THE 29TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100090003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 23, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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Confident
No Foreign Dirrem
Intelligence Memorandum
The 29th UN General Assembly
Confidential
~~~
September 23, 1974
No. 1127/74
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources-and Methods Involved
Additional Warning
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
g 56 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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September 23, 1974
The 29th UN General Assembly
Summary
T'he 29th UN General Assembly will be dominated by efforts of the lesser
developed countries to entrench-as basic UN policies-the new economic order and
plan of action that came out of the Special Session last spring. In keeping with the
movement of recent years toward politicization of economic and social issues by
their debate on the assembly floor, the lesser developed countries will use the
assembly--as their most accessible forum--to highlight their frustration at the mo-
nopoly over resources and power enjoyed by the developed countries. At the same
time, they will attempt to wrest for themselves a greater share of that wealth.
In addition to this heightened emphasis on economic issues, discussion in the
session will focus on the consequences of a number of events that jolted the UN
community this year: the Indian nuclear test, continued instability on Cyprus, and
the results of UN-sponsored conferences on the Law of the Sea and Population.
These will be listed on the agenda along with the traditional credentials issues, the
Korean problem, and humanitarian concerns. The usual desultory debate and inat-
tention that most UN issues engender will probably mark the session this year as
well. But the influence of Algeria's forceful foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika,
as president may be sufficient to arrest further diminution of the assembly's prestige
as a body responsive at least to the aspirations of its less fortunate majority, if not to
the desires of its most powerful backers.
Comments and queries on the contents of this ublication arc welcome. They may be directed to
_of the Office of Current Intelligence,
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Inter-Sessional Developments
Atmospherics
The 29th General Assembly convened last week in a climate heavy with
the disappointment of many of its members. These states say that the United
Nations has failed to influence international relations in line with the
objectives expressed in its charter: "to practice tolerance and live together in
peace...to unite...to maintain international peace and security, and . to
employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and
social advancement of all peoples." Unilateral national actions have frus-
trated these aims too often for the charter now to engender much confi-
dence in the success of international efforts backed only by the declining
prestige of the UN or its secretary general.
The major powers have come in for their share of the blame because of
their alleged neglect of the UN Security Council as the locus of discussion
and resolution of the major challenges to international order and security.
This neglect leads to the contention that problems are dumped in the UN's
lap only after all other efforts to solve them have failed. The UN remains, for
the majority of its members, the last resort when serious negotiations are
called for.
Events in Cyprus this summer confirmed for many members the UN's
inability to influence international events. There appear to have been few
delusions on the part of most countries that the UN could have prevented or,
once initiated, have halted the hostilities. But the UN was still expected to
fulfill a valuable humanitarian role through its peacekeeping forces on the
island. The vehemence of the international response to what was widely
considered to have been the failure of the peacekeeping forces to fulfill even
this minimum role may derive from apprehension that once the UN forfeits
social and humanitarian responsibilities, the rationale for its existence has
ceased.
Aggravating Economic Developments
That the UN is held in such low esteem has not, however, robbed it of
its importance as a political forum, particularly for the developing coun-
tries-the so-called Group of 77-who now number over 100. For these
countries, the UN system, and particularly the General Assembly, offers the
only platform available from which they can present their aspirations, air
their dissatisfactions, and be assured that they will at least be heard. The
assembly's importance has been revitalized by expanding the scope of its
responsibilities beyond those strictly political initiatives at which the UN has
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so consistently failed. Social and economic issues that were previously
discussed only in the specialized agencies are increasingly being debated on
the assembly floor.
The most obvious example of this movement toward politicizing eco-
nomic issues was the special session on raw materials and energy held last
April. It was initiated by the Algerians primarily to prevent international
opinion from focusing on the energy issue alone-anal on the great profits
realized by the oil exporters at the expense of other less developed countries
as well as of the developed countries. The session, in four weeks of speeches
and debates, heard speaker after speaker present the consequences of the
world economic situation on his country's economy. The Program of Action
and the Declaration of the New Economic Order that were adopted at the
conclusion of the session represented a major victory for the less developed
countries in focusing international. attention on the seriousness of their
financial situations and in pointing up the interdependence of economic
forces. These countries have defended these documents tenaciously in every
UN meeting since the special session, and have shown their determination to
see the so-called new economic order accepted as a blueprint for action by
the developed countries. This use of the assembly to highlight their griev-
ances has more appeal to them than strictly technical debates, and the
politicization of economic and social issues can be expected to have a
significant impact on the current session of the UNGA.
