LATIN AMERICA'S CHANGING FOREIGN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100230002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 29, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
Intelligence Memorandum
Latin America's Changing Foreign Relations
Confidential
0CVi Cv
December 29, 1975
No. 0783/75
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Latin America's Changing Foreign Relations
Summary
December 29, 1975
A combination of forces has moved Latin America away from a generally
passive view of world affairs toward an assertive, sometimes aggressive, activism
abroad. Diminishing commonality of interests with the US has produced a centrif-
ugal effect in Latin foreign policy, which traditionally followed the US lead. The
relaxation of east-west tension and the subsequent turn to a north-south axis of
confrontation in the UN and other international forums have significantly changed
Latin American behavior in these political arenas and drawn the region toward a
third-world viewpoint. The global impact of OPEC's oil politics has provided a new,
probably unrealistic model for bloc action to achieve mutual national goals. All of
these factors have stimulated reassessment of the constraints on and possibilities for
activities overseas, with the result that Latin American governments now engage in
international processes from which they previously felt excluded. They have
emerged as actors rather than observers on the international scene.
This kind of response to external factors might not have occurred a decade ago.
Latin America's "coming out" on the international stage has been possible largely
because of a greatly altered political atmosphere and remarkably changed social and
economic conditions in the hemisphere.
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This memorandum was prepared by he Office of Current Intelligence and
informally coprdinated within CIA. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed
to the author
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The relationship between governments and the citizenry has shifted
from estrangement to relative rapport. Government in the region is no longer
typified by an oligarchic elite backed by a praetorian military. Far from the
Jstratum of society, military establishments are now
commonly in control as leaders of a developmentalist national "revolution."
Activism and political challenge by labor organizations, student groups, and
insurgents are less and less seen by the common man or by the intellectual
community as a legitimate struggle against oppression. Governments now are
more typically reformist, engaged in fairly credible efforts that coopt the old
revolutionary causes, and responsive to calls for change. The literati, tradi-
tional naggers of the government on social and political issues, are now more
likely in tune with the official line.
Change, moreover, is visible. Economic development over the past
decade has inspired considerable public confidence. Urbanization has been
very rapid and, despite the problems it raises, provides tangible evidence that
the country is on the go. New buildings, roads, traffic jams, busy commerce,
and teeming street activity convey to the public symbols of modernization
and hearten elements trying to improve their economic and social
conditions.
Political and economic situations differ markedly from one Latin
country to another, but the overall regional mood, which a decade ago could
be characterized as besiegement, can now be described as upbeat. Latin
governments today, whether the few elected ones or the more common
military authoritarian kind, are typically secure, able to keep sight of freshly
defined national goals, and relatively free to pursue them. The ideological
warfare that raged through much of the region during the 1950s and l 960s is
over. A new generation of political figures has built or imposed national
consensus in a significant portion of Latin America.
For those governments operating from a base of political consolidation
and toward more clearly formulated objectives, the opportunity to pursue a
more expansive foreign policy arrived at a felicitous time. For other coun-
tries, however, the challenge of economic and political revisionism on the
international scene has been painfully disorienting. The smaller, less de-
veloped countries can see only a modest place for themselves in world or
regional affairs and look for security through alignment with an important
nation or blocs of nations. Feeling compelled to participate in the new
international dynamics in order to avoid isolation, they are seeking the new
mainstream but are often confused by the changing pattern of global affairs.
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Combined, the efforts of the bolder governments bidding for leadership
and the efforts of the others to keep in step with the changes around them
have created a sometimes perplexing mix of regional behavior. Once a fairly
reliable bloc led by the US, the Latins now rarely "line up," nor do they
divide along predictable lines. They make a concerted effort, often success-
fully, to achieve consensus on certain economic issues so as to present a
unified position in bargaining with the US or other parts of the developed
world. On the highly charged political issues at the UN, the Latin govern-
ments prefer to abstain; when they choose sides, they find strange bed-
fellows. On the "Zionism is racism" vote recently, for example, the Latins
voting in favor were Brazil, Cuba, Grenada, Guyana, and Mexico; ten
opposed, and 11 abstained.
