenomena from the position of defense of the conquests of socialism and
Communism, The thesis of philosophic materialism on the active role of
man's conscious activity lies at the basis of scientific solution to the
problem of the correlation between the objective laws of military science
and the conscious activity of the masses and military commanders.
The laws and :ategories of materialist dialectics enable military science
to focus its attention on the most important and substantial connections
and relations in the mechanism of military affairs, Marxist-Leninist
methodology serves as a compass in investigation and elaboration of mili-
tary-theoretical problems advanced by practical realities.
Marxist-Leninist sociology, revealing at the level of historical material-
ism the most general laws of development of society, teaches us to
approach and solve problems of war, proceeding from the material condi-
tions of society, to see the relationship between the course and outcome
of war and economic, political and spiritual factors. Only on the basis
of historical materialism is it possible to understand the nature and
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essence of wars, Marxist doctrine on war and army, developed by Lenin in
the new historical era, serves as a philosophic-sociological basis of
Soviet military science.
The ~?c;vcm2.c doctrine of Marx and Engels, elevated by Lenin to new heights;
is also inseparably linked with military science, which is explained by the
L,)jective and intimate interlink between the objects of their cognition --
eccnomics and war, Soviet military science proceeds from the determining
influence of economics on war and military affairs, The economic structure
Ji society dictates the causes and political character of wars, Economics
:onstituces the material base for creating the means of warfare; the
development of new means and changes in the "human military material" evoke
changes in the methods and forms of combat, in army organization, methods
of troop control, etc, Economic relations through politics and ideology
affect the morale of the civilian population and army, and determine the
capability for realization of the nation`s military-economic potential to
achieve victory in war.
Military economics, forming at the juncture of political economy and mili-
tary science, studies the economic patterns of war and offers recommenda-
tions on the most expedient economic policies in the area of military
organizational development, solution to problems of economic support of
national defense and utilization of material and human resources in the
interests of victorious prosecution of ware
The Leninist doctrine on imperialism thoroughly reveals the sources of
unjust wars of plunder, the politics of aggression, pursued for the sake
of profits for monopoly capital, and serves the cause of exposing today's
American "hawks." At the same time Lenin's substantiation of the socio-
economic advantages of the Soviet system over the capitalist strengthens
the confidence of Soviet citizens and the men in cur army and navy in the
inevitability of the aggressor's defeat if he dares start a war against our
homeland,.
The;ry of scientific corrvmtnism is of particular importance -- ideological-
political and methodological-- for Soviet military science and practical
military affairs. Scientific communism studies the principal laws govern-
ing the socialist revolution, the building of socialism and communism in
their interrelations and interdependencesa One of these general laws is
armed defense of the conquests of socialism against imperialist aggression.,
The growing role of military science in solving contemporary problems of
military affairs under conditions of a military-technical revolution of
necessity dictates further elaboration of new problems of military theory,
taking into consideration changes occurring in the means and methods of
warfare, in the forming and optimization of operational--tactical demands
on new types of combat equipment and weapons and in forecasting develpment
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of the art of war, proceeding from the nature of wars of the present era
and the prospects of scientific-technical progress.
At the same time one cannot help but see the growing role of military sci-
ence also in the fact that it constitutes one of the principal sources of
the shaping of military doctrine of the socialist state. Carrying out the
demands of the policies of the CPSU and Soviet government, military sci-
ence investigates a broad range of problems in order to provide our mili-
tary doctrine with an optimized choice of possible variant solutions to
military tasks facing the Soviet state. Herein lies the essence, of course
in general form, of the interrelations between military science and doc-
trine, We should emphasize that the interaction and connections between
military science and doctrine are of both an indirect and direct nature,
and within the links proper -- direct and inverse. These connections are
as follows: 1) military science-military policy-military doctrine; 2) mili-
tary science-military doctrine; 3) military doctrine-military science.
Indirect connections occur along the line military science-military policy-
military doctrine. Military policy, predicting the development of the
world's military-political situation, takes in the latest conclusions and
recommendations of military science and periodically, as needed, introduces
basic refinements into the content of doctrine. Consequently in this case
military science influences doctrine via military policy.
Direct connections occur in the most definite manner along the line mili-
tary science-military doctrine. Here we are dealing primarily with the
immediate role of military science in elaboration of the military aspect
proper of doctrine, as well as in development of the scientific principles
of already adopted points of military doctrine in the course of the
practical activities of the political, military leaders and all military
cadres in preparing the armed forces and the nation for war.
Feedback connections are naturally of prevailing significance along the
line military doctrine-military science, that is when military doctrine
assigns military science new tasks pertaining to the future elaboration
of military problems,
All the above-mentioned links are fully coordinated and reconciled with the
points of materialist dialectics on the diversity of processes of inter-
action and interpenetration of politics, military doctrine and science; the
character and functions of the latter are more deeply revealed in an in-
vestigation of these links.
Military science exerts corresponding influence on the elaboration of
fundamental directions of military-technical policy; it proceeds thereby
from overall national technical policy and the capabilities of the economy.
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Military-technical policy constitutes an aggregate of planned and in-
process measures pertaining to the development and manufacture of the
instruments of war, needed to supply the armed forces in conformity with
state military policy and military doctrine. Our state's military-tech-
nical policy is inseparable from its economic and military policy, Its
scientific, economic substantiation includes, for example, the following
items: 1) harmonious development of equipment and supply of all branches
and arms; 2) optimization of the ratio between the various services and
combat equipment within the different services and arms; 3) determination
of the material requirements of armed forces military-technical develop-
ment, and increase in the effectiveness of expenditures for military
equipment on the basis of scientific and technological advances.
Guided by CPSU policy, our military-technical policy has the task of en-
suring superiority over the aggressive forces of imperialism in the hard-
ware of war. We possess a realistic economic basis for this: the economic
system of socialism, based on public ownership of the means of production,
its root advantages over capitalism, the planned nature of social produc-
tion, and its subordination to national interest. All this unites eco-
nomic and military problems into a single whole. The principles of in-
divisibility of these problems is characteristic of all economic-political
activity of the CPSU and Soviet government.
The scientific, economic substantiation of our military-technical policy
is an organic part of the system of centralized planned direction of the
socialist economy, Herein is realized a most important advantage of
socialism over capitalism -- planned development of military-economic and
scientific-technical potential, serving as a foundation for the scientific
strength and effectiveness of our military science.
These are the general features of the substance of the matters discussed
in the article,
1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 11, 1970,
2. The editors plan to present a separate discussion of the laws and struc-
ture of military science in subsequent issues of this journal.
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MILITARY STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS
Col Gen M. Povaly
Marxist-Leninist science, which studies the development of society from
the standpoint of dialectical and historical materialism, d?scovered and
substantiated the true nature of political and economic relations of
classes and nations, and the essence-of war as a continuation of
politics by other, violent means. The founders of scientific Communism
established that the level of an economy's development is decisive in
the development of society, They also emphasized the decisive role of
the economy in war. " ..In every war," wrote V. I. Lenin, "the
economy is determining" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 34,
page 41).
It is quite natural that the mutual influence of strategy and economics
constitutes one of the root problems of military theory and practice.
Strategy as the most important area in the art of war is complex and
many -faceted. The article "Politics and Military Strategyi1 discussed
several problems handled by strategy during war, its subordination to
politics, the relationship between the success of strategy and the
social system, and the nature of national policy, In this article we
shall examine the most important aspects of the problem of mutual in-
fluence and interaction between strategy and economics with the leading
role of politics in the period of preparing for war.
The subject of strategy includes the theory and practice of comprehensive
preparation of armed forces for war and methods of conduct of warfare
with maximum effective utilization of all resources to achieve victory
over an aggressor.
For a deeper understanding of the content of strategy it is essential
to examine the interrelations between strategy and economics, guided
by the major tenets of Marxism-Leninism, which states that victory in
war "is based on the production of arms, and the production of arms
in turn is based on production in general, ..on 'economic power', on
'economic position', on the material means at the disposal of the agents
of coercion" (F. Engel's: Izbrann ye voyennyye proizvedeniya [Selected
Military Writings], Voyenizdat, 1957, page 11). Every important mili-
tary task deals with problems not only of a strategic but also of a
political, economic, technical, moral, and scientific character (taken
as a whole). Therefore strategy, which studies the capability of the
potential enemies, one's own and allied nations; is guided not only by
the tenets of military science but also by the instructions of top-
level political and governmental entities. In addition, it utilizes
the conclusions and recommendations of various scientific bodies.
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Strategy focuses particular attention on a study of the composition
and groupings of the most aggressive imperialist coalitions; their
open and concealed supporters and adversaries, Lt estimates the
state of their economic and political organization, the level of develop-
ment of their armed forces, the character of military-economic measures
being implemented, and the degree of militarization of the economy.
On the basis of this type of data, strategy can draw conclusions on
measures necessary to prepare to repulse aggression, on the character,
scale, and methods of conduct of potential wars and the conditions
producing them,
Proceeding from an analysis of the policies of imperialist: states and
their economic capabilities, politics and strategy, taking into account
the economic capabilities of one's own country, resolve the question
of the degree to which and the period in which it is necessary to
strengthen military potential,' which is expressed normally by numbers
of combat troops, logistic support, quantities of conventional and
nuclear weapons and means of delivery, as well as the state of military
production, In settling the question of development of military
potential one takes into consideration the state of the economy, its
mobilization potential, and the geographic distribution cf industrial
installations.
Strategy establishes the organizational forms of units, large units,
formations, all branches of the armed forces, quantity and sophistica-
tion of equipment, and logistics; it supervises troop combat training
applicable to the military-technical and strategic features of the
anticipated aggression,
Solving root problems of preparing a country's defense, strategy is
guided by Lenin's statement that "intensified preparations for a
serious war demand ... a protracted, intense, persisting and disciplined
effort on a mass scale" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 36, page 325). He
further emphasizes: "...We demand of all a serious attitude toward
national defense. A serious attitude toward national defense means
thorough preparation and strict consideration of the balance of power
and correlation of forces" (page 292). One should not underestimate
the opponent -- "this is the most dangerous thing" in war (V, I. Lenin:
Poln. Sobr, Soch,, Volume 41, page 144).
The modern development of science, technology, and the economy makes it
possible rapidly to improve all types of weapons. The imperialist
nations, and the United States in particular, are spending funds
lavishly on major efforts in this area. The effort is particularly
intensive in the area of study of the possibilities of use of lasers
and further sophistication of nuclear and thermonuclear warheads.
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Multiple warheads are being developed with scatter of the individual
nuclear warheads for penetration of an ABM system and more reliable
hit probability on area targets, particularly industrial centers.
Tests are being conducted on multiple warheads containing guidance
systems ensuring greater accuracy and higher hit probability on partic-
ularly "hard" point targets, such as silo-type missile launch sites.
Devices are being designed for submarine search and for more effective
warhead penetration of ABM systems. ABM and ASW complexes, space and
missile weapons are being developed. The Pentagon is building increas-
ingly powerful strategic missile complexes with improved protection
of silo-type launch sites. The submarine strategic nuclear-warhead mis-
sile system is being further improved, with more powerful missiles,
with MIRV warheads, as well as increased range of fire; low-noise and
no-noise nuclear submarines are being designed.
New strategic and tactical aircraft are being developed, with improved
performance and more sophisticated navigation equipment, missile
armament, and electronic devices for air defense system penetration.
Advanced models of tanks, APCs, helicopters, artillery, missiles and
other weapons are being developed.
One can conclude from the above that a war, if the aggressors initiate
one, will be waged with complex, diversified weapons and will be
characterized by a high degree of intensity not only of combat opera-
tions. It will require a high degree of intensity of effort on the
home front as well, tough competition on the part of the economies
of the belligerent nations.
Naturally our country and all nations of the socialist commonwealth
cannot help but take into consideration all the preparations being
made by American imperialism for the initiation of another world war.
The Soviet Union is doing everything it must in the interests of
preserving peace and security of peoples.
As a rule the tasks of strategy in regard to repulsing aggression are
specified on the basis of prediction, the complexity of which lies in
the fact that one is sometimes dealing with scattered, incomplete, and
in many instances contradictory data, since in preparing for war the
aggressor carefully conceals his war plans and intentions and endeavors
to launch a sneak attack, employing maximum force at the first strike.
The problem of organizing the nation's defense becomes extremely
complex in connection with this; this applies in particular to determina-
tion of the composition of requisite manpower and equipment, material
and other resources.
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In his Voerosy sovremennoy strategic (Problems of Modern Strategy),
Mar SU M, N. Tukhachevskiy wrote: "We can predict, forecast, the forms
of a future war only for its initial period, on the basis of the
character of development of armed forces, preparation and militarization
of the industry of those nations entering the war,"' Marshal Tukhachev-
skiy substantiated this statement by the impossibility of estimating
and predicting the character of a war as a whole, from beginning to end,
in view of the fact that past wars have brcken down, on the basis of the
nature of combat operations, into a number of stages, differing from
one another by the employed composition of forces, quantity and sophistica-
tion of weapons and equipment, tactical, major tactical and strategic
actions, Indeed, not only World War I but World War 1.1 as well., in-
cluding its most decisive segment -- the Great. Patriotic War -? was
made up of periods, the distinction of which was determined by economic,
political, strategic, military-technical and other ccnditions.
The task of strategy under present-day conditions appari-=ntly consists
in correctly estimating the overall picture of a potential world war,
determining the theaters of military operations and the significance
of each, determining the methods of warfare, as well as the material
requirements of the armies in the field, which serve as a basis for a
country's economic preparations for war. In these preparations one
takes into consideration the fact that in a modern war the economy
functions on the one hand as a source for strengthening the offensive
might and firepower of the armed forces, that is AE; {i ;nt~r:~~ ref ] nt.i rtl.
support for the nnil z,-.ivy, #iii'l ")-I th UI.hi r .... %s n" Oh j(-i;L1'/c of
r;;.7.ii ry inf? uence with the aim of weakening the opponent's economic
potential.
Strategy, proceeding from the points of military policy, takes part in
solving major problems connected with increasing a country's economic
potential, guided by fundamental conclusions drawn on the basis of
experience in preparing for and waging world wars, This experience
indicates that not only defense plants take part in supporting the
armed forces but almost all branches of civilian industry as well.
Success in modern operations is directly dependent on the transportation
network, its condition and the operation of all modes of transport,
Therefore transport and its development are constantly in the center
of attention of strategy, since "arms, composition, organization,
tactics and strategy depend first and foremost on the level of produc-
tion achieved at a given moment and on means of transportation" (F. En-
gel's: Izbrannyye voyennyy_e proizvedeniya, page 11). Also of consider-
able importance for strategy is the financing of military measures,
What are the interrelations between strategy and economics on the
fundamental problems of economic preparation of a country for war?
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First of all their interaction is seen in resolving problems of armed
forces organizational development. As is well known, it is carried out
on the basis of the tenets of military doctrine, scientific and tech-
nological achievements, state of production, state of all branches of
the economy and future prospects for economic development as a whole.
Politics and strategy are guided by Lenin's statements that "without
science it is impossible to build a modern army" (Poln, Sobr. Soch.,
Volume 40, page 183) and that in war "victory is won by the side with
the superior technology, organization, discipline and the best hardware;
war has taught us this... This must be learned, because without
machinery, without discipline it is impossible to live in a modern
society -- one must either master advanced technology or be crushed"
(Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 36, page 116),
The Soviet state, utilizing the advantages of the socialist economic
system, created powerful armed forces and is constantly improving their
organization, the balance between the branches and arms, their equipment,
as well as combat, politi^al and routine training.
A multimillion-man army is necessary for waging modern warfare. But it
is impossible to maintain such armed forces in peacetime. Therefore
in all nations without exception armed forces consist of a specific
contingent of peacetime troops, as a rule well-equipped and trained,
at a high level of combat readiness, as well as troops prepared for
mobilization deployment on the basis of universal military obligation.
Toward the beginning of and in the course of a war the economy must
supply the needs of the armed forces, satisfying their enormous and
increasing demand for military equipment, ammunition, fuel, clothing,
provisions, various gear, repair facilities and many other types of
support services.
