VIETNAM'S INTENTIONS IN THE SPRATLYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100290005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 15, 1976
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Vietnam's Intentions in the Spratlys
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June 15, 1976
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June 15, 1976
Vietnam's Intentions in the Spratlys
MAIN JUDGMENTS
--A new confrontation may be brewing in the South China
Sea over conflicting Vietnamese and Filipino claims to
the Spratly Islands.
-Three countries--Vietnam, the Philippines, and the Re-
public of China--have some sort of military presence
on one or more of the islands.
-The Philippines have been conducting oil exploration
in the area and have begun reinforcing garrisons.
-The Vietnamese view the Spratlys as an extension of
their territory, and they will almost certainly regard
any forceful challenge to their position from the
Philippines as unacceptable.
--The Vietnamese course in the immediate future will be
largely determined by Manila's actions.
--If the Philippines move oil exploration operations closer
to the Spratlys and further reinforce military garrisons
in the islands, Hanoi would probably use whatever force
is necessary to force the Filipinos out.
-The Vietnamese have overwhelming military superiority
that they could bring to bear in the Spratlys and could
easily expel the Filipinos (and Chinese Nationalists)
from the islands.
--Hanoi, however, must calculate that highlighting the con-
flicting claims may provoke Peking to press China's claims
more vigorously.
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LUZON
Quezon
mile
PHILIPPINES
Phan Rang
Blenfea t NortheastCay
.Sal Southwest Cayce
* g0T1 Thitu / West York
-Fiat
Loaite_
Binh Thuy
t Ilu Abate `-- Nenshan
Namyit- Sane
Cay
SPRATLY ISLANDS Sin
-Con Son
Cove
-K I
MALAYSIA
i6AST)
B~)R EO
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1. A Fresh Warning: A new confrontation may be
brewing in the South China Sea over conflicting Vietnam-
ese and Filipino claims to the Spratly Islands, largely
because of the Philippines' active interest in the oil
potential of the area. Early in 1976, Manila sent a sur-
vey ship to conduct tests near the islands, and more re-
cently it has begun reinforcing its garrisons there. On
May 14, new Vietnamese communist antiaircraft emplace-
ments fired on a Philippine reconnaissance flight over
one of their garrisons. By early June, the Vietnamese
had issued a statement from Saigon, reaffirming their
sovereignty over the Spratlys and reserving the "right
to protect" their claims.
2. An Old Dispute: Several nations have variously
claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys based in part on
records of exploration dating from the third to the nine-
teenth centuries. Fishermen made irregular visits, but-
none of the islands normally supports a permanent
ian population; all require a regular resupply effort if
they are occupied. Despite the placement of markers and
flags, the claims have rested primarily on usage.
3. Currently, three countries--Vietnam, the Philip-
pines, and the Republic of China--have some sort of mili-
tary presence on one or more of the islands in the group.
The People's Republic of China also claims the Spratlys,
but it has not had forces in the area and does not patrol
around the islands. France, the United Kingdom, and
Malaysia also have occupied or claimed the islands, but
France and Britain are apparently prepared to renounce
their claims, and Malaysia has shown no interest in press-
ing its claim.
4. Vietnamese claims were advanced seriously for
the first time in 1951 at the time of the signing of the
Japanese peace treaty. Nationalist China advanced its
counterclaims at the same time, the Chinese Communists
shortly thereafter. In the 1950s, a private Philippine
citizen claimed several of the islands.
5. Rival Garrisons: The Spratlys were generally
uninhabited from the end of the second world war until
1956, when the Nationalist Chinese established a garrison
on Itu Aba, the largest island in the archipelago. They
are still there.
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6. In 1971, President Marcos stated that the Spratlys
were, in effect, an international trusteeship of the allied
powers of the second world war. The position was amplified
by Marcos' implication that the Philippines, owing to prox-
imity and the dictates of national security, were the
proper claimants to the archipelago. To reinforce this
contention, Marcos dispatched a company of marines to oc-
cupy at least three islands in the group, and by 1974
Manila had some sort of military presence on Nanshan,
Loaita, West York, Flat, Thitu, and Northeast Cay.
7. The first permanent Vietnamese presence was es-
tablished in the fall of 1973, when a 64-man South Viet-
namese security force was placed on Namyit Island. Partly
in response to its expulsion from the Para-cels to the
north by the Chinese Communists in January 1974, Saigon
dispatched an additional 100 troops later the same month
to set up military camps on at least five more of the
Spratly Islands--Sand Cay, Sin Cowe, Spratly, Amboyna,
and Northeast Cay. Vietnamese Communist forces captured
the islands occupied by South Vietnam's troops in April
1975.
8. The Philippines temporarily evacuated one of
the positions, on Northeast Cay, in April 1975, fearing
the Vietnamese Communists would attack their positions.
Upon concluding that the Communists would follow a live-
and-let-live policy in the Spratlys, however, they re--
occupied the position last November.
9. Stakes at Issue: The Vietnamese view the Sprat-
lys as an extension of their own territory, and maps pub-
lished recently show the islands as part of reunified
Vietnam. The Vietnamese also regard themselves as a
regional military power to be reckoned with, and they
will almost certainly regard any forceful challenge to
their position in the Spratlys from the Philippines as
imposing an unacceptable loss of face.
10. The Vietnamese are still smarting from their
expulsion by the Chinese in 1974 from the Paracel Islands.
