LE DUAN AND THE POST - HO CHI MINH LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 1, 1974
• Content Type: IR

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Confidential
Intelligence Report
Le Duan and the Post - Ho Chi Minh Leadership
Confidential
April 1974
No. 0937/74
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LE DUAN AND THE POST - HO CHI MINH LEADERSHIP
1. Principal Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Unity, Differences, and Groupings . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. Le Duan's Policy Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
On Strategy Toward the South, 1945-1972
On Strategy Before the US Entered the War, 1958-1965
On Strategy Against Combined US and GVN Forces, 1965-1972
Le Duan vs. Truong Chinh on Building the North
IV. Le Duan's Position Since Ho Chi Minh's Death . . . . . . . . 23
Le Duan Encounters Resistance, February to August 1970
Le Duan Acquires More Power and Silences the
Opposition After August 1970
The Status of Truong Chinh
Le Duan's Strengths
Le Duan's Weaknesses
V. Structure of the Present Leadership and the Outlook . . . . . . 37
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LE DUAN AND THE POST - HO CHI MINH LEADERSHIP
1. Principal Judgments
Le Duan, First Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers'"Party, appears to
be fairly secure in his position as "first among equals" in the collective
leadership that runs North Vietnam. He faces some generally muted opposi-
tion, chiefly from the party's doctrinaire wing, but thus far has commanded
enough support from colleagues to make his views prevail. The central issue
for the leadership in Hanoi since 1954 has been and remains the question of
how to "liberate" South Vietnam, and how much of the North's resources
should be put into the effort. The Hanoi leaders have worked hard to achieve
a take-over and have been reluctant, even since the cease-fire, to defer
progress toward that aim. At the same time Le Duan, Premier Pham Van
Dong, and some others are eager to push ahead with the job of rebuilding the
North. Thus the leaders will be faced with a policy dilemma as long as the
Communists remain so far short of their goals in the South.
Next to Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan apparently has had more influence than
any other North Vietnamese leader in determining Hanoi's strategy toward
the South since 1945. His strategic views have been relatively flexible. He has
never been identified with a strategy of protracted guerrilla war (the strategy
the Viet Minh followed against the French in the North), at least as a
long-term policy. After the US entered the war in 1965, Le Duan generally
advocated and supported large-unit, sustained offensive warfare in the belief
that it could force a collapse of US and South Vietnamese resolve to keep
fighting. Earlier, there had been periods (e.g., 1955-1957 and 1961-1962)
when Le Duan seemed to share with Ho Chi Minh the belief that the North
had nothing to gain by stepping up the war; at those times Le Duan
supported a policy of refraining from major violence, while letting the
political pot simmer.
The evidence since the cease-fire suggests that the Politburo under Le
Duan's leadership is taking the second, "political" tack, at least for the time
being. Hanoi is also maintaining major North Vietnamese forces in the South
*This report was prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. Analysts of
several other offices in CIA have been consulted, and they are in general
agreement with its judgments. Questions and comments are welcome and
may be directed to the report's author,
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capable not only of defending Communist-held territory (their immediate
mission), but also of mounting a strong offensive should the Politburo decide
that it could force the South Vietnamese into a weakened negotiating
position. The currently somewhat ambivalent policy is apparently the best
mix the Politburo can agree on to preserve some military options in the
South while improving opportunities for pushing postwar construction in the
North.
A Record of Unity, Despite Internal Differences
The record of stability in the Vietnamese Communist leadership is
unmatched by that of any other ruling Communist party. There has never
been an open power struggle or an extensive purge in the top leadership. The
men at the top have been waging war most of the time since 1941, and have
tended to submerge differences for this reason. A more important unifying
force has been the skillful leadership provided first by Ho Chi Minh and then
by Le Duan. The hallmark of their leadership style has been a willingness to
tolerate differences in the Politburo, combined with an ability to keep
dissenters in line.
Differences have existed among Politburo members over both domestic
and war policy. There have usually been some leaders who have regarded
specific decisions as too aggressive and others who believed they were not
aggressive enough. Such differences apparently persist despite efforts by Le
Duan to broaden the base of agreement. In 1972 and 1973, for example, Le
Duan reportedly had only a majority of Politburo members with him in his
decisions to launch the Easter 1972 offensive and then, again, to make
concessions to reach agreement at Paris in January 1973.
Le Duan's chief rival over the years has been Truong Chinh, who was
party secretary-general from 1941 until 1956, when he was demoted for
errors in domestic policy. Under Truong Chinh the party had operated in
consonance with Chinese precepts in both domestic affairs and war strategy.
In 1957, Le Duan was brought to Hanoi to replace Chinh. The Southern-
oriented policy he began to develop owed little in the way it was applied to
either the Soviet Union or China.
Since then, Le Duan has gathered around him a group of men who had
worked under him in South Vietnam while other leaders were fighting the
French in the North. Among them are Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's highly com-
petent negotiator and chief of the party's powerful Organization Depart-
ment, and Pham Hung, who heads COSVN. There are indications that Chief
of Staff Van Tien Dung has been particularly close to Le Duan and shares
some of his views. If Le Duan were able to form a new Politburo in the near
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future, e.g., at the long-rumored 4th Party Congress, these men might well be
key figures.
Le Duan's Strengths and Weaknesses
Le Duan has several things going for him:
? More than any other leader, he had Ho Chi Minh's trust and
backing. It was Ho who in 1960 conferred on Le Duan the title "First
Secretary"-the title then held by the head of the CPSU and that of
nearly every other ruling Communist party except China.
? Le Duan's long tenure at or near the top (since 1937) gives him
prestige and authority. He made good use of the years he served as party
boss under Ho to put his men in key spots.
? Although lacking Ho's charisma, Duan has solid qualities of intel-
lect and leadership that seem to command respect and loyalty in the
VWP apparatus.
? He has never been tainted by association with an officially dis-
credited policy nor did he ever publicly incur Ho's displeasure, as did
Truong Chinh, Premier Dong, and General Giap at one time or another.
? Le Duan is an astute political maneuverer who has acquired enough
proteges and allies in the power structure to give him majority support.
He has edged his old opponent Truong Chinh into an isolated position
that provides little opportunity to challenge him effectively.
Nevertheless, Le Duan's failure to restructure the Politburo suggests
that the potential for opposition to his policies, if not to himself, remains
strong. The present Central Committee and Politburo were both created by
Ho Chi Minh at the last party congress in 1960, and changes seem overdue.
The failure to hold the long-delayed 4th Party Congress now that the
cease-fire has reduced hostilities in the South is reminiscent of delays often
seen in Chinese affairs which have usually masked an unresolved power
struggle. As long as solid progress is not apparent in the reconstruction of the
North and the revolution in the South, the opposition could coalesce against
Le Duan. This will become increasingly likely if the regime is unable in
another year or so to show reasonable progress toward its goals in the South
or should it decide to put the main emphasis on development in the North
and fail to make some solid economic progress there.
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II. Unity, Differences, and Groupings
The leadership in North Vietnam is remarkable for its cohesiveness and
for the determination with which it has pursued its nationalist and Marxist
goals. The senior members of the Politburo of the Vietnam Workers' Party
(VWP) all began their revolutionary careers in the 1920s, rose to prominence
in the Stalinist Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in the 1930s, and have
worked as a leadership team for about three decades. The fact that they have
been fighting wars most of the time since 1941 has been ? a unifying force.
More important has been the skillful leadership provided first by President
Ho Chi Minh until his death in 1969, and then by Party First Secretary Le
Duan. The hallmark of their style of leadership-unusual among ruling
Communist countries-has been a willingness to tolerate dissent among
colleagues, combined with the ability to reconcile differences.
The smoothness of Politburo teamwork has been marred occasionally
by personal antagonisms and sharp behind-the-scenes disputes. These have
sometimes led to shifts in relative positions within the power structure. But
there has never been an open power struggle among the men at the top, a
purge reaching into their group, or a major defection (like Trotsky and
Chang Kuo-t'ao). This Vietnamese record of stability and continuity is
unmatched by any other Communist state.
The party leaders are clearly tough-minded people; they have had their
differences, but they have also demonstrated that they are able to submerge
or resolve their disagreements and to work together once a decision is
reached. Differences stem from several causes. There is diversity in tempera-
ment, background, and experience. Some individuals have at times been
more receptive than others to Soviet or Chinese influence. Some, often the
same individuals, have been associated with mistakes in domestic policy or
have opposed key war decisions.
