THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EST) NO. 4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100160007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 6, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLI(_ENCE P.rENCY.
Directorate of Intelligence
6 April 1975
The Situation in Indochina
(As of 1600 EST)
No. 4
SOUTH VIETNAM
Political' Developments
1. Thieu's obvious intention to remain in power has
produced mounting dissatisfaction in both military and
civilian circles, but as yet there is no firm evidence
of a serious move to force his ouster or resignation.
2. the reactions of Senate President Tran Van Lam
may best reflect the general political situation in the
country. Lam conceded Saturday that his efforts to per-
suade Thieu to step aside in favor of an "executive
council" headed by general Ky had failed. Moreover,
he admitted that despite what he felt was universal
dissatisfaction with Thieu the President still had the
trump cards and "he is playing them coolv." Some people
had been arrested on vague charges of coup plotting and
others had lost their draft deferments and were being
sent to the front lines. The labor force, includ.inc
government bureaucrats, is reluctant to speak out against
Thieu in the wake of rumors that Viet Cong accents are now
surfacing to spread confusion among the people. Military
men are equally reluctant, fearing that any unsuccessful
coup would bring disgrace to them and reprisals against
their families. Religious factions, especially the
Catholics, do not want to take any action that would
help the Communists. Thus, in Lam's opinion, so long
as Thieu retains the loyalty of a few high-level military
DOS review(s) completed.
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officers and the police, his removal from office will
not be an easy task to engineer.
Communist Reactions
3. Communist reaction to political developments
in South Vietnam has focused on US support to the Thieu
government; so far, there has been no reaction from
either the Viet Cong o_C North Vietnamese to Thieu's
speech. Hanoi has been preoccupied. criticizing the
US evacuation of Vietnamese refugees and orphans. An
article in the party daily Friday called the evacuations
a "shrewd and malicious plot" to force "our people to
leave their native lands." Premier Pham Van Dong in a
radi-o broadcast Sunday charged that the US evacuation
plan was "abominable" and "unhealthy."
4. Viet Cong commentary has focused more on develop-
ments in the recently "liberated" areas of South Vietnam,
claiming that life is "returning to normal." The Com-
munists also claim that a political solution could be
arrived at following the departure of President Thieu
and members of his "cliaue." The Viet Cong have not
identified who they would be willing to negotiate with
in a new government or who comprises Thieu's clique,
although at a press conference in Saigon__ Saturday, a
Viet Cong spokesman claimed that the "number is not a
big one."
Delta Action Levels Off
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5. The bulk of Communist-initiated military action
continues in the form of shellings of government positions
in the northern and central provinces of the delta. The
Binh Thuy airfield, just outside Can Tho, was hit by
seven rockets last night. No heavy offensive-action was
mounted by either side on April 6, but the North Vietna-
mese 4th Division is maintaining pressure on the South
Vietnamese units defending Can Tio City.
6. The 21st Division commander is following his
recently-adopted tactic of maintaining a mobile blocking
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type of defense rather than committing his troops to
large-scale offensive operations that could result
in heavy casualties. This tactic appears to be work-
ing well so far. Government officials believe the
division's blocking role is effectively keeping the
Communists off balance, and this accounts for the
Communists' failure thus far to launch their exnected
attacks against the city.
7. A slight upswing in optimism among regional
staff officers rests on the substantially increased
availability and effectiveness of -air support. The
delta is now receiving at least 60 sorties of strike
aircraft daily, and government units are no longer
complaining that pilots are bombing from high altitudes
that preclude any degree 'of accuracy.
8. The regional commander has been strengthen--
ing the defenses of~Moc Hoa in the northern delta and
the South Vietnamese 9th Division units supported by
armor and increased air support now have the military
edge on the battlefront that some military leaders feel
could be the first big test of the resolve of Saigon's
forces-in the remaining third of the country.
Status of Units Evacuated from Northern Provinces
9. The commander o.f.the'South Vietnamese Marine
Division evacuated from Da Nang is now regrouping the
unit at Vung Tau along the.coast and has more 'than
5,000 marines. Of the three brigades that are being
reassembled and rearmed, one is almost full strength,
well-equipped, and is considered combat ready. The
other two brigades are at about half strength apd one
of these should be operational by late next week.
10. The marine commander has been given trucks
and artillery and will soon move, the operational bri-
gade to the Marine Training?Center outside Saigon for
the purpose of bolstering the confidence of the popu-
lation in the capital.
