1984 VULNERABILITY TESTING REVIEW SHAGAN RIVER TEST AREA, USSR

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• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
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• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
basic imagery interpretation report
1984 Vulnerability Testing Review
Shagan River Test Area, USSR (S)
Secret
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JUNE 1985
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1984 Vulnerability
1 esting Review Shagan River Test Area
CATEGORY BE NO. COMIREX NO
MAP R[ f E!RENCE
ACIC, USATC, Series 200, Sheet 0238-15HL, scale 1:200,000.
NEGATION DATE Qf required)
NA
1. 1 his report is the sixth in a series of annual NPIC reports on the vulnerability testing program at
the Shagan River Test Area in the USSR. It provides a thorough description and analysis of high explosive,
vulnerability testing activity observed during 1984. Three ICBM silos in vulnerability area 89 were the
primary test objects during this year; the 1984 test series may be the last multiple-silo vulnerability tests
conducted and observed at Shagan River. NPIC has reported extensively on high-explosive activity at
Shagan River since 1968 and has published an annual review on vulnerability testing since 1979. This
report contains 37 figures and two tables. The date of the latest imagery used is
IS/WN)
is the primary locus for the Soviet vulnerability testing program. This program tests the 25)(~
vulnerability of strategic structures using HE" simulators to generate nuclear effects.'-s More than 80
vulnerability-related HE events have occurred at Shagan River since the program began in 1968. Many of
the early HE tests did not appear to be directed at targets other than sensor arrays. These early tests were
probably conducted to determine explosive characteristics and to perfect HE simulator designs. Later in
the program, simulator designs were measured by instrumented generic test articles (single- or dual-
walled cylinders buried vertically with their tops exposed). Test articles were used to calibrate test beds
consisting of two or more HE sirulators detonated simultaneously to create an environment which
mimicked some of the effects of a nuclear weapons detonation. These simulated nuclear effects were
usually ground shock (both direct and air-blast induced) and overpressure. Some evidence suggests that
both EMP and Thermal simulators have been used or attempted. (SAWN)
3. Concurrent with the early HE experiments and calibrations, six full-scale Soviet ICBM silos, a
generic bunker, a deeply buried probable C3 structure, and several Soviet rocket force-related hardened
antennas were built. These strategic structures were subjected to amultiple-target vulnerability test in
1974,~~ the first of 37 vulnerability tests of Soviet strategic structures to be conducted through 1984. During
the last 10 years, vulnerability tests of strategic structures have included four multiple-silo tests, five deep
UG probable C3 structure tests, and a series of nine tests involving various kinds of hardened antennas
and cabling. In the same 10-year period, eight ICBM silos, two LCF silos, and at least eight hardened
antennas were built and subjected to the effects generated by HE simulators. (S~WN)
4. 1 he primary test objects during 1984 were three ICBM silos in vulnerability area 89: one each for
the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 missile systems. Each of these silos had been subjected to an earlier
vulnerability test, and each underwent repair and refurbishment during 1983 and 1984 prior to the tests.
As is typical of Soviet testing of missile silo vulnerabilities, acalibration test in area 122, using afull-scale
HI test bed surrounding a generic silo test article, preceded the tests of the ICBM silos. Other HE tests
during 1984 included a test of the vulnerability of buried cables, connections, and junction boxes in
vulnerability area 108 and the continuation of a series of small HE experiments started in 1983 around the
location 116 instrumentation bunker (Figure 1). (S~WN)
"~1 lisl ns is c>n page 46.
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1 he Shagan River Test Area of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving Ground (BE
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5. This report provides a detailed imagery analysis of the 1984 Soviet vulnerability tests at Shagan
River. Five tests and two experiments were conducted on at least five dates between June and September.
Evidence of the two experiments was provided by overhead imagery alone (Table 1). A
listing of all HE tests conducted at the Shagan River Test Area since 1968 is also provided (Table 2). This
listing is intended to illustrate the direction and scope of the Soviet vulnerability testing program and
includes additions and modifications to previously published listings. (SAWN)
Table 1.
1984 Vulnerability-Related Tests at Shagan River Test Area, USSR
Alert
No
Time
(GMT)
Yield
(Approx kt)
Imagery-
Derived
Coordinates Remarks
49-57-28N Silo 156 calibration 25X1
078-49-59E test in area 122
50-03-15N Cabling & junction test
078-51-20E in area 108
49-57-44N Small HE experiments
078-52-23E at location 116
49-57-44N Small HE experiments
078-52-23E at location 116
49-58-02N Concurrent vulnerability
078-52-55E tests at silo 10,
49-57-57N silo 12,
078-53-OOE
49-58-08N & silo 13
078-52-52E in area 89
Calibration Test Location 116
6. Location 116, outside the southwestern
corner of vulnerability area 89, was the location of
the 1980 calibration silo test. In June 1983, work
was begun on a series of small HE experiments.
This activity resulted in two groups of small craters:
one group north of the 116 instrumentation bun-
ker and the other group east of the bunker. These
craters, most about 4 meters in diameter and a
meter in depth, were first observed during June
and July 1983. No seismic signals from these ex-
periments were identified, and no further activity
was observed in the area until 1984. (S~WN)
1984 HE Experiments
7. At least two small HE experiments, pro-
ducing six separate craters, were conducted be-
tween on the west
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side of the location 116 instrumentation bunker
(Figure 2). On~people were seen north of
this instrumentation bunker in the vicinity of the
1983 craters. This activity was confirmed on
when a new cable trench system, extend-
ing from the rear of the bunker, was observed. The
trench terminated at three points along the west
side of the bunker. When the site was next ob-
served on ~ there were three new craters:
one near each of the three trench terminals. The
craters were circular, roughly 4 meters in diameter,
and 1 meter in depth. A stain extended 100 meters
south of the craters before dissipating. (S/WN)
8. Little or no activity was observed around
the new craters or the adjacent bunker until
On that date, indications of minor ex-
ernmost of the August craters. Imagery of
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area. No further experiments were conducted at
location 116 during the year, As with the 1983
experiment, no seismic signals were received from
these experiments, probably due to the very small
size of the detonations. The craters from both the
1983 and 1984 experiments are all nearly the same
size, and many appear to have an additional hole
in the bottom. Whether these holes were the re-
sult of some posttest activity or were caused by the
explosive device was not discernible. (S/WN)
9, Additional study of other small cratering
events around the Shagan River Test Area contin-
ues tosupport the analysis that the experiments at
location 116 are part of the HE vulnerability pro-
gram and are not related to seismoc surveys or
other known range activity. The use of an instru-
mentation bunker in an area associated with vul-
nerability testing; the lack of any survey activity in
the immediate area; and the similarity between the
growing pattern of craters at location 116 and old-
er, abandoned HE test areas all support the analy-
sis. (SEWN)
Calibration Test Area 122
10. Area 122 is on the southernmost scarp of
the deflation basin, in the center of the Shagan
River Test Area. Area 122 is about 3.5 km west of
silo vulnerability area 89 and has been the primary
area for HE calibration testing since the spring of
1981, Before that time, calibration testing was con-
ducted in several locations including locations 5,
13, 51, 58, 116, and the HE cratering area north of
area 89, Since calibration testing began here in
1981, seven HE tests have been conducted, includ-
ing the one in 1984. (S/WN)
11. The first observation of new construction
activity in area 122 was on hen
a crane shovel was seen excavating a new silo
shaft. The silo excavation was the 156th drilled or
mined excavation at Shagan River. By
while the excavation of silo 156 continued,
more excavations had been started east of the
shaft. On 0 five excavations were in
an arc roughly 55 meters east of silo 156, The
excavations were 20 meters apart and were identi-
fied as DI-HEST shaft locations being prepared for
drillings. Prior to drilling DI-HEST shafts, which
require a large drill rig, the Soviets install surface
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casings around the future shaft positions to pre-
vent rig movement from collapsing the shafts. Sur-
face casings used for Shagan River DI-HEST shafts
typically have a diameter of Ofor the
outer casings andOfor the inner casings.