In the past, diversity was encouraged by Ho Chi Minh's unusual style of
leadership. He seems to have tolerated a spectrum of views in the Politburo,
while generally taking a central position himself. Thus during the Vietnam
war some leaders usually regarded particular decisions as too aggressive,
while others believed they were not aggressive enough.
Le Duan apparently is continuing Ho's practice of keeping around him
men who do not always see eye-to-eye. It is doubtful, though, that Le Duan
is pleased at having potential rivals on the Politburo. Perhaps, lacking Ho's
great personal authority, he acquiesces in their presence on the Politburo for
reasons of prudence or because he really has no choice. Whatever the reason,
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differences persist under Le Duan and are not always welcome. In late May
1972, for example, the party journal Hoc Tap complained of "rightist and
leftist tendencies" in the party. This was possibly a referen :e to reservations
of some of the leaders about the wisdom of the 1972 offensive, especially in
view of the strong US retaliation that resulted. The decision to launch the
Easter 1972 offensive reportedly did not have the unanimous support of the
Politburo, only the "majority."
It has never been easy to identify with certainty the individual members
of groupings within the Politburo, but it was not quite so difficult when Ho
Chi Minh was alive. He allowed considerable information about factional
views to circulate within the partyl Much o this e o
information ultimately leaked outl
uc repor s nave
been rare since Ho's death. Their near-disappearance suggests either that Le
Duan has clamped down on circulation of dissenting view within the party
or that, with the passage of time, groupings have become less distinct and
contentious.
The views of leaders on war policy have shifted over tLe decades. In the
early years of the war, when the leadership as a whole was deciding to
escalate the war, General Giap and, to a lesser degree, Premier Pham Van
Dong apparently tended to urge caution and were more ready than others to
make concessions to negotiate an end to the war. Their counsel resembled
the advice Hanoi got from Moscow throughout the war, and they were
labeled by their more militant adversaries in inner party circles as "pro-So-
viet" and "revisionist." In 1967, when Hanoi's war strategy changed to the
launching of big offensives (either to win a quick victory or to gain a strong
position to negotiate), both Giap and Dong apparently be,'ame strong team
players again. Giap almost certainly played a major part in the military
planning of the Tet 1968 and Easter 1972 offensives.
At the other extreme, early in the war, was a group of men who
opposed any concessions and advocated instead a classic "people's war" that
would continue until a complete military victory was achieved. This was
what the Chinese Communists were advising too until 1971. and it seemed to
be a view widely held (and probably still held) in the army and in the
southern apparatus. The most vociferous advocate of this position in the
Politburo was COSVN chief General Nguyen Chi Thanh, who died, reputedly
in an air raid, in July 1967. His chief backer (besides Ho (_'hi Minh) was the
then number-three man, Truong Chinh, who had been party secretary-gen-
eral from 1941 to 1956. In that era Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese
Communists accepted Chinese political and ideological guidance more or less
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VIETNAMESE WORKERS' PARTY
Politburo
Members
Pharr Hung Hoang Anh
Le Duc Tho Nguyen Van Tran
Le Van Luong Nguyen Con
To Huu Xuan Thuy
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uncritically and with great enthusiasm. Their illusion,, came to an end,
however, in 1956 when a land reform program conducted along lines
specifically recommended by Mao Tse-tung had disastrous results. The fail-
ure of the program also led to the downgrading of Truong Chinh, although
Chinh later made a partial comeback.
The year 1957 was a watershed for Hanoi. A soberccd Ho Chi Minh, by
now determined to pursue an independent Vietnamese course in domestic
affairs and also impatient to take over South Vietnam, brought Le Duan, the
Communist Party boss in the South, to Hanoi to replace Truong Chinh. Le
Duan was given the job of reorienting the party toward a southern-directed
policy, which was independent of both the Soviet Union and China. Over the
next few years a third grouping coalesced under Le Duan, and this is the
dominant group today. Besides Le Duan, it includes party organization boss
l_e Duc Tho and COSVN chief Pham Hung. The background of these three
differs significantly from other senior members of the Politburo. They were
in jail in Indochina during World War II and thus did not participate in the
building of the Viet Minh organization. After 1945, they all stayed in the
South to work in the underground. Le Duan and Le Duc Tho remained there
until 1957. Pham Hung returned to the North in 1955, but was not placed
on the Politburo until 1957. Thus none was serving in the center of power
during the many years the Vietnamese were particularly close to the Chinese
Communists.
The record indicates that one additional member of the Politburo-
('hief of Staff Van Tien Dung-has been close to Le Duan (he worked under
I,.e Duan in the South in 1955-56) and shares some of his views. Like Tho
and Hung, Van Tien Dung was not at the center of powu.ur until after 1956.
Dung was only a lowly divisional commander during the war against the
French and was not even at Dien Bien Phu. Despite hi inexperience and
youth (he was 37), he was promoted to chief of staff in mid-1954, displacing
favorite of Giap's (Hoang Van Thai, who became De ut Chief of
and was immediate! transferred South
Other members of the Politburo are specialists who exercise varying
degrees of influence. In order of precedence, they are Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh, a political light-weight; economic specialist Le Thanh
N,-hi, a loyal Le Duan man: the aging specialist on China and an associate of
Truong Chinh, Hoang Van Hoan; and Security Minister Trarr Quoc Hoan. the
only one of the four who appears to have a strong power- base of his own.
"]'ran Quoc Hoan is a shadowy figure not aligned with any faction. He has
held his sensitive post since 1953, well before Le Duan's rise, and there are
tenuous signs that the relationship between the two is an uneasy one.
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111. Le Duan's Policy Record
For many years the DRV has been generally consistent in its broad
policy directions. Apparently Le Duan saw eye to eye with Ho Chi Minh on
most issues, and thus felt no reason to institute fundamental changes after
Ho's death. Le Duan, unlike Khrushchev under Stalin, was more than just an
executive officer carrying out Ho's orders; he was a junior partner, helping
form policy. The main elements of Le Duan's policies are:
. In foreign affairs, he has continued the policy started by Ho of
pursuing a line independent of Moscow and Peking, while, so far as
possible, maintaining good relations with both. The Sino-Soviet doctrinal
split on war issues that existed from 1957 to 1971 enabled the Viet-
namese to play one ally against the other and ensure continuing support
from both. Hanoi has not been able to do this as effectively in the
current era of Soviet and Chinese detente with the US, but it still
maintains its independence of the two big Communist powers.
? His policy toward the South has been innovative and flexible.
Military strategy has sometimes been daring and sometimes cautious, and
the mix of political and military measures employed in each phase of the
war has varied. Le Duan, with Ho Chi Minh's approval while he lived,
apparently has had a dominant role in determining most strategy shifts.
Virtually all the recurrent changes-from the 1954 Geneva agreement to
the 1973 cease-fire agreement-met with opposition from groups be-
lieving that the decision was either too militant or not-militant enough.
Le Duan, and Ho Chi Minh before him, dealt skillfully with dissenters to
induce them to submerge their differences. They also showed consider-
able talent for dealing with conflicting demands of their big allies.
? In the domestic field, Le Duan's prime objective is to build a
modern, industrialized state as rapidly as possible, and to do so in an
efficient way unencumbered by excess ideological baggage. He has op-
posed efforts to restrict "capitalist tendencies" if this hurts the econ-
omy, and he believes that "revolutionary enthusiasm" and experience in
guerrilla warfare are a poor substitute for managerial and technical
expertise. He is sometimes pragmatic to the point of being non-Marxist.
More doctrinaire leaders, whose most vocal spokesman is Truong Chinh,
have understandably taken exception to some of Duan's positions. Since
1960 policies generally have borne Le Duan's stamp, but the occasional
appearance of mixed strands suggests a flexible amalgam of the two
approaches. The doctrinaire wing of the VWP is strong enough to make
its influence felt, particularly because the cease-fire has not ended
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fighting in the South. So long as that conflict continues, Le Duan
probably will hesitate to make the policy shift he almost certainly would
like to initiate-that is, to give the North top priority for attention and
resources.