Strategy in turn, in order to achieve maximum economical and effective
utilization of military equipment, particularly costly and complex-
manufacture weapons, guides the research efforts of appropriate mili-
tary scientific establishments.
With the aid of science, technology and industrial production,
strategy also resolves such an important problem in armed forces
organizational development as improvement in military hardware; it
determines the requisite quantity and types of existing and development-
stage arms for each branch, service and arm; it accelerates the process
of becoming operational for all new and improved models of combat,
transport and other types of military equipment; together with the
economy it endeavors to ensure that the latest scientific and techno-
logical advances are put into production in order to build the most ad-
vanced and powerful weapons.
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In connection with increased aggressiveness on the parr of imperialism,
Soviet military strategic thought, science and economic system have
provided for the development of strategic nuclear forces which in the
hands of policy constitute a decisive means of preventing war and
ensuring the security of the nations of the socialist commonwealth.
L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, has
highly praised the role of the strategic nuclear forces and has defined
important missions in the area of the state's military policy, "We
have created strategic forces," said Brezhnev, "which constitute a re-
liable means of restraining any aggressor, We shall respond to any and
all attempts from any quarter to secure military superiority over the
USSR with a corresponding increase in military strength, guaranteeing
our defense. We cannot do otherwise.,"3
One can very clearly see the interrelationship between economics and
strategy in development of rail and highway network and modes of
transportation, which play an important role in the conduct of military
operations, In the world wars the great extent of the fronts and the
distance between the troops and the bases supplying them required a
vast network of lines of communication of all types -?- land and water --
for the prompt hauling of troops and supplies?
The problem of transport is an important one today as well. Strategy
determines the scope of requisite mobilization, operational and supply
traffic, estimates the capability of all modes of transport and,
jointly with the economy, specifies the execution of appropriate
measures for peacetime and war, proceeding from the assumed character
of a future war, Strategy takes into account the advantages and dis-
advantages of each mode of transport for a given theater of operations
and plans together with the economy development of lines of communica-
tion and manufacture of transport means, Strategy, for example,
is interested in the manufacture of large-capacity trucks with off-
road capability, in the manufacture of transport helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft, fast river vessels, etc.
Taking into account enemy intentions of disrupting transportation,
strategy and economics also coordinate the matter of defense of all
lines of communication, particularly junctions, transshipment points,
as well as matters pertaining to repair of highways, rail lines,
river-crossing structures and various other structures ensuring orga-
nization of rapid movement of passengers and goods. Strategy is also
interested in securing redundant transport facilities not only in
theaters of military operations but also between industrial regions
and forces operating in a theater of military operations and on home
territory.
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Planned distribution of manpower resources is an extremely complex
matter pertaining to armed forces organizational development and the
operation of the economy (particularly at the beginning of a war). As
demonstrated by the experience of World War II, all branches of the
economy required from 4 to 5 times as much manpower as was in the
armed forces in order to supply war needs. In a future w'r, in addition
to ensuring the normal operation of industry, transportation and
agriculture, considerable manpower will be required for repair and re-
building operations and for civil defense efforts. Therefore prob-
lems of drawing up a wartime manpower balance sheet should definitely
be resolved jointly by strategy and the economy.
Strategy establishes the principles of supplying the armed forces with
personnel and of setting up a system of military cadre training. The
system of combat, technical, political, and special troop training is
constantly improved, as is tactical and strategy training of higher
headquarters personnel and military cadres in regard to changing mili-
tary equipment adopted by the armed forces for conducting combat opera-
tions. Friedrich Engels noted that the influence "of military com-
manders... was limited to adapting method of warfare to new weapons and
new soldiers," while Lenin stressed that equipment exerts decisive
influence on combat training methods, methods of warfare and strategic
operations, "Military tactics depend on the level of military tech-
nology -- Engels masticated this truth and placed it into the Marxists'
mouths" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 13, page 374).
Lenin spoke of the enormous role played by the aware soldier and sailor,
who possessed initiative, in achieving victory in modern war. The
enlisted men, NCOs and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy are in-
doctrinated in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian interna-
tionalism, possess excellent technical training and morale-fighting
qualities. Our armed forces are directed by the best of the ex-
perienced Communists, who have proven capable of organizing personnel
training and handling agitation, propaganda and indoctrinational ef-
fort in the army and navy at the requisite level.
in view of the complexity of the manufacture of modern weapons, the
adoption of automatic control in industry and transportation, and the
development of mechanization in agriculture, the economy requires
highly-skilled workers, technicians, and engineers. Consequently,
strategy and economics are equally interested in complete and prompt
supply of manpower resources both to the armed forces and the economy,
For planning training and distribution of manpower during the period
of the Great Patriotic War, a special manpower committee was set up
under the Council of People's Commissars. The optimal variant of
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utilization of all manpower resources in war can be established only
with a careful examination of the manpower needs of the armed forces
and each branch of the economy.
Ties between economics and strategy are also revealed in matters of
financing military expenditures in peacetime and in war, determination
of state expenditures for maintaining armed forces and for conducting
a complex of military-economic measures to support their combat activi-
ties, Of course all these matters are settled in the light of the
fundamental points and requirements of policy.
Strategy defines the volume and product mix for military consumption
covering the immediate future, which also determines expansion of
military production, the aim of which is to provide combat equipment
and supplies to large units and units, to create reserves of weapons,
ammunition and other military supplies needed by armed forces when
war begins. This can be used as a basis in determining the volume
of military expenditures in the state budget,
A decisive role in determining volume of military expenditures is
played by policy. It estimates the international situation, defines
the military-political aims and tasks of strategy, and also assigns
targets to the economy.
Of primary importance to Soviet policy in peacetime are tasks pertain-
ing to steady growth of the country's productive resources and improve-
ment in toiler living standards. These tasks are resolved on the basis
of the socialist economic system. In a complex international
situation, with a threat of military aggression presented by imperial-
ism, "substantial funds must be spent on defense," stated L. I. Brezhnev,
General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU. "And I can assure
y o u that we shall maintain defense at the very highest level. Our
Armed Forces are reliably defending the boundaries of our homeland
and are standing guard together with the allied armies over the con-
quests of the brother socialist nations..."4
In the imperialist countries direct and concealed military expenditures
have assumed fantastic proportions, and war preparations are being con-
ducted on a broad scale. Hidden expenditures are being made through
the budget appropriations of nonmilitary departments and agencies, for
the purpose of deceiving the people. The giant military-industrial
complex is exerting enormous influence on governmental policy, is
receiving large appropriations and is obtaining high profits in the
area of military production. "The imperialist governments are drawing
up new plans for armament growth extending entire decades into the
future ..."J
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Military budgets provide for expenditures for the maintenance of per-
sonnel, acquisition and operation of military equipment, and capital
construction. For further growth in military potential, vast sums are
allocated for the purchase of combat equipment, weapons, ammunition,
transportation, communications, fuels, and a great variety of military
supplies necessary for mobilization deployment of the army and navy.
Large sums of money are allocated for scientific research and experi-
mental projects for the purpose of developing new and advanced weapons.
The construction of new military plants or the expansion of existing
facilities is financed.
This type of development is going on in the United States and the FRG,
where military potential is growing rapidly. The specific share of
military expenditures in the overall budget of these countries, in
connection with the arms race and militarization of the economy, has
reached a fantastic level. "Militarization of the economy is in-
separably linked with the general aggressive policy course of the
imperialist powers, and the United States in particular.i6 For example,
out of a total U.S. federal budget of 135 billion dollars for 1968,
expenditures for the Defense Department alone totaled 78 billion dollars,
that is more than 56 percent of total allocations. Counting ex-
penditures for the AEC (Atomic Energy Commission), NASA and foreign
"aid;' actual U.S. military expenditures reached a level of 85 percent
of total federal budget expenditures.?
Judging from the 1971 budget, the percentage of military expenditures
is continuing to grow.
Military appropriations in the FRG almost doubled from 1960 to 1967 --
from 10.0 to 19.7 billion marks.
Under present-day conditions the cost of even so-called conventional
weapons in the imperialist countries has multiplied dozens of times
over. The increase in expenditures for a war economy also is connected
with the fact that in addition to conventional military hardware, produc-
tion includes nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, automatic control
gear, electronic and other complex and costly equipment, The lion's share
of military expenditures goes for the purchase and maintenance of a great
variety of expensive military equipment. All this has altered the struc-
ture of the military budget. In 1968 and 1969 the United States budgeted
military appropriations of 78 billion dollars each of these years, 28.4-
30,4 percent of which was for maintaining personnel, 26.6-28.4 percent
for operation and maintenance of equipment, 30.1-31.3 percent for the
purchase of military hardware, and 9.8-10.0 percent for research and
development,
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Of the 21-23 billion dollars budgeted for the purchase of military hard-
ware in 1969, it was planned to spend 38 percent for aircraft and aircraft
parts, 11.5 percent on missiles, 29 percent on armor equipment, artillery
weapons, small arms and ammunition, 7,2 percent on warships, and 6 percent
on electronic equipment (figures rounded off),8
in the FRG expenditures for combat equipment and weapons in the period
1960-1964 averaged70-71 percent,9 while in Japan 40 percent of 2340 billion
yen allocated for armed forces development in the Third Five-Year Program
was for the purchase of advanced equipment.110 A characteristic feature
of scientific and techt.ological progress is an extraordinarily broad scope
and high rate of research and development., in which military topics occupy
an important position. This is connected with the fact that imperialism
has become more aggressive and adventuristic, "Militarism has, always been
an inseparable feature of imperialism," stated L. I. Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, "but today it has assumed an un-
precedented scale "11
U.S. federal expenditures for research and development projects in 1969
were planned at approximately 18 billion dollars, with 8,1 billion for the
Department of Defense (46 percent), and 4.5 billion for NASA (25 percent).
The fact is that approximately 70 percent of all expenditures are military
in nature (not counting AEC appropriations). Within the Department of
Defense, appropriations were distributed among the services as follows:
approximately 50 percent to the Air Force, 27.3 percent to the Navy, and
21,2 percent to the Army, while the structure of expenditures broke down
by types of equipment as follows: missile hardware -- 31.7 percent, air-
craft equipment -- 12.8 percent, space exploration -- 16.2 percent, basic
research -- 8,2 percent, warships -- 5.2 percent,12
At the same time the production of new weapons is accelerating, with the
participation of the big monopolies in almost all branches of industry.
According to reports in the American press, the U.S. government made a
preliminary decision to increase military appropriations for the 1971/72
fiscal year by 3.7 billion dollars over the preceding year. The Washington
r.'ost reports that the bulk of additional appropriations will be spent on
perfecting new weapons.13
Other imperialist countries of interest are the FRG and Japan, which are
utilized by the United States as forward bridgeheads for aggression against
the USSR and the nations of the socialist commonwealth. FRG monopoly
capitalism is endeavoring to keep pace with the nuclear powers in the
development of missile-nuclear and conventional weapons. The FRG's big-
gest monopoly -- the Federal Union of German Industry -- is playing a
major role in militarization. At the present time approximately 50 sci-
entific research organizations in the FRG are working on rocket and mis-
sile design, while approximately 20 firms are prospecting for and mining
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uranium in various countries. In 10 years of intensive Bundeswehr growth
(1956-1965), military consumption has increased 2.6-fold. The sharp in-
crease in arms production has been based primarily on aircraft and mis-
siles.
Japan receives assistance from the United States in development of its
atomic industry, as it does in other branches of the economy which are of
military significance. The achieved level of sophistication of the atomic
industry makes it possible to perform tasks connected not only with the
production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,14 but also tasks con-
nected with building nuclear weapons. The newspaper YCn.i.~uri -pu13Jitshed in
mid-1966 figures on Japan's industrial capability: "The Japanese nuclear
weapons manufacture program will not require major additional capital in-
vestment... The atomic plant can easily be converted to produce nuclear
weapons. As for missile production, in this respect Japan is ahead of the
PRC,,, It will require not more than 12-15 months for Japan to be able to
begin producing nuclear weapons... But the main difficult ," the newspaper
emphasizes, "lies in the resistance of leftist elements.i1 In Japan, just
as in the FRG, the move in the direction of manufacture of missiles and
nuclear weapons is not supported by the broad toiler masses and therefore
is carefully concealed from them.
It follows from the above that capital investment for research and develop-
ment projects dealing with improving military equipment in the imperialist
countries is steadily growing. Therefore, in the interests of defense
against the aggressor, the socialist nations are also compelled to conduct
similar projects, in order not to give imperialism the opportunity to
gain strategic and economic advantages which it would unfailingly utilize
to unleash war. We cannot forget Lenin's statement that "the behavior of
that army which is not preparing and training to master all. types of
weapons, all means and methods of combat which the enemy has or may acquire,
is foolish or even criminal"(Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 41, page 81).
Preparing the nation for defense demands the planning of measures which
ensure a fast and organized shift of the armed forces and the economy from
a peacetime to a war footing. This process will be considerably more
complicated in the missile-nuclear age. Estimating its role in forming
the productive revolutionary energy of the toiler masses on the battle
front and on the home front, Lenin stated that "victory in war will be won
by he who has greater reserves, greater sources of strength, and greater
stamina within the masses" (Poln, Sobr, Soch,, Volume 39, page 237). The
experience of the last wars has confirmed this.
The modern history of wars knows of several conditions and methods of
mobilization deployment of mass armies and their engagement in war. The
battles of W o r 1 d War I were preceded by almost simultaneous mobiliza-
tion of the armed forces of the belligerents, their concentration and
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a
deployment along the frontiers. Combat operations began under approx-
imately equal conditions. The general staffs, on the basis of experience
inherited from past wars, were counting on bringing the war to a swift
completion, relying on mobilization supplies of weapons, ammunition, and
clothing, plus the current output of war plants, But they had badly mis-
calculated. The war demanded a shifting of almost the entire economy to
supplying the needs of war, In 1918 war production comprised 75 percent
of total industrial output in Germany and France, 65 percent in England,
and 40 percent in the United States. Military orders for all these ra-
tions amounted to 90 percent in the metallurgical industry, and 75-80 per-
cent in heavy industry?16
In World War II the process of shifting of armed forces and economy to a
war footing occurred under other, more complex and critical conditions,
particularly for those nations which were the victims of sneak aggression.
Nazi Germany mobilized its army sequentially, over a period of 5-7 years,
Every campaign waged in Western Europe was preceded by preliminary
mobilization deployment, with utilization of the military, raw material and
industrial resources of the occupied nations, Attacking its victims, Ger-
many would put superior numbers into battle, figuring on disrupting mobili-
zation of the armed forces and economy with a single sneak attack, destroy-
ing morale and inflicting a decisive military defeat before their economy
could affect the course of military operations.
An important role is played by the economy in shifting armed forces from a
peacetime to a war footing. Lenin taught that in struggle against aggres-
sive imperialist states a peace-loving country can count on success only
if it can quickly mobilize its armed forces and the entire economy to meet
the requirements of war. "...If things have developed to the point of war,
then everything should be subordinated to the interests of war; all domes-
tic activities should be subordinated to war" (Poln. Sobr, Soch., Volume
41, page 117)?
The role of the economy is also important in readying the territories of
future theaters of military operations. The actions of the NATO nations
are extremely typical in this respect. In Western Europe new air and
naval bases are being built and existing ones renovated, air defense and
communications systems are being constructed, lines of communication are
being expanded, control centers are being built (frequently under ground),
as well as arms, fuel and supply dumps, according to plans of the NATO
command, The Warsaw Pact nations, united by a solidarity of political
aims, naturally must respond to these preparations for aggression.
Defense of industrial plants against hostile attack from the air, land and
sea is a matter of great importance in economic preparations.
