WHY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MUST CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00757R000100030011-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

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Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change
'A slightly abridged version of this article
will appear in the Hay Associates' Magazine,
Directors and Boards during February, 1982.
General David C. Jones
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Board of Governors - American Red Cross
Board of Directors - Youth Service, U.S.A., Inc.
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 ,During :this" time and= b'efore, any good men have struggled very.hard to
I have been "a member of this "Board" for nearly eight years and its
Chairman for most of:. the past four years, and have thus served as a- member
of the Joint Chiefs,"under four Presidents and four Secretaries of Defense.
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, if viewed as the military board
of a governmentcorporation, would provide some striking
contrasts to organization and management principles followed.
in the private sector: ...Board consists of five directors,
all insiders, four of whom simultaneously head line divi-
sions ..,. reports to the chief executive and a cabinet
member... supported by a corporate staff which draws all its
officers from line divisions and turns over about every two
years...'?line-`divisions control officer assignments and
advancement; there is no transfer of officers among line
divisions.'." -Board meets three times a week to address
operational ''as well as policy matters, which normally. are
fi r.st Are.vi awed by" ?a 'four-layered ;commi ttee system involving
'full `participation -. of division staffs from the start...at
seventy.-five percent of-the Board meetings, one or more of
the 'dir~ctors are represented by substitutes...if the Board
can't reach 'unanimous agreement on an issue, it must--by
law--inform its superiors ...at least the four top -leader-
ship and management levels within the corporation receive
the'-tsame,;basi'c?--compensation, set' by two"committees consist-
ing of a total of 535 members ...and any personnel changes
in the top three levels (about 150 positions) must be
approved.ih `a'dvance'by one of the committees.
.. nTW'~Lr a.{ ~ M ..s~F -s'wi j'(~ ~,y~f., ~.,/s.,.: .. ?'. ,.. _ .: 'x W A :,t ,i . l.r ..'yi ...M1{.~, r'~ ?. "!\
fort"?to'?il lumi nate"thereal' --issues -once more:' and hopefully wrest some sub-
stantial'changes. Most of"the problems and some'of the approaches I wi
address have been. discovered--then reburied--many times in the past thirty-
five years.- The difference this time is that the proposals for improvement
are - coming 'from' someone 'inside the system who for many years ,.has been in
the best position- to '-understand the causes and . consequences of its short-
comings. In'-formulating my approach, I have been, helped by a group of
senior' retired officers who are in a better 'position than those now serving
not' 1 eave office = in- 'good`- conscience this summer without making a major of
f
A1thoughfI recog m ze"the-'very -strong and persistent headwinds, I. could
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J~ }M^~~ a t,.,;t r k' .. r. ~', a Z .p?.{~yj'~}~~-~^ro~.$
3 Y~T ( p ke'~Yt~J'Yt~ Y1F a,7~ l~ ~ it^t' ~' i ~..p4fs N' . ?~ N:~aj t~5 ^.4 y1. ~$~ilt.FT.~ii, f..ig:C ..- ~ y" ~ :J-S x.r. ;1 fs. ~, ~?~ i.ai.fj y S^{~: '%
,~'i,
xtx
1et~alone everythingt?c M.>x
'
nything--
pol icy' decisions;' but ?ithey are' notoriously: poor agents for .running anything--
'-'_`C ommittee-s- -can.- serve
ably= resistant'to change ' {Committees-_can.-serve a userui purpose_',in provia-
anA"maAP r_~aent'='recommendation's `for - improvements,i: the system has, been remark-
have'''`'periodicallly "documented problems with'-..this..military committee system
attempts to meet the rapidly changing eman s o o y ,
basic leadership and management principles. 'Yet, despite many studies that
and'organization al. constraints which reflect'concerns of the past, inhibit
d d f t da ' s world and viol ate
: ? ,as'r3" Much of -this frustration comes from having to cope with legislative
a great sense of frustration in dealing with- both large and. small problems.
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to step.aside'from long-standing Service positions and objectively assess the
iL;?
joint system.
ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM
The roots- of-enforced -diffusion of military authority can be traced
to a..period which precedes the founding of the republic. ..The Continental
Congress distrusted standing armies and military heroes, and-even with George
Washington in command,. established multiple checks on his authority. The
principles of the separation of, powers. and.,civilian control over the military
,1+,.-- hn+h in law and in
. .
i
n
imbedded
~stomras.weil as::in~~..the;att'itudes,of;;our,_mi..l.itary...professi,onals?: ,4
however, the mechanisms erected to exercise such controls
In many cases
,
have had the unintended effect-of permitting--and often promoting--serious
organizational 'deficiencies. As our military institutions evolved, the vari-
ous military sub-bureaucracies attempted to establish as much independence
departments--Warand .Navy--were' riddled with'-"'semi-autonomous ?.often intrac-
f
th.
or
table fiefdoms: branches, corps, departments,. bureaus, and.so
time we went to':war, with Spain in 1898,. conditions were ripe for
reform,' but as is so 'often the case it' took ,near, military disaster in the
conduct of the war to provide the impetus within the Army and Navy to move.
toward` better integration within the Services. The Army, despite much opposi-
tion,'created a' Chief of Staff position in 1903; after several intermediate
steps," the Navy created the position of Chief of Naval- Operations i;n ?1.915.
Institutional resistance was still great, however, and. i t would take decades
t' tt vi",
.;.Both the Army'and the Navy began World War II. with authority and responsi-
bility diffused. The Army still had a large number of semi-autonomous agencies
with'little effective-coordination below the Chief of Staff level. Immediately
of te'r'r- Pearl Harbor,? General ';;..Marshall stream.l i ned: the r Army : 'by reducing the
number'of officers reporting directly- to' him from 61- to six. In December of
1941.,,,,.,the Navy had split responsibility in Washington with Admiral Stark as
Chiefs of Naval .Operations and. Admiral King,::-as- Commander.-in-,Chief of,.the.?US
,.
. .e
__J_ _a
h
t
blem wa .solverd When. Admiral King
the l
much
t
a
pro
med bob5
1 assu?. A.'_`~._..< ith, O
.?,..
'-ti Iriterservice" cooperation. `aevei opea even:; nwre ;, I VW IY T Ua I V1 c ; ~c~.nnv vy I -
cal developments began -to blur the boundaries ' between sea:- and 1 andwarfare,
the' Services had evolved-independently into-distinctly different organizations
with'sseparate policies and traditions... Competition rather.-than cooperation was
the''standard.:`?This evolution.:resulted-in four. organizations. which even today
gravitate quite naturally to"" two -groups of:.shared"traditions, and experiences:.
a maritime grouping (Navy -and Marine Corps),.:and primarily: a--land ;warfare
grouping .(Army-and.'later,the Air-Force). However, 'ci rcumstances surrounding defense i n. .the,twentieth .century
created needs and motives for unified action. The first United States.exper-
ence in deploying and supplying large expeditionary forces occurred in 1898,
and,iV'was not=until World War:I-that the airplane emerged to blur historical
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distinctions between ground and sea warfare. These sorts of changes spurred
the military into developing embryonic arrangements in the early part of the
century for coordinating strategic. and logistic plans and for conducting joint
maneuvers. Until World War II, however, such arrangements remained rather
exceptional and clearly did not work well. '
The watershed for development of a permanent interservice system was
the crisis atmosphere surrounding our entry into World War II. The British
had. established a committee of the heads of their military Services in 1923.
When :intensive military consultation with the British commenced after Pearl
Harbor, it soon became apparent that we too needed some such system, not
only to assure smoother dealings *with the British but also to coordinate our
`tr'al i nation of''`mi 1 i tarv nauthori ty. The'-fAct created a 'loose .:.confederation
between those who favored full Service integration and those who feared cen-
grated system. Many at that time believed that the Army would dominate any,
integrated system. The Air Force,' then still part of the Army, supported'
integration,"but was primarily interested in becoming a separate Service.
'After 'nearly" two 'years of studies, committee reports, and presidential
?interventions., the National Security Act' of 1947 emerged as -a "compromise
the postwar military: the Army favored, but the Navy opposed, a highly ante-
As the war drew to a close, an exhaustive debate ensued on how to organize
inadequate coordination resulted in innumerable delays on many critical issues.'-
governments to surrender unconditionally. In 'many ways, it. was a simpler.:
world. But as the biographies of many World War II leaders reveal, the joint
system established then did not work very well: Service partisanship and
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were established informally by President
Roosevelt in February 1942. The White House appointments calendar suggests
that the President met with the Chiefs as a body frequently during 1942, but
primarily with the Chief of Staff to the President in the- remaining three
years of the. war. For the most part, the Chiefs, along with their British
counterparts,`- directed largely separate wars -through three geographic com-
mands which were essentially divided by Service. General Eisenhower com-
manded Europe while Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur commanded separate
theaters in the Pacific'. Strategic planning was conducted on the basis of
direct guidance: put first priority on Europe, use the nation's full resources
.own national .war effort
little au thori ty.''~ '" Amendments' i n 1949, 1953' . and 1958 served to' strengthen
`the` 'Secretary'=?'2.= authority and to expand the ,size and purview ? of hi s.. staff','
- w
among the :-'mi 1 i tary 'Servi'ces ''and a Secretary -of De ense 'who' m i a y'- had
but" as-' far 'as the' joint system was concerned, the. changes - were much more,
margi na.l ., The role of the Chairman was -formalized, the'Joint Staff was
expanded, and the chain-of-command from the President. and .Secretary:of .Defense-
to the Combatant Commands was clarified.
