TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL' NUMBER 12 - DECEMBER 1971

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 131
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 17, 1974
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~Illlill~~~~~~u~ulllllllll~
IGES1E
Translations From " oyennaya Mysl"
NUMBER 12 - DECEMBER 1971
17 January 1974
FPD 0003/74 STAT
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST NO 0003 -- 17 January 1974
TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSL'," No. 12, DECEMBER 1971
Issue No. 12, December 1971, was signed to press on 18 November 1971.
CONTENTS
On Guard for Peace and the Building of Socialism (3-17)
The Moral Factor in a Local. War (18-26)
Lt Col D. Volkogono-;?
The Use of Leninist Experience by the Czechoslovak
Communist Party in the Organizational Development
of the Socialist Army (27-34)
It Col CzPA A. Michnak
Military Science Conferences - an Important Form
of Military Science Work (35-39)
Col A. Tonkikh
Operational Efficiency as the Main Criterion
for the Quality of Troop Control (40-45)
It Col R. Vaysman
On the Methods of Influencing an Opponent's Decisions
Maj Gen Arty M. Ionov
The Status and Some Trends in the Development
of Radioelectronic Warfare (53-62)
Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv A. Paliy
Concerning the Density of Artillery (63-67)
Col. J. Kaczmarek
(46-52)
32
43
n
5 u
67
80
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The Development of Military Terminology (68-71)
Col (Ret) P. Trifonov, Maj Gen (Ret) A.
Lagovskiy and Engr-Capt 3rd Rank G. Rudenko
The 50th Anniversary of the Periodical
Voyennyy Zarubezhnik (Foreign Military News) (72-74)
86
91
Indoctrinating Students in the Process of Their Training (75-83) 95
Engr-Col N. Sal'nikov
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Aggressive 108
Plans of NATO (84-92)
Articles Published in Voyennaya Mysl' in 1971 (93-96) 120
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The 24th CPSU Congress gave high. praise to the state of the Soviet Armed
Forces. This assessment rang with great persuasiveness in a statement by
General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU L. I. Brezhnev: "Soviet
citizens can be confident that our glorious Armed Forces are ready at all
times, day and night, to repulse an enemy attack, from whatever quarter it .
might come." This is the finest testimonial to our military cadres, army
and navy Communists, who are investing enormous labor in the cause of
ensuring the security of their socialist homeland.
As all revolutionary experience, the military experience of the CPSU is
extremely multifaceted. It has confirmed the historical correctness of
Leninism, Leninist doctrine on armed defense of the socialist homeland,
and the superiority of the socialist military organization over the
capitalist. The party has created such an organization in the person of
our Soviet Army and Navy. This is the reliable shield and sword of
socialism) The history of our state attests fairly eloquently to the fact
that the Soviet people, guided by the Leninist party, and its Armed Forces
are capable of standing up for their righteous cause. They have achieved
great victories over our enemies because in this struggle they have
relied on knowledge and utilization of the objective laws of war revealed
by Marxism-Leninism.
CPSU guidance has been and remains a vital foundation for the activities
of the Soviet Armed Forces, a guarantee of their combat might. Even today
the CPSU is focusing the closest attention on creative development of
Marxist-Leninist military theory. The party attaches primary significance
to a thorough study of the Leninist military theory legacy as applied to
the tasks and features of the present day, taking into full account the
latest achievements of societal and scientific-technological advances as
well as the distribution of class forces in the international arena,
Under conditions of aggravation of the aggressiveness of imperialism,
military matters remain important in strategy and tactics of the revolu-?
tio'rary forces of the present -- the world socialist system, the Communist
and :orker parties of the capitalist countries, and the national liberation
struggle. Hence proceeds the vital necessity of their profound theoretical
-understanding and corr-)rehensive elaboration.
These an.' other matters of great theoretical and practical significance in
our military organizational development, in development of Soviet military
doctrine and science, in revelation of the heroic history of the Soviet
Armed Forces, their glorious victories on famous battlefields of history,
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their great liberation mission, and the solving of the increasingly im-
portant military problems assigned to them at the present stage by the
24th CPSU Congress, are examined,iiri detail in a recently-published book
written by Minister of Defense Mar SU A. A. Grechko entitled On Guard for
Peace and the Building of Communism.'
On the background of the magnificent successes of socialism in the struggle
against imperialism, the author discusses the most important, fundamental
military theoretical and practical problems handled by the CPSU in the
course of building socialism and communism and its reliable defense against
imperialist aggression. He exaniines in detail the influence of the
successes of building communism on the development and strengthening of
the Soviet Army and Navy, the influence of the scientific and technol.o.ical
revolution on the development of military affairs, enhancement of the role
of military science in military organizational development, in the course
and outcome of war, and in troop control at all levels. He shows the most
effective ways to achieve further solution of military problems, including
on the international level. He clearly expresses a class, party approach
to the subject, historicism, as well as a dialectical materialist
analysis of its most important aspects.
Lenin's ideas on the leadership, guiding and organizing role of the CPSU
constitute an unshakable principle of development and strengthening of the
Soviet Armed Forces, of our entire military organizational development,
solution to the cardinal problems of national defense and elaboration of
problems pertaining to the victorious conduct of wars in defense of the
socialist homeland. They serve as a point of departure for the high
ideological level, communist party-mindedness and revolutionary orientation
of all military activities and solution to problems on the basis of Lenin-
ist methodology. This idea comprises the heart of the study and runs
through its four chapters, from the introduction to the concluding summary.
The book emphasizes that the 24th CPSU Congress once again demonstrated the
triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
It is permeated from beginning to end with a Leninist spirit and convincing-
ly demonstrates that unity, solidarity, and an atmosphere of harmonious
efforts based on Leninist principles prevail in the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. The CPSU is performing with dignity and honor the role of
vanguard of the Soviet people, the political leader of all toilers. It is
leading the homeland along the true Leninist path (5).
The theme of this work is the scientific analysis by the 24th CPSU Congress
of the present stage of the struggle between socialism and capitalism,
particularly in the area of economic and scientific-technological
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competition between the two world systems, the congress's fundamental
assessment of the present international situation, its character and
features, and the degree of military danger emanating from imperialism.
Chapter One, "Resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress, -- a Magnificent
Program for Building Communism," consists of three sections: 1. External
Political Conditions for Building Communism at the Present Stage; 2.
Development and Strengthening of the USSR Economy; 3. Improvement o
Sociopolitical Relations and Consolidrtion of the Party.
This chapter very precisely specifies the traits, features avid conditions
for the forward development of the first socialist nation. They are
characterized by the Increasingly complete and effective utilization of
the advantages and potential of the socialist system, by further develop-
ment of socialist democracy, strengthening of the Soviet state and its
Armed Forces, by new achievements in the area of the economy, science and
culture, by improved toiler living standards, as well as a further in-
crease in the prestige and authority of the Soviet Union in the inter-
national arena and by strengthening of its influence for solving the
root problems of the present day.
It is stated in the chapter that the congress offered enthusiastic support
of the fundamental trends in CPSU foreign policy activity as contained in
the Central Committee report: further consolidation and development cf
the world socialist system, unswerving strengthening of u.tity and in-
ternational solidarity with the labor movement in the capitalist countries,
consolidation of communist ranks on a Marxist-Leninist basis, support. of
the national liberation struggle of peoples, expansion of ties with the
revolutionary democratic parties of liberated countries, with all anti-
imperialist forces, and development of relations between states with
differing social systems, guided by the Leninist principle of peaceful co-
existence (page 9).
The CPSU directs all its foreign policy activity toward the objective of
ensuring that the socialist world is stronger today than it was yesterday
and stronger tomorrow than today. The general foreign policy pursued by
the Soviet Union aims at securing peaceful conditions for the building of
Communism. At the same time it resolutely opposes all aggressive forces
and is realistically flexible, corresponding to the urgent needs of social
progress, the struggle against imperialism and wars. This is in the
first place a policy which has developed from the socialist revolution,
promoting its revolutionary aims, and in the second place it is profoundly
international, permeated with a spirit of solidarity with revolutionary,
progressive forces throughout the world and constituting an active factor
in the class struggle in the international arena.
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The 24th CPSU Congress confirmed the earlier appraisal of contemporary
imperialism, the features of which are today substantially defined by
attempts to adapt to the new world situation. But these maneuvers by im-
perialism are doomed to failure. The general crisis of capitalism is in-
creasingly deepening, and its inner contradictions are becoming more
aggravated. It is becoming increasingly obvious that neither the
processes of capitalist integration nor the class interest o n the part of
the monopolists to join forces in the struggle against world socialism will
eliminate interimperialist conflicts. Integration processes in the West
are developing under conditions of savage commercial competition, bowing to
the dictate of the strongest, evolving in the final analysis into a new
form of struggle among imperialist partners for spheres of economic and
political influence.
All this intensifies the aggressiveness and adventurism of imperialism,
which continues to seek a way out through wars and military conflicts. The
forces of aggression in war are vigorously active: since the. end of World
War II they have initiated more than 30 so-called local wars and military
conflicts in various parts of the world. Hence the increased importance of
the defensive capability of the Soviet state, the role of the Soviet
Armed Forces in this, their state and combat readiness to crush any
aggressor, It is stated in this chapter that the military might of the
USSR and the worthy fulfillment by the Soviet Army and Navy of the tasks
facing them constitute one of the most important factors ensuring
favorable external conditions for building communism in this country and
the development of all socialist nations, as well as for the liberation
struggle of peoples (pp 16-17).
Communism is defeating capitalism with its rapid, continuous economic
growth, which expresses the superiority of the socialist system over the
capitalist, by the comprehensive upswing in the economy and the con-
stantly rising level of material and cultural living standards of the
people as a whole. This process is steadily progressing, as is vividly
attested by our planned development indices for the Ninth Five-Year Plan
and for the more distant future. For example, while at the present time
the industrial might of the nations of the socialist commonwealth is
equal to approximately one third of tie world figie, by 1985 they will account
for approximately 40-50 percent of world industrial output volume,
The achievements of the Soviet: economy are great and indisputable, These
achievements prepared an excellent starting point for reaching the targets
of the Ninth Five-Year Plan. It was stated at the 24th CPSU Congress that
"the Soviet people, worthily completing the Eighth Five-Year Plan, have
taken a new and important step forward in building the material and tech-
nological foundation of communism, in strengthening the nation's might and
raising the people's living standards."2
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"We value communism only when it is economically well-substantiated,"
stated V. I. Lenin (Poln, Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 38, page
179). The party, following Lenin's lead, has incorporated in its new five-
year plan the fundamental. task of expanding and improving the industrial
base for development of the socialist economy, particularly agriculture
and related branches, to raise the technological level and efficiency
of production, and radically to improve product quality. It is planned to
increase industrial output by 42-46 percent, including capital goods by 41-
45 percent and consumer goods by 44-48 percent, A high growth rate for
heavy industry, the foundation of the state's economic and defense might,
will be preserved.
In addition to describing the magnificent prospects for growth of the
socialist economy, this chapter contains an extensive assessment of the
program for improving sociopolitical relations in Soviet society and the
steady growth in the leadership and guiding role of the party it this
process.
Tasks connected with improving sociopolitical relations are focused primari-
ly on further moral and political consolidation of our society, strengthen-
ing of the alliance between the worker class and peasantry, friendship and
fraternal cooperation of the peoples of the USSR, on consistent development
of socialist democracy, increasing involvement of the masses in societal
and governmental affairs, on increasing communist consciousness on the part
of all toilers, comprehensive development of science and culture, and
spiritual prosperity of the Soviet citizen (page 25),
The party has done an excellent and comprehensive job in further strengthen-
ing the Soviet state and improving the entire political organization of
our society. One of the great triumphs of socialism is the inseparable
unity of all nations and peoples of the USSR and unification of the equal
Soviet Socialist Republics in a united, mighty Union of Scviet Socialist
Republics, the 50th anniversary of which will be celebrated in 1972 (page
27),
The concluding part of this chapter deals with problems of further develop-
ment or party ideological effort at the present stage, Today as never
before it is essential to conduct an offensive struggle with great ability
and to win victory on the ideological front, on the front of struggle for
men's minds and hearts, This task has been formulated extremely precisely
in the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress. The Resolution on the Party
Central Committee Report reads: "The congress emphasizes that the forming
in toilers of a Marxist-Leninist world view, excellent ideological-
political qualities and standards of communist morality will remain in the
future a central task of the ideological effort by party organizations.
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"The most important thing in party ideological work is dissemination of
the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and an implacable offensive struggle against
bourgeois and revisionist ideology, A most important component part of
ideological-political effort is instillment of a communist attitude toward
labor and public property, development of toiler creative activeness and
a strengthening of conscious discipline and organization" (page 29).
Chapter Two, "The Soviet Armed Forces -- Dependable Guard over Socialist
Conquests," consists of three sections: 1. Successes in Building Communism --
Foundation for Strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces; 2, The Scientific
and Technological Revolution and Its Influence on Increasing the Combat
Might of Army and Navy; 3. For a Scientific Approach to Solving the Prob-
lems of Military Organizational Development.
The chapter as a whole and its sections synthesize the experience of mili-
tary organizational development accumulated during the course of the sci-
entific and technological revolution, analyze the cardinal military
theory problems pertaining to ensuring a unity of theory and practice
in development of military affairs, and state fundamental questions for
creative elaboration of military theoretical thought at the present stage.
The author describes the Soviet Armed Forces, the state of the branches
and arms, and their strategic and operational-tactical capability to wage
modern warfare. The author emphasizes the fundamental aspects of Soviet
military doctrine and military science dictated by their present state and
further development, taking into consideration social and scientific-
technological advances.
First of all we should emphasize discussion of the role and significance of
the scientific and technological revolution as one of the main areas of
historic competition between two sociopolitical systems :-.n our time, in-
cluding in the area of the military. The influence of scientific and
technological advances on the military might of the state is extremely
diversified. For example, research in nuclear physics has made it pos-
sible to develop nuclear weapons, which'have become the determining factor
in the revolutionary changes in military affairs. The rapid growth of
mathematics, physics, particularly such areas as rocket dynamics, gas
dynamics, as well as metallurgy and chemistry, has led to the creation of
totally new vehicles for the delivery of nuclear warheads -- rockets, which
today constitute a universal weapon.
Automated weapons and combat equipment control systems, modern communica-
tions equipment, radar gear, various automatic control and remote control
devices have been developed on the basis of advances in mathematics,
cybernetics, and electronics. Successes in the area of chemistry have
made it possible to utilize extensively in military equipment many new
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materials and substances which possess great strength, heat resistance and
other very important properties.
The problem of supersonic aerodynamics was solved with the development of
high-performance jet-propulsion engines. This resulted in a qualitative
reequipment of combat and transport aviation. Utilization of atomic
energy led to the employment of nuclear propulsion plants on submarines.
In short, today there is not a single area of military affairs which has
not been affected by the scientific and technological revolution (page
40).
The successes of the socialist economy and the outstanding achievements
of science and technology have made it possible to equip our Armed Forces
with modern weapons and combat hardware. This has led to radical changes
in army and navy armament and to changes in the organizational structure
of the Armed Forces, views on the methods and forms of conducting combat
operations, methods and means of training and indoctrinating personnel.
Today the army and navy have advauceci far beyond what they were at the end
of the Great Patriotic War. They are qualitatively new Armed Forces,
which possess great combat potential. They are continuously being armed
with sophisticated weapons and combat equipment of various types, which
enable them successfully to accomplish complex combat missions on land,
in the air, and on the sea. The Armed Forces include the Strategic Mis-
sile Troops, Ground Troops, National Air Defense Troops, Air Force, and
Navy (page 41).
Further on in the chapter the author describes the state and development of
each of the armed forces branches, arms and special troops, their combat
capabilities in performing various missions in the engagement, operation
and war as a whole, and demonstrates the qualitative changes which have
been achieved in improNing the Armed Forces rear services.
The technical capabilities of the Soviet Army and Navy have grown immeasur-
ably during the course of the scientific and technological revolutic.ri.
Their main force, however, consists of the men who operate these modern
weapons. Under present-day conditions victory depends to a large degree
on the morale of the belligerent armies. Men who have a total mastery of
their combat equipment and who are conditioned in a moral and political
respect will in the final analysis determine the outcome of war. The
Soviet Army and Navy consist of such individuals. Our outstanding soldiers,
sailors, sergeants and petty officers, officers, general officers, and
admirals are solidly ranked around the Communist Patty and are totally
dedicated to the homeland and the great, ideals of communism. Patriots and
internationalists, they serve as a model for the fighting man of the
socialist army. Communists and Komsomol members, who comprise more than
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80 percent, of personnel, are the cementing and inspiring force of our
army and navy rarks.
Officer cadres constitute the decisive element and basic figure in the
Armed }orces. In recent years their ideological-political level, general
educatlonal level and professional expertise have substantially improved,
The number of officers possessing higher military and special education
has ,ioubled in the last 5 years. jUp to 45 percent of officer slots in the
army and navy are occupied by engineers and technicians. Officer cadres
possess the ability to train acid indoctrinate personnel on -a scientific
basis, to control subunits, units, and naval ships, and have a mastery of
all the methods and forms of waging modern warfare. (page 49).
It is important to note that during the last five-year plan the CPSTJ,
through its tireless efforts in the area of the military, increased the
strength of the Soviet Armed Forces to a new and higher level. This has
been of enormous importance not only for the Soviet state but also for the
entire socialist community, and for world peace. F :)r ii: is quite. ob-
vious that if it were not for the military might, of the Soviet state; the
imperialists would already have unleashed upon mankind a third world war.
"Every potential aggressor," it wilts noted at the congress, "is well aware
that any attempt to launch a nucld.ar missile attack on our country will
be met with a devastating response.i3
The military might of the state and the strength of its defense are thus
organically related to the nature of a country's social system, the level
of development of Its economy, science and technology, and the degree of
unity of army and people. As is emphasized by Marxism-Leninism, this in-
terrelationship becomes even more important under present-day conditions.
This is why in elaborating the principal areas of development of the
economy and implementation of plans for economic and social trans format ions
which are of a peaceful, productive character, our party always takes into
account the necessity of strengthening the defense capability of the USSR.
This also found expression in directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan. in
the report on the Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress on the 1.971-1975
Five-Year Plan for Development of the USSR Economy, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers USSR A. N. Kosygin stated: "In a complex international
situation, when imperialist reaction is resorting LD military adventures
and naked aggression, when the American imperialists, trampling the stan-
dards of international law, are waging a shameful, foul, bandit war in
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and are promoting aggression in the Near East,
when -tension and the threat of war remain in the world, we do not have
the right to forget for a single moment the necessity of strengthening our
Armed Forces and their high degree of combat readiness. Our five-year plan
will ensure the further strengthening of the defensive might of our state:'`'
This will make it possible to an even greater extent successfully to
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protect the Soviet people and all nations of the socialist community
from the threat of imperialist aggression,
This chapter stresses the importance cf a scientific approach to resolu-
tion of the tasks of military organizational development and points out
that our party is inalterably guided by the thesis of V. I. Lenin that
without science it is impossible to build a modern army, Under present-
day conditions -~ilitary organizational development has become substantially
more complicated and encompasses all aspects of a nation's preparations
for potential war. It constitutes an aggregate of purposeful and interlinked
efforts by the state, with the aim of securing the armed defense of the
homeland by means of total and comprehensive utilization of economic,
moral.-political and military potential as well as the achievements of
scientific thought. The character of the scientific approach to solving
practical problems under the conditions of socialism is quite different
than under conditions of capitalism. We utilize the resources of science
by means of organic combination of they achievements of the scientific and
technological revolution and the advantages of the socialist economic
system. It is precisely the forms of development of science which are
inherent in socialism which help us gain superiority in the military area.
The Armed Forces of the USSR are an organization of a totally new type,
radically different from the military organization of the capitalist
countries. One peculiar feature of the Soviet military organization is
the fact that it, constituting the instrument of a socialist, genuinely
popular government:., reflects the character of the socialist societal and
governmental system, socialist productive forces and production relations.
This is what predeterLlines its fundamentally new sociohistorical roles
the meaning and significance of all activities, as well as the character
of the scientific approach to solving the problems of military organiza-
tional development.
The fundamental basis of Soviet military organizational development is
Communist Party guidance of the Armed Forces. Thanks to unflagging con-
cern by the CPSU, our defense has become invincible. The history of the
Soviet Union graphically attests to the extreme effectiveness of guidance
over military affairs by the Marxist-Leninist party. Under the leadership
of the Leninist party, the worker class, uniting around itself the broad
toiler masses, has proven that its military prganization comprises a real
and impressive force which exerts enormous progressive influence on the
course of world events. This is an exceedingly important achievement,
which by right stands alongside all other historic accomplishments of the
Soviet people (page 52).
As has already been emphasized, this chapter discusses the fundamental
problems of contemporary military doctrine and science, their subject,
structure, tasks, and role in securing a unity of views on war and methods
of waging it on part of the party, people and army.
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The basic fundamentals of Soviet military organizational development, we
read in this chapter, find expression in military doctrine -- a system of
scientifically substantiated and officially approved views on problems of
preparation for and victorious co.:11`ict of war in defense of the interests
of the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community (our
underline -- Ed.).
Military doctrine is elaborated by the political leaders of the state with
the participation of top-echelon military agencies, on the basis of an
assessment of the international situation and distribution of forces in
the world, taking into consideration all the material, spiritual and mili-
tary potential of the nation and the potential enemies, development of
weapons, and assessment of geographic and other factors. It includes
determination of the character of a future war, the tasks of the state in
a potential military conflict, methods of accomplishing these tasks, and
directions to take in readying the country and its armed forces for war.
Military doctrine expresses the degree of participation in war not only of
the state's Armed Forces but of the entire people as well. Military
doctrine is directly linked with all areas of activity of the state. All
forms of struggle comprising the content of wa.-, together with the
principal and decisive form -- armed combat -- are embodied in it.
Soviet military doctrine derives entirely from CPSU policy ir, the area of
defense of the Soviet socialist state. It is directed not at initiating
wars but rather pursues the aim of readying the nation and its Armed Forces
to repel aggression if war cannot be averted. Consequently, the question
of employment of military force is considered in Soviet military doctrine
only in connection with the possibility of war being initiated by an
aggressor.
In the content of military doctrine one normally distinguishes its
political and military-technical principles.
The political principles include tenets revealing the sociopolitical essence
of a war which the imperialists may force upon the Soviet Union, the nature
of political objectives and strategic tasks of the state in war, their
influence on army and navy organizational development, and methods of
preparing for aid waging war. Leninist doctrine on defense of the socialist
homeland constitutes the ideological foundation of Soviet military doctrine.
The military-technical principles of doctrine encompass problems of
organizational development, training and utilization of the Armed Forces
in war, the most important areas of combat employment, equipment, orga-
nizational structure of army and navy, development of the art of war, and
demands on troop combat training and combat readiness. This aspect of
doctrine points out the %iays, means and methods of Armed Forces accomplish-
ment of their assigned tasks.
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Military doctrine, based on scientific achievements, itself in turn
exerts on science an inverse effect in the sense of directing its efforts
toward solving those problems which are of the most practical importance
at the present time (pp 52, 53, 54).
In characterizing Soviet military science and its increasing role in
carrying out the tasks of military organizational development, training
and utilization of army and navy in war, the chapter stresses that one
must gain a deep understanding of the fact that today a new relationship
has formed between science and production, between science and practical
military affairs. In .addition to transformation into a direct productive
force, science has also become one of the deciding factors in gaining
victory in modern war. A scientific approach to solving all problems of
military organizational development has become an imperative demand of the
times.
Supported by Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and army and on Leninist
methodology, Soviet military science examines the nature of military
operations in a future war, tle`-Jaws inherent in it, methods of waging mili-
tary operations, principles of the art of war, elaborates theoretical
principles and practical recommendations on problems of Armed Forces
organizational development and their preparation for a potential war.
Together with practical activity, military science determines the ways to
improve existing and develop new weapons (our underline -- Ed.).
The development of military science presupposes purposeful planning of
scientific effort and planned utilization of scientific achievements, the
conduct of scientific research in the aim of developing new weapons and
combat equipment, elaboration of the most effective methods of utilization
of manpower and hardware in the engagement, operation and war as whole,
search for progressive forms and methods of training and indoctrination
of army and navy personnel, rapid adoption of research results in practical
military affairs, prompt synthesis and dissemination of advanced know-how
connected with combat, political and operational training of troops and
staff personnel.
Since armed combat per se never is of a purely technical character but is
thoroughly permeated with the so.:'al? essence of the political aims of the
war, military science cannot be isolated from political, economic and
ideological factors. It must take them into account and must utilize the
achievements of all other sciences. Military science can successfully
develop and in fact does develop only under the condition of maximum utili-
zation of the achievements of the social, natural and applied sciences,
from which it gleans material for performi:,g its tasks and satisfying
practical requirements. to addition, it affects other areas of knowledge
and practical affairs as well, imposing on them specific demands in the
interest of increasing the combat might of army and navy.
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It is stated in this chapter that the might of the Soviet Armed Forces is
based on the achievements of progressive military science, which was born,
formulated and developed on a totally different basis from bourgeois mili-
tary science. The methodological foundation of Soviet military science is
Marxism-Leninism, which ensures it a deep penetration into the essence of
the phenomena of war and gives it great strength in solving the most com-
plex problems of military affairs.
In recent years Soviet military science has become enriched with new
theses and conclusions on the potential character of modern war, means of
improving the combat and mobilizational readiness of the Armed Forces,
forms of their organization, and methods of operations. It is believed
that in a world war, if the imperialists initiate one, nuclear missile
weapons will constitute the decisive means of warfare. In addition non-
nuclear weapons will be utilized, while under certain conditions units
and subunits may conduct combat operations exclusively with nonnuclear
weapons.
A war may begin with the employment either of nuclear or nonnuclear weapons.
There are possible different variants of ivcilization of all types of
weapons in the enemy's arsenal, The combat, political and operational
trair.iitg of our Armed Forces takes into account all methods and forms of
militar; operations which are permitter by iwodern military equipment and
which th3 potential aggressor may employ, Therefore all services and
arms are developing, being perfected and equipped with the latest and
most advanced weapons in conformity with the demands of coordinated weapons
utilization in the modern engagement, operation and war as a whole (pp 54-
55)
Future development of Soviet military science should be based on unswerving
observance of the Leninist principle of combination of succession of the
military experience of the past and bold statement and solution of new and
vital problems concerned with military affairs, This chapter emphasizes
the extremely large range of modern problems of military science the solu-
tion of which must involve concentration of the efforts of all our military
theory front, all military cadres. These include first and foremost
elaboration of the problems of maintaining constant Armed Forces combat
readiness to stop an attack and crush the aggressor under all situation
conditions. All activities of command, political, engineer-technician,
scientific cadres, troops and staffs must be subordirrted to solving these
problems. They further include elaboration of methods of waging war,
principles of the art of war, and methods of troop control nn the basis of
new technical devices and other: vital problems of military theory and
practice, which are examined and discussed in detail in the sections of
this chapter in light of the demands of the 24th CPSU Congress (pp 56-60).
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Chapter Three, "Constantly Improve Army and Navy Combat Readiness," con-
sists of six sections: 1. CPSU Demands on Further Increasing the Vigilance
and Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces; 2. Enhancement of the Role of
Moral-Political and Psychological Training of Personnel; 3. Mastery of
Modern Combat Equipment -- a Central Task; 4. Field, Sea and Air Training --
Foundation of Co?lbat Training; 5. Developing Socialist Competition; 6. For
a High Level of Military Discipline, Organization and Order.
This is essentially a purposeful, scientifically substantiated program of
combat, political and operational training of troops and staffs, all
elements of the Soviet Armed Forces, their routine and activities under
present-day conditions. The military experience of the past and the
latest experience from field exercises and maneuvers are concentrated here,
raising the state of army and navy to a qualitatively higher level of combat
and mobilization readiness to handle any and all missions in a modern war.
The Dvina dombined-arms maneuvers and Ocean naval maneuvers (1970), as well
as the Brotherhood in Arms exercises, conducted jointly with the armies of
the nations of the socialist c o m muni t y, constituted, as is well known,
c'arwincing evidence of this. The South field exercises held in June 1971
also constituted a major test of combat capability. These exercises in-
volved the participation of the Ground Troops, Air Force, Air Defense Troops
and Navy. The exercises were held in an atmosphere of enormous patriotic
enthusiasm evoked by the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress.
Successes in strengthening the combat might of the Armed Forces and in
improving their fighting efficiency and combat readiness are substantial.
They were affirmatively noted by the congress. But Communists do not rest
on their laurels. This chapter discusses ways of accomplishing the tasks
in this area. It is emphasized that an all-out increase in the vigilance
and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces constitutes an objective
necessity, that without tha.s a high level of naticnal defense capability
is inconceivable. Lenin always demanded that a high degree of revolutionary
vigilance be` considered a most important condition ?;f o r securing continuous
Armed Forces combat readiness. He emphasized time and again that vigilance
is the ability correctly to orient oneself in a given situation, to display
political vigilance, promptly to expose any and all imperialist reactionary
intrigues, strictly to guard party, state and military secrets and to take
effective measures to achieve vigorous interdiction of hostile actions
(Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 44, page 296; Volume 39, page 407; Volume 23,
page 166). The party teaches us constantly to remember and carry out these
Leninist instructions. This was forcefully reemphasized by the 24th CPSU
Congress.
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Enhancement of army and navy combat readiness is a complex and diversified
task. To one degree or another it touches upon almost all aspects of troop
activities and constitutes the result of an organic combination of un-
f lagging political vigilance on the part of Soviet fighting men, the combat
capabilities of first-class weapons and combat equipment, excellent combat
skills on the part of personnel, their outstanding moral-political and
psychological qualities, excellent field, sea and air performance, flawless
discipline, organization and order. This in the final analysis is the
crown of troop combat skill in peacetime and the key to victory in war
(pp 61-65).
This chapter discusses enhancement of the role of troop moral-political and
psychological training and reveals the deep sources of this factor rooted
in the forces of so.:.Lalism, in the ideals of communism, in communist moral
fiber, conscientiousness, dedication to the people and the cause of the
Leninist party. A high degree of ideological content and political con-
ditioning constitute a foundation for all other qualities needed by the
true fighting man. Today the Leninist statement that "in any war victory
in the final analysis is determined by the morale of the masses which shed
their blood on the field of battle" rings forth with new force (Poln. Sob-,
Soch., Volume 41, page 121).
Psychological training, which is organically interlinked with morale-
political and combat training, should ensure the forming in fighcing men
of such qualities which are essential in combat as courage, bravery, inner
willingness to self-sacrifice, stability of psychological and mental
reactions, resourcefulness, etc. Soviet fighting men should also possess
outstanding sociopsychological qualities -- a feeling of comradeship, col-
lectivism, willingness to engage in mutual help and assistance. All this
acquires particular importance under the conditions of nuclear war.