On Strategy Toward the South, 1945-1972
The Vietnamese Communists have paid due obeisance to Mao Tse-
tung's precepts of guerrilla warfare. The precepts, which have been set out in
textbooks by Tnzong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, is fact governed Viet
Minh strategy against the French from 1946 to 1954. Le Duan, however,
seems never to have been an unqualified admirer of either the Chinese
Communists or their revolutionary doctrine. He has developed a complicated
and flexible doctrine of his own that gives a place to classical riles of
"people's war," but stresses the political and psychological effects of a given
course of action. Thus, while the Communists have consistently emphasized
political measures-including subversion and terrorism-in their struggle in
the South, they have been far more willing to initiate heavy military action
for its political impact than classical doctrine dictates. The aspect of
people's war" that has received short shrift is guerrilla warfare-a fact duly
noted by proponents of classical strategy such as Truong Chinh, who
reportedly criticized the offensive of Tet 1968 as a costly, "adventurous"
act.
Some of Le Duan's views on strategy undoubtedly have their roots in
the essentially political nature of his party experience from the 1930s
through the 1950s. During those decades, Le Duan was engaged primarily in
legal and clandestine political organization work, not in organizing forces for
armed rebellion.
Between 1936 and 1939, for example, when the Communist parties of
France and its colonies were permitted to operate legally and their leaders
were given amnesty, the Indochina Communist Party. was a tightly knit
group of intellectuals-urban-based, bicultural, and responsive to the French
Communist Party and the Stalin-controlled Comintern. I n contrast, by 1935
Mao Tse-tung's Communist Party had left the coastal cities to organize
peasants for armed revolt, in defiance of the Comintern. Le Duan held high
positions in the ICP between 1936 and 1939; this was in fact the only period
between 1931 and 1945 when he was not in a penal colony.
After 1945, during the war against the French. Le Duan served as
secretary of the party's southern region, away from the main fighting in the
North. Le Duan's area of responsibility simmered along at "stage one" of
people's warfare-the stage of political preparation.
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After the French left in 1954, strong pressure built up in the southern
branch of the VWP to expand guerrilla forces and to work to overthrow the
Diem regime by violence. For several reasons, however, the VWP leadership
in Hanoi ordered the Viet Cong to bide their time and restrict themselves to
political activities: Hanoi was under pressure from both China and the USSR
not to renew armed conflict; building the North had been given priority for
resources; and it was felt that as a result of Diem's repressive policies and
resultant unpopularity, time was on their side.
It was Le Duan's job to keep the lid on the restive southern apparatus,
and this he did. Subsequently he justified his action in a widely circulated
pamphlet issued late in 1956, South Vietnam's Revolutionary Line. In the
pamphlet Le Duan said that the VWP fully supported the thesis of the 20th
CPSU Congress (February 1956) on pursuing revolution through a "peaceful
line." Le Duan specifically ruled out armed violence in South Vietnam,
stating that "only" political action was permissible.
On Strategy Before the US Entered the War, 1958-1965
By 1958, however, the VWP Politburo, with Ho and Le Duan setting
the line, began moving in the direction of a policy of more violent resistance
to the Diem regime. Two developments brought about this change: the Diem
regime, with US aid, was growing stronger, not weaker; and Hanoi was being
pushed hard by one of its major allies, Peking, to pursue a militant anti-US
policy.
Hanoi's shift was made slowly because of persistent opposition from
Moscow and concern over provoking US intervention, and also because of
what captured documents have referred to as "hesitancy" within the ranks
of the Politburo itself. *
Le Duan signaled the beginning of the shift early in 1958, when he
made a series of speeches criticizing Soviet ideas on "peaceful" means of
*According to available evidence on the 1958-60 strategy arguments, Gen-
eral Giap and Premier Dong urged caution and delay in stepping up the
conflict; at the other extreme, Truong Chinh and General Nguyen Chi
Thanh, backed by Peking, argued that as long as it was being decided to fight
a "people's war" they should go all-out and fight it in the way they had
fought the French and the Chinese had fought their revolutionary wars. Ho
and Le Duan opted for a third course, which in most respects was a
compromise between two extremes.
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acquiring political power. Reversing his 1956 position, Le Duan asserted that
the Soviet theses did not apply to South Vietnam.
indicate that the Politburo
spe
I IL Me next two years working out the strategy for the southern struggle
and the amount of support the North should contribute. What was finally
agreed upon was a cautious mix of political action and "armed struggle" at
the level of guerrilla warfare, backed by limited logistic and manpower
support from the North. Le Duan spent most of these two years in the South
preparing the apparatus for an intensified conflict. He evidently played a
direct role in forming the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in
December 1960; its manifesto incorporated verbatim whole passages from
his September 1960 report to the Third Party Congress in Hanoi.
By the end of 1960, Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan apparently were
satisfied that the insurgency in the South was on the right track and that
they could safely turn their attention to economic development of the
North. Over the next two years the Politburo held several plenums on North
Vietnam's economy, and Le Duan spoke frequently on problems of industri-
alization, which seemed now to be his chief area of concern and interest.
Relations with the USSR warmed, Tnrong Chinh stayed out of the limelight,
and in March 1961, the hawkish General Nguyen Chi Thanh was quietly
transferred to a position in rural affairs.
The lull in attention to the South ended in the spring of 1963, when
the Politburo perceived that the Diem regime was on the verge of crumbling
and decided that the time had come to make contingency plans for a
military take-over. According to a captured document, Hanoi then reached
the conclusion that it would have to send NVA forces South to ensure a
decisive victory.
Le Duan once again signaled the change in a speech delivered in March
1963. The speech so closely followed the Chinese line on use of violence in
revolutionary situations that it was broadcast by Radio Peking. As before,
however, there was delay in acting. General Giap, backed this time by
Khrushchev, argued that overt North Vietnamese intervention would invite
US retaliation. (Khrushchev did, in fact, cut back Soviet military support in
the spring of 1964.) General Nguyen Chi Thanh, back in Ho's good graces
and now commander of all Communist forces in the South, believed with the
Chinese that the North should quickly send enough of its own troops south
so that ARVN could be defeated before the US had a chance to intervene
effectively.
The final decision to send NVA forces South, made at the 9th Plenum
in December 1963, mixed boldness with caution. Large-scale support-about
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six NVA infantry divisions-was planned, but the Politburo (including Le
Duan, according to a captured document) did not believe that the US would.
introduce ground forces, and thus had no sense of urgency. NVA combat
units were formed, trained, and dispatched South so deliberately and cau-
tiously that they were not in position to fight until mid-1965. By then the
US had entered the ground war, and the Communists had lost their chance
for a quick victory.
On Strategy Against Combined US and GVN Forces, After 1965
trongly suggest that Le
Duan was the chief architect of North Vietnam's strategy in the next stage of
the war. It was apparent to Le Duan that the war no longer could be won by
military means alone. His ide
as to fight h hard for two or three years to soften up e
US (particularly U public opinion) and then to negotiate a favorable
settlement of the war from a position of military /psychological strength.
Basically, it was the same strategy that had been used successfully against the
French. Le Duan called it a strategy of "fighting and negotiating."
The strategy was immediately opposed by Peking and Moscow, for
different reasons, and Le Duan took issue with both allies.
e viewed the Chinese as extremists who wanted Hanoi
tie down forces by dragging out the war indefinitely, and who dismissed
any possibility of negotiations in the future. In a speech published in August
1966, Le Duan attacked basic Maoist principles of warfare, which had been
spelled out-apparently largely for Vietnamese benefit-in an article by Lin
Piao. Le Duan took two of Mao's points-fight defensively when the enemy
is stronger, and do not risk losses by pitting weak units against strong-and
turned them around. He asserted that the Vietnamese Communists were on
the offensive and had been throughout the war, and had "invented" methods
that enabled them, even with a weak force (a ratio of "one to 10, or more")
to overpower a stronger enemy force. Le Duan was justifying two basic
elements of his strategy: to maintain the option of negotiating, which can be
done only from an offensive position; and to be prepared to strike military
blows, even when one's forces are weaker, for psychological effect. The Tet
1968 offensive launched 19 months later was based on these premises.
Soviet advice to negotiate an end to the war immediately was rejected
by Le Duan in 1966. He argue e US was not
yet as war-weary as the French were at e time of Men ien Phu. In a
speech given at the 23rd CPSU Congress in Moscow in April 1966, he
carefully pointed out that the time was not ripe for negotiations.