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Even modest changes, however, created great controversy.. During part
of-"the' period the amendments were 'being addressed, I was aide to General
Curtis LeMay, then Commander of the Strategic Air Command, and I had many
opportunities to observe, the intense debate which 'took place not only in
Washington but throughout much of the military. Only from such a vantage point
was it clear how strong the pressures for preserving Service autonomy remained.
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resident Eisenhower, writing in 1965, said he had reminded his associ-
.that further steps have not been taken.
another step toward what was necessary. I believe he would be disappointed
ates "on signing the Defense Reorganization Bill of 1958 that it was just
;Since 1958, there have been many recommendations for fundamental
At the top of that system are the Joint Chiefs,' appointed. by the Presi-
ied i n a patchwork way during Worl d ,.,War I I.
we have had.24years--and' in many ways 35 years--without fundamental revisions -
of? the' joint;?':system,,: a system which ,in effect represents arrangements devel-
tial ly,', despite . major, changes . in . the world;,, on which I . will . comment later,
by-:.'law, but- this. primarily. codified what had al ready become practice. Essen-
revisions of the system but few changes in its statutory framework. In 1978
the.. Commandant. of the Marine Corps was made a full member of the Joint Chiefs
dent.:. and confirmed by.. the Senate. : By law.: we are the pri nci pal H military
mi,l.i.tary leaders, and provide, mi,li,tary representation to arms control negotia-
links to and. within our combat forces worldwide.- We also consult with foreign..
! superv:fse?.but, command, the senior Combatant Commanders*, and. maintain
an elaborate command, control and communications system which provides the
interests- and .:identifying the forces required to meet those; threats. We
`rt= As ?a: body .-we.,?:are responsible for reviewing and developing ways to
improve??the' state of military. readiness, assessing threats to our security
? a?
advfsors~ to Ithe,-President,,- ,the; Secretary, of,. Defense and the. Nationa r,r-security ,.
ions :teams.
0, O~u
tsx'pr.,ofessional,Fnterests, ,,,standards, and ;traditions, .~- tif,tp ;`^
f,.,one' of the four: Services. .,-.,,A Service Chief i s not only a full member of the
oint'Chiefs' 'of Staff but also is the leader of his uniformed Service.
s ;;-i.is?,pr,incipal:, military: spokesman, the Service considers him. the guardian
four-year..-.term. Since.1947, nearly. 50 officers: have held the office of Chief
.individual,~.Services who, except in..-time of war,. are restricted to a single.
r`Four of-the members of the Joint Chiefs are-,the military heads of their
1~het^;:f4ifth member of,th6iaJointChiefs,:the Chairman.;-l,s the?>only'.one-.to ?
termand may ;be reappointed one:,time;,.except:during:,time -of war when unlimited.
integrating influence.,whenever possible.:A Chairman is appointed for a_two-year
dry ;6,ffi cers,-;the,I.Chai rmarn does not exercise command . over the, Joint Chiefs or _`
he--YArmed ?Forces.,,:but';acts:,assanr:advisor.,.;a.-- moderator, an.,.implementer,' and an
evote' all, ofk;hisE:time;-:ao,>joint;'affairs. `Al'thoughl,:ou.tranking .all'>other'mili-
~1a.^$t~ ..~.. .. ._. ... . .. >....?... .. . 1 .fi? 1: '~ ;L~. u.?'! ,.3 ? is R. .,t,
wo.-year reappointments are-allowed,
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After four years as a Service Chief and now on my fourth year as the
Chairman, I have found that a Chairman generally has more influence but
less control than a Service Chief. Whereas a Service Chief can draw on signi-
ficant institutional sources of formal authority, the Chairman's influence must
be derived primarily from his effectiveness in personal relationships. His
position provides the opportunity to meet with the leadership of the nation,
but it is his professional competence, his ability to. present well thought out
and broad-based arguments, and his performance as a team player in grappling
with difficult questions of national priorities that determine his degree of
influence. The Chairman's only institutional advantage is his status as the
one senior military official whose sole responsibility encompasses the entire
spectrum of defense.