Consequently, the task consists in cementing together in each fighting man
his moral, volitional and physical capabilities, on the basis of this
developing firm emotional and spiritual stability, constant readiness to
withstand the sternest trials of modern war, preserving a will to win under
the most difficult conditions.
The forming of excellent moral-political and psychological qualities
essential in war is a complex and diversified process; it organically
coalesces with the entire system of combat and political training, military
indoctrination, and the entire fabric of army and navy life. A decisive
role in this process is played by party political work. It always has been
and remains a powerful weapon of our army, the strength of which has been
tested time and again in the flame of battle. This frightens the enemies
of socialism even today. This chapter con"ains specific recommendations
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to officer cadres pertaining to organization:.and conduct of the entire
process connnected with forming excellent moral-political and psychological
qualities in Soviet fighting men (pp 65-71).
An important aspect of this process and of total combat training as a
whole is mastery of modern combat equipment in a short period of time. The
foundation of combat trailing proper, as is well known, consists of per-
sonnel field, sea and air training. Conclusions and recommendations on
these matters have been provided in the concrete examples of combat
routine and activities of the Armed Forces in the present day. Recommenda-
tions and counsel are given, essential for the daily activities of command,
political and engineer cadres. It is emphasized that it is important
at each field exercise to create for the troops a new and instructive situa-
tion. One must strive to ensure that each and every field exercise, naval
cruise, training flight, tactical and command-staff exercise is conducted
under complex conditions, approximating to a maximum degree real combat.
Only then will commanders of all echelons develop innovative operational-
tactical thinking, initiative, and the endeavor to employ the'rmost effec-
tive methods of accomplishing combat missions. A complex, dynamic situa??
tion makes it possible successfully to instill in personnel an excellent
aggressive spirit, moral-combat qualities and to improve their psycho-
logical conditioning (page 77).
Fundamental syntheses, conclusions and recommendations have been given
relative to the organization a:n:d-development of socialist competition in
the Armed Forces at the present stage ^f their development. Recommenda-
tions are offered on the basic content of socialist pledges in the troops,
at training institutions and other military establishments, taking into
consideration the specific features of military activities and Armed
Forces routine (pp 77-80).
Substantial syntheses have been provided on the matter of further
strengthening military discipline, organization and order in the troops in
light of the demands of the 24th CPSU Congress (pp 81-85).
Chapter. Four, "The Patriotic and International Duty of the Soviet Armed
Forces," consists of three sections: 1. The CPSU on Unity of Patriotic and
International. Tasks of the Soviet People and Its Armed Forces; 2. Strengthen
the Fighting Alliance with the Brother Armies of Socialist Nations; 3. In-
doctrinate Ideologically Convinced, Firm, Toughened Fighting Men --
Patriots and Internationalists.
The importance of these matters is strongly emphasized. The monolithic
unity and interrelationship of patriotic and international missions of the
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Soviet people and its Armed Forces reflect the socialist nature of society,
engendered by the Great October Revolution. The first socialist country,
the world's first wor':er.-peasant state, is the base and foundation of the
international socialist revolution and national liberation movement.
Therefore Soviet patriotism combines within itself a unity of national
sentiments and socialist internationalism, the ideas of which are embodied
in the successes of our people, the brother socialist nations and the
entire world communist movement, They have become an inseparable feature
of the ideology of Soviet society, a moral standard of conduct for all
Soviet citizens, including army and navy personnel.
The CPSU has always viewed the national and international missions of
people and army in a unity with the overall revolutionary task of the world
communist movement -- liberation of the peoples of all nations from the
oppression of capitalism. An example of this is the selfless struggle by
the Soviet Union against foreign interventionists and domestic counter-
revolutionaries during the Civil War years, the struggle against fascism
during the Great Patriotic War and, today, the constant solidarity with the
entire liberation movement of the present day.
The content of the tasks facing the Soviet Army and Navy broadened sub-
stantially with the forming of the world socialist system. The mighty so-
cialist c o m m u n i t y of nations has become a real force, which is con-
stantly growing and strengthening. Socialist internationalism has gone
beyond the framework of a single country and has become the state policy
and ideology of the Communist and worker parties of a lame number of
socialist countries. The principles of socialist internationalism are
practically manifested in an ind--ticructible friendship, in comprehensive
political, economic, cultural and military cooperation, and in fraternal
mutual assistance by the peoples of the socialist nations.
This chapter emphasizes that the international character of our army con-
sists in the fact that it serves the noble cause of defense of the entire
socialist commonwealth and the world historic achievements of socialism.
This is dictated by the international character of socialism, by a c:,mmuni-
ty of interests of the socialist nations, by the vital interest on the
part of all toilers in preserving and strengthening the world socialist
system -- the leading revolutionary force of our era, the bulwark of anti-
imperialist movement and the securement of peace throughout the world.
Soviet efforts to maintain the combat might of the Armed Forces at a level
ensuring prevention of a new world war and crushing defeat to any aggresor
are profoundly international and serve the common cause of defense of the
peoples of all socialist nations. The other brother nations are also
contributing toward maintaining the defensive might of the socialist
commonwealth at a high level, Today's defense might of the USSR and the
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other socialist nations gives us reason to state firmly that we possess
armed strength of such colossal might that it will crush any aggressor
(pp 90, 91).
In proceeding to a description of the combat alliance with the brother
armies of the socialist nations, this chapter points out that with the
forming of a world socialist system the Communist and w"rker partie- of
these nations were faced with a new task -- that of pr'senting to the
united military might of imperialism the unified armed might of socialism.
In accomplishing this mission, the brother parties have been guided by
Lenin's statement: that "standing against the vast front of imperialist
powc.rs, we who are struggling against imperialism constitute an alliance
which demands a solid military unity, and we view all attempts to disrupt
this unity as a totally impermissible phenomenon, as betrayal of the
interests of the struggle against international imperialism.. We say:
a unity of ar'ned forces is essential, and departure from this unity is
out of the question" (Poln. Sobr. Soch,, Volume 40, pp 98, 99).
This united armed force of socialism was indeed established, The unified
might of the socialist nations of Europe, formalized in May 1955 by the
Warsaw Pact, was placed in oppo"Ction to the aggressive schemes of the
imperialists, The Warsaw Pact em.'dies and further develops the Leninist
ideas of unity.and close alliance of the socialist nations, consolidation
of their political, economic and military efforts for defense of the revo-
lutionary conquests of their peoples. The recent past has graphically
demonstrated how correct and essential was the establishment of this
organization as a measure to ensure the security of the nations of the
socialist c o m in u nity against the real threat of imperialist aggression.
Its great effectiveness was discussed at the 24th CPSU Congress: "The
military organization of the Warsaw Pact has teen perfected in recent
years as a result or collective elaboration and implementation of a number
of measures, The armed forces of the allied nations are in a high degree
of readiness and capable of guaranteeing the peaceful labors of the brother
peoples."5
In addition to general matters characterizing the military oooperation
of the brother countries and armies, this chapter reveals the trends and
paths of further development of their cooperation in the area of the
military on the firm basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian inter-
nationalism (pp 92-98)..
The chapter is concluded by a discussion of such an important matter as
the indoctrination of ideologically convinced, firm, toughened fighter-
patriots and internationalists. This matter is viewed in the light of
those high demands spelled out by the r';solutions of the 24th CPSU Congress.
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It is emphasized that an important role in patriotic and internationalist
indoctrination is played by propaganda of the revolutionary and fighting
traditions of the Communist Party and Soviet peopl =. The entire history
of the CPSU, the heroic life and struggle of its founder and leader, V, I.
Lenin, constitute the most vivid evidence of life-affirming patriotism and
internationalism, selfless activity for the benefit of the toilers. Lenin
pointed out time and again to the necessity of nurturing revolutionary
traditions, skillfully utilizing them for continuous propaganda and agita-
tion and for acquainting the masses with the conditions of the implacable
offensive struggle waged against th,; old society (page 101).
Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism is that force which makes
our people and its army steadfast, courageous and invincible in battles
against our enemies. A feeling of patriotic and internationalist duty in-
spires and mobilizes Soviet fighting men to overcome difficulties, to
accomplish heroic deeds in the name of defense of their homeland and the
nations of the entire socialist c ommu n i ty, for victory of the communist
cause (page 103).
The fact that our army and navy today exist and are growing stronger is t.n
the historic credit of the Communist Party, one reads in the summary
chapter. The Soviet people and its fighting men are fully justified in
calling the party the organizer and leader of the Armed Forces. In party
leadership they see a decisive condition for success in military organiza-
tional development and indoctrination )f excellent moral-fighting
qualities in personnel, an inexhaustible source for strengthening the
might and combat readiness of army ~;.id navy.
One of the most important conditions for successfully accomplishing the
missions facing the Armed Forces consists in improving the ideological
maturity and Marxist-Leninist conviction of all our fighting men. We
possess a powerful weapon for this -- Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
doctrine. Lenin's priceless syntheses and conclusions contain philosophic
and methodological principles and recommendations for elaboration of the
problems of readying the nation for defense, for further development of
Soviet military science and for unmasking the reactionary essence of
imperialism (pp 106, 107).
We have seen that the materials contained in this scholarly work reveal in
detail the major problems of the present stage of military organizational
development, military theory and practice which crop up in the course of
building communism and its armed defense against imperialist aggression.
In light of the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress ways have been
pointed out, in following which the Soviet Armed Forces, guided by the CPSU,
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will continue in the future to be worthy of their great liberation mission,
constituting the dependable shield and sword of socialism. The genuinely
popular character of the Soviet Armed Forces is manifested in all this.
This study will without question assist military cadres of all echelons in
more thoroughly understanding and accomplishing the tasks.. facing us at a
higher level, uniting the school of political and military knowledge with
the school of life.
1. A. A. Grechko: Na strazhe mira i stroitel'stva kommunizma, Moscow,
Voyenizdat, 1971, 112 pages. Further references to this volume are
parenthesized in the text.
2. Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress),
Politizdat, 1971, page 31.
3. Ibid., page 81.
4. Ibid., page 186.
5. Ibid., page 7.
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Lt Col D. Volkogonov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences
With the aid of local wars imperialism hopes to hold back the powerful
revolutionary flood, to snuff out the aspirations of many countries and
peoples for freedom, independence and socialism.
The nature of local wars of imperialism was exposed by V. I. Lenin. In
hic Voyna i Revolyutslya (War and Revolution) he pointed out that the
history of local wars of imperialism is the history of plunder of the
peoples of Africa and Asia, the history of wars which con_;itituted the
continuation of politics by plunder and the murder of entire ethnic
groups. In its predatory aspirations imperialism is capable "of any and
all acts of barbarity, brutality and crime" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete
Works], Volu:re 32, page 86; Volume 23, page 166).
It was noted at the 24th CPSU Congress that since the war the forces of
aggression and militarism have initiated more than 30 wars and military
conflicts of various scale. The flames of war continue to burst forth in
various parts of the world.
A number of studies have provided an operational-strategic analysis of
some local wars. But unfortunately the military press has produced no
studies of the moral factor in local wars. It is the author's aim to
elucidate certain aspects of this problem.
Moral-Political Features of Local Wars
Local wars of the present day are characterized by a number of specific
features in a r.noral-political respect.
A local war initiated by imperialism is usually characterized by the fact
that the socialist countries come to the assistance of the victim of im-
perialist aggression, and in such a case the local war takes one of the
forms of conflict between the two systems, focused as it were in a
specific area of the globe. At the same time it expresses the struggle,
between two opposite military-political concepts,'two philosophies and
different principles of morality and ideals.
Progressive organizations and world public opinion are ir.alterab?y on the
side of the victim of imperialist aggression together with the socialist
nations. Assistance to a people which has been attacked is of an economic,
political and particularly moral nature, is comprehensive and essentially
unlimited. It is precisely this which explains the fact that in recent
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decades imperi.z2iism has been unable to sustain a singe ultimate military
victory in local wars.
Another substantial feature of contemporary local wars is the fact that
imperialism views the "battlefield" in such wars not only as a proving
ground to test new weapons but also to test and perfect methods of
psychological warfare. This trait has been particularly noticeable in
Indochina and in the Near East. The results of "experiments" and tests of
methods of combat against liberation forces,1 and methods of maintaining
the "combat stability" of their troops are synthesized and find expression
in special manuals: the following have been produced on the basis of
experience gained in the war in Korea and Vietnam: U.S. Army Field Manual
16-100 (on the ideological. conditioning of U.S. and enemy
personnel); U.S.. Army Field Manual FM 33-5 (psychological operations)
AP ;35-5 and A2 355-6 (personnel. moral-political informat'on.) ; AP 360-81
(methods of personnel moral-psychological training), and others.
U.S. military sociologist 1). Calula writes in his boc:ic Counterinsurgency
Warfare, that the local war is a means of "testing and preparing troop
morale for waging a nuclear world war.i2 The majority of methodE. of
influencing morale which have been investigated and employed are directed
primarily at the ordinary level of consciousness, its morale-psychological
'de. The U.S. "Office of Psychological Operations" in Vietnam is of the
opinion that "control of the enemy's mind" can be achieved primarily: a)
with the effect of moral intimidation (threat of destruction) and b) with
the effect of "replacement of moral values" (introduction into the con-
sciousness of the populace and armed forces of the country subjected to
-ogression of bourgeois ideas, which undermine the ability to fight for
independence). Unprecedented acts of brutality oy the military of the
United States and its satellites, establishment of "scorched-earth" zones,
and annihilation of every living thing within vast areas once again attest
to the depth of moral ->rosion of bourgeois society and its army, which with
these methods is attempting to destroy the will of the Vietnamese people
to fight and to win.
The protracted character of lo, it wars, which demand extended morale-
psychological stresses on the warring parties, constitutes one of their
prominent features. The protracted nature is due to the stubborness and
steadfastness of the passes, which are waging a just war, and to the
enormous support being received by the liberation forces from the nations
of the socialist commonwealth and the world's progressive organizations.
The capability to withstand the protracted psychological stresses of ;war is
an indicator of high degree of moral fiber on the part of people and army,
.one if the most important indications of the morale factor. For example,
the taa~: in Vietnam has been going on for more than 2 decades; it has
demanded of the nation colossal sacrifices and deprivations. Nevertheless
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American military sociologists have been forced to acknowledge that "there
are no signs of crisis of morale among the Viet Cong."3
The U.S. command cannot count on even a remote semblance of steadfast
morale within its troops. The Pentagon must therefore intensify the com-
mercial aspect of means of "boosting" morale. According to a specially
passed law, a U.S. serviceman serves 1 year in Vietnam. Many are unable to
withstand even this period of service, although each man receives after
3 months a week's pass (rest a.nd recreation in Hawaii, the Philippines,
Australia) with 2 weeks home leave after 6 months.
The Moral Factor of Imperialist Armies in a Local War
Imperialism experiences its principal difficulties in local cars in the
moral-political area. This is understandable: the imperialist nature of
war generates just resistance on the part of various elements which morally
condemn the aggressor. An unjust. war exposes the moral bankruptcy and
moral emptiness of bourgeois armies.
As regards the moral factor of the aggressor army waging a local war, it is
a unique model of the social consciousness of the bourgeois society with
its conflicting tendencies and the predominance of chauvinist, militaristic
elements. The omnipotence of the imperialist monopolies spiritually im-
poverishes people, evokes distorted senses and creates an atmosphere of
uncertainty and fear of the future. The ideological and psychological
press of bourgeois reality de..:orms people's social and individual con-
sciousness and transforms many of them into blind implementers of the will
of others, into obedient defenders of imperialist interests.
Local wars, although limited in aims and scope, manpower and hardware
employed, are conducted-by large masses of people. As a rule there is
lacking a genuine understanding of the reasons for and aims, consequences
and character of the war in the consciousness of a large percentage of the
military personnel involved (yesterday's blue-collar workers, peasants,
white-collar workers). The ideological elements of the moral factor
reflect these matters in a distorted form, through the prism of bourgeois
propaganda. For example, the majority of American military personnel
captured in South Vietnam either totally erroneously appraise the moral
and social meaning of the war which they are waging or frequently have no
specific moral or political position on this question, viewing their par-
ticipation in the war as a professional duty, a means of earning money, etc.
The individual consciousness of a large number of military personnel,
poisoned by militarist propaganda, is little receptive to antiimperialist
drguments. Today's U.S. soldier (the "average American") as a social type,
possessing a standard stereotyped thinking, is crammed full of myths about
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"democracy," "freedom," and the "moral right of the United States to
lead the world" to such a degree that truthful information which percolates
through to him either simply fails to exert the requisite effect or is
grossly distorted by the "filter" of a false philosophy. Moral attitudes
are for the most part taken on faith alone: the sociopsychological aspect
of the moral factor is more highly developed (from the bourgeois stand-
point), and this is quite easily explained. One cannot deny that bourgeois
military ideologues possess enormous experience in soc-fal demagoguery,
ideological and psychological pressure on men's consciousness and feelings;
all means of brainwashing the masses are in the hands of the bourgeoisie,
a fact which compels the masses at times to fight stubbornly for interests
which are totally alien to them.
The American serviceman, on the basis of an appraisal of his moral quali-
ties, appears as an enterprising specialist who believes jn "Gocd, America,
and the dollar," with a highly developed technical and practical approach;
he fights fairly well when he is confident of an overwhelming superiority
over the enemy, but he does not possess much moral-psychological willing-
ness to fight under difficult: conditions; he is inadequately trained to
sustain the extended hardships of combat life in the field and ie not
highly disciplined.
In analyzing the moral factor during the course of a local war one must
take into account the fact that there are many mercenaries within the
aggressor forces. The institution-of the mercenary soldier in the mid-20th
century has been galvanized by imperialism; it has taken on new and
revolting features, Edward Kennedy has stated that more than 60 percent of
U.S. Armed Forces personnel are volunteers and that if "military pay were
increased, we could have an all-volunteer army."
Such mercenaries comprise at least 80 percent of many units in South
Vietnam. They include many declassd elements and worshipers of the
dollar. Financial reward is the main factor stimulating their "fighting
spirit." There exists here an, ill-concealed system of bonuses for each
Vietnamese killed, for each operation, and for each c--rder executed.-5
Usually the mercenaries do not resort to ideological camouflage of their
moral motives for fighting in this predatory war.
In the process of forming and maintaining the requisite state of the moral
factor, military leaders emphasize the sociopsychological aspect. The
U.S. Army Field Manual Psychological Operations states that psychological
influence is the principal means of maintaining the morale-psychological
factor at the level of tasks of the most dramatic situation.' This
extensive manual, consisting of 18 chapters, prescribes arousing "moral
feelings of love for America," which may become "decisive in the spiritual
motive force of the troops,"
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Lenin stated in regard to ideological speculations of this sort that the
bourgeois leads to war individuals who are inexperienced in politics and
"with ringing phrases about 'patriotism, national honor and prestige"',
deliberately camouflages the foul deeds of fi ancial swindlers and
capitalist adventurers of every ilk (Poln, Sobr. Soch., Volume 23, page 121).
Special training methods aim at developing "firmness and absen.:e of mental
deliberation when encountering the enemy." In the U.S. Army approximately
25 percent of training time is devoted to methods of "counterinsu.trgency"
warfare. As a whole the stamp of the gendarme punitive function lies in
the moral factor of the imperialist armies which wage local wars.
It is a wcll-kr.oan fact that the "fighting spirit" of U.S. troops in
Vietnam is maintained with the aid of ideological distortion of the truth,
financial incentives and overwhelming military technological superiority.
As long as these instruments work, military leaders succeed to some degree
in achieving their aims. An abrupt drop in troop morale occurs as a result
of substantial patriot attacks and defeats sustained. Then attitudes of
depression and apathy quickly begin to dominate.
At moments of critical states of "fighting spirit" class conflicts become
aggravated, while ethnic and racial antagonisms assume particularly acute
forms (27 percent of U.S. Army enlisted personnel serving in Vietnam are
Negroes. Strained relations between Negroes and whites become openly
hostile on days when defeats have'! een sustained). Violence, mass stealing,
insubordination and desertion are commonplace. During the war in Korea
125 out of every 1000 U.S. Army personnel faced charges for insubordination,
shirking of duty in combat, etc.7
The January 1971 issue of the French magazine Actualit6s contains an
article by [Van Teyrt] entitled "American Soldiers Between Vietnamization
and Demoralization," in which the author writes that troop discipline and
morale are presently at rock bottom. Drug abuse, brawling and racism have
become commonplace in the army. It is estimated that about half of all
soldiers use drugs. In the author's opinion many men go into combat due to
fear of prison and repressive action and are merely waiting for the day
when they will be rotated.
Sharp fluctuations in the state of morale, when blind militaristic self-
assurance of the so-called "superman" alternates with animal terror in face
of the inevitability of just retribution for crimes committed, a:e dictated
by general social causes. But there are also specific causes as well.
Military personnel are frequently rotated in local wars, due to the low
state of morale among the aggressor troops and in order to enable as large
a number of personnel as possible to acquire combat experience. New
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arrivals encounter such an unaccustomed environment that it takes a long
time for them even to relatively adapt to it. Jungle or desert,
humidity and opp reasiv a heat, the unconcealed hatred of the local populace
in combination with savage resistance and heroic struggle by the liberation
forces lead to the most unexpected changes in the consciousness of the
occupation forces -- desperation, repentance, etc; their morale noticeably
weakens.
When there occurs even partial political and moral enlightenment, personnel
become aware of the depth of that social injustice which imperialism is
dealing the people which has been subjected to aggression. This sharp.y
weakens morale in the interventionist armies. In the 17 March 1S71 issue
of the New York Times S. Sulzberger wrote that right now "the American army
in Indochina is experiencing particular difficulties in the morale-
psychological area, as a result of doubts regarding the need for this war,
An army which entertains doubts about the aims of a war and about itself
zanaot be fully effective." We must agree with this grudging acknowledge-
. mr.nt .
Lacking confidence in the reliability of the "human material" of their
armies, its morale and combat qualities, which has been confirmed time and
again in predatory wars, the political and military leaders of the im-
perialist armies would like to replace man with machine, automaton. But
since this is impossible, in recent years they have greatly intensified
the search for "versatile means of influencing" the consciousness and will
of the man in uniform. According to reports in the foreign press, U.S.
scientific research centers are testing means of a biochemical, neuro-
tropic cha::acter capable of stimulating or inhibiting certain mental
processes, making man indifferent to danger, ruthless, etc.
The moral factor of the imperialist armies parti.culaxla clearly reveals
its weaknesses in comparison with the moral potential kf the liberation
forces.
The Moral Factor of Liberation Armies in a Local War
Local wars are normally not declared: they either quietly "creep" into the
lives of individual countries and peoples or arrive with the clatter of
combat vehicles of imperialist interventionist forces. Most frequently
the aggressor delivers a massive sneak attack on the selected victim.
Such was the case, for example, when Israel treacherously attacked the
Arabs, and the events in many other wars also developed in this manner.
The element of surprise, a greater degree of mobilization, the greater
preparedness of the aggressor and his substantial superiority in hardware
ensure him (in most cases) an appreciable military advantage. At this
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stage the moral factor of the liberation forces has not yet formed; it has
not yet become a well-formed system in which all elements are coordinated
and positively oriented. Anger, the bitterness of loss and hatred toward
the enemy are sometimes m lnifested simultaneously with confusion and
depression. The role of political leadership, of Communist and worker
parties, progressive organizations and acknowledged leaders, who formulate
tasks, aims, determine methods of struggle to employ against the aggressor
and express them in political slogans and appeals, is extraordinarily
great at this time,
A& a rule, soon after the initiation of aggression, during the course of
buildup of resistance against the interventionists, moral-political consoli-
dation of the people becomes intensified, based not only on domestic forces
but also on international support from the socialist nations and interna-
tional progressive organizations, The role of the organizing element in
t'rming the spiritual capability of a people and its armed forces to fight
to the end for its freedom and independence is determined to a decisive
degree by the maturity of the political leadership and the ability
profoundly to express the root interests of the toilers.
The moral factor in war performs a number of functions, first and foremost
the function of moral-political orientation. Conviction of the justice of
a war, taught Lenin, determines a genuinely true class position in it and
unprecedentedly raises the morale of the fighting masses.
Also extremely importan. is the function of consolidation of the entire
nation and all progressive forces around a patriotic nucleus, the political
leadership of the liberation forces.
The moral factor in a local war also performs the function of an immediate
stimulus, a motive for action and behavior in conduct on the part of in-
dividual soldiers, units, and detachments. A high state of morale
creates the spiritual prerequisites and resoluteness to implement in a
combat situation concrete appeals and slogans.
In the process of implementation of these functions the law of increase in
the moral superiority of the liberation forces over the interventionist
army can clearly be seen. The moral superiority of-the liberation forces
increases as a local war runs on (and such a war assumes for the most part
a protracted character). This pattern is dictated by certain objective
circumstances.
First of all the morale of tha liberation forces is strengthened by the
just nature of the war. Ideas of just war find expression not only at the
socioideological level but also at the sociopsychological level, and partic-
ularly in moral-psychological national structures. Moral elements of
spiritual forces acquire a particularly noticeable national coloring and
ring.
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The fact is that small peoples, defending their independence agair?st the
encroachments of invaders, have a stronger feeling and awareness of them-
selves as a nation, within which at this stage the national bourgeoisie can
play a positive role. The national element serves as a substantial con-
solidating stimulus and occupies an important place in the structure of
morale as well. National enthusiasm, noted Friedrich Engels, is of enor-
mous significance for struggle. It is a well-known fact that restoration
of the morale of the Syrian and Egyptian armies following the Six-Day War
became possible to a substantial degree on the basis of nationalistic
ideas and sentiments,
But an increase in the role of the national element in the..moralt:'actor can
simultar..eously be reflected negatively, for nationalism hides the social-
class aspects of war. And this must be taken into account when analyzing
events, "...Nat:J.onal character, historical traditions and particularly a
differing level of civilization," stated Engels, "create many differences
and engender the strong and weak points characteristic of every army"
(K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch. [Works], Volume 11, page 436).
With skilled political leadership (when the determining socioeconomic as-
pects of war are clearly emphasized as central, dominant) the national
element of the moral factor is of positive significance. But in the final
analysis even the national element can be correctly comprehended and
utilized only on the basis of awareness of the just aims of struggle and
its class character.
In many cases (in specific states of the moral factor of liberation forces)
a certain role may also be played by religious elements. For example, in
a description of the morale-political state of the armed forces of the Arab
nations one cannot but see the influence of Islam. But of course neither
nationalist nor religious ideas and feelings existing in social and in-
dividual consciousness can express the entire depth of social interests of
the masses in war and are unable to give a real picture of the essence and
character of the war being waged.
Another objective source of increased moral superiority over the forces of
aggression is extensive, comprehensive economic, technical, political and
moral support offered a struggling people by progressive forces, and by
the socialist nations in particular. It was emphasized at the 24th CPSU
Congress that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can be confident that it
can continue to count on the fraternal assistance ci the Soviet Union in
armed struggle and peaceful labors. The USSR helped restore the defense
potential of the Arab nations and together with the other socialist nations
is offering comprehensive support in their just struggle against the Israeli
invaders.
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Of course it is difficult for small countries and peoples which have been
picked as victims of aggression to stand up under the onslaught of the
imperialist war machine. But practical implementation of the principles
of proletarian, socialist internationalism and an atmosphere of aid and
support engender in the consciousness of the fighters of the liberation
forces the concept of "we," which gradually goes beyond the framework of
the content encompassin3 only their own people. There develops a s,.)iritual
atmosphere of a broader community, indirectly including within the moral
factor of the liberation forces solid support, the sympathy and solidarity
of many progressive countries and organizations. Numerous conferences and
political demonstrations in various countries in support of the victim of
aggression are of great moral assistance to the embattled forces.
The awareness and sense of a moral community of liberation forces and the
forces of the world socialist system are becoming stronger. Moods which
are normally extremely changeable acquire greater stability: the ideas and
feelings of optimism, confidence of final victory and profound hatred of
the enemy dominate in these moods, in spite of individual declines and
fluctuations. The heroic struggle of the people of Vietnam, who have won
many victories, constantly enjoys the broadest support of the toiler
masses.
Finally, one must also take into account the following objective circum-
stance which determines the trend toward increase in the moral superiority
of the forces of liberation: they are defending their native soil, the land
of their ancestors, their deeds and aspirations. The feeling of homeland
serves as an inexhaustible source of morale in the struggle against im-
perialist interventionists. A guerrilla movement in pprticular is possible
first and foremost on home territory.
The conduct of a war on home territory gives patriots not only enormous
political but also combat-morale advantages. For the fighters of the
liberation forces almost all elements of the homeland (geographic,
climatic, ethnic, historical, etc) are direct or indirect "allies." That
which under normal circumstances may be a source of suffering and depriva-
tion (tropical diseases, high humidity, etc) becomes a positive aspect for
the liberation forces and is a detriment to the imperialist invaders.
According to the U.S. military journal Military Review, during the rainy
season (March-September) , up to one third of U.S. troops in Indochina be-
come unfit for combat as a result of various ailments, complications from
them, etc.
General and specific conditions objectively promote a clear moral superiori-
ty of the liberation forces over the aggressor.
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Certain features of implementation of the functions of the moral factor in
the local war are revealed in the course of combat operations.
First feature, For the country which has been subjected to imperialist
aggression this war is not local at all. For the victim of aggression it
is of a general, uniquely global character, for it affects the very founda-
tions of this people's existence and demands extreme mobilization of all
spiritual and material potential. For Vietnam, for example, as assessed by
the Central Committee of the Vietnam 1orkers' Party, it is a "struggle for
salvation of the homeland."
From the very outset war imposes extreme demands on the moral forces of
people and army, without the fulfillment of which a nation cannot :lope to
preserve (or win) its freedom and independence. And at the same time the
forces of liberation an achieve their moral-political potential fully
and most effectively only by relying on the comprehensive political,
military-technical and moral support of the nations of the world socialist
system,. the world communist and labor movement.
Second feature. The Liberation Army combines the operations methods of
regular forces, employing "classic models," with guerrilla warfare methods.
The aggressor cannot totally adjust to these combined forms of action; in
Indochina, for example, the interventionists are in a state of constant
danger and tension, which creates in them a mood of depression, uncertainty,
deep apathy and plunging morale.
Third feature. Liberation forces engage not only the aggressor but also
puppet regimes and emigre counterrevolutionary elements. This complicates
the struggle and gives it overtones of civil,war (which is advantageous
to the aggressor), and makes moral-political'~unification of the masses for
struggle against the enemy more difficult. Nevertheless the morale of the
army of a puppet regime which lacks broad popular support is as a rule very
?ow. The desertion rate has at times been a s high as 20 percent in some
units of the Saigon pup>et army of South Vietnam.
The liberation forces in turn can under certain circumstances count on
assistance in the form of military volunteers. History contains numerous
cases of such assistance (Spain, Korea, Algeria). The heroism and high
morale of the International Brigade in Spain embody the international
solidarity of the worker class, the toilers, and all oppressed peoples.