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the
Poli uro met in the a ot 1966 and, over the objections of Truong Chinh
and General Nguyen Chi Thanh, adopted a contingency plan for stepped-up
military action that would lead to negotiations. anoi
sought and readily obtained Moscow's support
Tor Lne pan, a at Le
Duan was unable to get Chinese approval. The Politburo went ahead with
contingency planning despite the reported opposition of the Chinese. Gen-
eral Thanh's death, on July 7, 1967, may have removed one obstacle to the
plan, for specific planning at COSVN headquarters for the Tet Offensive
began soon after he died. The 1968 Tet offensive consisted of surprise
attacks on nearly every city and military base in South Vietnam. Since in
most battles the attacking forces were weaker than defending forces, no
lasting military gains were possible. The boldness of the stroke, however, did
lead to a dramatic rise in anti-war sentiment in the US.. but not enough to
force the US to withdraw on Hanoi's terms. So a second country-wide
offensive was launched on May 5. 1968. Its failure and the failure of two
subsequent country-wide offensives compelled the Polithuro to abandon the
Le Duan strategy in April 1969 and to retreat to the concept of "protracted
war" that Truong Chinh and the Chinese had been advocating all along.
The failures almost certainly eroded Le Duan's leadership authority for
a while. senior COSVN
commanders were openly complaining as early as the summer of 1968 that
the cost of the offensives was not worth the gains. t Le Duan reportedly
visited COSVN headquarters in June 1968 to argue in person for continua-
tion of his strategy.) The publication that September of a major speech by
i ruong Chinh criticizing the big-offensive strategy imphc,d that the Politburo
(and Ho Chi Minh) were dissatisfied with Le Duan's direction of the war.
But after Ho Chi Minh's death in September 1969, Le Duan managed to
reassert his authority. A major policy statement published in February 1970,
and his subsequent war policies, demonstrated that his faith in the basic
validity of his approach had not been shaken by the need. to retreat in 1969.
In his 1970 article he again rejected Maoist military tactics and reiter-
ated his concepts of strategy and war goals. For example
? Le Duan: Our general theory of warfare is to maintain steady
offensive pressure, with occasional leaps forward, even though the em-my
is superior in troop strength and equipment. Mao: Fight the war in slow
stages, and do not risk going on the strategic offensiv~ until the military
,balance of forces has tipped in your favor.
? Le Duan: It is our strategy to attack the enemy un all fronts. Mao:
Never disperse your forces. Concentrate superior forcc.cs for every battle
and destroy enemy units one by one.
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? Le Duan: We attack the enemy anytime and anywhere, when he is
weak and uncovered and even when he is strong and on guard. Mao:
Strike the enemy only when he is weak and off guard.
? Le Duan: In a passage underlined for emphasis, Le Duan claimed
that the Vietnamese have learned the military art of using a small force
to fight a great force. Mao: In every battle, concentrate an absolutely
superior force (2,3,4, and sometimes even 5 or 6 times the enemy's
strength.)
On negotiations, Le Duan was flexible. "To take advantage of the
enemy's internal contradictions ...our Party, on the basis of holding fast to
principles, has flexibly and wisely employed various strategies." He cited
approvingly past occasions when the party had made "principled com-
promises" in dealing with the French.
Le Duan's 1970 article laid the doctrinal basis for the 1972 Easter
offensive and its aftermath, the January 1973 cease-fire. As of early 1974, it
was Communist strategy to refrain from major military action, except to
defend territory already under Communist control, and, instead, to turn to
"political struggle." But GVN-controlled territory is fairly stable politically
and also well-policed. With little opportunity for effective subversion a
"political struggle" policy, in effect, means acquiescence of the status quo.
Le Duan vs. Truong Chinh on Building the North
Le Duan's views on domestic policy are shaped by his vision of creating
a modern industrialized country in a brief period of time. In March 1973 he
wrote that "the greatest scientific and technological revolution in mankind's
history is now in full swing over the world," and expressed his determination
to take full advantage of the opportunity to share in these benefits. He said,
"We will not spare any effort or money in this field, which plays the most
decisive role...in the present era."
Le Duan's pragmatic and energetic proposals for building a strong state
are not always enthusiastically received by others in the leadership. Some
fear that economic development may be achieved only at the expense of
traditional Marxist goals and lead to a resurgence of "capitalist and bourgeois
tendencies."
Debates on domestic policies, like those on war policies, have been
sharp and polemical. The key issues in dispute show up most clearly when
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the writings of Le Duan and Truong Chinh, long the principal spokesman for
the doctrinaire wing, are compared:*
*Le Duan's economic and ideological views-which have been consistent over
lime-have been set down at length in writings and speeches published since
he became First Secretary in 1960. His views are comprehensively spelled
out in three statements issued since 1968:
? a speech given June 1908 in Nam Ha Provine, published in the
August 1968 issue of Hoc Tap
? a "state of the nation " renort in February 1970.
? an article in the March 1973 Hoc Tap describini, the kinds of cadres
and party and government organizations needed in the "new era" ofpostwar
construction.
Truong Chinh's ideological views are comprehensively stated in his
1968 speech, "Let Us Be Grateful to Karl Marx and Follow the Path
Followed by Him. " The speech was summarized in th._: same August 1968
issue of Hoc Tap that published Le Duan's Nam Ha spee: lt. Chinh's speech, a
tong one, was broadcast in full on September 16-20, 1068, and apparently
recirculated, at least to Party members, in 1970; as recently as August 1970
Party members were beine instructed to study it.
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Truong Chinh
The "three revolutions"-"the revolution in production relations, the
revolution in technology, and the revolution in ideology and culture"-is a
slogan that has been popular in Vietnam since at least 1961. The slogan
expresses, somewhat cumbersomely, the same idea embodied in the Chinese
slogan "Red and expert."
It has been standard practice for Le
Duan, especially since 1970, to
word the slogan in a way that sin-
gled out technical expertise as the
most important aspect. For exam-
ple, he says that the only way to
build socialism is by "successfully
carrying out the three revolutions,
of which the technical revolution is
the key." (Le Duan's underlining)
(1970).
The general line of building social-
ism in the North consists of
"strengthening dictatorship toward
the people's enemy, repressing coun-
ter-revolutionaries, maintaining se-
curity and order. ..and carrying out
the following three revolutions: the
revolution in production relations,
technical revolution, and ideological
and cultural revolution." In the
ensuing discussion of the "three rev-
olutions" Truong Chinh typically
gives more extended treatment and
emphasis to the third revolution,
that of ideology and culture. (1968)
The Struggle Between the Capitalist and the Socialist Road
The struggle between the two roads
is primarily a problem of economic
production. "Only" by expanding
production through the three rev-
olutions-of which the technical rev-
olution is the main one-can the
conditions that foster capitalism be
eliminated. "Carrying out the three
revolutions... represents the basic
content of the class struggle."
(1970)
"The struggle between the socialist
road and the capitalist road is still
going on to determine definitely
who will defeat whom.... This is a
protracted, hard, and complicated
struggle. Such movements as the
movement to suppress counter-rev-
olutionaries... are the content of this
struggle." (1968)
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Lenin on "Building Socialism"
Praises Lenin for having boldly
changed from a policy of war corn-
n:unism to the New Economic Pol-
icy in 1921. Lenin, he said, "had to
exert immense effort to persuade
communists who were imbued with
revolutionary enthusiasm but un-
aware of economic laws" that "the
New Economic Policy was not a pol-
icy of restoring capitalism but the
only possible single policy for the
USSR at that time." (1970) (similar
reference to Lenin's NEP was made
jr 1968)
Quotes Lenin to the effect that the
main task of a u.volutionary regime
after acquiring power is to prevent
the resurgence o- capitalism. (1968)
On Cooperative Farming
Cautions that it is absolutely essen-
tial under present backward condi-
lions to preserve the individual peas-
ant economy, which provides peas-
ants with 40 percent of their in-
come, and is the system under
which 5 million pigs are raised.
Twice Le Duan states that it is party
policy not to do anything that "re-
stricts" the sideline economic activ-
ities of peasants. Cadres should even
help promote family farming by see-
ing that peasants get seed and tools,
and should not find this a "frighten-
ing" trend. (1968)
"The idea that ,,ny method of pro-
duction that increases the social pro-
duct is acceptablc is not the view of
the working elms and the Party....
We must prodi.,.ce in accordance
with socialist collectivization."