The Joint Chiefs are supported by a Joint Staff which is significantly
limited by law in terms of size--it is dwarfed by the Service and Secretary
of Defense staffs--and the tenure of officer assignments. Except for urgent
matters, a joint action is traditionally handled by assigning the issue to
a Joint Staff action officer who meets with comparable level representa-
tives from the four Service staffs. The pressures at this point* create a
greater drive for agreement than for quality: the process usually results
in extensive discussion and careful draftsmanship of a paper designed to
accommodate the views of each Service--at least to the extent of not gor-
ing anyone's ox.
The paper then works its way up through a series of such committees
to a group composed-of the Service Operations Deputies (three-star positions on
each Service staff) and the three-star Director of the Joint Staff. These
individuals--who normally attend the meetings of the Joint Chiefs--can 'approve
a routine paper, but refer any substantive issue or unagreed matter to the
Chiefs. As would be expected, papers produced by such a multiple committee
process are often watered down or well waffled, although not as badly as Dean.
Acheson judged when in his 1969 memoirs he wrote of the Joint Chiefs organiza-
tion: "Since it is a committee and its views are the result of votes on formal
papers prepared for it, it quite literally is like my favorite old lady who
could not say what she thought until she heard what she said."
When there is not time for this elaborate staff process or even to con-
vene the Joint Chiefs, I must take action and consult with my colleagues
,later. The most extreme example would be that of direct attack on the United
,States. The Soviets have a number of submarines on alert off our Atlantic and
Pacific coasts which could deliver nuclear warheads on Washington and other
targets in a very few minutes. If an attack were made, our warning sensors
would pick up the launches within seconds and reports would reach Washington
and other key points almost immediately. The general or admiral on 24-hour
'duty.in the National Military Command Center would'at_once notify me as well as
others. I then would recommend a course of action to the President and Secre-
tary of Defense, and would implement the Presidential decision without delay.
At the other end of the spectrum are incidents such as the one last
year when a Libyan pilot fired a missile at our Navy fighters over the Gulf
of Sidra and our pilots responded by downing two of the Libyan planes. ' I
was notified immediately and in turn informed the Secretary of Defense.
I then proceeded to the National Military. Command Center in the Pentagon to
determine what further action, if any, was required. The need to respond
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to crises and incidents such as this one requires that I be immediately
available, a requirement to which I have long been accustomed.
The more routine actions are considered each week in three regularly
scheduled Joint Chiefs meetings in which operational as well as policy issues
are addressed. When in Washington, the first responsibility of a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is to attend all of these meetings, but because of our
worldwide responsibilities we must be gone a considerable amount of the time.
The Vice Chief of Staff substitutes when a Service Chief is absent but since
the Chairman is not allowed a deputy (a major weakness which I will address
later), the senior Service Chief in attendance chairs the meeting when I am
away. My experience. has been that one or more substitutes attend about three-
quarters of.the meetings, a situation that results in a lack of continuity.
By law, if we cannot reach unanimous agreement on an issue, we must
inform the Secretary of Defense. Such splits. are referred to the Secretary
a few times a year, but we are understandably reluctant to forward disagree-
ments so we invest much time and effort to .accommodate differing views of
the Chiefs.
Joint Chiefs
of Staff
National Security
Council
The Joint Chiefs must maintain many constructive external relationships,
the most important of which derives from their role as the senior military
advisors to the civilian leadership, particularly the Secretary of Defense
As pointed out earlier, the Joint Chiefs oversee but do not command the
Combatant Commands.
President
Secretary_of Defense
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and the President. The Chiefs meet with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense each Tuesday to discuss joint matters as well as attend other
meetings with them during the week. As Chairman I meet privately with the
Secretary and his Deputy each day and participate with them in interagency.
discussions.
Resources Board and the Armed Forces Policy Council.
Traditionally, Presidents have met with the Chiefs as a body only on
a few occasions. More often we send memoranda to the Secretary of Defense
and request that they be.forwarded to.the President. Any Chief has the
right to ask for an individual appointment or correspond directly with the
President, but this right has also been exercised very rarely. To the best
of my knowledge, it was last used in 1974 by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief
of Naval Operations, who wrote.directly to President Nixon to urge a stronger.
negotiating stance during'SALT Two negotiations.
The main contact with the President comes when I participate as the
Joint Chiefs' representative in National Security Council meetings. Such
meetings are scheduled frequently by President Reagan who has used the National
Security Council forum more than any President since Eisenhower. I have the
full opportunity at these meetings to express to the President the corporate
views of the Chiefs as well as my personal views on any matters, regardless of
whether the Chiefs have addressed them. I also have the opportunity to express
such views below the Presidential level as a member of various interagency and
Defense working groups such as the Military Manpower Task Force, the Defense
Next to advising the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs' most important responsibility is the requirement to oversee the Com-
batant Commands. In meeting this responsibility, it is essential to nurture
a close relationship with the commanders through long-standing personal
contacts and frequent communications as well as visits to the field. . The
Service Chiefs are also responsible to their Secretaries for organizing,
equipping, and training the forces assigned to the Combatant Commands.