Fourth feature. The local war is also viewed by the aggressor as a
proving ground in which to test military hardware and to verify methods of
conducting combat operations as well as organization of -3ychological war-
fare operations. The U.S. militarists employed in Korea and Indochina
essentially for the first time napalm, phosphorus and ball-bearing
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fragmentation bombs, several types of unmanned devices, guided missiles,
models of the new Armalite, Vulcan, and Spiv infantry weapons, chemical
defoliants, etc.
Employment of a new and unfamiliar weapon takes the consciousness "unawares"
as it were, particularly the emotional side. A certain loss in signifi?
cance of existing experience and information starvation (how should one
act?) can create a morale crisis situation. Of course reflection of the
new phenomenon may be adequate, correct, and yet consciousness "response"
and the making of a decision to engage in specific action are difficult
due to a lack of experience and knowledge of the characteristics of the
new weapon. Unexpected or surprise battlefield employment. of new weapons
can negatively affect morale. This possibility is particularly strong
when the adversary controls the air and enjoys a technological superiority.
Thus while the interventionists have particular cause to fear surprise
attacks (as regards time and place), the liberation forces have reason to
fear the surprise employment of new weapons against which there are ini-
tially no countermeasures.
In a local war there exists the threat of a nuclear attack,, particularly
when circumstances are extremely unfavorable to the aggressor (threat of
total military defeat, annihilation of large forces, etc).
Subjected to the effect of new weapons, liberation forces develop a high
capability to stand up against the element of surprise and seek to find
effective methods of struggle. In Indochina this has been expressed in
the employment of tunnels, night actions, stepped-up military activities
in the rainy season, etc.
Thus the moral factor (as the preparedness and ability of a people and its
armed force: to carry the unprecedented burdens of modern warfare while not
losing the will to fight and to win) is one of the most important factors
in local wars as well. Expressing the general pattern of relationship
between victory or defeat on the one hand and morale of the st.-uggling
masses on the other, it is manifested in local wars in a specific manner.
The essence of these specific features consists primarily in the possibili-
ty of comprehensive material and moral assistance to the liberation forces
from outside the zone of armed conflict.
The local war, engendered by imperialism and constituting a continuation
of its aggressive policies, expresses essentially a concrete instance of
the conflict between the forces of progress and reaction, concentrated
in a given part of the globe. Its social analysis should in all cases
take into consideration the political distribution of class forces within
that area; economic, social and ideological features of conducting warfare
in that region, which can promote improved effectiveness of resistance to
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the imperialist aggressors. In the moral-political area it is struggle
between two political lines, two philosophies, a struggle for the freedom
and independence of small peoples and countries which are the victims of
imperialist aggression, a struggle against imperialism with the all-out
support of the forces of socialism, democracy and progress.
1. For ease of presentation the author employs the term "liberation forces,"
which shall be defined as those countries and peoples which have been
subjected to imperialist aggression and which are waging a struggle
against the invaders. This problem is examined primarily on the basis
of the events of the war in Vietnam, but it is at the same time obvious
that locLl wars can occur in various theaters and in differing specific
sociopolitical situations, which can introduce substantial revisions in-
to this description.
2. D. Calula: Counterinsurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice, London, 1968,
page 58.
3. Infantry, No 1, 1968.
4. E. Kennedy: Decisions for a Decade, London, 1969, page 34.
5. Military Review, May 1968, page 18.
6. U.S. Army Field Manual 33-5. Psychological Operations, 1968.
7. V. A. Matsulenko: Lokal'nyye voyny imperializma (1946-1966 gg.,Z (Local
Wares of Imperialism [1946-1966]), Izd. VPA, 1967, page 14.
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THE USE OF LENINIST EXPERIENCE BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY
IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIALIST ARMY
Lt Col CzPA A. Michnak
This year the Czechoslovak Communist Party celebrated an important date,
its 50th anniversary. These 50 years constitute a history of struggle by
convinced internationalist revolutionaries for the establishment of a
Marxist party following the example of the Russian Bolsheviks, for implemen-
tation of the ideals and principles of the Third Communist International,
and a systematic campaign against opportunism.
Consolidating its ranks, the party was called upon consistently to carry
out the historic role of leader of the worker class and all progressive
elements in Czechoslovakia, the role of forward detachment of fighters for
the socialist revolution and the victory of socialism. We must emphasize
that for a long period of time the party operated in the difficult en-
vironment of a bourgeois state, and later under the harsh conditions of
Nazi German occupation. A new period in the activities of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party began following the liberation of this country by the
Soviet Army, and it is natural that at each stage the party had the task of
defining a political lint, an inseparable part of which is policy in the
area of the military.
In the struggle for the socialist revolution the Czechoslovak Communist
Party proceeded from the position that the conquest of political power by
the proletariat can take the form of an open clash with the armed force
of the ruling class. Therefore the question of the nature of the acute
conflict which was possible as a consequence of employment of armed force
by the bourgeoisie and its army was not only of theoretical significance.
The Czechoslovak Communist Party consistently elaborated a program of
action in respect to the bourgeois army as a component element of its
general strategy and tactics, which corresponded to the revolutionary
interests of the proletariat.
The guiding element of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's military policy
in the period of bourgeois rule was a well-known demand of the revolution-
ary labor movement, theoretically substantiated by Karl Marx and practical-
ly implemented for the first time by the party of Lenin -- disarming of the
bourgeoisie and arming of the proletariat. Practical questions were
subordinate to this task, such as the question of whether or not young
workers should serve in the bourgeois army. Lenin's counsel to learn the
art of warfare in the bourgeois army (of course not for the purpose of
firing on one's class brothers but rather for the purpose of taking up arms
against the bourgeoisie in case of need) assisted our party in overcoming
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"leftist" views, which stated that one should not enter military service in
compliance with the announcement of mobilization.
Elaboration of a correct policy was assisted both by the party's ex-
perience and, first and foremost, by the synthesized experience of the
world labor movement, reflected in the documents of the Third Communist
International, The June 1922 Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee
dealt in a very concrete manner with problems of revolutionary activity in
the Czechoslovak Army,. As the plenum noted, the fact that military per-
sonnel technically possessed some democratic rights (for example,the
right of suffrage) made it possible to combine legal forms of activity in
rh. army with illegal forms, and thanks to this to lead amore aicc dl cause
toward weakening the bourgeois army, conveying to the masses its imperial-
ist nature and preventing its use against the revolutionary movement, bc..h
domestic and international, The Soviet reader will undoubtedly be in-
terested in the fact that the main element in these activities was the
endeavor to expose all anti-Soviet steps taken by the Czecnoslovak bour-
geoisie,
An important area of party effort in the army was protection of soldiers
against the despotism of the militarist machine. The Communist Party
always sought to attract soldiers to the side of the revolution, to take
advantage of the requirement of military service in the bourgeois army in
order to teach proletarians in uniform ::o master weapons and the art of
warfare for possible future armed struggle to seize power.
Klement Gottwald, in his first speech in parliament, delivered on 21
December 1929, stated with complete frankness the purpose of Communist
effort in the bourgeois army: "You say that we are demoralizing and
destroying the army, Yes, we are doing just that to an army which you
want to use against the people and against the Soviet Union. We are de-
moralizing an army in which you are the masters and the workers are merely
cannon fodder, in short we are demoralizing and shall continue to de-
moralize your capitalist army, and we are campaigning for a Red Army, a
proletarian army, In spite of your laughter and outcries, we shall
destroy your army with the approval and help of the soldiers of this army:4
The historic Fifth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was held in
1929, It consolidated the revolutionary line of the new leadership, headed
by Klement Gottwald. P,xty military policy in a spirit of the principles
and experience of Leninism was affirmed.
A tense international situation had developed by thernid-thirties. The
crisis of bourgeois systems engendered fascism, the most vicious dictator-
ship of imperialism. At the same time deem appeared new focal points of
war, created by the imperialists and directed primarily against the USSR.
In Czechoslovakia which, as other nations, had Nazi Germany for a nv:ighbor,
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a direct threat of German attack led to the necessity for revisions in the
attitude toward the bourgeois state and army.
In the spirit of the recommendations of the 7th Congress of the Communist
Interna':ional, the party at its Seventh Congress in April 1936 defined a
new military policy. It proceeded from the position that, although the
essence of the Czechoslovak army as a bourgeois army had remained un-
changed, it was objectively capable of becoming a weapon for defense of
the homeland against German fascist aggression. The Communists opposed
all attempts by the bourgeoisie to suppress internal revolutionary elements
under the pretext of defense against the external enemy.
For some time the bourgeoisie-sponsored law on defense of the republic had
been a point of clash with the bourgeoisie. The Communists campaigned in
parliament and in the press against the bourgeois bill and proposed their
own. Klement Gottwald formally announced in parliament the Communist
formulation of the bill. The Communists demanded that the brunt of mili-
tary expenditures be borne by the capitalists, that living conditions be
improved for the families of noncadre personnel, and in case of war that
the people perform a watchdog function over the economy and distribution of
resources. The party demanded thy..: fascist elements be removed from the
army and other government bodies, as well as public organizations, with the
decisive participation of people's committees in this effort, committees
consisting of the members of nonfascist parties, The activities of all
who sought to sabotage defense measures as well as the machinations of
usurers and bribe takers should be resolutely suppressed. The bill called
for antifascist indoctrination in the army and its organizational develop-
ment following the model of the Red Army. Attention was also focused on
military training of civilians on a voluntary basis, on the basis of
democratic self-government and disarming of all fascist organizations.
This attests to the fact that the party was solving problems of national
defense and democratization of the army from a proletarian-class position.
Implementation of the party's policy would have meant a weakening of the
position of the bourgeoisie, and particularly of its most reactionary
elements.
The 1935 Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Alliance constituted a major victory
for the party and all progressive elements in Czechoslovakia. The Czecho-
slovak bourgeoisie signed this treaty under the pressure of public opinion
and in view of the threat of Nazi aggression. The treaty was not only of
military significance. By its very existence it exerted influence on the
development of democratic, antifascist forces in the country and assisted
the party in popularizing the Soviet Union and its army by legal means.
Public sympathy toward the Soviet Union and the Red Army grew. Thus even
before the war there was taking place an accelerated establishment of
fraternal relations between the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples. These
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relations were strengthened during the course of World War II in a common
struggle and joined by the cement of common blood shed in battle against
the fascist invaders.
The crushing defeat of Nazi Germany, in which a decisive role was played
by the Soviet Union and its army, signified Czechoslovakia's liberation
from the disgraceful occupation and created qualitatively new conditions
for the activities of the Communist Party, progressive and antifascist
forces in Czechoslovakia, and for development of the popular democratic
revolution, which also accomplished important tasks of socialist revolu-
tion. As the democratic state developed into a state of dictatorship of
the proletariat, conditions were also forming for the consistent applica-
tion of Leninist principles of army organizational davalupment and the
army's transformation into an army of a socialist type. The Czechoslovak
Communist Party's position was that the Leninist principles which had been
practically tested by the Soviet Army are of not only specific but also of
general effect and that their implementation is essential for the creation
of a new Czechoslovak aruiv, differing radically from the pre-Munich army.
It was necessary to wage a struggle for this character of military orga-
nizational development against representatives of the bourgeoisie in the
government, parliament and in the army.
In respect to these representatives the party pursued r policy which was
in full conformity with the experience of the masses dux ing the period of
the bourgeois republic and the stage of struggle against German fascism.
The fundamental idea consisted in the fact that the new army should be an
inseparable part of a popular democratic regime as well as its instrument,
a guarantee of the freedom and security of our peoples. The Kosice
Government Program2 -- a program of the first government of the republic,
a government of the popular front of Czechs and Slovaks, demanded that it
be a consistently antifascist, popular liberation army, a genuinely
democratic army which would carry out the will of the people, which would
be bound to the people, which would enjoy the confidence of the people and
therefore would receive its affection and care.
As was emphasized in the program, "the government will do everything to
ensure that in the course of organizational development of the Czechoslovak
Armed Forces the army's popular democratic character will be substantiated,
consolidated and further deepened."
The new army was formed of those units which fought fascism, and particular-
ly the I Czechoslovak Army Corps, which was formed on Soviet territory
during the war, as well as partisans and personnel of the insurgent army of
the Slovak National Uprising.
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The popular character of the army and its bond with the people were to be
ensured :
by the popular democratic system of our state, a component element
of which is the army;
by the active participation of army personnel in the political
affairs of the people;
by the purging of collaborators and other antipopular elements from
command personnel. The Kosice Government Program demanded that command
positions be occupied "only by officers of sincerely democratic and
genuinely antifascist conviction";
by educating command personnel in a spirit of the democratic policy
of the Kosice Government Program, with the goal of assimilating Soviet
military experience verified in the course of World War II;
by strengthening cooperation between our army and the Red Army,
which constituted a "model for building a new, truly democratic, anti-
fascist Czechoslovak army."
Implementation of the demands of the Kosice Government Program depended on
th complex circumstances of the economic and particularly political
development of society and the possibilities of transition of the popular
democratic revolution to a socialist revolution. The elaborated policy
was consistently implemented only following the February (1948) victory
of the toilers. The critical question here was the application of the
class principle and the principle of the pasty's leadership role.
The principal element of military organizational development following the
February victory of the toilers was the training of command personnel who
would be a dependable executor of the will of the ruling worker class,
politically and professionally competent and physically toughened. Work
with military cadres was conducted in tl--e fDllowing areas: a purge of coin-
mand personnel to eliminate reactionary bourgeois elements; reeducation
and reindoctrination of those among the old military specialists who had
not broken with the proletarian revolution; a drawing from the ranks of
the worker class and peasantry ofr cadres, their indoctrination and train-
ing.
7aanks to the efforts of the party, we succeeded in creating an officer
corpc the political qualities of which corresponded to the interests of
the worker class. By the Tenth Congress in 19.4 62.1 percent of army
officers were of worker origin, 3.3.2 percent were from the lower and middle
peasantry, while the rest were from the families of lower-level white
collar workers, civil servants and artisans. Only 1.6 percent of officers
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were from the families of wealthy tradesmen, capitalists and landowners.
In subsequent years the numbers within this category diminished, while the
other categories changed insignificantly. At the same time 61.7 percent of
command personnel in the army were Communists. This number gradually
increased, reaching 74.2 percent by the beginning of the sixties. Sub-
sequently it declined somewhat, since increasing numbers of young party-
unaffiliated individuals were enrolled in the service schools.
When speaking of the training of Czechoslovak People's Army command person-
nel after 1950, one muF.t emphasize the very effective assistance given by
the Soviet Union and the Soviet command. This aid was rendered in all
basic areas.
Hundreds of specialists with higher education and commanders in the tech-
nical arms were trained at Soviet service academies, while Soviet special-
ists took part in the training of higher command cadres, as well as sci-
entific cadres, particularly in those specialties which were new for the
Czechoslovak People's Army. Soviet experience and know-how were rapidly
transmitted in the form of field manuals, training manuals, publications
and lectures delivered by Soviet Army officers. Up to 1955, when the
Warsaw Pact organization was established, the Czechoslovak People's Army
had received 6000 different field manuals, training manuals, and special
publications. Direct assistance was offered by Soviet Army advisers
attached to the Czechoslovak People's Army during the period of its ac-
celerated organizational development following 1950.
Thanks to this assistance and comprehensive work done by the party, which
had taken steps to ~raiz new commanders in the military training es-
tablishment system, within a relatively short period of time command
personnel had been developed possessing suitable class-political qualities,
with a specific level of special knowledge and skills. Today approximate-
ly one out of every four officers possesses higher education, while many
officers possess an academic degree.
Affirmation of the class principle of military organizational deve'opment
did not take place without resistance on the part of antis cialist ele-
ments. As is well known, however, anti-Marxist views and actions were. to
no avail. The Leninist interpretation of cadre policy was clearly
expressed in the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Presidium
Decree on Cadre and Personnel Work effective 6 Novembsi 1970, which also
applies in full measure to the army. The decree states that in cadre
matters _he Czechoslovak CGmmunist Party proceeds on the basis of class
and ?olitical criteria, as well as a full appraisal of the special know-
ledge, abilities and moral qualities of individuals. the Czechoslovak
Communist Party constantly seeks to ensure that top positions are occupied
by highly qualified cadres.
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The process of consolidation of the class principle took place in close
link with the process of strengthening the party's leadership role.
Prior to February 1948 the party did not establish primary organizations
and a party edifice in the armed forces. It was important to prevent
other political parties which were endeavoring to take over power from
forming their own organizational structure in the army. This did not mean
that the party was not taking steps to strengthen commcnist influence in
the armed forces. It exerted influence through government executive agen-
cies, in which the Communists were influential, through the National Front,
through party member c nmanders and indoctrination officers, as well as
through tt:e rank and file personnel, where the percentage of Communists
was higher than among command personnel.
Following the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in February
1948, the party was able fully to exercise its leadership role in the
edifice of state, including the army. First of all party organizations
were established, followed by a party political edifice in 1950, with the
same rights, obligations and operating principles as in the Soviet Army.
In practice the leadership role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in
military organizational development consists primarily in the following.
Every important matter pertaining to national defense is discussed and
settled with the direct and determining participation of the party and
under its supervision. The party formulates the military policy of the
state, that is the fundamental goals, directions and sequence of effort to
strengthen national defense capability; it organizes the selection, train-
ing and placement of cadres capable of implementing party policy in the
military area. Daily, purposeful party political effort in the troops,
effort aimed at mobilizing all armed forces personnel for successful im-
plementation of combat and political training plans as well as assimilation
of Marxist-Leninist ideology, is carried out under the supervision of party
executive bodies.
Military councils, one-man commanders, the armed forces political edifice
and youth organizations carry out party military policy under party super-
vision.
By consolidation of its leadership role, the party completed a struggle of
many years to win over the armed forces as an important instrument of
popular power and a component part of the socialist nation's edifice of'
government. Experience confirms that the specific forms assumed by the
party's leadership role may change, but the fundamental Leninist principles
of Communist Party guidance of the armed forces remain firm as long as
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there is a need for the existence of an army to defend the conquests of
socialism. In party leadership lies the guarantee that the armed forces
will always constitute a reliable bulwark of the peaceful policies of the
party and Czechoslovak government as well as trustworthy defenders of the
peaceful labors of our people and the peoples of the nations in the so-
cialist system., The principle of the party's leadership role in the army
constitutes a condition for implementation of the other principles, an
essential property of the socialist nature of an army of toilers, as well
as a guarantee that this army will always be a reliable instrument of the
domestic and foreign policy of the socialist state.
It is not surprising that the principle of the party's leadership role was
savagely attacked in 1968 by antisocialist elements in this country and
by opportunistic elements within the party. Strengthening of party
leadership constituted the basic content of the process of consolidation in
the armed forces following the establishment of the new party leadership.
The principle of socialist internationalism is closely linked with the
leading principle of the party's guiding role, Internationalism developed
simultaneously with the labor movement. The proletariat had to employ an
international unification and coordination of effort against an inter-
national force -- bourgeois cosmopolitanism and an exploiter alliance. In-
ternationalism became an inseparable part of Marxist-Leninist ideology,
an inseparable feature of all theoretical and practical activity by Marxist-
Leninist parties.
Following the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution proletarian
internationalism became one of the foundations in building the Red Army.
All peoples and nations of the USSR possess a single common military or-
ganization, identical rights and obligations to defend the socialist home-
land and its national interests; indoctrination of Soviet Armed Forces
personnel is organized in a spirit of friendship and brotherhood among the
peoples of the USSR, among the armies and toilers of the nations of the
socialist community, The Soviet people and its army, true to Lenin's
behests, see their patriotic and international duty in strengthening their
country's defense capability and in active support for peoples struggling
against imperialism and domestic reactionaries.
Following the example of the CPSU, the foreign policy of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party is an expression of a unity of national and international
interests pertaining to the country's defense. Our country has traditional-
ly based its security on bonds of alliance. Following the collapse of the
Versailles system and the betrayal at Munich, our foreign policy became
oriented once and for all towara an alliance with the Soviet Union, an
alliance based on a common struggle against German fascism. The victorious
socialist revol-ition in this country placed it on the solid foundation of
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a socialist societal and governmental system and Marxist-Leninist ideolo-
gy
With the forming of the world socialist system, socialist internationalism
became enriched with new content. At the present time one of the main
functions of the socialist nations is the strengthening of mutual friend-
ship, cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, political, cul-
tural areas and in the military area proper.
The Leninist idea of unified military efforts by the socialist nations in
combined, joint resistance against the intrigues of imperialism and reac-
tion is of enormous significance, particularly if one considers the in-
creased aggressiveness of imperialist circles and further development of
the military technological revolution, The integration of all resources of
the socialist nations is an objective necessity for societal development.
This idea was implemented by establishing a defensive alliance of the
socialist nations -- the Warsaw Pact and the Joint Command, which increased
the defense capabilities of the socialist nations, whose defensive might is
concentrated primarily in the military potential of the USSR,
Political, economic, cultural and military cooperation has been reinforced
by bilateral treat~es between individual pairs of socialist nations. The
treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between Czecho-
slovakia and the USSR, which was concluded in May 1970, proceeds from the
position that friendship with the USSR constitutes a historically-proven
necessity. It takes into #.ccount the increased capability for cooperation
in comparison with that which could be foreseen by the 1943 treaty.
These thoughts were summarized by Gustav Husak in his address on the
occasion of the signing of this treaty. "The treaty which we have signed,"
he stated, "fully takes into consideration those changes in the world
which have taken place in the last 25 years and reflects the strengthened
position of socialism in the world and a higher level of Czechoslovak-
Soviet relations. The text of the treaty is in conformity with the prin-
ciples of proletarian internationalism, on which is based a new type of
relations which have developed among the socialist nations, Every word in
this document attests to the fact that we are aware of our great respon-
sibility for the results of our joint efforts in building communism as well
as for its development and defense,"
Comrade Husak noted thereby one of the fundamental aspects of our military
policy, deriving from our alliance obligations and from the needs and in-
terests of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Its implementation fosters
the process of integration within the world socialist community, its
progressive development, the lessening of international tension, and gives
a guarantee of security to Czechoslovakia under all possible conditions of
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the European situation. Thus we have expressed simultaneously the fun-
damental aspect of organizational development of our armed forces and in-
doctrination of armed forces personnel.
In addition to the sociopolitical principles employed in Czechoslovak
People's Army organizational development, we also apply such organizational
principles as the principle of a regular cadre army, the principle of ore-
man command, the principle of strict discipline, centralism and, finally,
the principle of continuous improvement in army organizational structure,
harmonious development of services and arms, and strengthening of continu-
ous combat readiness in conformity with the demands and prospects of im-
provement in contemporary military affairs and the tasks of defending the
socialist homeland and the conquests of socialism.
The organizational and sociopolitical principles of army organizational
development are carried out in a close interlink and unity. Their
separation from one another is alien to the Leninist approach to arui?,d
forces organizational development and in practice leads to harmful one-
sidedness and deviations. Only in their unity do they reflect the
char acter?of the socialist army. Lenin considered unity of political and
special military leadership to be an extremely important principle of
party military policy, which must be fully observed in the course of armed
forces organizational development.
In proceeding to build a new army, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had at
its disposal the experience of the Soviet Army, wh_ch had been tested in
the conflagration of the Great Patriotic War. Because of this our party
was able to avoid the complex process of seeking correct solutions -long
unexplored paths. The Soviet experience, which our army and the armies of
the other socialist nations have utilized, has accumulated achievements in
the area of organizing a modern socialist army.
Of course we are not dealing with a mc-chanical but rather an innovative
application and simultaneously t?sting of the effect of generalized
princ;' ples. Socialist military science receives an important argument in
confirmation of the viability of Leninist ideas in the area of military
organizational development and their international strength.
The international effect of the Leninist principles of organizational
development of an army of a new type is stressed in a book by Soviet
investigators entitled V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennvye 'ily (V. I.
Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces). This book states: "Within the frame-
work of the world socialist system experience has been amassed in
establishing armed forces under the most varied historical conditions...
Know-how in socialist military organizational development under present-
day conditions is the result of collective efforts by the CPSU and the
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brother parties of the nations of the socialist community. It is of great
importance both for the socialist nations proper and for those peoples
which will be struggling for socialism in the future. Mutual study of
experience and know-how has always been one of th a most valuable traditions
of Communist and Worker Parties. Lenin drew attention tc this time and
again, stressing that 'complete socialism' is created 'from the revolu-
tionary collaboration of proletarians of all nations.' Collective ex-
perience and know-how contains everything of value and significance which
is of general and common interest, which is of instructional value for
other countries and peoples. This also applies in full measure to
experience in military organizational development. "3
The Czechoslovak Communist Party highly regards mutual cooperation and
exchange of experience and know-how among socialist countries in the area
of military organizational development and is persistently campaigning for
further strengthening and development of this cooperation.
1. Klec.ent Gotval'd: Izbrannyye proizvedeniya (Collected Writings), Volume
1, Gospolitizdat, 1957, pp 127-128.
2. It received the designation Kosice because the Czachoslovak government
which adopted this program convened for the first time on 5 April 1945
in the city of Kosice (East Slovakia).
3. V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily (V. I. Lenin and the Soviet
Armed Forces) , Second, enlarged edition, Voyen zdat, 1969, pp 401-402.
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MILITARY SCIENCE CONFERENCES -- AN IMPORTANT FORM OF MILITARY SCIENCE WORK
Col A. Tonkikh, Candidate of Military Science
Science is playing an important role in Implementation of the historic
resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress. Science constitutes a powerful.
accelerating force for technological, economic and social progress and is
an essential condition for strengthening the defense capability of the
Soviet state. The tasks specified in the Congress Directives on the Ninth
Five-Year Plan include all-out development of basic and applied scientific
research and faster adoption of research results in the economy, with
stronger ties between science and production.
Soviet military science plays an important role in raising the level of
armed forces combat readiness ane in strengthening our country's defense
might. Military science is called upon, in conjunction with other sci-
ences, to inv/'.stigate thoroughly the laws and ?.iature of a future war, the
principles and method: of conducting war and military operations, and to
elaborate the most acceptable structure of armed forces organization,
forms and methods of personnel training and indoctrination.
Minister of Defense Mar SU A. A. Grechko stressed the particular importance
of these problems in a speech delivered in October of this year at a con-
ference of USSR Armed Forces ideological workers, HR noted in particular
that in connection with the steady improvement of the technological base
of the armed forces, "we must even more deeply and comprehensively
elaborate methods of conducting the engagement, operatioc, and war as a
whole, as well as problems pertaining to the further improvement of our
military organization." The defense minister also pointed to the great
importance and significance of mastering scientific methods of troop con-
trol on the basis of new technical devices and training of personnel for
modern combat operations.
Armed. Forces military science cadres as well as line officers, general
officers and admirals are being called upon to achieve successful solution
to these and other problems; di'rersified forms of military scientific
effort are being extensively employed.
Military scientific conferences constitute one of the most effective forms
of this effort. At military scientific conference it is possible to
discuss comprehensively, profoundly and productively the most vital prob-
lems of the art of war and miltkary organizational development as well as
other problems deriving from practical combat and operational training.
Extensive participation in these conferences of prominent military c.om--
manders, experienced officers, general officers and admirals, teaching
faculty of higher military training institutions and staff of scientific.
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research establishments makes it possible tea examine and gain a thorough
understanding of the results of military scientific research, theoretical
and practical problems of troop operational and combat training, critically
to evaluate various points of view on various problems, to elaborate
unified views and to offer appropriate recommendations which can be rapidly
adopted in practical troop and staff training and utilized in the activities
of scientific research establishments and organizations. "This unity of
views," stated M, V. Frunze, "which should create in the army a unity of
thought and will, transforming it into a powerful, strongly-knit organiza-
tion, is an essential prerequisite for planned indoctrination and training
effort."
Promising items connected with further development of weapons, improvement
in troop organizational-personnel structure, etc can also be discussed at
a military scientific conference,
Field manuals, military regulations, guidelines, teaching methods manuals
and other official documents regulating armed forces routine and combat
activity can be prepared on the basis of the proceedings of military sci-
entific conferences
The success of any military scientific conference depends on comprehensive
and careful preparation. It is very important first and foremost precisely
to define iti topic and objective, proceeding on the basis of the funda-
mental tasks facing the armed forces as a whole, the services and arms,
military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and air defense districts at
a given stage of combat training in the current year, as well as long-term
prospects for development of military theory and practice,
Military scientific conferences can be devoted to a forthcoming or past
(experimental, research, etc) exercise. In the former case the opportunity
is presented to examine more thoroughly matters which must be studied and
verified during the course of the exercise, and in the latter case it is
possible to summarize the exercise and draft practical recommendations on
methods of conducting combat operations which are most suitable and ac-
ceptable for line units.
In determining the subject of a military scientific conference one should
bear in mind that such a conference usually runs 2-3 days, and sometimes
less. Therefore in orderto obtain extensive coverage of the topic it is
necessary to introduce for discussion one or several items of maximum
theoretical and practical value.
The subject matter of military scientific conferences can be determined by
senior commanders in order to achieve more expedient and comprehensive
solution to the major problems of military theory and practice. The useful-
ness and expediency of such a method has been given practical confirmation.
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For example, in 1970 theoretical orientation was specified for military
scientific conferences of services, military districts, groups of forces,
air defense districts and fleets. At conferences of the armed forces
branches the keynote addresses were delivered by prominent military com-
manders, who presented for discussion a number of new problems in the area
of strategy, operational art and tactics. During discussion of these prob-
lems much useful advice was given and recommendations presented, aimed at
further increasing troop combat readiness and fighting efficiency, improve-
ment of methods of organization and conduct of military operations, as well
as increased effectiveness of troop control.
The general objective of a conference consists as a rule not only in
discussing current problems of the art of warfare but also in elaborating
unified views on them, specifying the most effective means and methods of
implementing final conclusions in practical troop training.
It is extremely important correctly to determine the list of conference
participants. Of course they should possess fundamental training and
preparation in the area of military theory and should possess experience in
personnel training and indoctrination. It is also necessary, however, to
involve promising young officers, particularly those who are innovatively
and inquisitively seeking new forms and methods of troop training and are
intelligently employing them in their practical activities.
Also meriting serious attention is determination of conference scheduling,
In principle it is advisable that scheduling be handled by senior commars;
This will help avoid the scheduling of conferences simultaneously by
various headquarters and establishments, consequently creating favorable
conditions for participation by representatives of interested organizations.
After the subject and problems to be discussed have been determined, as
well as the schedule and participants, a detailed schedule of events is
prepared, which specifies the subject of the keynote address, other
addresses and papers and a deadline date when all materials must be ready.
Experience indicates that preparation of the keynote address is f'- he most
difficult task in the preparation period (and sometimes preparation of
supporting reports and even some addresses). This job begins with the
drafting of a detailed structural plan, and if enough time is available,
an extensive content outline as well, specifying the main items to be con-
tained in the report.