They are at least 10 meters deep. Although the
installations of the surface casings at silo 156 were
observed infrequently, they appeared to be consis-
tent with typical installations. (S~WN)
12. BvOthe DI-HEST surface cas-
ings were in the ground, ready for drilling, and two
silo wall se 7ments had been delivered to the site.
On~three silo wall segments were pres-
ent. Each silo wall segment was
with an outside diameter of
inside diameter of
high,
and an
Together, these
nents remained on the component platform where
the wall segments had previously been. These
components were installed on top of the wall seg-
ments, and the concrete had been poured by
Thus, the silo construction portion of the
project (Figure 4) was completed. (SAWN)
14. Construction of the HEST and BLEST sim-
ulators began on when the first arch of the
HEST simulator was erected (Figure 5). The footing
blocks for the HEST structure were laid in trenches
which placed the base of the simulator
below the top of the calibration silo. HEST footing
blocks are usually laid at the same height as the
top of the silo. In 1980, footing blocks were laid in
trenches at silo 6, a type IIID silo for the SS-11
ICBM. At silo 6, the footing blocks were
three ~;egments represent a "depth" of
tors, several meters deeper than any previous ge-
neric calibration silo. Calibration silo 16, used in
1981 and 1982, was at least 17 meters deep and
may have been as much as 20 meters deep. Silo
156, a deeper calibration silo, is the most recent
example of gradual evolution in Soviet testing
practices and may allow internal instrumentation
to obtain a more accurate recording of simulator
forces. The actual ICBM silos that are eventually
subjected to the simulator forces calibrated with
these test articles vary between 25 and 40 meters
in depth. Several cylindrical components were de-
livered to the silo 156 test site during Januar
These components had outside diameters of
meters and inside diameters of 0 They
were originally assessed to be silo base and head-
work pieces which would have made silo 156 over
30 meters deep. However, these components were
evidently delivered to the wrong test site. They
were later moved to silo 10 in area 89 and used to
build a horizontal cylinder on the side of the silo
headworks. (SAWN)
13. Work at the silo 156 test site continued
throughout February and March. Late in March, a
large drilling rig was delivered to the test site, and
drilling of the DI-HEST shafts began (Figure 3).
Drilling continued until at least ~ When
completed, the DI-HEST array consisted of five, 1-
meter shafts spaced 20 meters apart. The center
shaft was 54 meters from silo 156. The pair of
shafts nearest the center shaft was 56 meters from
the silo, and the outer pair of shafts was 63 meters
away from silo 156. By ~ one of the three
silo wall segments had been installed. All three silo
wall se =menu had been installed in the silo shaft
by ~~ Three probable silo closure compo-
r:c,a-i~/ooo~i/s5
below the silo door; thus, the volume of the HEST
structure was significantly decreased. This testing
anomaly and the use of fewer HE emplacement
shafts (five instead of seven or eight) in the rosette
DI-HEST were assessed to be means of lessening
the overpressure and ground shock generated by
the HE simulators. Reduced overpressure and
ground shock appeared to be necessary because
silo 6 was an older, less hardened missile silo. If
this analysis is correct, the HEST simulator over silo
156 was being calibrated to generate less over-
pressure than a typically constructed HEST simula-
tor. Whatever the purpose, the HEST structure lat-
er built over silo 13 (type IIIH) was like the one
over silo 156. (SAWN)
15. The arch-roofed portion of the HEST
structure had been completed by 0 al-
though neither end wall was in place. The HEST
structure was built from the standard refabricated
materials and was 14 meters
across the base, and 7 meters high from the foot-
ing block level to the peak of the arch. Because the
footing blocks were0 below grade and
the ground was backfilled around them, the peak
of the arch was 0 above the ground or
above the top of the silo. This modification de-
creased the nternal volume of
a standard HEST structure by 360 cubic meters or
about 27 percent. The internal volume of the HEST
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the ground around the HEST structure
was being leveled in preparation for the BLEST
bed. Stacks of HE containers for the BLEST bed had
been present since at le
They appeared
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in Shagan River
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volume of ~ ~ Before the HE was
laid out, an instrumentation cable trench, which
extended from the silo to the instrumentation bun-
ker, was backfilled. The instrumentation bunker
was not new but was one originally built for the
silo 16 calibration tests in 1981 and 1982. (S~WN)
16. When the silo 156 test site was next ob-
served onOtwo thirds of the BLEST bed had
been laid, and workers were laying out the rest of
the HE containers (Figure 6). Like the BLEST bed
configuration used in 1983, the silo 156 BLEST bed
consisted of rows of 12 HE con-
tainers. The spacing between the rows varied as in
the previous year; however, the rows were much
closer together and were greater in number. The
outer nine rows of containers were spaced 1 meter
apart, center to center, and formed a
meter outer bed. Imagery of sufficient interpret-
ability to distinguish the inner BLEST bed spacings
at silo 156 was not collected; however, three dif-
ferent bed spacings were on either side of the
HEST structure, as well as in front of and to the
rear of the structure. The inner BLEST bed spacings
at silo 156 were probably the same as spacings at
Silos 10, 12, and 13 because silo 156 was used to
calibrate the simulators used at these silos in the
September test. Therefore, the silo 156 BLEST bed
was probably over 70 meters long and contained
more than 400 cubic meters of HE containers.