The US Angle
A Latin preference for a "special relationship" with the US lingers on
but is no longer the motivating force behind the formLrlation of foreign
policy. For a long time the Latins have sought, and many continue to seek, a
formula for Latin-US cooperation that takes account of the overwhelming
power and wealth of the US as well as the Latin req _=irement to avoid
outright dependence. The Latins, always conscious of the long history of
intervention, whether punitive or benign, by the region' superpower, and
believing in the inevitability of their linkage with the US, have assiduously
worked at shaping a relationship that ensured against patronage and bullying
by Washington. They believed they had achieved the right balance with their
1969 Consensus of Vina del Mar. a document in which they detailed a
concept of new bases for US-Latin relations.
The consensus clearly indicated Latin frustration with the state of the
relationship but it also clearly indicated a preference for linking their future
to the US. The Latins contend that Washington has never responded to their
proffer of this design for a practical partnership, and many Latins date the
intensified effort to broaden their foreign policy from this failure of the US
to engage with them on the consensus.
The Vina del Mar analysis of where the inequities lie in the relationship
and what can be done to correct them has continued to serve as a measuring
rod for evaluating US performance and intentions toward Latin America.
The discussion and debate that forged the Consensus served to sharpen Latin
sensitivity to every US move, small and large, that might have some adverse
effect on the region or on one country in the region. From this slant, the
Latins have detected a long series of affronts, slights, and damage to their
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well-being emanating from US policy. Tallying these has caused a re-
awakening of the ever present but usually latent sense of victimization of
Latin America by the US.
The political alliance with the US suffered, for one reason, as a result of
Washington's shift to detente without prior consultation with the actively
anti-communist governments of the region. The response to this has been
varied. A number of Latin governments continue to regard the communist
camp as ideological lepers, but on the whole the region is considerably more
relaxed about treating with a variety of other governments, including com-
munist ones. Opening normal diplomatic relations with a communist state
was a bold move for a Latin administration only a few years ago. By now,
the majority have diplomatic relations with the Soviets. A dozen have them
with China and with Cuba. The US is no longer political mentor, and in fact
the Latin countries take pride in diverging from the US in international
politics. Some countries retain a certain measure of ideological purity vis a
vis the Marxist world, and others try to stay ahead of the US in warming
relations with Marxist governments.
Another manifestation of the political alienation is the revised defini-
tion of hemispheric solidarity. Until recently, Latin governments generally
held to the long-established tradition of pan-Americanism, the community of
South and Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and the US. Even during
the past decade, as nationalism surged through Latin America, provoking a
growing stream of anti-US rhetoric, Latin governments remained highly
responsive to the US view on regional matters. The communal tradition was
in some ways reinforced by Cuba's aberration from the Inter-American ideal.
Cuba's realignment to Moscow was broadly denounced, leaving Havana
marked as an outcast by most of the Latins for better than a decade.
The ideal now stresses the bonds among the countries south of the US
and specifically excludes the US. Cuba is on its way to reintegration in
regional affairs and has even emerged as a respectable model for other
Caribbean countries. The Latins want to continue the old pan-Americanism
on certain levels, for example retaining the Organization of American States
and its suborganizations, but they are giving greater attention to Latin-only
alliances.
. The roughest road in the Latin-US connection is in the economic area.
As dependents on US trade, many are alarmed at what they interpret as a
growing protectionist bent by the US. A number have been irritated at the
conditions on commerce imposed b various legislative amendments. The
role of transnational corporations
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1has become a subject of serious concern. A few have
,ome to feel that every ostensibly benign action toward them by the US is in
reality another device for exploitation. AID program: are criticized in
retrospect as outlets for surplus high-paid US administrators; conditions set
for financing by international development banks are susr".octed as manipula-
tive means to interfere in economic policy; and proprietary constraints such
as patents are seen as efforts to maintain monopolies on technology that
might be important for Latin development. The Latins are quick to read a
retaliatory intent in actions from Washington. The exch lion of Venezuela
and Ecuador (as OPEC members. although neither participated in the oil
boycott) from the Trade Reform Act benefits is interpreted as the kind of
punitive reaction that can be expected by Latin governments that follow an
"independent" policy.
Governments inclined toward a hostile view of the US interpret these
problems as a deliberate US effort to keep the weak countries down. Others
interpret them as largely accidents born of US indifference toward and lack
of understanding of Latin America. From their various points of view, most
Latins would agree that the US is on a path chosen with little consideration
for the rest of the hemisphere. And this judgment emboldens or forces them
to look for other options in meeting the needs of interdependence.