This keynote address or report should be based on the results of the
latest theoretical research and practical operational combat training. It
should not be overloaded with well-known statements from guideline docu-
ments, works on military theory, materials from the mill*ary periodical
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press, etc. They should be utilized only as initial data for subsequent
development of a given theoretical thesis, and in some cases for corrobora-
tion of certain lines of thought. Many useful ideas for preparing this
address can be drawn from the experience of the Great Patriotic War as well
as from local war:. which the imperialists have initiated in recent years.
Judging from experience, a high scientific-theoretical level of the keynote
address and its profound content are ensured primarily by involving in
its preparation a team of the most highly-qualified officers, general of-
ficers and admirals. A thorough discussion of important items is achieved
when the drafting of the address is supervised by the commander who will
present it at the conference. It is advisable to send an abstract of the
keynote address in advance to conference participants, These should con-
stitute brief summaries and should encompass essentially results obtained
in the course of theoretical research and practical army and navy training.
They must also formulate concrete conclusions and proposals and specify
which require more thorough and comprehensive discussion, Experience in-
dicates that this enables participants to prepare more thoroughly for dis-
cussion of problems advanced and ensures a productive debate during the
course of the conference. Unfortunately, sometimes resumes of the keynote
address are sent out at an extremely late date, and sometimes are not sent
out at all,
n':-ring the preparation period the senior officer who is organizing the con-
ference should exercise continuous supervision over his executing personnel,
offering them assistance in working on the most important and difficult
matters and ensuring prompt preparation of materials,
One of the fundamental conditions for achieving thorough presentation of
vital problems of the art of war and elaboration of the most expedient
actions by armed forces branches and arms is extensive utilization in
preparing for military scientific conferences of the latest research
methods (including with the aid of computers), and advances in the fields
of mathematics, cybernetics, psychology, physiology, and educational
science. Mathematical methods of operations research with the aid of com-
puters reduce the time required to prepare the requisite calculations,
ensure improved argumentation of advanced theses, assist in more deeply
comprehending the essence of the processes and phenomena under examination,
and make it possible to reveal new laws, patterns, and relationships in
the development of the art of war,
Great importance is acquired by the ability of conference participants to
elaborate in a mathematically correct manner the large quantities of data
acquired in the army and navy on tactic:; of various forces and techniques
of weapons utilization in a specific situation.
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Comprehensive and qualified analysis of statistical data promotes success-
ful solution of many vital problems pertaining to the art of war, revela-
tion of the relationships and patterns of utilization of branches and arms
in modern warfare, as well as detailed elaboration and timely revision of
various points of field manuals, regulations, guidelines and other funda-
mental documents defining the activities of troops, fleets, staffs and mili-
tary establishments in peacetime and in time of war,
It is the pix ssianal and party duty of command personnel, as well as staffs,
political entities and party organizations to do everything possible to
promote personnel mastery of modern, advanced research methods,
The success of further development of the art of war depends in large mea-
sure on the degree to which problems examined at military scientific con-
ferences are coordinated with ideological effort, which is of great impor-
tance for development of the finest Soviet Army and Navy fighting traditions
and which promotes indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of excellent
patriotism and total dedication to the communist cause, This is accompanied
by a broadening of the military horizons and knowledge of officers, general
officers and,admirals, opportunities for them to master history and theory
of the art of war, with elaboration of the skills of an innovative approach
to solving the most varied practical problems.
In April 1970, as is well known, a jubilee scientific conference was held
in Moscow, dedicated to the Lenin Birth Centennial, a conference which con-
stituted an important event in the overall effort to prepare the armed
forces for this signal holiday. Assessing the significance of this con-
ference, Minister of Defense Mar SU A. A. Grechko stated that the con-
ference "has the task of even more deeply revealing the inexhaustible
wealth of Lenin's military theory legacy and his diversified practical ac-
tivities in the area of military organizational development, as well as the
task of contributing to further improvement of ideological-theoretical and
military training of our cadres.,"
The methods of conducting militi?4 scientific conferences may vary. In
recent years two methods have won widespread recognition: with the first
method, all items are discussed at a general session; with the second
method, the keynote address or report is first presented at a plenary ses-
sion, after which subsequent discussion and work is conducted in smaller
sections.
One advantage of the first method consists in the fact that each conferee
has the opportunity to hear the opinions of others and to express his own
opinion on all items on the agenda, With this method, however, relatively
few individi?als have the opportunity to speak. With the other variant,
whereby the. members of each section discuss during the allocated time only
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those items pertaining to the specialization of the section, a much larger
number of individuals have the opportunity to express their views, while
the adopted recommendations as a rule will be more specific and well-sub-
stantiated,
In each individual case methods of conducting the conferences depend on the
topic and scope of the problems to be discussed, the quantitative and
qualitative structure of participants, time available and other factors.
For example, in examining a complex topic it is advisable to employ the
plenary session-section method, that is the conference begins with a
plenary session for presentation of the keynote address or report, after
which the individual sections go to work; the conference is concluded with
another plenary session, at which the section recommendations are discussed
If the keynote address was examined in advance by the conference partici-
pants, work can begin immediately with its discussion.
During the course of debate there should be no restriction to examination
of the items advanced merely to the area of theory. Depending on the
topic and aims of the conference, one can discuss new methods of troop
operations (or new development in training methodology) which are employed
in a practical manner, followed by the elaboration of concensus views,
In recent years joint military scientific conferences have been held by
higher military training institutions and headquarters of various large
units. Such conferences, for example, have been held by the Military
Academy imeni M, V. Frunze, Armored Troops Academy imeni Mar SL R. Ya. Ma-
linovskiy, and the Military Political Academy imeni V. I, Lenin, Ex-
perience indicates that they exert a positive influence on the development
of operational art and tactics and make it possible more fully and
thoroughly to resolve practical problems, at the same time enriching mili-
tary heory.
We should note that the results of military theory conferences depend in
large measure on the degree to which there is secured the possibility of
free exchange of ideas, presentation of new opinions, critical statements,
with the establishment of a friendly, productive atmosphere. In holding
conferences one should not ignore any "minor matters"; it is essential
thoroughly to comprehend and analyze each and every proposal and recom-
mendation. Following discussion of each theoretical question or problem
as a whole, conclusions should be drawn, which will promote further improve-
ment in armed forces combat readiness and fighting efficiency, the level of
their operational and combat training, and assis t in the productive
activities of scientific research establishments and military training
institutions,
After conferences are over there is organized the study and synthesis of
conference proceedings, in order to ensure that useful conclusions and
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recommendations are communicated to the troops, fleets and headquarters,
and utilized in their practical training. This is an extremely important
phase of the overall operation. Therefore the command personnel who
organize a conference should exercise personal supervision over synthesis
of the conference materials and prompt practical adoption in the training
and indoctrination of army and navy personnel.
Military scientific conferences devoted to current problems of military
theory and practice are thus an effective means of further development of
the art of war. When well organized, they help reach a solution to many
problems which are of great importance for increasing armed forces combat
readiness and fighting efficiency and strengthening of this country's
defensive might in conformity with the demands of the 24th CPSU Congress.
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OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AS THE MAIN CRITERION FOR THE QUALITY OF TROOP
CONTROL
Lt Col B. Vaysma.,
An analysis of the results of field exercises, c o mm a n d- s t a f f
e x e r c i s 'e s and war games as well as the experience and results of
research efforts in line units and at military scientific establishments
very strongly confirm that careful attention is being devoted to modern
theory and practice of troop control and that they have become a most
important subject of extensive scientific invest:'.gaticz and continuous
improvement, The logical process of increasing concentration of effort in
the area of troop control is dictated on the one hand by a steady increase
in the quantity and scope of measures carried out by control entities and
on the other hand by the increasingly shrinking time during which these
measures must be carried out. Thus we are faced with two conflicting ten-
dencies, which make troop control one of the most important problems of
modern theory and practice of warfare. Further improvement of troop con-
trol has become a most important task of contemporary military art.
Today the effectiveness of troop ccmbat operations depends to a significant
degree on quality of troop control. As is well known, a full assessment of
control effectiveness can be given only on the basis of results of combat
operations. This approach to assessment of control is incontestable: since
control is aimed at the performance of combat missions, its quality should
he assessed on the basis of the results of combat operations. Nor is there
any doubt about the fact that tilis is the most sensitive and objective
criterion of the quality of control and its effectiveness as a whole. Such
an assessment of control, however, can be obtained only after troops carry
out those combat operations the organization of which comprised the basic
content of control.
Utilization of this criterion in determining effectiveness of control in
the process of troop and control entity training under peacetime conditions
involves even greater difficulties, since engagement or operation models
constructed at troop and command-staff exercises cannot fully and precisely
reflect the real conditions of the contemporary engagement (operation). In
addition, before obtaining the concrete results of an engagement (operation)
it is important to know whether control corresponds to the battle plan and
consequently to the prevailing situation conditions.
Therefore particular significance is acquired by the possibility of assess-
ing the quality of troop control during the course of battle, in the
process of control proper, that is the possibility of focusing control en-
tities on certain specific indicators which would enable one to determine
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whether or n-ot,-control corresponds to the demands imposed on Ic by the
conditions of the contemporary d:ilagement (operation). These demand, are
well known. They include: conl:.ir.iuity, firmness, flexibility, efficiency
and secrecy of control. All these are factors which determine the quality
of troop control.
The most promising method of assessing quality of troop control in the
process of control will be that one which Is based on utilization of a
criterion which is sufficiently sensitive to all demands imposed on troop
control. Operational efficiency of troop control could constitute such a
criterion. Therefore we shall examine this term in greater detail and
shall determin?~ what relationships e::ist between efficiency and the other
demands imposed on troop control (continuity, firmness, flexibility),
Fulfa llment of each of these demands 's closely incerlinked with fulfull-
ment of another or all other demands imposed cn troop control. It does
not require any special examiur-cion to see that in order to ensure opera-
tional efficien^y of control it is also mandatorily necessary to carry out
the majority of measures directed at achieving continuity, secrecy, firm-
ness and flexibility of troop co.,,trol.
Thus fulfillment of the demands of continuity, firmness, flexibility and
.,ecrecy in implementing troop control is inseparably linked with the
achievement of operational efficiency. To these demands we should add
substantiation of decisions.
In connection with the above we assume that there is no need to advance
a great number of demands in an assessment of control quality. Otherwise
it would be impossible to obtain an unambiguous assessment. There should
be one demand -- operational efficiency of control, while it is more
advisable to view all the others -- continuity, firmness, flexibility and
others -- as a component complex of mandatory indicators in control which
ensure its operational efficiency.
Consequently, operational efficiency of control can sei:ve as a criterion
in determining quality of troop control.
Attempts by many authors and teams of investigators to find a criterion
(or criteria) for a quantitative expression of quality of troop control
will in our opinion acquire greater purposefulness and of ectiveness if
efforts in this area will be concentrated precisely on quantitative expres-
sion of operational efficiency of control, which most closely and precisely
reflects quality of troop control as a whole.
One feature of the present-day role and content of operational efficiency
in troop control consists i. the fact that while in the pac - we spoke
primarily-of efficiency of stLff operations or of an entire control entity,
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today we apply the term "operational, efficiency" [operativnost'] to a sys-
tem of troop control as a whole. The. latter substantially broadens the
definition of operational efficiency and carries it beyond the time frame-
work of staff operations alone, placing operational efficiency of control
in relation to the time during which accomplishment of the requisite volume
of work in control entities as well as preparation of troops for combat
operations are achieved, and most importantly, a lead is gained on the
enemy in various actions, and troop actions correspond to the decision and
the prevailing situation on the basis of which the decision w.s made,
One cannot help but note, however, a confusing and sometimes identical
utilization of the terms "operational efficiency of control" and "efficien-
cy of operations of a staff or control entity as a whole," which is still
encountered in some studies and in military practice, A systems approach
to the problem of operational efficiency of troop control as well as an
analysis of the results of staff research efforts in a number of districts
attest to the fact tl'at operational efficiency of control and efficiency
of staff operations (or a control entity - a whole) are nonidentical terms.
Efficiency of staff operations is definitely composed of quantitative and
qualitative indicators of performance of those tasks which are specified
by the appropriate regulations or manual, One readily notes, however, that
most of these tasks involve the operations not only of the staff proper but
also those of other secti..ns (departments, services) of the entire control
entity, as well as the performance of subordinate and supporting subunit
and unit headquarters, and particularly intelligence entities.
A delayed (lengthy) decision-making process may reduce the operational
efficiency of staff performance (although the process in large measure
depends on efficiency). The most businesslike, smoothly-operating and
well-trained headquarters staff will be unable to achieve operational
efficiency in its perfcrmance if too much time is spent on decision-making
and if the decision-ma'.cing method dies not provide for the possibility of
parallel operations by headquarters at several control levels. In addition,
headquarters staff performance depends on the capabilities of utilized
control means, the capabilities and effectiveness of work done by intel-
ligence-gathering entities and command posts located directly in the combat
formations of the troops conducting the combat operations. They supply
higher control entities with situation data the character and prompt
delivery of which determine promptness of control entity response to
changes in the operational-tactical situation.
Thus operational efficiency of troop control is a broader concept than
efficiency of headquarters staff operations, both in content and in scope
of basic components included within the concept of "control. system."
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Bearing the above in mind, we believe that an assessment of the quality of
troop control can find quantitative expression, not only to a "certain
degree," as Engr-Col N. Bazanov1 emphasizes in his article, but totaliy,
in the efficiency and effectiveness of decisions.
A number of recently-published studies acknowledge a formula which ex-
presses the conditions of operational efficiency of control in the form
Tco`Tcr? Here control time Tco is the sum total of times T1, T2 and T3,
which respectively represent the time of collection and processing of
operational-tactical information and transmission of commands to the line
units for execution; critical time Tcr is that minimum time within which
all requisite troop control measures must be carried out.
It is precisely with consideration of the specified relationship between
operational efficiency of control and Tco that the Bazanov article con-
cludes that operational efficiency of control should be defined as the
capability of a system to carry out troop control processes as quickly as
possible. The author also presents a mathematical egression of control
efficiency
1
Qco=T
co
that is the smaller Tco, the greater the operational efficiency of control.
At first glance everything seemed quite logical, but as Engr-Col Ye.
Dashevskiy2 quite correctly notes, efficiency of control is characterized
not so much by the high speed of the control system as by promptness in
accomplishment of the assigned task, We should modify that to read
promptness of assignment of combat missions, since it is precisely this
fact which first and foremost determines promptness of accomplishment of
assigned missions.
At the same time a correct approach to defining the term "promptness of
performance of tasks or measures by control entity" is of considerable im-
portance. In most cases promptness is considered in comparison with a
critical time,3 after which earlier planned troop actions become ineffec-ci
or impossible. The question arises, however, of how one should define
duration of critical time. Replies to this question bear the most con-
flicting interpretations. We know that Tcr is not a constant value. Its
value. is determined not only by the nature of the operational-tactical
situation but also by when, at what moment in time the control entity
received operational-tactical information and particularly information on
the enemy.
As a rule data on the enemy which result in refinement of troop missions
for a new decision come to the control entity when factor Tcr has already
gone into effect and is operating. This is confirmed both by the mobility
53
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of time frame Tcr and the considerable complei:ity of determining its dura-
tion. Consequently the problem reduces to determining the critical time
value (Tcr) with maximum accuracy.
In practice the commander's situation assessment always terminates with
connlusions the value of which is in direct proportion to the accuracy and
substantiation of data on the time which the enemy will require to carry
out his intentions, In fact this is nothing other than determination of
that critical time whose duration controls both the pace of staff opera-
tions and the conditions for achieving operational efficiency of troop
control as a whole,
Thus to determine critical time (Tcr) means to determine that time limit
which will be used to assess control under given conditions from the
standpoint of operational efficiency. This will provide the requisite
results of purposeful operation of the entire control system and to a
certain degree will predetermine success in achieving operational efficien-
cy of troop control,
More attention must be devoted in the periodical press and in practical
staff training not only to the search for means and methods of reducing
time Ti, T2, and T3, but also to methodology of determining critical time.
In order to establish value Tcr it is necessary to possess data on the
capabilities of the enemy's control system, for knowledge of at least mean
approximate statistics in tte enemy's area of control is just as essential
as knowledge of standard time for control operations in one's own control
system. Sometimes staffs interpolate their own time expenditures to
analogous actions by the enemy. But this approach of course cannot claim
computational accuracy.
Another important aspect which must be considered in solving the problem of
operational effi-iency of control is the comprehensive nature of this prob-
lem, which is dictated by the necessity of determining the most diverse
qualitative and quantitative indices, each of which can acquire primary im-
portance, depending on the situation.
For example, in order for headquarters to collect information on the enemy
it is necessary for the primary source of this information (within the
control system) to possess it, that is it is necessary for the manpower and
means of all types of reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering to meet
the demands of promptness of acquisition of intelligence, Obviously the
sooner reconnaissance data reach the control entity the greater the
critical time can be, and consequently the easier it will be to achieve
operational efficiency in troop control. Of course organization of the
reconnaissance effort applies to the area of control, but securement of
promptness in acquisition of reconnaissance data is also a special,
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technical problem and in many instances goes beyond the framework of the
troop control system.
We should note that in solving the problem of operational efficiency there
may occur factors which cannot be described either by quantitative or even
by qualitative i.idices. We know, for example, that operational-tactical.
information constantly flows into headquarters, but in incomplete batches,
and it is not always the case that the situation abruptly changes throiigh-
out an entire sector or along the entire front simultaneously, The com-
mander's skill consists in promptly choosing, in the course of constant
change in situation details, that moment when it. is necessary either to
refine assigned missions or to make a new decision. This is the function
of man alone; no presently-existing automated system can perform this
function. Consequently it is possible to possess a sufficiently reliable
and rapidly-functioning automated control system, but if there is delayed
response in situation assessment we shall not achieve operational ef-
ficiency in control.
Thus nonformalized factors also occur in the problem of operational effi-
ciency of control, that is.,factors which are not amenable at present to
rigorous quantitative evaluation, These are also matters connected both
with the collection of information which is of v a 1 u.e at the given moment
in time and with decision-making, for at the present time we do not
possess reliable statistics on time expended on these measures.
Not only presently-employed mathematical methods and computer' hardware but
future automated control systems as well will be unable to solve this
problem; they merely facilitate man's work in a control system, effecting
transmission, storage and processing of information. At the present time
man alone can fully synthesize this information and make decisions; the
possibility of future improvement of efficiency of control depends on the
success of future efforts directed at optimizing man's productive activity
in the control system.
One important aspect of man's creative activities in a control system and
particularly in solving problems of .control efficiency is his practical
prediction ability. It is usually the routine prediction activities by the
commander and his staff which make up for that gap which as a rule occurs
in a combat situation when there is a deficiency of information. Improve-
ment in the art of situation prediction cannot be effective with a one-
sided operational-tactical approach to this important problem of man's
creative activity. Here we again need a comprehensive approach which
encompa:.es a broad range of efforts in various scientific areas, from
military psychology to heuristic programming in military cybernetics.
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At the present time control of the control entity itself also remains an
unformalized f actor in the problem of operational efficiency of troop
control. Of primary importance here is organization of control effort in
the control entity, Experience in staff training indicates that organiza-
tion cannot be limited to some one-time measure, plan or permanent in-
structions and orders. 0;: ganization of labor in the control entity is not
a measure but rather a continuous process which should begin before the
control entity receives the combat mission and should continue until such
time as the troops accomplish that mission.
Today, when the present military technological revolution has made and
continues to make substantial changes in the conditions and process of
troop control, special importance for solving this problem is assumed by
a rigorously scientific, quantitative and logical substantiation of those
work methods which can be utilized by control entities under present-day
conditions.
Increased troop maneuverability, the highly dynamic nature and swiftness
of the modern engagement, rapid and frequent situation changes dictate
a rapid "obsolescence" of operational- taci:ical information reaching the
control entities. The principal task of :ommanders and staffs at all
echelons is to make a well-founded decision, to communicate missions to
the troops and to secure their execution before there is a change in the
situation on the basis of which the decision was made, Fulfillment of
this condition essentially comprises the basis of operational efficiency
of troop control.
Thus operational efficiency as a criterion of quality of troop control
should be defined as ; combination of quantitative and qualitative in-
dicators in a control system whereby total conformity is achieved between
the operational-tactical situation, the adopted decision and troop combat
operations.
One must approach the problem of operational efficiency of control as a
complex and comprehensive problem, encompassing items of an operational-
tactical and methodological character, as well as all those aspects of ac-
tivity which constitute the object of investigation by Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, military cybernetics, psychology and logic.
1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 12, 1969, page 33.
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2. Ibid., No 2, 1971, page 65.
3. I. Anureyev and A. Tatarchenko: Primeneaiye matematicheskikh metodov
v voyennom dele (Employment of Mathematical Methods in Military
Affairs), Voyenizdat, 1967,
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ON THE METHODS OF INFLUENCING AN OPPONENT'S DECISIONS
Maj Gen Arty M. Ionov, Docent, Candidate of Military Science
In recent months various aspects of the problem of troop control and
automation of troop control have been examined in the journal Voyennaya
Mysl'.1 We feel that it would be useful to focus attention on one as-
pect of the general problem of control, connected with influencing an
opponent's will and mind when that opponent is making decisions in
the course of preparing for and conducting combat operations.2
Selection of methods of such influence and purposeful implementa-
tion of the requisite complex of measures, taking into account not only
achieved results but also analogous meajsures performed by the opposing
side, comprise a complex process.
M. N. Tukhachevskiy noted: "...Actions are genuinely governed only by
that side which achieves their development in conformity with a plan,
and this means that genuine control of a combat engagement should con-
stitute control of the entire process of combat, that is not only of
one's own actions but to a certain degree the actions of the opponent
as well, forced upon him by our actions... The art of control in com-
bat demands an understanding of this complex, conflictive process."3
In order to exercise control over an opponent's actions the following
primary items are essential: penetration of the enemy's intentions
and plans, skilled conduct of combat, precise execution of one's own
decisions and plans, and seizure of the initiative. The generals of
antiquity stated that he who fights well controls his opponent and
does not permit him to control himself.
In warfare control of an opponent's actions is achieved by deluding
the enemy as to one's own intentions, capability, state and actions of
troops% concealment of their actual position, by means of dummy, decoy,
feinting actions; seizure of the initiative, manifestation of persistance
and military pressure, a bold varying of combat techniques, and bold
actions. One of the most important conditions for such control is
discovery of the enemy's plan and intentions. As Machiavelli put it,
nothing makes a general greater than discovery of the enemy's plans.
A commander, elucidating on the basis of reconnaissance data the
spatial and functional correlations of the enemy's troop dispositions
(combat formation, designation of its constituent: parts and their
links), predicting spatial-temporal characteristics and the dynamics
of their development (combat capability, mobility, and maneuverability),
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in determining the opponent's plan should establish what'"correlations
between his elements the latter has incl,ded particularly for the pur-
pose of delusion and concealment of plan (dummy fortifications and
targets, phony communications traffic, revelation of one portion of actual
communications and concealment of another, etc). Incomplete,
frequently contradictory and delayed information on the enemy,
reflecting only a past condition, makes it difficult to determine his
intentions. The commander must mentally put himself in his opponent's
position in order better to grasp the latter's plan.
One can cause the enemy to make and execute a decision which is
favorable to us (herein lies the essence of control of the opponent's
actions) with various methods: by applying the pressure of force,
by the opponent forming an estimate of the initial situation,
requisite objectives and specified procedure (algorithm) of decision-
making which is favorable to us, and by influencing the choice of
decision-making moment. One can also classify techniques of controlling
an opponent's actions on the basis of these methods. Their distribu-
tion among the specified groppss, however, cannot be very rigorous,
since some techniques permit the exercise of multiple influence (for
example, on estimate of :initial situation and objective forming, choice
of decision-making moment: and forming of estimate of initial situa-
tion, as well as other combinations of methods). We shall briefly
examine their content.
Power pressure includes those techniques whicnr are the most easily
recognized. A show of force in one form or another (force blackmail,
demonstration of numbers or weapons, etc) is aimed at influencing the
psychological state of the decision-maker and forming in his mind the
primary objective of avoiding combat. Consequently the techniques
in this group a-e linked with the techniques of shaping the opponent's
objective. Somewhat to the side stands reconnaissance in force, the
principal aim of which is to establish the ccnnection between elements
in the enemy's system, to determine the weak and strong points of his
organization. This technique, however, can also be utilized for
collateral attainment of other aims.
Power pressure linked with utilization of excessive forces will aim
primarily at intimidating an opponent, and in certain cases at
applying psychological pressure to one's ally. For example, during
World War II the relatively small English city of Coventry was bombed
by approximately 500 German airplanes (the Nazis even invented a
special term -- "coventrization"). A similar act of savagery were the
Anglo-American raids on Dresden in February 1945, involving the par-
ticipation of approximately 3200 aircraft. The atomic bombing of the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 had no strategic
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purpose; they were "addressed" to a U.S. ally, the Soviet ?eople,
that is it was an act of "blackmail of force." Power pressure and
blackmail can be of a less obvious nature as well, carried out in the
form of various threats (deliberate show of force, new type; of weapons,
threat of unleashing a nuclear war, etc).
The group of techniques of shaping the enemy's initial situation
estimate includes techniques connected both with tactical camouflage
(display or concealment of actual installations, construction of
dummy installations, display of one installation to look like another,
dissemination of false information) and with. utilization of means
of "instantaneous" and abrupt change in the initial situation (surprise
utilization of new combat techniques and weapons), which in turn
affect the choice of decision-making moment.
This group of techniques can be revealed to one degree or another with
the aid of technical intelligence-gathering devices. For example,
utilization of absorbing coatings is discovered by determining the
geometry of the target object with analysis of the reflected signal
spectrum.
The group of techniques of shaping the opponent's objectives is recog-
nized with great difficulty. This requires of the commander con-
siderable intellect, intuition and experience, logical thinking,
thorough knowledge of military history, ideology, military doctrine, in-
doctrination procedures, and the individual peculiarities of enemy
command personnel.
Some techniques can be revealed onl?t after a considerable amount of
effort of a scientific research type. The following example is notable
in this respect. U.S. Air Force leaders, substantiating a request for
funds to develop a new low-altitude attack aircraft, emphasized that
the USSR would have to spend approximately 21 billion dollars over a
period of 5 years in order to improve air defense to cope with the
new aircraft, while organization of air defense without the necessity
of countering the performance of the new aircraft (as part of a program
of continuous upgrading) would require, in the opinion of the Americans,
an expenditure of only 6 billion dollars during the same period.
Although the U.S. Secretary of Defense did not approve the request,
he ordered development of certain assemblies and the engine for this air-
craft. `'
Objective-shaping techniques are realized through the psychology of the
decision-making commander. They are more difficult to spot, and for
this reason they are more insidious and dangerous than techniques of
power pressure or techniques of shapin, nitial situation estimate.
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A commander's thinking during the process of solving problems of troop
control is based primarily on the deductive method. He draws his con-
clusions, particularly in determining the opponent's plan, as a rule
on the basis of incomplete, fragmentary, frequently contradictory
data, utilizing not only direct information but various indirect in-
dications as well.
Neutralization of enemy deduction presupposes the conduct of combat
operations according to a plan whereby their objective cannot be
discovered at least until the final stage of the operation, that is
the enemy should see in the actions a large number of possible
variants, all of which, in spite of their diversity, should be more
or less e ually probable. For example, movement of a large number
of hostile aircraft into an area which does not contain
air defense installations but which does open-up routes to two or three im-
portant areas faces commanders with a difficult logical problem of
determining the opponents real intentions. The selection of a
minor strategic axis, containing several important targets, enriches
and enhances the value of a plan of operations by compelling the
opponent to scatter his forces for defense.
Neutralization of the opponent's deduction, increasing the uncertainty
of our intentions, on the one hand makes it more difficult for the
opponent to shape the objectives of his actions, an(; on the other
hands disrupts the algorithm (sequence) oL his decision-making, requir-
ing additional effort and more time to reach a well-founded decision.
The group of techniques of shaping the opponent's decision-making algo-
rr.'thm requires su'stantial expenditure of effort, particularly the
technique of regular conduct of strategic-scale exercises on one !) ian
with the aim of decisive actions on another plan which sharply di,' '--r
from the training exercise.
Techniques influencing choice of decision-making moment are of partic-
ular significance to air defense troops conducting combat operations
under conditions of a rapidly changing situation. Choice of moment to
launch a sudden attack and utilization of a shortage of time for
decision-making 'n combination with other techniques and methods of
influencing the opponent can constitute an extremely sharp weapon in
warfare.
Utilization of a time shortage is the most important technique in-
fluencing choice of decisic:-making moment. As regards choice of moment
for a surprise attack, when the opponent possesses various types of in-
telligence-gathering means, it is relatively difficult for large forces
to conceal preparations for a mz::,s_r1 attack.
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There exist connections between .:ontrol and various kinds of combat
support (reconnaissance, major tactical concealment, etc) as well as
psychological warfare and electronic countermeasures, determined
primarily by the aim to be achieved as a result of controlling the
opponent's actions. The greatest development of these connections can
be observed in the shaping of the opponent's initial situation estimate.
As a rule this task is resolved with the combined utilization of
several techniques which differ in character of influence on the
psychology of enemy command personnel. For example, display of one
installation in the guise of another should be accompanied by display
of appropriate relations between analogous installations. A dummy
command post should maintain radio communications with the same pat-
tern as a real command post. In like manner a dummy installation will
be more readily accepted as genuine if when it is displayed steps are
taken to hinder the reconnaissance effort. Considerable influence on
shaping an initial situation estimate is also exerted by the element
of suprise in employing new forces.
In order to enr > control of the opponent's actions reconnaissance and
int,.lligence-gatheric.g are required on a broader scope, encompassing in
addition not only the organizational aspect but also the morale-
psychological state of enemy command personnel and troops and determina-
tion of the effectiveness of psychological. techniques employed.
Electronic warfare is closely i.nked with techniques of influencing the
opponent's decision making, but it affects only initial situation
shaping, primarily at the tactical level.
Some techniques of controlling the opponent's actions can be revealed
with an analysis of the counterpropaganda methods employed by him.
Direct or indirect denial or minimizing of the importance of a given
action by our side may indicate that it is having a result which is
favorable for us; si?.ence or distracting propaganda rather indicates
that the result of the action is minimal; employment of forestalling
and a combination of methods should be viewed as c.ountercontrol. Here-
in is manifested the link between control of an opponent's actions and
psychological effect.
Control of an opponent's actions is of a creative character: it should
not rely on chance. "If we astound the enemy with an absurd action,"
commented Clausewitz, "then in all probability we shall not have good
success but will perhaps be dealt a return blow; in any case the enemy
will not be particularly upset by our surprise, for in our blunder he
will find a means of averting negative consequences."5
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In elaboration of countercontrol decisions one should not be carried
away by a great number of hypotheses and proposals; one should select
out the most probable ones and firmly execute designated plans. As
Napoleon warned: "An abundance of ideas without firm and rapid analysis
of those ideas blinds rather than clarifies."