Responsiveness to Congress is another important responsibility of the
Joint Chiefs. The Secretary of Defense and I normally appear together be-
fore eight Congressional committees--many times each year before some. Serv-
vice'Chiefs also have hearings before several Committees, particularly those
concerned with Service budget matters. And the Joint Chiefs occasionally
will-,Appear as a bod_ y , . as . we,. di d during. va.ri ous arms control hearings.. Ex-
tensive questioning of every"action of the 'Defense Department -is the-norm
during hearings as well as in detailed written questions addressed 'to -us
throughout the year.
Whenever military officers appear at a Congressional hearing, we are
expected to respond fully to questioning, even when asked for personal views
about matters on which we may disagree with the position of the Administra-
tion. I have responded to unsolicited questions with personal views at vari-
ance with the decisions of the civilian leadership on a number of occasions,
the most recent of which concerned my reservations on the basing decision
for the MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. I believe our system is unique
among the nations of the world in airing such disagreements. A number of
years ago, when I explained this aspect of US military-Congressional rela-
tions to a head of government of one of our Allies, he responded that one
7
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of his military officers would be fired if he gave a view other than the
official position to his Parliament. The US civilian leadership throughout the
years has understood and even supported the military's responsiveness to
Congressional questions so long as our comments have been made in good faith
and neither solicited nor intended to circumvent a decision. I have found
that, senior officers have generally been sensitive to this responsibility.
Since it is essential to maintain the American people's confidence and
support for our defense programs, the Joint Chiefs consider public relations,
including speeches and other public appearances, another important function.
Finally, it is important for the Joint Chiefs to work very closely
with bur 'friends and Allies since we simply cannot go it alone in-today's
world. I meet with my NATO counterparts on-at least four occasions each
year, and with officials from many other countries somewhat less frequently.
Since almost every aspect of our job has international implications, for-
eign travel is an indispensable aid to understanding key issues and estab-
lishing good relations with foreign leaders.
These important external relationships take a great deal of time, but it
is the cumbersomeness of the committee processes that constrains our ability to
produce the best joint military advice. One of the Presidentially-directed
studies of the joint system, the 1978 "Steadman Report," concluded that the
advice provided personally (usually orally) by the Chairman and the Service
Chiefs was of high quality but that the institutional products '(the formal
position papers) were not found very useful.
SOME PROGRESS ...
Despite the institutional constraints, however, we have managed to
make some joint program improvements over the last few years. Much of the
credit for whatever progress has been made must go to my colleagues on the
Joint Chiefs. The nation has been, and continues to be, well served by these
competent, hard-working officers. Some of the improvements are:
?.development of a broader joint exercise program,
,'.practice. 3., .
o' establ i'shment 'of a joint, Deployment ' Agency
plans and activities.
? integration of our land and sea transportation systems.
? redirection of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to achieve
better understanding of mobilization.
? revamping of our joint education system, to include establishment,
in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, of research centers
at the National Defense University to help us take fresh looks at
defense problems.
? organizational adjustments for better integration of the joint command,
control and communications system.
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o establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to improve our
an eaug . m _ --
''rington and field tours. I had attended the National War College, an institu-
on the Joint Chiefs as well as we should::;.I include myself in this judgement
even though I was fortunate in having an unusually diversified background
before becoming a member of the Joint Chiefs. In my many years in, the Air
-Force, I had' been assigned to bombers and fighters, command and staff, Wash
We do not prepare officers to assume the responsibilities of membership
`;.high degree of turbulence in Key positions. U
military,from the top down. The incentives and rewards for seeking .such
;experience are-.virtually nonexistent.. And the problem is compounded by the
di rectrinvolvement i n two wars. ._ And in. my.-last overseas. assignment I had
:atwo-jobs---as'US:air`commander with geographic responsibility stretching from
Norway to- Iranand concurrently, as a NATO air commander with coalition js?,
responsibility'-for the air forces of a number of nations:
~r~.?. However,,,.I- still lacked two major ingredients of a fully rounded experi-:.
ence when I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I.had begun serv-
'ice in the Army'and had maintained close contact with that Service even after
'the Air Force became independent. But my contact with the maritime forces--
the Navy and Marines--was limited. I had visited and had.partici_pated in
joint exercises with maritime forces, but. still did not have as deep an under-
standing of their strengths and weaknesses, their doctrines and traditions,..'
