FIDEL CASTRO S EXPANDING ROLE AS A BROKER BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100250012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 26, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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CI-M 7610078
NO. 0747-76
February 26, 1976
SUBJECT: Fidel Castro's Expanding Role as a Broker
Between the Communist and Third Worlds
movement_:. ,hat he--.le 3_ tb .iidtc~z-l. 17 _years .a_go his
and in the.-.khaki-green atti re of `the guerrilla
Fidel Castro stands out as a protean and
commanding figure among the Soviet-style communist
party leaders gathered in Moscow this week. Bearded,
they are with his more stolid communist counterparts..
While in Moscow, and later in Eastern Europe, Castro
well seek to exploit these unique bona fides to win
support for his increasingly assertive and global
foreign policy.
third. aarld.yciveYnmer s.a d revalut ovary groups as
credentials :are curantly_ _s ::goad with.-the heads o
Unlike the four visits Castro made to the USSR
in earlier years when he was cast in the role of an
underprivileged client seeking Soviet beneficence,
he will consult with Soviet leaders this time from
a position of greater strength. The Cuban Revolution
is more secure and successful than ever before,
(although still dependent on massive Soviet aid)
and he is at the peak of his power and prestige.
Decisive Cuban victories with the Popular Movement
in Angola underscore for many the wisdom of his
audacious decision to project Cuban military power
8,000 miles across the Atlantic.
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While these and other solid Cuban accomplishments
undoubtedly impress the leaders of the other communist
parties, Castro's credibility with them is probably
better enhanced by important steps he has taken
recently to accept Soviet orthodoxy. The first congress
of the Cuban Communist Party last December was a
final step in the pervasive institutionalization of
the Revolution along lines recommended by Moscow.
In recent weeks, moreover, Havana has abandoned ten
years of silence in the Sino-Soviet dispute by
loosing a vicious propaganda barrage against Peking.
Castro's remarkable success in simultaneously
augmenting his credibility-as a communist and third
: ~. _ _ _ ....
world leader will.._better'enable him-to carryout
,the nta're exP nsive' fore gri_ pa.l c he _ s -now emtzarxea
dual- credentials -in the= communist ana to ra -wor.ius ,
but to act as a bridge between them. He seems
genuinely to believe that in this manner he can
help to forge a greater convergence of interests
between the two, and once again become a major
player on the world stage.
Castro is encouraged to pursue this ambitious
design because he believes that the international
balance of power has shifted during the last few
years. The US failure in Southeast Asia, Watergate,
revelations about and investigations of the US
intelligence community, and other developments have
persuaded him that "imperialism'' is in eclipse
and that communist and third world forces have
gained the upper hand. Cuban successes in Angola
have strongly reinforced that view.
Castro also is encouraged by the increasing
compatability of Cuban and Soviet objectives and
methods in the third world, and by Moscow's apparent
satisfaction that his efforts there work to its
advantage as well as his. The economic, technical,
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and security assistance that Cuban advisers provide
the governments of several countries, including
Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia,
contributes to the fulfillment of both Cuban and
Soviet objectives. Castro may even believe that
he helped to persuade the Soviet leaders to more
actively support third world causes. This heightened
degree of mutual trust has resulted in increased
Soviet willingness to delegate to the Cubans immediate
responsibility for advancing the objectives of both
countries in certain Caribbean and African countries.
Cuba's Future Role :in. Africa
___AS of--these factors-"strongly--impel--Castro to
capl,talize=on -Cuban successes Ancjala by continu-
ng to perform as a major power }3roker in Africa.
At least 12,000 seasoned Cuban troops are believed
to be in Angola even now after the fighting has all
but ended. Castro may be keeping them there
primarily as a reminder to the white minority
governments of southern Africa that he is irrevocably
committed to support wars of national liberation in
the area.
The extent of the support Cuba eventually will
provide to guerrilla movements in southern Africa
will depend largely on how much of a commitment
Castro can win from the Soviets. His ambitions for
that part of the world undoubtedly will be one of
the central topics in his discussions with Soviet
leaders during his stay in Moscow. The presence
in his entourage of Osmani Cienfuegos, Cuba's
senior troubleshooter in Africa and-the Middle East,
and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the regime's top foreign
policy official, seem to emphasize the priority that
Castro places on his African pursuits.
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Castro will probably seek Soviet backing to
begin providing material support and training to the
faction of the African National Council that supports
Joshua Nkomo in his efforts to negotiate a settlement
with the Smith government in Rhodesia. Moscow has
long aided Nkomo, and may agree to funnel arms and
money through the Cubans. If there is any truth in
reports that Cuban military personnel and Soviet
military equipment have been sent to Mozambique
from Angola, then such a decision may already have
been made. Cuban efforts will be hampered, however,
by the poor organization and small size of the group,
and by the fact that Peking supports another faction
of the Council that is stronger and more active than
Nkomo's.
the Cubans are likely to
, therefore
ll
niti
,
y
a
I
confine their efforts in beh.lf of-the Rhodesian
guerrillas t-0 = trainij.g -and organizational areas
while seeking to build up the group's capability.
A small number of Cuban advisers could be expected
to engage in guerrilla operations, but it is not
likely that regular Cuban troops will become
involved without strong endorsements from Moscow
and major African nations.
Cuba is also likely to provide training and
material support to the South West African People's
Organization in concert with the expected efforts
of the Angolan Popular Movement to support
ency in Namibia, even if an accomodation is
insur
g
reached with Pretoria. The levels and types of
Cuban assistance would depend here, as in Rhodesia,
on a variety of external factors. In balance, it
seems unlikely that in the next few months Cuban
personnel will become involved other than as advisers
with guerrilla units.
Cuban efforts in support of the Katangan
secessionists who oppose the Mobutu government in
Zaire also are possible, but restraints that dxtend
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,well beyond those discussed in the above cases apply
here. Despite his antipathy for Mobutu,--against
whom Che Guevara fought a guerrilla action in 1965--
Castro would support a struggle against a legitimate
black African government only in the extremely
unlikely event that its opponents enjoyed the
overwhelming support of other black nations.
In the longer term, Cuba also can be expected to
expend considerable and growing energy--both
diplomatic and subversive--against white minority
rule in South Africa. The possibilities for Cuban
meddling are more limited there than elsewhere in
southern Africa, but Havana may endeavor to establish
and support a guerrilla force--perhaps from bases in
Mozambique_ in :th_e. _.hopes_ of _genex..ting.s.upport in the
-international area _for,.--r;+.awe_ direct _i.nvc51_veme.nt.._
despite the -triphant mood-brat. _Castro and-=most of
his military commanders are in following their
success in Angola, however, few of them have illusions
about how much more difficult and costly a conven-
tional war with South Africa would be.
During the remainder of the year and beyond,,
the Castro regime can be expected to perform in
Africa in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the
European colonial powers of the last century. A
growing number of Cuban guerrilla advisers are
likely to be assigned with African liberation groups,
diverse Cuban aid programs probably will be expanded,
16 and large numbers of Cuban advisers will work in
Angola to help pattern a system modeled on Cuba's.
Unless the Neto government strongly objects,
moreover, a Cuban military contingent of at least
several thousand is likely to remain indefinitely
in Angola both as a defensive force and to unsettle
nearby white minority governments. In concert with
these efforts, Cuban officials and the media will
concentrate on a theme that Castro broached late
last year: "Cuba is not just a Latin American
country, but also a Latin African country. African
blood flows abundantly in our veins."
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