PROSPECTS FOR A COUP IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 2, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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0404/75
January 2, 1975
SUBJECT: Prospects for a Coup in El Salvador
MILITARY ATTITUDES AND CLUES FROM THE PAST
The military is the most powerful political force in
El Salvador. It is the military officers who decide who
will govern and what direction the government will take.
While they are mildly reformist and consider themselves
close to the people, they are essentially conservative
and paternalistic in their perception of the problems of
the masses. They consider it their responsibility to
decide what the people need, and their decisions are
frequently colored by their own needs.
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During the past two decades, all Salvadoran govern-
ments have been headed by military officers and have re-
mained in power because of military backing. Most coup
plotting has been instigated by dissidents within the
military establishment who were dissatisfied with their
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tions.
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Those that have succeeded were undertaken for reasons that
appealed strongly to the military and had the benefit of
strong leadership.
El Salvador's most recent coup (1961) is a good
example. In October 1960, a group of leftist officers
and civilians overturned the government of Colonel Jose
Maria Lemus. Only three months later, the leftist junta
was ousted by the majority of the military establishment,
united in its determination to rid the country of its
"communist" government and led by the decisive Colonel
Julio Rivera. The Rivera government subsequently gained
widespread support through a program of economic and
social reform, but the coup was possible and control was
maintained because a majority of the military considered
it necessary and Rivera proved to be a dynamic leader.
IS THE MILITARY SATISFIED WITH MOLINA?
Molina took office in 1972 as the result of an elec-
tion that was widely believed to have been rigged. A
coup attempt by disaffected army officers following the
election failed because of poor planning, uncertain leader-
ship, and lack of support among a majority of the officers.
An investigation showed that most of the rebels were in-
volved because of personal dissatisfaction. Molina began
a series of discussions with groups of officers to deter-
mine the causes of their discontent. Since assuming of-
fice, he has taken a number of steps to solve some of
their problems.
--He has upgraded military equipment by purchase of
new planes and weapons.
--He has provided housing assitance for military
families.
--He has forced some older officers to retire in
order to make room for the younger ones to advance.
--He has given younger officers increased responsi-
bility.
--He has taken a tough line with leftist students
and politicians.
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IS A COUP LIKELY?
The reform program started by Rivera has lost much of
its momentum under his successors, Sanchez and Molina.
World-wide inflation and other economic problems are being
felt in El Salvador as elsewhere, and the adequacy of the
administration to combat these problems is being questioned
by both civilian and military observers. The democratiza-
tion of the electoral process which El Salvador so proudly
displayed during the 1960s has diminished with each elec-
tion since 1970,
All of these factors matter to the military as parts
of one major problem. The officers view the electoral
process with ambivalence. They favor democracy as long
as the right party wins. They have been proud of El
Salvador's new democratic image, but they are not yet
ready to accept a civilian--especially a Christian Demo-
crat--as President or allow that party to win control of
the legislature. As the Christian Democrats have gained
in strength, becoming the m n art the
have also become a threat.
less cooperative as
an opposition and more willing to enter coalitions with
parties farther to the left, including the Communists.
This has merely "confirmed" the military's worst fears
about them.
To the extent that the military blames the governing
party for its loss of support, it is unhappy with the
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party's inaction on reform programs, economic development,
and inability to combat inflation. Government handling
of peasant unrest, leftist violence, and student demon-
strations, on the other hand, is likely to cause military
criticism only if it lacks firmness. The closing of the
national university in 1972 for over a year, for instance,
gained the government some credit with the military. Al-
though the military is not likely to oust the Molina
government soon, there is a strong possibility that it will
do so before the presidential election in 1977 unless the
administration shows evidence in the meantime of having re-
covered enough of its lost support to be able to maintain
control without resorting to fraud.
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Western Hemisphere Division
Central America and Caribbean Branch
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