THE APEX SPECIAL ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM A SECURITY MANUAL FOR INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1980
• Content Type: REQ

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
The APEX Special Access
Control System
A Security Manual for Industry
Confidential
April 1980
r
Copy)
rc:,
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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April 1980
An effective date for beginning the use of the APEX Special Access System
has not yet been established. This manual is available now-before the start
date-in order to allow you to study it, ask questions about its content, and
understand what you must do when a firm date for the initiation of the
APEX system is established. You will be told when to start to use the
manual by your normal chain of command.
Questions about the content of this manual may be directed to the nearest
control or security officer for whatever existing SCI system governs your
working area or your current access to compartmented intelligence.
The above information is Unclassified.
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Confidential
This manual sets forth the US Government's procedures for safeguarding
extra sensitive materials in industry. As such, it merits and warrants the
overall classification of CONFIDENTIAL in its totality. Individual
paragraphs may be excised for use at the unclassified level.
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Introduction I
Organizational Structure I
Description of System 3
General 3
Access to APEX Special Access Control System 3
Revalidation of Access 3
Access Approvals 4
Responsibilities of Contractor APEX Control and Security Officers 4
Basic Duties/ Responsibilities of Contractor APEX Control Officers 4
Basic Duties/ Responsibilities of Contractor APEX Security Officers 5
Security Standards for Access Aproval 5
Need-To-Know Policy 5
Personnel Security Standards 6
Reinvestigations 6
Changes in Personal Status 7
Contacts or Association With and Marriages To Foreign Nationals 7
Factors Governing Contractor Access 9
Factors Considered in Selection of Contractor Firms 9
Types of Access 9
Physical Security 12
Construction and Protection Standards 12
Accreditation of CACFs 12
Inspections 12
Colocation Within Facilities 12
Emergency Destruction and Evacuation Planning 13
Personnel Access Controls 13
Two-Person Rule 13
Technical Security 14
Technical Security Countermeasures Inspections 14
Computer Security 14
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Compromising Emanations Control (TEMPEST Security) 14
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Access Approval Certifications 14
Visits to/by Contractors 14
Information Updates 15
Security Classification and Control Guidelines 15
Decompartmentation Sanitization 15
Control Standards and Procedures 16
Labeling 16
Pouching and Transmittal Requirements 18
Reproduction 21
Accountability 21
Procedures for Control of Specialized Hard Copy Documents 22
Automatic Data Processing 22
Film/ Photographic Materials 22
Raw Data 23
Security Violations/Compromises 23
Responsibility to Report 23
Investigative Responsibility 24
Security Education 24
Continuing Security Programs 26
Glossary 27
Enclosure I - Sample Cover Sheets 33
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S
The APEX Special Access
Control System
1. This manual describes the Special Access Control System known as
APEX. The system was established to control and protect the Special
Access programs within the category of national security information
called National Foreign Intelligence. (u)
2. This manual will serve as the basic guide for the control of APEX
material in industrial facilities. Existing directives and regulations
governing the protection and control of Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) will be superseded or revised, if necessary, to be in
accordance with this manual. The manual is not, however, intended to
intrude on the activity of Senior Intelligence Officers (SIOs) of the
Intelligence Community, who will continue to prescribe basic direction
and classification guidance consistent with this manual. (u)
0
3. Contractors and consultants dealing with participating government
agencies or departments will be furnished only that information which
is essential to the fulfillment of contractual obligations. This manual
will serve as the principal operating directive for the conduct of APEX
activities within industry. (u)
Organizational Structure
4. Senior Intelligence Officers of the Intelligence Community, program
managers, government contracting officers, and industrial contractors
authorized access to APEX materials are responsible for enforcing the
policy and implementing the procedures outlined in this manual.
Whenever the term SIO is used in this manual, it means the SIO or
his/her designated representative unless it is specifically stated that
the responsibility must personally be performed by the SIO. (u)
5. To fulfill their responsibilities, government officials may provide, as
necessary, additional implementing guidance to contractors under
their cognizance as long as such guidance does not conflict with the
provisions of this manual. Copies of such directives will be provided to
the APEX Steering Group. (u)
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6. Although the government and industrial officials specified above must
have the overall responsibility for policy compliance and implementa-
tion of pertinent procedures, adherence to the security and control
procedures outlined in this manual is also the personal responsibility of
each person indoctrinated into the APEX Special Access Control
System. (u)
7. To assist in carrying out the precepts dictated by the APEX Special
Access Control System, the cognizant government security official will
appoint or cause to be appointed Contractor APEX Control Officers
(CACOs) and Contractor APEX Security Officers (CASOs), with
alternates, to administer the system within contracting firms. CACOs
and CASOs shall be appointed at the appropriate management
echelon to ensure executive-level support within each firm. Their
responsibility is to actively administer the APEX system within their
firms and to ensure full compliance with the provisions of this manual
and any subsequent supplemental APEX directives that may be
issued. It is preferable that the CACO and CASO positions not be held
by the same individual unless management, operational, and organiza-
tional considerations clearly dictate otherwise. (u)
8. SIOs are responsible for the establishment, accreditation, and annual
inspection of Contractor APEX Control Facilities (CACFs) within
industry for the control, storage, and use of APEX materials. These
facilities will be consolidated or decentralized within industrial firms,
depending on joint security-management concerns. Government guid-
ance and assistance should be solicited prior to construction of a
CACF. (u)
9. All APEX information will be transmitted and maintained within the
APEX Special Access Control System. Compartmentation within the
system will be denoted by the use of terms identifying categories of
product information (e.g., COMINT, HUMINT, IMAGERY,
TECHNICAL) and by project codewords which refer to collection
activities. (u)
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Description of System
10. The APEX apparatus provides a single system for controlling access
to, and distribution and protection of, selected intelligence information
and collection programs requiring extra security measures. Within this
unified system there are distinct means of controlling access to
operational data, as well as access to generic sources of intelligence
information and to finished product. (u)
Access to APEX 11. There are three basic requirements for individual access to the APEX
Special Access Special Access Control System:
Control System
A. Certification by the SIO of a need-to-know for specific aspects of
the system. In the case of access to operational projects, a nominee's
need-to-know must be validated by the SIO and have the approval of
the operational Program Manager or director.
B. Favorable adjudication by the SIO of the appropriate Government
Sponsor that the nominee meets uniform personnel security criteria
and investigative requirements set forth in this manual and DCID
1/14.
C. Security indoctrination and execution of a nondisclosure agreement
as a condition of access to APEX material. The security indoctrination
will provide the individual with prescribed information so that he or
she will know what is to be protected, his or her responsibilities in doing
so, and general information about the APEX system. If additional
access approvals are required, the processing steps enumerated above
will be repeated. Upon indoctrination for any access to APEX
material, the completed indoctrination agreement will be forwarded to
the US Government Sponsor. (u)
Revalidation 12. It is the responsibility of each US Government Sponsor to maintain a
of Access continuous review of access approvals to ensure that only those
contractor personnel with documented need-to-know have access at
any time. In addition, in January of each year, SIOs and the DCI will
review all extant approvals under their cognizance and revalidate
need-to-know requirements. Those accesses no longer required will be
formally terminated. (u)
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Termination 13. When it has been determined that certain accesses are no longer
required, each individual concerned will be notified that his/her access
to specific types of information is being terminated. At that time, each
individual will be required to account for and surrender all APEX
materials. The responsible SIO will be notified of all terminations of
access. (u)
14. When an individual leaves one firm to join another, he/she will be
debriefed from all APEX accesses. (u)
Access
Approvals
15. To control access to information within the APEX Special Access
Control System, SIOs will provide only those access approvals
required to fulfill the needs of the contract(s). (u)
Responsibilities of Contractor
APEX Control and Security Officers
Basic Duties/ 16. Contractor APEX Control Officers are to administer the APEX
Responsibilities Special Access Control System within their firms and will:
of Contractor
APEX Control A. Ensure that APEX materials are accounted for, controlled,
Officers disseminated, destroyed, packaged, and otherwise safeguarded in
accordance with provisions of this manual.