Major Influences on this Session
The period since the conclusion of the last assembly has also witnessed
other events with serious implications-and opportunities-for the UN's
future: the Indian nuclear test of last May, the Cyprus crisis, and the
recently concluded UN-sponsored conferences on Law of the Sea and
Population. Should this General Assembly fail to translate the international
concern over these issues into at least a climate beneficial to their resolution,
the UN may find its prestige so weakened in the opinion of its member states
that it would lose even much of its function as a forum for debate and
discussion.
The Indian nuclear explosion-the first breach of the proliferation
barrier since the Chinese nuclear test of 1964-shook the international
community from its complacency with existing nuclear non-proliferation.
policies. India's ability to explode a device without the help of thf? major
powers, and despite the controls placed on Indian nuclear facilities by
international and bilateral obligations, has inspired some other potential
nuclear states to consider a similar course. At a minimum, the changed
climate has reinforced the reluctance of a number of countries to ratify the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the keystone of the major powers' nuclear policy.
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By maintaining public pressure on India and other near nuclear states to
affirm and abide by non-proliferation goals, the UN could emphasize the
serious concern with which its member states regard such actions, which
have an extremely destabilizing effect on the peace and security of all states.
The continued instability on Cyprus has led to calls from a number of
quarters for greater UN involvement in solving the problem. The Soviet
Union has been attempting to broaden its own role on Cyprus by pushing for
the dispatch of a Security Council mission-which would include an East
European representative-to investigate and report on conditions on the
island. The nonaligned group has also been urged, primarily by Yugoslavia,
to play a more decisive role to ensure that Cyprus retains its territorial
integrity and nonaligned status.
At the same time, Turkish opposition to an assembly discussion of
Cyprus is having some success in undercutting this Yugoslav initiative. The
Turks have been actively lobbying with the nonaligned Moslem states. The
Algerians-whose foreign minister will play a decisive role as president of this
assembly session-have said they will try to keep the issue from becoming
the subject of divisive debate.
Although most countries appear to be resigned to some assembly
discussion of Cyprus, the countries directly involved will- ultimately set the
tenor of the discussion. Archbishop Makarios supported the earlier Soviet
call for a large international conference under UN auspices to deal with
Cyprus, and he has recently repeated his call for the "internationalization"
of the question. He will probably use any assembly debate primarily to
bolster his own osition as the le itimate head of the Cy riot overnment
e ree s an ree yprio s are consi Bring inscri mg a separa a agen a
item on Cyprus, in the hope of pressing the Turks to move promptly on a
negotiated settlement.
All sides realize that probably little constructive debate would result
from throwing the question into the assembly, but the members can do little
to prevent it from being used as a propaganda forum. Such a debate could,
however, reflect a genuine international concern that might influence the
concerned parties to resume negotiations. Positive assembly responses to an
appeal for the UN coordinated refugee relief program could also help to
remove the serious obstacle that the refugees pose to a final settlement.
Although the Law of the Sea and the World Population conferences
have been criticized as typically inconclusive UN debates, both have
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registered achievements in areas that are new to international decision-
making. The Law of the Sea Conference, which ended in Caracas on August
29, did not produce a new treaty for the use and exploitation of the seas.
The ten weeks of negotiations did, however, educate the representatives of
the 148 nations that attended on the points on which compromise may
eventually be possible. Moreover, by pointing out the chaos of any alterna-
tive arrangements, the talks may have reinforced the determination of the
participants eventually to conclude a Law of the Sea treaty.
The World Population Conference, on the other hand, served a function
merely by forcing the world community to consider the consequences of
current population policies. The World Population Plan of Action that was
finally adopted was a significant watering down of the original targets, due
chiefly to objections by developing and Communist countries to what they
considered as potential infringements of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, a
good start was made toward bringing home to the less-developed countries
the effects of continued unrestrained population growth on their own
development, and to the developed countries the realization that population
policies cannot be considered apolitically.
Economic issues-and basic differences in how the developing indus-
trialized, and Communist countries approach them-will be at the center of
much of the General Assembly debate. The developing states will focus on
the disparities between industrialized and developing countries, but their
views may differ according to their relative levels of poverty, regional
affiliation, or political orientation. Most will nevertheless do all that is
possible to maintain a united front. Their success in this will influence their
alignment on the non-economic issues as well.