is/WN)
17. Bv0 the HEST and BLEST simula-
tors were partially covered by overburden. Towed
scrapers and bulldozers were being maneuvered
from the burrow pits to the overburden pile and
back again, while a bailer was removing the wa-
ter/drilling mud from the DI-HEST shafts. The
overburden pile was almost complete on
and workers were connecting the BLEST bed tim-
ing/firing lines. Lightning arrestors had been erect-
ed around the HEST~BLEST overburden and along
the line of the DI-HEST array. Overcast monosco-
pic imagery ofOrevealed that the overbur-
den pile had been groomed into its final pretest
configuration and that most of the equipment and
personnel had been removed from the test site.
The necessary pretest imagery was not obtained,
so an accurate assessment of the HEST~BLEST
overburden volume was impossible. The pile ap-
peared normal for the emplaced simulators and
probably contained from 15 to 20 thousand cubic
meters of earth. (S~WN)
~zca-is/uuo~/s
A seismic yield of
The test results, observed on
eluded a large dark stain extending 1,800 meters
south-southwest, a large DI-HEST crater, and a
berm from the HEST~BLEST overburden (Figure 7).
The DI-HEST crater measured 125 b 47 meters lip
to lip with an average depth of below
normal terrain. The depth varied between 4 and 8
meters, and the height of the rim above the terrain
varied between 3 and 5 meters. Two axis profiles of
the DI-HEST crater (Figure 8) convey the true post-
test appearance of the test site area. The berm
around the silo from the HEST~BLEST overburden
was 84 by 49 meters and merged with the near lip
of the DI-HEST crater, 34 meters from the top of
the silo. Reentry into the instrumentation bunker
had occurred by and a trailer was parked
near the entrance. (S~WN)
20. If bags of HE material small enough to fit
into the flanges
were held in place with metal bands or with wood
riveted to the concrete, more than 100 cubic me-
ters of HE material could be installed in the flanges
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-~~AZIMUTH
NORTH
SOUTH
RIM
RIM
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PRETEST GR
OUND LEVEL
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NEAR
RIM
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DIMENSIONS IN METERS
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of the Explosive structure (Figure 9). While this HE
arrangement is only one possibility, it is based on
the flange configuration and on the fact that the
arch pikes completely disintegrate in the HEST
Explosion, probably because the HE is placed close
to the inside of the arches. This HE arrangement is
provided as a starting point for discussion or for
modeling and tests to determine how an arch-
roofed HEST structure provides a valid overpres-
sure simulation. (S~WN)
Vulnerability Area 108
I. Vulnerability area 108, a 1.4- by 1.0-km
area, is 7 km north of the deflation basin. The area
is secured by three fences and is used for testing
the vulnerability of strategic structures other than
ICBM silos. Most of the structures tested at this
area have been C3 related, including both de-
ployed and experimental versions of hardened
communications antennas. Two tests conducted in
1980 were probably related to the development of
a viable horizontal rail-mobile missile shelter. This
program has either been delayed or cancelled be-
cause afull-scale, probable shelter built in area
108 has never been tested. In the two years since
this probable shelter was completed, both the
shelter and its HE simulator have suffered apparent
structural damage from flooding. Ten vulnerability
tests have been conducted at area 108 since 1979,
including one test in 1984. The 1984 test was actu-
ally conducted outside the northwestern fenceline
of the area, evidently because there is little or no
room left within the fence for construction of ei-
ther test objects or HE simulators. Subsequent C3
vulnerability tests may require an additional fence-
line expansion or a move to an entirely new area
on the range. (SAWN)
Cabling and Junction Vulnerability Test
22. The Shagan River vulnerability testing
program is evidently intended to uncover weak or
vulnerable points in Soviet strategic deterrent facil-
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hies. phis investigation has taken at least fifteen
years thus far. It has included testing the vulnera-
bilities of National Command bunkers buried hun-
dreds of meters beneath the ground and hardened
concrete and steel missile and command silos. The
buried antennas and cables by which these facili-
ties conununicate have also been subjected to vul-
nerability tests. The part of the vulnerability pro-
gram conducted in vulnerability area 108 has
concentrated on the vulnerabilities of the connect-
ing or communications links. Since 1980, the vul-
nerability of several hardened antennas has been
tested. In 1984, the second aspect of the connect-
ing links between command authority and weap-
ons systems, that is underground cabling, was test-
ed. (S~WN)
2a. Test Bcd Preparations: April-June 1984.
In lath npril 1984, a roughly triangular trench sys-
teni was excavated just outside the northwestern
fenceline of area 108. The two sides of the triangle
were approximately 120 meters long and met at a
right angle, while the base was approximately 155
nu~ters Ion ~. the trenches were Odeep
and wide. By early May, the sides had
been expanded into a system of parallel trenches,
cross trenches, and alcoves. Additional trenches
split the middle of the triangle and connected the
expanded north and west sides to the center of the
bax~ where an instrumentation bunker was under
construction (Figure 10). Work on the HE simula-
tors also began in May, and their orientation
evinced that the test objects would be centered in
the expanded north and west sections with the
major focus on the alcoves in each of these test
buds. the rest of the trench pattern connected the
test beds to the instrumentation bunker. (S~WN)
24. 1 he north test bed was approximately
half the sire of the west test bed. It was 42 by 12
meters, with three alcoves spaced 10 meters apart.
I he west test bed was 70 by 25 meters, with three
alp cues spaced 20 maters apart. In addition to
being larger, the west test bed had twice the num-
ber of cross and parallel trenches. On
cable lines were visible in the bottom of the
trenches leading into and away from the north test
bed. Within the test bed, the cables were laid
throughout the cross and parallel trenches and led
to the center point in each alcove. A tent,
was in the easternmost alcove.
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ages during May and June revealed that the tent(s)
was (were) moved from alcove to' alcove, presum-
ably covering preparations attachment of the test
objects to the cable lines. Observation of the al-
coves after the tent(s) had moved revealed only
very small conduits or junction boxes. (SAWN)
25. ByOthe northern test bed trenches
had been backfilled, and the western test bed was
being prepared. A tent was in the southern alcove,
and cables were present in all parallel and cross
trenches of the test bed. Ono the tent had
been moved to the central alcove. The exposed
southern alcove contained a small conduit~junc-
tion box and alight-toned, inline splice (Figure 11).