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Economic preparation o f a country for war, that is its preparation to ac-
complish the missions advanced by strategy and the war plan, encompasses a
broad range of large and complex problems. As the experience of the war
has shown, advanced determination of the comprehensive needs of the armed
forces and creation of conditions for their full satisfaction should be-
come one of the principal general tasks of strategy and the economy during
the period of readying a nation for defense. Strategy determines the
volume of combat equipment, weapons, transport, ammunition and other sup-
plies needed by the armed forces to accomplish strategic missions. This
is necessary in order in peacetime to estimate the degree to which the
economy is capable of meeting these demands, to plan and prepare for in ad-
vance expanded reproduction of weapons, in order to prevent any gp from forming
between the needs of the armed forces and the capability of the economy.
This will depend not only on the production capacity of the engineering in-
dustry, the metallurgical, chemical and other branches of industry, but
also on the availability of the requisite raw materials base.
An analysis of the needs of the armed forces and the capabilities of the
economy is essential in order to prevent a gap from forming between the
arms production potential of one's own economy and that of the enemy. To-
day there is no need to demonstrate the necessity of economic preparations
for war. These words were uttered by Mar SU B. M. Shaposhnikov. This
point acquires even more significance in the age of missiles and nuclear
weapons.
Soviet military science, guided by Marxist-Leninist doctrine, proceeds
from the position that the wars of the present era are characterized by a
vast spatial scope, great duration and intensity of combat operations,
accompanied by substantial devastation and losses in manpower and equip-
ment. Military science also proceeds from the standpoint that in order to
provide for the needs of war a high level of economic potential is required,
as well as full mobilization of a nation's entire productive forces and
resources, their most expedient and economical utilization for the com-
prehensive support of combat operations. In the socialist countries, where
private ownership of the means of production and man's exploitation of man
have been eliminated, and where the economy Is run an a planned, scientific
basis, the process of mobilization of resources, reorgai:zation of the
economy to a war footing, and continuous, steady growth of military produc-
tion during the course of war are effected faster and more fully. Con-
tinuous increase in the qualitative and quantitative superiority in primary
types of military equipment in reasonable ratios constitutes tie continuous
concern of strategy and economics.
In 1917 Lenin wrote that "in today's war... economic organization is of
decisive significance" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 34, page 194) and that
"the defense capability of the country which has overthrown the yoke of
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capital, has turned the land over to the peasants and has placed the banks
and factories under worker control, would be many times greater than the
defense capability of a capitalioL country." These Leninist theses have
been entirely confirmed.
As was demonstrated by the Great Patriotic War, our economy, possessing
less initial resources (steel, coal, etc), was able to surpass the enemy
substantially in scale of military production and in quality of military
hardware. "Our plants supplied the Soviet Army with weapons with the aid
of which we were able to crush the war machine of Nazi fascism, which was
supported by the industrial might of almost all Europe,"17
The present-day development of the socialist economy, particularly metal-
lurgy, power engineering, machine building, and collective agriculture,
as well as successful accomplishment of the task of building the techno-
logical base for Communism, other economic and social measures conducted
in this country serve as a reliable guarantee in the matter of defending
our homeland and all nations of the socialist commonwealth against en-
croachments by aggressors.
1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1970.
2. M. N. Tukhachevskiy: Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Selected Writings),
Volume 1, Voyenizdat, 1964, page 252.
3. L. I. Brezhnev: Leninskim kursom (Leninist Course), Volume 2, Politiz-
dat, 1970, page 541.
4. Ibid., pp 407-408.
5. Ibid., page 371.
6. Materialy F.XIII s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 23rd CPSU Congress),
Politizdat, 1966, page 11.
7. R. A. Faramazyan: SShA: militarizm i ekonomika (The USA: Militarism and
the Economy), Izd-vo Mysl', 1970, pp 37-38.
8. Ibid., pp 112-116, 122-123.
9. M. I. Bulgakov: Voyennoye potrebleniye i ka~italisticheskoye vosproiz-
vodstvo (Military Consumption and Capitalist Reproduction), Izd-vo
Mysl', 1969, pp 256, 269.
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10, I, Sergiyenko: Vozrozhdeniye militarizma v Yaponii (The Rebirth of
Militarism in Japan), Voyenizdat, 1968, pp 117-118.
11, Brezhnev, op. cit., page 371.
12, Faramazyan, op. cit. , pp 133-134.
13. Pravda, 11 January 1970.
14, Sergiyenko, op. cit., pp 94-96.
15. Quoted from A. P. Markov: Yaponiya: kurs na vooruzheniye (Japan Strikes
a Course Toward Rearmament), Izd-vo Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1970,
page 87.
16, P. A. Belov: Voprosy ekonomiki v sovremennoy voyne (Problems of Eco-
nomics in Modern Warfare), Voyenizdat, 1951, page 113.
17, Brezhnev, op. cit., page 90,
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METHODS OF DETERMINING ROAD NETWORK REQUIREMENTS OF TROOPS
DURING-AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION
Col Yu, Parfilov, Candidate of Military Science
The offensive operations o: modern ground forces are characterized by
resoluteness of objectives and a substantial increase in spatial scope.
The development of nuclear missile weapons has produced profound changes
in the content and character of combat operations; with a sharp increase
in the role of troop mobility and consequently their need for routes of
movement,
Experience indicates, however, that determination of what the road network
should be in the operations area of units and large units in an offensive
operation is not the simple task it might appear to be at first glance. It
is not surprising that these matters have been discussed time and again in
the press,1 Unfortunately the conclusions which have been drawn are
frequently contradictory, and in some cases doubtful. This is due primari-
ly to the fact that in determining troop road requirements one at times
fails to take into consideration many factors which under certain condi-
tions are of great importance. For example; in computing the requisite
number of routes, the basic criterion is normally the number of combat and
transport vehicles in units (large units) which must operate within the
zone of advance, as well as distance between routes, selected in order to
avoid a hit on two columns advancing on parallel routes. At the same time
one insufficiently considers and sometimes totally ignores such factors as
the character of movement on maneuver routes, the traffic capacity of roads
and change in capacity as a result of restriction of road utilization time
under conditions not only of intensive hostile air reconnaissance but also
hostile activity directed against en-route columns.
This gives us reason to believe that the matter of road network support in
modern warfare merits more careful attention and demands special methods
making it possible quickly to determine troop road requirements, taking
into account all basic factors influencing both the number of routes and
organization of route preparation.
In our opinion conditions which determine requisite road network density
in a zone of advance can be subdivided into two basic groups -- opera-
tional-tactical and technical.
Operational-tactical conditions include those which are determined by the
size of the force and nature of operations in the zone of advance, by the
scope of destruction and contamination, by specific actions taken by the
adversary, and by the necessity and possibility of securing the passage
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of a specified number of columns as regards time and axis, Technical con-
ditions are determined by intensity of movement, availability and traffic
capacity of roads, volume of requisite route repairs and engineer troop
capabilities to perform such repairs. In order to prevent errors in
preparing routes required by troops for the conduct of combat operations,
an entire aggregate of requirements must be taken into account.
It is well known that a road network prepared for offensive operations in-
cludes cross-country routes, maneuver and basic military roads. The nature
of movement on these roads and duration of utilization will vary during
the course of an offensive operation. For example, cross-country routes
are usually designated for the advance of attack echelon battalions,
as well as for deployment into approach march and combat formations. There-
fore the utilization time for these roads is as a rule quite limited. The
number of these routes increases sharply when support echelons and
reserves are engaged, while the number is reduced when troops reform into
march columns,
Maneuver roads are designated primarily for the movement of attack and
support echelons of advancing units and large units, attached and sup-
porting artillery, the movement of supplies and to some extent for
evacuation of the sick and wounded, Traffic on maneuver roads will be
characterized by a specific directional emphasis, Experience indicates
that 85-90 percent of all movements on these roads involve maneuver and
movement of troops toward the front, while only 10-15 percent involve the
movement of supplies and evacuation. Consequently the principal direction
of movement on these roads will be toward the front. Therefore these routes
can be set up solely for one-way traffic, Proceeding from the possible
rate of advance, the time during which these roads will be occupied by sub-
units ranges from several hours to 24 hours, while the traffic load will be
at a maximum when the support echelon (reserve) is being engaged; as a rule
the support echelon advance3 in route formation and at a rapid rate.
Organization of traffic on basic military roads is distinguished by the
fact that in addition to troop maneuver and movement, these roads are used
for bringing up supplies from mobile bases, evacuation of sick and wounded,
as well as of damaged equipment. The flow of return vehicular traffic on
these roads may reach 25-30 percent of total traffic, while these roads
may be utilized for several days. In order to provide for return traffic,
basic military roads are set up for two-way traffic (width of travelled
way 6,5-7 m), or separate routes are specified for return-flow traffic,.
We shall examine the relationship between troop route requirements and
road capacity, Road capacity is customarily defined as that number of
combat and transport vehicles which can pass over a particular road
segment per unit of time with continuous movement. In general form it is
defined by the formula
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Vav, ,1000
N=ldd+lo
where N -- number of vehicles passing per hour; Vav average speed, km/h;
ld vehicle distance, in meters; 10 -- vehicle length, in meters.
It would be more correct to call this quantity (N) the technical road
capacity, since in a given instance it will be determined by road condition,
distances between vehicles, and vehicle speed. But this formula fails to
take into account the specific structure of march columns and actual
column gaps. And yet road capacity will change in relation to these
factors,
Therefore the military press2 has directed attention to this, and the
suggestion has been made to introduce the term operational-tactical road
capacity [operativno-takticheskaya propusknaya sposobnost' avtomobil'nykh
dorog], defining this term as the maximum number of combat (transport)
units in troop columns which can pass over a particular section of road
per unit of time with continuous movement. Experience indicates that the
adoption of such a term is entirely justified, since this will substantial-
ly simplify calculations to determine road capacity and troop road
requirements.
At the present time column gaps or distances between units and subunits
are considered in determining road capacity, considering vehicle flow con-
tinuous, which inevitably leads to rather complex and inconvenient
mathematical computations, In order to achieve simplification we suggest
that one take into account change in road capacity depending on column
gaps with a factor which we can call the column en-route dispersion
factor [koeffitsiyent ucheta rassredotocheniya kolonn na marshe] (Km),
Its value is derived from the ratio of total column length (Lc) to the
length of the same column minus column gaps (El), If we assume that gaps
between units and subunits equal 5 km, while distances between vehicles
are 25-50 m, column length can be expressed as follows:
Lc=(ld+lo)n+5000(m-l),
where n -- number of vehicles in column; m -- number of subunits in
column.
But if we consider that with the movement of several battalion columns
along a route the following battalion can initiate movement behind the
preceding column only when there is a gap of 5 km, the computed column
length must be increased by one such gap. The formula will then appear
as follows:
Lc=(ld+lo)n+5000 m.
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Figure 1 contains a.computation diagram, conclusion and graph value of
a column en-route dispersion factor (Km) in relation to vehicle distances.
NO-7XuuueNm yvemC p0ccpe-
kN , eomoveIuR NOnoN NO Ma/U/e 1
7 C't
L;
Cm
3 Cd - ducmax4m ,t w6V mm-Una
4 to - dnUNO MOIUUN{/ (dnn pocvema
IO,wNO npUNNmb 7M)
5 EC - cynnopMOM drama NanaNN nodpo9de-
1eN0 (deo ysemO dUCTONI(UU~
6 #'- dUCn7CN4UN Mewdy nOdpCJdenei!/NMU
L,,-nanNOH dnUNO N0n0NNII
n - YUCnO MO(UUN a NonoNNe
9 m - YUCn0 0OdpaadeaeHUu a NOnoRNe
M 000
-
m
~Ld ? ~o)n
QnN gO0pO
J3E/1GwUU o ~mc
I1~,L
3;0
40
3,0
2.0
/,0
n
0X0
~
20 40 60 80 /00
rt#re
EL EL
6K~ EL+ EL'
EL'= L',?Li*?????+L'm = m?5000
ft ,j'd?Lo)n?m.5000 m SOOO
n /Ld.Lo)n (Ld?La1p
Figure 1.
Key to figure: 1,-- column en-route dispersion factor; 2 -- for subunits
up to battalion; 3 -- vehicle distance; 4 -- vehicle length (7 meters
used for purposes of computation); 5 -- total length of subunit columns
(excluding gap); 6 -- gap between subunits; 7 -?- total column length;
8 -- number of vehicles in t--olumn; 9 -- number of subunits in column
Analyzing the relationship obtained, we see that for subunits (up to and
including battalion) the column en-route dispersion factor is equal to 1.
For larger units the factor varies with vehicle distance and number of
subunits in the column. With an increase in vehicle distance its absolute
value will diminish, while it will increase with an increase in number of
subunits. For the distances we have used (vehicle distance 25-50 m) the
value of the factor will range between 2.5 and 3.1 (1d=25, Km 3.1; 1d=50,
Km=2.5).
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CZ
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If the column en-route dispersion factor is introduced into the road
capacity formula, the latter will assume the following form
N-Vav'1000_
(ld+lo)Km"
Using various coefficient values, one can establish the character of
change in operational-tactical road capacity in relation to average speed;
vehicle distance and column gap. Figure 2 shows these changes, It is
evident from the graph that the per-hour road capacity will range between
150 and 250 vehicles if a column maintains vehicle distances of 25-50 m
and moves at an average speed of 20-30 km/hr., We should note that such
a road capacity is impossible on many roads, Even in well-developed
theaters of military operations only 30-40 percent of the total mileage of
existing roads will offer such a road capaci~yo The remaining 60-70 per-
cent will be routes with a capacity not exceeding 150 vehicles per hour,
due to the limited speed of columns proceeding on these routes. This
figure may be considerably smaller in other theaters. Therefore when
determining the requisite number of routes for adequate securement of
movement and maneuver of troops, each time the problem will require a
differentiated approach, taking into consideration the traffic capacity of
existing roads, In one case the operational-tactical capacity (if it is
less than the technical) should be used as the value for computation,
while in another case only the technical road capacity should be used,
Thus if we know the road capacity (N) and number of combat and transport
vehicles to pass along a given section of route per unit of time (T), we
can determine the requisite number of routes in the zone of advance (R)
from the ratio;
R=T1khJ11
Nveh/hr
Finally, in determining troop route requirements one must bear in mind the
fact that during the course of combat operations the enemy will be con-
ducting continuous recrnnaissance and will be attacking lines of communica-
tion and troops, which will disrupt movement on the roads The closer the
advancing troops approach to the forward units, the greater the degree
to which they-are subject to hostile activity, and consequently route
utilization becomes increasingly difficult, Therefore, when determining
the requisite number of routes, one should also take into consideration
the degree to which the potential road capacity can be realized, For this
purpose we shall introduce a road capacity realization factor (Kr), the
numerical value of which we shall derive from the ratio of potential daily
traffic flow intensity to the operational-tactical road capacity (as has
been stated above, we can obtain the latter from the graph). Daily
traffic flow intensity is dictated by tactical conditions, It can be
either specified or computed, but the latter case requires special, fairly
canglex studies, which we do not consider feasible to discuss in this
article.
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Moo
1000
900
600
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
N" f(V, Ze. I')
I
A
V. /000
~(1d'1o)h''
V- cpeaMRA cvapocm? deuweMUn YoAoRwfMm/vac)
N-nponycMNan caocodMocmb dopoz (Maur/vac)
Figure 2. Operational-tactical road capacity.
Key to figure: 1 -- veh/hr; V -- column average speed (km/hr); N -- road
capacity (veh/hr)
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a ~?+~ N z` I _N h n I
_ Q l Z
a. cp 'T'
- Nnam/vae p ~C
4 3 2 1 O o 1,
Q h O h O h O O O
Jr ?~ h OON~n Oh i~h ON1 O
9 B 7
~~ NN -.
N
Cm
2 rpeoyenoe yonuvecneo iiymeu a no oce ftneyeadHo
-N
OdoM'eNUR - /JymR (N0lU/VOC)3
Figure 3. Nomogram for determining requisite number of routes in a zone of
advance.