The search for alternative alliances abroad continuos to put distance
between the US and Latin America. The fruitfulness of thy: effort to identify
a range of options varies considerably from country to country, but in
general the entire region shares a certain success. Extrahemispheric govern-
ments no longer treat the area as a nloc of US satellites imr'ervious to outside
influence. The huge increase in the number of diplomat.Lc and commercial
missions traveling between Latin America and all other carts of the world
testifies to the broad recognition of the region's new ecumenism. The
frequency of contact and the high level of foreign officials who have come
visiting have boosted the Latins' confidence in their ability to act on the
larger stage, even when little of substance has resulted immediately from
such interchange.
Reaching for a variety of international outlets has served several pur-
poses. Psychologically, it symbolizes the breakaway from a satellite role.
Politically, it emphasizes the safety and mane uverabilit- afforded by the
principle of "no automatic alliances." Economically. it represents a
pragmatic approach to the need for export markets, unproved terms of
trade, and development assistance. Latin American governments by now
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have an array of technical and commercial agreements and development
projects with a full range of the industrialized world, including the EC,
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, Japan; and they are engaged in
negotiations with numerous LDCs in attempts to work out joint positions at
international conferences and in efforts to form blocs among raw material
producers.
Experiences in dealing with the broad spectrum of political and eco-
nomic interests led Latin America to take a second look at the "third
world," long epitomized by the nonaligned conference. Cuba had joined. the
nonaligned in 1961, but through most of that decade Latin America gen-
erally regarded the group as a collection of international misfits and
visionaries-a lunatic fringe. Cuba remained the sole Spanish-American
country in the nonaligned movement until 1973. The Latins found no
affinity with the much less developed countries of Africa and Asia and
tended to look at Middle East countries through an Israeli prism. More
recently, the general submergence of east-west divisions and the focus on the
north-south differences in terms of wealth and power have made the Latins
see a large area of mutual interest with the third world.
The impact of OPEC's oil politics has, at least for the time being,
encouraged a continuing reassessment of foreign policy and made the third
world still more attractive. The Latins' interpretation of the oil boycott, the
high fuel prices, and the world response to the problem reveals how different
their interests are from Washington's. On one level, OPEC's unity--and the
strength in unity-was inspiring to the Latins. They were impressed by the
fact that the squabbling Arabs could achieve solidarity, an often elusive goal
for the Latins. They were further impressed with the clout achieved through
solidarity. The Latins have tended to generalize unrealistically, appreciating
the lesson of bloquismo and the possibilities of cartels for their products, but
sometimes ignoring the uniqueness of oil.
Despite their own problems directly caused by OPEC, both the
shortages and the financial bleeding they suffered, the Latins have been loath
to criticize OPEC except obliquely. The Latins are betting that in the long
term, their own interests will be better served by OPEC's jolting of the rich
countries and are therefore encouraged to make their own contributions to
LDC pressure on the industrialized world.
Another aspect of great interest was US "retaliation" against OPEC
countries, which were excluded from the benefits of the 1974 Trade Reform
Act. The fact that denial of the trade preferences was indiscriminate--and so
encompassed the two Latin members despite their innocence of the boy-
cott-came across to the Latins as a very threatening turn of US policy. They
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expect the US and the rest of the industrialized countries to subvert other
bloc efforts that assist smaller or weaker countries to operate from a basis of
equality with the rich.
Latin America hardly serves as only another group of followers for the
third world, though for the sake of "consensus" it will often go along with
positions that matter to some other regional bloc. With its greater and longer
experience in many economic areas, Latin America frequently sets the tone
and identifies the issues for the underdeveloped world. Many of the current
third world issues were picked up from the Consensus of Vina del Mar:
transfer of technology, sharing of scientific data and methodology, a code
for transnational enterprises, the obligations of rich nations toward the less
advantaged. Particular Latin American governments also are way out in front
as long-time advocates of principles currently under international debate,
such as Mexico on denuclearization and Ecuador on the 200-mile sea. The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the UN is a
creation of Mexico's President. President Echeverria has also begun to
promote a larger third world version of the Latin American Economic
System, and Brazil has offered a proposal for establishing new "north-south"
rules of the game for economic relations between developed and developing
countries.