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as I would have liked. Unfortunately, my experience in this regard is far from
unique: few Navy or Marine officers have substantial experience with the Army
or Air Force, and vice versa.
The second gap in my, experience is also far too common among officers
.who assume key positions in the joint system (both on the Joint Chiefs and
as Combatant Commanders): I had never served on the Joint Staff or in the
headquarters of a Unified Command. And, frankly, I have found from my own
experience that serving on the Joint Chiefs as head of a Service does not
necessarily make an individual a truly joint officer. My perspective changed
when I became Chairman and was immersed every hour in joint problems. But as
Air Force Chief, while I prided myself on my joint attitude and believed that
some fundamental changes were needed, I must confess that I was very reluctant
--as were the other Service Chiefs--to accept any infringement on Service
autonomy on individual issues.
Most newly assigned officers arrive on the Joint Staff or a Unified
Command staff from a Service-oriented career with little interservice experi-
ence and inadequate preparation for joint duty. In the case of the Joint
Staff, the problem is compounded by statutory limits--restrictions which
do not apply to the Service and Secretary of Defense staffs. For example,
public law (10 USC 143) states that:
? the tenure of members of the Joint Staff...except in time of war,...
may [not] be more than three years."
? "Except in time of war ... officers may not be reassigned to the Joint
Staff [in] less than three years ... except ... with the approval -of
the Secretary of Defense" who may waive this restriction for no more
than 30 officers.
Furthermore, officers come from and return to their Services which con-
trol their assignments and promotions. The strong Service string thus at-
tached to a Joint Staff officer (and to those assigned to the Unified Com-
mands as well) provides little incentive--and often considerable disincen-
tive--for officers to seek joint duty or to differ with their Service posi-
tion in joint deliberations. Indeed, it is hard to argue that Joint Staff
duty is `a path to the..top. With the exception of Army General Earle Wheeler,
not a single Director. of the Joint Staff or one of its major components has
ever become Chief of 'his Service or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of- Staff.
We have many outstanding officers on the Joint Staff who work very hard
under very difficult conditions-with few rewards. It is no wonder that many
retire while on or soon after-leaving the Joint Staff, or seek early release
for a more rewarding job. The three-year limit on assignments--when coupled
with our reluctance to stand-in the way of good people attempting to move
to Service jobs that may further their careers--results in a turnover of the
Joint Staff in a little more than two years. Better continuity is required.
Organization. In the Joint system we not only have the advantages and
all disad vantages typical of committees, but our problems are further
compounded by the "spokesman-statesman" dilemma that a Service Chief encounters
This is especially true when the issue of distribution--of resources or of
missions--is raised. Time after time during my years as a member of the
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Joint Chiefs, the extraordinary difficulty of addressing--let alone gain-
ing the Chiefs' agreement on--the distribution of constrained resources
has been driven home to me. A Service Chief finds himself in a very tough
position when asked to give up or forego significant resources or important
roles and missions, both because his priorities have been shaped by his Serv-
ice experience and because he must be the loyal and trusted leader of a Serv-
ice whose members sincerely believe their Service deserves a greater share
of constrained resources and of military missions--and the control thereof.
Service Chiefs do differ with the position of their Service staffs on
occasion, but to do so too often and particularly on fundamental issues is
to risk losing the support essential for carrying out Service responsibilities.
One former. Chief relates that during a joint meeting, a,_Service action officer
(a Major) 'handed him a note which said,."General , under no condition can you
agree to the third paragraph." This incident is representative of a phenome-
non which has often been called "the tyranny of the action officer." However,.
that phrase tends to obscure a significant point: the Major was expressing
the viewpoint of a large and often unforgiving bureaucracy.
we in the defense business share the problem which afflicts most of
Corporate America--the difficulties inherent in long-range planning. Today's
business leaders are of course well aware of the problems of accurately pre-
dicting the future and developing successful strategies to improve long-range
profitability--and creating incentives within constituencies to address the
long-term. ' Those of us responsible for defense planning. must contend with
the same problems as well as further complications stemming from the lack of a
readily calculable "bottom line," the buffetings, of political and social
disturbances anywhere on the globe, and a high degree of resistance to change.