Although the industrialized states will want to show sympathy for the
problems of the developing world, they are also interested in limiting their
own expenditures and avoiding long-term commitments. The Soviet Union
and the East European Communist countries will verbally support most of
the developing countries' stands, but will also look for ways to limit their
own involvement. China, which continues to try to expand its influence in
the Third World, will use the development issues to launch its familiar
attacks on the super powers, especially the USSR. China's excessive rhetoric
and lack of concrete action last spring during the special session of the
General Assembly on raw materials and development did little, however, to
strengthen Peking's image among the developing states.
For most developing states, the General Assembly is the only interna-
tional forum in which they feel they have any power. By voting as a unit,
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they hold an automatic majority anal can force adoption of any resolution.
In practice, the group has sought-whenever possible, and often heavy-
handedly-to have resolutions adopted by consensus motions, which mask
any objections to points they favor.
This tactic was evident at the special session of the General Assembly
last spring. The developing states placed great store on adoption by con-
sensus of a declaration of principles and an action program fora "new world
economic order." Resolutions that endorsed, among other things, producer
cartels and unrestricted nationalization of resources were opposed by the US
and other industrialized nations. Although a vote was never taken, a "con-
sensus" resolution was accepted. During the 57th session of the UN Eco-
nomic and Social Council in July, the Group of 77 then tried to establish
recognition of the action program and the declaration of principles by
prefacing various resolutions with references to the earlier declarations and
citing the consensus obtained earlier.
Along with the US, most of the other industrialized states demanded a
vote and opposed points that specifically mentioned the declaration and
program of action. Although the resolutions were approved, the actions of
the developed countries broke the pattern of acceptance of imposed con-
sensus resolutions and angered many delegates from thy: developing countries
who had come to take acceptance of "consensus" for granted.
The developing states will certainly raise the program of action and the
declaration of principles again at the coming General Assembly. The Group
of 77 will continue to endeavor to entrench the resolutions as basic UN
policies. If the developed states continue to oppose this drive, enforced
consensus could become a test of solidarity for the developing countries.
Should resource-poor developing states begin to feel that substantial aid
cannot be obtained without full, willing cooperation from the industrialized
nations, however, they may begin to oppose the rigid stands advocated by
other developing states. Nevertheless, even the poorest states would probably
resist overt attempts to split them from the developing-country bloc. Soli-
darity is so important to such countries that even Chile, which is treated as a
pariah by most members of the Group of 77, feels it must stick to the
developing-country line whenever possible.
The interests of the developing and industrialized countries wilLconflict
on a number of specific points. While both sides will seek to avoid open
confrontation, the world economic situation will make it as difficult for the
developing states to be less demanding as it will be for the industrialized
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states to be more forthcoming. Certain issues that will be discussed at the
General Assembly are so fundamental to the relations between and among
developed and developing states that they transcend the particular forums in
which they are presently being discussed and the resolutions to which they
have been attached.
Sovereignty Over Resources and Nationalization
The developing states have insisted-both at the General Assembly
special session and in the UN Conference on Trade and Development
deliberations on the draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States-that each state has an absolute right to control its own natural
resources and wealth as it sees fit, and that it enjoys a concomitant right of
nationalization. Although the developed states agree in principle, they insist
that nationalization must be governed by international law and that com-
pensation must be prompt, complete, and subject to negotiation. Some
compromise solutions were advanced, but even if agreement is reached on
wording for the Economic Rights and Duties Charter, the explosive issue of
nationalization will not be completely resolved.
Multinational Corporations
Multinational corporations are a favorite whipping boy of the
developing world and are invariably dragged into debates on development,
transfer of technology, and nationalization. Some of the developing coun-
tries will no doubt want to attack multinationals once again as neo-
colonialist tools of capitalist imperialism. They will reject the developed
countries' argument that curbs on multinationals will only limit private
foreign investment in developing economies and hence retard development.
Nationalist tendencies will, in any case, prompt the developing states to push
for increased domestic control of foreign firms on their soil.
In June, a controversial UN study by a group of "eminent persons"
took a negative view of multinationals and recommended restrictions on
their activities. A special UN committee is now considering establishing
permanent machinery in the UN to develop a "strategy" on multinationals.
If the issue is not raised directly on the floor of the General Assembly, it will
be forwarded to the General Assembly from the concurrent meeting of the
Economic and Social Council.
Transfer of Technology
Many developing states argue that liberal, if not free, access to advanced
technological processes is vital for their economic development. They want
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this principle incorporated into UN aid programs. The industrialized states
recognize the importance of technological advances in the development plans
of these states, but they are not willing to codify the transfer of technology.