On the other side of the coin. the Latins tend to believe that pressure
from the less developed world is having a positive effect: much of the
industrialized world has subscribed at least in principle to such statements as
the charter of economic rights and the call for a new inter- national economic
order; some developed nations have agreed with the third world position that
oil price rises are not the cause of world inflation; and the US, they find, is
slowly becoming isolated in resisting, third world pressure.
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Regionalism
As Latin America has enlarged its view abroad, it has arrived at a new
appreciation of its own special regional interests. Even the distinction be-
tween Latin America and the Caribbean has in some ways become
sharpened. The small non-Latin entities of the Caribbean see most broad
issues from a different slant. The burden of their long dependence, for one
thing, is not related to the US but rather to Europe. They can take their
conformance or divergence with the US in stride, since there is no "special
relationship" to be affected. Their different situation has been emphasized
for the Latins by the fact that the European powers have responded to the
Caribbean's bargaining for economic privileges, while the Latins have been
unable to get special concessions from either Europe or the US.
One spin-off from the broad foreign policy reappraisal is intraregional
fence-mending. In a period when the potential for rivalry and hostility is at a
high point, the level of cooperation has probably reached new heights. At
some levels ostensible agreement blankets deep and bitter grievances which
the Latins themselves recognize as probably not containable in the long run.
Yet all are anxious to seize this moment in time which promises a bigger
payoff from unity than from indulgence in particular grievances.
Despite what they say to the contrary in private, officials of almost
every Latin government will stand in public defense of a neighboring coun-
try's pet aspiration. All will speak for Panama's rights in the canal nego-
tiations, for Venezuela's prerogatives as an OPEC member, for Guatemala's
claim to Belize, for Bolivia's need for an outlet to the sea. Governments
favored by US trade practices will condemn the exclusion of another
country from those benefits. Each contestant for regional leadership-
Echeverria, Perez, or Morales Bermudez-will endorse the other's bid for that
role. Latin leaders are speaking of various forms of substantive economic
cooperation, such as multinational businesses of various kinds, communica-
tions networks, an information clearinghouse for matters of common
concern such as data on transnational corporations, and Latin-only associa-
tions in various categories such as labor and news media. An umbrella
Latin-only organization, the Latin American Economic System, to which 25
governments have subscribed, is a recent creation.
No small factor in the move toward unity is the fact that Venezuela,
one of the primary advocates of solidarity, has made effective use of its oil
wealth, showing itself willing to fund multilateral enterprises and to give
special assistance to countries in the region most hurt by the oil price rises.
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Granting these favors, Venezuela has on its side a group of indebted govern-
ments which, satellite-like, feel obliged or motivated to fall in line with
Caracas on particular issues. Venezuela has been the most successful of the
Latin countries ambitious for a leadership position, but Brazil, Mexico, and
Cuba are also potential centers for orbits of influence. These emerging new
spheres of political prestige or economic power contribute to the continuing
diffusion of foreign policy interests in the area.
Particular Viewpoints
Each government of Latin America judges its own well-being and the
state of its relations with Washington and the rest of the world from its own
particular point of reference. Almost all, however, are dissatisfied, in varying
degrees, with the US. Depending on the circumstances of the moment, these
governments tend to shift from one to another of two broad camps with
respect to the US. One camp plays out an adversary relationship to its own
advantage, finding the pose as "victim" of some US policy to be a political
gold mine at home and internationally. The other camp detects a hostile
attitude from Washington which it believes is unwarranted. This second
group, which usually includes most of the small nations of the region, feels
that it has reaped guilt by association with the more assertive governments of
the area. Finding a coolness from Washington, the small countries fear
isolation and therefore do become willing to join the adversary camp,
providing "solidarity" even on issues that make them uncomfortable. They
often hope that by attracting Washington's attention to a deteriorating state
of relations in this way they can impress on US officials the need to remedy
the situation.
Motivations and rationales that underlie the making of foreign policy
vary not only from country to country, but within countries from one
administration to another. Some of the more developed countries and a few
of the small ones that have been spared political turmoil exhibit a certain
consistency or hold to long-time traditional special interests in foreign
policy. But for the most part, the president or prime minister operates fairly
freely from his own particular view of the world and his country's place in it.