(speech published in January 29-30,
19691Vhan Dan)
"The spontaneous capitalist charac-
ter of small producers is appearing
again and must be repressed." "The
management of land under collec-
tive ownership las run into devia-
tions and errors." and we must
strengthen the a.- ollective economy
in all possible wa rs. (1968)
Although it is very important to
eliminate capitalist elements, this is
not the crucial thing, it is imperative
that labor and materials are
"managed so as to expand produc-
tion most rapidly." ( 1970)
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On Repression
Old cadres, trained in revolutionary It is "necessary to use violence
techniques, now often rely on coer- against counter-revolutionaries and
cive measures to get things done. exploiters who refuse to submit to
"This is not right." (1970) reform." We must strengthen "the
repressive apparatus." (1968)
"Easing vigilance against... counter-
revolutionary forces... represents a
dangerous rightist error. How-
ever,...if we are only concerned with
quelling (these forces) while losing
sight of the essential task of.. .carry-
ing out the three revolutions, we
would commit a serious error."
(1970)
On Revolutionary Enthusiasm
"Without revolutionary enthusiasm, "The most zealous elements" make
there can be no revolutionary acts. the best party members. (1968)
But with only revolutionary enthusi-
asm, the most we can do is eliminate
the old; we cannot build a new soci-
ety." (1970)
"Revolutionary enthusiasm is very
important. But if we think that we
can build socialism with.. .our enthu-
siasm alone and if we disregard all
objective laws and economic facts
which are sometimes cruel and hard,
we are grossly mistaken." (1970)
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On Ideology
"But something which deserves our
zAtention is that no small number of
our cadre often merely emphasize
ideological indoctrination and view
that as the only and the best meas-
Lire for resolving every problem. It is
clear that this method of operation
cannot meet the requirements of
production." ( 1968)
"If we simply acquiesce to gener-
alized ideological appeals...we will
be unable to complete the great task
of building socialism." (1968)
Cadres are already imbued with
enough zeal and enthusiasm. The
main danger now lies in the fact that
"many" party officials, at all levels,
"have substituted general ideological
and political tasks ...for the organiza-
tional task." (1970)
The party must he built "both ideol-
ogically and organizationally." He
stresses the importance of "height-
ening the political and ideological
standards of cadres and party mem-
bers and of enhancing their revolu-
tionary virtues." "However, it is
regrettable that up to now, for one
or another reason, our tasks of
theoretical and ideological struggle
still have many shortcomings." The
solution Truong Chinh recommends
is to intensify ideological indoctrina-
tion "to guard against the influences
of revisionism and dogmatism."
(1968)
Formerly, the party relied heavily
on propaganda to get things done,
but now we should use modern
methods of management. "However,
most of our cadres do not yet know
or are still unfamiliar with this
fact." (1970)
It has "become a way of life" with
some people to talk incessantly
about ideology in a loose way that
ignores practical organizational
problems. "This is an inherent sick-
ness found in the bourgeois intellec-
tuals and old-fashioned Confucianist
school teachers." [This could be a
slap at Truong Chinh, who is the
only senior Politburo member to
have received a classical Chinese
(i.e., Confucianist) education. I (1973)
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Criteria for Selecting Party Cadres
Previously, cadres had to know how
to lead revolutionary struggles, how
to operate clandestinely, how to
lead guerrilla warfare. Today, in the
era of construction, problems are
different. Now, in order to lead eco-
nomic development, party officials
"must know how to manage the
economy and must study science
and technology." Today, criteria for
judging performance are different:
"We cannot recognize any party
organization-as good, as long as its
production is slow." (1968)
The old guard must be replaced by
men who have the energy, health,
know-how and managerial skills re-
quired in this "new era." Thus:
Experience acquired in decades of
revolutionary party work is "valu-
able;... however, this definitely can-
not compensate for what we need
most badly-the ability to organize
economic development." (1970)
"The task of party-building must be
closely tied to mass revolutionary
movements. New cadres must be
selected on the basis of their rev-
olutionary background.... On the
one hand, look for the most zealous,
most select elements of the working
class and make them party mem-
bers. On the other hand, draw into
the party outstanding elements of
the laboring masses who have
emerged in the long and arduous
struggle against imperialist aggres-
sors.... Simultaneously with the
admission of new party members,
quickly expel from the party the
provocateurs, the antiparty ele-
ments, the factionalists, and those
who are politically backward, as
well as those poorly qualified, party-
wise." [Says nothing about techni-
cal or managerial expertise and ex-
perience] (1968)
The key party mission today is the
"technical revolution," and this will
be the "only" criterion by which
party members are judged. (1973)
"We have often heard abstract and
fuzzy talk about `class stand and
class ethics."' There is no need to be
unclear, because the issue is simple.
In the past, one's class stand was
manifested by revolutionary activ-
ities. Today, in the North, class
stand is manifested mainly by ef-
forts to create modern industry and
agriculture. (1973)
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Le Duan appears to have strengthened his political position con-
siderably since Ho Chi Minh died in 1969. He was even then "first among
equals"; now the gap has widened between him and his potential rivals on
the Politburo. Le Duan's decisions do not always command unanimous
support, but he seems strong enough to make his views prevail. There is a
similarity in the rise of Le Duan and that of Brezhnev in the Soviet Union.
Neither is a figure who rules through the force of his personality, but both,
after somewhat shaky starts, have gradually consolidated control so that
they now effectively lead their respective Politburos.
For a few months after Ho's death in September 1969, it was unclear
who was more powerful, Le Duan or his chief rival Truong Chinh. In fact,
during that period VWP policy guidelines seemed to be inspired more by
Truong Chinh's ideas than by Le Duan's. Truong Chinh set out his thoughts
in a long speech in mid-1968 (the exact date was never clear) that was
published in full in September. The speech was promptly hailed by Hanoi as
"a new contribution to the treasury of theoretical works on the Vietnamese
revolution," attesting to its authoritative character. It was a programmatic
speech calling for greater commitment to ideological goals in the North, and
in the South for a shift from the big offensives espoused by Le Duan to a
more orthodox "protracted war." The speech is generally considered to have
been the basis for the VWP decision in the spring of 1969 to reduce the level
of fighting so as to test the new US administration and at the same time to
get a breathing spell. This long-overdue retreat was almost certainly adopted
with Le Duan's approval-in February 1970 he publicly endorsed the prin-
ciple of sometimes shifting to the defensive to gain time. Nevertheless, it was
Truong Chinh's name, not his, that was associated with originating the policy
of retrenchment.
Uncertainty over Le Duan's status increased late in 1969 when, after
delivering the funeral oration for Ho Chi Minh, he went into seclusion for
five months, making only one routine public appearance in October. Truong
Chinh, in contrast, remained publicly active, and made a few speeches on
ideological issues. Understandably, Western observers began speculating that
Truong Chinh was winning a power struggle.
That theory became untenable in February 1970 when Le Duan
showed up to give an important speech on the occasion of the party's 40th
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anniversary and Nhan Dan published a long statement* by him spelling out
the party line on strategy and domestic policies. That article firmly estab-
lished Le Duan's primacy. It was immediately given nearly the same authori-
tative standing as Ho Chi Minh's writings. A Nhan Dan editorial described
the article as an important basic document that correctly set forth "the
party's lines and policies," and all party cadres were instructed to study it.
Its emphasis was on a flexible strategy toward the South and a pragmatic
approach to economic development at home. In setting forth these broad
new party guidelines, the article clearly was intended to put Le Duan's own
stamp (and his gloss as well) on the strategy outlined in Truong Chinh's 1968
speech. As such, it was a vigorous assertion of Le Duan's leadership.
In subsequent months several leaders found occasion to affirm their
loyalty to Le Duan. On May 3, 1970, Truong Chinh himself instructed 500
senior cadres attending. a seminar held to study the February article to
"unite around the Central Committee which is headed by Le Duan." Shortly
after that, Foreign Minister and Politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh
privately told a visiting foreigner that Le Duan's stature was far above
Truong Chinh's. The foreign minister was quoted as saying that Le Duan was
popular and flexible, while Chinh was considered dogmatic and pro-Chinese.
Premier Pham Van Dong in his annual National Day speech, given on August
31, 1970, quoted only Le Duan and Ho. Dong confirmed Le Duan's
authority in the area of economic development-the main theme of the
speech-by saying that "in his February article... Comrade Le Duan already
made clear the party's line concerning.. .industrialization."
Le Duan Encounters Resistance, February to August 1970
Although Le Duan clearly had nailed down his claim to the number-one
spot by February 1970, for several months expressions of support for
Truong Chinh and some of his 1968 views indicated that Duan was still
facing opposition powerful enough to introduce sour notes in the propa-
ganda. The public discussion dealt only with domestic issues, but it seems
likely that long-term strategy toward the South-the most crucial problem
facing North Vietnam in the spring of 1970-was the chief issue.
