BRIEFING PAPERS (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100270011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 28, 1976
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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28 April. 1976
BRIEFING PAPERS FOR VISIT OF GENERAL NEMATOLLAH NASIRI
I. 'Iran's Foreign Policy
A. Policy flows from the perceptions of Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi.
1. He takes a classical realpolitik approach:
National power is what counts, and balance
of power--worldwide, regional, and intra-
regional--is the long term goal. Events are
and _by_their _imp act on the power balances.
2. Each major power should have an acknowledged
zone of influence. Iran's zone is the Persian
Gulf. Challenges, in this area. will be met
with military force if necessary.
3. Geography, the Shah believes, is an important
factor in determining policy. He sees Iran
as caught between two unstable areas-.-the
sub-continent and the Middle East. Iran must
prepare for the regionalolitical instability
that seems inevitable to the Shah.
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4. The Potential for instability in the Persian
Gulf appears great to the Shah because many
of its states are militarily weak and have
outmoded political structures. This combined
with the presence of oil also ensures great
power meddling.
5. The Shah is heir to a traditional Persian
sense of isolation in a largely hostile
environment. He seeks to build economic
and political ties to lessen this isolation--
Iran is on good terms with all the major
powers. At the same time, this historical
perception increases the Shah's determination
to build Iran's power so that it can go it
alone if necessary.
6. The Shah is determined to build an industrial
export-oriented economy that can earn
revenues needed to pay for imports when oil
earnings fall off near the turn of the century.
B. The intensity of the Shah's efforts diminishes as
he shifts his attention outward from the Persian
Gulf, but his interests are essentially worldwide.
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C. The Persian Gulf
1. The goals are to ensure a dominant political
and military role for Iran in the Gulf, to
limit the influence of outside powers, and to
prevent the spread of political radicalism.
The Shah would risk confrontation with the
Arabs, the US, or even the Soviet Union to
ensure Iran's primacy here.
.2. Because he sees the Gulf as studded with weak
regimes open to subversion, the Shah fears
foreign--particularly communist--adventurism
in the area.
3. He prefers to deal. with this threat through a
regional collective security arrangement. His
efforts to secure such a pact have so far been
rebuffed by his Arab neighbors who are apprehen-
sive over Iran's military build up.
4. The arming is a necessary part of Iran's two
track policy because the Shah feels he must be
prepared, if necessary, to deploy Iranian
forces across the Gulf to forestall radical
subversion. About 3,000 Iranian troops remain
in Oman guarding against a removal of the decade-
long communist-backed subversive effort.
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D. Iraq
1. The political relationship: Iran and Iraq
signed an agreement in Algiers in March 1975
intended to resolve long-standing border
differences which had led to a number of armed
clashes. Both sides have lived up to the
letter of the accord and have settled a wide
range of differences.
2. The basic reality of Iran-Iraq relations, however,
is competition. There is a public facade of
good will, but a more enduring undertone of
distrust and divergent views on how the region
should. develop politically.
3. The durability of the reconciliation is
therefore questionable. Baghdad still seems
intent on overturning the status quo in the
Gulf, which Iran wishes to preserve.
4. The Shah so far has been unable to use the
accord to successfully pursue his wider goals.
Iraq contributed to blocking his campaign
for a Gulf security pact, and there has been
no substantial lessening of Soviet influence
in Iraq or of Iraqi support for radical Arab
causes.
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5. Continuation of these trends could eventual
cause the Shah to revert to his former policy
of seeking Iraq's isolation.
6. Iran-Iraq, the Military Balance
a. Excluding Turkey, Iran's armed forces are
today the lamest in the Middle East, and
by far the largest and most capable in the
Persian Gulf area. Its military budget
far exceeds that of other states in the area.
b. Iran has the military edge against Iraq
primarily because of the quality of its
forces. In terms of weapons inventories,
the Iranian edge is not as clear-cut.
c. Ground forces: Iran has a 3 to 1 numerical
superiority over Iraq in manpower, and a
slight edge in field and anti-aircraft
artillery. Iraq, however, has two Soviet
surface-to-surface missile systems; Iran
has none.
d. Air forces: The two are relatively even
in numbers of supersonic jet fighters;
Iran has a 1.5 to 1 edge in advanced
fighters; 7 to 1 superiority in manpower;
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2 to 1 advantage in jet-qualified pilots;
2.5 to 1 advantage in air transports; and
a 3 to 1 advantage in helicopters. Iraq,
however, has a bomber force; Iran does not.
e. Naval forces: Iran has a clear numerical
superiority in manpower and operational
combatant units.
f. Net military assessment: Iran should be
able to defend successfully against Iraqi
attack, but remains vulnerable to Iraqi
airstrikes against vital oil and other
facilities near the border. Iraq could
contain an Iranian attack but could not
prevent penetration of its borders by a
major Iranian invasion.