B. Act as the control point within a Contractor APEX Control Facility
for receiving and dispatching APEX materials via electrical, courier,
or other means approved for the transmission of APEX materials.
C. Complete and return to the sender receipts attached to APEX
documents received. Ensure that all outgoing materials have properly
prepared receipts and send tracers as required for receipts not
returned.
D. Ensure that APEX materials are disseminated only to those persons
properly indoctrinated and having a need-to-know.
E. Provide advice and guidance on the proper classification levels,
codewords, and caveats within the APEX Special Access Control
System.
F. Perform such other duties as might be required. (u)
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Basic Duties/ 17. Contractor APEX Security Officers are responsible for all security
Responsibilities aspects of the APEX Access Control System within their firms and
of Contractor will:
APEX Security
Officers A. Coordinate and receive prior approval for accreditation and
establishment of APEX control facilities.
B. Maintain current listings of all APEX-accessed individuals within
their jurisdiction, and which APEX contract(s) they support.
C. Process all APEX access approval requests for personnel within
their jurisdiction.
D. When authorized conduct required security indoctrinations and
debriefings of personnel approved for APEX access and obtain signed
Nondisclosure and Termination Secrecy Reminders as necessary.
E. Conduct reindoctrinations on a periodic basis, not to exceed two-
year intervals.
F. Ensure periodic security inspections of Contractor APEX Control
Facilities under their jurisdiction: submit a report of this inspection,
with any recommendations for corrective action, to the accrediting
official, and conduct followup action on recommended corrective
measures.
G. Ensure investigation of any possible security infractions involving
APEX information under their jurisdiction to determine if a compro-
mise has occurred, make appropriate recommendations, and prepare
required reports. These reports will be forwarded as soon as feasible to
the responsible SIO.
H. Notify responsible SIOs of all additions and deletions of access
approvals within the APEX system on a timely basis.
1. Perform such other duties as might be required. (u)
Security Standards for Access Approval
Need-to-Know 18. Access to the APEX Special Access Control System is governed by the
Policy need-to-know policy in conjunction with approval criteria established
in this manual. The need-to-know policy is defined as that determina-
tion made by competent approving authority which attests to the bona
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fide need for access in order to perform official duties on behalf of the
US Government. Need-to-know approval rests with the responsible
SIO.(u)
Personnel Security 19. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis
Standards for access to the APEX Special Access Control System are as follows:
A. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion,
and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
B. Except where there is a compelling need and a determination has
been made by competent authority as described below that every
reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances
the security risk is negligible:
(1) Both the individual and the members of his/her immediate
family shall be citizens of the United States. For these purposes
"immediate family" is defined as including the individual's
spouse, parents, brothers, sisters, and children.
(2) The members of the individual's immediate family and
persons to whom he/she is bound by affection or obligation
should neither be subject to physical, mental, or other forms of
duress by a foreign power, nor advocate the use of force or
violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or
the alteration of the form of Government of the United States
by unconstitutional means. (u)
20. Prior to security approval and indoctrination of an individual into the
APEX Special Access Control System, the nominee must have a
complete background investigation and meet the additional provisions
of DCID 1 / 14 which specifies the investigative and personnel security
criteria for access to sensitive compartmented information. (u)
Reinvestigations 21. Programs will be instituted requiring the periodic reinvestigation of
personnel provided access to APEX information in accordance with
DCID 1/ 14. These reinvestigations will be conducted on a five-year
recurrent basis under normal circumstances, but on a more frequent
basis where the individual has shown some questionable behavioral
pattern, where his/her activities are otherwise suspect, or when
deemed necessary by the SIO concerned. (u)
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Changes in Personal 22. Responsible officials must take into consideration any change in
Status personal status that may have a bearing on the continuing eligibility of
individuals approved for access to APEX material. Name changes
(resulting from marriage, divorce, or court decree) must be reported to
the appropriate US Government ACO/ASO. (u)
Contacts or Asso- 23. A close, continuing personal association with a foreign national is a
ciations With and matter of APEX security concern if it is characterized by ties of
Marriages To Foreign kinship, affection, or obligation. APEX-indoctrinated personnel must
Nationals protect themselves against cultivation and possible exploitation by
foreign nationals who are or may be working for foreign intelligence
services and to whom they might even unwittingly provide APEX
classified information. The following types of relationships must be
reported to the cognizant US Government Sponsor through the
Contractor APEX Security Officers:
A. All nonofficial contacts with citizens or representatives of
Communist-controlled countries, no matter how brief or apparently
trivial the contacts may be.
B. Close and continuing or any regular, frequent nonofficial contact
with any other foreign national. (u)
24. Casual, inadvertent, or irregular contacts which arise from normal
living and working in a community need not be reported. However, if
the person with whom the casual contact occurs shows undue interest
in employment, assignment, and so forth, then the contact must be
promptly reported. Whenever any doubt exists about whether a
situation should be reported or made a matter of record, the individual
should promptly make a report to the cognizant US Government
Sponsor through the Contractor APEX Security Officer. Failure to
report such contact may result in withdrawal of access to APEX
material. (u)
25. APEX-approved individuals who contemplate marriage to a foreign
national must report such plans to their APEX Security Officer along
with, at a minimum, basic biographic details about the intended spouse
and his/her immediate family (name, date and place of birth, country
of origin and current citizenship, current residence, present occupa-
tion, and any present or former employment on behalf of any foreign
government). A security evaluation will be undertaken by the
cognizant SIO in accord with DCID 1/ 14 before there is any
determination that a waiver of standards might be made to continue
the approved person in APEX-indoctrinated status. (u)
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Travel Restrictions 26. Unofficial Travel. Persons granted authorization for access to certain
categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence
sources and methods protected by the APEX Special Access Control
System incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted by their
Contractor APEX Security Officer to risks associated with unofficial
visits to, or travel through, certain designated countries (DCID 1/20).
The Contractor APEX Security Officer concerned should advise that
unofficial travel in those countries without cognizant SIO official
approval may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access
to APEX information for persons with specific and extensive
knowledge of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence
sources and methods. (u)
27. The CACO/CASO shall advise all persons having access to APEX
information who plan unofficial travel to or through designated
countries that they must:
A. Give advance notice of such planned travel to the CASO.
B. Obtain a defensive security briefing from a Contractor APEX
Security Officer before traveling to such countries.
C. Contact immediately the nearest US consular, attache, or embassy
official if they are detained or subjected to significant harassment or
provocation while traveling.