Key to figure: 1 -- veh/hr; 2 -- required number of routes in zone; 3 --
intensity of traffic flow on routes (veh/hr)
The calculations we have made of probable enemy activity against troops
and lines of communication indicate that, depending on the conditions of
conduct of combat operations, need and capability to displace units, the
road capacity realization factor will be 0.3-0.5 for maneuver: L-,ad.s and
0.4-0.7 for basic military roads. It follows that in order to eliminate
to a maximum degree disruption of traffic flow on maneuver routes and
basic military roads, in order to avoid the creation of bottlenecks and
in order not to give the adversary the opportunity to impede planned
troop movements, the number of routes in the zone of advance should be
determined taking into account the potential degree of realization of-
road capacity. All the above-mentioned computations can be quickly per-
formed by utilizing a nomogram (Figure 3). For this one should first of all
specify potential route traffic intensity; secondly, using the graph
(Figure 2), one determines operational-tactical road capacity; third, one
determines the potential road capacity realization factor. Armed with these
data, it is not difficult to determine the requisite number of routes in
a zone of advance.
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Example. Volume of traffic on routes is T=350-400 veh/hr; operational-
tactical road capacity is N=180-200 veh/hr; road capacity realization
factor is Kr=0.4, We det?rmine with the nomogram that under these con-
ditions the zone of advance must contain five routes.
This method can also be employed for operational-tactical assessment of
the road network in a zone of advance. Individual. points in this method
require practical verification, in order that it can be utilized under
various conditions of the engagement and operation on various terrain.
1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 2, 1959, pp 45-49; No 12, 1961, pp 34-45; No 2,
1964, pp 30-37; No 10, pp 48-55; No 12, pp 40-47; No 4, 1967, pp 56-
62; No 12, pp 58-63.
2. Voyennaya Mysl', No 4, 1967, page 58; No 12, page 61.
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ARTIFICIAL. EARTH SATELLITES IN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
(Based on Materials Published in the Foreign Press)
Engr-Lt Col Yu- Yur'yev
In American plans to prepare for a nuclear world war, alongside intensive
development of strategic offensive forces and the deployment of an ABM
system, great importance is attached to a reliable, effective early warning
system., This system has the task of providing the earliest possible detec-
tion of the launching of a massive enemy nuclear missile attack, with
warning of such an attack to be communicated to top government and military
officials, armed forces branch commands, air defense command and civil
defense entities, It is believed that information provided by the early
warning system in combination with information provided by other types of
strategic intelligence should constitute the basis for putting strategic
nuclear offensive forces into action. For the benefit of the ABM system
the early warning system determines the trajectories of the incoming
hostile missiles at as great a distance from the defended installations
as possible.
Work has been going on for years to deploy and improve the U.S. early
warning system. The first step in this direction was the establihhment of
the BMEWS1 radar system which, in the opinion of U.S, experts, can provide
warning on the launching of missiles and orbital vehicles across a large
zone, encompassing the arctic regions, Eastern Siberia, the northern part
of the Soviet Union and all the countries of Eastern Europe down to the
Turkish border, 15 to 20 minutes before they appear over U.S. territory.
Subsequently testing was initiated on below-the-horizon radar in the 10-100
meter and 10-20 thousand meter band, radars which are capable of detecting
ascending rockets immediately after launch.
At the present time research is being conducted in the area of rocket
detection based on high-frequency oscillations occurring in the iono-
sphere caused by expansion of the exhaust gas stream emitted by a rocket
engine, on the basis of solar radiation reflected from the rarefied wake
of gases in the middle segment of a rocket trajectory, on the basis of
change in atmospheric pressure in the vicinity of the launch site, etc.
A special place in this research is occupied by studies dealing with em-
ployment of artificial earth satellites in early warning systems, since
satellites, due to their high altitude above the earth's surface, con-
stitute ideal observation platforms. Evidently if such a satellite were
equipped with radar or some other type of intelligence-gathering device,
it would be possible to spot a launched missile as soon as it separates
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from the launch apparatus. In contrast to conventional ground radar sites,
which spot missiles only when they rise above the horizon, satellites can
maintain direct observation of the launch sites. This is due to the fact
that the entire surface of the earth gradually passes under a satellite
launched into a polar orbit whose plane passes through the north and south
pole. In other words the earth "presents" itself to the reconnaissance
satellite for a sequential inspection. A system of several of these
satellites will have the capability of maintaining continuous observation
of the entire surface of the earth, increasing missile attack warning time
to 30-35 minutes (the flight time of an ICBM).
The number of satellites in the early warning system is determined primari-
ly by altitude and inclination of the selected orbit. The lower a satel-
lite's altitude above the earth's surface, the smaller its "field of view."
On the other hand, satellites launched into orbit with a moderate inclina-
tion will be unable to observe the earth's polar regions. On the basis of
this it is believed that it is advisable to launch early warning satellites
into orbit up to several thousand kilometers high at an inclination of
approximately 90?.
The most promising from the standpoint of continuity of observation are
stationary and synchronous orbits, in which a satellite completes one
revolution arand the earth every 24 hours at an altitude of 35,800 km. If a
satellite is in an orbit -whose plane coincides with the plane of the equator,
its angular velocity coincides with the earth's angular velocity of rota-
tion, and the satellite hangs suspended as it were above a specified point
on the earth's equator, presenting a fixed observation platform. This type
of orbit is called stationary.
With a synchronous orbit the plane of the satellite's orbit forms a certain
angle with the plane of the equator, due to which the satellite, in making
one revolution around the earth, offers the capability of observation of
the north and south polar regions, which remain beyond the field of view
of a stationary satellite. At the same time a synchronous satellite pos-
sesses the capability of appearing above each point on the earth's surface
at the same time. This makes it possible to observe "missile threat" areas
on the potential enemy's territory. Elementary calculations show that a
system of 3-4 stationary and synchronous satellites is sufficient to en-
sure continuous observation of the entire surface of the earth.
The effectiveness of an early warning satellite system also depends to a
large degree on the type and sensitivity of the reconnaissance gear it
car':ies on board. This determines the performance capabilities of satel-
lites, According to reports in the foreign press, the best capabilities
from sae standpoint of reliability and efficiency of detection of rocket
launchings are possessed by satellites carrying infrared equipment capable
of detecting the exhaust flame of rocket engines at distances of several
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hundred and even thousands of kilometers. The main advantage of employing
infrared equipment is that, in contrast to radar, which emits probing
pulses and forms highly-directional beams of electromagnetic waves, a
passive infrared system also picks up infrared (thermal) rays emitted by
any object with a temperature of above absolute zero (-273.16'C). There-
fore infrared equipment can detect ballistic missiles and their warheads in
practically any segment of flight, since they comprise powerful sources of
heat radiation even when their engines are nor operating, Particularly
strong infrared radiation is produced by the stream of gases ejected by
operating rocket engines during the powered segment of flight. One must,
however, take into consideration the difficulty of detecting the object of
interest on a background of such "hot" sources of radiation as factories,
industrial plants, etc.
Infrared radiation is similar to visible light in its nature and properties,
It covers that band within the electromagnetic spectrum from 0.76 t to
500 u, and operations to detect sources of infrared radiation with infrared
equipment are in many ways similar to operations involving the use of
optical equipment for the same purpose
The principle of operation of infrared equipment is fairly simple. The
thermal radiation detection device, called an infrared detector, is
mounted on the satellite in such a manger that its sensing element is con-
tinuously aimed in space in that direction from which ballistic missiles
are expected to appear. For this purpose the satellite is oriented with a
high degree of accuracy by an on-board three-axis stabilization system.
The temperature of ambient space is very low compared with the temperature
of an ICBM exhaust flame, as a consequence of which the energy of the back-
ground radiation striking the satellite infrared detector is insignificant.
As soon as a rocket, whose maximum intensity and consequently infrared
radiation wavelength correspond to the receiver's sensitivity range ap-
pears in the receiving devices field of view, a signal is excited, which
,darns of the appearance of a target of interest.
While certain characteristics simplifying identification of signals
reflected from the target (for example, change in pulse frequency or
repetition according to a specific law, change in variation of carrier
frequency, etc) can be imparted to radiated signals with the aid of radar,
with a passive infrared detection system identification of the radiating
object can be effected only by analyzing the received infrared radiation
and determining its internal features which are inherent only in the given
radiating object.
After an infrared signal has been received, satellite on-board equipment
analyzes the received radiation, on the basis of which the characteristics
of the radiating object are examined, the spectral composition of the
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received radiation is determined, the velocity of the detected object is
estimated and, if possible, its direction of movement. The end objective
of all these operations is establishment of the fact that what has been
detected is the launching of a ballistic missile and not a passing meteorite,
a sun flash, a cloud-reflected ray, or other similar phenomena.
Practical solution to the problem of detecting and identifying a target
emitting infrared radiation constitutes a very -iifficult task, The fact is
that infrared rays are very strongly absorbed b, the earth's atmosphere,
in particular by water vapor, carbon dioxide, ozone, and dust. But the
degree of their absorption differs in different wavelengths. The atmosphere
contains so-called. "windows," in which this radiation is very little
attenuated (in the wave bands 3-5, 7-9.5, 10-13.5 u) . Infrared detectors
picking up these bands are used to detect ICBM exhaust flames, in order
that the rocket's thermal radiation can "pierce" the atmosphere and reach
the early warning system satellite infrared receiver.
The problem of missile exhaust detection, however, cannot always be com-
pletely solved in this manner. Rocket infrared radiation can be of a
different wavelength due to different chemical composition of the fuel
employed, Therefore the infrared characteristics of liquid-fuel missiles
differ somewhat from those of solid-fuel missiles, foreign experts claim,
which complicates the problem of identifying them and isolating the signal
on the background of atmospheric radiation. In connection with this it
becomes necessary in target detection and identification to determine
wavelength and intensity of radiation not only of the missile but of the
ambient atmosphere as well. Fulfillment of this requirement leads to
greater complexity of satellite on-board equipment.
In addition, target discrimination on the basis of infrared radiation is
complicated by tle fact that the principal products discharged from the
nozzle of an operating rocket engine are carbon dioxide and water vapor,
But they also are found (along with other substances) in the earth's
atmosphere. Therefore the problem also consists in being able to distin-
guish radiation coming from the carbon dioxide and water vapor of a rocket
exhaust from atmospheric. Discrimination is assisted only by the fact that
the former have a higher temperature and greater density.
Finally, one must note the influence of such factors as inhomogeneity of
particles in the atmosphere, difference in chemical composition of sub-
stances in the atmosphere at different altitudes and reflection of sun-
light from high-altitude clouds. In order to overcome the interference
caused by these factors, studies are being conducted on the properties
and composition of the atmosphere at all altitudes, the sensitivity of
infrared radiation detectors is being increased, and ultraviolet radiation
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detectors are being developed for combined utilization with infrared
detectors. The necessity of using ultraviolet detectors is due to the
fact that the radiation maximum of a ballistic missile exhaust flame lies
in the infrared band, while that of clouds is in the visible and ultra-
violet bands. By comparing the results of measurements with thL.;e two
types of detectors it is possible on the background of radiation from
clouds to isolate the signal coming from an operating rocket engine.
These are the principal features of employment of infrared equipment on
board satellites to detect ballistic missile launchings. Realization of
the idea of developing reconnaissance satellites for this purpose can be
examined with the example of U.S. efforts within the framework of develop-
ment of a comprehensive ballistic missile early warning system consisting
of facilities on the ground and in space
Practical efforts at ballistic missile detection with the aid of :satellites
began in the United States in 1960 with the launching of Midas satellites,2
It was believed that these satellites would be able substantially to in-
crease the effective range of the detection system by spotting ballistic
missiles immediately after launch. Data on satellite-detected missiles
would be immediately transmitted by special communications lines to the
ABM system control center as priority importance information. It is
believed that preliminary computation of the trajectory parameters of
detected missiles will make it possible in the first place promptly to ready
for action all ground facilities for the detect. n, tracking and destruc-
tion of incoming warheads and, in the second place, to warn the population
and authorities of the area threatened by nuclear missile attack.
The first Midas satellite, launched in 1961 into an orbit 3000 kn, high,
detected with the aid of infrared equipment a Titan ICBM at an altitude of
60 km 90 seconds after launching from the Atlantic missile range. Data on
the missiles flight were immediately transmitted to ground stations.
This type of experiment was repeated several times.
In the course of launching Midas satellites it was determined that the
infrared radiation detectors carried on board many times are unable to
discriminate the radiation from rocket engine exhaust on the background of
solar radiation reflected from cloud tops at very high altitudes. In ad-
dition, the satellite orientation system proved insufficiently precise.
in operation, and the satellite was too complex in design-
In connection with this, launchings of Midas satellites were terminated in
the spring of 1962, and all work on this problem was transferred to the
research category.3 An ambitious program was announced, calling for
thorough study of the infrared characteristics of the atmosphere at various
altitudes, the features of infrared radiation of rocket engines of various
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types, as well as the development of higher-sensitivity infrared
detectors. According to information in the press, in 1963 two secret U.S.
satellites successfully detected launchings on the Atlantic and Pacific
ranges not only of Titan and Atlas liquid-fuel ballistic missiles but also
of solid-fuel Minuteman missiles.
Study of prospects for employing infrared equipment to detect missiles in
the powered segment of flight continued with the launchings of the Gemini
two-man spacecraft, in addition to solving problems connected with
preparations for the Apollo Program. On several Gemin!. missions the
astronauts were able on several occasions, with the assistance of such
equipment, to detect the launching of ballistic missiles and record with
the aid of radiation meters the infrared radiation of the exhaust of
rockets both in flight and in special static test stands. The crew of
Gemini-7 picked up radiation from the nose ooze of a Minuteman ICBM during re-
entry,
Subsequently these studies were conducted on a larger scale. According to
available information,4 the U.S. Air Force reached a decision to establish
a satellite early warning system with the task of detecting ICBMs in the
initial and middle segments of flight, as well as missiles launched from
submarines, The developers of this system intended for missile detection
during the initial segment of flight to be effected by picking up infrared
radiation from the rocket exhaust, and during the middle segment -- infra-
red radiation from the slightly-heated missile body or separated nose cone
on the background of "cold" space, It is planned to install radars on
satellites for the detection of submarine-launched missiles.
In conformity with these plans, under the aegis of the U.S. Air Force
space and missile systems directorate, SAMSO, studies were initiated
to develop infrared radiation detectors of various types, high-precision
satellite orientation systems (including systems employing the star sky
background and gravity gradient), long-life on-board power systems and
satellite temperature control devices. Equipment is also being developed
for the fast transmission and processing of information pertaining to
detection of missile launches and optimal display of this information at
ABM system command posts. Scientists are studying the possibility of
developing infrared equipment to photograph the eart;I's surface from a
satellite in synchronous orbit, with the obtained information transmitted
to ground receiving stations on a real-time scale.
Infrared equipment of a new type which, in contrast to the equipment on
board the early Midas satellites, would operate in the band of absorption
of rocket infrared radiation by atmospheric carbon dioxide gas, was built
with the aim of developing reliable methods of detecting ballistic missile
launchings. This is done so that the satellite detectors can react only
to the strong signals emanating from the rocket exhaust. All weaker
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interfering background radiation signals with this method of building
detection gear will be "cut off" by atmospheric. absorption. The gradual
increase in infrared radiation receivedr as a missile ascends, as well as
its specific spectral composition, serve as criteria for identifying a
ballistic missile.
Program 749 involves a study of the possibility of building satellites to
detect and track ballistic missiles launched from subma.cines., For this
purpose the SAMSO directorate awarded parallel contracts of 1 million
dollars each to Hughes Aircraft and General Electric, with the technical
assistance of Westinghouse Electric. It is planned ro use Titan IIIC
boosters to launch satellites of this type
Problems connected with building satellites to detect and track ballistic
missiles in the middle segment of flight are being studied on Air Force
contracts by TRV Systems and Philco-Ford. These satellites would be
launched into low orbit, carrying equipment recording at distances of up to
2400 km infrared radiation emitted by a missile body or nose cone? SAMSO
has already announced a competition for development of such equipment with-
in the framework of the High }Hghstar Program. It is planned to test in-
frared telescopes developed on the basis of parallel contracts with
Autonetics and Hughes Aircraft.