This is because most processes are, in fact, proprietary to individual firms,
and the industrialized states feel that .all countries, developing or otherwise,
should deal with the particular firm that possesses the relevant technology.
Most private firms have been loathe to part with industrial secrets-
particularly at concessional terms-because they fear competition once the
developing states acquire the necessary skills. The developing countries'
reactions to what they see as atight-fisted attitude have also been important
in shaping their negative attitudes toward multinational corporations.
Aid to the Most Seriously Affected
The special session last spring agreed in principle to establish an aid
program for those developing states "most seriously affected" by oil and
other commodity price increases. The aid plan would provide emergency
relief and development assistance to some. 20 or 30 countries-most with an
annual per capita GNP of less than $200. An ad hoc committee was
established to manage the fund, to be made up of contributions from
industrialized and oil-producing states. Backers of the program hoped to
raise $4 billion, but donations have been slow because most industrialized
nations are feeling the pinch of inflation and because they are making their
pledges contingent on substantial sums from Arab oil producers. These have
not and do not seem likely to materialize.
For the most part both the industrialized states and the Arab oil
producers prefer to contribute aid bilaterally rather than submit their funds
to the control of a UN committee.
Should the UN program nevertheless get under way, perhaps as a
bookkeeping operation for a series of bilateral loans and grants, the devel-
oped states will still want to ensure that the aid be used as a means of
relieving balance-of-payments problems and not as long-term project assist-
ance. If rhetoric does not materialize into hard cash or food aid, however,
the resentment of these poorest of the poor certainly may impel them to
unite in disruptive tactics at the UN. Although few in number, the most
seriously affected states include several influential members such as India
and Pakistan, who might be able to sway a majority of the Group of 77 into
supporting their cause.
The Nuclear Question
The questions of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation will this
year spark more than the desultory debate that has marked assembly
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consideration of these issues in recent years. A number of proliferation and
arms-related events-notably the Indian nuclear test in May-have jolted the
international community during the past year. The resulting recognition of a
need for more effective non-proliferation controls or, at a minimum, some
form of security guarantees for non-nuclear states, has fostered the inscrip-
tion of a number of disarmament-related items on the agenda this year.
Despite the agreement in principle for a US-USSR threshold test ban
treaty, those UN-related disarmament forums in which the US and USSR
exert the major influence-the Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment, which both powers co-chair, and the working group considering the
convening of a World Disarmament Conference, a USSR initiative-will
submit reports for the General Assembly's consideration reflecting another
year of little or no progress toward negotiating multilateral disarmament
pacts. This will provide ample ammunition for such countries as China,
which has long condemned the domination of the super powers in this area.
Heightened international concern over the implications of continued
proliferation has focused attention on the security requirements of many
nations, but the oil embargo last winter and the subsequent high price of fuel
have added a new dimension to the nuclear proliferation debate. For many
developing countries, the use of nuclear energy sources has assumed a critical
importance that effectively tempers their concern over nuclear proliferation.
These countries will probably push at the General Assembly-as well as at
the board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency this month-
for increased technical assistance and financial grants from the developed
countries.
The two major non-proliferation items on this year's agenda resulted
directly from the Indian test and are patterned after an earlier arms-control
measure successfully negotiated within the UN forum: the Latin American
Nuclear Free Zane, established by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco. Alarmed at
the implications of the Indian explosion for its own security, Pakistan has
called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. The
Pakistanis are seeking to strengthen the security of non-nuclear states against
nuclear threat or blackmail-if possible by obtaining some form of assurances
from the permanent Security Council members-and to sustain world con-
cern over proliferation in the wake of the Indian test. By pushing for a
nuclear-free zone for South Asia, the Pakistanis may also be seeking to
embarrass the Indians. They may hope to expose what they consider to be
India's insincere justification of its test as a peaceful nuclear explosion. The
Treaty of Tlatelolco permits treaty parties to conduct peaceful nuclear
explosions provided their peaceful purpose is verified under international
safeguards. India, the Pakistanis feel, would not be able to justify non-acces-
sion to such a treaty.
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The Shah of Iran, reviving a proposal he first introduced in 1968, has
also called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
Unlike Pakistan, Iran is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus
prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Shah's motivation in
promoting such an initiative is not only to shore up the treaty's faltering
controls, but also to point up the growing risk of nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East.
The Egyptians have joined the Iranians as co-sponsors of the item, but
their support is linked more to propaganda than to a strong commitment to
non-proliferation. The Egyptians reportedly feel that by co-sponsoring the
resolution they can emphasize the difficulty or impossibility of obtaining a
ban on nuclear weapons in the Middle East as long as Israel refuses to ratify
the treaty.