D. Report upon return from travel, to the cognizant US Government
Sponsor through their Contractor APEX Security Officer, any
incidents of potential security concern that occurred during the trip.
(u)
28. Official Assignment/ Travel. No person with access to APEX infor-
mation will be assigned to or directed to participate in hazardous
activities (as defined in DCID 1/20) until he/she has been afforded a
defensive security briefing and/or risk-of-capture briefing as applica-
ble. (u)
29. Individuals With Previous Access. Persons whose access to APEX
information is being terminated will be officially reminded of the risks
associated with hazardous activities as defined herein and of their
obligation to ensure protection of APEX. (u)
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Factors Governing
Contractor Access
Factors Considered in 30. The past record of a contractor or consultant in properly safeguarding
Selection of Contractor material will be taken into account when making contractor selections
Firms for work on APEX-related activities. In this regard, when an APEX
facility is established in industry, the responsible government APEX
Security Officer will closely monitor and inspect its activities to ensure
that APEX procedures are followed completely and that APEX
materials are properly segregated from other classified or unclassified
materials of the contractor. (u)
Restrictions on Access 31. Contractor companies under foreign ownership, control, or influence
will generally be ineligible for access to APEX activities and
information. However, a waiver of this provision may be granted, after
review by the responsible SIO, if the following conditions apply: the
foreign ownership, control, or influence does not involve a Communist-
controlled country; the foreign interests own less than 5 percent of the
contractor's voting stock; and such minority holdings do not enable the
foreign interest to control the appointment and tenure of the
contractor's APEX-approved managing officials. Before a waiver is
granted, provision must be made to ensure that security safeguards
exist to prevent disclosure of APEX-controlled information to any non-
US owners and managing officials. Should foreign ownership increase
beyond 5 percent during the course of a contract, a review of the
contractor's eligibility for continued access will be made. (u)
Types of Access 32. Within the APEX Special Access Control System, there are various
types of access in industry. These types of access are identified as:
APEX-GENERAL; APEX (Operational); APEX-ALPHA (Oper-
ational Subcompartment); and APEX (Product). (u)
33. The Security criteria for indoctrination are the same for all categories
in that all must be in accord with the APEX security access standards
of this manual and DCID 1/ 14 and must withstand strict need-to-
know tests. (u)
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34. The extent of indoctrination for the various categories is as follows:
A. Administrative Access Approval. Personnel who do not require
substantive access to individual APEX compartments, but who require
physical access to APEX-accredited areas or who administratively
process APEX materials, will be given an administrative access called
APEX-GENERAL. The APEX-GENERAL access may be given in
two phases:
(1) Phase I accesses will accommodate those personnel who
must have physical access to APEX areas but who do not need
to see or process clear text APEX materials. Guards, couriers
carrying APEX materials in sealed pouches, technical person-
nel such as switching center and computer technicians, are
examples of types of personnel who might require Phase I
access.
(2) Phase II accesses will accommodate those personnel who
process substantive clear text APEX materials in an adminis-
trative capacity. Examples of such personnel include secre-
taries, distribution personnel, communications center and ADP
output device operators, and document control personnel. (u)
35. Persons indoctrinated for APEX-GENERAL access will be instructed
that their industrial firm has a contract or contracts with US
Government entities but may not necessarily be told of the specific
departments or agencies. They will not be briefed on details of
operational programs. They will be instructed in the rules for
protecting classified materials, in its proper storage, transport, and
destruction, and in the need for it to be disseminated only to
appropriately indoctrinated individuals. (u)
36. The Phase I and Phase II briefings will be identical, except that those
briefed for Phase II will be advised of the specific codeword relating to
the particular project in which they and their firm participate. (u)
37. APEX (Operational Codeword) - Phase I. This level of access is
intended for industrial contractors whose personnel need to know
about specific operational parameters but have no need to know all
aspects of the activity. Included within the Phase I briefing would be
the general purpose of the activity, those technical details which are
necessary to accomplish that portion of the engineering design,
development, fabrication, or installation that is directly within the
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individual's area of assignment. Reference will not be made to the
particular governmental sponsor unless such identity is obvious from
the nature of the contract. This category of access should be
considered for machinists, engineers not directly involved in total
program planning, and others not requiring full knowledge of the
activity. (u)
38. APEX (Operational Codeword) - Phase II. This level of operational
access is reserved for those in industry who, by virtue of contractual
necessity or other duties, are required to have full knowledge of a
particular operational activity. The Phase II level of access will permit
knowledge of all data released to the Phase I accessed individuals and
will allow detailed knowledge of the activity mission, sponsor, financial
arrangements, geographic operational bases, system vulnerabilities,
and so forth, as may be necessary. A need-to-know policy still exists
despite approval for Phase II access, and it should not be assumed that
all details will be given to all Phase II accessed individuals. (u)
39. APEX (Operational Subcompartment) - ALPHA. In addition to the
above-cited phases of access, it is envisioned that under analytical
contracts in industry and academic circles, certain facts about
operational compartments will be required by industrial intelligence
processors/analysts. To provide relevant operational details to such
personnel, a separate operational subcategory, designated by the
collection project codeword plus the term ALPHA, is to be used. The
intent of this subcompartment is to avoid disclosure of full operational
details not considered relevant to the contract. Generally this
subcompartment will not allow access to financial or funding details,
information pertaining to international agreements, details about
governmental sponsorship, interagency arrangements, vulnerability
data, and such other operational parameters deemed nonreleasable by
the operational program manager or his designee. (u)
40. APEX (Generic Product). The product resulting from operational
collection projects will be identified within the APEX Special Access
Control System by its generic term. Specific access approval will be
required for each of the four generic categories of APEX products.
Access to each of these generic products is not controlled by phases of
access. The APEX Product accesses will be reserved for personnel
engaged in analytical and research projects that produce finished
intelligence and for those engaged in developmental research projects
requiring access to intelligence product. (u)
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Physical Security
Construction and Pro- 41. All APEX materials held by contractors must be stored in Contractor
tection Standards APEX Control Facilities. These standards for construction and
protection of CACFs will be as prescribed in Physical Security
Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, dated
30 April 1973 or other such guidelines that may supersede it. (u)
Accreditation of 42. Before an industrial facility is authorized to handle APEX material, it
CACFs must be inspected and certified by the appropriate US Government
Sponsor as having met the aforementioned construction and protection
standards. Actions concerning accreditation of CACFs will be
reported to the APEX Control Staff by the US Government Sponsor.
(u)
Inspections 43. Periodic inspection of CACFs is mandatory and must be done at least
annually. Inspections are to be performed by designated government
APEX security officers experienced in conducting security inspections
for the control and storage of APEX materials and will assure that
procedures and physical safeguards comply with standards prescribed
by this manual. Reports of inspection will note all irregularities and
will be forwarded to accrediting officials for review and necessary
corrective action. Inspections will include inventory of APEX docu-
ments of such scope to ensure that accountability and control are being
maintained. Failure to locate any such documents will be reported on a
priority basis. (u)
Colocation Within 44. When it is deemed economically desirable to colocate different APEX
Facilities activities within a single industrial CACF, a determination must first
be made that such sharing will not have an adverse effect on any of the
compartmented activities involved. When security considerations
permit, a "Memorandum of Agreement To Share Facilities" will be
executed among the industrial contractor and the government agencies
sponsoring each separate APEX activity. The agreement will delineate
the spaces to be used, storage procedures, access limitations, security
responsibilities, and any other provisions considered germane to
sharing the facility. (u)
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Emergency Destruction 45. Each CACF must maintain an emergency plan approved by the
and Evacuation responsible government APEX security officer. This plan will nor-
Planning mally be part of an overall facility or corporate plan. It will, however,
be separately stated for the CACF and will include provisions for the
protection, of APEX data as well as protection of assigned personnel.