Considering on the whole that tactics of deception should always run
one step ahead of what the opponent knows about these tactics, it is
essential to avoid underestimating the enemy, for a sure way of being
deceived is to consider oneself more clever than others. Control of
an opponent's actions shouli be viewed as the fine art of applying
nonrepeating techniques, keeping one step ahead o- the same strategem
being employed by the opponent.
A vivid example of this is the Battle of Kursk. In the spring of 1943,
when making preparations for Operation Citadel, the German Command
carefully elaborated a plan of strategic attack by two army groups,
Center and South. Various measures (night troop movements, radio
silence, limited number of persons elaborating the operation) in
Operations Order No 6, 15 April 1943, included the following: ",,,In
order to deceive the enemy, continue in the sector of Army Group South
preparations for Operat:-n Panther. Preparations shall be intensified
with all means (obvious reconnaissance efforts, advance of tanks, con-
centration of river-crossing means, radio traffic, agent activities, the
spreading of rumors, use of air power, etc) and shall be continued as
long as possible. These measures.,. shall al,-,o be effectively supported
by appropriate measurei on the front along the Donets River..."
At the same time this order specified for Army Group Center an absence
of similar large-scale activity; the real situation was to be concealed
from the enemy with all availaole means (withdrawal of troops toward
the rear and feigned truop shifts, vehicle traffic during daylight
hours, spreading of false rumors about the timetable of the offensive),
In conformity with this order, concentration of the forces of both
army gr.rups w,ls conducted far from attack positions; the majority of
air units were displaced to front airfields only on the eve of the
battle. In this operation the Germans employed new weapons on a mas-
sive basis: T i ger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns,
and the Focke-Wulf 190 A and Henschel 129 aircraft.
The Soviet command, utilizing information obtained from all types of
intelligence means and carefully analyzing the combat situation,
discovered not only the overall plan and probable axes of attack, but
also the location of the force, potential reseives and their arrival
timetables, The time of initiation of the offensive was also determined
with great :accuracy.
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The powerful attack was opposed by a deeply-echeloned, impenetrable
defense set up in advance, while to the rear of two fronts -- the
Central and Voronezh -- was established the Steppe Front, the troops
of Thich, comprising the Soviet High Command's strategic reserves,
prepared for a counteroffensive. The entire operation took the German
Command totally by surprise; their thrust hit a strong rather than a
weak poi-.it. Late.: General Friessner said in self-justification: "We
encount,F.red a deeply- echeloned, strongly-fortified defensive system
armed with numerous AT weapons. The defensive fortifications were
so well camouflaged that even our constant air reconnaissance failed
to spot them all. Thanks to well-controlled barrage fire by the
enemy's artillery, our tanks were halted before minor natural
obstacles, so that the attacking units ended up in front of strongly-
fortified reinforced-concrete pillboxes without effective fire sur-
port.i6
A skillful command effort promoted the success of the operation. On
the Central Front, for example, 10 minutes before initiation of enemy
artillery preparation, our troops conducted a 30-minute artillery
counterprepara.tion aimed in on artillery position areas and control
entities. This produced uncertainty among the enemy command personnel,
shook their confidence in the success of the operation and deteriorated
morale. The moment had been selected well. During the enemy artillery
preparation Soviet troops conducted a second 3C-minute artillery
preparation, in which almost twice as many guns and mortars took part.
Control of the enemy units, which had barely been :,arched back together,
was again disrupted, as a result of which the enemy was deprived of
the element of surprise on which he was strongly counting. Mauling
the main enemy for_e in savage defensive erg..dements, t':c Soviet troops
subsequently launched a devastating attack and as a result of a
strategic offensive reached the Dnieper.
During the course of the Great Lacriotic War the Soviet command made
extensive use of a rich arsenal of techniques of controlling the
opponent's actions on a strategic, tinor strategic and tactical scale.
We feel that this merits a special examination.
In bourgeois military literature elaboration of problems pertaining to
influencing the opponent is conducted in separate areas (for example,
psychological warfare,8 electron.... warfare,' etc). T. Shelling, for
example, focuses primary attention on techniques connected with
various methods of threat and ensuring the persuasiveness of threats:
threat by risk, unreasonable behavior, "delegation," etc. The latter
technique means shifting authority and responsibility for decision-
maki to an individual who has proven to rather unreasonable, rash
or ii, some way interested in carrying out the threat.
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We should discuss in particular the Herman Kahn theory.10 All tech-
niques examined by him involve working on the psychological makeup of
an opponent who is making a decision at a certain stage of development
of an international crisis (Kahn specified 44 such degrees -- from "ap-
parent crisis" to "spasmodic war"). Most can be assigned to the power
pressure group: repression, threat by risk, unreasonable behavior,
various forms of power blackm.il, sensational show of force in the form
of a powerful high-altitude or space detonation over enemy territory,
speculative statements on military measures, provocative maneuvers and
arms test, ultimatums on use of nuclear weapons, a "harmless" strike
into a desert area or mountain peak, exchange of strikes in the form of
"trading cities," etc.
Kahn assigns to the initial situation shaping group such techniques as
well-publicized shifting of naval and air units, enlargement of forces
to wartimc size, an increase in the size of induction callups, "anonymous"
attacks, etc.
Kahn cynically recommends the assassination of statesmen as one of the
techniques of altering the decision-making algorithm.
Adventurism, c yn.icism and particular attention to the elaboration of
techniques connected with various methods of carrying out and ensuring
the oFfectiveness of threats reflect in these theories the aggressive
nature of imperialism. Therefoie in elaborating problems of control
of a}~ opponent's actions one must take into account not only psycho-
logical but social aspects as well.
We should note that the very publicatiorr:of the theories of Shelling,
Kahn and other "strategists" in open artiiles and sources available to
the publi_. may also constitute a technique of influencing the
opponent, aimed at forming in him corresponding doctrines and decision-
making algorithms. This requires special investigation, careful
analysis and consideration in top-level decision-making.
Control of an opponents actions constitutes a complex logical problem
requiring for its solution the processing of a large quantity of
constant information of a historical, technical, psychological and
dynamic character, and variable information characterizing the actual
'ombat situation and tendencies of change. A commander and his staff
are unable to convert such large volumes of information under present-
day conditions: conversion r +zires the use of automates; devices.
Utilization of automation as can be effected in two are - first
of all, for information-re. _nce work and for primary processing of
essent: al information, and secondly, in simulating conflict situations
and the troop control process proper, in a preliminary playing out of a
decision and an estimate of its potential consequences.
65
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1. Voyennaya Mysl', Nos 8, 10, 12, 1969; Nos 2, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12,
1970; Nos 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 1971.
2. We shall henceforth call such influence control of an opponent's
actions. In Soviet psychology literature this influence is also
called reflex control (see, for example, V. A. Lefe?,r: Konfliktuyu-
shchiye struktury [Conflicting Structures], Izd-vo Vvsshava shkola,
1967).
3. Voyenr~o-istoricheskiy zhurr.al, No 2, 1962, page 73.
4. Dzh. Tompkins: Oruzhiye tret'yey mirovoy voyny (Weapons of World
War III), Voyenizdat, 1969, page 243.
5. Klauzevits: 0 voyny (On War), Part I, Voyenizdat, 1941, page 190.
6. H. Friessner: Verratene Schlachten. Die Tragddie der deutachen
Wehrmacht in Rum9nien and Ungarn (Bungled Battles. The Tragedy of
the German 'wehrmacht in Romania and Hungary), Hamburg, 1956, pp 245-
246.
7. Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-19.45
(History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1;45),
Volume 3, Voyenizdat, 1964, page 257.
8. P. Leynbardzher: Psikhologicheskaya voyna (Psychological Warfare),
Voyenizdat, 1962.
9. R. Shlezinger; Radioelektrr::ciaya vovna (Electronic Warfare),
`Toyenizdat, 1963.
10. G. Kan: Ob eskalatsii (On Escalation), V'.iyenizdat, 1966.
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THE STATUS AND SOME TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RADIOELECTRONIC WARFARE1
Maj Gen Engr-Tech Serv A. Paliy
The development of military radioelectronics and its increasing influence
on the effectiveness of employment of modern means of warfare dictate the
necessity of continuous improvement in the methods and means of neutraliz-
ing the enemy's radioelectronic systems and securing invulnerability of
our own equipment to electronic countermeasures. The aggregate of present-
ly-employed forms and method;; of neutralizing hostile radioelectronic sys-
tems and achieving stable operation of our own equipment constitutes the
essence of such an important element of modern war as electronic warfare.
Its component parts are electronic intelligence, electronic counter-
measures, and electronic countercountermeasures.
Electronic intelligence, involving the intercept and analysis of electro-
magnetic emissions -- is a fundamental means of obtaining information on
enemy location and activities, as well as data necessary for combating
enemy radioelectronic systems.
Electronic countermeasures are aimed at neutralizing or reducing the
effectiveness of enemy radioelectronic equipment. They include radio and
radar jamming, the employm=nt of decoy targets, the effect of ionizing
radiation and the destruction of radioelectronic installations.
Electronic countercountermeasures aim at securing the continuous operation
of friendly radioelectronic equipment under conditions of hostile jamming
activities.
There is a constant struggle going on today between means and methods of
electronic countermeasures and countercountermeasures, Each side is
endeavoring to gain control of the airwaves during peacetime since, ac-
cording to the firm opinion of foreign experts, this greatly promotes
superiority in all other types of military hardware.2 This is indicated
by increasing expenditures on electronic warfare gear, In the United
States, for example, outlays for development and manufacture of such
equipment have more than tripled in the last 10 years, and now comprise
approximately 2 billion dollars.
Electronic warfare has presently become a component part of combat opera-
tions and an extremely important area of activity by all services and all
echelons of military command. It is precisely for this reason that mili-
tary leaders and scientists in the most highly-developed foreign countries
state that without taking into consideration the effects of electronic war-
fare it is becoming impossible to plan and direct combat operations.,
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Let us examine some trends in the development of means and methods of
waging electronic warfare in the armed forces of foreign nations.
Electronic intelligence is still an important means of acquiring informa-
tion within the overall. military reconnaissance and electronic counter-
measures system. Sources of electronic intelligence are, as in the past,
emissions from radio communications facilities, microwave relay facilities,
radio remote control, radar, and radio navigation facilities. But today,
as foreign authors note, in connection with the extensive adoption of
scrambling and encoding equipment in radioelectronic systems, principal
attention in the process of conducting electronic intelligence is focused
not on intercepting meaningful radio transmissions but rather analysis of
the nature and parameters of electromagnetic emissions, determination of
the location of radioelectronic equipment, and determination of identifying
features in their operation.
On the basis of this data, in addition to establishing the types, quantity,
parameters and tactics of utilization cf radioelectronic devices, one
determines the location of airfields, missile launchers, military units and
large units, as well as acquiring other information of a military nature.
In many cases observation of the operation of radioelectronic equipment and
its displacement helps determine the nature of enemy activity and in-
tentions. The results of analysis of intercepted radio signals help dur-
ing combat operations in reaching decisions on the method of neutralizing
radioelectronic equipment, in determining what type and quantity of
electronic countermeasures should be undertaken, in selecting jamming
technique, and time for on- and off-switching jamming equipment.
At the present time tactical and strategic electronic intelligence is
conducted by foreign armies. The former aims at determining the location,
parameters and particularly the combat employment of enemy radioelectronic
equipment, with the objective of organizing electronic countermeasures.
The latter pursues the aim of acquiring data essential for elaborating
methods and means of electronic countermeasures. Information obtained by
tactical electronic intelligence is analyzed for the most part during
the receiving process, while data obtained by strategic electronic intel-
ligence is processed at special facilities and laboratories, with only a
portion subjected to analysis during actual observation. Strategic
reconnaissance data retain their value for some time, while information
obtained by tactical reconnaissance can be util.zed for the most part dur-
ing an engagement or operation.
The acquisition, processing and analysis of electronic intelligence in-
formation are conducted by ground, air, space and naval electronic warfare
units and subunits.
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Ground electronic intelligence units and subunits are equipped with
stationary, mobile and portable equipment. For example, electronic eaves-
dropping is conducted for the U.S. Army by the Army Security Agency (ASA),3
which consists of several battalions and companies. ASA equipment is used,
in addition to the gathering of electronic intelligence, for monitoring the
radioelectronic emissions of friendly troops, for electronic jamming, and
for purposes of electronic deception and dissemination of false information.
ASA battalions are assigned to army corps headquarters for the period of
combat operations. Electronic reconnaissance companies in turn are
detached from battalions and assigned to division headquarters. In addi-
tion to units of the Army Security Agency, tactical electronic intelligence
:s conducted by electronic warfare units.
At the present time electronic intelligence activities are regularly con-
ducted by special units and subunits of NATO nations and the United States,
stationed in West Germany, England, Turkey, Norway, Japan, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Latin America, South Korea, Vietnam, at GuaLitanamo Bay (Cuba)4
and in the United States.
Ground radio reconnaissancL' units and subunits intercept and analyze radio-
electronic signals of a military nature. Special attention is focused on
intercepting radio transmissions at field exercises, orders pertaining to
troop movements, emissions from radar equipment, signals emitted by systems
for radio controlling rockets, artificial earth satellites, and other
information.
The capitalist nations conduct an aerial electronic intelligence effort
along the borders and territorial waters of the socialist nations. Eaves-
dropping missions are flown by special aircraft carrying electronic
intelligence gear (for example, the American EC-121 aircraft carries
radio intercept and signal analysis equipment weighing a total of 6 tons5).
The greatest number of these missions are flown in the area of the Barents
Sea, the Baltic, and in the Far East.
Scannirg and detail reconnaissance satellites are employed by other countries
in the conduct of an electronic intelligence effort from space. Principal
attention in organizing scanning electronic intelligence-gathering from
space is focused on determining the working band and operating conditions
of radioelectronic facilities. This information is essential in order to
select the type of equipment for subsequent intercept, radio direction
finding and more precise signal analysis by detail electronic reconnais-
sance satellites. Electronic intelligence data obtained by both types of
satellite is transmitted to ground stations by radio or by return of
magnetic tape in special capsules.
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The American Ferret satellite, for example, carries electronic intel-
ligence-gathering equipment; this satellite is a modification of the
Samos reconnaissance satellite. The Ferret system, which has been
operational since 1964, includes four satellites, one of which conducts
preliminary while the other three conduct detailed radio reconnaissance.
The width of a satellite's observation coverage is 2-5 thousand kilometers;
error in pinpointing the location of sources of electromagnetic radiation
is several tens of kilometers.
The main efforts in the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program are aimed at
locating air defense systems, missile launchers, spacecraft radio remote
control facilities, .1n1 at detecting the existence of new radioelectronic
systems.
Specially-equipped ships, such as the Americans' Pueblo and Liberty =lasses
and the West German Trave and Oste, conduct an electronic intelligence-
gathering effort on principal sea-lanes and on the fringes of the terri-
torial waters of socialist nations. Ships of the Pueblo class operate in
the Far East, while ships of the Liberty class operate in the Mediterranean.
They eavesdrop on the operation of radioelectronic facilities at a dis-
tance of 80-100 km from shore. Sometimes these ships deliberately enter
t-'rritnrial waters in order to provoke radioelectronic facilities into
operation.
Special intelligence agencies organize the electronic intelligence effort
in foreign armies. In the United States, for example, such activities are
conducted by several organizations: the United States Army Security Agency,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence services of the army,
air force, and navy.
The National Security Agency hab a complement of approximately 10,000 men.
It is presently operating several thousand radio intercept posts es-
tablished at U.S. military bases located around the socialist nations,
as well as on board aircraft, ships, and satellites. High-speed computers
are employed to decode intercepted transmissions. NSA cooperates in the
field of electronic intelligence with counterpart agencies of Great
Britain, West Germany, and Canada. The CIA conducts an electronic intel-
ligence effort both with its own manpower and resources and with the
facilities of the military services.
Electronic countermeasures are conducted by special units and subunits
equipped with the appropriate gear. U.S. Army jamming activities, for
example, are handled by the ASA and army electronic warfare battalions.6
The latter conduct electronic intelligence-gathering and jamming activities
ar electronic equipment carried on board rockets and aircraft, employed
for reconnaissance, control, guidance and bombing. The U.S. Continental
Air Defense Command operates similar bu:.talions.
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A U.S. army corps employs an ASA battalion and a corps electronic ?!arfare
battalion for jamming activities, An ASA group company and a corps elec-
tronic warfare battalion company can be attached to a division for dis-
rupting the operations of ground and airborne radioelectronic equipment.
Antiradar concealment is employed to conceal combat equipment and military
installations from observation by ground, airborne and shipboard radars.
Modern radar equipment can detect under all visibility conditions aircraft,
tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks, military subunits, surface ships,
and other targets. Ground targets can be observed particularly well with
the aid of airborne high-resolution, side-viewing radar. A radar image of
the terrain with targets situated on it is transmit~ed from the aircraft to
ground processing and control facilities, where the received signals are
converted to a radar terrain map. Comparing it with a topograp'~1ic map,
the crew of a combat aircraft can spat targets and bomb them.
Since real and dummy targets may look the same on a radar screen, an effort
is made to conceal military installations and targets from radar recon-
naissance by constructing dummy targets with the aid of antiradar reflec-
tors, by "equalizing" to the background terrain the radar image of ob-
jects which can serve as reference points or auxiliary aiming points for
bombing runs, as well as by concealing military equipment behind terrain
objects and artificial screens of trees, brush or wire nets. The re-
quisite effect in antiradar camouflage is achieved only if the combat
equipment and installations are simultaneously camouflaged from other
means of observation (visual, infrared, photoreconnaissail ce, etc).
The operation of radioelectronic systems is also disrupted as a result of
altering the conditions of propagation of electromagnetic waves under the
effect of ionizing radiation which attends nuclear explosions, or artifi-
cial ionization effected by atomization and combustion of cesium, sodium
and other readily-ionizing elements.? The onizing radiation of nuclear
explosions exerts the greatest effect on radioelectronic equipment operat-
ing in the shortwave band (shortwave radio communications are disrupted to
a distance of several hundred kilometers from the site of a nuclear burst).
Ionized areas, absorbing energy and bending the path of radio waves, sub-
stantially reduce the effective range of radars and accuracy of determina-
tion of coordinates of aerospace targets. Reflections from ionized areas
create interference observed on the radarscope in the form of flickering
blips similar to target returns. Aerospace targets in ionized areas are
totally screened from radar observation.`3
In addition to change in the conditions of propagation of radio waves, the
ionizing radiation of nuclear explosions affects the parameters of radio-
electronic equipment and its operating capabilities. Radioactive radiation
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changes the values of capacitors, resistors, and the parameters of semi-
conductor devices and electron tubes.9 Nuclear bursts also produce power-
ful pulses of electromagnetic energy which induce high currents and
voltages in electronic equipment and communications line;. These can put
equipment out of commission and can present a lethal hazard.
Electronic countermeasures in the air and space are aimed at penetrating
antiaircraft, antimissile, and antispace-weapon defense.
The capability of penetrating an antiaircraft defense system is determined
in large measure by the ability of the attacking aircraft to inhibit the
operation of electronic detection and guidance systems and to protect
themselves against radio-guided missiles and fighters. Toward this end
attacking aircraft employ various jammirg devices, decoy targets and anti-
radar missiles,
Jamming can be effected both by special electronic countermeasures air-
craft and by combat aircraft. Individual and group electronic counter-
measures equipment is placed on board the latter. Special aircraft carry-
ing group-protection electronic countermeasures equipment support attack-
ing aircraft either directly at the intercept point or from a patrol zone
beyond the range of antiaircraft fire.10
aircraft-released decoy radar targets, strongly reflecting radar signals,
can substantially overload the target distribution system computers, in-
creasing the time required to identify genuine targets and draw fighters
and antiaircraft guided missiles.
U.S Shrike missiles are used to attack radar sites at a range of up to
30-40 km, with a target accuracy of 15.100 meters. Several of these mis-
siles can be fired simultaneously in order to increase the probability of
destroying radar sites.
In the opinion of foreign experts, the following may be the basic phases of
electronic countermeasures carried out by attacking aircraft to penetrate
air defenses. Upon approaching the radar detection limit the attacking
aircraft fly low, utilizing terrain screening properties; upon reaching the
target area they climb, simultaneously jamming air defense radar, firing
missiles at radar sites and launching decoy targets. In this phase jamming
is employed to conceal the aircraft from radar observation until they reach
a point where they are no longer vulnerable to the air defense system.
Great importance is attached to correct selection of the moment to initiate
radar jamming. Upon entering the antiaircraft defense zone, principal at-
tention is focused on disrupting missile and fighter guidance and control,
with the objective of preventing the AA missile or fighter from homing in
on or being vectored to the target.
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The Americans employ electronic countermeasures in their raids on targets
in the Democratic Repub'-Uc of Vietnam. Since 1965 U.S. aircraft have been
ee-?loying all types of. electronic count%rmeasures -- from jamming to
attacking radaL+sites. U.S. electronic countermeasures tactics consist in
the following. During raids on targets defended by antiaircraft missiles,
special EC-121 aircraft patrol along the coast of the DRV, conducting
electronic reconnaissance, determining when antiaircraft missiles are
fired and transmitting this information to the attacking aircraft. The
latter, having been informed that a missile has been fired, execute an
evasive maneuver, initiate jamming or fire missiles at the radar sites.
When ballistic missiles became operational, it became necessary to organize
an ABM defense. The United States, for example, has set up a ballistic
missile early warning system (BMEWS) and is building the Safeguard ABM
system. Since ABM systems are based on various radioelectronic equipment --
long-range detection radar, target identification and tracking radar, tar-
get designation, ABM missile guidance, control of ABM complexes -- the
operation of such a system can be disrupted with electronic countermeasures.
These can include decoy targets and multiple warheads, radar jamming, and
reducing the level of reflection of electromagnetic waves from missile
warheads." Since it is comparatively difficult to distinguish a warhead
from other aerospace objects which readily reflect radar signals, work has
begun abroad on developing special decoy targets in the form, of corner and
dipole reflectors, arrows, spheres and inflating balloons.
Active jamming in combination with dummy targets is capable of effectively
disrupting the operation of ABM radar facilities. Reflection of radar
signals from warheads can be reduced by giving them a special low-reflecti-
vity shape and coating them with absorbing materials.
When a missile enters the atmosphere a blanket of ionized gas forms
around it; radars can identify the warheads by observing this blanket. In
order to make warhead radar detection more difficult, it is proposed to
reduce the ionized blanket, altering the shape of the warhead and employ-
ing special materials which absorb missile warhead thermal radiation, as
well as neutralizing the ions with oppositely-charged gas particles. At
the same time measures are being taken to increase the ionized envelope of
dummy targe`.s. This of course will reduce the difference in intensity of
reflection of electromagnetic energy from warheads and dummy targets and
make it more difficult to discriminate between them.
In addition to the above-enumerated methods of neutralizing the radio-
electronic devices employed in antimissile systems, the Americans are
developing maneuvering and multiple warheads capable of carrying several
warheads and decoy targets, as well as missiles with warheads which home
into radar sites.
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Bearing in mind the increased probability of electronic countermeasures,
steps are being taken abroad to improve the protection of radioelectronic
devices against jamming.
With this aim in mind, it is planned to employ ir. Tri.can ABM system
radars capable of identifying missile warheads on is of discrimina-
tion between difference in the signals reflected ids and decoy tar-
gets, as well. as by discriminating these targets on of speed,
trajectory and other indications. During the tatgat tr::cking process
signals from warheads and decoy targets received by the radar stations are
fed into a computer, where they are ccmpared with computer-stored data on
warhead characteristics. As a result of this comparison the computer can
distinguish genuine warheads from decoy targets.
Aware of the present importance of electronics in space, a number of
foreign countries are engaged in programs to develop hardware and methods
of conducting electronic countermeasures in space. The purpose is to make
radar detection of spacecraft: more difficult, and to reduce the effective-
ness of weapons employed in antispacecraft, antimissile, antiaircraft
defense systems and space weapons systems.
In the opinion of foreign experts,12 spacecraft in flight can be con-
cealed by antiradar camouflage and jamming. It is proposed to create
around spacecraft swarms of dummy radar targets, such as inflated
balloons, corner and dipole reflectors. Spacecraft can be coated with
radioabsorhing materials in order to reduce the degree of reflection of
radar signals.
Radioelectronic devices of a defense system against space weapons can be
jammed by automatic jamming transmitters carried on board satellites.
Since spacecraft are comparatively small, and little power is required to
conceal them, jamming equipment can be fairly light in weight and compact.
It is propusLd that spacecraft radioelectronic equipment be jammed by
means of ground installations or satellite-borne equipment. There is the
possibility of utilizing powerful electromagnetic radiation obtained from
a laser in orner to put out of commission radioelectronic equipment carried
by spacecraft.
Research and development of electronic countermeasures abroad is being con-
ducted in the following main areas. In place of individual devices,
automated complexes of equipment are being developed, primarily for in-
stallation on board aircraft, ships and missiles.
Inree types of aircraft complexes are being developed: individual protec-
tion of combat aircraft, escort aircraft, and support aircraft (electronic
countermeasures aircraft).
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The standard combat aircraft electronic countermeasures complex normally
includes three elements. One of these is a multifunction system providing
detection and identification of radioelectronic devices, measurement of
emission parameters, determination of direction to source of emission,
crew warning that the aircraft is being painted by radar, and actuation of
jamming equipment. The system includes a receiver which warns that an
antiaircraft missile has been fired, a radio direction finder which gr.ides
the aircraft to the radar site, and a device for firing antiradiation
missiles. In addition to radio-frequency band reconnaissance receivers,
the system includes infrared band scanning receivers capable of detecting
missiles and aircraft by their heat radiation.
Additional components of the complex include automated active jamming
devices and automatic devices for releasing dir_iAe reflectors and infrared
traps.
The combat aircraft airborne installation also
includes
antiradiation mis-
siles. In addition to the first antiradiation
missile,
the Shrike,
developed in 1964 in the United States, today's
arsenal
includes new
American missiles of this type -- Arm and Standard Arm,
the Anglo-French
Martel AS-37 missile, and the West German Kormoran.
Electronic countermeasures complexes developed abroad show a tendency
toward a substantial Increase in the role of automation, based on small
computers. Work is proceeding on the development of adaptive jammers, which
can automatically tune themselves to the working frequency of the radio-
electronic devices to be javmed.
Ambitious efforts are proceeding for the development of electronic counter-
measures installations for strategic bombers, designed primarily to dis-
rupt intercept guidance of missiles and fighter-interceptors. Some
representatives of the U.S. military establishment claim that in order for
strategic bombers to penetrate a future air defense system, not so much
new bombers as devices permitting such penetration will be required.
Lightweight, small, inexpensive one-time-use jamming transmitters are
being developed, which would be automatically released to descend by
parachute. They would have a power output of only a few watts, which is
considered sufficient to disrupt radio communications, air defense radar
and radio detonators. Such a transmitter would operate for two or three
minutes. Possibilities are being studied for increasing transmission
time to 30 minutes and transmitter output to 40 watts.
It is planned to protect aircraft from missiles guided by infrared homing
devices by releasing a number of decoy targets and reducing engine heat
radiation.
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With the aim of quick readying of aircraft for a combat mission, electron-
ic countermeasures devices are beginning to be placed in containers and
hung under fuselages or under wings in place of bombs, missiles, or fuel
tanks. In addition to jamming transmitters, the container carries a power
supply (usually an airstream-impelled turbogenerator). By the end of 1969
the United States had manufactured approximately 1000 electronic counter-
measures containers.13
Nor are foreign countries ignoring the use of passive jamming techniques.
Special rockets and automatic devices with electromechanical, pneumatic
and pyrotechnic drive systems are employed on aircraft to release radar-
cluttering chaff. These automatic devices can also be used to release in-
frared traps and miniature one-time-use jamming transmitters. This auto-
matic equipment is being updated in order to produce the capability of
cutting chaff on board the aircraft to the required dimensions, depending
on the operating wavelength of the radars to be jamm _-d. S.cattering
through the air, the chaff forms swarms of dipoles which generate reflec-
tion interference. Long strips have also been developed for the purpose
of producing passive radar jamming across a broad band of wavelengths.
Aircraft designers take measures to reduce effective reflective surface,
which makes it easier to conceal aircraft against radar detection with
electronic countermeasures and to protect them against homing missiles.
They are continuing to mount on board surface ships and sut^narines anti-
radar reflectors, means of producing active and passive jamming, decoy
radar targets and infrared traps fired by rockets and mortars, sonar
jamming devices and decoy sonar targets, for the purpose of confusing
sonar and hydrophone operators.14
Systems are also being developed to divert radio-controlled missiles from
surface units and submarines. Since ships travel much slower than air-
craft, dipole chaff released in packets (containers) by special rocket
launchers is extremely effective for protection against missiles.
Not only special ships (the United States has about 80 electronic counter-
measures ships) but regular combatant types as well are beginning to
be equipped with electronic countermeasures gear. Electronic intelligence
gear employed on naval ships is designed to give warning of missile
attacks, to determine the moment when electronic countermeasures gear
should be switched on, and to control jamming transmitters.
A standard system consisting of electromagnetic radiation detection gear,
equipment to warn of radar contact, equipment for signal identificati'rn and
automatic generation of simulating and noise interference i' being
developed for installation o n board U.S. naval ships. The possibility of
guiding hostile missiles to shipboard jamming transmitters is eliminated by
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simultaneously operating transmitters %?n two or several ships. The pos-
sibility of instal1_ing a::-:,orne electronic countermeasures gear on board
surface units is being studied.
In ground forces it is planned to employ jamming equipment against radio
communications, particularly communications used to control field artil-
lery, antiaircraft artillery and missiles.15 Some firms have begun
developing response jamming transmitters for disrupting radio communica-
tions. At the present time the U.S. Armed Forces have approximately 150
models of ela,:tronic intelligence and electronic countermeasures gear.
An additional 50 are in the development stage.
Considerable ai:tention is being focused on seeking means and methods of
jamming new types of radioelectronic equipment: equipment employed by
aircraft in ccnt-our flying, satellite communications, electronic-optical
intelligence-gathering equipment, missilo guidance =,nd night troop control
equipment. An extensive effort is under way to design jamming equipment
for use against radioelectronic gear :mploying new principles of operation:
phased-array radars, stepped frequency change, and single-pulse radar. The
principal trend in development of electronic countermeasures gear is
development of means of combatting radioelectronic equipment the develop-
ment of whicl is, possible in the near future, in place of simple response
to currently-operational gear.
Another trend in technical policy in the development of electronic counter-
measures gear is a gradual integration with other radioelectronic
equipment. The idea is to have multipurpose equipment in which the same
eiements are used sim'lltanenusly to perform several functions in different
systems. Such equipment employs phased-array antennas, integrated circuits,
solid-state components and computers. The employment of identical com-
ponents in multipurpose equipment simplifies design, reduces size and
increases equipment reliability.
An intensive effort is also being conducted abroad in the area of electron-
ic countercountermeasures (improvement in the resistance of raa-i.oelectron-
ic gear to jamming) as a third component part of electronic warfare.