Reconnaissance satellites to detect missiles in the initial segment of
flight are being developed by TRV Systems under contract with SAMSO,
Program 647. These satellites have been designated IS,S since in addition
to the detection of surface and submarine missile launchings they have such
missions as recording troop movements and observing military installations
of the potential enemy, determining the coordinates of nuclear explosions
and monitoring the results of nuclear strikes, conducting strategic
weather reconnaissance, etc (a total of approximately 10 tasks).
IS satellites carry for the detection of infrared radiation from a
launched missile telescopes manufactured by Aerojet-General, which record
infrared radiation in the 3.5 and 10.6 a bands.6 This satellite weighs
approximately 800 kg, is 7 m in length and 3 m in diameter. It is launched
into a stationary orbit above the Indian Ocean cr the Western Pacific by.a
Titan IIIC rocket.
In addition to infrared sensors, IS satellites carry Aerojet-General
optical gear for a preliminary assessment of the weather situation in
various parts of the earth. It is believed that due to a rather high
resolving power of 80 lines per mm (approximately 300 meters at the
earth's surface), in the absence of cloud cover this equipment can be
utilized to observe ICBM launch sites as a supplement to survey and detail
photoreconnaissance satellites.
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It is planned to control early warning satellites in stationary orbit from
the control center in Sunnyvale, California, with satellite information
transmitted to a special station in Manhattan Beach, California.
Beginning in 1975 a special relay satellite, to be built under Program 313,
will be used to transmit to the control center information from satellites
beyond line-of-sight.? In connection with this, SAMSO has announced a
competition among firms vying to develop this satellite. It is anticipated
that the relay satellite will carry a highly-directional antenna and
wideband communications equipment, operating in the millimeter band, in
order to ensure communications secrecy. Prior to such a time as the
repeater satellite goes into operation, information from early warning
system satellites will be received by a tracking station on Guam, and re-
layed from there to the North American Continental Air Defense Command Post
in Colorado Springs by submarine cable (the Guam facility went into
operation in 1969). In addition, information from satellites will be
picked up by two special stations in Australia: in Pine [Tep] (not far from
Alice Springs), and near Woomera (in South Australia).
The high intensity of early warning satellites research and testing in-
dicates that, as we have stated above, the United States is devoting the
most serious attention to this problem.
In addition to the development of space early warning devices, the United
States is working extensively on the improvement of existing and develop-
ment of new systems with the same mission. Their goal is to in;rease the
warning time and improve reliability of warning of initiation of a hostile
missile attack, In the United States preference is being shown, however,
to space systems (219 million dollars in appropriations were requested for
1971 by the Defense Department for Program 647).8 It is probable that the
United States will seek to put a space early warning system into continuous
operation in the very near future.
FOOTNOTES
1. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
2. Missile Defense Alarm System.
3. At the beginning of 1963 a report appeared in the press that spokesmen
for the U.S. Defense Department were deliberately playing down in their
public statements success achieved in the development of infrared radia-
tion detectors for MIDAS satellites.
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4. Aviation Week, No 3, 1970, page 21.
5, Integrated Satellites.
6? Flying Review International, No 9, 1970, page 73,
7., Aerospace Daily, No 2, 1970, page 11; Air et Cosmos, No 324, 1970, page
16; Aviation Week, No 4, 1970, page 13.
8, Space/Aeronautics, No 4, 1970, pp 18-22~
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CONCERNING THE SUBJECT MATTER, CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF A JOURSE IN
MILITARY ECONOMICS
(Reader Responses)'*
Capt 1st Rank A. Pozharov, Candidate of Economic Sciences
Increased interest in the problems of military economics is a notable
feature of the intellectual life of military cadres.
Quite obvious is an objective necessity of more fully taking into account
the economic factor both in accomplishing the major national tasks of
strengthening this country's defense capability and in various areas of
military activity proper. It is dictated by an intensification of the
interrelation and interdependence of economic and military organizational
development. The party accomplishes these tasks in a unified manner,
guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin. The Central Committee CPSU
draft "Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress on the 1971-1975 F-e-Year
Soviet Economic Development Plan" st:ate: "The Ninth Five-Yea an will
be an important stage in the further advance of Soviet society .long the
road toward communism, in building its material and technological base and
in strengthening the nation's economic and defense might."
The party's course toward comprehensive intensification of social produc-
tion and its improved effectiveness evokes in all categories of military
personnel the endeavor to work efficiently,.to accomplish the specific
tasks of combat training with minimum outlays of manpower, resources and
time. This requires increased economic sophistication on the part of all
military personnel, and by officers and general officers in particular.
Party instructions pertaining to improvement in cadre training, particular-
ly in the area of Marxist-Leninist economic theory, theory and practice of
control and management, scientific organization of labor, new methods of
planning and economic incentive, as well as application of economic-
mathematical methods and modern computer hardware apply in full measure to
military cadres as well.
Various problems in this area are studied at military educational institu-
tions. They include determination of profile in the teaching of political
economy, inclusion of specific military economic topics in courses'in
political economy, specific economic systems, and military disciplines.
This is not sufficient, however, for there are a considerable number of
problems which can be examined by military economics, which comprises its
* See Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1969; c.*::~ 't, 8, 9, 1970.
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cwn special subject. VigorouT work must be done to examine the problems
of this science, and a special course should be offered at military
educational institutions.
Considerable work has been done by the political economy and military
economics department at the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin,
as well as at. other military educational institutions. The present course
in military economics, however, should be revised and improved, Promoting
a broadening of officer intellectual horizons and economics training, it
provides little of that specific knowledge which is so essential in
daily serc.ice..
in order to settle the question of the content and structure of a course in
military eccnomics, it is important to determine at the outset: just what
military economics is, what its subject matter is, At the present time
various points of view are being expressed, which is quite understandable:
there are sciences which have existed for centuries, and yet debates about
their subject matt,- still rage on, One can hardly claim exhaustive
definitions even today, It is also important to define precisely enough
for practical purposes the boundaries of this science and its specific
problems, to determine its place among the other sciences,
We shall begin with a definition of the object of this science, At the
present time two points of view are fairly prevalent. According to one of
the views, military economics comprises the entire national economy re-
geared to war needs and wartime operations; according to the other view it
is merely a part of the national economy, which produces military products
both in peacetime and wartime.
The question, however, is not which view should be given preference.
Neither the national economy as a whole nor any part of it exhausts the
entire subject of military economics as a science, It should at all times
involve the armed forces and their functioning both in time of peace and
war. The military and economic might of the state is realized here; the
effectiveness of the military economic system finds expression. In this
light another approach to military economics would seem expedient: it
should be viewed not as a more or less broad sum total of the branches of
the economy but rather as an aggregate of special economic relations. With
this approach we can more precisely define the subject matter and content
of military economic science, its boundaries and relationships with other
sciences.
We know that economics as an aggregate of production relations includes
relations connected with production, distribution, exchange and consumption
of material goods. In this sense military economics comprises specific
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economic relations, that is.relations connected with the production,
distribution, exchange and consumption of goods of military designation.
These relations take place in various spheres of the vital activities of
society: in the nation's economy as a whole, in that sector directly
linked with the armed forces, and immediately in the armed forces. The
aggregate of these relations (we shall call them military economic rela-
tions) comprises military economics. As such it can exist and does exist
both in time of peace and war, both in the capitalist and socialist so-
ciety. The existence of military economics under socialism is engendered
not by the nature of the socialist system but rather by the military
threat presented by imperialism. Arising on the basis of this external
cause, military economics under socialism develops on the basis of so-
cialist production relations, which determine its root differences from
capitalist military economics and its advantages over it.
Any definition of military economics influences the answer to the question
of the subject matter of this science, determination of the range of its
problems, the content and logic of a formal course in this subject.
If we define military economics as "a special qualitative state of the
economy,"` in the first place the object and subject of the science coin-
cide with the object and subject of political economy. Military economics
comprises a special chapter of political economy -- the political economy
of war.2 In the second place, this science does not always have an ob-
ject, for a wartime economy exists only for the duration of a war, and not
during every war. What does this science study today? A hypothetical pic-
ture of the nation's economy in a postulated war?
If we define military economics as that part of the economy which involves
support and supply of the armed forces in time of war and peace, then the
subject coincides with the subject of specific economic systems, boils down
to elucidating the specific features of military industry, military
finances, military supply, etc.
Thus a shortcoming of both points of view is an underestimate of the
relations and problems connected with the distribution, exchange and con-
sumption of military products in peacetime and wartime, economic prob-
lems of military activity, and armed forces organizational development.
But these relations and problems are so specific that neither political
economy nor specific economic subjects can provide the solution, no matter
what extent to which we broaden their subject matter.
Of considerable interest are suggestions to create a special discipline --
armed forces economics, which in the opinion of Comrade Lagovskiy should
examine "military economic problems only in the interest of the armed
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forces proper, for the purpose of establishing ways and recommendations to
achieve maximum expedient expenditure of resources for armed forces or-
ganizational development, supply, combat training and attainment of a con-
tinuously high state of combat readiness."'
It would seem that we need two military economic disciplines -- theoretical
and applied. But this is incorrect, In Lagovskiy's article the author
essentially is dealing with that group of military economic relations
which pertain to distribution and consumption of products of military
designation, consequently to the subject of military eccnomics.
Here are revealed first of all the features of military economics as a
juncture science, which studies the kindred relations of two interlinked
objects -- economics and armed forces; secondly, features of approach to
this science by the economist and military professional.. Proceeding
from the standpoint of economics and analyzing the military problems of
the economic sciences, we move from the sphere of political economy and
specific economic subjects to the sphere of military economic relations.
Examining and synthesizing current economic problems of wars and military
organizational development, proceeding from military science and practice,
we arrive at theory of military economics from its other side; we see it
in a somewhat different light,
It is important correctly to understand the plus and minus points of both
these approaches, their certain one-sidedness. This makes it possible on
the one hand to avoid excessive abstractness, a separation between mili-
tary economic science and the practical problems of military affairs, as
well as to avoid a narrow practical approach on the other.
We shall now attempt to define more specifically the content and structure
of a course in military economics, to break down the aggregate of military
economic relations, to pinpoint the basic problems and to establish their
interrelations and subordination,
A logical continuation of political economy and specific economic sci-
ences is an investigation of the features of production, distribution,
exchange and consumption of military product, the mechanism of effect of
economic laws in the area of defense, scientific analysis of substantial,
persistent relationships of military economic phenomena and processes, and
disclosure of specific military economic patterns. Here we shall be deal-
ing with relations which change substantially from one period to the next,
and even from war to war. Nevertheless, this does not rule out a certain
-;u.-..cession of investigated patterns and principles, nor does it minimize
the importance of historical experience, Military economics should study
the experience of economic backup of wars, specifying in this those grains
of truth which have not lost their practical significance.
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Consideration of the dialectical relationship between wars and economics
existing in the real world and developing together with the development of
productive resources is also important for another reason. The level of
productive forces and nature of the economic system (and political system
as well) predetermines the character, technical base and scale of war.
Military economics is faced with specific tasks: the study, measurement and
comparison of the economic capabilities of nations and coalitions, study of
the ways and forms of their transformation into real military power,
determination of the degree of mobilization of the economy for war, ways
and means of increasing its survivability, expedient forms of organization
and management of the economy, etc. The practical research goal consists
in elaborating a scientifically substantiated military economic long-
range plan for the state (coalition), as well as elucidation of the strong
points and vulnerable points in the enemy's economic system, in the
interest of more effective action against that economy.
The task of military economics is elaboration of scientific methods of
economic substantiation of practical solutions at various levels of manage-
ment and in different areas of activity -- from recommendations in the
area of the military technical policy of the state, to selection of the
most effective variants of operations, models of combat equipment, etc.
Elaboration of the fundamentals of military economic analysis and a system
of military economic criteria is consequently essential.
Also possible is a broader examination of the basic problems of science,
but even the above is sufficient to give a general picture of the structure
and content of a course to be offered at every military higher educational
institution, This course can consist of four sections.
The first (introductory) section would reveal the fundamental theses of
Merxist-Leninist doctrine on the relationship between war and economics,
on this basis offering a brief historical survey of the methods and forms
of economic securement and support of wars, demonstrating the process of
genesis and development of a war economy, critically analyzing bourgeois
*,tilitary economic concepts, and discussing the basic features and
advantages of the war economy of a socialist state in comparison with the
war economy of imperialist countries (based on the experience of past wars).
It is advisable thereby to reveal the content of basic military economic
categories. The section concludes with a general description of root
changes in military affairs and economic support of war as a result of the
scientific and technological rev 1.ution, which prepares the transition to
the second section of the courE
The second section is devoted to an examination of the general economic
problems of contemporary wars. The role and place of branches of the
economy in the economic support of wars, physical distribution and
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survivability of the economy, manpower resources, economic mobilization,
administration and mapagement of the war economy, and military action
against an economy. Problems of military economic cooperation among social-
ist nations are also examined in this section. The section is concluded
with a description of the basic features of the Soviet military economic
concept a,.d a critical analysis of modern military economic concepts of
imperialism,
Thus the second section examines fundamental prob.icmG contained in the
course in military economics as taught at the V. I. Lenin Academy.
Problems of the economics of coalition war are not discussed in a separate
section, since they shouic' be examined in an organic relationship, when
elucidating the fundamental economic problems of modern wars.
The third section contains particular military economic problems and is
structured on the basis of the school's specialization profile. This sec-
tion should deal with matters of economic accountability, rear services,
storage and maintenance, operation and repair of weapons and combat
eq+.ipment, as well as problems of military economic analysis. Problems
of economic justification of the senior research paper can be included in
the course at many military educational institutions.
The fourth section deals with problems of the economics of military house-
keeping and economic activities in military units and on board naval ships.
OUTLINE OF COURSE IN MILITARY ECONOMICS
1. Subject matter and objectives of course in military economics
I. Introductory Section
2. Marxism-Leninism or the relationship between war and economics.
Economic principles of the military might of states.
3. Development of methods of economic securement and support of wars:
Prehistory of military economics;
World War I and military economics;
Military economics in World War 11;
Advantages of Soviet military economics.
4. The scientific and technological revolution. Radical changes in mili-
tary affairs and economic support of contemporary wars.
II. General Economic Problems of Contemporary Wars
5. Role and place of branches of the economy in economic support of
a war, War and manpower resources.
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6, Geographic distribution and survivability of an economy. Military
action against an economy.
7. Economic mobilization. Management and control of a military economy
in peace and war.
8. Military economic cooperation of socialist nations.
9, Basic features of the Soviet military economic concept. Critique of
the military economic concepts of imperialism.
III. Economics of Production, Distribution and Consumption of Military
Products
10. Features of commodity-money relations and economic accountability in
the area of national defense.
11. Functions of Armed Forces rear services.
12. Fundamentals of military-economic analysis:
Economic and military technical parameters of combat equipment,
weapons systems, their interrelationships and measurement;
Content and methodology of economic analysis of the military
operation (problems of combat training);
Place and role of the economic factor in decision-making.
IV. Economics of Military Housekeeping and Economic Activities in the
Military Unit (Naval Ship)
13. Supply services.
14. Unit finances.
15. Economic activities in the unit,
1. Economic principles of a nation's military strength.
2. Economic p?oblems of contemporary wars.
3, On one of the topics of Section III.
The proposed course structural outline is tailored to the needs of higher
military command and political schools. Higher military engineering
schools will require some modification of Section III of the outline,
pertaining to area of training specialization. Some items contained in
the outline (for example, those in Section IV) are handled in other courses
at a number of military educational institutions. Depending on specific
conditions, various decisions can be made pertaining to the advisability
of dealing with them in a given course. The requisite time can be assigned
at. the expense of hours allocated for adjacent disciplines.
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1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1969.
2. See N. Voznesenskiy: Voyennaya ekonomika SSSR v period Otechestvennoy
voyny (War Economy of the USSR During the Great Patriotic War), Gos-
politizdat, 1948, pp 3, 10.