Plans shall include provisions for the emergency destruction of APEX
materials as well as action to be taken in the event of fire or other
natural disaster. Emergency planning should ensure that adequate
protection and firefighting equipment is available, especially in vault
areas, and that escape and emergency exit plans are provided for and
published.. Updates of emergency plans will be made annually and
training provided to familiarize assigned personnel with the plans. (u)
Personnel Access 46. Positive controls for personnel access must be established over all areas
Controls where APEX information is handled. In areas where only small groups
of personnel are involved, this control may be by means of personal
identification. Where larger numbers are involved, a system of
identification badges may be required for assigned personnel and
cleared visitors. The industrial contractor will implement whichever
procedure is deemed appropriate by the Government APEX security
officer who has original cognizance over the facility. Access to CACFs
by uncleared visitors-must be approved in advance by the cognizant US
Government Sponsor except in those emergency situations where
maintenance, fire, or medical personnel may require access. Uncleared
visitors will be escorted at all times while in APEX areas. A visitor
control log including the visitor's name and affiliation; date and time
of entry/exit; purpose of visit; and point of contact will be maintained
and retained by each CACO/CASO. (u)
Two-Person Rule 47. To provide security and safety protection to APEX materials, all
CACFs will be occupied by at least two APEX indoctrinated persons
when in use. Persons selected to work in such areas will be chosen on
the basis of proven reliability and maturity. (u)
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Technical Security *
Technical Security 48. Technical Security Countermeasures Inspections will be conducted as
Countermeasures part of the accreditation process of a CACF and following major
Inspections physical renovations. Reinspections will be scheduled by the cognizant
SIO who will also ensure that personnel assigned to CACFs are briefed
concerning the threat of technical penetration. (u)
Computer Security 49. All automatic data-processing equipment used in CACFs will be
operated in compliance with DCID 1/ 16 (Security of Foreign
Intelligence in Automated Data-Processing Systems and Networks).
No APEX or APEX-related information is to be processed before
approval by the responsible SIO. (u)
Compromising 50. All equipment used to transmit or process APEX information
Emanations Control electronically, including communications, word-processing, and auto-
(TEMPEST Security) matic data-processing systems and equipment, must satisfy the
requirements of USCSB 4-11 (National Policy on Control of
Compromising Emanations). All compromising emanations must be
contained within boundaries specified by the TEMPEST accreditation
authority. (u)
Access Approval Certifications
General Guidelines 51. The responsible SIO, normally acting through the ASO, is the
authority empowered to certify APEX accesses held by a contractor to
other government departments and agencies or to other government
contractors or consultants. Such certification will be made only when
need-to-know and the neccessity of visit requirements have been
established. (u)
Visits to/by 52. APEX-related visits will not be undertaken to/by the contractor
Contractors without the approval of the cognizant government APEX contract
authority. Normally, certification for a visit will be made on a one-
time basis only. In unusual cases, however, when constant contact is
required, term certifications for a period not exceeding one year may
be authorized. Visit certifications are to be made in writing, either by
* All requirements for technical security approvals are in addition to physical security approvals outlined in this manual. (u)
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letter or secure communications circuits, or otherwise as directed by
the program manager. (u)
Information Updates 53. A critical need of the APEX Special Access Control System is to
maintain an accurate record of personnel currently indoctrinated for
various compartments of the system. To enable the system to function
properly, all CACO/CASOs must provide timely information on
changes in the status of their personnel to the US Government
Sponsor. These updates will also ensure that all briefing or debriefing
actions are recorded as soon as possible. (u)
Security Classification and Control Guidelines
Basic Guidance 54. Only those government officials specifically authorized under EO
12065. may decide security classifications. Compartmentation caveats
will be used solely, to provide need-to-know or access protection where
normal management and safeguarding procedures are not, as protec-
tive measures, considered sufficient. (u)
Decompartmentation 55. Contractors are not authorized to decompartment or sanitize APEX
Sanitization materials. CACO/CASOs may request or make recommendations for
decompartmentation or sanitization of specific materials if essential to
contract performance. (u)
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Control Strandards
and Procedures
Classification Levels 56. Information in the APEX Special Access Control System will be
classified and use of derivative classification will be in accordance with
EO 12065, reserving CONFIDENTIAL for "identifiable damage,"
SECRET for "serious damage," and TOP SECRET for "exception-
ally grave damage." No other classification levels are authorized. The
following terms used in this system are unclassified when standing
alone or not connected to the intelligence activities or intelligence
information they designate: APEX; the APEX Special Access Control
System; the codewords which identify the categories or intelligence
product within the system (i.e., COMINT, HUMINT, IMAGERY,
TECHNICAL). Project identifiers may be used outside the APEX
control system, but must be protected by the standard classification
level of CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET. The nature of individual
contracts, however, may require that the connection of a contractor to
APEX activity be treated as classified by virtue of the association. (u)
Classification Guides 57. Contractors will be furnished classification guides by APEX govern-
ment program managers or contracting officers to assist in the
marking and control of information, hardware, or other items
originating in contractor firms. These guides will be made as specific
as possible and will be the means by which contractor firms assign
classification categories. Responsible SIOs will provide individual
guidance as required. (u)
Labeling 58. The following labeling requirements are established for all written or
graphic materials that contain APEX information and are dissemi-
nated within the APEX Special Access Control System:
A. Classification. The overall classification of a document, whether or
not permanently bound, or any copy or reproduction thereof, will be
conspicuously marked or stamped at the top and bottom of the outside
of the front cover (if any), on the title page (if any), on the first page,
on the back page, and on the outside of the back cover (if any). Each
interior page of a document will be conspicuously marked or stamped
at the top and bottom with the highest classification of the document.
Portions of documents, to include paragraphs, subparagraphs, and
titles, will be marked to reflect the level of classification, codewords,
caveats, and other dissemination control markings or to state that the
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particular portion is unclassified. Major components of some docu-
ments are likely to be used separately. In such instances, each major
component will be marked as a separate document. Examples include
each annex, appendix, or similar component of a plan, program, or
operations order; attachments and appendixes to a memorandum or
letter; and each chapter of a report or document.
B. Control System Caveats. All documents controlled within the
system will be marked "HANDLE VIA APEX CONTROL SYS-
TEM" on the front cover (if any), title page (if any), back page, and
first page of all documents. Each interior page that contains APEX
information will bear the same markings.
C. Codewords and Indicators. Codewords for operational projects and
product indicators will be placed following or below the classification
marking on the front and back covers (if any), top and bottom of the
title page (if any), first page, and each page which contains
information requiring specific codeword/indicator protection.