7. Iraqi-Soviet Relations
a. The Kremlin is showing concern about
Baghdad drifting from the Soviet orbit.
(1) The Soviets worry that the easing of
tensions between Baghdad and Tehran,
and the collapse of the Kurdish
rebellion following the Algiers
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agreement a year ago, decreased
Baghdad's dependence on Moscow for
military equipment.
(2) Even before the agreement, the Soviets
were upset with Baghdad's efforts to
attract Western technical expertise
and to buy Western arms.
(3) Before 1974, Western suppliers had
sold only about $5 million worth of
arms annually to Iraq.
(4) In 1974 and 1975, Baghdad contracted
for $872 worth from the West and
Yugoslavia.
(5) France is Iraq's most important non-
Communist arms supplier.
b. Even so, Iraq will depend on Moscow for
most of its advanced weapons for some time
to come.
(1) Under arms agreements
Baghdad has received MIG-23
jet fighters, SA-6's, Osa II and Zh.uk
patrol boats, minesweepers, 180-mm
field guns, and FROG-7 tactical
surface-to-surface rockets.
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(2) In 1974, Iraq became the third
country in the Middle East--after
Egypt and Syria--to get the SCUD
surface-to-surface missile system.
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Indian Ocean.
Iraq has provided the Soviet Union since
1968 with limited .port facilities for its
naval ships in return for Baghdad's
relatively secure source of Soviet arms.
(1) A Soviet repair ship has berthed
at the Basra naval base for prolonged
periods. It has provided replenish-
ment and limited maintenance to
small Soviet warships.
(2) Commercial facilities at Basra and
Umm Qasr have provided replenishment
to Soviet auxiliaries and small warships.
(3) These ports are not used extensively
by the Soviets because they are
crowded and are distant from the main
Soviet operating areas in the Gulf
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of Aden and in the northwestern
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8. Status of the Iraqi Kurds: The Kurds
associated with the 1974-75 abortive uprising
in Iraq are not in a position to rebuild a
resistance organization. Both Baghdad and
Tehran worry that the tribesmen may stage
terrorist attacks against Iraqi and Iranian
diplomatic posts, however.
a. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, seriously ill and
discredited by his defeat, has been
effectively eliminated as head of the
Kurdish movement. His sons have not been
able to pick up the reins of leadership
and the Kurdish leaders who took refuge
in Iran are kept under wraps by the Shah.
b.. Jalal Talabani, a leftist and long-time
rival of Barzani, is the only serious
aspirant to leadership of the Kurds.
Using Syria as a base, Talabani has been
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trying since last July to build a
dissident organization--the Kurdish
National Union. The organization
probably has only a few thousand members.
It has launched a limited number of
guerrilla raids from Syr;a into Iraqi
Kurdistan.
c. Syrian Baathist leaders see the Talabani
Kurds as another means of putting pressure
on the rival Baath Party in power in
Baghdad. Damascus is not likely to give
free rein to Talabani to operate against
Iraq unless relations between the two
countries get much worse than they are now.
E. The Sub-continent and Indian Ocean
1. The Shah considers Moscow's friendship pacts
with India and Iraq, its attempts to deepen
its influence in Afghanistan, and the fragmenta-
tion of Pakistan as constituting a giant pincer
movement aimed at placing hostile regimes on
Iran's flanks.
2. Although Moscow is the main concern, the Shah
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sees India as basically aggressive, expansionist,
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and ultimately Iran's principal ML titer in
the region. To lessen the frictions and to
present alternatives to reliance by area
states on the Soviet Union, the Shah has
sought improved relations and economic ties
with New Delhi and supported expanded regional
economic cooperation, mainly through the
Regional Cooperation for. Development framework.
In addition, he has made clear his support for
the territorial integrity of Pakistan.