3. Voyennaya Mysl', No 1, 1970, page 60.
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By Col I. Vakurov and Professor Col A. Butivchenko, Doctor of
Military Sciences
The ideas, or as they are termed, principles of programmed learning, which
specify careful selection and logical arrangement of curricular material,
its breakdown into specific meaningful doses, as well as systematic
verification and self-testing of mastery of the material, that is im-
plementation of feedback and continuous management of the students' cog-
nitive activity, existed long before the term "programmed learning" first
appeared.
As the number of persons studying simultaneously in various groups in-
creased, however, it became more difficult to verify their mastery of the
material; feedback deteriorated, as did capability to manage and control
student cognitive activity. With simultaneous study by a large number
of students in the same groups, the above-enumerated factors make the
teacher's task so difficult that he is physically unable to manage and
control effectively all stages'of the learning process.
An answer to this problem has been found as a result of scientific and
technological advances, particularly achievements in the area of
electronics, cybernetics and a number of other sciences. It has become
possible to transfer some functions (particularly information output and
testing of information assimilation) performed by the instructor to
special technical devices: teaching machines, simulators, automatic testing
units, etc.
Even in this case, however, the main role in the teaching process is still
played by the instructor, for in order to utilize machines it is necessary
to elaborate for them special teaching programs which include not only
course information but also a carefully-planned system of control of the
student's effort at all stages of his cognitive activity, The term
"programmed learning," that is learning on the basis of a special teaching
program placed in the machine, arose precisely in connection with the need
to develop these special teaching programs. The term "programmed learning,"
in analogy, for example, with the terms "computer-controlled blast-furnace
process," "numerically-controlled machine tool," etc, raises no doubts or
objections, particularly since it has been accepted throughout the world.
* The editors received a number of responses to an article by Lt Gen P. Va-
shu r i n entitled "More Extensively Adopting Programmed Learning" (Voyennaya
Mysl', No 12, 1970). We are publishing two of these; the remaining re-
sponses, as well as the editors' conclusions, will appear in subsequent
issues,
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But what about the term "machineless programmed learning," which the
author of the article discusses? (As well as others!)
Since "machineless programmed learning" provides a certain individualiza-
tion of learning and to a certain degree enables one to control the cog-
nitive activity of students, this term is just as entitled to existence
as the term "dismounted soldier performing as tank" [peshiy po tankovomu}.
Of course this is not programmed learning in the full meaning of the term,
but it does approximate it to a certain degree.
If we approach from this standpoint Va,~nuri.n's deliberations, conclusions
and recommendations, we readily note that he spoke very little in his
article about genuine programmed learning, and particularly about ex-
perience in its utilization. It is true that at the end of the article,
where he discusses complex computer-based teaching units, a system of
peripheral self-learning stations linked with a teaching center, the
author has drawn an enticing picture, but utilization of complex teaching
units at the higher educational institution is a thing of the future.
At the present time, as experience shows, the possibilities of programmed
learning are extremely limited at the higher school, with flow-type group
training (particularly in such disciplines as tactics, operational art, and
the social sciences). This is first and foremost because in teaching a
number of disciplines (operational-tactical, social sciences) a formal-
logical approach to presentation of the course material, without which it
is impossible to program it for a teaching machine., is not always allowable.
The experience of recent years and _he results of numerous experiments at
a number of military educational institutions, particularly of an en-
gineering specialization (which possess more favorable conditions for
programmed teaching than other higher educational institutions), permit us
to draw the following conclusions.
Programmed teaching, including automated testing, has not been employed
for lecture courses presented in section-organized lecture halls for the
simple reason that acquisition of information on assimilation of course
material by 100 and more students and subsequent processing of this in-
formation by the instructor, with the aim of immediate response to feed-
back results, prove to be a difficult task from the standpoint both of time
required for this job and the greater expenditure of funds to equip such
"flow-type" lecture hall facilities.
At class-group and particularly practical and laboratory exercises, as well
as for student independent study, programmed teaching is quite well suited
for a number of disciplines and courses and produces good results.
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Out of the numerous teaching machines and various technical devices
devised at higher educational institutions during the last 10 years,
many have proven unworkable. Testing devices such as the Lastochka,
KISI-5, OM-7-4 and others are being successfully employed in the learning
process.
Sih..ulators with a special programmed device are being more and more ex-
tensively utilized in the learning process.
Teaching and testing machines are employed both in the system of automated
classrooms (sometimes called programmed learning classrooms) and in-
dividually, particularly for independent study.
Programmed learning is successful as a rule in the area of the social
sciences and general engineering disciplines, and particularly at exer-
cises dealing with highly practical aspects of the course. At many higher
educational institutions programmed learning is employed in the study
of physics, chemistry, mathematics and other social sciences and general
engineering disciplines. Nonmachine programmed learning has produced
good results at many higher educational institutions. A large number of
so-called programmed textbooks, various test cards, etc have been devised.
In all these efforts, however, as Lt Gen P. Vashurin correctly notes,
there is no suitable organizational principle. The determining element in
this extensive and complex activity is chiefly enthusiasm, not scientifical-
ly-substantiated methodological expediency.
A major inhibiting element in the spread of programmed learning is the lack
of requisite technical devices at military educational institutions.*
Obviously what is needed here is a common approach, a common methodological
policy, if only at military educational institutions of like profile.
It is a well-known fact that in industry, such as at plants producing
identical or similar products, mass production as a rule is effected on
the basis of an identical and most advanced manufacturing process. Why is
it that outmoded methods are permitted in education, which today has also
become mass-production (industrial) in character? To draw a further
analogy with industry, teaching methods can be called the industrial
processes of learning. They should also be based on the achievements of
educational science and utilization of the entire technical arsenal of
devices providing high labor productivity on the part of both instructors
and students.
* A s is well known, technical devices for programmed learning are
presently not specified in the facilities and equipment lists of military
educational institutions.
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The entire complex learning process should be carefully planned and
secured, that is, it is essential to possess for each discipline a
thoroughly elaborated particular methodology. Programmed learning
(assimilation of new course material with the aid of teaching devices or
programmed textbooks, reinforcement of acquired knowledge with the
utilization of tutoring machines, testing the assimilation of course
material, in the classroom or self-testing during independent study on
automatic testing machines, acquisition of primary practical skills on
simulators, etc) should be provided at all stages of learning, in all
types of learning effort, wherever expedient., methodologically justified,
economically advantageous and effective,,
The particular methodology of each discipline taught at a military
educational institution will determine the specific place of programmed
learning. In addition, the requisite number of technical devices and
corresponding course materials will be determined for each discipline,
a point which also applies to other technical learning devices and visual
learning aids.
With this approach to elaboration of particular methodology; employment of
programmed learning in military educational institution: courses will not
only be an activity for enthusiasts but also a methodologically sub-
stantiated necessity for all instructors.
The proposal made by the author of the article that scientific research
effort in the area of programmed learning be centralized definitely
merits attention.
At the present time two basic ways to improve the learning process are
being examined. The first constitutes extensive adoption of programmed
learning methods in the curricular process at military educational in-
stitutions. The second constitutes automation of the learning process.
In his article Lt Gen P. Vashurin?discusses the first method in detail.
The author does not limit himself to the framework of past interpretation
of programmed learning and does not reduce improvement of the curricular
process merely to elaboration and adoption of programmed learning means
and devices. He advances and substantiates a thesis of expanded in-
terpretation of the very term "programmed learning."
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We consider this statement of the problem to be absolutely correct. It
is not solely and not so much a question of employing programmed devices
in teaching within individual branches of knowledge, of elaborating
particular methodologies of studying a given discipline and finding on the
basis of these methodologies ways to present subject matter or individual
sections of discipline content with utilization of programmed means and
methods. All these are particular, separate parts of that great whole
which constitutes improvement of the learning process on the basis of
programmed learning. The entire learning process should be programmed,
not only individual sections pertaining frequently to a limited number of
disciplines. And this must be done in two areas. First of all one must
apply the principles and ideas of programmed learning within the presently
existing or, as it is called, "traditional" learning process. Secondly,
it is necessary to elaborate in detail and adopt technical devices and
methods of programmed learning in the study of various disciplines. We,
just as the author, feel that the first area is of primary importance at
the initial stage,
In connection with this it is necessary first of all to determine the
optimally necessary volume of knowledge in each discipline. For this it
is necessary to know solidly and in detail the demands imposed by line
units on military educational institution graduates, which in turn will
predetermine the scope of information forming the requisite knowledge,
as well as its breakdown into separate doses of information in a rigorously
logical sequence, with unnecessary duplication eliminated. In order to
accomplish this task we have utilized the principles of programmed learn-
ing and methods of critical-path planning and management. The former have
enabled us to break down the requisite knowledge to optimally essential
doses, and the latter -- to structure and optimize a learning process
flowchart on the basis of volume and scope of knowledge.
This optimization has made it possible to revise the scope and content of
various disciplines in the curricular process and in the final analysis
to elaborate new programs in regard to scope and subject matter. It was
necessary to find a reasonable and efficient ratio of forms of teaching:
lectures, group and practical exercises, exercises dealing with comprehen-
sive and departmental problems, in classroom and field, independent study,
taking into consideration vario,ls indicators pertaining to range of
achieved performance within a single group of students, range of topics
covered, range of current performance results, degree of feedback between
student and instructor, etc.
On the basis of solving problems dealing with optimization of the scope
and range of a given course at our educational institution, we have been
able sharply to increase the degree of student independent effort and to
reduce somewhat the number of lectures.
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Elaboration of all curricular materials is permeated with ideas of
programmed learning on breakdown of course material in- individual
doses of information, with an endeavor to achieve t Df presentation
and close logical coordination.
Lectures and other classroom exercises are being r- om the stand-
point of the requirements of programmed learning and _ooG-,logy. We are
applying basic principles of sequential presentation of r jot doses of
knowledge and support of maximum feedback with the students.
On the whole, application of the principles of programmed learning in
order to improve and optimize the learning process constitutes the most
important direction in applying these principles to the curricular
process.
We also consider creation and utilization of programmed means and devices
in the learning process as a second area fur i?iproving learning. In our
opinion the most important thing now iF cNtensive adoption of means of
machineless programmed i?arning. This is dictated by the fact that at the
majority of military educational institutions of operational-tactical
specialization, insufficient experience has been acquired on programming
course materials (breakdown into individual doses of information,
logical linking of doses, elaboration of test questions and variant
answers tailored to the information doses, formulation of confirmation and
explanations accompanying answer, etc). An important task is elaboration
of programmed textbooks, the principal virtue of which is the capability
of continuous student self-testing of assimilated material.
It is true that programmed textbooks, alongside their positive aspects,
possess substantial drawbacks: the coverage rate is 25 to 50 percent
slower than conventional text materials; their elaboration is extremely
laborious and complicated; their quality is determined not only by the
author's level of knowledge on the subject but also his knowledge of the
rules and techniques of preparing such materials. In spite of this fact,
programmed textbooks are making it possible sharply to improve the
quality of learning a discipline, particularly in the course of student
independent work with course materials.
Utilization of electronic devices in programmed learning should be the
final stage in its adoption and should occur in conjunction with automa-
tion of the learning process.
We share Lt Gen P. Vashurin's opinion on the advisability of a systems
approach to the utilization of electronic devices in programmed learning,
and we fully support his recommendation that electronic devices be em-
ployed in a centralized manner,
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Essentially two variants of centralization of equipment are possible: by
department or area of study; on a scale of the school as a whole.
With the first variant each department (area.-of study) programs its own
curricular material and elaborates a program and schedule for operation
of the electronic equipment at its disposal. Study is conducted on the
basis of department (area of study), with utilization of textbooks
programmed to be compatible with the various technical devices.
With the second variant, department (area of study) programmed textbooks
are fed into the general-use electronic device each time classes or
exercises involve the given department (area of study).
An advantage of the first variant is stability of setup and operational
readiness of the electronic device and its utilization during the learning
process. A disadvantage is the comparatively high cost. The second
variant is more complex in preparation and utilization of programs, but it
is economically mpre advantageous. We consider it fundamental for mili-
tary educational institutions.
The operational-tactical demands on programmed learning electronic devices
with centralized utilization have been specified in Lt Gen P. Vashurin's
article. They are in full conformity with modern stationary computers,
particularly the Minsk-32 digital computer. This computer can be used to
build a centralized system of programmed learning and to achieve automa-
tion of the learning process.
Professor Col A. Butivchenko, Doctor of Military
Sciences
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ON THE QUESTION OF THE SCIENCE OF TROOP CONTROL
Considerable attention is presently being devoted to elaboration of the
scientific principles of troop control, This explains the interest being
shown in an article by Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv A. Tatarchenko entitled
"Science of Troop Control,"*
This is not the first time this journal has addressed the above subject,
but this time science of troop control is discussed on a more specific
basis, The author has endeavored (and we feel, with some success) to
define the subject and structure of this science, its place in military
science in general, and to express his opinion on one of the most important
and complex questions -- criteria for evaluating effectiveness of control.
We shall discuss in greater detail the structure of the science of manage-
ment.
First of all we shall determine whether it is necessary at all to define
the structure of science of management, and if so, why? Would it not be
better, in place of a general discussion, to concentrate our efforts on
elaboration of concrete, specific problems?
Lenin gives the most precise answer to these questions:, ",,He who addresses
particular problems without first solving general problems will inevitably
and unconsciously encounter these general problems at every step. Blindly
to encounter these problems in each particular case means to doom one's
policy to the worst wavering and lack of principles" (Poln., Sobr. Soch.
[Complete Works], Volume 15, page 368). As applied to the science of troop
control this means how correctly we define the content and structure, how
successfully its development proceeds and practical effectiveness is
achieved.
Carefully examining the structure of science of troop control proposed
by Maj Gen Tatarchenko, one can easily see that in addition to certain
points which have been sufficiently fully elaborated; there are some items
which are in the beginning stages of development, in spite of their
undisputed importance (for example, criteria and standards of assessing
effectiveness of troop control). Just as the periodic table of elements,
in addition to all its other virtues, helps scientists obtain. their
bearings in scientific quest and to discover previously unknown (but
predicted) elements, a well-founded structure of science of management will
make it possible correctly to determine its paths of development, to find
individual problem points and promptly to focus-efforts on resolving
* Voyennaya Mysl', No 6, 1970,
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these points. Without this the planned development of science as a whole
is impossible
While we agree with the basic points made by the author of the article,
we should like to make some comments.
As is well known, the physical foundation of any complex control system is
made up of people and technical devices taking part in the control process.
In view of the continuing rapid development of control technology, there
is no need to demonstrate the necessity of such an area of science of
management as "troop control technology." But we cannot limit ourselves
to an examination solely of this portion of the supporting base of control
and ignore another important segment -- the persons involved in management
and control functions.
This is why it seems essential to include in the structure of science of
management a separate section which. we shall call (tentatively) "manage-
ment cadres." This section should on the whole discuss matters pertaining
to efficient selection and placement of cadres in various management and
control systems. Lenin emphasized the importance of this. In a letter
to A. D. Tsyurupa he stated that "...the primary task of the moment is not
decrees, not reorganizations, but rather selection of personnel; determina-
tion of individual responsibility for the job at hand; verification of
the work which is going on" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. , Volume 44, pp 369-370).
Lenin returns to this problem in a number of his writings and documents
pertaining to the period of establishment of state management and control
entities during the early years of Soviet rule.
Up to the present time science has not yet elaborated any strict, specific
theses on this problem, There is no need to demonstrate that at a certain
stage in the development of troop control an empirical approach to solving
the problem of cadres may become an insurmountable hindrance impeding the
achievement of further success in the area of technology, in the area of
organization and in the area of management methods.
In the most general form the section "Management Cadres" could consist of
the following basic subdivisions:
general principles of selection and placement of cadres in manage-
ment systems;
classification of management positions on the basis of two funda-
mental indicators: functional orientation (commander, political worker,
officer-operator, specialist, etc), and by level of hierarchic echelon of
the control entity (subunit, unit, large unit and corresponding com-
manders, staffs, sections, directorates, etc) ;
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basic requirements on personal properties (characteristics) of
individuals in each management slot;
method of determining (measuring) personal qualities in the process
of practical activity and in conducting special investigations;
orientation of cadre management training, for the purpose of cadre
practical improvement
It follows from the above approximate content of the section that the most
important role is assigned to the problem of professional selection, which
at present; in connection with the scientific and technological revolution,
has become quite acute in various areas of human activity, including the
area of troop control?