The delineation of the area to be covered in .the Egyptian-Iranian
proposal has deliberately been left vague, with the only stipulation being
that such an agreement must include Israel. While Iran favors a broad
definition of the Middle East, political antagonisms and alliances in the area
are likely to complicate any geographic definition. Turkey feels, for instance,
that it cannot consent to being part of a nuclear free zone because of its
NATO commitments; the Arab states, moreover, refuse to negotiate directly
with Israel. The sponsors of the resolutions probably do not expect the
General Assembly to do more than endorse their initiatives and request that
reports be submitted next year.
The only other major new initiative is a Soviet-proposed ban on
environmental warfare. In a letter to Secretary General_Waldheim requesting
the item's inscription, Moscow called for an international convention that
would outlaw modifying the weather for military purposes. The resolution
has engendered little corridor interest and has been described by one
delegate as the annual Soviet "showcase" proposal.
The committee studying the resolution on the Indian Ocean peace zone
will submit a report on Great Power presence in the area that was strongly
criticized when it was originally published by the committee this summer.
Because it has since been revised, it will probably result in less criticism of
the Great Power presence, particularly in light of India's own nuclear
explosion.
The General Assembly will face the Middle East problem again this
year. Last year, discussion was deferred because of concurrent Security
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Council deliberations. Even though the Middle East has been entered as a
separate agenda item, the Arabs apparently have not yet decided on a
resolution or on their parliamentary maneuvers to gain its passage. Decisions
may not be reached until the Arab summit conference meets in October. The
Arabs are now concentrating their planning for the assembly on those
resolutions that would afford the Palestinian issue the greatest exposure
while embarrassing and isolating Israel.
Actually, the inclusion of a separate agenda item on the Palestinian
problem is likely to be the major diplomatic offensive of the Arab countries
this year. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, backed by the Arab
League, wants the problem debated as a political rather than as a humani-
tarian issue centering on aid to the refugees, to which they feel debate has
been limited since the 1950s. To better present its cause to the world body,
the PLO is also considering a request for observer status and for recognition
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
Discussion of the Palestinian issue will also provide the Arab countries
with another occasion to reiterate their long-standing opposition to con-
tributing to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East. The agency is already in serious financial difficulty. It faces a
$39-million deficit in 1975, and a major curtailment of its educational and
relief efforts was only averted at the last moment this summer by generous
donations from the US, Japan, and some European countries. Growing
opposition by traditional supporters to footing the bill has made little
impression on the wealthy Arab countries. Their argument-that the Pal-
estinian refugees were created by the West and should be supported by the
West-will undoubtedly be presented again, preventing any progress in
placing finances on a sound basis.
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Peacekeeping
The attempt to formulate general peacekeeping guidelines has been a
recurrent concern of each General Assembly since the Committee of
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33-charged with drawing up such guidelines-was established in 1965. A
working group has plodded along for years; because of differences between
the US and USSR over the issues of peacekeeping financing and authority
for conducting such operations, the group has no concrete achievements to
show for its efforts. Events this summer involving the peacekeeping forces on
Cyprus, however, have generated new interest and have refocused attention
on the need to formulate more explicit peacekeeping guidelines than those
under which UN forces presently operate. Many members feel that the legal
justification for peacekeeping forces as well as their guarantee of safety,
must be rooted in generally accepted principles and not in an ad hoc
consensus among the five permanent Security Council powers. At a
minimum, those countries contributing troops to the various UN peacekeep-
ing operations may now demand a clearer and more specific formulation of
how far their forces can go, either in defending themselves or in carrying out
their mandated responsibilities.
UN units are currently stationed on Cyprus, along the Suez Canal,
between Israel and Syria, and as observers in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt,
and Israel. The original, predominantly West European, make-up of these
forces has been broadened in recent years to include greater representation
by Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans.
That the UN can do only what its member nations, and particularly the
major powers, want it to do was dramatically illustrated in the Security
Council discussions regarding the duties and fate of the UN troops on
Cyprus. When the crisis broke out in July, this force was at its lowest
strength-2,300 men-since its establishment in 1964. Confronted by 40,000
Turkish troops on the one hand and 12,000 Greek troops on the other, and
armed primarily with rifles, the UN troops were theoretically charged with
the overwhelming responsibility of protecting the Greek and Turkish Cyp-
riots trapped in each other's territory. Despite the protestations of its
commander that the UN force was not an occupation army and had neither
the power nor authority to impose itself between the warring parties, both
sides felt that their Cypriot brethren were being purposely abandoned by the
UN troops. The Turks, in particular, vehemently attacked the peacekeeping
forces' inaction, claiming that racial antagonism was behind their failure to
rotect the Turkish Cypriot minority.