Other inline splices were visible in the test bed but
not in other sections of the trenches. At each end
of the test bed was a 2- by 2-meter junction box.
Part of the cables from the test bed entered the
junction boxes, but most of the cables bypassed
them and were laid directly to the instrumentation
bunker. The instrumentation bunker was incom-
plete, and several coils of cable were lying in the
trench next to the unfinished bunker (Figure 12).
On~the western test bed was being back-
filled. Earth was in approximately half of the ex-
panded trench system. A small object, presumably
the junction box previously observed, was visible
in the exposed southern alcove. The western test
bed was completely backfilled by 0 al-
though the instrumentation bunker was still in-
complete and exposed. Finally, during observa-
tions of these preparations, it seemed possible that
a test more complex than cables and junction box-
es was being prepared. The spacing of the alcoves
was the strongest indication of greater complexity,
and a search for similar spacing in a strategic sys-
tems deployment pattern was made. No known
system fit the matrix, and a cable and junction box
vulnerability test remained the likely alternative.
(S/WN)
26. HE Simulator Construction: May-July
1984. DI-HEST ARRAYS. Work on the DI-HEST ar-
rays had begun by 0 On that day, casing
sections were on site, and equipment was working
on the north test bed array. The casing sections
each measured 11 meters in length and
in diameter. These casings were emplaced by
means other than the usual drill rigs. On
the unique equipment used was observed on the
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were built with the alcove row on the front edge of
the north test bed and on the rear edge of the west
test bed. The westernmost part of the west test
bed consisted of an additional alcove containing a
cable and two in-line splices. These objects were
subjected to greater ground shock and motion
than the test objects on the alcove rows. (S~WN)
27. (3LEST BEDS. Construction of the BLEST
beds began as soon as the test beds were back-
filled. The north test bed was backfilled between
The earth-moving operation
appeared to be continuous, with no interruption
between the backfilling and the building up of the
lower earth mound over the test bed. The lower
mound covered the entire north test bed. It was
121 meters long, and 3 meters
high. The mound was frustum-shaped, like a trun-
cated pyramid, with a. volume of 17,243 cubic me-
ters. On top of the mound, a large bed of closely
spaced HE containers was laid down. There were
eight rows of the standard
meter-diameter HE containers. The rows were at
least 90 meters long, with the individual containers
spaced0apart center-to-center. This spac-
ing and row length translate into 129 containers
per row or 1,032 containers in the BLEST bed. The
volume of an HE container is Ometers,
which means an HE container volume for the north
BLEST bed of 357 cubic meters. Since the complete
BLESI bed was not observed without overburden,
the rows could have been longer, and therefore,
the total container volume could have been larger.
Overburden was then placed over the lower
mound and the BLEST bed. The entire earthen pile
was 110 meters long, wide, and 6
meters high with a volume of more than 25,600
cubic meters. A similar, but larger BLEST bed was
built over the west test bed at the end of June. The
lower mound over the west test bed was 126 me-
ters long, 70 meters wide and 2 meters high. The
volume was 15,225 cubic meters. The west BLEST
bed, which was laid out on top of the mound, was
10 rows of containers wide, two rows wider than
the north BLEST bed. The west BLEST bed was 39
meters wide and at least with 125
containers in each row. At least 40 more HE con-
tainers were stacked at the end of the orderly
rows, and the ground had been prepared for HE
placement. Use of all the prepared area would
have made the bed Along and able to
accommodate 138 containers in each row, for a
RCA- ~ ~/uo~~ i/t~
total of 1,380 HE containers and a volume of 477
cubic. meters. Once the BLEST HE containers were
laid down, they were covered with earthen over-
burden (Figure 14). When this work was complete
on ~ the earthen pile was
54 meters wide, and 6 meters high, with a volume
of more than 29,700 cubic meters. (S~WN)
2B. HESS STRUCTURES. A HESS was built at
each test bed. Each HESS consisted of three screen
structures built in an arc in front of each test bed.
Construction began early in May, and the bases of
the HESS structures were complete byDEach
HESS structure base was 12 meters long, 5 meters
wide, and The bases were built of
prefabricated concrete pieces and were simply a
flat base supported on five parallel walls, each 3
meters from the adjacent wall. The center of each
HESS base was 110 meters from the center alcove
of its associated test bed. At the north test bed, the
three HESS structures were separated by 50 de-
grees of arc, while at the west test bed the were
separated by 0 of arc. By ~ up-
rights to support the screen enclosures atop the
HESS bases were being erected. The uprights had
been erected by 0 and the screen enclo-
sures had been completed byOThe screen
enclosure for each HESS structure was 12 by 2 by
when the overburden over
the BLEST beds was being groomed, all six HESS
enclosures were full of HE material. Each screen
enclosure held 132 cubic meters or 396 cubic me-
ters of HE material in each HESS (Figure 15).
(S~WN)
29. Test and Posttest. The last pretest obser-
vation of the cable and junction test site was on
The first clear posttest imagery o the test site was
obtained on OThe DI-HEST arrays had creat-
ed two large craters with a lot of rocky throw out.
The north DI-HEST crater was 117 by 53 by 11
meters deep, and the west DI-HEST crater was 112
by 59 by 11 meters deep. The average rim height
for both craters was0 Each of the HESS
structures created slightly oblong craters 30 by 26
by 6 meters with high rims. By
reentry was underway at both test beds. Earth was
being removed from the top of the north test bed
(Figure 16). The cuts back into the test beds were 4
meters below the test-altered grade level and did
not appear to have reached test bed level. (SAWN)
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Silo Vulnerability Area 89
30. Silo vulnerability area 89 is a 1- by 1.5-
km area situated on the southwestern scarp of the
deflation basin at the center of the Shagan River
I est Area. The area is surrounded by three security
fences which are lighted and patrolled (Figure 17).
An all-weather road extends east of area 89, past
vulnerability areas 23 and 108, and exits the north-
western corner of the test area. Construction of
ICBM silos began in area 89 in July 1978. Five silo
wrings were dug and faced with silo-lining blocks
,Tonga 650-meter-radius arc between the north-
western and southeastern corners of the area.