We should state at this point, however, that, taking into consideration
the present level of knowledge in the area of management, psychology, and
heuristic science, it would be premature to state the objective of in-
vestigating all levels on the hierarchic ladder, At the present time prob-
lems of occupational selection are being successfully solved only in those
specialist categories such as radar operators, vehicle, drivers; pilots,
etc, that is persons for control functions at the "man-machine" level, that
is, these studies are far from completion.
The higher the control system level we subject to such an examination, the
less success we can anticipate. This is understandable; since the more
creative man's activity is, the less readily it submits to investigation,
And yet it is generally acknowledged that the activity of the military
commander pertains to the category of the most innovative and difficult,
The boundaries of such investigations can be elucidated with relative
precision only in the course of investigation proper, although it can
already be assumed that in the foreseeable future they will not exceed,
in the military, the level of regimental commander (ship captain), But
even this level (if only because of the large number of persons involved)
is an important object of investigation by science of management.
With addition of this section to "Structure of the Science of Troop Con-
trol" we should eliminate "Demands on Command Cadres" from the first
section (subsection 8).
Up to the present time there has been a considerable amount of materials
published on various problems of science of management. There has been
little practical effect, however, in this area from the achieved level of
knowledge, There are evidently several reasons for this, the aggregate
of which can be characterized as the absence of the element of "self-
improvement" in existir.g complex control systems, In order to eliminate
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these causes, that is, to achieve a constant control system tendency toward
improvement, it is essential to elaborate special methods, procedures and
technical devices for investigating control processes. In connection with
this it seems expedient to isolate within the proposed structure of sci-
ence of troop control a separate section which could be called "Improvement
of Control System" and could encompass the following main subsections:
1) organization of research in control and management;
2) methods of investigation and improvement of control and manage-
ment systems;
3) technical devices for investigation in the area of control and
management;
4) organization of training of management cadres (theoretical
training);
5) methods of teaching management science;
6) forms and methods of practical adoption of results achieved by
management science;
7) methods of determining achieved effect eness of control.
We shall explain in somewhat greater detail the content of each of the
above subsections.
The first subsection, taking into account the volume of requisite re-
search in management and control, will issue recommendations on the fol-
lowing matters: who should engage -in a given investigation, and with what
personnel arrangement; how should the research ',e organized (for example,
should special investigator teams be set up, what arrangement and how many,
under whom, where should they fit organizationally?); what research can be
performed by officers in addition to the performai;ce of their primary
duties. Consequently, the first subsection, under conditions of a con-
stantly changing situation, develcpment of knowledge, forms and methods of
management and control, Will make it possible to find the correct way to
meet the demands and principles advanced by general theory of management,
Special methods and entire methodologies of investigating management and
control processes will be elaborated in the second subsection (for
example, how to measure various flows of information, temporal indices of
individual processes, psychophysiological and intellectual parameters of
the individual, etc).
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The third subsection should provide the investigator with requisite
special and multipurpose technical means enabling him to implement re-
search methods in the area of management and control-
The fourth and fifth subsections will make it possible to determine the
amount of special training for those persons who will be employed in manage-
ment in various posts, who will be elaborating and perfecting training
programs and methods, taking into account the specific features of the
training establishment and the students, and who will be obtaining a
reasonable organization of information efforts among management specialist
officers,
While knowledge on management and control elaborated and synthesized up to
the present time cannot be considered a science, a scientific discipline
should be constructed on this base, which should be taught to one extent
or another at various training establishments, The history of science
contains many examples of how extremely valuable discoveries saw no
practical implementation or were utilized only partially for a long period
of time. There can be many different reasons for this Sometimes, tor
example, it involves a certain "inertness" inherent in man; that is ad-
herence to old, tested methods and means of labor, and sometimes with
certain side complications caused by adoption of the new. But in most
cases adoption of scientific advances demands not only the persistence of
the enthusiast but also the knowledge of the specialist. The sixth and
seventh subsections should be devoted to elaboration of this knowledge.
With the treatment of these items in a separate section of management
science, "Methods of Studying Problems of Management and Control at
Educational Institutions and Thei.- Development During Troop Combat and
Operational Training" (Subsection 12) can be eliminated from th?, first
section, "Structure,"
Thus, while the first section of science of control -- "Theory of Troop
Control" -- defines its principal areas and specifies points of departure
for investigation within the area of all succeeding suctions; this section
will provide a scientifically substantiated "process" for improving manage-
ment and control,
Considering science of troop control as new and not yet completely for-
mulated, one must bear in mind that it is inconceivable to make consider-
able headway in the area of management and control without employing a new
scientific edifice. This edifice has now begun to appear in the form of
the theory of large systems mentioned by Maj Gen Tatarcheko and which he
calls one of the scientific foundations for elaboration of organization
of troop control.
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Study of control processes'is inconceivable without a systems picture
of all elements participating in the given processes. Presently-known
studies in the area of theory of systems are for the time being more
theoretical in nature, although studies have to some extent been given
practical application in designing various technical systems and weapons.
There is no doubt that in the fairly near future theory of large systems
will become practically the main instrument of mai:agement science.
Therefjro. it seems logical to include the subsection "Problems of Applica-
tion of General Theory of Systems to Troop Control" in the first section,
"Structure" -- "Theory of Troop Control." A central item here, in our
view, will be methodology of systems analysis of management and control
processes, taking into account the entire aggregate of aspects of manage-
ment science: organization, hardware, personnel and management methods.
In conclus .on we should note that ma:i_ie tent science is presently at a
sta-e ';:iere farther elaboration and particularly practical implementation
o.: t> ic'lieveme-it , re iuire substantial material and organizati_onZ1 ;u;.-
port. Existing Soviet and foreign experience in scientific approach to
management has persuasively demonstrated that the outlays involved are
repaid many times over by the gains achieved.
Capt 2nd R- k Jubravin, Candidate of
Naval Science, Docent
T'ia con-,i.,erzble attention being pail to an article by Maj Gen Engr-Tech
Serv A, Tatarchenko entitled "Science of Troop Control" is due not only to
the increasing importance of this problem but also the novelty of its
statement by the author. `iaterials published up to the present time have
contain-., merely preli:.iinary and perhaps comparatively timid attempts at
elaboration of a theory of troop control. The principal contribution of
!ai Gen Tatarchenko is, in our opinion, the fact that he has taken a step
Eor~;ard and has boldly addre'sed tiie question of further and fundamental
elaboration of the science of troon control.
Th:e 'verall statement of the problem in his article generates no objection,
but we cannot agree with the author's statements on such fundamental items
as the subject of science of troop control and its relationship with other
component parts of military science.
The author proposes that science of troop control she limited to inveci;a-
tion 'ril- o= extremely general problems of control. As regards specific
tasks of control of services and arms at various echelons and under
various conditions of conduct of co.abat operations (attack, defense, etc),
they shoul:i b3 dealt not by control science but rather by strategy,
operational art and tactics respectively.
81
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With this statement of the problem we shall find first and foremost a
certain ;ap between science of troop control and the above-mentioned com-
ponent parts of the art of warfare and military science as a whole., In
addition, such an abstract science of troop control, detached from con-
crete, practical affairs, is useless; since it will produce no practical
benefit,
Every science, in addition to general theses, is concrete in character and
helps solve purely practical problems; for this reason it is called a
science Obviously science of troop control should not only deal with
general matters of theory but should also assist command-rs and staffs of
the various echelons in successfully carrying out specific measures of
troop control, should teach practical work methods in specific types of
combat (operation) and situation conditions (collection and study of
situation data, planning of combat operations, assignment of missions
to troops, organization and implementation of troop coordinated actions,
etc). Only then will it be entitled to exist and grow
Consequently we should be discussing not separation (detachment) of sci-
ence of troop control from military science but rather differentiation of
the latter. Only under this condition will science of troop control be-
come an organic component part of military science, including military
art (see diagram). In recent years such a differentiation has been ob-
served in many other fields of knowledge-
The author's fear= that in such a case science of troop control will be
too broad, will lack visible boundaries, are groundless. The boundaries
are established by combat realities proper, from which one must proceed in
resolving this matter, for no genuine science can be concocted, It can
arise only on the basis of life itself, reality.
A careful analysis of combat developing in a theater of military opera-
tions clearly reveals two of its components.
First of all there are the actions of the troops proper, that is soldiers
organizationally contained in subunits, units, and large units. With fire
and attack troops destroy enemy personnel and equipment, execute maneuver,
shift to reserve, etc or support all these actions (conduct reconnaissance,
build roads and bridges, transport ammunition, etc)? The first component
part of military science, military art, as well as (depending on scale)
strategy, operational art and tactics should study the above troop actions
under various situation conditions, This part -- we shall call it sci-
ence of conduct of combat operations -- r..ieals the general la us, patterns
and principles of the conduct of war as a whole, as well as operations and
engagements of various scope, and must provide a clear and precise answer
to the question of how troops should operate under various situation con-
ditions-
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The place of science of troop control in the overall system of military
science
Key to figure: 1 -- military science; 2 -- general laws of war; 3 -- -
general laws of science of armed forces control; 4 -- military art; 5 --
general laws and principles of warfare; 6 -- general laws and principles
of troop control in the conduct of warfare; 7 -- other components of mili-
tary science; 8 -- strategy; 9 -- principles of employment of armed forces
branches in combat; 10 -- theory of strategic control; 11 -- operational
art; 12 -- principles of conduct of operations; 13 -- theory of operational
control; 14 -- science of troop control; 15 -- tactics; 16 -- principles
of conduct of the engagement; 17 -- theory of troop control in combat
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Secondly, in a theater of military operations there occurs activity of
corresponding commanders, staffs, chiefs of arms (services) and the party
political edifice in the execution of various measures connected with
troop control. This activity should be studied by the second component
part of military science, military art, as well as strategy, operational.
art and tactics. Its task is to elucidate not only the general laws,
patterns and principles of troop control but also to answer the questions
of what control entities there should be, what control equipment they
should be provided, and how they should work and carry out specific
measures connected with control under various conditions of combat opera-
tions (collect and study situation data, perform computations, decision-
making and formalization, communication of missions to subordinates, etc)-
This part will comprise the content of science of troop control,
This approach by the author of the article to the subject cf science of
troop control has inevitably engendered a substantial deficiency in
determining the procedure of teaching officers problems of troop control
at educational institutions, In his opinion only general theoretical
principles should be studied within the framework of a course on troop
control, while all applied problems of management and control should be
studied within the framework of appropriate operational-tactical and
special disciplines (course on strategy, operational art, tactics, etc).
The author claims that otherwise there will occur an impoverishment of
the latter. He notes that the truth lies on some middle ground. We can-
not agree with this opinion either.
The system proposed by the author for teaching officers troop control is
not new. It has been practiced for many years at our educational in-
stitutions and nevertheless has not fully proven itself, since in this
case problems of control have been given secondary priority, and there has
not always been adequate time to work on them. In the same case, when
the instructor attempted to devote more attent,.ti to problems of control,
purely tactical (operational) items pertaining to troop actions proper
-could be neglected.
Theoretical research and some practical experience obtained in recent years
at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze permits us to propose a some-
what different and in our opinion more effective procedure for officer
training. It consists essentially in sequentially working on problems of
utilization of manpower and equipment in a given type of engagement (opera-
tion) at the first stage of study in a course on general tactics (opera-
tional art) and tactics of arms at lectures, seminars and group exercises.
Trainees receive thereby a thoroughly-substantiated answer to the question
of how troops should operate (subunits, units, large units of the various
arms) in preparing for and conducting specific combat operations under
various situation conditions.
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Parallel to this, officers acquire at lectures, seminars and group exer-
cises in a course on troop control knowledge and skills which enable them
to answer the question of how corresponding commanders and staffs should
proceed in carrying out various control measures in a given type of
engagement (operation) as well as under various situation conditions.
To illustrate the above we shall give the example of organization of the
teaching process in workin, on the following general topic: "The attack,
involving a hasty river-crossing operation," In a course on general
tactics, in this instance particular topics of lectures, seminars and group
exercises may be the following: disposition of unit, in assembly area; se-
quence of their advance and deployment; conduct of preparation fire; ac-
tions in case of hostile counterpreparation fire; types and procedure of
river crossings; sequence of river-crossing operation and penetration of
the enemy's defense; repulsion of enemy counterattack; engagement of sup-
port echelons; pursuit of the adversary; meeting engagement with enemy
reserves, etc,
In a course on troop control, parallel with classes on tactics and on a
common tactical background, one can work on such particular topics as the
procedure of acquisition by commander and staff of an attack operation
order from the higher commander, collection and study of situation data,
commander decision-making and decision formalization for an offensive opera-
tion (in various combat documents), communication of combat missions to
troops and organization of their coordinated action by various methods,
comprehensive support and preparation of troops for combat operations,
organization of command posts, communications, coded communications,,
traffic control, verification of readiness of units for the attack, control
of units during the attack.
It is easy to see that there will b e no impoverishment of tactics with
such training, since the range of study items is extraordinarily large and
complex. In addition, work on these items under various situation condi-
tions will make it possible to eliminate stereotype and to teach officers
the real art of conducting combat operations, while division of exercises
in the course on troop control will make it possible to develop initial
knowledge and skills in supervising units b y the large unit commander
and staff,
At the second stage of training on this topic one can hold test exercises,
staff drills, wc: games and command-staff exercises, at which problems of
subunit and unit tactics and problems of control are worked on (reinforced
and consolidated) in an organic unity by the joint efforts of all depart-
ments, with the tactics department dominant,
Col P. Shemanskiy, Candidate of Military
Science, Docent
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Col A, Timorin, Docent, Candidate of Philosophical. Sciences;
Maj V. Terent'yev
Soviet military organization dates from the establishment of the Soviet
State? Its content and forms have been steadily improved and perfected
parallel with the development of socialist society, The Communist Party,
exercising supervision over military organizational development, has in-
novativel.y utilized the wealth of historical experience of the revolu-
tionary manifestations of the proletariat, profoundly and comprehensively
considering the character of the domestic and internaticnal situation, the
nation's economic potential, the level. of armed development, and potential
methods of weapons utilization in wars in defense of the socialist homeland?
A study of this complex process is not only of historical-cognitive but
also of scientific-theoretical significance for resolving the problems of
military organizational development in the present day,
Problems of the development of Soviet military organization have been
little investigated in our military-philosophic and military-historical
literature. In many studies the very term "military organization" is in-
terpreted in various ways. In the one case i.t is equated with the Soviet
Army or Soviet Armed Forces, while in another case it is assumed that the
cadre armed forces of the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations
comprise only the foundation of their military organization.1 In this
article we intend to examine briefly the content of Soviet military orga-
nization and its historical forms at various stages of organizational
development of the Soviet state.
The Founders of Marxism-Leninism on Military Organization of the Exploiter
Society and the Toiler Masses
The deathless legacy of the founders of Marxism-Leninism constitutes the
ideological-theoretical foundation for scientific investigation of the
content of Soviet military organization and its historical forms. Their
writings contain a profound analysis of the causes of origin, the
political purpose and tasks of military organization of a socialist and an
exploiter state.
The principal cause of development of the military organization of the
exploiter society, as was emphasized by the founders of Marxism-Leninism,
was the split of society into irreconcilably hostile gasses, caused by
the economic and social conditions of historical development. An unequal
level of eccL.omic and political development, state of the military and the
different character of resistance of the masses to the exploiters dictated
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the appearance of varied forms of organization of the coercive agencies
of the exploiter society: the army, the police, various militia and other
entities,
Friedrich Engels, an expert on military affairs, gave a classic definition
of army. "An army," he wrote, "is an organized association of armed in-
dividuals maintained by the state for the purposes of offensive or defen-
sive warfare" (K, Marks and F, Engel's: Soch. [Writings], Volume 14, page
5). The founders of Marxism-Leninism clearly defined the sociopolitical
role of the army in an exploiter society, viewing it as an analog, a copy
of that society, ",,,The army," commented Lenin, "just as the means of
production, was formerly an instrument of oppression in the hands of the
exploiter class" (Poln, Sobr? Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 36, page 485).
