ANGOLA-CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100310007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 18, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 0908/7
18 August 197,
ANGOLA-CUBA
Political and economic conditions in Angola weight heavily in
favor of a continued large-scale Cuban presence there for several
years to come. The overall reduction in Cuban strength during
thie period will be keyed to the -success the Angolans and the
Cubans achieve in establishing a credible Angolan army, suppress-
ing a lingering insurgency, and reviving the Angolan economic.
The reduction is likely to be offset to some degree, however by
the introduction of specialized military units and increasing
members of civilian personnel.
Havana provides the vast majority of the military, technical,
economic, and social welfare personnel currently engaged in sup-
porting the Neto government. It faces no competition and no other
government is likely to supplant the Cubans. Portugal, because of
its own political and economic uncertainties and the strained
state of relations with Luanda, is in no position to offer assist-
ance. Western governments capable of rendering assistance have
been discredited by the new regime for their support for the Popu-
lar movement's rivals during the civil war. Western business in-
terests are being allowed to continue their operations, however.
With the exception of its contribution of military hardware, even
the Soviet Union has not contributed significantly to Angola's
post-civil war development.
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Angolan President Neto to Cuba and the agreements signed
during Neto's visit, ties between the two countries are likely to
expand in the coming years.
Military Support
Castro, speaking at the 26 July ceremonies, promised that
Cuban forces "will stay as long as necessary to organize, equip,
and train" the Angolan armed forces.
quickly accomplished.
During-the latter years of Portuguese rule in Angola, the
Popular Movement waged a lackluster insurgency characterized by
small-scale ambushes and minor acts of sabotage against trans-
portation and communications facilities. Face-to-face encounters
with Portuguese troops were few and casualties were light.
By the time the civil war was over the Popular Movement may
have had some 10,000 men under arms. Most of them were hastily
recruited and poorly trained. Few of them had any experience in
conventional warfare.
Approved
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The Angolan army is hobbled by ideological disputies
among senior officials, administrative failures, logistical short-
comings, and weak leadership in the field.
Thus, the Cubans are faced with the challenge of transform-
ing a largely illiterate, poorly-motivated army of at least 10,000
into a relatively efficient military force familiar with using
and maintaining modern military equipment such as tanks and
artillery.:
Although government forces apparently have had some success
against guerrilla operations by the National Front and the National
Union, their successes in some cases can be credited to the weak-
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nesses of their adversaries.. Moreover, the Cubans are playing a
major support role
the level of insurgency is persistent
enough and sufficiently dispersed throughout Angola that it has
tied down a large part of the government's limited resources and
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has distracted both the Angolans and Cubans from concentrating on
upgrading the military's efficiency.
Non-Military Support
Cubans in large numbers have replaced Western technicians,
advisers, and skilled workers. It seems likely that a large number
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of the Cubans now fulfilling civilian functions in Angola are
troops who have been demobilized it place because they have special
ardent. nationalist, probably wants to lessen the Cuban presence in
his country as rapidly as possible, consistent with national
stability.
The present.pace of withdrawal, which appears to be roughly
consonent with Castro's pledges, is by no means dramatic, particu-
larly in view of the rapid buildup,. but it apparently satisfies
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Neto personally and can be defended by him politically. The
present regime does not seem anxious to accelerate the withdrawal
and, unless conditions in-Cuba force a change, the pace is not
likely to quicken until significant progress has been shown in
reviving the Angolan economy and improving Angola's own defense
capabilities.
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