Total expenditures on antijamming equipment have increased from 10-20 to
50 percent in recent years in comparison with the cost of the electronic
gear proper.
Particular attention is being devoted to protection against noise-inter-
ference jamming, as the most highly-developed type of electronic cc,ounter-
measures. A*itomatic gain control circuits are extensively employee';
steps are being taken to increase the dynamic range of radio-receiving
equipment and to reduce the size of side lobes; signal coding is being
employed, as well as change in emission polarization and rapid change of
operating frequency. Some electronic gear employs stepped frequency
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change from one pulse to the next for protection against jamming. In case
of successful radar jamming, equipment. is provided with the capability of
tracking on the basis of jamming-source angular coordinates.
An examination of major trends in electronic warfare indicates that the
means and methods of electronic countermeasures are becoming increasingly
sophisticated. This makes it neces;?ary to seek new counter countermeasures.
Thus at the present time an unremitting struggle is under way to control
the airwaves.
FOOTNOTES
1. From materials published in the foreign press.
2. Driano: Forces A6riennes Francaises, June 1958, pp 779-808.
3. Irving Kheymont: Takticheskaya, razvedka v sovremennoy voyne (Tactical
Reconnaissance in Modern Warfar,~), Voyenizdat, 1963.
4. B. Karpovich: "PET -- an Electronic Ear," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 22
September 1960.
5. R. Khoman: "America's Electronic Spies," Za Rubezhom, No 20 (465),
1969.
6. Kheymont, .p. cit.
7. S. A. Vakin and L. N. Shustov; Osnovy cadioprotivodeystviya i radiotekh-
nicheskoy razveclk~. (Fundamentals of Electronic Countermeasures and
Electronic Intel! igencs) , i; :-vo Sovetskoye radio, 1968.
8. Space/Aeronautics, Vol. 92, November 1969, pp 56-64.
9. L, G. Shirshev: Ioniziruyushchivve izlucheniya i elektronika (Ionizing
Radiation and Electronics), Izd-vo Sovetskoye radio, 1969.
10. Thomas B. Peters: "Electronic Warfare," Wehr and Wirtschaft, May 1969,
page 297.
11. Space/Aeronautics, November 1964.
12. Space/Aeronautics, April 1960, page 120.
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13. B. Miller: "Electronic Warfare," Aviatic.i Week, September 1969; Space/
Technology, Vol. :'1, 1969.
14. Aviation Week, July 1968.
15. Electronics News, December 1969.
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CGNCERNING THE DENSITY OF ARTILLER"1
Col J. Kaczmarek, Doctor, Docent
The theory of optimal artillery density requisite to neutralize the
enemy's defense in the breakthrough areas of combined-arms large units
when military operations involve solely conventional weapons, has become
quite widespread today. This theory is based on the position that one of
the most important conditions for penetrating an enemy's defense is con-
centration of a specific number of pieces per kilometer of pl9nned break-
through area.
In our opinion the establishment of rigid limits of required artillery
density for breakthrough is excessively schematic and can lead to a situa-
tion whereby in one combat situati !n there;will be an excess and in another
situation a deficiency of artillery. In the former case one could etviden t-
ly expand the area of breakthrough successfully, while in the latter case
one must deal with the possibility of insufficient n u::ralization of the
enemy in th,. given area. Of course we are dealing here with an artillery
density index which is utilized in operational-tactical computations under
conditions whereby one lacks sufficiently complete data on the enemy.
Nevurti,aless the problem in our opinion is not so much artillery density
proper as the achievement of a neutralization of the enemy's defense in
the period of preparation fire whereby the motor:Lzed infantry and tanks
of the attacking force will be able to effect penetration. Effective
neutralization of a defense is determined by many factors. In this
article we shall examine those which exert the greatest influence on
establishment of the required artillery density.
The principal criterion is the width of the defense frontage of enemy for-
ward-echelon subunits. We shall see how this circumstance (assuming that
the other factors remain unchanged) affects artillery density. As is well
known, a Bundeswehr mechanized battalion defends a zone 2-3 km in width
(similar standards have been adopted by the other NATO nation armies). Let
us assume that a commanding afficer in,.ends to penetrate the defense in a
sector c'efended by two battalions, the reduced target area in which with
artillery fire neutralization comprises approximately 150 hectares (75 ha
per battalion).2 In addition. artillery must hit targets (objectives)
sited at defense depth in a total area of, let us say, .approximately 70 ha
(batteries, command posts, etc). Thus the total area of targets to be
delivered preparation fire in the zone of interest to us will be 220 ha.
If we assume in turn that during the period of preparation fire each piece
is capable on the average of neutralizing targets within an area of 0.4 ha,
then wa shall require approximately 550 pieces to accomplish the mission.
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In case both enemy battalions defend in a 4 kilomet-:r sector (2 km each)
without gaps between them (variant I), then their neutralization during
preparation fire prior to the attack will require an artillery density of
approximately 140 pieces per km. If these same battalions defend a sector
of 7 km (3 km each with a 1 km interval -- variant I1), then it will be
sufficient to secure an artillery density in the order of 80 pieces per km.
It may happen that each of these battalions is defending on a frontage of
4-5 km (secondary axis, terrain conditions favorable for defense, etc).
Then in view of the fact that in a war waged with conventional weaporl$ it
is advisable to penetrate the defense at the weakest point, accomplishment
of the mission will require the same number of pieces as in the preceding
examples (550). Density of artillery, however, will be considerably less.
For example, if the frontage of the defense sector of both battalions is
10 km (together with gaps -- variant III), the required density of artil-
lery will be only 55 pieces per km.
Air strikes are involved as well as artillery in preparation fire for an
attack. Of course if aircraft hit all or a certain number of enemy artil-
lery batteries, this will reduce the required artillery density. Let us
assume that hostile artillery batteries occupy 60 ha of the total area of
targets being neutralized at defense depth. If we assume that some of them
(36 ha) will be neutralized by air strikes, the above-specified quantity of
artillery (550 pieces) can be reduced by 90 pieces (36 ha:0.4 ha/piece).
In connection with this the artillery density for the above variants will
respectively diminish to 115, 3; and 45 pieces per km.
The enemy's defense on a certain axis can be penetrated by one or two
tactical large units. If we assume that two large units are operating in
the area of breakthrough, they may be compelled to engage the same
quantity of hostile artillery as in the preceding examples !in an area of
60 ha). Naturally under these conditions the artillery of each large unit
will deliver fire not on 10 but on only 5 hostile batteries (if some of
these targets are not taken by air strikes). This means that the quantity
of required artillery will diminish i'y 75 pieces and will total 475 pieces.
Under these conditions artillery density .or these variants will be 120,
70 and 50 pieces per km,
The next factor influencing artillery density is duration of preparation
fire and the related problem of ammunition consumption. This influence is
expressed in a persistent endeavor to reduce the period of artillery fire
activity. In many cases the duration of preparation fire and ammunition
consumption will differ substantially from those assumed in our illustra-
tion. For example, consumption of ammunition may be less, but the number
of pieces and density of artillery will increase. And in like measure on
the contrary, if ammunition consumption increases, density of artillery
will diminish.
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This can be illustrated as follows. If, for example, we increase the
fire effectiveness per piece from 0.4 to 0.5 ha, we can accomplish our
mission with 440 instead of 550 pieces. Artillery density with the above-
specified varianL:. will be 110, 65 and 45 pieces per km respectively.
Of course these figures can change if, for example, air strikes are in-
volved in the penetration effort or if penetration is effected by two large
units in a single sector.
In the last war there were frequent cases where vigorous action taken by
the defending force thwarted or weakened the preparation fire of the at-
tacking force, and the artillery density established in the area of break-
through proved insufficient for a successful offensive operation. In this
connection we must acknowledge that anticipated enemy opposition is also
one of the most important factors determining requisite artillery density.
Nor should one forget that the nature and quality of the enemy's defense is
of great importance for this problem. Defense, according to the views of
NATO ~.eaders, can be position or maneuver defense. Depending on the time
available to the enemy, the degree of position fortification and prepared-
ness of fire system will vary. In addition, subunits defending in the
forward position may be at full or at partial strength (as a result of
casualties sustained). State of training and morale can also vary. In the
last war these factors exerted very substantial influence in determining
the required degree of effectiveness or density of fire, which in turn
affected the quantity and density of artillery. We feel that this factor
is just as important today.
Presently-adopted standards of ammunition consumption to destroy separate
targets reduced to sectors essentially correspond to the structure of the
defensive combat formations of the subunits of our potential adversaries.
One should n..c assume, however, that in the future the enemy will not alter
the structure of his troops. It is quite possible both from a tactical and
technical standpoint, for example, that artillery batteries in fire posi-
tions will be sited by platoons or even by single pieces. In such a case
engagement of this artillery will require a substantial increase in am-
munition consumption, which in turn will affect both quantity and density
or artillery as a whole.
According to pr.sent practice, if the attacking force possesses little
artillery, duration of fire and thus consumption of ammunition is increased,
while battalions (batteries) are each assigned two and more targets
(areas) to neutralize during the period of preparation fire. Depth of
effective fire on enemy personnel and weapons is also reduced. We feel,
however, that such techniques (particularly the latter) should be avoided
if one is dealing with a strong adver sa ry, although one can assume that
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they may occur under forced conditions, particularly or. secondary
axes.
Considerable influence on artillery density is also exerted by the caliber
of the weapons involved in preparation fire. It is a well-known fact that
today's armies are equipped with a large number of tanks and armored per-
sonnel carriers (combat vehicles). It is best to empiny heavy artillery
against them (from indirect fire positions), since mortar fire (partic-
ularly 82 mm) is little effective, while rocket-launching artillery fire
at small concealed targets, particularly those sited close to the FEBA,
presents a danger to friendly troops or i' also little-effective.
If heavy guns comprise a significant percentage of the artillery employed
in preparation fire, the fire capabilities of such a force will be consider-
ably greater. In such a case fewer pieces will be required than when the
majority are medium-caliber guns and mortars.
Up to the present time we have examined tie problem of artillery density
in the area of breakthrough without consideration of securing the flanks
of the attacking troops. In actuality the fire neutralization area should
always be wider than the area of breakthrough. It is normally assumed that
during the period of preparation fire targets sited on the flanks of the
area of breakthrough are neutralized if they can directly affect the
attacking troops with their fire. It follows from this that the area of
fire neutralization should be at least 2-3 km wider than the area of
breakthrough (by 1-1.5 km on each flank),
From the standpoint of reducing the requisite artillery density it is most
advisable to effect penetration with two large units in a common sector.
This will require cover fire on the flanks of only one rather than two
sectors, which would be the case if the two large units penetrated the
defense in different, separated sectors.
It follows from the above discussion that, depending on the factors we have
mentioned, artillery density in the area of penetration can vary within
rather large limits (from 45 to 140 pieces per km). Under aczual condi-
tions this difference may be even greater, Therefore one naturally asks:
does it make sense in establishing the apprcximate artillery requirements
for penetration to consider artillery density?
Of course in principle this question can be settled fairly simply. It is
sufficient merely to recall that a specified density of artillery must be
established to penetrate a defense, particularly if someone has already
made the requisite computations for us and we can use them as a ready
formula.
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The author of this article, however, is firmly convinced that currently-
established artillery densities for a penetration can serve the combined-
arms commander only as a rough or approximate standard, determining what
number of pieces per km can be considered adequate for the successful con-
duct of the offensive operation. Of course such a standard should
approach its upper limit. This will evidently be correct if the range
between the maximum and minimum number of pieces is not very large.
A deeper analysis of these examples indicates that the maximum difference
in density of artillery, comprising more than 60 percent, is the con-
sequence of a varying width of enemy battalion defense frontage (for 2-3
and 4-5 km density is 140, 80 and 55 p/km respectively; if 140 p/km is
taken as 100 percent, a density of 55 p/km will comprise 38 percent). The
other factors we have discussed exert considerably less influence on
density of artillery (approximately 10-20 percent).
Thus in order to avoid a substantial error it would seem advisable in
operational-tactical computations to adopt as a basis not density but the
relatively constant number of pieces required to neutralize one enemy
motorized infantry battlion. In determining this number one should take
into consideration the most typical conditions (with the exception of
battalion defense frontage width), as well as (in corresponding proportion)
those targets sited at defense depth in the area of breakthrough,
In our illustration we have conditionally assumed that the "vulnerable
area" of an enemy motorized infantry battalion totals 75 ha, while that of
targets sited at depth is 35 ha per battalion; thus we have a total of
110 ha. If we assume that one piece is capable of neutralizing 0.4-0.5 ha
during the period of preparation fire, 200-250 pieces will be required to
neutralize targets in the sector of one battalion (taking into account
those sited at defense depth) or, for the sake of brevity, simply for
battalion neutralization. These figures can b recommended to combined-
arms commanders as an approximate standard in computing artillery re-
quirements for preparation fire prior to an offensive operation. In other
words the combined-arms commander who intends, for example, to penetrate
the defense in a sector defended by 2 battalions should employ 400-500
pieces in preparation fire (according to our conditional calculations).
This method, in addition to the fact that it makes it possible to determine
Faith greater accuracy the required number of artillery pieces for a break-
through, possesses other virtues as well. First of all these figures are
just as easy to memorize as are artillery density value--. If the need
arises they can also be used to compute artillery density. For this it 13
enough merely to determin: the width of battalion defense frontage (3 kilo-
meters for example) and to divide this figure into the number of pieces
required for its neutralization (in our illustration 200-2-;0 pieces: 3 km=
66-83 p/km).
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We should note that width of breakthrough area is not so important for
higher command echelons (that is whether an area of penetration will be
-several hundred meters wider or narrower). This problem becomes important
primarily for the commanders and staffs of those combined-arms large units
(units) which will be penetrating the enemy's defense, for the artillery
headquarters involved in specific fire planning, as well as for the
battalions (batteries) performing the fire missions.
Thus knowledge of the actual (precise) width of the area of breakthrough
begins to acquire importance of y at the tactical echelon, during the
pericd of refining offensive operation missions. It is not so important
for the operational echelon or at the beginning of planning combat opera-
tions.
The above discussion is of importance not only for combined-arms but also
for artillery commanders, for artillery engages concrete targ'ts, not
"kilometers." Determination of the number of pieces required to neutralize
a specified target (battalion) becomes more understandable and in addition
makes it possible to make rapid preliminary calculations of the duration of
fire, as well as to determine a preparation fire timetable and consumption
of ammunition, which cannot be done JJ.f only density of artillery is known.
We should add that regardless of how combined-arms commanders solve this
problem, missile troops and artillery commanders possess proven methods of
determining artillery fire capabilities and are capable (particularly when
employing calculators or electronic computers) of quickly performing all
the necessary calculations. Therefore this problem pertains merely to
approximate standards designed primarily for utilization by combined-arms
commanders and staffs. (Translated by: Col I. Andrushkevich)
1, Mysl Wojskowa, No 4, 1971.
2. The figures and calculations presented in this article are merely for
purposes of illustration and should not be construed to be ready-to-use
data.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY TERMINOLOGY'
Reader Resronses
The problem of military terminology today is a matter cf some urgency.
The development. of military science ai.d the rapid increase in sophistica-
tion of armed forces hardware have resulted in the development of a great
many new terms and expressions. But due to haste, and in a number of
cases due to a lack of understanding as well, one observes incorrect use
of terminology, distortion in interpretation or redundancy, as well as
attempts at arbitrary borrowing of foreign terms, which makes new terms
more difficult to memorize and assimilate.
The criticism of military dictionaries made by Col. Nadirov in his article
is justified, But it is not fair to blame all shortcomings solely on the
aut?--ors of the dictionaries, They have done much -o standardize military
terminology, In spite of the gaps and omissions, these dictionaries are
still being used today, In addi_ion one should consider that some dic-
tionaries have long been out of print, such as the Kratkiy slovar' opera-
tivno-takticheskikh i obshchevoyennykh slov (terminov) (Concise Dictionary
of "Operational"-Tactical and General Military Terminology), compiled by a
team of professors and instructors at the Military Academy imeni M. V.
Frunze, This dictionary was pul-lished in 1958, when the military-tech-
nical revolution was just beginning.
Colonel Nadirov notes that field manuals and regulations are issued it a
sporadic fashion, less frequently than changes occur in military terminology
(page 68), We can agree with him as far as certain terms are concerned.
The ccre of military terminology, however, changes much more slowly than
do field manuals and regulations. For example, the terms "nastupleniye"
[offense, offensive, attack] , "oborona" defense], "marsh" [march],
"vstrechnyy boy" [meet'_ng engagement], "ataka" [assault, attack], and "raz-
vedka" [reconnaissance, intelligence] have long been in existence, and yet
during this time mai.y service regulations, manuals and various texts have
been issued and revised. The content of military terms is based on field
manuals and service regulations, on approved data of military science and
technology, The deeper and broader the scope of elaboration of military
science, the richer and more diversified its terminology becomes. Ob-
viously we- should be emphasizing not so much those partial ch~.ages in basic
terminology as a regularized handling of the steady inflow of new terms
(corresponding to new concepts) and the change in meaning of old terms,
caused by the continuous development of the military-technical revolution.
We agree with the author that considerable work remains to be done on
such fui.uamental terms as "voyennaya nauka" [military science] and "voyen-
noye iskusstvo" [art of war] (page 63), and not only by dictionary
86
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compilers, but first and foremost by teams of professors and instructors
at the service academies, where most of our military scientists .re located,
as well as the General Staff Military Science Administration, the. Central
Military Technical Information Institute, the Ministry of Defense Institute
of Military History, military scientific societies and all other army and
navy scientific research establishments.
Recent debates in the military press and at scientific conferences have
not fully plumbed the theoretical depths of prob?.ems pertaining to military
science. For this reason they have not been properly reflected in our
military dictionaries. Under the conditions of the military-technical
revolution, military science proper with .ts constituent parts is con-
tinuing to develop rapidly, introducing many new elements into the con-
tent of the above-specified problem.
On the other hand we cannot agree with the comments by the author of the
article that our dictionaries do not explain the definition of such terms
as "dinamichnost"' [dynamic nature], "skorotechnost"' [fluidit) fast-
moving nature], "neravnomernost "' [nonuniformity], "nepreryvnost' boyevikh
deystviy" [continuity of combat operations], "tverdost "' [firn?ness], "gt!b-
kost"' [flexibility], "operativnost"' [flexibility, operational efficiency]
and many others (page 65). La our view the above terms do not require
special explanation or interpretation: they are either generally acc-?ocable
terms or their meaning can easily be found in an:, dictionary of standard
Russian. The question of abbreviations and conventional symbols employed
in military literature is another matter. They should be published as an
appendix to a dictionary. Under conditions of modern combat operations,
when every second counts, one cannot disregard a well-elaborated system of
abbreviations.
One final comment. When the author discusses the development of military
terminology he only mentions in passing the military language as a whole
which, constituting an organic part of standard literary Russian, serves
as an important vehicle of communication. Military language is inseparably
lir'-~d with the operational-tactical thinking of command personnel, The
decisive character of modern combat operations, the speed and fluidity of
their development as well as abrupt situation change in the course of
combat also impcse greater demands on military language, its semantic
precision, definiteness and brevity.
In all other matters we support the author and are of the opinion that
regularization, standardization and the further development of military
terminology will be promoted primarily by preparation and publication of
a unified dictionary, and even better -- the early publication of the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia, w:iich subsecuently should he supplemented,
following the example of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, by periodic
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publication of a supplement volume for new terms, changes in and additions
to definitions.
Col (Ret) P. Trifonov
At a get-together with writer and reader activists at the offices of the
journal Voyennaya Mysl' in January 1970, Mar SU M. V. Zakharov quite cor-
rectly stated the need to "purge" our military language, "for terminology
is the building material of every science, including military."2
Every science or field of human activity systematically accumulates
requisite terms for designating specific phenomena, facts, and circum-
stances. It frequently occurs that another science or area of human ac-
tivity, finding acceptable a giv,n "alien" term, adopts that term, but
always with the addition of an appropriate att?ibutive or another defini-
tion. For example, Karl Marx, taking the military term "armiy,a" [army],
wrote about the "army of unemployed." Today we frequently employ the term
''army of scientists," "army of construc::ion workers," etc. Military sci-
ence in turn has adopted many terms from other areas of knowledge and ac-
tivity. "Voyennoye iskusstvo," "voyennyy inzhener" [military engineer],
"voyennyy ekonomist" [military economist] and other terms arose in this
manner, and this is to be expected.
There are some terms, however, which are not scientifically justified.
They frequently are the product of a hasty decision. Such, for example,
is the term "tyl Tsentra" [rear services of the Center], which is defined
as the higher, strategic echelon of the armed forces rear se-vices, As
we all know, the armed forces rear services consist of three echelons:
vcyskovoye [troops], which is under the tactical echelon of command;
ol~erativnoye [major tactical or minor strategic] -- major tactical command,
and strategic, under the higher military command. It would seem that this
structure is quite logical and clear, that a rear services echelon cor-
respcads to each area of the art of war . Nevertheless some individuals en-
deavor to put too broad a content into tha term "strategicheskiy tyl"
[strategic rear services], defining this term as the entire nation with
all its economic resources. This produces a situation which is ini-
acceptable to Soviet military science: since the strategic rear services
comprise the entire country, then the: strategic echelon of command, which
supervises the strategic rear services, also governs the country.3
In this country politics directs all areas of activity, including economics
and strategy. Strategy supervision covers all those resources transferred
to the armed forces from the economy. The strategic rear services handle
all material resources under the higher military command. Therefore we
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feel that o;e should discard the term "tyl Tsentra" as erroneous. There is
no better term than "strategic" for the highest rear services echelon.
This term quite logically derives from the structure of our military orga-
nizational development.
Maj Gen (Ret) A. Lagovskiy,
Professor, Doctor of Military
Science
The article by Col Yu. NadirowT entitled "Development of Military Terminol-
ogy" initiated a very useful d,., ussion on stridardizing and improving
military terminology. The fi-.:,t response was an article by Engr--L:: Col
V. Prokopts-"r. in ?,n:ich the author discusses the terms "dezakti-: atsiya"
[radiological decontamination], '.'degazatsiya" [gas decontamination], and
"dezinfektsiya" [bacteriological decontamination] of equipment and draws
the conclusion that these terms are obsolete (also obsolete in his opinion
are generalized terms pertaining to these processes -- "obezzarazhivaniye"
[decontamination] or "spetsial'naya obrabotka" [special decontamination]).
On the basis of these deliberations he proposes a new generalized term,
"spetsial'noye obsluzhivaniye tekhniki" [special servicing of equipment].
We can hardly agree with these proposals, particularly since the terms
"degazatsiya," "dezaktiv a t s iya," and "dezinfektsiya" are members of a
large group of analogous terms employed not only in the military but also
in the civilian technical vocabulary; they include such terms as "insect
extermination," "rat extermination," etc. Of these terms, "dezaktivatsiya"
is unfortunate only in a physical sense, s'.rtce no destruction of radio-
activity takes place, but rather a process of remcval of radioactive sub-
stances from surfaces. On the recommendation of CEMA, our literature is
more and more frequently employing the term "dekontaminatsiya" [decontamina-
tion], which means "rem.)val of contamination." In particular, it has been
incorporated into the current draft GOST "Protective Equipment and Gear
for Wor'?zing with Radioactive Substances and Sources of Ionizing Radiation.
Groups, Terminology, and Definitions."
We feel that the presently,-used general terms "obezzarazhivaniyc" and
"spetsial'naya obrabotka" are entirely appropr'.^tn. The proposed term
"spetsial'noye obsluzhivaniye" is vague and car!-'. es no indication of the
processes for which it stands. Nor should -ine ignore the fact that the
adoption of ever/ new term immediately leads to the obsolescence of a
numb,.!: of documents containing the measures referred to by the terms, and
it does not always have a positive effect on personnel training, since it
is necessary to overcome the habit of employing the old term.
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We agree with Colonel Nadirov that efforts ti_-a improve military terminology
will make it possible in the future to publish a Soviet Military Encyclo-
pedia, This is the position taken by the staff of the Journal Morskoy
sbornik, which carried a useful discussion on naval terminology, We feel
that a broad exchange of opinion on this topic will produce nothing but
o^sitive results.
Engr-Capt 3rd Rank G. Rudenko
1. Col Y, . Nadirov: "Development of Military Terminology," Voyennaya Mysl',
No 6, =970; Lt Col V. Prokoptsov: "Response to Yu. Nadirov's Article,"
Voyennaya Mysi', No 7, 1970.
2. Voyennaya Mysl', No 3, 1970, page 92.
3. The editors feel that the question brought up by Comrade Lagovskiy re-
quires further investigation.
4. Morskoy sbornik, Nos 2 and 8, 1970. Articles by Rear Adm A. Gontayev:
"Military Terminology, Dictionaries and the Encyclopedia"; R. Poretskoy:
"A Philologist Speaks."
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THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE PERIODICAL VOYENNYY ZARUBEZHNIK*
The Journal Voyennyy Zarubezhnik is celebrating its. 50th anniversary.
Founded in 1921 as a publication of the foreign military press division of
the military scientific society attache4 tc the 'ilitary Academy imeni
M. V. Frunze, it soon won recognition among the troops, at this country's
service schools and central military establishments. The journal was
published with a minor interruption almost up to the outbreak of the Great
Patriotic War. Publication was -esumed after the war, and in July 1956 it
became a monthly central publication of ti-.. Ministry of Defense USSR.
The journal based its activities on Lanin's statement pertaining to the
importance of studying the enemy. Lenin wrote: "Everyone will agree that
the behavior of that army which does not prepare to master all types cf
weapons, all means and methods of combat which the enemy possesses or may
possess, is foolish or even criminal" (Poln, Sobr. Soch, [Complete Works],
Volume 41, page 81). This emphasis enabled the journal to accomplish its
mission fairly effectively: assisting the young Red Army, with its
articles, reviews and recommendations, in improving its organization and
troop combat training.
An editorial in Voyennyy Zarubezhnik dedicated to its third anniversary
emphasized that the journal's mission was to serve the cause of Red Army
organizational development and to discuss foreign military thinking and
the achievements of foreign armies. Oe should note that periodicals and
books at that time contained a variety of conflicting and in many cases
erroneous conclusions from the exp ~rience of World War T.. It is to the
journal's credit that it published the most valuable alLd useful recom-
mendations of a theoretical and practical nature for utilization in our
Armed Forces.
At the sa,..a time Voyennyy Zarubezhnik was keeping a close watch on foreign
army preparations for s new war and was endeavoring promptl-- to warn its
readers about the aggressive intentions .,f the military an(; political
leaders of the imperialist nations.
The journal was extremely helpful in the thirties to command cadres in
critical assimilation of the experience of foreign armies in organizational
development and training. This period, as is well known, was characterized
by an aggravation of the international situation and by intensified
war preparations on the part of the imperialist states. At that time the
Red Army was faced with the critical problem of strengthening its combat
might, technological upgrading and of course a more detailed study of the
armies of the potential adversaries. The articles published by the
* Foreign Military News
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journal in these years are distinguished by thoroughness of analysis and
an extremely objective appraisal of the achievements of foreign armies,
while the recommendaticns and advice elaborated on this basis, on problems
of improving our country's Armed Forces, were extremely useful? The
journal's popularity with the military reader in those years is indicated
by its increased circulation, which rose from 2000 to 15,000 copies.
In 1940 the journal temporarily ceased publication; publication resumed in
the mid-fifties. The editors always s`.rive, in addition to acquainting
the readers with foreign armies, to give extensive coverage to the peaceful
policy of the Soviet Union. This is extremely important, because militant
elements in the bourgeois nations launch various slanderous attacks against
our country, distorting its foreign and domestic policy or the purpose
of deceiving the public.
The journal employs the most diversified methods and forms.- it publishes
editorials and special survey articles, including on international military-
political topics, editorial commentary on the translated articles of
foreign authors, and prints statements by capitalist political and military
leaders which are distinguished by objectivity in appraising the strength
of our country and its armed forces.
The journal is constantly g-aided by the deathless Leninist heritage in
accomplishing the tasks of struggle again;t bourgeois ideology.. This was
particularly clearly revealed on the eve of the birth centennial of the
great leader of the proletarian revolution, V. 1. Lenin, during the period
of prer.:arations for the 24th CPSU Congress, and at the present tine, when
this ccuntry is successfully accomplishing the tasks specified by the
congress.
Articles published in Voyerayy Zarubezhnik in honor of the Lenin Birth
Centennial deeply reveal the content of Lenin's doctrine on defense of the
socialist homeland and conclusions drawn by Lenin on Liie reactionary
essence of imperialism and its policy of violence and international
brigand;ige.
It was emphasized at the. 24th CPSU Congress that in the postwar years the
grow ,h of militarism has been taking place in tre capitalist world on an
unprecedented scale and that imperialism's -jar against peace-loving peoples
is continuing unchecked. Hence military command cadres have the mission
of doing everything possible to strengthen the army's combat might, to
improve their knowledge of military theory and to study the strong and weak
points cf the potential ens-ny.
Voyennyy Zarubezhnik is very helpful to Soviet Army and Navy officers,
general officers and admirals in this respect. It regularly publishes
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articles Lefl.:cting the aggressive nature of organizational development
an' combat traininb of the armed forces of the NATO, CENTO and SEATO mili-
tary blocs as well as the meirl-ers of these alliances.
The journal directs the cutting edge of ideological struggle at exposing
the ideology and titary pol___ s of the major imperialist states. In
particular., a number of articles have rather persuasively disclosed the
aggressive nature of the strategy and tactics of U.S. imperialism, the
crisis of U.S. military policy and the reasons for the failure of U.S.
intervention in Vietnam. In order to increase the vigilance and combat
readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, the journal regularly discusses
major events and facts characterizing the aggressive nature of imperialist
circles in the capitalist nations.
The journal's importance also lies in the fact that it regularly publishes
materials from the foreign press on general problems of war and the mili-
tary science of foreign countries. In particular, it promptly not(:.v
changes in the views of the military leaders of Imperialist states on
modern armed forces organizational development, on the character of a fu-
turewar and the methods of waging such a war.
The editorial staff of Voyennyy Zarubezhnik holds reader conferences in
military units, training inst-tutions and central directorates of the
Ministry of Defense. These make it possible to find out what the readers
want and to adjust the subject matter handled by the journal, to attract
a large number of contributors, and enable the readers more fully to _,onvey
their wishes and desires to the editors.
One generally-acknowledged virtue of this journal is the fact that it
regularly publishes materials on operational art and tactics of the
armies of the capitalist nations, tha organization and armament of their
large units, units and subunits, as well as interesting articles discussing
the achievements of the imperialist nations in their military space
programs and development of strategic weapons, One can also find other
interesting materials on the state of various arms and services in the
capitalist armies, organization of intel'_ igence and r,abotage-reconnaissance
activities, combat support and supply, trends in the development of weapons,
combat equipment, rear services, etc.