3. The Shah wants Iran to be the leading, if not
the dominant power in the Indian Ocean.
a. He regards an Iranian naval, presence in
the Ocean essential to protecting the
routes of Iran's oil exports.
b. Establishment of a deep-water navy is
several years away. In the meantime, the
Shah wants a strong US naval presence in
the Indian Ocean and he supports US
expansion of Diego Garcia.
c. He will ultimately work for the elimination
of both the Soviet and US military presence,
but for the moment he sees the Indian
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Ocean as a power vacuum that Moscow
must not be allowed to fill.
F. The USSR
1. A constant in Iran's foreign polyc is deep-
seated mistrust of Moscow. The Shah is con-
vinced that Moscow wants to extend its hegemony
to the Persian Gulf.
2. He applauds Soviet reverses in the Middle
East and gives political and economic support
to Arab moderates, such as President Sadat,
in hope of furthering the decline of Soviet
influence.
3. There has been a cooling of Iranian-Soviet
relations during 1976, expressed by sharper
propaganda attacks by both sides. It is an
outgrowth of the Shah's displeasure over
Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa and their
support of the Dhofari guerrilla movement
operating against Oman.
4. Despite the mistrust, the proximity of Soviet
op wer requires that Iran have normal, if
cautious, relations with Moscow. By expanding
trade with the USSR and by regular high-level
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political exchange, he believes he has
provided strong incentives for Soviet
cooperation. He clearly will not let relations
deteriorate too far.
G. The US
1. The Shah has no doubt that Iran's natural and
most vital alignment is with the West in
general and the US in particular.
2. The West supplies needed sophisticated
industrial technology, military equipment,
and trains Iran's army.
3. The Shah still relies ultimately on Iran's
link to the US to deter Soviet aggression
against Iran.
4. There are, of course, problems.
a. The Shah doubts the US would prove a
reliable ally in case of a regional
conflict not involving a communist
power--hence his determination to
build military power adequate to defeat
all neighbors but the Soviet Union.
b. He questions US reliability as a supplier,
citing the experience in Pakistan, Turkey,
and Indochina; and he questions US
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resolve in resisting the communists,
citing Angola.
c. The Shah bluntly states the advantage to
the US of close ties to Iran and what his
regime expects in return--support but not
US dominance.
H. Economic factors lie at the heart of the Shah's
foreign policy initiatives beyond ITran's immediate
region.
1. Oil exports accounted for 96% of Iran's
total foreign exchange earnings in 1975.
Oil is a diminishing asset. The Shah, there-
fore, believes it imperative that Iran build
a modern, self-sustaining industrial economy
before the oil runs out.
2. Initiatives in Africa, Latin America, and the
developed world aim at securing unfettered
access to modern technology, technical
training, capital goods, raw materials, and
potential foreign markets for the time
when non-oil exports must sustain Iran's
economy.
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II. Iran's Nuclear Program
A. In 1973 the Shah announced an ambitious program
for nuclear energy development. It calls for
the construction of nuclear power reactors having
an installed electric power capacity of over 20,000
megawatts in the next 20 years.
1. Iran is not expected to meet the plan to
have its first nuclear power station in
operation by 1980.
2. It is questionable whether Iran will be able
to meet the long-range goal.
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B. Iran is completely dependent upon foreign assistance
in all areas of its nuclear program.
1. The terms of foreign assistance require that
the nuclear program be under international
safeguards limiting it to peaceful uses.
2. Iran does not have a capability to unilaterally
develop nuclear weapons and will not for
many years.
C. The nuclear program in Iran has consisted to date
of research and training; the major facility is a
small US-supplied research reactor at Tehran
University.
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1. An agreement for cooperation in nuclear
energy has been concluded with France.
2. Agreements with the US and West Germany are
under negotiation.
3. Although final contracts are not signed,
France and West Germany are working on the
construction of nuclear power plants of two
reactors each.
4. The first reactors are scheduled to go into
operation in 1980 and 1981.
D. Iran has selected the pressurized-water type reactor
for its program and will require foreign supply of
enriched uranium.
1. The West Germans will supply uranium enriched
by the USSR for the two reactors it will
construct.
2. Enriched uranium for the French-supplied
reactors will come from Iran's share of the
French-led multinational gaseous diffusion
project.
3. Iran has signed contracts with the US for
fuel for future US-supplied power reactors.