In addition to the split between the US and USSR, the differences in
conceptions of peacekeeping objectives-particularly between the
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less-developed and the nonaligned, on one hand, and the major powers,
primarily the US and West European, on the other-will be most evident
when the General Assembly considers financing, the most basic of peace-
keeping problems. Secretary General Waldheim has for months been trying
to devise a formula for paying or reimbursing those countries now supplying
troops to the UN's Middle East contingents. Once an acceptable solution has
been reached for that peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat's formula
could be applied to other UN operations.
Waldheim is committed to the concept of "equal pay for equal work"
for soldiers of the UN forces. In line with this, he has proposed that each
country be paid an identical flat rate for each soldier serving. The plan does
allow for a slight bonus in the payment of technical or highly skilled
personnel, but does not reimburse countries for the equipment that they
supply their troops.
The proposed flat-rate figures, which have ranged from $S00 per man
per month to $350 with an extra $150 for technical personnel, are con-
sidered too low by both developing and Western states. The developing
countries see participation in peacekeeping forces as a chance to enhance
both their treasuries and their national prestige. The Western countries, on
the other hand, argue that their real costs per man are much higher than
$S00 (the Swedes cite $900) and that a lower flat rate would penalize them.
This, in turn, could become a factor causing them to reconsider their
commitment to UN peacekeeping operations in general.
Human Rights
In line with the shift toward greater emphasis on economic and social
questions at this year's assembly session, the issue of human rights will
probably attract greater attention than in recent years. The aftermath of the
Chilean coup last 5epternber, documented reports of human rights violations
in a number of UN member countries, and domestic pressures in some UN
states to show more progress in dealing with these issues have all led to the
introduction of important new human rights initiatives this year. Other
resolutions considered-but usually buried-by earlier assembly sessions have
also been revived.
The Australian government, for example, has requested the inscription
of an item on diplomatic asylum. Motivated in particular by what they
consider the inadequacy of existing conventions in alleviating the plight of
Chilean coup victims, the Australians have requested that the General
Assembly draw up a new convention codifying the principles governing the
right of asylum. Attempts to standardize such principles have been arecur-
rent concern in international law and have already been addressed by various
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UN bodies. The Australians feel, however, that consideration has been
limited to granting physical safety. Canberra argues that now is the time to
broaden the debate and to address the consequences of granting diplomatic
asylum to those alleged to have committed "political" offenses.
A number of countries are opposed to the Australian proposal, arguing
that new standards could seriously limit territorial sovereignty or could have
repercussions on internal security. If, despite these objections, the Austra-
lians persist in pushing for assembly consideration, a clash similar to the one
during the debate last year over the Convention on the Protection of
Diplomats is likely. The crux of the matter lies in defining acts that are
"political." The Africans and Arabs made clear last year that they will seek
to define the right of asylum to include those engaged in armed struggle
against colonialism or apartheid, as well as to many acts commonly regarded
by the international community as "terrorist." Most countries have little
taste for according humanitarian protection to such persons, and this may
preclude the formulation of any guidelines at the session this year.
Assembly discussion of items on torture and the elimination of religious
discrimination serves little more than propaganda purposes for many coun-
tries and, even if UN resolutions on the subjects are ultimately adopted, such
recommendations have no effect in moderating national policies. The West
Europeans and the US, nevertheless, remain strongly behind efforts to
improve UN machinery for safeguarding human rights, but even with broad
support within the assembly, the consistent Communist opposition to dis-
cussing problems of religious tolerance stalls any positive action. A report
setting forth alternative approaches for strengthening the UN's role in these
matters has already been requested for submission to the next assembly
session. The Communist states may attempt to deflect some of the expected
criticism of their internal policies by focusing on torture and human rights
violations in other countries. A recent report by a subcommission of the
UN's Human Rights Commission levied accusations at five countries, ranging
from widespread torture in Brazil to political executions in chile and
Uganda. While the report of the subcommission itself will not be submitted
formally to the Human Rights Commission until early in 1975, the leaked
results of its findings could be effectively exploited to trade charges between
alleged offenders and stall general consideration of human rights issues at the
assembly.
Membership
One of the first actions of the 29th General Assembly will be the
admission of three new members: Guinea-Bissau, Grenada, and Bangladesh.