More and mcre contributors are submitting articles to Voyennyy Zarubezhnik:
officers, general officers and admirals from line units, military training
establishments and central directorates of .he Ministry of Defense. As
regards articles by foreigners, we feel that it would be useful to
acquaint our readers with the opinions of top-echelon officers in foreign
armies, military theorists and military leaders,
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The journal hail earned the right to be called a loyal companion and as-
sistant of Soviet Army and Navy command cadres at all echelons.
Together with other publications, Voyennyy Zarubezhnik helps form in
officers, general officers and admirrls of the Soviet Armed Forces a com-
munist ideological outlook as well as their indoctrination in a spirit of
Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, total dedication to the
Communist Party and Soviet government, love for the socialist homeland and
deep faith in the triumph of communism and the power of our arms ; it
helps Soviet command cadres study the potential enemy.
We wish the editorial staff of Voyennyy Zarubezhnik continued success in
accomplishing the tasks assigned our nation's Armed Forces by the 24th CPSU
Congress,
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INDOCTRINATING STUDENTS IN THE PROCESS OF THEIR TRAINING
(Problems of Indoctrination and Development of Young Officers)
Engr-Col N. Sal'nikov, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Docent
The task of indoctrination
is one of the most difficult.
The best educators consider
it not only the task of sci-
ence but of art as well.
The military technological revolution has introduced substantial changes
into the means and methods of conducting combat operations and has imposed
new demands on training military personnel. Personnel training encompasses
such aspects as theoretical knowledge and practical skills, which guarantee
optimal weapons utilization, and morale-political and psychological con-
ditioning, which ensures the maximum effect from application of this know-
ledge and these skills. At the All-Army Conference of Young Officers
Mar SU A. A. Grechko noted that problems of training and indoctrination,
discipline and morale-psychological training have merged into an in-
separable whole to a greater extent than at any time in the past.
Both theorists and practical workers have always devoted attention to the
relationship between military training and indoctrination. The creative
thinking of commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians has
inalterably been focused on the search for new, maximum efficient methods,
means and techniques of training personnel. This is indicated by articles
published in Voyennaya Myysl'.'- The problems they discuss are cf current
importance, and their content generates productive debate.
The principle of indoctrination in the training process, emphasized one
article published in this journal, is entitled to its rightful place with
other principles. Today it is impossible to teach without indoctrinating;
one cannot first teach and then indoctrinate, or teach one and indoctrinate
another.2
Young instructors of course are aware of this, but they do not possess suf-
ficient experience. It will require considerable effort for them to
master the methods and techniques with the aid of which this problem can
be resolved in an optimal manner : the probi.ep, Is complex and u'?.,`_ f i.cult;
success is achieved individually, on a firm ~ entific basis, assimilated
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and correctly utilized by the instructor, "The art of indoctrination,"
stated K. D. Ushinskiy, "possesses the peculiar feature that it seems
familiar and understandable to almost all, and even easy to some.. But
very few have arrived at the conviction that in addition to patience, in-
nate ability and skill, special knowledge is required as well...i3
This article attempts to present in some measure specific proposals on
techniques and means of indoctrinational effect by the instructor at the
military higher educational institution on students during the learning
process,
In'providing a student with a higher educatio:i, the military training
establishment exerts considerable influence on an individual. An officer's
very presence within the wails of the military educational institution
changes him for the better, for in addition to education, every military
training institution engages in the indoctrination of its students,
"-Indoctrination, " stated M. I. Kalinin, "is specific, purposeful and
systematic effect on the psychology of the person being indoctrinated,
in order to develop in him qualities d9sired by the indoctrinator.i4
We are certainly interested in what kind of young specialist is graduated
from the military training establishment, and we naturally want him to be
a specialist of the highest caliber, with the broadest engineering know-
ledge, for example. But this is not the only poirit. We are interested in
what kind of an officer our graduate will be, to what extent a Marxist-
Leninist ideological outlook will be developed in him, how he is prepared
for the role of indoctrinator, what kind of a person he becomes, and what
mark he will leave in the military and in Soviet society.
The military training establishment system provides an entire complex of
indoctrinational effort, a complex of appropriate indoctrinational effect
on the students. It encompasses diversified activities by the command,
political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. In addition, there
is a special category of officials (course supervisors), whose principal
task is systematically to indoctrinate their subordinates. Another im-
portant problem within the system of student indoctrination is that of
increasing the effectiveness of the indoctrinational effort of instructors
in the student learning process. This is understandable if one considers
the fact that they more than all other functionaries are in protracted and
continuous contact with the students and for several hours each day are
closely linked within the teaching process.
There is one other important aspect of this problem, to which the 24th
CPSU Congress drew the attention of executive cadres and party organiza-
tions. The scientific and technological revolution is not erasing class
boundaries and is not converging the ideological positions of the two
world social systems. The forming of a Marxist-Leninist ideological
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outlook, excellent ideological-political qualities and standards of come
munist morality in toilers continues to be the central task of the ideolog-
ical effort of party organizations.5 Military indoctrination presupposes
purposeful propaganda of communist ideals, their profound assimilation and
transformation into concrete service deeds. The instructor in the Soviet
higher educational institution cannot be indifferent to the way of thinking
and acting or the heart of his pupils. There is no place in the higher
educational institution for an indifferent person. Not every teacher,
however, no matter how much he may try, succeeds in resolving the questions;
of training and indoctrination in an optimal combination. And yet the
teacher who combines the qualities of teacher and indoctrinator is extreme-
ly valuable.
We recall a remarkable statement by V. G. Belinskiy on the role of the
teacher: "Linked to the profession of teacher are great responsibilities
for the successful meeting of which much knowledge, talent, skills and
experience are required. The teaching method employed by the teacher
determines not only the success or failure of his pupils but also their
like or dislike of learning. The teacher with a poor grasp of his job may
choke and crush in his pupil the seeds of the finest abilities and, driving
out of him the desire to study, may make him incapable of anything. On
the contrary the teacher who understands the importance of his obligation
and possesses all the qualities necessary for the performance of these
obligations not only develops, strengthens and properly orients natural
abilities but even produces successful learning in those students who
have.-not been bestowed intellectual ability by nature.i6 In spite of the
fact that this statement was made more than a century ago, it is valid
even today. We military instructors should think about these statements.
We must constantly bear in mind the moral-political influence of the
teacher on his students.
What are the elements which form our system of indoctrinational effort,
the indoctrinational effect of the military educator on the student? They
are the fo:L'.owing: high quality of class presentation; party-mindedness
in teaching; the countenance of the teacher (his example) ; relationship
with the students -- kindness, affability, demandingness; "pauses" for the
purpose of indoctrination during lectures; study of the students --
preliminary and during the course; the teacher's activities outside of
class, participation in the activities of student Komsomol and party meet-
ings.
High quality (profound content, scientific level) of classes is ;nsured by
careful and thorough preparation (visual aids, facilities, equipment, etc).
What kind of positive indoctrinational effect can thhre be if even the
most experienced instructor utilizes in his classes poorly-made posters,
defective equipment, models and assemblies which refuse to function or
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fail during demonstration, or if he has forgotten something and then later
agonizingly remembers it when he is presenting the material?
A class is remembered and has an educational effect when form and content
are organically joined, when everything of secondary importance has been
eliminated, and when the main points are completely fresh, Of course this
is possible only if the instructor constantly broadens his knowledge in
the given field, keeps up to date on the latest scientific advances and
follows the periodical literature.
It is important from a methodological standpoint for each class to be
complete, solving a specific problem (group of problems), rather than
"hanging in the air" due to poor planning. The experienced educator al-
ways asks himself before each class what new elements he will be giving
his students.
In view of the present level of development of science and technology,
the abundance of scientific information and its transience, it seems to us that
in a high-quality class the students will not only and not so much be
given concrete data, facts, as shown a scientific approach and methods
used in solving the problem. This is what develops subsequently an of-
ficer's ability independently to deal with problems which he will in-
evitably encounter in the troops. The purpose of the military higher
school is not only to give the student a sum total of specific knowledge
but also to teach him to think innovatively, to arrive at correct
practical conclusions on the basis of acquired knowledge.
Of course well-selected material will be correctly perceived by the
students only when it is presented in a comprehensible manner.
High quality of classes, their deep content, and scientific level in com-
bination with correct methods constitute that basis which enables the
teacher to accomplish the tasks of teaching and positively influencing
the students during the learning process.
Party-mindedness of teaching is one of the most important principles, en-
compassing a system of instructor methods and techniques whir,', ensure
the class orientation of classroom exercises, that is, presentation of
material from the position of Marxist-Leninist ideology, from the stand-
point of Communist Party policy, in a spirit of Soviet patriotism. This
was reemphasized at a reception in honor of service academy graduates at
the beginning of June of this year. Who if not we should be responsible
for ensuring that service academies and schools graduate politically
literate, ideologically convinced fighters for the communist cause?
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Every military educator is not some collector of known book information
who has an indifferent attitude toward the facts and phenomena he presents,
but rather an active fighter for the party's cause, an impassioned
propagandist of progressive ideas, achievements and know-how, He cannot
be limited merely to the transmission of knowledge to his audience, his
duty is to display his party attitude toward the information he conveys.
During the process of preparing for class the instructor, having gathered
and systematized the requisite mater.i al, carefully analyzes it from the
standpoint of its potential ideological influence on the students?
We know that it is not always easy to ensure party orientation of class-
room activities, The most favorable conditions for this are during in-
troductory and concluding lectures, when it is appropriate to draw atten-
tion to the preeminence of Soviet science and technology, to note the role
of Soviet scientists and designers in developing the best weapons, to
reveal the colossal capabilities of socialist industry, which is building
first-class hardware for the army and navy, and to demonstrate the selfless
labor and patriotism of the Soviet people, the guiding and organizing
activity of the CPSU and future prospects for the development of science
and technology.
During each class the instructor must find an opportunity for party in-
fluence, for forming in students an excellent ideological outlook, un-
shakable faith in the righteousness of our party's cause, feelings of
Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and excellent moral and
political qualities. Unfortunately we must note that sometimes even mili-
tary educators who have the wisdom of considerable teaching experience
do not always attach sufficient importance to the party orientation of
each and every class, considering this to be self--evident,
Environment and conditions are important, but one should not forget Lenin's
thesis that ideas are introduced. But ideas must be introduced intel-
ligently, without going to extremes. Some instructors, endeavoring to
develop feelings of patriotism, in the area of technology; for example,
loudly claim without sufficient scientific substantiation the priority of
Soviet scientists in a given area of knowledge or inventions. I should
like to stat. that we do not need any "party-mindedness" of this kind,
The principle of party-mindedness in teaching is an empty sound without
authenticity, proof, and a scientific approach to facts, events and
phenomena.
A party-minded approach in the presentation of materials presupposes the
objective treatment and evaluation of this material. This applies not
only to priority in general but also to a presentation of the enemy, his
weak and strong points, weapons, operational art, etc, Only a serious
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analysis of the performance capabilities of Soviet in comparison with
foreign hardware will enable these future specialists to focus their
attention on unsolved problems and to add to Soviet achievements.
The personality of the instructor exerts enormous influence on his
students.
The personality of the military iur:i:ructor should be balanced in all
respects. All self-respecting instructors strive for this, for every
educator strives for a thorough knowledge of his subject and thorough
preparation for his classes, is concerned with the ideological orientation
of his actions, rrinciples and party-mindedness in assessing various events
and facts, He conveys knowledge to his students with great desire, con-
viction and enthusiasm.
It would be incorrect, however, to limit himself solely to the framework
of his subject, In order to proceed in step with the time, it is essential
to take a lively interest in contiguous disciplines and constantly to
improve ones overall education. Arrogance and ego are the scourge of the
educator; modesty is to the indoctrinator's credit,. His conduct in the
military collective, in the family and in daily routine should be simple
and exemplary in all respects.
While one's inner countenance is not immediately noticeable, one's ex-
ternal appearance (such as observance of uniform regulations) exerts an
effect from the very first encounter. Neatness and smartness of appearance
in combination with competence and military-political knowledgeability
constitute a powerful indoctrinational means. Chekhov made a most
remarkable statement: everything should be beautiful in man: the face,
clothing, the soul and thoughts express the essence of man's harmony,
perfection and culture,
There is no question that the student is sickened by superficial elegance
and affectation, but how precious and useful from an indoctrinational
standpoint are smartness of appearance and precision, coolness and
restraint, sparingness of words and excellent speech habits, the ability
to control one's voice and gestures, the strictness and cordiality,
deman&.ngness and tactfulness of the educator.
A teacher is not born; the personality of the teacher is formed by the
environment and by the teacher himself; his development takes years of
painstaking, persistent labor. Improvement is limitless and requires one's
entire life.
Students' endeavor to emulate their teacher, to follow him in their deeds,
to copy his techniques and actions is an understandable and natural thing.
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How important it is for the object of emulation to be a positive exampl:'!
Mar SU A. A. Grechko, discussing the diversified and complex activities of
the officer, noted that "his principal weapon and most important condition
for successful performance of his duties and or influencing his men is
personal example, ,7
The teacher's example is inseparable from his person, unity of word and
deed, his high party-mindedness and military demandingness, His indoctrinat-
ing influence is constant -- during breaks between classes, during consul-
tations, on practical production experience days, and in the process of
tests and examinations, He is always visible to the students; they are
familiar with his character, his habits, and his purely human weaknesses.
The teacher also indoctrinates students pith his conduct outside the walls
of the training establishment -- on the street, at the theater, during
recreational excursions t-) the country, on harvest assistance details, etc.
This is particularly important under the conditions of military educational
insti.tutions which are .G-t_tuated in a s wall Loan or on a military base.
Teacher-student contacts are based on military service relations permeated
by creative interests. An intense, businesslike atmosphere is necessary
for mastery and assimilation of course materials. It is very important
for the student from the very first contact to sense the teacher's kindness,
to see and perceive (this of course takes time) that the instructor is
not a dry dogmatist, not a proclaimer of unshak able truths and laws, but
an experienced older comrade who helps in mastering the subject and in
receiving an education.
It is a good thing when these relations are distinguished by mutual under-
standing, which does away with an "isolating" stone wall; affectation,
and an attitude of superiority, But the other extreme is dangerous and
absolutely unacceptable: currying favor, undue familiarity;, the endeavor to
? be "one of the guys," although this type of instructor impresses some
students.
The relationship between instructor and student Is ba _d cn mutual trust
and respect, It happens that a student co=its a mi..or infraction, fails
to prepare for a class or is even rude in the classroom, The instructor
has considerable opportunity to correct such a student tactfully and
calmly, without demeaning or insulting him, The indoctrinaticna7. effect
will be more substantial than that produced by shouting or a dressing down,
which merely alienate. A feeling of fear is not a feeling of respect,
Relations between the instructor and his students are always frank, This
applies as well to cases when the instructor (young and inexperienced;
is placed in a difficult situation by a question "from the floor." There
is nothing worse than trying to "explain' something to the class when one
does not know the precise answer, This is where it is appropriate to
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display frankness (even courage), to admit that one does not know the
answer but to present it at the next class meeting. "it is necessary,"
stated Mar SU A. A. Grechko at the All-Army Conference of Young Of firers,
"always to have the courage to admit an error. Admission of one's error
and its prompt correction does not weaken the authority of the commander,
There is nothing disgraceful in admitting one's mistake; on the contrary,
it attests to one's courage,"6
A certain cordiality and even friendliness is established between teacher
and student: students share their problems with the instructor, discuss
things and con;:-de in him, The officer who succeeds in winning over his
students exerts extremely favorable influence on them..
Frankness and friendship, however, should not weaken demandingness0
Measure, balance, and tact are important in teacher-student relations,
One can hardly count on full student conscientiousness in assuming that
they will do everything within the framework conceived by the instructor?
Their performance and b,.havior must be strictly monitored. The life of
a military instructor, as that of the commander in general, is permeated
with a high demandingness on himself and on his men.
The efforts of the student in the classroom are extremely intensive,
requiring considerable mental, emotional and physical exertion, Ex-
perience indicates that it is advisable to introduce into the classroom
session periodic pauses or breaks, which last 2 to 3 minutes. In some
cases as much as 5 minutes can ?:e devoted to these relaxation pauses. At
least one such break should be taken in a 2-hour class. These breaks must
be planned on the basis of place and time, and their content must be
very thoroughly considered (prepared),
From my personal experience, teaching each year a course in the design of
special equipment, I know precisely what questions and areas are partic-
ularly diffi.'ult for the students. One such difficult area is dynamic
computation. Having presented a large number of new concepts and defini-
tions,I note that the students, are "saturated" and sense that the abundance
of information is beconing a certain inhibiting factor in further assimila-
tion of the material,
I then suggest that the students put down their notes and relate to them
with what enthusiasm Doctor of Technical Sciences Professor Maj Gen
Engr-Tech Serv Mitrofan Fedorovich Samusenko worked in the area of.,dynamic
weapons research, how a given solution had been found, where a contribu-
tion had been made by students who have now become candidates and doctors
of science, department chairmen and higher school instructors.
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The officers listen very attentively to my story! Subseqeuntly, in breaks
between classes, at lectures and elsewhere (practical industrial production
experience, in working on term and senior projects) they will ask me to
tell them about the Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy and about M. F. Samu-
senko, his school and pupils. The aroused interest and curiosity will
compel them to open Samusenko's textbook; they will become enthusiastic
about his scientific creativity, and they will come to the department to
discuss various matters.
A direct and immediate effect is also produced: after such a break they
develop increased interest in the material; it no longer seems like dry,
uninteresting formulas but rather the expression of creative thinking
worthy of emulation.
Another te.chnique is also effective -- switching the students' attention
to something "alien." For example, they listen avidly tc, everything per-
taining to the area of interrelationships and culture.
People's Artist USSR S. Oiatsintova once wrote an article which was published
in Pravda entitled "What Does It Mean to Be Ed.icated?" Soon thereafter I
had an opportunity during a lecture break to refer to an example she had
cited: "The homeless and indigent of Paris would come to the Louvre in
the mornings to stand by the radiators and get warm. One morning an old
lady warming herself was standing next to an artist working on a copy of
a painting. The artist suddenly got up and brought a chair over for the
old woman. The old woman bowed low in thanks and sat down. This scene was
observed by a lady and her son. The mother whispered something to the boy.
He walked up to the artist and said; 'Merci; Madame,' and then returned to
his mother, his face beaming.i9
You should have seen the reaction of my students; so many thoughts took
shape in their mind; the noble act is so instructive! To do good to others
is a great happiness.
In addition to all else? breaks bring commanders and their men closer to-
gether (in our case teachers and students) and make It easier to recognize
individual characteristics, It has long been known that a class is easier
to control if the instructor is acquainted with the individual students, if
he knows their names, proclivities, etc. "Life itself teaches," it was
emphasized at the All-Army Conference of Young Officers, "that i t is im-
possible to be a good officer-indoctrinator if one does not know and fails
to consider the specific features of one's men..."10
It is useful to begin individual study of the students prior to the first
class meeting. From the standpoint of education science it is extremely
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useful if at the first class meeting the students sense that the instructor
is familiar with the audience and their individual traits, Close contact
with the course supervisor and activists makes it possible to obtain much
biographic data, to learn the personality traits of the students (modest,
authoritative, possesses initiative, quick to anger, introvert, needs watch-
ing, etc) and to form a picture of an individual's development, his
capabilities, service and life experience.
Meetings between the instructor, commander and secretary of the party or-
ganization of the department of studies help in studying the students and
create conditions for establishing not only a businesslike and formal
atmosphere in the classroom, but also an atmosphere of mutual understanding
and respect.
Received information is refined and expanded during class sessions, a
process which is promoted by periodic question and answer sessions; the
students should not always be left during a break, An informal conversa-
tion on any subject of interest to the students brings the students and
teacher closer together and cre:.ces a productive atmosphere, Comprising an
important element in the system of education and indoctrination, such con-
versations also make it possible sometimes to find the way to resolve such
complex matters as an objective assessment of student knowledge in examina-
tions, assignment of topics for course and particularly senior design
projects in conformity with their individual abilities, etc.
When students are performing scientific research activities in the Military
Scientific Society, in course and senior design projects and during
practical prccluction experience, the instructor meets with the students in
an informal situation, unrestricted by the rigid framework of the classroom
lecture but nevertheless businesslike in nature. More protracted personal
contact is established, during which there is an opportunity more fully to
determine the preparation of the student, his methods of working on the
course material., to become acquainted with his personal qualities, aspira-
tions, and finally to talk "heart to heart."
It is necessary merely to caution the instructor against transforming such
contacts into examinations. The instructor helps choose the area of
future research and participates in the forming of a qualified military
specialist. Frequently students remain true to that scientific road which
they trod together with their mentors at the military higher school.
Assimilating the knowledge and know-how of the instructor and scientific
methodology in problem solving, during this period the student is partic-
ularly receptive, easily indoctrinated, as they say, when the influence
proceeds from the instructor. This should be utilized to instill in the
student a sense of optimism, enthusiasm in scientific search, persistence
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in solving the assigned problem, independaance, a striving to assist his
comrade and the ability soberly and objec:ively to assess the results of
his labor.
The students' accustomed school environment changes during practical
production experience; students are no longer under the direct supervision
of superiors and for a certain period of time are operating under different
conditions of learning and daily routine. Here the instructor supervises
practical activity, the learning process, organizes party political effort
and participates in intelligent planning of the students' free time. He
performs the function both of teacher and older comrade, not only as a
narrow specialist but also as a man who is wise in matters of art'and
literature, who is friendly and versatile, direct and optimistic. Careful-
ly conceived and properly-organized practical activity contains great
potential for indoctrination; students can obtain much from contact with
top production personnel, whose hands build our modern weapons, as well as
with the design engineers who work on scientific problems.
The instructor employs various forms and methods of contact with students
in order to achieve indoctrinational effect: discussions and lectures; he
actively participates in the activities of ::t,_dent Komsomol and party
meetings. It is absolutely impermissible, however, to give a lecture or
address on the basis of hastily-assembled material which is familiar to
all. Consequently, careful preparation is essential. Here everything is
important: selection of topic, thorough study of the subject, one's point
of view on the subject, examination of the problem in connection with the
practical affairs of the students, and finally the mood of the instructor.
When we speak of instructor participation in the activities of Komsomol and
party organizations, this should nci be defined solely as an address
delivered at meetings. on the i t e m s on the agenda. ThQ very presence
of the instructor, let alone his participation in the discussion, has an
indoctrinational effect, for he is a senior comrade, a commander, a Com-
munist.
Contact with the students is also very helpful to the instructor: he
learns to know his men better, their needs and desires, lis;-ens to their
requests and as an indoctrinator draws practical conclusions for himself.
In conclusion we shall state that tLe question of organic linking of
training and indoctrination is not new. It has always been assigned an
appropriate place in the activities of commander:;, political organizers
and. staffs, Present attention to this question is not of transitory
significance. It is dictated by radical changes in the hardware and
methods of conducting modern combat operations; The trilitary instructor
must combine the qualities of teacher and indoctrinator, Subsequent
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investigations and exchange of know-how will dt:monstrate, how these
qualities can be practically manifested. One thing is clear -- there are
and can be no insignificant items in indoctrinational effort, it was
emphasized at the All-Union Student Mass Meeting at the Kremlin, because
we are dealing with one of the most complex and critical questions -- the
forming of the soul and character, conditioning of the heart and mind of
the Soviet patriot.
The indoctr.inational effort of the instructor is multifaceted; it is
extremely difficult to exhaust all its aspects in a single article. I:t is
indisputable, however, that it constitutes that area containing great
reserve c. utilization of which will make a tangible contribution to the
training and indoctrination of military cadres,
From the editors. In this article Engr-Col N. Sai 'nikov discusses impor-
tant problems pertaining to the indoctrination of students du:ing the
learning process, The editors invite school faculty to share with our
readers their experience and ideas on this problem.
1. 1. Yef,-emoii: "Unity of Training and Indoctrination" (Voyenna ay Mysl',,
No 9, 1968); A. Khorenkov: "Planning the Work Schedule of the Military
Educator in a More Concrete Manner" (No 3, 1969); L. Zheleznyak:
"Method of Studying Officer Military Occupational Orientation" (No 6,
1970); A. Stolyarenko: "Psychological-Pedagogic Matters Pertaining to
Training Young Officers" (No 7, 1970), and other materials.
2. A. Stolyarenko: "Improving Theory of Military Training," Vo e,_na a
My;.;1', No 7, 19.9.
3. K. D, Ushins.kiy: Sobraniye Sochineniy (Collected Writings) , Volume 8,
Izd-vo Akademii pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR, 1950, page 11.
4. M. I. Kalinin: 0 komm.inisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge (Com-
munist Indoctrination and Military Duty), Voyenizdat, 1567, page ?+26.
5. Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress)
Polltizdnt, 1971, page 205.
6. V. G. Belinskiy: "My Thoughts..." (unpublished mane:script) , See Pe:n-
zensk:rja Pravda, li January 1968.
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7. ysokoye pri;tvani.ye. Vsearmeyskoye soveshchaniye molodyykh of:Ltserov.
Nyabr' 1969 &. (Lofty Calling. All-Army Conferences of Young Officers,
November 19(9) , Voyenizdat, 1970, page 20.
8. Ibid., pag,:. 22.
9. Pravda, 25 February 1968.
10. Vysokoye prizvaniye..., op. cit., page 19.
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WEAT20NS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE AGGRESSIVE PLANS OF NATO*
Maj Gen M. Kir'yan, Professor, Doctor of Military Science
The 24th CPSU Congress, analyzing the preselit international situation,
noted that an unprecedented scale of militarization is presently character-
istic of the entire capitalist world. During the last 5 years alone the
United States has spent approximately 400 billion dollars for military
purposes, while NATO, the most aggressive imperialist bloc, spent 103 bil-
lion dollars on war preparations in 1970 alone. All armed conflicts
initiated by imperialism in the last 20 years have taken place with the
direct or indirect participation of the NATO bloc. Aggressive NATO policy
is supported by armed forces which have at their disposal the entire
arsenal of modern weapons, a leading role among which is played by weapons
of,/mass destruction. This is confirmed both by official U.S. and NATO
military doctrine and by the character of equipping and training of their
armed forces.
NATO armed forces in Europe possess approxi.aately 2250 nuclear warhead
delivery vehicles. Europe also contains a concentration of more than
7000 nuclear warheads, chiefly in he FRG.I We should note that the
United States possesses more than 30,000 nuclear warheads, representing
a total destructive force of 25,000 megatons. There is a continuing trend
toward an increase in the U.S. nuclear potential., in spite of the fact that
existing nuclear weapons, according to statements made by U.S. leaders,
are more than enough to destroy the enemy many times over.
Preparations by U.S. and NATO imperialists for nuclear wz,,r are also at-
tested by statements made by their official spokesmen. U.S. Deputy
Defense Secretary David Packard, discussing prospects of arms development
during the coming decade, that is during the seventies, emphasized,
states the New York Times, "the extensive growth of nuclear forces with
the aim of reestablishing a position whereby the United States would be
capable of delivering such a powerful and accurate first strike that the
enemy would for all practical purposes be disarmed." A similar trend is
confirmed by proposals made by the NATO nuclez,r planning group, ratified in
1969-1970 by the NATO Council. These proposals are based, as reported in
the NATO journal NATO Letter, on the idea of "the inevitability of
employment of nuclear wer;ons in the conduct of war in Europe."
In the effort to consolidate Its position, Britain is also placing its
cards on nuclear weapons which, in the o?inion of British ruling circles,
can help it become NATO's Europeer military leader. With this objective in
* From materials in the foreign press.
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mind, the British government is initiating the establishment of "European
nuclear forces," while the British Isles themselves are being transformed
into NATO's European nuclear arsenal.
Major efforts conducted in the United States and other. NATO member nations
toward further improvement and stockpiling of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons also attest to preparations for the most dangerous
crime against mankind -- a world war with weapons of mass destruction.
` Nuclear Arms
Soon after the end of World War II air Atomic Energy Commission was es-
tablished in the United States; one of its principal missions was the
development, testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons. At the present
time the AEC possesses vast resour:ces and a huge industrial base. In the
period 1950-1967 alone the United States spent 40 billion dollars on nuclear arms.
Since then these expenditures have not diminished. Even in the so-called
"reduced" military budget of 1970 appropriations for strategic missile
systems were increased by 500 million dollars. Sums appropriated for new
weapons development have hit record highs for the last 10 years. The
magazine Military Review states that "the U.S. Army, supported by a highly-
developed industry and raw materials base, has a realistic potential for
development and maximum expansion of its nuclear arms arsenal and can con-
tinue deploying units and subunits for utilization of these weapons.i3
It is evident from AEC reports that research and development in the area
of nuclear arms are aimed at perfecting nuclear warheads and developing
new raw materials for them. This research is concentrated at major
laboratories located at Albuquerque, Los Alamos (New Mexico), and Liver-
more (California). Under laboratory conditions research is being con-
ducted which is aimed at increasing the destructive effects of nuclear
explosions. A capability has been developed to employ new materials for
nuclear warheads. For example, transplutonium elements with low critical
mass can be used to build very sma'.l tactical nuclear warheads.
Theoretical research in the fields of nuclear and general physics, hydro-
dynamics, chemistry, metallurgy, and mcthematics have made it possible to
improve environment simula_t C -,, 11-yith t:he objective of further studying
th., propagation and effects ui. nucle.ir -xplosions.
The search for ways to achieve further increase in the destructive effects
of nuclear weapons is connected with solving the problem of increasing
the percentage of utilization of the nuclear energy generated in a burst,
and this in turn leads to a reduction in the size and weight of nuclear
warheads without diminishing their destructive force. In the future it
will be possible to design means of warhead delivery which will be smaller
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and lighter in weight than the well-known Davy Crockett system. The
development program to produce lighter and smaller nuclear weapons
specifies in particular the development of new 105, 155;, 175 mm atomic
shells and small thermonuclear devices for new types of strategic missile
warheads,
Underground nuclear testing is continuing, for the purpose of testing new
warhead devices, as well as to study the effect of nuclear bursts on
personnel and military installations. In spite of the treaty prohibiting
testing in the atmosphere, U.S. test facilities are maintained ready to
resume such testing on short notices This is confirmed by the retention
and maintenance of the requisite facilities, measuring equipment, and
refresher training for test facility personnel.
The United States is continuing to devote considerable attention to the
development of strategic offensive forces, although in 1.968 the USSR and
the United States reached an agreement to initiate strategic arms limita-
tion talks, During the last 2-3 years the U.S. government has undertaken
efforts aimed at further accelerating the development of strategic offen-
sive forces, At the end oY 1968 the U.S. made tf-e decision to develop the
WS-120A ICBM, which has a range of 12,000 km and can carry a 3100 kg pay-
load o Some Mi .tuteman-1 s i l o s are being modified to accommodate this new
missile. Dev,'lopment of the Minuteman-3 missile was completed in 1971;
this missile is capable of carrying rultiple warheads, it is believed
that such a missile can be employed to destroy several targets located at
a substantial distance from one another. By Oho end of 1974 the Minute-
man-3 missile is scheduled to replace all 500 Minutemen-lB, and then the
Minuteman-2.