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4. Exploration for uranium deposits in Iran have
so far been unproductive.
5. Iran is negotiating with South Africa for the
purchase of large quantities of uranium over
the next 20 years, and is negotiating a tri-
laterial deal with France and Niger for
uranium exploration in Niger.
E. A major handicap in the expansion of the Iranian
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nuclear program is lack of trained personnel.
1. An extensive training program has been set up,
but will be some time before it shows results.
2. The French will supply an extensive nuclear
research center, scheduled for completion in
1 9 8 0 .
3. To meet construction schedules, both West
Germany and France will have to bring trained
personnel to Iran.
III. Other Items of Interest
A. Cuban activities: Excluding Angola, Havana has
about 2,500 Cubans serving abroad in advisory and
technical roles. Most are in Africa. Cubans have
worked with the African revolutionary movements since
the early 1960s; Africans have been trained in Cuba.
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1. Africa: In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Cuba broadened the range of its support
activities to African guerrilla groups and
newly emergent leftist governments.
now in Angola.
Angola: There are 13,000 to 15,000 Cubans
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We do not expect an early reduction of the
number of Cubans in Angola.
2.
Middle East: The first sizable
group of
Cubans]
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South Yemen in 1972. About 100
military
personnel followed in 1973,
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The Cuban military
contingent eventually grew to 250-300 men,
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3. Far East: Cubans have given assistance to the
Communist regimes in Vietnam and Laos. Havana
seems to be rotating contingents on a regular
basis.
4. The Soviet connection:
a. We do not know the exact degree to which
Cuba acted. in Angola in response to
Soviet direction. The scale of the
intervention and the risks certainly
point to some Soviet direction and
assurances of support.
b. A new adventure on the scale of Angola
would be repeated only if Havana could
again depend on Moscow for the same
degree of support.
c. Havana will. continue assistance on a
smaller scale to leftist regimes with or
without Soviet backing.
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B. North Korea: Beginning in the late 1960s North
Korea moderated its aggressive, heavy-handed
diplomacy and support for insurgent groups in order
to reduce its political isolation and to more
effectively compete diplomatically with South Korea.
In 1969 North Korea had relations with 28 countries,
nearly half of which were communists. By the end
of 1975 Pyongyang had relations with 87 countries.
Much of the gain came in the third world, especially
in Africa.
C. Despite this shift in tactics, Pyongyang has not
completely abandoned subversive activities or dis-
pelled its reputation as a mischief-maker.
1. There have been reports that the North Koreans
continue contacts with some insurgent groups,
albeit on a reduced and more selective basis.
2. Pyongyang continues to have close relations
with, for example, the Palestine Liberation
Organization
A North Korean
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military attache was expelled from Egypt
last year for spying.
3. North Korea's earl recognition of the MPLA
in Angola and the Polisario Front in the
Sahara have strained developing relations
with Zaire, Mauritania, and Morocco.
4. Pyongyang's earlier connections with
guerrillas in Mexico and Sri Lanka were
exposed in the early 1970s and have left a
legacy of distrust.
5. Despite improving ties, Vthiopia and Kenya
remain wary of North Korea's reputation for
supporting local dissidents.
D. Libya and the PFLP have maintained some ties, and
Libya has given some financial assistance for the
last few years, but close cooperation and heavy
financial aid began only last year.
1. President Qadhafi had always been deeply
suspicious of the Marxist philosophy of the
PFLP and of its leader George Habbash, as
well as of Habbash's Christianity, and he
kept the organization, at arms length until
approximately a year ago.
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2. A growing dissatisfaction with the PLO,
however, led Qadhafi to swallow his ideological
objections to Habbash.
a. Qadhafi had grown increasingly dissatis-
fied with Yasir Arafat's relative moderation
on the Arab-Israeli question and with
his willingness to engage in negotiations.
b. Qadhafi had also long been unhappy with
the failure of Arafat and Fatah to con-
duct more frequent guerrilla operations
in Israel and Israeli-occupied territory
and to engage in international terrorism.
3. Qadhafi apparently found in Habbash a client
more attuned to his thinking on the Arab-
Israeli issue, more responsive to his direction,
and more willing to engage in terrorism, both
international and within Israel.
a. Since approximately last summer, the PFLP
has received weapons and regular subsidies
from Libya,.which has replaced Iraq as
Habbash's principal financial backer.
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