D. Control Numbers. APEX control numbers for hard copy docu-
ments generated by contractors will be directed by the US Govern-
ment Sponsor. They will consist of the letter "A", a three-digit number
identifying the contractor, a dash, a five-digit assigned number, a slant
or oblique stroke, and the last two digits of the current year; e.g.,
A123-12345/80. A sequential ("one up") system, beginning with
00001 each year for each contractor, will be used as the assigned
number. The control number will be placed immediately below the
classification in the upper right-hand corner of the front cover (if any),
title page (if any), and first page of the document. Copy numbers of
individual documents will be reflected as Copy _ of _ on the cover
and first page of the document. Copy numbers of finished publications
may be shown as Copy _ on the cover sheet, cover (if any), and first
page. Electrical messages will be excluded from the requirement for
APEX Control Numbers.
E. Classification Review Notice. APEX materials are classified for a
period of 20 years (except for foreign government information which
will remain protected for 30 years). The following Classification
Review Notice will be used on the cover (if any), title page (if any), or
first page of typescript text, or inside cover of formal publications:
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CLASSIFIED BY: (designated government authority)
REVIEW ON: (indicate date, 20 or 30 years from date of issuance)
REASON FOR EXTENDED CLASSIFICATION: APEX 59E
The abbreviation "REVW (date 20/30 yrs)" may be
substituted in electrically transmitted messages.
If derivative classification, use the following format:
DERIVATIVE CL BY
REVIEW ON
DERIVED FROM (source document or classification guide citation)
F. Marking Files, Folders, or Groups of Documents. Files, folders, or
groups of documents shall be conspicuously marked to assure the
protection of all APEX material contained therein. The classification
and handling controls for such material should be marked on the file
folder tab or other prominent location, or the marking should be
affixed to an appropriate APEX cover sheet. (u)
Pouching and Trans- 59. APEX material to be transmitted from one CACF to another must be
mittal Requirements carried by two approved couriers, or by the Armed Forces Courier
Service (ARFCOS). Courier procedures will ensure that APEX
materials are adequately protected against the possibility of
unauthorized viewing, loss, or other form of compromise during the
transmission. Transmittal of APEX material via non-US-Govern-
ment-operated or chartered aircraft is prohibited.* The responsible
SIO must specifically approve all exceptions. Special contracting
relationships with unique security requirements may be arranged by
US Government Sponsors or program managers. Such arrangements
must be approved by the appropriate SIO and coordinated with the
APEX Steering Group. (u)
60. APEX couriers will be active-duty military or US Government civilian
employees meeting APEX access approval standards of this manual
and be specifically designated by the cognizant sponsoring agency.
Couriering of APEX material by contractor employees is prohibited
except when specifically approved by the responsible SIO. (u)
61. APEX materials will be enclosed for delivery in two opaque envelopes
or otherwise be suitably double-wrapped using canvas bags, cartons,
crates, leather pouches, and so forth. Containers will be secured with
tape, lead seals, or tumbler padlocks, or by other means which would
reasonably protect against surreptitious access. This container will be
marked:
* Does not apply to ARFCOS. (u)
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PROPERTY OF THE US GOVERNMENT
DO NOT OPEN
If found call: (insert Phone No.) Collect
(city state)
62. The inner and outer container will be annotated to show the pouch
address and package number of the sending APEX facility. The
notation "TO BE OPENED BY THE CACO" shall be placed above
the pouch address of the receiving APEX facility on both containers.
The proper security classification and the caveat "CONTAINS
APEX-CONTROLLED MATERIAL" will be annotated on each
side of the inner wrapper only. The inner container will contain the
document receipt and should also reflect the name or office symbol of
the person/activity for whom the material is intended. (u)
Electrical 63. APEX material transmitted electrically will be controlled according to
Transmissions procedures prescribed below. Senders must assure that electrical
transmissions are made only to authorized recipients, who must
provide procedures for the proper protection of APEX material
received in this manner. These procedures will include the establish-
ment of a recipient's need-to-know in circumstances where no hard
copy or record copy of the material will result. (u)
64. Electrical transmission of APEX material will be limited to
specifically accredited communications circuits secured by a govern-
ment-approved cryptographic and/or protected distribution system.
(u)
65. Material transmitted by accredited communications circuits or other
specialized means will be marked at the top and bottom with the
assigned classification and portion marked in the manner prescribed
above for documents. Applicable codewords, designators, caveats, and
so forth, will be clearly shown, consistent with the design of the
message form or format being used. (u)
66. The first item in the text of a message will be the overall classification
of the message, applicable codeword(s), the words "HANDLE VIA
APEX CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY," and such other markings as
may be required to note dissemination controls. (u)
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Cover Sheets 67. An APEX cover sheet will be used when transmitting APEX materials
outside a CACF. Publications need not have a separate document
cover sheet affixed if the publication cover includes all prescribed
markings.
A. TOP SECRET APEX hard copy material will be covered with
unique cover sheets. There are cover sheets for TOP SECRET APEX
publications which incorporate on the reverse side a dissemination
control log and a certification of destruction. There are cover sheets for
TOP SECRET APEX documents (less formal issuance than publica-
tions) which incorporate on the front of the cover sheet a dissemination
control log and a certificate of destruction.
B. There are separate cover sheets for TOP SECRET documents and
publications.
Operational compartments (Yellow)
Operational subcompartments (Brown)
Product compartments (Red)
C. SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL level APEX material will be
covered with a Gray cover sheet.
D. Cover sheets need not be used on electrical transmissions or on hard
copy material that does not leave an APEX facility.
E. Samples of the cover sheets are at Enclosure I. Cover sheets are
available through the US Government Sponsor. (u)
Destruction 68. As soon as possible after its purpose has been served, all APEX
material will be destroyed in a manner that will preclude reconstruc-
tion in any intelligible form. However, only those items approved by
the cognizant government agency may be destroyed, by only those
methods of destruction specifically authorized by the responsible SIO.
(These methods may include burning, pulping, pulverizing, melting, or
chemical decomposition, depending on the type of materials to be
destroyed.) All destruction shall be supervised and witnessed by at
least two APEX-indoctrinated individuals. Destruction certificates
will be completed for all items destroyed. APEX material contained
within computer or automated data-processing systems or other
magnetic media will be degaussed or destroyed only by equipment
specifically approved by the contracting authority. (u)
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Reproduction 69. Reproduction of APEX material will be subject to the restrictions and
procedures established by the responsible SIO. Copies of documents
are subject to the same controls as the original. Adherence to stated
prohibitions against reproduction is mandatory. Any equipment used
for APEX reproduction must be thoroughly inspected and sanitized
before removal from an APEX facility. (u)
70. Reproduction of all hard copy APEX materials within the APEX
Special Access Control System requires the consent of the originator,
and shall be accomplished by the CASO or ACASO following
procedures approved by the US Government Sponsor. (u)
Accountability 71. All hard copy APEX TOP SECRET documents will be inventoried at
least annually or when there is a termination of contract, a change of
designated CACO, or a change of authorized custodians of such
material. (u)
72. Random inventories will be conducted at least annually for all APEX
materials classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL according to
formulas provided by the responsible SIO. (u)
73. Should the random inventory of APEX material fail to locate the
sampled documents, the CASO will order a complete inventory of all
APEX documents received by a CACF. (u)
74. Reports of discrepancies will be provided immediately to the responsi-
ble US Government Sponsor. The CASO will initiate a search for all
of the missing documents and the Sponsor will conduct an investiga-
tion. (u)
75. CACOs will keep a record of all APEX-numbered material received
by or dispatched from their CACFs. This dissemination record will
include for each item a brief entry that identifies the nature of the
APEX material and the specific organizations-outside or within the
CACF-for whom the material is intended. Dissemination records of
incoming or dispatched APEX materials will be retained for two years.