*On February 14, 1970 the normally four-page Nhan Dan published an
extraordinary 12-page edition devoted to Le Duan's article, entitled "Under
the Glorious Party Banner, for Independence, Freedom, and Socialism, Let
Us Advance New Victories. "
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In mid-1968 a public debate had been conducted on domestic matters
(and only on them) while the Politburo in fact was preoccupied with a
heated argument over whether to continue the big offensives strategy.* In
brief, the evidence suggests that in mid-1968 Truong Chinh was calling for a
return to the classic people's war doctrine, arguing that big offensives had
proved "adventurous" and too costly. Le Duan defended the big-offensive
strategy. With Ho Chi Minh mediating, it was apparently decided to launch
two additional coordinated country-wide offensives (August-September
1 968 and March 1969). In April 1969, after these offensives also had failed
to achieve satisfactory gains, the Politburo adopted the Truong Chinh line.
The classic strategy to which Communist forces then returned was the
cautious and defensive stance that people's war doctrine prescribes for
combat with a militarily superior enemy. It was essentially designed to
conserve manpower so that the Communists could, if necessary, fight for a
long time. The Politburo was still committed to this course in the spring of
1970, when Le Duan again asserted his primacy. In his February 1970
arlicle, Le Duan approved the retrenchment strategy-as a temporary ex-
pedient. He urged that Hanoi retain its flexibility and be ready to seize
promising opportunities of any kind: either to resume the offensive, or to
make "principled compromises" with the enemy under certain circum-
stances.
At that point, the Politburo seems to have been wary of giving Le Duan
the authority to move in one of these directions. On the one hand, it had
had enough of "adventurous" offensives for the time being, but on the
other, it probably saw no advantage in making concessions. Without Ho Chi
Minh around to mediate. it was not surprising that Le Duan apparently had
trouble selling his strategic views.
Whatever the issue, he was certainly having trouble convincing his
colleagues to accept his recommendations. His own February article ac-
knowledged the existence of "differences in view" in the collective
leadership, and said that "some comrades must learn to make concessions."
I1 is significant that the Hanoi leadership as a collective body withheld public
affirmation for Le Duan's program through most of 1970. During that
*-The August 1968 issue of Hoc Tap published a speech on domestic
problems by Le Duan-his only major public statement (f the year-which
soundly criticized the doctrinaire stand being taken by Truong Chinh on
such issues as qualification of 'party members and farm cooperativization.
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period, the program was not endorsed in part or in whole by a Central
Committee communique, Politburo resolution, or Secretariat directive.
Not only did Le Duan fail to get a clear endorsement from his peers,
but two Politburo resolutions issued in March and one in August actually ran
against the grain of his February article. In March, the Politburo issued
resolutions on improving the quality of party members and on strengthening
cooperative management of farms. In their emphasis on ideological purity,
both echoed Truong Chinh's 1968 speech, and both conspicuously failed to
pick up Le Duan's standard emphasis on practical results and on the
importance of technical expertise over ideological purity.
Treatment of this so-called "Red and expert" issue became a measure
of support for Le Duan's position. With typical pragmatism, Le Duan has
generally treated technical expertise as more important than ideology, but
his February 1970 article was exceptionally categorical. It stated flatly that
of the three revolutions (the revolution in production relations, the revolu-
tion in technology, and the revolution in ideology and culture), "the tech-
nological revolution is the main one." The slogan, which appeared repeatedly
in his article in this form and was even underlined several times for emphasis,
thereafter appeared routinely in articles and editorials in the party press. The
two Politburo resolutions of March 1970, however, withheld endorsement of
Le Duan's formula, by mentioning merely "the three revolutions" without
indicating that one aspect had priority over another.
Le Duan apparently was running into substantial opposition in August
1970, when a Politburo resolution came out instructing cadres to study both
the 1968 Truong Chinh and the 1970 Le Duan statements. Party officials
almost certainly interpreted this as a sign that pressure was being put on Le
Duan to make concessions to those who shared Truong Chinh's more
fundamentalist philosophy.
Another important clue that Truong Chinh's standing vis-a-vis Le Duan
remained strong in that period surfaced in the treatment given the two in
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official histories published at the time.* As in histories before Ho's death,
Loth men continued to he given more or less equal attention in passages
describing their roles in the party's early history. After Au Rust 1970, Truong
Chinh's name rarely appeared in historical reviews and attention to Ho Chi
Minh himself diminished, leaving Le Duan the paramount figure in early
:arty history.
In sum, there were enough mixed signals in propaganda as of August
1970 to conclude that Le Duan's power position was less firm than he
desired. Nothing in the propaganda indicated that his hold on the number-
one spot in the VWP party structure was in doubt, but ?t appeared that he
was having difficulty enlarging his authority and winning over colleagues to
his policy viewpoints.
Le Duan Acquires More Power and Silences
the Opposition After August 1970
A review of political events in the last third of 1970 suggests that late in
the summer Le Duan did manage to strengthen his position. Probably the
immediate pressing issue he was able to exploit was the mounting GVN/US
military threat to Communist logistic bases in Laos. In any event, from the
r?itumn of 1970 through the beginning of 1974, war strategy and policy
~aronouncements carried Le Duan's stamp and propaganda !-omments on him
were more adulatory. Central Committee documents. instead of under-
eutting him, reinforced his authority. What political opposition persisted was
imot clearly defined.
Military developments in the late summer of 1970 were forcing the
Politburo to make a major decision on how to respond to the threatened
three histories were published in 1970: a history of the party (January
x'170), a new biography of Ho Chi Minh (May 1970), and "The August
Revolution (1945)" (August 1970). The January historv, the most com-
prehensive of the three, followed the traditional party line in presenting a
]WHY balanced treatment of Duan and Chinh. It noted that Le Duan rose to
the standing committee of the ICP Central Committee in 1939, shortly
before going to jail. Truong Chinh then became provisional secretary-general
in 1940, helped build up the Viet Minh, and, with Ho. led the party to
v-iztory against the French. The January history, like previous ones, took a
significant slap at Truong Chinh by referring to land reform errors in 1956.
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allied invasion of Laos. A few months earlier, allied forces had invaded all
Communist bases in Cambodia, and Communist forces retreated in con-
fusion. By late summer 1970, Hanoi realized from the logic of the situation
(and probably from agent reports as well) that the allied command was
planning to follow up with a massive invasion of Laos.
The Politburo had a choice to make. It could continue the strategy of
"protracted war"-falling back when strongly attacked, encouraging the
enemy to extend his lines of communication, and then moving to inflict
heavy losses on him. After the enemy has withdrawn, friendly (Communist)
forces would then rebuild their bases and resume the slow process of
building up greater military strength, in preparation for an ultimate con-
frontation after the balance of forces had tipped in their favor. It was
recognized that this process probably would take many years.
The strategy actually adopted was much more daring and aggressive. It
was plainly devised by Le Duan, who once before (1966-1967) had shown
little patience with "protracted war" doctrine as a long-term policy. In
high-level debates, Le Duan argued successfully for adoption of the "fighting
and negotiating" strategy that became firmly identified with his name. The
crux of the strategy was to strike hard military blows so as to be in a
position of strength during peace negotiations.
The final decision to launch another big military/ psychological offen-
sive in 1972 was probably reached at the 19th Central Committee Plenum*
convened about December 1970. The Hanoi leadership apparently decided
to resist the coming allied invasion with all possible force (elements of 13
divisions were used) and, if all went well, to follow up with preparations to
launch a large country-wide offensive of its own.
The allied operation, Lam Son 719, failed to achieve its objectives and
was successfully thrown back in March 1971. On March 27, 1971, just after
the operation ended, Le Duan went to Moscow where he stayed 43 days,
arguing successfully for Soviet support of Hanoi's own plans for its offensive.
As with previous offensives launched against a militarily superior force, the
*The communique of this crucial Plenum picked up Le Duan's formula on
"the three revolutions" in the North ("the technical revolution is the main
one")-the first known instance a collectively approved Central Committee
document used this slogan. This, and other signs, indicated that Le Duan was
in firm control at the Plenum.
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aim of the Faster 1972 offensive was as much psychological as military. The
purpose was to break ARVN'S resolve to keep fighting and to induce a
demoralized Saigon government to negotiate an end ~o the war on Com-
munist terms, namely, to accept a coalition government dominated by
Communists. It was the same fight-to-compel-negotiations strategy Le Duan
had pursued, with only partial success, in the big offc.nsives of 1968 and
early 1969.