Only four of these silos have been completed:
three ICBM silos (types IIIF, IIIG, and IIIH) and a
type 3 LCF launch control silo. The silos were
~ crmpleted in -1980, and vulnerability testing began
in 1981. Sinc e then, seven silo tests, using HE simu-
lators to generate ground shock and overpressure,
have been conducted. Three of these tests oc-
~ erred in 1984. (S~WN)
Repairs, Refurbishments, and Modifications:
January-August 1984
31. During the four-month period after the
vulnerability tests at silos 10 (type IIIF) and 12 (type
IIIG) in September 1982, there were clear indica-
tions that the silos had been damaged by the tests.
An extensive effort to repair the damage took
more than 18 months. During that time, activity in
the first year appeared to be the evaluation and
repair of damage in the core areas of the two silos.
By winter 1983, it was apparent that major compo-
nents would be removed from each silo. The silo
doors and their associated mechanisms were re-
moved. Preparations for removing the doors took
place from January through March, and the refur-
bishment from April through August. Because part
of the refurbishment process probably necessitat-
ed pouring concrete, a portable batch plant had
been set up in area 89 by 0 and remained
there until the end of August. Meanwhile, HE sim-
ulators for the 1984 tests at silos 10, 12, and 13
were being prepared. (SAWN)
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32. Silo 10 (Type IIIF). The gantry crane at
silo 10 had been assembled and erected on its rails
by the end of January. During much of February,
no major changes were discernible. The door was
open at the end of the month. By it was
at least 50 degrees past the typical vertica position
and was supported by the gantry crane. For the
door to reach this position, part of the activator
mechanism was probably disconnected. The door
itself was tom letel disconnected and lying on
the apron on ~ With the door off, an
excavation next to the west side of the silo was
begun. Tl~e excavation was complete in early April
and measured 17 by 15 by 7 meters. On
components for a horizontal cylinder arrived at
silo 10. These components, which had a
outer diameter and a ~ inner diameter,
were high. They had been at calibration
area 122 next to calibration silo 156 (see paragraph
12). The assembled cylinder was in the excavation
and attached to the silo headworks 3 meters below
ground level byOThe assembled horizontal
cylinder was ~~in diameter and 9 meters
long. (S~WN)
33. The horizontal cylinder was probably
pargeted by the first of May, as its appearance
changed from dark and smooth to light and rough.
When the excavation was backfilled in early June, a
pipe with a 1-meter diameter was attached to a
hole near the center top of the cylinder. This pipe
extended aboveground a few meters west of the
silo. During May, while the horizontal cylinder was
being completed, work was also underway both
on the silo door anti in the silo. The silo door was
lying top down on the apron, usually with alight-
toned cover over the plug area. This cover was also
seen off the plug area several times and was an
indication of activity at the door. On ~ sev-
eral small components were laid out next to the
eastern gantry crane rail. The components were
probably pieces of the hinge and door actuator
mechanisms and included the two hydraulic actua-
tors (Figure 18A). The following day, a chute, prob-
ably for pouring concrete, was next to the hinge
area of the headworks. (SAWN)
34. On ~ the cover was off the silo
door, and some of the material making up the
bottom of the plug had been removed (Figure
18B). A crane was over the door, and apparently
discarded components littered the area on the east
side of the door and crane. During the next two
RCA-14~0001~85
weeks, more of the plug area was removed. By the
end of June, the bottom of the door had probably
been completely disassembled. When next ob-
served on ~ the silo door was lying top up. By 25X1
the top plate of the silo door had been 25X1
removed and light-toned blocks, possibly radiation
absorbent material like paraffin, were being re-
moved from or placed into the structure. Major
structural beams of the door were clearly visible,
and what appeared to be the concrete apron was
visible between the beams (Figure 18C). On~ 25X1
much of the door had been reassembled. The top
of the door appeared complete except for the top
plate and any full material that was placed around
the structural members which support the top
plate (Figure 18D). The top plate of the door was
installed by ~ Reassembly of the bottom
side of the door must have occurred earlier be-
cause the door remained top up on the apron until
19 August when it was back on its hinges. (S~WN)
35. Silo 12 (Type IIIG). By the beginning of
January 1984, some of the activity which had oc-
curred at silo 10 in the summer had already been
completed at silo 12. A horizontal cylinder, very
similar to the one installed at silo 10, was installed
at silo 12 in October and November 1983. Howev-
er, this excavation was still open at the end of
January 1984, and a trench extended from it three
quarters of the way around the silo headworks.
The excavation and trench were filled in at the end
of March, concurrent with the arrival of a antry
crane and its erection at the silo. On ~ the
silo door was open, and dark marks or voids were
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open again until when the door was off 25X1
and lying top down on the apron. (S/WN)
36. Work on the silo door was visible on[
when the middle of the light-toned plug fill
or t e cover over the fill had been removed. By[
the light-toned material had been separated Z~X1
into quadrants. One quadrant was missing; anoth-
er was lying flat on the plug, and the other two
were raised into the air. A cruciform component
was on the apron beside the door (Figure 19A). It
had either been removed from or was to be in-
stalled in the door. The next clear imagery, on[
revealed that the door had been turned over
and that the spoke plate with the spokes attached
had been removed from the rest of the door (Fig-
ure 19B). The radial spokes were attached to at
least three circular reinforcing rings, and the door
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body was visibly offset beneath the spoke plate.
I he spoke plate had been reattached to the body
of the silo door by 0 and the fill between the
spokes had been replaced in all wedges except
one. (ti~WN)
37. By 0 the silo door had been turned
over once again and was top down. The bottom
plate was off, and light-toned blocks of material
were being removed from the door body (Figure
19C). I he next day all the light-toned material,
which could be to absorb radiation, was out of the
door, and the primary structural beams aligned
with the base of the door hinge were visible. On
even more of the internal door structure was
visible, and on ~ hoop-shaped components
from the door were hanging over a support struc-
ture next to the silo door. On Othe silo
door was evidently being reassembled. A crane
was over the door, and light-toned blocks were
once again in the door body (Figure 19D). The
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reassembly continued throughout the rest of June
and was probably complete by0 Throughout
the silo door disassembly and reassembly, work
was underway at the silo. A small lifting mecha-
nism was adjacent to the hinge, and the movement
of objects and vehicles around the silo seemed to
center in this area. On ~ the door pocket,
which had been covered for two months, was ex-
posed and appeared clean and refurbished. On
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the silo door was closed atop the silo. The top
of the door appeared dark with radial spokes faint-
ly visible. (SAWN)
38. Silo 13 (Type IIIH). Silo 13, which was
last subjected to a vulnerability test in 1981, did
not undergo extensive refitting like silos 10 and 12.