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Venezuela, like Mexico in this regard, expects a largess of sympathy and
understanding from the US for its nationalist aspirations, based on a long
tradition of friendship and mutually beneficial alliance. Venezuela by now
feels its open political system is fairly secure but dependent on the govern-
ment's responsiveness to the popular nationalist surge. Oil wealth provides
transitory wherewithal for meeting nationalist and development needs and
must be used to maximum political and economic advantage. Also somewhat
like Mexico's Echeverria, President Perez has chosen an ambidextrous policy
that tries to maintain vital links with the US while pursuing an expansive,
third world tack on international issues. Increasingly, the relationship with
the US has deteriorated as Perez has identified various US positions (e.g., the
Trade Act) as "aggression" against the developing nations. In these circum-
stances, Perez has exploited the role of the harassed defender against US
imperialism to great political effect.
Perez' performance is probably outdone by that of Panama's Torrijos.
Panama's third world stance, its successful internationalization of the canal
issue, and its unique dependence on US good will combine to grant General
Torrijos great maneuverability in both foreign and domestic policy. With
world opinion strongly backing its case against the US, Panama enjoys
almost unlimited opportunity to attack the US rhetorically with impunity,
activity which confers on Torrijos excellent third world credentials abroad
and unassailable revolutionary credentials at home. At the same time,
Torrijos can credibly explain his failure to follow through on any given
particular by alluding to the constraints imposed on him by the negotiation
process and by the power of the US.
Peru's revolutionary government was built around highly nationalistic
political and social principles that tend to set the country on a course away
from the US. Particularly under the leadership of ex-President Velasco, the
revolution operated partly from the premise that the US meant harm to
Peru, and the Peruvian leadership was probably the most paranoid among the
Latinos in its conviction that US subversion. was an everyday threat.
Excepting Cuba, Peru remains, despite the departure of Velasco and the
more discriminating attitude of his successor, Morales Bermudez, the most
comfortable and accommodating Latin country in the company of the third
world and the nonaligned.
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Argentina, for all practical purposes, is not in the international game.
Internal chaos has left the nation without a coherent foreign policy.
Argentina identifies itself as a "natural" leader in the region and beyond, but
its long preoccupation with domestic affairs has meant a forfeiture of such a
role.
Brazil has perhaps the most sophisticated and experienced diplomatic
talent in the region and it makes the most serious effort to look at the
changed world scene, and particularly at US-Latin American developments,
in a constructive framework. Feeling generally superior to Spanish America
and confident that it is at a significant take-off point in its development,
Brazil views the new relationships as realistic. Brazilian leaders tend to
interpret any hard knocks from Washington as proof that their nation is
becoming truly competitive with the traditional world powers. They never-
theless resent the obstacles they believe the US deliberately puts in the way
of their success, such as trade barriers and US reservations about Brazil's
nuclear program.
Most other governments in the area are less confident of their ability to
function successfully in the dynamic international arena without the pro-
tection of a reliable and powerful ally. The multitude of international
conferences and issues strains their financial and human resources both in
terms of fielding able delegates and in terms of keeping abreast of events.
Having perceived diminishing US interest in Latin America as a whole and in
their particular countries, these governments find security, if not content, in
following the lead of the more assertive countries and by contributing to
Latin solidarity.
'their reluctance to accept the idea that the US has `'abandoned" the
area definitively or permanently is obvious in their repeated expressions of
concern over the unsatisfactory state of US-Latin relations. The Central
American countries, Uruguay, Chile, and Colombia have all sounded this
theme. All have conveyed in some detail the specific angles of their anxiety
and deplored what seems to them a US failure to understand Latin America.
The Chilean government is increasingly embittered over Washington's failure
to embrace it, however, believing that it has earned US gratitude for freeing
the hemisphere of a Marxist cancer.
Continuing Reappraisal
The Latin governments, whether operating from confidence or not in
the present situation, see the entire international scene as still in flux. They
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are more firm than ever in the past about the essentiality of getting a better
deal for the region in an interdependent world but recognize a need to stay
tactically flexible. Few, and perhaps none, would judge a permanent rift
between Latin America and the US as in the Latin interest. Yet the concept
of multipolarity seems to them inescapable, and each country will continue
to try to make the most of the new options available. The case of anti-
Communist Chile's warming relationship with the People's Republic of China
is instructive on this point. Latin America's own more catholic attitude
toward the rest of the world will continue to attract the interest of extra-
hemispheric powers seeking new outlets for their influence.
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