Although the forces expelled belonged to the former
South Vietnamese government, the communists share the
old Saigon regime's chagrin, and they continue to reit-
erate Vietnam's claims to the Paracels. The Vietnamese
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can do little militarily to contest the Chinese presence
in the Paracels, but they are in a better position to
enforce their claims to the Spratlys. Hanoi undoubtedly
considers maintaining its position in the Spratlys useful
in pressing its claim to the Paracels against Peking.
11. Hope of finding oil deposits in the area pro-
vides Vietnam a further compelling incentive to defend
its claim. Reserves beneath the South China Sea are
still largely unproven, but all parties seem to believe
that considerable quantities exist, with Manila the first
to conduct an active exploration program. The Saigon
government viewed the discovery of oil as its economic
salvation, and the communists more recently have placed
considerable emphasis on re-establishing a Vietnamese-
sponsored oil exploration program.
12. Broader Considerations: The Vietnamese would
probably prefer not to be forced into a military con-
frontation with any of the various claimants over sov-
ereignty in the Spratlys. To date, Hanoi has been pre-
occupied with other more pressing matters, such as re-
unification and reconstruction of the economy. The
Vietnamese have stated publicly that they eventually
would try to resolve the conflicting claims through bi-
lateral negotiations. This offer was directed primarily
toward the Chinese, but they have also indicated in the
recent past--before Manila began actively exploring for
oil and strengthening its military presence in the Sprat-
lys--a willingness to discuss the issue with the Philip-
pine government.
13. Probable Provocation: The Vietnamese course
in the immediate future will be mainly prompted by
Manila's actions in the area. If Manila moves its oil
exploration activity closer to the Spratlys and further
reinforces its military garrisons in the islands, Hanoi
would interpret these actions as a direct challenge to
Vietnamese sovereignty and would probably use what force
is necessary to secure the withdrawal of the survey ship
and the garrisons.
14. Vietnamese Military Capabilities: The Vietnam-
ese can bring overwhelming military superiority to bear
in the Spratly Islands, and neither of the other countries
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currently maintaining garrisons on the islands could de-
fend its holdings if the Vietnamese made a serious attempt
to capture them.
15. Vietnamese airpower gives Hanoi an effective
defensive and offensive capability in the Spratly area.
The Vietnamese presently have 82 MIG fighters at various
airfields in the south which are within easy striking
distance of the islands. This includes 14 MIG-21s at
Bien Hoa Airfield just outside Saigon. Many of the 75
F-5s the Vietnamese captured last April are operable, and
from existing bases these aircraft could operate in the
island area for an hour or more with full bomb loads.
Many of the 112 A-37s are also operable, and they too
could spend considerable time over the islands armed with
rockets and machine gun ammunition.
16. The Vietnamese also have captured US transport
aircraft, some of which are rigged for combat. The AC-47,
AC-119, and AC-130 gunships are capable of remaining over
the islands for many hours. Other transports could be
used for aerial resupply as well as for command and con-
trol. The Vietnamese have a large fleet of helicopters
and recently shipped one to the islands. Additional
helicopters could be stationed on the islands to improve
Vietnamese mobility and firepower.
17. Vietnam's navy also has sufficient craft to
support action in the Spratly Islands. Captured US
landing ships and other boats could transfer as many
troops and supporting equipment as necessary to any of
the islands without difficulty. In addition, the Viet-
namese could use their Komar guided missile patrol boats
and torpedo boats effectively in an anti-ship role.
18. The Vietnamese earlier this year strengthened
the defenses of some of the islands they occupy with
the addition of artillery and antiaircraft weapons.
Hanoi may also have armed its troops with the small and
extremely effective SA-7 system. Most of the other
countries staking claim to islands in the area would
have difficulty operating against the SA-7 and anti-
aircraft artillery.
19. Hanoi has long directed one of the most effec-
tive antiaircraft forces in the world. The Vietnamese
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have well-trained personnel, sophisticated electronic
equipment, and the capability to extend their air defense
umbrella to the Spratly Islands.
20. The only real air threat to the Vietnamese in
the Spratly Islands area is presented by the Philippine
air force, which has been-flying from Palawan Island, just
200 miles from the Spratlys. The Filipinos also recently
constructed a small airstrip on one of the six islands
they occupy, but it can handle only small aircraft, such
as the T-28,
Other aircraft in the i ippine air
inventory include some 34 older F-86 and T-33 jet fight-
ers and trainers and nearly 20 of the early models of
the F-5. None of these aircraft could seriously chal-
lenge the more modern Vietnamese fighters which are
flown by combat-experienced pilots.
21. The Chinese Factor: Hanoi must calculate that
any action it takes against the Filipinos could, by high-
lighting the several conflicting claims, provoke the
Chinese to press their own claims to the Spratlys more
vigorously. This may already be occurring. The Chinese
statement of June 14 taking note of Manila's oil explor-
ation activities appears to be directed primarily toward
the Vietnamese rather than the Filipinos; in particular
it seemed to censure Hanoi's military garrison in the
islands.
22. The Chinese statement contained no warnings
or threats of consequences, and Peking would in any
event have much greater difficulty intervening in the
Spratlys than would Hanoi. The Vietnamese must recog-
nize, however, that China possesses leverage, both
through its economic aid to Hanoi and through the abil-
ity to exert pressure along the common border, which
it could apply should it choose to retaliate against
Vietnamese action in the Spratlys.
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