The door was not removed, and there was a limit-
ed amount of activity within the silo coring. How-
ever, ahorizontal cylinder like the ones at silos 10
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and 12 was attached to the headworks, and the
equipment room was renovated and evidently re-
connected to the silo through the cylinder. Work
on the horizontal cylinder and equipment room
was completed during April and May. In early May,
before the cylinder was backfilled on the west side
of tha silo, an excavation was started on the east
sides. This excavation extended several meters be-
low grade and was open until the first of June
(Figure 20). Ono the excavations east and
writ of the silo were filled in. Two square access
ports to the equipment room were covered, and a
1-meter-diameter pipe from the top of the hori-
zontal cylinder extended aboveground near the
silo. T ha renovation was evidently complete; the
silo door was closed, and work on the HEST simu-
lator began. (SAWN)
39. Imagery Analyst's Comments. The disas-
sembly and reassembly of the silo 10 and silo 12
doors required considerable time and effort, yet
no imagery data suggested the doors were dam-
agad. Any severe deformations of the silo doors
would probably have been noticed, either because
of a change in appearance or because the damage
would have forced a change in door function.
Howaver, both silo doors appeared unchanged by
tha 1982 test, and they were opened and closed
frequently during the 18-month period between
the test and the door removals. Minor deforma-
tions could have remained undetected, allowed
the doors to function, yet threatened the survival
of the doors in a second test. Therefore, minor
deformations could be interpreted as the cause for
the reconstruction, although there is at least one
other possibility.
40. Kec onstruction may have been necessary
to complete the analytical phase of the vulnerabili-
ty test program. The purpose of vulnerability test-
ing is to discover how a structure reacts to stress,
to find where its point of failure is, and to pinpoint
the mode of that failure. Failure modes in complex
structures like silo doors-given the interaction of
steel beams, plates, and fill materials-are un-
avoidably complex. A truly scientific vulnerability
tasting program would completely examine these
complex structural responses-including disas-
sembly of the most complex portion of the silo
structure-the door, and its associated opening
systems. 1 he disassembly and reassembly of the
silo 10 and 12 doors may be another example of
the Soviet's thoroughness in their vulnerability
tasting program. (SAWN)
Silo Vulnerability Tests and Preparations
41. On the Soviets con-
ducted concurrent vulnerability tests at three
ICBM silos within area 89. The silos-designated
silo 10 (type IIIF), silo 12 (type IIIG), and silo 13
(type IIIH)-were subjected to ground shock and
overpressure from HEST, BLEST, and DI-HEST sim-
ulators and to unknown effects from HESS simula-
tors. Preparations for these tests required that the
silos be made ready for testing (see previous sec-
tions) and that the HE simulators be built. Simula-
tor construction began in December 1983, when
surface casings for the DI-HEST array at silo 12
were installed. The final preparations were ob-
served on when the HEST/BLEST
overburdens were being groomed two days before
the tests. While most simulator construction at the
silos was relatively concurrent, preparation of silo
13 was slightly faster because significantly less was
to be done to the silo itself. Construction of the
HEST~BLEST simulators was begun earlier at silo 13
than at the other silos. The HE simulator "sets"
over and around each silo were relatively the
same; they differed in size and volume, but not in
kind. The observed preparations of each simulator
are described in the following paragraphs. All im-
portant simulator measurements are included on
Figures 21, 24, 26, 32, 33. (S/WN)
42. DI-HEST Arrays. Construction of arcuate
DI-HEST arrays at each of the three silos was the
beginning of simulator work in the test area. The
installation of surface casing began at silos 12, 10,
and 13 in December, January, and February, re-
spectively. The outer casing measured
in diameter, and the inner casing me
meters in diameter. The depth of the surface cas-
ing was at least 11 meters, which was the length
the inner casing measured before installation. The
installation took about a month at each silo. The
position of the surface casings indicated that there
would be a five-shaft array at silo 10 and at silo 12,
but only afour-shaft array at silo 13. The arrays
were each more than 50 meters from their respec-
tive silos and built along arcs which did not use the
silo as a center point (Figure 21). (SAWN)
43. A large drill rig was moved into the silo
12 test site in the middle of March, and drilling of
the DI-HEST shafts be an. The drill rig remained at
silo 12 until at least This onsite time of 97
days would have allowed more than 19 days to
drill a shaft. Because the shafts were mined to the
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A
A'
ALL DI-HEST SHAFTS WERE 20 METERS APART
SILO O
SILOO
SILO 10 & 12
DI-HEST SHAFT
CONFIGURATION
SILO 13
DI-HEST SHAFT
CONFIGURATION
Distances and azimuths are
from the silo to the shaft.
I I-mater level (for the installation of the surface
casing) and were certainly less than 40 meters
deep, drilling must have been extremely sporadic.
A large drill rig was not observed in operation at
the silo 10 DI-HEST array. Cloud cover during sev-
eral periods could have masked its presence, or
some other means might have been used to drill
the shafts. The silo 10 DI-HEST array was certainly
built, was exploded correctly, and consisted of five
,hafts spaced like the array at silo 12 (Figure 22).
(S~WN)
44. The lar ~e drill rig was first seen at the silo
13 test bed on and it remained there until
at least This onsite span of more than
58 days allowed 14.5 days for each of the four
shafts to be drilled, an extraordinarily long time for
drilling shallow shafts 1 meter in diameter. The use
of a four-shaft instead of a five-shaft DI-HEST array
at silo 13 was the first indication that the silo 13
test bed was probably being designed to generate
less energy than the test beds over and around
silos 10 and 12. The array had one less shaft for HE
material and was further away from the silo (Figure
23). (S~WN)
45. HEST Structures. Work on the arch-
roofed HEST structures began at silo 13, where
prefabricated feces of the structure were first
seen on HEST structures were made from
the same type o components at all three silos, and
their characteristics were similar (Figure 24). The
only difference was that the silo 13 HEST footing
blocks were installed in trenches
on either side of the silo (Figure 23); thus, the
height of the HEST structure was reduced, and the
internal volume decreased by 360 cubic meters.
This difference in installation was the second indi-
cation that the silo 13 test bed would produce a
milder environment than the test beds at silos 10
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and 12. The calibration silo 156 test in June had a
similar reduced-volume HEST structure, and the
technique was originally used at silo 6 (type IIID) in
19#30. Other than the reduced volume at silo 13, all
other aspects of the arch-roofed HEST structures
were normal. Arch pieces had arrived at silos 10
and 12 by mid-June, when the HEST structure was
nearly complete over silo 13 (Figure 25). However,
the completed back wall and accessway of the silo
13 HFSI structure, as seen in late June, must have
restricted access to something because they were
disassembled in July and not rebuilt until August.