Records of incoming or dispatched TOP SECRET APEX documents
will be detroyed five years after the documents are transferred,
downgraded, or destroyed. (u)
76. Working materials containing APEX-controlled information that are
used and retained exclusively within a CACF-such as preliminary
drafts of reports or studies, film clips included in analysts' reference
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files, and waste materials such as carbon sheets, carbon ribbons,
reproduction plates, stencils, composition tapes, masters, stenographic
notes, and worksheets-do not require an APEX number or dissemi-
nation record but must be safeguarded and marked as "WORKING
PAPERS" in accordance with the storage requirements for APEX-
controlled materials. If they are to be removed from the CACF they
will be controlled as regular APEX materials. (u)
77. Contractors or consultants will not distribute APEX materials outside
a CACF without the permission of the contract monitor or the
responsible SIO. (u)
Procedures for Control of Specialized Hard Copy Documents
Automatic Data 78. All automatic processing of APEX-controlled information and mate-
Processing: rial will be conducted in accordance with instructions provided by the
responsible SIO. To facilitate identification, accounting, and control of
APEX-controlled data in magnetic form, each reel or casette of tape,
and each magnetic card or disk pack that contains APEX-controlled
data will be prominently labeled with security classifications, APEX
Special Access Control System markings, and other required APEX
caveat designators. To the extent possible, other ADP-related media
will be similarly marked. (u)
Film/ Photographic 79. Roll film, flats, slides, or other forms of photographic negatives or
Materials positives used for photographic interpretation are considered raw
intelligence data and need not be.subject to individual accountability
controls, but must be labeled as to security classification and
controlled under APEX control procedures. (u)
80. Labels on roll film placed in opaque containers will be located as
follows:
A. One on end of spool flange.
B. One on side of spool container.-
C. One on container cover. (u)
81. Film in transparent containers needs only one label placed visibly on
the spool flange. This procedure is intended to facilitate reuse of the
containers. (u)
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82. The film itself will include all APEX control system markings on the
heading and tail identification. (u)
Microfiche 83. Each microfiche will have a heading whose elements are readable
without magnification. The heading elements will specify: the long and
short titles of the documents; security classification and codewords,
which will not be abbreviated; and standard abbreviations or codes for
handling caveats, APEX control numbers, copy numbers, dissemina-
tion control marking, and distribution restrictions. The exact place-
ment of the heading elements will be as prescribed by the cognizant
SIO. Individual microfiche are also to be placed in separate envelopes
that are color-coded to reflect the level of security protection to be
accorded them. (u)
Microfilm 84. Each role of microfilm, whether mounted on an open reel or in a
cartridge, will contain security information which is readable without
magnification. The boxes containing processed film in open reels and
the film cartridges will be labeled with the appropriate security
information. In addition, the labeling will include the document's long
and short titles. Microfilms containing documents with individual
titles and APEX numbers too numerous to be included on the label
may be identified by a generalized composite title and a new APEX
number. (u)
Raw Data
85. Bulk receipts will be used on raw data that is dispatched to or from any
ACF or CACF via the APEX CONTROL SYSTEM. (u)
Security Violations/Compromises
Responsibility to 86. Persons approved and briefed for APEX access are responsible for
Report reporting any possible security violations or compromises of APEX
information to their CASO. Such reporting must be done immediately
to keep damage to an absolute minimum. The primary focus is to
determine the damage to the nation's security and secondly to
ascertain management or individual actions to minimize recurrence.
The cognizant government ASO is to be notified in a timely fashion of
both the incident and the results of the investigation of it. (u)
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Investigative 87. CASOs and ASOs of cognizant government agencies are jointly
Responsibility responsible for the investigation of all security violations and possible
compromises of APEX materials within their jurisdiction. Investiga-
tions will attempt to develop full details of the violation or compromise,
determine whether and how much information was exposed, the
damage that resulted, and whether culpability was apparent in
allowing the violation or compromise to occur. Sanctions will be
prescribed by the responsible SIO. These sanctions will be adminis-
tered by the ASO and the action taken will be recorded in security files
of the contractor and the cognizant government agency. (u)
88. When it is determined that material has, in fact, been revealed
inadvertently to an unauthorized person, the contractor will immedi-
ately advise the responsible government ASO of the incident and will
secure an inadvertent-exposure agreement, unless otherwise directed.
(u)
89. In all cases of inadvertent exposure a written report will be provided by
the CASO to the cognizant government ASO. (u)
90. If personnel to whom inadvertent exposure has been made can be
expected to maintain absolute secrecy of the APEX material to which
they have been exposed and execute an inadvertent-exposure agree-
ment, the cognizant government ASO may make a finding that no
compromise has occurred. (u)
Corrective Action 91. In the course of investigating security violations and compromises, it
may become clear that there are weaknesses in operating procedures in
the affected components. It is the responsibility of each CASO, when
identifying such basic deficiencies, to initiate corrective action. The
corrective action recommended will be incorporated in the investiga-
tive report to the ASO of the cognizant government agency. (u)
Security Education
General 92. Security education is a continuing process, which must be initiated at
the time of indoctrination, periodically reinforced, and emphasized
when access is terminated. ASOs and CASOs as well as all
indoctrinated personnel must continually maintain and increase
security awareness through day-to-day vigilance and reinforcement of
basic security principles. (u)
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Initial 93. Personnel are to be indoctrinated by a designated ASO. The
Indoctrination indoctrination will cover:
A. The need for, purpose of, and structure of the APEX Special Access
Control System and the adverse effects on the national security that
could result from unauthorized disclosure of APEX information.
B. An explanation of the sensitivity of APEX information and its
relationship to other intelligence information processed by the US
Government.
C. The administrative, physical, and other procedural security
requirements of the APEX Special Access Control System.
D. Individual classification management responsibilities of personnel
in the APEX system, including classification guidelines and marking
requirements.
E. The criminal penalties for espionage and unauthorized disclosure.
F. The sanctions for violation or disregard of APEX security
procedures.
G. The techniques employed by foreign intelligence organizations in
attempting to obtain national security information.
H. The security responsibilities of the individual, who must be made
aware of:
(1) The prohibition against disclosing any classified informa-
tion to unauthorized persons, with special emphasis upon
nonsecure telephones and nonsecure places.
(2) Procedures to determine that prospective recipients are
approved for access.
(3) The administrative reporting requirements involving such
things as nonofficial foreign travel, contacts with foreign
nationals, attempts by unauthorized persons to obtain APEX
information, possible loss or compromise of APEX material,
physical security deficiencies, and personnel security concerns
that would probably have an adverse effect on APEX security.
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(4) The requirement for prior review of public speeches or
writings related to work done or in progress involving APEX
compartmented materials or materials from predecessor
programs.