Their admission will bring membership to 138 and bolster the UN's claim to
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universal representation-a claim that may be weakened if expected chal-
lenges to the credentials of South Africa and the Khmer government are
successful.
Although the General Assembly has voted for the past three sessions to
reject South Africa's credentials, this ruling has been interpreted as having
only an admonitory effect. This year, the African group has stated its
intention to go beyond a ritual condemnation to secure the actual expulsion
of South Africa, either by a direct General Assembly vote or by a resolution
asking the Security Council to recommend such action. In the latter case,
South Africa would be suspended from participating in the assembly pending
a decision of the Security Council.
The Africans' decision to press for South Africa's expulsion is probably
related to the fact that Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Algerian foreign minister,
now holds the presidency of the assembly. While it is unlikely that Boute-
flika himself would precipitate the credentials challenge through question-
able constitutional rulings, the Africans are probably confident that he
would do little to impede their own attempts to challenge South Africa's
right to representation. The argument that South Africa's continued UN
membership sustains its exposure to international public opinion and thus
has some beneficial effect appears to have little chance of moderating the
African call for expulsion.
Following the close vote last year on a procedural motion to defer a
Khmer credentials challenge to the session this year, Cambodia's Southeast
Asian allies have been closely coordinating their efforts to draw up a
resolution that would effectively defer the question once again.
Cambodia and its allies are considering a proposal that would set up a
UN-sponsored fact-finding mission-made up of representatives from three
governments that recognize neither the Khmer nor the Sihanouk regimes-to
investigate conditions in Cambodia. This report would be submitted to the
30th UNGA in 1975 and would allow UN members the opportunity to
evaluate both sides' claims to national sovereignty. In proposing this fact-
finding mission, Cambodia and its allies are confident that the Sihanouk
insurgents would not allow the mission to investigate conditions within their
territory or to assess the degree of control they exercise. Phnom Penh
believes this attitude would compare unfavorably with its own more forth-
coming and cooperative response, and would result in a more favorable
assessment by a number of countries of Phnom Penh's viability as a govern-
ment and its right to retain the UN~ seat.
The North Koreans remain opposed to admitting two Korean states to
the UN, so the stalemate on this membership issue will continue at this
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session. On the broader Korean problem, however, the consensus reached
last year to postpone discussion of the question appears unlikely to be
repeated this year. The item proposed by North Korea for inscription on the
agenda this year specifically addresses the issue of the UN Command-as it
did last year-but reflects a new, two-phase approach for achieving Pyong-
yang's objectives. The North Koreans feel that if they can gain support in the
assembly for abolishing the 1950 resolution that established the UN troops
in South Korea, it will be easier to secure their second objective-the
withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, whose legal basis for remaining
would thus have been undercut.
The UN Command, which enforces the Korean armistice-as an agent of
the Security Council, can be disbanded only by the Security Council,
however, so any General Assembly resolution would have no legal impact.
Moreover, the presence of US forces in South Korea is authorized by a
bilateral treaty of 1954, which would continue in effect even if the com-
mand were abolished.
The European Community will press its claim for observer status at the
UN. Under the EC treaties, community officials increasingly speak for the
member states on trade and aid issues over which the Community has
jurisdiction. The EC already has observer status in several of the UN's
specialized agencies, and its drive to secure a position in the General
Assembly reaffirms the community's desire to play a leading role in the
world body.
The annual General Assembly debate over the Portuguese territories is
expected to be much less strident than in previous years, now that the new
Portuguese government is moving to grant independence to its former
colonies. The Africans' satisfaction with the Portuguese actions may not
mellow their attitudes on the Rhodesian and Namibian questions. While no
definite African strategy for raising these questions has yet emerged, the
Africans have consistently regarded both issues as important, and they can
be expected to condemn the continued lack of progess in implementing
.relevant UN resolutions regarding self-determination for the territories' black
inhabitants.
Budgetary and Administrative
In recent years, the UN system has been called. upon to provide an
increasing number of services for its member states. Through its 12 spe-
cialized agencies, the UN annually dispenses about $1.4 billion in technical-
assistance grants, equipment and training outlays, and other economic,
social, and human rights activities, primarily to the developing countries. The
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demands that such assistance grants be augmented every year-either through
contributions by the developed states or from the regular UN budget-often
seem to be made without regard to the realities of UN financing. For many
of the developing-country representatives, their yearly General Assembly
speeches have become the major vehicle for presenting "pet" projects or
grand international initiatives to enhance both their personal prestige and
their nation's image. Many of these initiatives may well be worth the UN's
attention, but the growing tendency to propose new programs that fre-
quently duplicate existing functions and ignore financial implications is
placing the UN in an untenable financial position.