When the 1972 offensive lost momentum in September 1972, Moscow
and Peking-concerned that the war was interfering with their separate
efforts to develop a detente relationship with the US-urged Hanoi to come
to terms with the Saigon government. As a result, the collective Politburo
nnade political concessions it had been unwilling to consider at the time the
offensive was first planned-a time when the Vietnam war was still politically
lacked by Peking. Le Duan, as party leader, must have approved the final
cease-fire arrangements, but some Vietnamese leaders reportedly opposed
any new concessions. The vacillation in Hanoi between October 1972 and
January 1973 over signing the agreement suggests that Le Duan had diffi-
culty getting the support of the Politburo for the concessions.
Hanoi Radio went out of its way immediately after the signing of the
Lease-fire agreement to describe Le Duan in an exceptionally effusive way,
apparently to scotch any thought that his authority was in jeopardy. In
reporting on a celebration of Tet 1973 attended by Le Duan, Truong Chinh,
and others, Hanoi Radio said that those who attended "together with
Comrade Truong Chinh wished...Comrade Le Duan good health so that he
may lead the party and state in achieving ever greater victories."* The
account not only put Truong Chinh in his place, but. more important,
showed that Le Duan dominated direction of the st:ite as well as the
party-an unusual situation inasmuch as Le Duan holds no important posi-
tion in the state apparatus.
Despite this expression of public confidence in Le Duan, his endorse-
ment of concessions almost certainly strained Politburo unity, for it implied
that Hanoi was willing to admit the possibility that the division of Vietnam
`1 year later, during Tet 1974 festivities, Hanoi Radio again gave Le Duan
unusually adulatory attention, reporting that a group of people to whom he
paid a Tet visit greeted him as "venerated and beloved Una le Le Duan. " This
kind of accolade hitherto had been reserved for Ho Chi Mir; h_
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into two countries would be perpetuated. This prospect was anathema to
die-hards in the leadership, and Le Duan himself probably was unhappy
about it. One positive note from his point of view was the opportunity the
cease-fire gave him to push economic development and modernization in the
North. This had long been a subject dear to his heart, and Le Duan wasted
no time announcing plans for postwar development.* A prominent feature
was a comprehensive plan to reshape the party at all levels, possibly in-
cluding the Central Committee, in a mold of his own choosing. A Politburo
Resolution-on which Le Duan published a lengthy exegesis-was issued in
February 1973. It set out guidelines for changing the Party apparatus so that
it would be better prepared to direct the economic and technical revolution
that Le Duan envisaged in the "new era" ahead. One basic precept was that
tired old revolutionaries should be replaced by vigorous managerial and
technically oriented people. Le Duan had argued before, notably in his
February 1970 article, that personnel changes were overdue. Numerous
articles touching on aspects of this theme and quoting one or both of the
1970 and 1973 Le Duan articles appeared in North Vietnamese media after
February 1973.
The North Vietnamese media also bolstered Le Duan's position relative
to his colleagues by rewriting an early period of party history so as to give
him, rather than Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh, major credit for setting the
line on "armed struggle" that was followed in the three decades since 1940.
A series of articles played up the importance of the 6th Plenum of the
Central Committee, convened in November 1939 near Saigon, and attended
by Le Duan and a few other leaders (now all dead). The articles, published in
the autumn of 1972, asserted that the 6th Plenum, rather than the 8th
Plenum attended by Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh in 1941, set the party
on its wartime course. Hitherto, party histories had invariably treated the
8th Plenum as the "historic" occasion when the party firmly embarked on
its revolutionary course.
The Status of Truong Chinh
In past years, when Le Duan gained political strength, Truong Chinh
tended to fade into the background, and vice versa. This pattern has held
true since August 1970.
*Progress on this front has been slow, probably because of the persistence of
uncertainties in the military situation. These uncertainties have strengthened
VWP elements opposed to making a wholesale shift to a peace-time footing
until political prospects in the South look better.
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Truong Chinh has ceased to be identified with major policies, either
those actually adopted or those espoused by the regime. His 1968 speech---
his last important contribution to policy-has not been mentioned in the
lfanoi press since August 1970. Chink did make one long speech in Decem-
ber 197 1 at a Vietnam Fatherland Front meeting, but it does not appear to
have been a major one. Although it was mainly a pep talk designed to rally
popular and international support for the new phase of the war the Commu-
nists were about to initiate, Truong Chinh made his first capitulation on the
"Red and expert" issue, acknowledging that the aim of socialism in the
North was "to achieve the three revolutions-of which the technical revolu-
lion is the key."
An early sign that Truong Chinh's position in the power structure was
insecure was his absence from public view from October ?6, 1970 to January
26, 1971. This was unusual for Truong Chinh; his ceremonial posts require
him to carry a heavy schedule of public speaking, receiving foreign dele-
gations, and so forth. Truong Chinh may have been abroad for medical
attention during at least part of his absence; on January 11, 1971, the East
German radio made a brief and unusual announcement that Chinh was there
taking a rest cure. In any case, it appears that Truong Chinh missed the
crucial 19th Plenum, which is reliably reported to have been held in Decem-
,er 1970. (Hanoi held up announcement of the plenum until February 2,
1971; such announcements are often not made for a month or more after
the event.) Another Politburo member who apparently missed the plenum
was Chinese specialist Hoang Van Hoan, a long-time associate of Truong
Chinh. Hoan, who was traveling in Europe in the autumn of 1970, did not
return to Hanoi until December 30, 1970. Whatever the precise facts of their
whereabouts and the timing of the Plenum, Hanoi apparently was willing to
give the impression that the presence of these two Politburo members was
not necessary at key leadership deliberations.
Shortly after the Easter 1972 offensive began, "1 ruong Chinh told a
"events have passed me by." This
remark was interprets o mean that his, views
on the offensive had been ignored.
Truong Chinh continued to make frequent routine, public appearances
during the rest of 1972 and 1973. He made one trip ahroad, to Moscow in
December 1972, but the highest ranking official he met was Suslov, an
influential party secretary but not one of the "troika." Occasionally C!iinh is
still quoted in the media, but not on really major matters. In general, Truong
Chinh's activities and speeches show that his post-1970 role has been to serve
the propaganda purposes of the regime, not to initiate or influence policy.
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Le Duan's Strengths
In the competitive atmosphere that characterizes high-level politics in
Communist regimes such as North Vietnam, it takes strong and astute men
to survive at the top. Le Duan, although lacking the oracular authority of Ho
Chi Minh, seems to have the necessary strength to survive. He has:
? the mantle of Ho Chi Minh's approval;
? a long tenure at or near the top;
? solid qualities of intellect and leadership, which seem to command
respect and loyalty in the VWP apparatus;
? an unblemished party record, unlike some of his colleagues;
? enough proteges and allies in the power structure to give him
majority support.
How and when Le Duan earned Ho Chi Minh's esteem is something of a
mystery. According to party history, the two did not meet until after World
War II. Even then, for the 12 years that Le Duan was party boss in the South
their personal contacts were limited to Lc Duan's infrequent visits to Ho Chi
Minh's headquarters in the North. Le Duan must have made a good impres-
sion, for when the first postwar Central Committee was formed in 195 1, he
was given the number-three
Truong Chinh
In 1957, Ho Chi Minh, disenchanted with Truong Chinh's disastrous
handling of land reform and wishing to develop a more aggressive policy
toward the South, summoned Le Duan north and gave him his first postwar
job at the national level. It could not have been easy going for Le Duan at
first. Although listed ahead of the now demoted Truong Chinh in protocol
appearances, Le Duan was not given a formal title to enhance his status and,
moreover, had to spend much of his time in the South preparing the
apparatus for the new war effort. (The new course did not get fully launched
until 1960.) While Le Duan was diverted to this task, Truong Chinh was able
to make a strong comeback. In 1958 and 1959, Chinh again became regime
spokesman on land reform and sharply criticized "rightists" and "revi-
sionists" in the areas of ideology and culture. Chinh apparently retained a
seat on the Secretariat and was named (over General Giap, for one) senior
vice premier, a position that automatically made him acting premier when
Pham Van Dong was out of the country or ailing.
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Such signs of preferment ended abruptly for Truong Chinh in Septem-
)ihr 1960 at a party congress held, in part, to confirm Le Duan as First
' icretary. Chinh was dropped from the executive side oof government and
from the Secretariat in a reshuffle that left him chairman of the legislature, a
prestige job carrying no responsibility. He did, however, retain his number-
three spot on the Politburo.