The reactionary role of the army was intensified to an even greater
degree in the capitalist society, The bourgeois army, wrote Lenin, is the
most rigid instrument of support of the old system, the most hardened
bulwark of bourgeois discipline, the support of the domination of capital,
the preservation and indoctrination of slavish submission and subordination
of the toilers to capital, The profoundly antipopular, reactionary role of
the bourgeois army as an instrument of the class domination of the imperial-
ist monopolies is manifested today particularly forcefully.
In addition to permanent, regular armies, the ruling classes of slaveown-
ing, feudal. and capitalist societies employed various militia forms ;'f
military orgmization. A scientific analysis of the organizational aspect
of these forms is contained in the writings of Engels and Lenin? The
founders of Marxism-Leninism defined as militia organization an organiza-
tion whereby the members of society possess a mastery of weapons, military
knowledge and skills necessary for carrying out a military function in
addition to other occupations (see Marks and Engel's: Soch,, Volume 2,
page 539; V, I, Lenin: i'oln? Sobr, Soch,, Volume 31, pp 32-33).
St-idying the lessons of the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865), Engels concluded
that militia organizaticn in any form is possible only with the presence of
a regular cadre army as an organizing nucleus. "No army organized of
civilians from the ground up will ever be able to become combat capable if
it is not trained and supported by the vast intellectual and material
resources at the command of a large regular army, and particularly that
organization which comprises the most powerful aspect of a regular army"
(Marks and Engels: Soch,, Volume 15, pp 413-414)0
Examining the militia form of military organization of an exploiter so-
ciety, the founders of Marxism-Leninism noted that it, just as the army, is
divorced from and opposed to the toiler masses, Lenin, examining the
bourgeois militia, wrote that "an increasing Prussianization of the militia
is taking place... it is being prostituted by the mobilization of troops
against strikers" (Poln, Sobr.. Soch,, Volume 30, page 141).
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Engels also called guerrilla entities of a nonarmy type militia troops?
He considered them less prepared than regular troops in an organizational
respect, and he therefore concluded that guerrillas can harass the enemy,
disrupt his communications, seize or destroy his supply trains, at the same
time avoiding a serious engagement and "withdrawing into the forest or
swamp upon the appearance of a large body of regular troops," At the same
time Engels believed that utilization of guerrilla forces is essential
under certain historical conditions,
The founders of Marxism-Leninism also included police in the military orga-
nizaticn of the exploiter state. "A regular army and police," emphasized
Lenin, "are the principal instruments of government authority,,,." The
police, as the army, is a special organization of armed individuals under
bourgeois command, separated from and opposing the people, In contrast to
the army, however, it performs only an internal funcci.n of suppressing
the toiler masses.
In addition to the army, police, and militia organizations, the imperial-
ists make extensive use of various militarist organizat-;,)ns financed by
monopolies, in their class interests, These organizations play an im-
portant role not only in the dissemination of military knowledge but also
in the organizational and political preparation of broad segments of the
population for participation in armed combat for the interests of the
capitalists,
As we see, the founders of Marxism-Leninism, examining the content and
forms of military organization of the exploiter society, did not restrict
themselves to the army alone, although they did stress its principal role,
but examined all forms of military organization of the state, They also
substantiated the necessity of military organization of oppressed,
exploited classes,
Lenin wrote that in any exploiter society the "oppressed class endeavors
to create a new organization of this type; capable of serves-ig not the
exploiters but the exploited"(Poln, Sobr. Soch., Volume 33, page 10). Only
one class, however -- the proletariat, led by a Marxist-Leninist party --
is capable of accomplishing this historic task, The founders of Marxism-
Leninism scientifically demonstrated, and history has confirmed,, that in
order for the proletariat to gain victory over the exploiters it is neces-
sary to create a military organization of a new type, capable of destroy-
ing the instrument of coercion of the exploiter state and defending
revolutionary gains?
The very term "military organization" as a toiler instrument of power was
first mentioned by Lenin in his article "'The Revolutionary Army and
Revolutionary Government," written on 10 July 1905. Analyzing the specific
conditions of revolutionary struggle, he concluded that "only by force is
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it possible to settle great historic questions, and organization of force
in the present-day struggle is military organization." Lenin explained
that the only such force under these conditions is an armed people headed
by an armed proletariat.
Practical revolutionary activity advanced before the party the problem of
selecting specific forms of military organization of the proletariat in a
bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution. Lenin taught a careful
approach to selection of form:: of military organization and methods of com-
bat which, regardless of the newness of historical tasks, should not be
divorced from past experience or elaborated out of contact with it? "Marx-
ism," he wrote, "in this respect learns, if we can use this expression,
from mass experience, and is far from claims of teaching the masses forms
of struggle con:octed by 'armchair experts"' (Poln. Sobr. Socha, Volume 14,
page 2). In this connection Lenin time and again appealed to party members
not only to study the forms of military organization but also to enlighten
the masses about them, to assimilate them;, to be prepared for a swift change
in methods o f struggle and forms of organization for this struggle, as
dictated by objective conditions,
Even before the October Revolution Lenin considered in theory a regular
cadre army to be the most perfect form of military organization. He wrote
in the summer of 1915, "Let us take the modern army, Here is a good
example of organization, And this organization is good only because it is
flexible, and yet at the same time capable o. imparting to millions of
individuals a single will" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 26, page 258).
Prior to seizure of power by the proletariat, however, and creation of the
requisite political, economic and organizational conditions, Lenin and the
Communist Party did not advance this form of military organization on a
practical political plane.
Lenin stated that in selecting forms of military organization the party
should, basing itself on the organizational experience of the past, take
into consideration the specific historical situation and tasks to be
accomplished, taking into consideration both direct military factors --
type of combat, ^_orrela' on of military forces, the enemy's methods of
operation, level of development of military science, etc, and sociopolitical
and economic factors -- correlation of class forces, societal and govern-
ment structure., economic conditions, character of the anticipated war, the
leadership role of the worker class and its vanguard, the Communist Party.
Lenin called the revolutionary army the military organization of the
forces of the revolution, He pointed out that the military strength of a
revolutionary people (not the people in general, as the Mensheviks
asserted) "consists 1) in an armed proletariat and peasantry; 2) in orga-
nized forward detachments of representatives of these classes; 3) in troop
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units willing to take the side of the people. All these together comprise
a revoluticncz'y cwrny" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 11; page 365) At the
same time Lenin directed the attention of the delegates at the 3rd Congress
of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party to Marx's statsmenc that
"the workers should be armed and comprise an independenu worker guard,"
He devoted a number of writings to the worker militia, ccrst.icuting the
proletarian guard; "Letters from Afar" and others.
Lenin made a thorough and comprehensive study of guerrilla warfare and its
organizational forms, "Guerrilla warfare," he wrote, I'is of great Interest
to our party and the worker masses.` He underscored the importance of
understanding what historical conditions engender this struggle and the
form of military organization connected with it, explaining that. the party
of the proletariat cannot consider guerrilla warfare the sole or, even the
main vehicle of struggle, that this vehicle should be subordinated to
others, should be commensurate with the principal means of struggle, should
be improved by the educational and organizing influenze of socialism''
(Poln, Sobr. Soch., Volume 14, page 9). Lenin saw the advantages of the
revolutionary method of waging war and a guarantee of vicrory in utiliza-
tion of the diversified forms of military organization.
Various forms of military organization of the toiler masses, united, as
Lenin stated, "on the basis of class armament;" were readied and utilized
under the guidance of the Communist Party for accomplishment of the
socialist revolution in Russia. Precisely coordinated actions by all
forms of proletarian military organization along with the political and
ideological struggle of the Communist Party ensured establishment of a
dictatorship of the proletariat in this country within the shortest pos-
sible time,
Soviet Military Organization During the
Intervention
Bearing in mind the complexity of the historical conditions under which
the dictatorship of the proletariat was established in this country, and
the inevitability of military clashes between the Soviet republic and the
bourgeois states, Lenin concluded that "the proletariat, if it wants to
and intends to rule, lust demonstrate this with its military organization
as well."
Lenin assigned a decisive role in military organizational development to
a dictatorship of the proletariat, Soviet rule, the Communist Party.
"Soviet rule alone," he emphasized, "as- a permanent state crganization of
the classes formerly oppressed by capitalism, is capable of putting an end
to subordination of the military to bourgeois commands and genuinely to
merge the proletariat with the troops, genuinely to effect arming of the
proletariat and disarming of the bourgeoisie, without which the victory of
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socialism is not possible" (Poin. Sobr. Soch., Volume 37, pp 500-501). In
order to accomplish this historic mission it was extremely important cor-
rectly to settle the question of selection of forms of Soviet military
organization,
The first such fotn was tha Red Guard, established in February 1917 and
consisting of industrial workers. It constituted the main striking force
both in the October Revolution and during the period of the general "Red-
Guard assault on capital." Regular units of the old army and navy, which
were in a revolutionary mood, acted in conjunction with the Red Guard.
The Red Guard was a worker militia, combining military functions with
governmental and societal functions. In addition to the struggle against
counterrevolution, the Red Guardsmen, the revolutionary soldiers and
sailors became the armed foundation of Soviet power and the defenders of
the social order,
With consolidation of the Soviet state, the Communist Party carried out a
number of measures ensuring that the Red Guard approach the form of
regular armed forces, introducing Red Guard service obligation and govern-
ment support. By the end of April 1918 the Red Guard, 100,000 man
strong, had totally merged into the new Red Army, becoming its proletarian
nucleus.
The military effort against the German invasion in February 1918 confirmed
the necessity of creating a permanent, regular army. Lenin felt that it
would be intolerable and fatal to initiate a war with a professional
opposing arry if the proletariat did not have an organized army itself.
Heaping scorn upon the Socialist Revolutionaries and "leftist" opportunists
in the party for their demands that volunteer militia (guerrilla) forces
be organized in place of a regular army to engage the German intervention-
ist forces, Lenin stated that such demands were ridiculous to any soldier,
for they were contrary to the logic of military realities and failed to
take into account methods of combat, In spite of the fact that a militia
form had been outlined for future military organizational development
under socialism, Lenin and the Communist Party, under conditions of an
invasion by foreign interventionist and White Guardist armies, correctly
assessed the specific historical situation and concluded that it was
essential to establish a regular Red Army.
Setting up an army which was professional in both organization and train-
ing, the party, as stated at the 8th Party Congress, in -to way was
scrapping the militia program as such. During the Civil War the militia
principle of military organizational development found expression in other
forms, which supplemented and strengthened the Red Army. One of these
forms was Vsevobuch [universal military training].
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The resolution on war and peace drafted by Lenin for the 8th Party Congress
emphasized that the primary and fundamental task of the party, of the en-
tire vas.6uard of the conscious proletariat and the Soviet government, along
with other measures to strengthen the rep~.iblicwas "adoption of the most
vigorous, mercilessly resolute and draconial, measures to a-hieve? com-
prehensive, systematic, universal training Df the adult population;
regardless of seK, in mait.G:y knowledge. and military opeya*icns" (Poln^ Sobr,
S~ch~ Vol-.;me 36, pp 35-36), These party i.nstru:ticns ware made official
by a decree issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on 22
October 1918, calling for universal military training tot :.oilers. The
main task cf Vsevobuch was the readying of militarily-trained reserves for
the Red Army. This was not the limit of its activities; howe?.':er; Vsevobuch
units also performed other important functions of the socialist state --
together with the extraordinary commissions they ,rushed the resistance of
the overthrown classes and together with the Red Army :.c,--.k part in orge
n.tzing national defense .2 Communists were the initiators in organizing
Vset 1buch?
In May 1919 A, Ye, Mar'yasin, Chief of the Main Administration of Vsevobuch,
reported to Lenin: "in all the major cities along the Volga, in Nizhniy
Novgorod, Kazan", Simbirsk;, and Saratov, Vsevobuch cadres set up in ad-
vance have made it possible to deploy Vsevobuch forces and to establish
powerful worker regiments, permeated with revolut.icnary spirit, for the
.med:',atc defense of the above-maned cities" (Our italics -?- Auth0') , The
largest contingents ere established in Moscow and Petrograd, They were
organized on a territorial-militia basis and essentially constituted a
worker militia strengthening the republic's home front.
The historic role of Vsevobuch consisted primarily in the fact that in the
:eriod 1.918-1920 more than 5 million military reservists were trained in
its system; without separation from their normal duties;' together with
Cheka units and ether organizations they provided reliable defense of the
home front against domestic counterrevol.:ticn. Vsevobuc.h,in contrast to
the Red Guard, possessed a broader social base Its operation was largely
paid for with public funds, and supported by the initiative of the worker
-lass and toiling peasantry,
We should also mention. the spec-;a2-purpose ur:its set. up on a militia basis
and on the regular principles of military organizational development.
Their appearance during the Civil War years was quite logical, Occupied
with the business of repelling the foreign armies and White Guardists, the
young Red Army was unable to allocate sufficient manpower and means to
put down dangerous foci of domestic counterrevolution, which was employing
the most insidious methods of combatting Soviet rule: provocations,
sabotage, banditry, and counterrevolutionary propaganda, This demanded
mobilization of local Communists, Komsomol members and toilers dedicated to
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the revolution, for are,, r defense of the Soviet government, the establish-
ment of a special organization. It ^onsisted of special-purpose detach-
ments and units set up on the basis u.' a directive issued by the Party
Central Committee in March 1918 entitled "Arming Communists and Giving
Them Military Training," as well as other directives. In addition to Com-
munist contingents, the special-purpose units included trade-union and
Komsomol detachments, which totaled approximately 30,500 men by the end
of 1919,5 and 371,869 men by December 1921.6
The special purpose units played an important role in the struggle against
counterrevolutionaries in the rear areas and greatly assisted the front.
They existed up tc the mil-twenties. In connection with an improvement
in the domestic and international position of the Soviet Republic and a
strengthening of the Red Army, the special purpose units were disbanded in
1924-1925, and their personnel were employed to strengthen the party
stratum in Worker-Peasant Red Army units.
The Communist Party displayed a high degree of flexibility and an innova-
tive approach in utilizing the rich arsenal of forts of military organiza-
tion of the worker class and toiling peasantry for successful defeat of our
enemies and defense of revolutionary conquests. Soon after organization of
a regular Red Army, the worker class heeded the appeal of Lenin and the
Communist Party and organized under the difficult conditions of the Civil
War armed food detachments, which operated on the basis of Soviet govern-
ment decrees. Some of these detachments operated as a food requisition
army of the RSFSR People's Comnissariat of Food, while others worked under
the supervision of the-All-Russian Central Trade Union Council Military
Food Bureau, in contact with the People's Commissariat of Food. In 1919-
1920 the food army fluctuated in size from 35,000 to 62,000 men, while the
food detachments of the Military Food Office totaled more than 20,000 men.7
The food detachments evolved histori.:.ally from volunteer worker militia
units organized to combat the class enemies for grain, to regular internal
security troops units. Supported by the food detachments, the party was
able to carry out its food policy; in addition the good detachments con-
stituted an additional Red Army reserve.
Under conditions of temporary seizure of strategic initiative by the enemy
and the capture of a portion of Soviet territory, Lenin and the Communist
Party did enormous organizational work to set up guerriZZa forces behind
enemy lines. The guerrilla movement was supported by extensive initiative
on the part of the toiler masses, which had risen up in defense of the
socialist homeland. Appraising the nature of guerrilla activities, Lenin
noted: "Guerrilla actions do not constitute vengeance but rather military
operations," pursuing specific political aims. The guerrilla forces, Lenin
emphasized, were engendered by powerful economic and political causes,
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