At a press conference in 1171 U.S. Defense Secretary Lai+.-d stated that the
Pentagon intended to request additional funds frnm Congress for further
deployment of these ICBMs At the same true the new Poseidon-3 missile,
with a maximum range of 5000 km, has become operational. This missile
carries powerful multiple warheads.
The arming of nuclear submarines with the Poseidon.-3 began in 1971. Work
is rreser..tly in progress to improve them further; in the opinion of
American experts this will substantially increace navy combat capability.
Recently the American press reported a statement by Laird which indicates
that the United States is actively studying the possibility of building
a new type nuclear submarine capable of attacking surface units while
remaining beyond the effective range of their ASW weapons,
It is planned to build in the eighties nuclear submarines armed with
6000-mile missiles; the maximum range of existing submarine-launched ICBMs
is somewhat greater than 3000 miles.
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Work is in progress to develop high-thrust nuclear rocket engines, in
order to increase missile range and payload. A designed engine called
Nerva, is to produce a thrust of approximately 34,000 kg. It would sub-
sequently be improved, for extensive utilization in spacecraft and rockets.
In the search for ways to increase the survivability of strategic nuclear
forces, they are studying the possibilities and feasibility of a shift to
mobile systems established in the near future on the basis of the Minute-
man missile.
Approximately 2 years ago a decision was made to speed up development of
a new strategic bomber; it is scheduled to replace the B-52 strategic
bomber in the latter half of the seventies.
Since 1964 Great Britain, on the basis of an agreement with the United
States, has been working on a program to develop its own strategic nuclear
weapons. In conformity with this program the Polaris-A3 missile is being
modified by the addition of a new multiple warhead, which should make it
pc3sible, as reported in the press, to keep this missile operational up to
the end cf the seventies.
0perati-.,nal-tactical missiles are constantly being refined and upgraded.
Advanr_ing the possibility of waging war solely with offensive tactical
nuclear weapons, Pentagon leaders are making a great effort to improve
their performance characteristics, Plans called for snaking operational in
1971 the new Lance missile, which was to replace the obsolete Little John,
Honest John, and Sergeant missiles, Ground forces of the United States and
its allies should be armed with this new missile by 1976,4 In view of the
fact that the Lance missile can be employed most effectively at ranges of
30-140 km, efforts have been under way to develop a tactical missile with a
range to 30-40 km,
Nor should one ignore the factor of the constant endeavor by revenge-
seeking circles in rest Germany to arm t.-heir forces with nuclear weapons;
U.S. and NATO military-political leaders are doing everything to assist
them in their desires, It is a well-known fact, for example, that the
nuclear planning group contains a representative of the FRG. What is more,
this group has assigned to operations entities of the FRG and British
armies elaboration of all matters connected with employment of nuclear
weapons. It has been reported on numerous occasions in the press that with
the consent-of the United States and NATO shafts have been prepared along
the FRG frontier, in which nuclear devices can be placed. Thus the
Bundeswehr command has succeeded in planting along the border between the
FRG and Czechoslovakia a nuclear minefield, for the purpose of covering
powerful friendly offensive forces and creating formidable obstacles in the
path of opposing troops. Nuclear landmines are stored at supply depots in
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the FRG and can be placed in the ready shafts on a moment's no-
tice.
Plans for the further development of nuclear weapons give appropriate
emphasis to research and development for the purpose of perfecting means
of detection and determination of the parameters of nuclear explosions.
The [Vella] program, being carried out under the supervision of the U.S.
Defense Department director of defense research and engineering, is working
on the development of special equipment to detect various types of nuclear
explosicns: underground, in the atmosphere, and in space.
Frightening the American people with stories of a threat of nuclear attack
by the Soviet Union, the U.S. government has recently succeeded in ob ain-?
ing heavy appropriations for constructing an ABM systera. The decision to
build such a system was made in 1967. The system was refined in 1969-1970
and is being constructed under the designation "Safeguard."
In addition to improvement and further stockpiling of offensive nuclear
weapons, ways are being sought to achieve more effective utilization of
these weapons, as attested by the large number of military exercises held
in the United States and in Europe. Methods of combat operations with and
without the employment of weapons of mass destruction are worked on at
these exercises. VArious factors have influenced the shift to employment
of weapons of mass destruction; one of the most important factors is the
desire to launch a preemptive nuclear attack.
Chemical Weapons
Aggressive circles in the United States and NATO are also counting
heavily on chemical weapons. Concealing their intentions behind statements
about the "humaneness" of these weapons, they are devoting considerable
attention to perfecting and stockpiling such weapons.
The United States has not yet ratified the 1925 Geneva Agreements which
prohibit the employment in war of suffocating and other toxic agents. In
addition, since the end of World War II the United States has been under-
taking a major reorganization of the chemical warfare service. At the
present time the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical
weapons by the U.S. Army is supervised by a special division which operates
approximately 15 research and manufacturing establishments. Testing
grounds and laboratories contain hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
sophisticated equipment. In addition to the research centers of the U.S.
Department of Defense, the research effort involves a large number of
civilian higher educational institutions and establishments. Appropria-
tions for chemical weapons research and development total in excess of
300-400 million dollars a year.
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Research results are practically applied at plants manufacturing toxic
agents. At various times the press has reported the manufacture of the
chemical agent Vx at the Newport Chemical Plant, as well as the storage
and manufacture of sarin at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. This same
facility contains equipment to construct chemical agent aircraft bombs and
warheads for Honest John, Sergeant missiles as well as other ground and air
weapons,
The T/O of U.S. Army military units specify chemical service officers frn::~
top to bottom.
In addition to the United States, considerable efforts in the area of
chemical weapons are being conducted in the European countries, particular-
ly the FRG and Great Britain. There have been numerous reports of toxic
substances entering the waters of the Rhine, which attest to the manufac-
ture of toxic agents iva the FRG. Quite symptomatic is close collaboration
between American chemical weapons centers and West Ge:~man enterprises --
the successors of IG Farbenindustrie, which manufactured the gas Zyklon B
for Nazi concentration camps. There is occurring a very active ex-
change of various delegations for the purpose of acquaintance with the
manufacture of chemical weapons. In particular, it was reported that the
Pine Bluff Arsenal was visited by a group of West German generals and other
officers, including the Bundeswehr commander of artillery and chief of the
army chemical service.
Research being conducted in Great Britain is being kept strictly secret.
Very little information is published in the press, while official spokesmen
for the governmenr :_rid Ministry of Defense refrain from commenting on this
subject., The only official statement issuing from the Ministry of Defense
in the last decade, confirming the conduct of experiments determining the
effect of neuroparalytic. agents on humans, was made in 1960. Although there
have been no other official statements since then, there is reason to as-
sume that work in the area of chemical weapons has not ceased. A confirma-
tion of this is the existence of chemical weapons test facilities. In view
of the lack of large unpopulated areas in the British Isles, these facili-
ties have been set up in Canada,
The U,,S, and NATO arsenal of chemical weapons contains various types of
toxic agr:nts, from those which temporarily disable to those which are
lethal.
The group of lethal toxic agents includes agents of neuroparalytic, skin
vesicant, asphyxiation and general toxic effect.
In the opinion of U.S. and NATO military leaders, neuroparalytic toxic
agents are the most promising. They can be employed for mass annihilation
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of personnel? The major agents of this type are. Sarin and Vx; the former
is u nst a b 1 e; while the latter is a stable substance. Since very large
quantities of Sarin have been stockpiled, its manufacture has been stopped?
The manufacture of Vx is continuin;, It is apparent from a U.S. Army
munit_ons list that sarin and Vx are extensively employed with various
types of artillery shells (105, 155 and 203,2 mm howitzers, 127 and 155 mm
guns, 127 mm multiple rocket launchers; which fire 45 rockets simultaneous-
ly), and missiles (Honest John, Sergeant, and Lance)? They are also
employed with chemical mines, aircraft bombs and airplane spray tanks.
Neuroparalytic agents penetrate the human organism through the skin,
respiratory and digestive organs, producing paralysis and death. These
agents act quickly, One drop of Vx coming into contact with the vic_iLn's
skin is fatal
The Armed Forces of the United States, Great Britain, France; Italy, Canada,
and other capitalist countries have neuroparalytic war gases in their
arsenals.
The principal skin-vesicant toxic agent is mustard gas.. Although less
lethal than saran and Vx, on the whole it is an extremely effective war
gas, which strongly affects troop combat capability. Mustard gas can be
stored for long periods of time with:,ut breaking down.
Psychochemical-effect toxic agents temporarily disable the victim. Per-
sonnel exposed to these agents become physically or mentally incapable of
combat for several hcurs or even days. A t pical psychochemical agent is
LSD, It causes optical and auditory hallucinations and perception dis-
turbance which last up to 24 hours and more, as well as a state similar to
schizophrenia, The most widespread substance in this group is BZ, which
causes headache, nausea, dizziness and abrupt loss of mental equilibrium.
So-called crowd-control agents include CS, which tr a powerful lacrimator
and irritant, as well as phenacyl chloride and adamsite.
It is evident from a cursory examination of the effects of the above-
enumerated ;.oxic agents that the U.S.. and NATO armies possess highly
effective agents capable of producing mass military and civilian casualties.
But this does not satisfy the Pentagon and NATO leaders. On their orders
research is continuing, with the aim of improving existing and developing
new types of toxic agents. First and foremost one observes an effort to
develop agents capable of striking persons equipped with individual
protective gear, Natural poisons in particular are employed toward this
end, poisons which are hundreds and-thousands of times more toxic than
sarine Development of nonlethal toxic agents is proceeding in the
direction of new, powerful substances which produce irritation of the eyes
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and respiratory passages, which produce temporary mental disturbance, as
well as loss of vision, hearing, etc.
The existence of a large arsenal of toxic agents and continuing development
efforts suggest the conclusion that U.S. and NATO leaders are preparing
for the utilization of chemical weapons which, in their view, may occur
both in a nuclear and nonnuclear war.
The general aim in utilization of chemical weapons is formulated in U.S.
Field Manual FM3-10, Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment (1966
edition). They are expressed as follows : "Employment of chemical agents
aims at influencing combat operations by causing injury to or threatening
injury to enemy personnel," This same manual formulates the specific
missions and objectives of employment of various types of chemical agents.
Sarin is prescribed when the objective is to hit by surprise personnel
without gas masks. The chemical agent Vx is employed when enemy personnel
are situated in shelters and have gas masks.
U.S. Field Manual TM3-125 recommends that psycho chemical agents be em-
ployed with the aim of introducing confusion among defending or counterat-
tacking troops, and with the aim of aff,acting important control centers at
critical moments in combat. The effect t` such chemical agents on combat
is discussed in a book by Rothschild, in which the author states that
"under the effect of LSD a commander loses the ability to make logical,
rational decisions and to issue clear orders. Coordination is disrupted."5
Similar tasks are perfoz::ed by the so-called crowd-control agents, which
have been widely employed in Vietnam. Although American propaganda
attempts to demonstrate their harmlessness; facts indicate precisely the
opposite. It was recently stated at a press conference in Hanoi that in
the period 1969-1970 alone U.S. aircraft applied chemical agents to
a total of 1,836,950 hectares in South Vietnam, as a result of which
P5',000 persons suffered from poisoning, hundreds of whom died. During
the first 9 months of 1970 alone, 415,000 hectares of land were rendered
unusable? According to figures of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, one seventh of South Vietnam has been turned into
useless wasteland as a result of employment of chemical agents.
The American press has also reported employment of CS against personnel
taking shelter in tunnel complexes, as well as the spraying of CS from
helicopters over difficult-access terrain where the presence of patriot
troops was suspected. Specific examples are given of employment of CS
against a popular liberation army headquarters and fortified positions
in combination with artillery fire., as well as in the execution of other
missions.6
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The U.S. and NATO armies possess the most diversified means of delivering
chemical agents. The air force has aircraft chemical bombs and aircraft
spray tankE for the delivery of all types of chemical agents, including
lethal agents, Ground troops are armed with missile chemical warheads and
chemical artillery shells; while naval forces possess chemical projectiles
for 127 mm nava guns and 4C'tube rocket launchers.
Biclcgical Weapons
Sine World War II biological weapons development has taken place chiefly
in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Although this research
is being kept much more secret than efforts in the area of chemical
weapons, the press and statements by ~:ertain officials have indicated that
such activities have not been stopped.,
:.n a book entitled Weapons of Tomorrow by D? Rcthschild, published in 1965,
the author lists in a systematized manner the results of numerous research
projects in the area of biological weapons and on th,.-: basis of these
results offers conclusicns on the methods of employment of such weapons in
war? A book by S. Hirsch,' published in 1969, synthesizes a great
quantity of factual material on development of the U.S. chemical-bacterio-
logical potential? The author shows the great scale of effort in the
area of chemical and biological weapons and discusses the major research
facilities in the United States and other NATO countries, as well as
plans for employment of these weapons in war..
Such a wealth of material could be acquired only on the basis of large-
scale studies requiring considerable time and money., An abrupt increase in
appropriations at the beginning of the sixties made it possible to recruit
various research centers and universities to work in the area of biological
weapons., As a result of this, as is noted in U.S, .Army Technical Manual
TM3-216;, it has been possible to produce many disease pathog:::ns which had
been impossible to produce in the past,
The U.S. Army now possesses three basic types of biological agents: for
use against humans- animals, and plants, They can subdivided into two
groups; with a short incubation period (plague, anthrax, tularemia, cholera,
encephalitis, spotted fever), of 1-3 days, and a long incubation period,
of a week or more (smallpox, brucellosis, typhus, Q fever). Such bacterial
agents as pneumonic plague, anthrax, and yellow fever frequently are fatal.
In view of the length of the incubation period;, the pathogens of the
first group can be more effectively employed against troops in combat, and
those of the second group against the population of large cities and other
strategic targets, With the employment of biological agents in combination
with chemical weapons, pathogens of the first group would be employed
simultaneously or later, while these of the second group would be employed
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earlier. In this latter case it is possible that biological agents would
be introduced by acts of sabotage before the outbreak of war, in order
that mass affection of military personnel and civilians break out at the
moment war is initiated.
It follows from an analysis of the properties of biological weapons that
the principal purpose of such agents is the mass affection of military per-
sonnel and the civilian population? both to render them disabled and to
produce a powerful psychological effect.
One reads in U.S. Army Field Manual FM3-10, Che..:?cal and Biological
Weapons Employment, that "biological agents are employed primarily against
enemy personnel. However, manpower in the broader sense might also be a
target, which would include military personnel and the civilian popula-?
tion... Biological agents producing a fast combat effect, that is quickly
producing fatal or disabling affections must be employed against hostile
troops on the battlefield," It is most probable that pathogens with a
short incubation period will be employed for these purposes.
Various manuals recommend the employment of biological weapons both by
means of overt and covert biological attack on the enemy. The basic and
most effective method is he spraying of biological agents into the air
and the consequent creation of a biological aerosol. This technique in
the first place can infect large areas and in the second place accomodates
utilization of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear and chemical weapons;.
We si:ould also note that the protection of personnel becomes more difficult
with the aerosol method: aerosol particles can enter the system through the
respiratory organs; they can penetrate buildings, other structures and
vehicles which are not airtight-sealed, together with the air.
Biological agents will be delivered to the target by aircraft, warship,
? submarine, balloon or rocket. Agent atomization would be effected with the
aid of detonation-type devices (bombs, cluster bombs, rockets, artillery
shells, mines), as well as special spray devices mounted on airplanes,
rotary wing aircraft. ;,nd trucks. Many of the above devices have already
? been developed, wi-' 4."ers are present? under development. It has been
reported in the Ar 1cress, for example, that there is a device which
can be mounted on a -.;;ting reconnaissance drones for the delivery of
biological -,.gents, and that rha U?S. Armed Forces have an aircraft auto-
matic spray urit designed to be wing-mounted on the F-100, F-105 and F-4C
aircraft. The latter has been used by the Americans in South Vietnam.
In 1967 an aircraft liquid spraying unit was tested, ;.sports indicate that
there is a container which could easily carry biological agents and be
released over specified target areas. In March 1967 scientists at Fort
Detrick completed a development program to produce a warhead for the
Sergeant missile, carrying biological agents. Official documents, and in
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particular the above-mentioned U.S, Army Field Manual FM3-10, indicate
that there are such warheads available for other missiles as well,. This
field manual, in contrast to the 1962 edition, not only states the fact of
biological agent ammunition in the arsenal of the U.S. Army but also
specifies the procedures for supplying line units with these items. The
basic supply plan calls for temporary storage of such items at depots
located in the United States, their transport to overseas bases and trans-
fer to the appropriate services.
Research conducted for the purpose of further perfecting biological
weapons is aimed at developing even more effective disease pathogens which
are more resistant to medical treatment, various environmental factors and
which contain several types of pathogens.
Such are the state of and development prospects for weapons of mass
destruction in the major NATO natior_s0 It is apparent from the above that
the United States and other capitalist countries have embarked upon an
ambitious program aimed at further improving the quality and increasing
the quantity of weapons of mass destruction. The scale of efforts in this
area and the rate at which these weapons are being added to the arsenals
of the NATO nations are assuming an alarming character. The imperialist
states are creating tension points in various parts of the world, engaging
in overt brigandage and violation of international law and treaties.
Bearing in mind the great danger imperialism constitutes to peace and
mankind as a whole, the Soviet Union is taking all steps to ward off
aggression, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is carrying out
Lenin's behest not to forget for a single moment the predatory nature of
imperialism, its hatred coward the Soviet system, and is tirelessly in-
creasing our nation's defense capability.
We presently possess the necessary capability for reliable defense of the
conquests of Communism. We do not forget for a single moment, however,
that imperialism is continuing the arms race and is strengthening military
blocs aimed against the socialist countries and the popular liberation
movement. Under these conditions a strengthening of the might of the
Soviet Union and the other socialist nations and an increase in the vigil-
ance and combat readiness of their armed forces constitute an objective
necessity dictated by the interests of defending the conquests of
socialism,
Tl;e Soviet Armed Forces, constantly improving their combat skills, are ever
prepared to carry out their patriotic and international duty together with
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the fighting men of Warsaw Pact member nations -- to defend the
peaceful labors, of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the entire
sociali3t commonwealth, to constitute a bulwark of peace and security of
all peace-loving peoples.
FOOTNOTES.
1, Military Balance, 1968-1969, London, page 16.
2, Probltmmy Mira i Sotsializma, No 3, 1971, page 41.
3. Military Review, October 1969.
4. Soldat and Technik, No 10, 1970.
5. D. Rotshil'd: Oruzhiye zavtLashnego dnya (Tomorrow's Weapons), Voyen-
izdat, 1966.
6. Array Digest, November 1968.
7. S. Khersb! Khimicheskoye i biologicheskoye oruzhiye (Chemical and
Bio'-'ical Weapons), Voyenizdat, 1970.
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ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN "VOYENNAYA MYSL'" IN 1971
Title and Author No. of Journal
Page
The 24th Party Congress, Editorials and
Articles on Problems
With a Firm Step - Editorial
1
3
Military Question in the Theory of Scientific
Communism - Ye. Sulimov
1
10
Some Features in the Development of Soviet
Military-Economic Thought - A. Korniyenko
1
28
A Scientific Approach in Ideological Work -
P. Isakov, V. Merkulov
2
26
Methodological Principles and Problems of
Military-Sociological Research - V. Koncplev
2
38
The Party of Lenin - the Fighting Vanguard, of
the Soviet People - Editorial
3
3
The International Indoctrination of Soldiers of the
Armies of Warsaw Pact Countries - I. Yakubovskiy
3
14
The Defense of the Achievements of Socialism - the
General Law of the Building of Communism - V. Zubarev
3
30
On the Leninist Course - Editorial
4
3
The 24th CPSU Congress on Current Problems in
the Building of Communism a-d the Strengthening
of the Defensive Might of the USSR -
S. Lukonin, A. Migols.t'yev
5
3
The Leninist Style for Management of the Military
Economy - K. Spidchenko, G. Fedorov
5
22
Destruction of the Assault Forces
Imperialism - A. Grechko
of
6
3
Work with Military Cadres - to the Level of
Requirements of the 24th CPSU Congress - A. Altunin
7
3
V. I. Lenin on Socialist Legality and Its Role
in the Ore anizetional Development of the Soviet
Armed Forces - P. Romanov, V. Belyavskiy
j
13
The Tasks of Soviet Military Science in the
Light of the Decisions of the 2JLth CPSU Congress
8
3
Problems of War and Peace and the World
Revolutionary Process - M. Vetrov
8
10
The 24th CPSU Congress and Questions of the
Scientific Guidance of Ideological Work
with the Troops - S. I1'in 9 3
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Title and Author No. of Journal Page
Leninist Ideas Concerning the Role of the
Rear in Warfare - X. Abramov, M. Ivanov
9
15
The Ideological Training of Officers - to the
Level of Requirements of the 24th CPSU Congress
10
3
Strictest Obserti:lace of Socialist Law - a Major
Condition for the Further Strengthening of
One-Man Command - A. Polev
10
23
The Distorti:>n by Maoists of Leninist ideas on
the Defers'; of Socialism - V. Zubarev
10
71
War and the Socialist Revolution - A. Milovidov
11
3
Ideological-Political Training of Young Officers
of the Czechoslovak People's Army - V. Matilfta
1.1
20
On Guard for Peace and the Building of
Communism - Editorial
12
3
The Moral Factor in Local Warfare - D. Volkogonov
12
18
The Use of Leninist Experience by the
Czechoslovak Communist Party in the Organizational
Development of the Socialist Army - A. Michl`iak
12
27
General Qwestions of Military Science
Prepare Competent Scientific-PedagcgIcal Cadres
B. Mikhaylov, A. Krasnov, D. Kucherenko, P. Trifono:
1
63
Soviet Military Science - an Important Factor
of the Defensive Might of the Country - Editorial
2
3
The Application of Scientific Organization of
Labor Methods in the Planning and Organization
of Scientific Activities - G. Vasil'kev,
S. Perepelitskiy, No. Sokolkin
2
48
Military-Pedagogical Mastery -- I. Pugin
3
64
Questions on the History and Theory of
Military Science - V. Zemskov
14
Concerning the Topic, Content and Structure
of a Training Course in Military Economics -
A. Pozharov
4
48
Programmed Learning - an Effective Way to Perfect
thke Training Process - I. Vakurov, A. Butivchenko
4
53
On the. question of the Science of Troop Control -
K. Dubravin, P. Shemanskiy
4
58
The Obje tive Laws of War and Their Reflection in
Soviet Military Science - V. Morozov, S. Tyushkevich
5
55
The Important Task of Higher Educational
Institutions and Scientific Research Institutions -
I. Shkad,::)v
58
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Ti; -e and Author N'a. of Journal Page
Programmed Learning in Higher Military
Schools - I. Kulikov, G. Ionov, P. T.,itvnenko
B. S'V-rel'che '3ko, P. Smirnov
6
65
Current Progrc-3s and Cosmic Research
(Interview with Cosmonauts)
7
22
PhE D:.aiectics of Possibility and Reality
in Military Affairs - V. Molchanovskiy
7
30
Pedagogical Tact - A. Barabanshchikov, V. Vdovyuk
7
71
The Character and Basic Principles of Military
Science Research - M. Kholodov, A. Sidorenko
8
20
Methods of Military Science - V. Andreyev
8
29
Developing in Every Way the Theory of
Military Economics - A. Muzychenko
8
50
D,nzv'lopment of a Theory of Troop Control -? V. Morozov
9
38
The Military-Economic Basis of Tasks - Yu. Solnyshkov
9
57
Personal Responsibility - I. Ivanov
9
61
The Development of Military-Economic Science -
M. Gladkov
10
655
On the Question of Programmed Learning - I. Shkadov
11
15
Military-Scientific Conferences - an Important
Form of Military-Scientific Work - A. Tonkik
12
35
The Development of Military Terminology -
P. Trifonov, A. Lagovskiy, G. Rudenko
12
68
Indoctrinating Students in the Process of
Their Education - N. Sal'nikov
12
75
The Art of Warfare
Leninist Methodology for the Solution of
Problems in the Art of Warfare - G. Lukava
1
19
The Method of Resolving Operational Tasks
with the Use of Automated Equipment -
V. Druzhinin, D. Kontorov
1
40
The Calculation of Hydrometeorological Conditions
in the Planning of Combat Operations - I. Pombrik
1
53
On the Quantitative Expression of the Quality
of Troop Control - P. Myasoyedov
1
6o
On Methods of Increasing Operational Efficiency
in the Work of Control Agencies - V. Savel'yev
2
57
On the Question of the Quantitative Expression
of the Quality of Troop Control -
Ye. Dashevskiy, V. Leonov
2
64
The Significance of the Seas and Oceans
in Combat Actions - K. Stalbo
3
43
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Title and Author No. of journal
Page
The Role of Cities in Armed Combat - G. Yefimav
3
51
Military Strategy and Economics - M. Povaliy
4
24
Methods of Determining Road Network Requirements
of Troops During an Offensive - Yu. Parfilov
4
35
Artificial Earth Satellites in the Early
Warning System - Yu. Yur'yev
4
41
?
Questions on the Methods of Organizing Combat
Operations - V. Vinnikov
5
70
Some Problems of Surprise in Warfare
(Translated by: I. Andrusbkevich)
5
76
Coalition Antiair Defense - B. Zabelok
5
85
Leninist T'heoretical Principles of Soviet
Military Strategy - S. Taran
6
35
?
The Scientifically Substantiated Style for
Management Activity of Military Cadres -
A. Bel~'ayev
6
46
Diplom,Acy and Military Strategy - V. Dmitriyev
7
40
Defense in the Past and Present -
G. Ionin, K. Kushch-ZbRrko
7
51
Combat Actions on the Sea - V. Bestuzhev
7
62
Psychological Aspects of Surprise
(Translated by: I. Andrushkevich)
7
82
On the Influence of Physical-Geographic Conditions
on the Conduct of Combat Operations -
K. Koziov, N. Pronin, M. Shirokov
3
36
The Influence of Helicopters on the Tactics of
Combined Arms Combat - I. Weinhold
8
46
On the Question of Foresight - D. Samorukov
9
22
Basic Trends in the Organizational Development
and 'Employment of Military Aviation - A. Drozhzhin
9
32
Methcds of Checking the Readiness of Weapons
Systems for Combat 'Use - V. Demidov
9
46
Basic Theoretical Questions on Troop Cooperation
in Combat - G. Tseglin
9
53
Correlation of Forces and Rates of Advance -
A. Gaponov
10
32
Sea and Ocean Communications and Warfare
on Them - B. Balev
10
40
Employment of Helicopters in the Combat
Operations of Ground Forces - I. Andrukhov
10
49
Questions on the Methods of Organization of
Combat Operations - A. Serov. Ye. Sokolov,
B. Trusevich, N. Kil'yachenkov
i0
59
123
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Title and Author No. of Journal
Page
Evolution in the Correlation of Strategy,
Operational Art and Tactics - 1. Zav'yalov
11
25
Principles of Military Art and Their
Development ?? V. Chervonobab
11
34
Troop Control to the Level of Current
Requirements - M. Ivanov
11
45
General Principles of the Approach to Appraising
the Effectiveness of Combined Arms
Control Systems - N. Zubkov
11
53
Military Camouflage - Kh. Ada.., R. Gebel'
11
63
The Significance of the Chemical Situation
and Its Evaluation - Kh. Gorges
11
69
Operational Efficiency as the Main Criterion
for the Quality of Troop Control - B. Vaysman
12
40
On the ;Iethods cf Influencing an Opponent's
Decisions - M. Ionov
12
46
The Status and Some Trends in the Development
of Radioelectronic Warfare - A. Palsy
12
53
Concerning the Density of Artillery - J. Kaczmarek
12
63
Military History Section
The Communist Party - the Organizer of the
Victory of the Soviet People in the
Great Patriotic Jar - S. Tyushkevich
2
16
Strategic Cooperation in the Great Patriotic War--
N. F?-I-vlenko
2
68
Fifteen Years on Guard for the Achievements
of East German Socialism - R. Mentsel'
3
57
The Military Experience of the Paris Commune -
I. Rostunov
3
72
Soviet Military Organization and Its Historical
Forms - A. Timorin, V. Terent'yev
4
66
The Initial Period of a War - S. Ivanov
5
34
The 50th Anniversary of Voyennyy Vestnik
5
46
Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War
of the Soviet Union - S. Ivanov
6
20
The 3rd Guards Tank Army in the Battle of Kursk -
I. Yakubovskiy
8
54
Rear Support of the Soviet Armed Forces During
Lhe Great Patriotic War - S. Maryakhin
9
69
Military Questions in the History of the CPSU -
V. Matsulenko
10
12
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Title and Author No. of Journal Page
The 50th Anniversary of the Periodical
Voyennyy Zarubezhnik (Foreign Military News)
12
72
Foreign Section
Character and Main Results of the Military
Operations of U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam -
P. Maslennikov
The Foreign Press on the Development of
Aviation - A. Drozhzhin
1
79
Research in the Sphere of the Social Sciences
in the Interests of the U.S. Department of
Defense - V. Borisov
2
83
West Germany: Its Politics and the Bundeswehr -?
0. Rubtsov
3
83
Limited Warfare in U.S. Foreign Policy -
V. Perfilov
4
80
The Problem of Combat Against Nuclear
Submarines - N. V'yuiienko
4
9o
Amphibious Landing Operations in the Plans
of the Pentagon - Ye. Kondrat'yev
7
87
The Development of Military Space Systems
and Equipment in the USA - A. Vasil'yev
8
77
Ideological Training of Personnel of Imperialist
Armies for War - A. Shevchenko
9
80
America Under Arms
10
84
Radioelectronic Equipment in Theaters of
Military Operations - V. Grankin, V. Galinskiy
11
73
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Aggressive
Plans of NATO - M. Kir'yan
12
84
Criticism and Bibliography
On Increasing the Effectiveness of
Troop Control ?. A. Karpov
1
87
Ideological Aggression - V. Zav'yalov
2
90
War and Politics - 0. Rzhefshevskiy
3
91
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010002-2
 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010002-2
No. of Journal
Page
The Defeat of the Fascist Troops on the
Southwest Axis in 1944 and 1945 - V. Kurasov
The Militaristic Essence of Contemporary
Capitalism - G. Arzumanov, V. Kadykov,
I. Gorshechnikov, S. Kochubey, M. Shifman
Some Trends in the Development of Operations
6
6
77
83
Research Theories and Systems Analysis -
V. Ryab chuk
8
83
Communist Morals and Military Duty -
V. Serebryannikov
8
91
Equipment and the Psychological Factor -
I. Pe 'rov
9
91
V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science -
Ye. Rybkin
11
83
Book on Troop Control - I. Chetverikov
11
83
At Readers' Conferences
7
94
Meetings with Readers
9
95
Meetings with Readers and Authors
10
93
Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010002-2