Any.' institution that imbues its-member's with traditions, doctrines and
`discipline is likely to find it quite difficult to assess changes in its
environment with a high degree of objectivity. Deep-seated Service tradi-
:- .for. , resources, such. inclAnations can lead-to a.. preoccupation with . weapon
f d t t 1 nnin
i
a
tions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, Service pride and hero-
ism, but they may also engender a tendency to look inward and to perpetuate
doctrines and thought patterns that do not keep pace. with changing require-
ments. .Since fresh approaches to strategy tend to threaten an institution's
interests and self-image, it is often more comfortable to-look to the past
than to seek new ways to meet the challenges of the future. When coupled
with a system-that keeps Service leadership bound up.in a.-continuous struggle
. g.
c p
systems. techniques,.-and tactics at {the expense o sou" _s ra eg
Despite valiant efforts to improve strategic planning in the Pentagon,
we. are often faced with intenseTpressures'to spend most of our time address-
ingimmediate. issues. Those pressures are particularly -great with regard
to budget actions: sometimes we are. addressing three budget documents at a
time. For example, in the fall of 1981 we were working with Congress on the
Fiscal Year 1982 budget (well after the fiscal, year had started), preparing the
1983 budget for submission to Congress in January 1982, and doing long-range
planning for the following five-year budget period (1984-1988). The work with
the Congress obviously took budgetary precedence, and at the same time, big and
small crises (Poland, El Salvador, Libya, Middle East, etc.) were rippling
through Washington with increased frequency. Under such conditions, it-takes
strong discipline to avoid being a total captive of the urgent.
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The shortcomings outlined above have been with the joint system for
too long and the need for correction is more urgent now than at any time.
Since we live in an era when conflicts could erupt regionally or globally much
more quickly than in the past,. we must build our military strength without de-
lay--and we must be able to integrate our military forces with great efficiency.
It is clear to me that the fundamental problem is not with` individuals but
is an organizational one. II have been a close observer or a direct participant
in joint activities for more than 20 years. During that time there have
been six Chairmen and dozens of Service Chiefs and' the basic problems have
As a minimum, we need changes'in three specific areas:
(1) Strengthen the role of'the Chairman.
Many areas cannot be addressed effectively by committee action. oarticu
unreasonable to expect the Service Chiefs to take one position as Service
iariy wnen Tour out or rive committee memoers nave institutional staKes in the
issues and the pressure is on to achieve unanimity in order to act.. 'It is =
.advocates when dealing in Servicei\channels, and a totally different position. in
11
the joint arena. Such matters should. therefore be removed from addressal by.
To the extent that an interservice perspective is needed on distribution
'issues, that perspective could be better provided by the Chairman in consulta-'
tion with the. Combatant Commanders. This in turn would require strength-
ening ~?of: `the Unified.: Commander's role -wi th respect to his,. Service Component
Commanders who command. the-- ~forces* and report both to the Unified Commander
and the Service' Chief. ' Under the current system the Service Component Com-
mander's 'attention is. often drawn more. to Service issues than to interservice
coordination problems. In other areas--such as'joint operational and long-
.'.range `planning, crisis management, and a number,of routine matters--neither
the service cniets nor the service statts need participate at the level- of
Furthermore, the`Cha 'rman `should be authorized a deputy. It .is an
the"!onlY``senior--and."in many cas"es,:,not so -senior'officerwho'does'.-not have
. a deputy. ' This causes substantial problems of continuity when individual
' s`e . rvice` Chiefs,` who spend only, '4 ` _ fraction of their time on j oint~ activities,
~assistance, -particularly in, insuring the readiness, improving the' war
plan
~'. also recommend- that,. at' least until there is. far- more cross-experience and
??-.education among all four Services, the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman
should come from the two different groupings (one, be a Navy or Marine'officer
and the other an Army or Air Force officer).
I am convinced that without some such revised role for the Chairman and
less reliance.on the cumbersome committee processes, the very great demands
on the time of a Service Chief will continue and perhaps even.worsen. Presi
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24 years of experience have shown. I, for one, would also like to see the
Service Chiefs be able to spend more time as the leaders of their Service in
improving the capabilities of their units and in managing the spending of the
dent Eisenhower. recognized this problem and when he transmitted his final
reorganization plan to Congress in 1958, he stated: "This situation is
produced by their having the dual responsibilities of chiefs of the mili-
tary services and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problem is not
new but has not yielded to past efforts to solve it." Unfortunately, the
approach Eisenhower then advocated--having a Chief delegate major portions of
his Service responsibilities to his Vice Chief (with the hope that this would
overcome many of the joint problems)--has not worked either, as the subsequent
? There is great wisdom inhaving the 'Joint Chiefs of Staff`'act as senior
military advisors"""to the President and Secretary of Defense on certain key
:.issues. ': : . But Without 'a stronger role and better support for. the Chairman,
the work. of the Joint Chiefs is likely' to remain too dispersed,. diluted,
..,and-diffused to provide the best possible military advice or to,insure the
full.caoability of our combatant forces.
(Z) Limit service start involvement in the point process.