Last year, the General Assembly approved the first biennial UN pro-
gram budget for 1974-75, amounting to $270.2 million a year. Early projec-
tions already indicate that this budget could be increased at least $55 million
by this assembly. As much as $45 million of the increase would go only
toward covering adjustments for inflation and currency changes. In addition
to these current operating expenses, the UN faces an accumulated deficit of
$90 million, stemming largely from unpaid assessments for earlier UN
peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo.
The General Assembly's budgetary committee must consider a number
of new proposals that would add to the already significant deficit. The
International Civil Service Board is expected to recommend a salary increase
of some six percent for professional UN staff members. If approved, this
would place UN salaries significantly above comparable US civil service
levels.
Another administrative and budgetary proposal with potentially far-
reaching effects is the request by the German-speaking countries (East and
West Germany and Austria) that certain key UN documents be translated
into German. While the sponsoring countries have decided, at least for now,
not to request that German be made an official and working language of the
UN, they will be influenced by the General Assembly's action last year in
according such status to Arabic. The Germans and Austrians, however, are
willing to assume the estimated $600,000 annual cost of translating the
documents for the first three years.
The implications of the German request assume alarming proportions
when considered in the context of current demands on the UN system. The
cost of translating and distributing UN documents is now running at about
$250 a page, and the UN's strained administrative services are being called
upon to provide documentation for an ever-increasing number of committee
and conference meetings. One recent memo from the UN's Department of
Conference Services reported that for a single committee's final report, the
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UN was required to reproduce and distribute 13.5 tons of documents, mast
of which had already circulated as working papers.
Consideration of the UN's budgetary situation obviously will not be
one of the brighter spots of the session this year. Certain Communist states,
moreover, have already expressed their intentions to table a number of
resolutions whose sole purpose seems to be to politicize an already com-
plicated issue. Led by Cuba, these states want a resolution blaming the
developed-i.e., Western-states for the effects of inflation and currency
instability on the UN budget and demanding compensation for the less
developed.
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Many of the issues which will face the delegates to the General Assem-
bly have been discussed earlier this year in more specialized forums and will
certainly be raised again in the coming year. The following limited list of
such meetings indicates both the intensity and the extent of discussion of
these subjects.
World Population Conference-Met in August and focused on population
policy issues as part of the World Population Year. Clash between developed
and developing states brought adoption of a considerably diluted World
Population Plan of Action.
Multilateral Trade Negotiations-These long-awaited talks may begin late this
fall. The developing states will look for ways to exploit them to push for
preferential trade treatment.
Law of the Sea-Met all summer in Caracas and reconvenes in March 1975 to
consider the proposed 200-mile economic zone, ownership of seabed and
marine resources, and laws of international waters. The developed and
developing states followed expected alignments, although maritime issues did
cause a few strange bedfellows.
World Food Conference-Delegates from almost all the UN countries will
assemble in Rome in early November to investigate the world food situation,
hoping to find ways to increase production and to improve distribution of
existing world food supplies. It may seek to establish a permanent world
food authority.
International Atomic Energy Agency-The agency's Board of Governors and
its eighth General Conference will meet as the General Assembly convenes.
Discussion will probably focus on ways to expand the agency's technical
assistance in providing peaceful nuclear services, primarily to the developing
countries. Increased concern about the implications of further proliferation
is also expected to lead to debate over safeguards provisions on developing
country power reactors.
UN Conference on Trade and Development-The conference's Trade and
Development Board will close its annual meeting in Geneva as the General
Assembly opens. Delegates from the industrialized and developing states
argued over familiar issues and voiced support for a successful conclusion to
the negotiations for the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
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The developing states may now transfer their lobbying for ratification of a
code of conduct on world shipping practices, which would benefit develop-
ing states, to the General Assembly.
Economic and Social Council of the UN-The council will resume its 57th
session, which began in July, in New York in November. It will assign
working groups to detail plans on aid issues and will be the center of activity
on the study of multinational corporations.
World Bank/International Monetary Fund Group-Meets in late September
to discuss global economic conditions and to consider formal establishment
of a joint ministerial committee to study the transfer of real resources to
developing states.
World Energy Conference-A UN-sponsored energy conference has been
under consideration since last winter, when it was proposed by the French.
A call for such a session would. have some chance of success, particularly if
prices of oil continue to increase or supplies decrease.
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