JSTPS STUDY ON RECOVERY ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100290004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 4, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Approved For Release 2003/11/19 : CIA-RDP85T00353R000100290004-1
4 June 1976
SUBJECT : JSTPS Study on Recovery Assumptions for the Soviet Union
1. "Centralized control" and "party control" are not synonymous,
although they are treated throughout the paper as if they were. The
two concepts should be kept separate. "Centralized control" refers
to the top level at which decisions are made. "Party control" refers
tarthe institution that sets goals at any level. As they are here
described, Case 1 and Case 2 are all but indistinguishable. Separation
of the concepts of "centralization" (attractive to the military) and
"party control" (not so attractive) would allow for a sharper definition
of "military" goals. The military are here simply assumed to be more
party-minded than the party itself, an assumption that should be very
carefully examined.
2. It is not clear whether this blurring is deliberate in Case 3.
The description is ambiguous, and the organizations listed in Table A-1
compound the ambiguity. Are we positing a real shift in the decision-
making locus at the primary (major?) regional level from party organi-
zations to the legislature, skipping the ministerial structure entirely?
If so, this should be expressed more explicitly. It should be noted
that there is no tradition of legislative control to fall back on in
any of the republics, and that republic Supreme Soviets--like the
USSR's--are very large organizations. They would be quite unwieldy
decision-making bodies, as indeed would the republic party Central
Committees.
3. Also, while we sympathize with the drafters' preference for
Case 3, some effort should be made to check the drift in language from
invidious (Case 1) to positive (Case 3). For example, in Table A-V,
Case 1: "The party pyramid dominates and infiltrates the government
pyramid." Case 3, describing the same situation at the Republic level:
"Republic parties incorporate interest groups, united to preserve the
Republic." Or in Table A-VI: Case 1: "Morale is maintained by
'bread AM) CIRCUSES'; cultural extras do get attention." Case 3:
"Schools, libraries, museunns, etc., foster Republic nationalism."
No Bread?
JCS review(s) completed.
CI M 76 10123
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SUBJECT: JSTPS Study on Recovery Assumptions for the'Soviet Union
Some detailed comments follow:
Table A-l: Level 3. Republics have Politburos. These are far
more likely loci for decision-making on regional matters than the
200-member republic Central Committees whose members, like those on
the CPSU level, have other day-to-day jobs. In the large republics,
the next levels downward are krays and oblasts whose party organizations
have buros and conmlittees. They seem to have been skipped entirely,
but they are--and presumably would be--very important organizations.
In the RSFSR, for example, they are the next level in the party
structure below "the Kremlin", and they are both numerous and
powerful. Below them in all republics come the city party committees
with their buros. "Executive Committees" and "City Executive
Committees" are not party organizations and should not be in the Party
column. They belong in that double-headed hydra "Government".
"Councils of Workers Deputies Enterprises" sound like something in
Yugoslavia. A garble, perhaps?
Table A-IV: In the economic section, the term "link" is inappro-
priate. Perhaps the drafters had agro-industrial complexes in mind,
although this seems somewhat sophisticated for an immediate post-strike
recovery period. "Link" (zveno) is a system of organizing labor on
a farm--any farm. It is roughly comparable to the share-cropping
system in this country. Kolkhozy and sovkhozy refer to the organiza-
tional ownership of given farms. The Soviet military now have their
own sovkhozy. Perhaps this would give some leads as to the future
for the militarized Case 2? Also, there appears to be a contradiction
in the Economic, item 5, Case 2 which suggests that the military
would encourage the spread of industry "associations" and management
via "optimal control". "Associations" are essentially decentralizing
instruments. The military have been posited as preferring centraliza-
tion.
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