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11. Parts of the South Vietnamese Airborne bri-
gade that were brought out of the northern provinces.
have been resting and refitting at Long Binh. One
battalion was sent on April 4 to reinforce government
units in the than Rang area of Ninh Thuan Province.
The government still is holding onto small enclaves
at both Phan Rang and'Phan Thiet, because the North
Vietnamese have been slow to occupy these weakly
defended areas of southern Military Region 2. There
have also been some reports that the Communists have
not yet moved into Nana Trang in force, but Saigon's
military presence there is weak.
.12. Much of the South Vietnamese 2nd Division,
which fled from Quang Ngai and Quang Tin provinces in
Military Region 1, is now in Binh Tuy Province. The
division commander is attempting to reorganize 4,000
or so troops but has encountered difficulties. Many
of the soldiers have been 'reluctant to turn in their
weapons, and. some were involved in stealing and loot-
ing in the provincial capital of Ham Tan, a. seacoast
city that has been deluged with military personnel
and civilians arriving by boat from the northern pro-
vinces. The 2nd Division commander has managed to
subdue'rany of the unruly troops and has placed them
aboard ships for several days to allow tempers to cool,
permit a screening and, selection according to military
unit, and preclude any serious disorders when they are
shipped to various camps for reorganization into fight-
Lag units. .
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The Tactical Situation
1. Increased Khmer Communist attacks today forced
elements of the Cambodian Army's 3rd Division to abandon
the town of Thnal Totung on Route 4 west of Pochentong
airport. Significant amounts of eau%rment were left
behind and several hundred government troops are missing.
Other 3rd Division units withdrew in a more orderly
fashion from a position just southeast of Thnal Totung.
Despite the loss of these outlying positions, most of the
3rd Division still is well dug-in along the primary
defense line protecting the army's main ammunition dump
near the airport and should be able to prevent any fur-
ther Communist gains, at'.least for the next few days.
2. -Insurgent forces today also kept Phnom Penh's
northwestern defenses under steady pressure but were
unable to make any further territorial.gains. govern-
ment maintenance crews managed to repair a number of
aircraft last night and the air force was able to flv
more than fifty tactical missions today, most of them
in support of government units north and northwest of
Pochentong airport. Communist rocket and artillery
attacks against the airport slackened today.
3. In the countryside, the Communists have stenped-
Qp their attacks against the provincial capital of Yom-
pong Speu, on Route 4 southwest of Phnom Penh, and the
situation there is becoming serious. Southeast of Phnom
Penh, ground attacks against the provincial capital of
Prey Veng last night forced government units to abandon
an outlying position. A small number of survivors from
Neak L"uo g end BariaT have "begun?,.filteririg `into Trey"gong
and Svay Rieng--now the onlf two government-held towns
east of the Mekong River.
Evacuation Status
4. Eagle Pull assets will be on a three-hour alert
as of midnight .Monday, Phnom Penh time. As of today,
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only 69 official members of the US Mission and 102
private US citizens 'remained in Phnom Penh. The
evacuation list, however, still includes over 600
third country nationals and Cambodians. Ambassador
Dean is still convinced that the situation in the
capital will unravel rapidly if large numbers of
government officials and Cambodian employees of the
US Mission begin leaving'and that the lives of any
remaining US officials would be endangered. He also
speculates that the relative lull in battlefield
activity around the capital is'ominous and that if the
evacuation is not completed soon, the "final extrac-
tion will have to be carried out under hostile fire."
Political Developments
5. Acting Cambodians President Saukham Noy met
with US Coz-igressional staff members today and made
an impassioned plea, for supplemental aid. Noy said
that a favorable vote on the aid question would buy
him time to arrange what in effect would be an orderly
surrender.-. Nov said that under present circumstances
the "best feasible solution" would be for the govern-
ment to give in to Sihanouk's demands and to invite
the Prince back to Phnom Penh. Koy envisioned tying
the "invitation" to an agreement that Communist forces
would not enter Phnom Penh and would allow the con-
tinued delivery of relief supplies to the capital.
If supplemental aid is not forthcoming, Noy said that
the government would have no choice but to surrender
unconditionally allowing 'insurgent forces to enter Phnom
Penh. He warned the Congressional. staffers that a
"bloodbath" could result. Noy was undoubtedly aiming
to shock his guests but his comments also indicate that
government officials now realize the severity o,f the
situation and that any hope of a compromise solution
has vanished.
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