1. Execution of a Nondisclosure Secrecy Agreement. (u)
Continuing 94. Security education programs will be established as directed by the US
Security Government Sponsor to ensure that persons granted access to APEX
Programs material are periodically instructed as to its unique sensitivity and
their personal responsibility for protection of APEX materials. (u)
Termination of Access 95. When it has been determined that an individual no longer requires
access to any type of APEX information, he/she should be debriefed
and provided with final instructions and guidelines on the protection of
APEX information and his/her personal responsibilities. This debrief-
ing will include:
A. A reminder of the appropriate sections of Titles 18 and 50 of the US
Code, their provisions, and criminal sanctions relative to espionage and
unauthorized disclosure.
B. The continuing obligation never to divulge, publish, or otherwise
reveal to any unauthorized person any APEX information without
express permission of the appropriate responsible officials.
C. An acknowledgment of individual responsibility to report to
appropriate US Government officials any attempt by an unauthorized
person to solicit APEX information.
D. A declaration that the individual no longer has any APEX
materials in his/her possession.
E. A reminder of the risks associated with hazardous activities.
F. Execution of a Termination of Access/Security Reminder. (u)
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Glossary
APEX Control Facility (ACF)
A formally accredited area, room, group of rooms, or installation where
APEX material may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electrically
processed. Procedural and physical measures prevent the free access of
persons unless they have been formally indoctrinated for the particular
APEX material authorized for use or storage within the ACF.
APEX Control Officer (ACO)
The US Government-designated individual charged with responsibility for
administration of the APEX Special Access Control System. SIOs will
appoint or cause to be appointed ACOs and alternates to administer the
system within their organizations and jurisdictions.
APEX Control Staff
A staff of professionals supporting the APEX Steering Group and the DCI
in establishing and operating a single Community special access system for
national foreign intelligence (APEX).
APEX Security Officer (ASO)
The US Government-designated individual charged with responsibilty for-
all security aspects of the APEX Special Access Control System. SIOs will
appoint or cause to be appointed ASOs and alternates to enforce APEX
security within their organizations and jurisdictions.
APEX Special Access Control System
A system which provides for the security control of Special Access Programs
within the category of national security information called National Foreign
Intelligence. It includes collection programs, its product categories of
COMINT, HUMINT, IMAGERY, and TECHNICAL Intelligence, and
especially sensitive material in the ROYAL category.
Codeword
Generally a word or term which conveys a prearranged meaning other than
the conventional one.
Compartmentation
Formal systems of restricted access established and/or managed by the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect the sensitive aspects of
sources, methods, and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence
programs.
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Contractor APEX Control Officer (CACO)
The contractor-employed individual charged with responsibility for admin-
istration of the APEX Special Access Control System within his firm.
Appointments of CACOs will be approved by the cognizant US Government
Sponsor.
Contractor APEX Security Officer (CASO)
The contractor-employed individual charged with responsibilty for all
security aspects of the APEX Special Access Control System within his
firm. Appointment of CASOs will be approved by the cognizant US
Government Sponsor.
Decompartmentation
The removal of information from a compartmentation system without
attempting to conceal the generic source.
Defensive Security Briefing
Formal advisories which alert personnel to the potential for harassment,
provocation, or entrapment while traveling within hazardous areas. They
should be based on actual experience when available, and include
information on courses of action helpful in minimizing adverse security and
personal consequences.
Document
Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics,
including, without limitation, written or printed matter, data-processing
cards and tapes, maps, charts, paintings, drawings, photos, engraving,
sketches, working notes and papers, reproductions of such things by any
means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic or electronic recordings in any
form. In the context of this manual, publications are documents which have
been produced by a printing plant.
Executive Agent
Within the meaning of this manual, that person, organization, or entity
which functions on behalf of another in the accomplishment of specific
intelligence tasks mandated by higher government authority.
Executive Agent Program
A program wherein a single department, agency, or organization collects or
processes foreign intelligence for the Intelligence Community at the
direction of the DCI or higher national authority.
Foreign Government Information
Information that has been provided to the United States in confidence by, or
produced by the United States pursuant to a written joint arrangement
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requiring confidentiality with, a foreign government or international
organization of governments. Such a written joint arrangement may be
evidenced by an exchange of letters, a memorandum of understanding, or
other written record.
Hard Copy Document
Any document that is initially published and distributed by the originating
component in paper form and that is not stored or transmitted by electrical
means.
Hazardous Activities
Hazardous activities include assignments or visits to, and travel through,
countries listed in DCID 1/20. Hazardous activities also include assignment
or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place,
duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or exposed areas
where individuals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action.
Intelligence Sources and Methods
A collective term for those persons, organizations, things, conditions, or
events that provide intelligence information and those means used in the
collection, processing, and production of such information which, if
compromised, would be vulnerable to counteraction that could reasonably
be expected to reduce their ability to support US intelligence activities.
National Collection Program
A program wherein a single department, agency or organization collects or
processes foreign intelligence for the Intelligence Community at the
direction of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) or higher national
authority.
National Foreign Intelligence
Information collected about foreign entities collected by or in the name of
the DCI to satisfy national level policymakers. It includes the means and
sources through which this information is collected. It does not include
departmental efforts to collect information to satisfy needs unique to their
mission. It recognizes a difference between classified defense materials an(
classified national level information.
Operational Compartments
Within the APEX Security Control System, those collection activities whic.
deal with proposed, developing, or functional foreign intelligence collectior
operations. Included within the definition are all policy, planning, research
development contracting, systems operations, budgeting, and mission-
related data.
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Operational Subcompartments .:: e.
A special category created to give. analysts, processors, tasking officers, and
resource. managers access to specified-operational project data needed to
perform their jobs.
Product Compartments
Intelligence resulting from APEX-controlled-collection activities which is
segregated into generic categories of information. Product includes some
raw-.data and intelligence information as well as finished intelligence such as
estimates,'reports, and other written matter. '
Program Manager/Director The head of an operational activity; which collects or processes foreign
intelligence. for;the=Intelligence Community at.the direction of the Director
of Central Intelligence; (DCI) :or higher national authority.
Release of Classified Intelligence.
For the purpose of this directive, release is the authorized visual, oral, or
physical: disclosure, of classified intelligence. - - .
Sanitization
The concealment of sensitive intelligence sources, methods, and analytical
procedures to permit dissemination of information outside of
compartmentation systems.
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
The term SCI means all information and material bearing special controls
for restricted handling within compartmented foreign intelligence systems.
The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended.
Sensitive Sources, Methods, and Analytical Procedures
Those aspects of foreign intelligence collection, processing, or exploitation
activities which are vulnerable to hostile actions that nullify or curtail their
effectiveness or continuing productivity.
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Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)
For purposes of implementing the APEX Special Access Control System,
the SIOs are defined as those senior principals and observers to the NFIB
who head intelligence organizations- or intelligence producing agencies
within the Intelligence Community. For purposes of expediency and
workability, the principals may delegate this authority to other persons
within their organization.
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Inspections
A thorough physical, electronic, and visual examination to detect technical
surveillance devices, technical security hazards, and physical security
weaknesses. TSCM inspections differ from TEMPEST surveys in that the
latter are limited to investigation and studies of compromising emanations
whereas the TSCM inspections are basically designed to prevent or discover
the technical penetration efforts of hostile intelligence services.