Construction on the HEST structure over silo 12
began on ~ and was completed by
The silo 10 door was replaced by
and construction on the silo 10 HEST struc-
ture ~e pan. Most of the arched sections were up
by ~ and the simulation structure was
completely finished (and about to be covered) on
(S~WN)
r,~c,a- i a/oor~ i/fr
46. BLEST Beds. The BLEST beds constructed
for the 1984 silo vulnerability tests remain a partial
enigma.
A review o t e avai a e imagery c i
indicate that the three BLEST beds at silos in area
89 and the BLEST bed at calibration silo 156 were
all similar. While the overall and bed subdivision
sizes were resolved, and it was clear that rows in
the inner beds were more closely spaced than
either middle or front beds, no data on exact row
spacing or actual container count was obtained.
However, based on the past Soviet propensity for
symmetrical BLEST arrangements and on the fact
that the inner and middle BLEST beds measured
consistently wider than the outer beds, a probable
BLEST HE loading solution could be determined
(Figure 26). The row spacing of the outer beds (1
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LENGTH
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL
DIAMETER
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL
HEIGHT
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL
EXTERNAL
VOLUME
INTERNAL
VOLUME
FLANGE
VOLUME
there were 18 and 27 rows in the middle and inner
beds, respectively, the spaces between these tight-
ly packed rows would not have been seen on the
acquired imagery. While the correctness of the
totals in the table cannot be confirmed, there is no
doubt that the number of HE containers in the
1984 BLEST beds was at least twice that observed
in the 1982 BLEST beds. The BLEST HE container
RCA-140001 X85
volumes would, therefore, be more than 400 cubic 25X1
meters. (S~WN)
47. The first evidence of BLEST bed con-
struction was seen at silo 13 on~when stacks 25X1
of HE containers were present. The bed was not
started until after the arched portion of the HEST
structure had been completed in early July. The
BLEST beds around silo 13 were complete by ~ 25X1
Figure 27) and buried beneath overburden 25X1
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I? bad begun by
plrl~~d b~.
and had been com-
Only the north side of the silo
I l1 BI I ti I b~~d~ was observed, as the work was
d~uu~ b~~iw~~eu and had been
partially c~rvrred
Iti~WN)
by overburden (Figure
began at silo 13 between and
was essentially complete by The
HEST and BLEST simulators at silo 13 were com-
pletely covered by and the pile was
roughly a pyramid b~when the overbur-
den was being put over the HEST and BLEST simu-
lators at both silos 10 and 12. The overburden over
all three silos had been shaped into rough pyra-
mids by Figure 29). The final groom-
ing of the overburden did not take place until after
-1t3. HEST~BLEST Overburden. Movement of
uv~~rhurden over th~~ HFSI and BLEST simulators
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th~~ lil f ST brd timing firing lines were connected.
I hi, process was underway at silo 10 on
~(f figure 30). By the BLEST tim-
ing~firing lines were attached at all three silos, and
th~~ final grooming of the overburden was nearly
e oniplete. 1 he overburden appeared to be in the
~~acked frustum typical of HEST~BLEST overburden
a~ the Shagan River Test Area. Other evidence of
thc~ lath stage of preparations included debris from
~h~~ Ht loading operation outside the HEST access-
ways and the HE loaded into the screen structures
(Figure 31 ). The sizes of the overburden frustum
and the volume, less the HEST structures beneath
them, are included (Figure 32). (S~WN)
49. HESS Structures. HESS structures have
been used at five different test sites since they were
first used at a calibration test in 1982. HESS struc-
tures were present at two 1984 test sites: the multi-
ple ICE3M silo test in area f39 and the cable~junc-
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lion test in area 108. While at least three different
hypotheses exist for the purpose of the HESS, none
have been proven. The three hypotheses are: an
pressure simulator. Whatever its purpose, the
HESS apparently functions within the design pa-
rameters, as it is still being used.
DIMENSIONS LISTED ARE
THE OVERBURDEN
FRUSTUMS LARGEST.
BLEST
OVERBURDEN
HEST
OVERBURDEN
TOTAL
OVERBURDEN
50. Work on the HESS bases began at silos
12 and 13 in late March and a few weeks later at
silo 10. All HESS bases were complete by0 25X1
and work on them ceased until August. The up- 25X1
rights, which form. the boundaries of the screen
enclosure atop the bases, were first erected at silo
13 and were erect at all three silos by~ 25X1
Three HESS structures were associate wit eac
silo. Each set of structures was positioned with the
DI-HEST array between them and the silo-with a 25X1
structure in the center, to the left, and to the right 25X1
of the array (Figure 33). The translucent material
that is hung between the u ri hts to confine the
HE was in place by and the HE was 25X1
partially loaded into the screen enclosures. A mea-
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~ure~ment on ~ vindicated that HE con-
tainers were stacked 4 meters high, which equalled
96 cubic meters of HE containers per structure (288
cubic meters of HE containers in the HESS at each
silo). If the HE containers were later stacked to the
top Dof the screen enclosures, each
~truchrre would hold 132 cubic meters or 396 cu-
bic meters of HE containers per HESS. (S~WN)
51. Thf~ last pretest observation of the three
posttest imagery was obtained on
0742 GMT, about one and a half hours after the
detonation. Three huge craters from the detona-
tions of the DI-HEST arrays dominated the appear-
ance of the test site. Each crater was more than
100 meters long and more than 50 meters wide.
They varied in depth from 6 to 10 meters below
ground level (Figure 34). A dark stain from the
explosions surrounded the entire test site but did
not appear to extend further in any one direction,
probably because of calm wind conditions at test
time. Reentry had not occurred at the silos, al-
though buses and other vehicles were at both silos
10 and 13 and new vehicle tracks were near silo
12. Actual reentry into the silos occurred in Octo-
ber. The silo 13 door was opened, and the other
25X1
25X1
25X1
All screen structures had bases measurin
25X1
high explosive screen areas measuring -
25X1
and were loaded with approximately m o
~.o
h c,a- i a/ooo i/85
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two silo doors, although not seen open, appeared
undamaged. Activity during reentry seemed to
concentrate on excavating back into the horizontal
cylinders, probably to recover instrumentation
data. (SAWN)
52. In order to show the differences in the
shapes of the DI-HEST craters, two axis plots of
Bach crater are included in this report (Figures 35
through 37). A striking difference is apparent in the
axis plots through the silos at silos 10 and 12 when
compared with the plot on the same axis at silo 13.