As mentioned before, the Service staffs dwarf the Joint Staff with many
of the Service'officers duplicating the work of the Joint Staff. There are
two basic problems.: First, the Service staff :involvement is a cumbersome
,.:needed on the Service staffs.
rn .- ... ... r .r. .- .. e.:r . n. :i.ti ..t.ni :J . i:: lx{ .. .::,.' ~: .?,.~ ,... ....~ .:.V ~'.~~ t.:, ., .: ~ .z'd.i ~ ...!'.J .. ~./. i o kJ ... ., .. ,.~ as at .... ...
,.informational inputs--the result would be a better product and fewer. officers
achanged. The..role,of Service staffs can 'and should be reduced to providing
.almost a de 'facto veto on every issue at every stage of the., routine staffing
process. resident Eisenhower noted 23 years ago that "these laborious proc-
esses exist because each military department feels obliged to judge inde-
pendently each work product of the Joint Staff." :The situation has not
?There are some advantages of having Service staffs involved in the joint
process, but we'.should abolish the current system. in which each Service - has
joint matters trom their service staTTS.
,.,.from his :Se'rvice staff and when.he-acts_on"a:joint matter. he should receive his
When a Service Chief acts' on aservice matter"he should- receive advice
advice from ahe. Joint -Staff; however,= since the beginning of the joint process,
:Service Chiefs :have. relied almost exclusively on -their Service staffs in
`preparing ?for,, joint meetings., It is. unrealistic to -expect truly.:interservice
vice. 1he joint
(3) Broaden the training, experience and rewards'for joint duty.
Finally, more officers should have more truly joint experiences at more
.points in their careers--and should be rewarded for doing so. There should be
more interchange among Services at the junior ranks, as Eisenhower strongly
advocated, and preparation for joint assignments should be significantly .
upgraded. The joint educational system should also be expanded and improved.
(Along these lines, one innovative idea that is being addressed is to have all
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tion.) An assignment to the Joint Staff or to a Unified Command headquarters
should be part of an upward mobility pattern rather than a diversion or end of
a career, as has been the case so often in the past. It is difficult to see
how present patterns can be changed, however, without some influence by the
Chairman on the selection and promotion of officers. Also,. the statutory
.newly appointed generals and admirals attend a common course of.joint educa-,
restrictions on service on the Joint Staff should be removed. .
of. my colleagues to address the issues and by the support of the Secretary
of. Defense,. and. others in the.Administration .he .need for change., Further-
more, I" sense a, different mood in Congress than that shownin,the '40s and
'50s, when large and powerful. elements strongly protected Service autonomy.
I am working hard in my final months as Chairman to bring about the necessary
changes. More specifically, I have underway a course of action which addresses,
first,' recommendations to my colleagues on changes which are within the author
ity of the Chiefs, and second, recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and
Despite the magnitude of the task, I am encouraged by,the willingness
the President on,other changes, to include specific proposals for legislative
Such change never comes easily.' As the Navy approached its major re-
organizations at the start of the century, Mahan concluded that no Service
could agree to give, up sovereignty, but would have to have reorganization
'forced upon -:t'from outside the organization. Six months before Pearl Harbor,
a farsighted Chairman of the General Board of the Navy proposed a truly inte-
grated joint system to the Secretary of the Navy. , Like many innovative pro-
posals before and since, the idea was referred to'.'a committee for study and
overtaken by eve,nts.`;.,It is .interesting to note, however, that then-Brigadier
General Dwight D. "Eisenhower supported this proposal with the Judgment '.'t'lhat
"coordination by cooperation is ineffective."
The Services.. have an 'understandable desire to protect organizational
interests,'to preserve ,an
sovereignty, and to conserve hard-won preroga-
tives. Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact that our national security
today requires the .integration of Service efforts more than at anytime in
our history.?. ,To, attempt ,to achieve meaningful .integration only through the
existing committee,,,.. system "is to 1 eave it at. the.. mercy... of, well -proven ,i nsti -
tutional counterpressures: n-Ibelieve we can.`..find a middle ground which
draws 'on 'the . str'engths`' of the separate Services and of having Service Chiefs
.as members.''of the Joint 'Chiefs, while at the 'same , time making. the changes
necessary to strengthen our joint system. If not, major surgery will be
required. .. i 4
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff
General David C. Jones, U.S.A.F.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(1978-80, 1580-82).
'Admiral Thomas B. Hayward.
Chief of Naval Operations
(1978-82)
General Edward C. Meyer
Chief of Staff of the Army
(1979-83)
General Lew Allen, Jr.
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
(1978-82)
General Robert H. Barrow
Commandant of the-Marine Corps
(1979-83)
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