TEMPEST Security Inspections .
A thorough technical investigation and study of compromising electromag-
netic emanations through the use of sensitive electronic listening devices and
recorders.
US Government Sponsor
In the context of this manual, that US Government office which has
designated responsibility for the contract.
This glossary is Unclassified
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APEX operational publica-
tion cover sheet (front).
Cover sheet for use with
APEX operational publica-
tions. Project name(s)/
codeword(s)/product indica-
tor(s) will be placed as
shown. Cover sheet stock is
unclassified. Cover sheets
are classified when classi-
fied project name(s),
codeword(s), and/or titles
are affixed.
Controlled Publication
This is an APEX publication
Restricted to those approved for
access to:
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each organization
receiving this document must sign on the reverse side
and maintain a record of its internal dissemination.
Each indviidual who sees this document will also sign
and indicate the date of handling.
Pub. No. 00-00000
Day Month Year
Copy
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 Confidential Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9
?
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each
organization receiving this document
must sign here and maintain a record of
its internal dissemination.
Each individual who sees this document
will also sign and indicate the date of
handling.
Certification of
Destruction
When document is destroyed, this
control sheet may be kept or returned to
the originator and be destroyed when
five years old.
APEX operational publica-
tion cover sheet (rear) with
integral dissemination con-
trol log and certificate of
destruction.
0
Confidential
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?
Handle via APEX Control System Top Secret
X7/7 7 /l/-/
APEX operational docu-
ment cover sheet (front).
Cover sheet for use with
APEX operational docu-
ments. Project name(s)/
codeword(s)/product indica-
tor(s) will be placed as
shown. Cover sheet stock is
unclassified. Cover sheets
are classified when classi-
fied project name(s) or
Controlled Document
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each organization
receiving this document must sign here and
maintain a record of its internal dissemination
Each individual who sees this document will also
sign and indicate the date of handling
This is an APEX document
Restricted to those approved for
access to:
codeword(s) is/(are)
affixed. /I
/
[Project Name(s) / Codewrd(s) / Product Indicator(s)]
V
~
V
Certification of Destruction
When document is destroyed, this control sheet
may be kept or returned to the originator
and be destroyed when five years old.
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9
is
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each
organization receiving this document
must sign here and maintain a record of
its internal dissemination.
Each individual who sees this document
will also sign and indicate the date of
handling.
APEX operational docu-
ment cover sheet (rear).
Continuation of the dissemi-
nation control Log.
0
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Cover sheet for operational
subcompartment publica-
tion (front). Operational
project name(s) with the
suffix ALPHA, other oper-
ational subcompartment
name(s), codeword(s), and
product indicator(s), if ap-
propriate, will be placed as
shown. Cover stock is un-
classified. Cover sheets are
classified when classified
project name(s) with
ALPHA suffix, code-
word(s), and/or titles are
affixed.
This is an ,cation
Restricted pproved for
a o:
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each organization
receiving this document must sign on the reverse side
and maintain a record of its internal dissemination.
Each indviidual who sees this document will also sign
and indicate the date of handling.
Control Number
A-00000000/80
Pub. No. 00-00000
Day Month Year
Copy
37 Confidential
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each
organization receiving this document
must sign here and maintain a record of
its internal dissemination.
Each individual who sees this document
will also sign and indicate the date of
handling.
Certification of
Destruction
When document is destroyed, this
control sheet may be kept or returned to
the originator and be destroyed when
five years old.
Cover sheet for operational
subcompartment publica-
tion (rear) with integral dis-
semination control log and
certificate of destruction.
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Cover sheet for use with
operational subcompart-
ment document (front).
Operational project name(s)
with the suffix ALPHA,
other operational
subcompartment name(s),
codeword(s), and product
indicator(s), if appropriate,
will be placed as shown.
Cover sheet stock is unclas-
sified. Cover sheets are clas-
sified when classified
project name(s) with
ALPHA suffix, and/or
codeword(s) is/(are)
affixed.
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each organization
receiving this document must sign here and
maintain a record of its internal dissemination
Each individual who sees this document will also
sign and indicate the date of handling
This is a ment
Resl'cte approved for
Certification of Destruction
When document is destroyed, this control sheet
may be kept or returned to the originator
and be destroyed when five years old.
Control Number
Copy of
Date
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each
organization receiving this document
must sign here and maintain a record of
its internal dissemination.
Each individual who sees this document
will also sign and indicate the date of
handling.
Cover sheet for use with
operational subcompart-
ment document (rear).
Continuation of the dissemi-
nation control log.
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9
Confidential
?
?
?
Enclosure I-E
Cover sheet for product pub- I
lications (front). Product
generic source indicator(s)
and/or codeword(s), as ap-
propriate, will be placed as
shown. Cover sheet stock is
unclassified. Cover sheets
are classified when classi-
fied codeword(s) and/or
titles are affixed.
G
(Publication Title Goes
in this Position)
Top Secret
Control Number
A-00000000/80
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each organization
receiving this document must sign on the reverse side
and maintain a record of its internal dissemination.
Each indviidual who sees this document will also sign
and indicate the date of handling.
Handle via APEX Control System
Top Secret
Pub. No. 00-00000
Day Month Year
copy
See overleaffor opposite side of this sheet.
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9
40
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each
organization receiving this document
must sign here and maintain a record of
its internal dissemination.
Each individual who sees this document
will also sign and indicate the date of
handling.
S
Certification of
Destruction
When document is destroyed, this
control sheet may be kept or returned to
the originator and be destroyed when
five years old.
Cover sheet for product pub-
lications (rear) with integral
dissemination control log
and certificate of
destruction.
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/12 : CIA-RDP85T00788R000100049 tial
?
Cover sheet for product
documents (front). Product
generic source indicator(s)
and/or codeword(s), as ap-
propriate, will be placed as
shown. Cover sheet stock is
unclassified. Cover sheets
are classified when classi-
fied codeword(s) is/(are)
affi xed.
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each organization
receiving this document must sign here and
maintain a record of its internal dissemination
Each individual who sees this document will also
sign and indicate the date of handling
\\\\/
This is anti FA EX doum
Restricted't&those approved for
acfiess-to: t
[Productfndlcator(s)/Codeword(s)]
Certification of Destruction
When document is destroyed, this control sheet
may be kept or returned to the originator
and be destroyed when five years old.
Control Number
Copy of
Date
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOa
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I
Dissemination Control Log
The APEX Control Officer of each
organization receiving this document
must sign here and maintain a record of
its internal dissemination.
Each individual who sees this document
will also sign and indicate the date of
handling.
Cover sheet for product doc-
uments (rear). Continuation
of dissemination control log.
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0
Cover sheet for all CONFI-
DENTIAL and SECRET
documents in the APEX
Control System. Project
name(s)/codeword (s)/prod-
uct indicator(s) will be
placed as shown. Cover
sheet stock is unclassified.
Cover sheets are classified
when classified project
name(s) and/orcodeword(s)
is (are) affixed.
N //
This is an APEX documet\v">
Restricted to those approved for
access to:
Certifcation of Destruction
When document is destroyed, this control sheet
may be kept or returned to the originator
and be destroyed when two years old.
Date
CoDY'
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOL/ Oa
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 Confidential Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP85T00788R000100040001-9