A distinct scarp with a drop of three or more
meters exists some 20 meters from both silos 10
and 12, and the near rims of the craters are at least
2 meters below ground level. These features are
not present at silo 13 where the near rim of the
crater is 4 meters above ground level. Some of the
observed differences in the craters could be the
results of the different DI-HEST array configura-
tions, but most are probably because the silo 10
and silo 12 DI-HEST arrays were placed in fill mate-
rial. The craters from the 1984 vulnerability test are
in the same place as the craters created by the
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0
20
-zo
0
25 50 75 100
125 150 175
~~AZIMUTH
i
NORTH
SOUTH
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RIM
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~~
P
RETEST GROUN
D LEVEL
'.,~
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SCARP
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RIM
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-20
175 200
DIMENSIONS IN METERS
m
n
25X1
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r*+ ~ +10
n ~
~ ~
m
-~ 140? AZIMUTH
NORTH ~
SOUTH
RIM
1
RIM
PRETEST GRO
UND LEVEL
FAR
RIM
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SILO
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I
SCARP
NEAR
RIM
1
q
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-
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-
I~
q ~
175 200
DIMENSIONS IN METERS
m
n
m
25X1
100
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I!
I
~
I
~
~
~
--~~AZIMUTH
I
'
NORTH
i~
SOUTH
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RIM
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PRET
EST GROUND L
EVEL
FAR
NEAR
RIM
RIM
+
AZIMUTH
SILO
13
75 100
SECRET/WNINTEL
-20
125 150 175 200
DIMENSIONS iN METERS
200
20
m
n
m
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1982 vulnerability tests at these silos. The 1982
craters were nearly 100 meters long, 70 meters
wide, and 8 meters deep and were backfilled for
the drilling of the 1984 DI-HEST arrays. A much
smaller and shallower crater (41 meters in diame-
ter and was at silo 13 from the
1981 vulnerability test at that silo. The scarps and
the appearance of the material that makes up the
near rim areas of the craters at silo 10 and 12
suggest that the crater rims are actually the scarps
and that fill material occupies a considerable por-
tion of the two craters. Formulating test levels at
the silos by using the crater volumes of these two
craters should be done with caution. (S~WN)
CONCLUSION
53. At present, all ICBM silos in the test area,
except silo 11, have been subjected to at least two
vulnerability tests and have probably been aban-
doned. Silo 11, a type III LCF launch control silo,
could be subjected to a test in 1985. Evidence
suggesting refurbishment of this silo has been
present since 1983. The opportunity to observe the
~ onstruction and testing of a new or modified
structure exists at the silo 14 coring. When recon-
struction of the silo doors had been completed at
silos 10 and 12 in August 1984, the rail gantry
cranes were moved from those silos to silo 14. At
thc~ end of 1984, the crane pieces remained on the
ground at silo 14. Their presence indicated major
construction and future testing, probably in 1985
and beyond. The other major vulnerability test
area is area 108 where C3-related vulnerability
tests have been conducted. Little or no room is left
in area 108 for the construction of new test beds.
Because of the apparently highly structured nature
of the test program at Shagan River and because
most available space in the vulnerability test areas
has been used, vulnerability testing may come to
an end after the silo 11 and 14 tests. A complete
listing of vulnerability tests at the Shagan River Test
Area with associated alert numbers, dates, loca-
tions, coordinates, types of simulators used, crater
sizes, and remarks is included in this report (Ta-
ble 2). This listing updates previous versions and
includes 1984 test data and revisions of earlier test
data. (S/WN)
Af tAC Air Force Technical Application Center
BEES1 berm loaded explosive simulation technique
C3 command, control, and communications
DABS dynamic air blast simulation
DI-HEST direct induced high-explosive simulation technique
EMP electro-magnetic pulse
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
HE high explosive
HESS high-explosive screen simulator
HEST high-explosive simulation technique
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
km kilometer
kt kiloton
LCF launch control facility
SRF Soviet Rocket Force
tgt target
UG underground
USAEDS United States Atomic Energy Detection System
Kc,a-~a/oooi/ss
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IMAGERY
All al~pli~ able satellite imagery acquired through
tS~WM
was used in the preparation of this report.
MAPS OR CHARTS
ACIC. USAIC, Series 200, Sheet 023[3-15, scale 1:200,000 (UNCLASSIFIED)
DOCUMENTS
~. NP~c.
IAR-0010/II0, 1979 Soviet Vulnerability Testing Review, Shagan River Test Area, USSR
(Sl, Mar 80 (LOP Sf-GREY
?. NPIC_ I-2U181~81 IAR-0162 #31
Nov 81 (SICKLE
~~~~, 1~2 (SI cRl ~
1980 Sovie( Vulnerability Testing Review, Shagan River Tes( Area, USSR (S),
RCA-14/0007/#32, 1981 Vulnerability Testing Review, Shagan River Tes( Area, USSR (SI,
4. NPIC. 1-1207583 RCA-14 0007 83, 1982 Vulnerability Testing Review, Shagan River Test Area, USSR (S),
n~~g 133 ~s1CRLr
;. NPIC.. !- 1404184 RCA-14 0004 84, 1983 Vulnerability Testing Review, Shagan River Test Area, USSR (S),
dun 84 (SLCKL 1
RCA-14~0034~75, Semipala(ins
I xira~ ted inlunnation is classified SECRET
1 ~ira~ ted information is classified SECRET
NWPG Shagan River Test Area (TOP SECRET
RELATED DOCUMENTS
NPIC. 1-2014580, IAR-0277 rnbilit Area 108 Shagan River Test Area, USSR,
Disc, Opt 80 (sLCRL
NPIC. ! 2000880, IAR-0103 80 Area 108 New Vulnerability Test Site-at Shagan River Test Area, USSR (S),
dun 80 (SI CRLT
NPIC. /._'0089/81 IAR-0114/131, Vulnerability Test Area
CRLI
108, Shagan River Test Area, USSK (S), lun 81 (SE-
NPI(~. / 145 ~ IAR-0051 82 New-T e Hardened Antenna at Shagan River and Voronezh, USSR (S), May 82
(Sf CRf i
COMIRI X 029
I'rujt~ct 54 50080
Conuiu~nis and queries regarding this report are wela>m ~ ma be. directed to
Navv Nun lear Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC,
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