Le Duan, now formally chief party executive, gave the major political
report at the congress, while Truong Chinh gave only a minor report on
ideology. By conferring the title "First Secretary" on Le Duan, Ho Chi Minh
showed that he had reached a firm decision to groom Duan to succeed him
as party leader; in 1960 "First Secretary" was the title held by party bosses
in most Communist states. In reserving the rarefied posir.ion of Party Chair-
man for himself, Ho Chi Minh was only following Mao Tse-tung's special
__--1.. ...,,1 u,. -1-NN, inivnrierl to let the nosition lapse on his death. In
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Although Le Duan now held the title of First Secretary, he was still
little known among party officials. Steps, almost certainly approved by Ho
Chi Minh, were therefore taken to enhance Le Duan's party prestige. His
works were quoted more than those of any leader except Ho, and the party
press gave rave reviews to some of Le Duan's books, a practice not usually
accorded anyone else except Ho. For example, a book by Le Duan on the
peasant problem (Truong Chinh's long-time specialty) was praised in the
January 26, 1965 Nhan Dan as a "great work" and an "important contri-
oution to the revolutionary dialectic." The review took special note of Le
Duan's leadership qualifications by observing that he had participated in the
"leadership" of the party since its inception, had done , xtensive work in all
three regions of Vietnam, and had successfully applied basic Communist
principles to actual conditions in Vietnam.
Again, the June 1969 issue of Hoc Tap described a hook by Le Duan on
the economy as "a valuable theoretical and practical book on developing the
socialist economy in North Vietnam." By asserting that Le Duan's precepts
are "practical" as well as "theoretical," the reviewer seemed to be pointing
up the limitations of Truong Chinh, who is known chiefly as a theoretician
and whose famous 1968 speech was praised only for making a "theoretical"
contribution.
Le Duan acquired more than just the trappings or power in 1960. Ho
Chi Minh allowed him to name his men to key positions and gave him a
virtually free hand in determining policy toward the South. In personnel
matters, for example, besides edging Truong Chinh away from center stage,
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Le Duan was able to place two colleagues from the South (Pham Hung and
Le Due Tho) on both the Politburo and the Secretariat.
I ost of the
time e Man has been the architect o North Vietnam's war policy. At the
first major COSVN conference held in early 1966 after the US entered the
ground war, the VWP representative said he was speaking on behalf of Le
Duan; the major report presented was a letter written by Le Duan; and the
COSVN commander expressed satisfaction that, in Hanoi, his conduct of the
war had the full support of "Comrade Secretary," meaning Le Duan. Ho Chi
Minh's name came up only in a general propaganda context.
said that o i Minh tended e to equivocate but e every hing to Le
Duan"-probably an accurate statement at that time.
By the time Ho Chi Minh died in 1969, Le Duan had had years of
opportunity to use the party's formidable resources for indoctrination-
secret party documents and political lectures as well as public media-to his
advantage. He was able both to enhance his own stature and also subtly to
weaken the political standing of potential rivals. The cumulative effect of his
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political reports that he had made a mistake or incurred Ho's displeasure
were never allowed to circulate. By contrast, political officers reportedly
have freely referred to Truong Chinh's tendency to be inflexible and too
pro-Chinese, and both General Giap and Premier Dong came under criticism
early in the war for counseling caution when Ho Chi Minh (and Le Duan)
wanted to enlarge the North's war commitment.
Although Le Duan's political assets are formidabitk, there are some
liabilities in his position.
As already noted, he has less than a charismatic personality and must
therefore work harder, and perhaps make more compromises than Ho Chi
Minh in order to retain control. His basic policies have prevailed in the past
two years, indicating that he has the majority of the power structure with
him, and probably commands personal loyalty from men like Le Duc Tho
Who owe their rise to Le Duan. The evidence also suggests, however, that he
must contend with a certain amount of stubborn opposition.
The opposition at present apparently lies mainly on Le Duan's left
tank, where he seems to be vulnerable as a result of the political concessions
he made to reach the cease-lire agreement. The evidence tenuously suggests
that opposition is centered in the army and the soathern Communist
apparatus.
The result presumably is a divided Politburo, ova+r which Le Duan
presides with something less than unquestioned authority.
One would expect a leader with Le Duan's experience to be doing more
-~o surround himself with able, loyal subordinates. The top party organiza-
Lions-the Politburo and the Central Committee-are all of 1960 vintage and
were largely created by Ho Chi Minh. Le Duan's failure to rearrange the
leadership in a mold more to his liking may be another sign of weakness.
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V. Structure of the Present Leadership and the Outlook
The leadership structure of the VWP has been very stable over the past
15 years. People have tended to be frozen in jobs because of wartime
requirements and there has been little upward mobility.
Most Politburo members are in their mid-60s, well below the age of
retirement or senility in communist countries and a decade younger than
their Chinese counterparts. Le Duan was 66 on April 7, 1973. The oldest
(and least influential) member is the 69-year-old former ambassador to
China, Hoang Van Hoan. The inner circle of six senior Politburo members
are all first-generation revolutionaries who rose to prominence in the ICP of
the 1930s.
Second-level leaders can be neatly stratified on the basis of when they
first made their mark on party history. The older group is composed of men
who came to the fore in the war against the French. They include 25
generals, men who now hold key command and staff positions. Some
probably will be transferred to civilian tasks to meet the need for executive
talent as extensive postwar reconstruction programs get under way. Civilians
in this category include two members of the Secretariat: Hoang Anh and To
Huu. Both are candidates for a future Politburo. Anh is the regime's top
agricultural specialist, and To Huu is responsible for propaganda and educa-
tion and possibly also for science and technology.
A younger group of men, so-called "new blood," is composed mostly of
economic managers who have risen to key positions since the mid-1950s.
Prominent men in this list include Nguyen Con, a Secretariat member who
also apparently serves as executive deputy to Premier Pham Van Dong, who
is in frail health; Nguyen Lam, Chairman of the State Planning Commission;
Tran Quang Huy, deputy head of the party's Science and Education Depart-
ment; and Tran Quynh, reportedly Le Duan's personal secretary, who also
has responsibilities in the area of science and technology. Con and Lam are
clearly Politburo material. Do Muoi, who was named minister of a reorgan-
ized and enlarged Ministry of Building in June 1973, is an important senior
economic manager.
A change in the leadership is long overdue. The list of men who look
like "comers" is sparse, and the Central Committee-last formed nearly 1.4
years ago-is full of deadwood. Less than half the 41 full members of the
Central Committee appear to meet Le Duan's criteria for men he wants to
have around him. In March 1973 he wrote that "general leadership" cadres
should be youthful or at least vigorous, loyal to the top leader (himself), and
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competent to manage major economic and technical developmental projects.
Rumors circulate from time to time in Hanoi that a 4th Party Congress will
ire held to revitalize the leadership and mark the changeover from a war to a
peace footing. They have not yet been confirmed, but the long-delayed
::ongress may be held in the coming year.
When a 4th Party Congress finally is convened, some diplomats in
Hanoi expect to see an "explosion" in the leadership ranks. Presumably, Le
Duan, if still in the saddle, would try to strengthen his position as much as
)olitically feasible. The outcome could be less than an "explosion," how-
Wer, for Le Duan has shown considerable prudence in the past when moving
against political adversaries. Assuming he retained control of VWP, he might
,settle for a few crucial selections of loyal, competent men for the Politburo
and Secretariat. Le Duan might not even try to purge his old opponent
'Cruong Chinh, but agree to a compromise that left Chinh on the Politburo,
while reserving for himself the right to pick his own number-two man. In this
ease, he would probably choose Le Duc Tho, who seems to be Duan's closest
associate on the Politburo.
Barring the unexpected, there will continue to be two influential bodies
of opinion in the VWP. One, centered in the military and the southern
apparatus, will argue for the return to a higher level of military activity (a big
offensive or perhaps guerrilla warfare). The other, the group headed by Le
)uan and Le Duc Tho, though not entirely unsympathetic: to the aims of the
'first group, will take a more moderate position.
Stabilizing factors are also at work. Hanoi media continue to make
requent references to a "new era" of "peaceful struggle.." and Le Duan,
Premier Dong, and some other leaders want very much to get on with the job
of "building socialism" in the North. Le Duan, who has dominated policy
toward the South under a variety of conditions during the past 28 years, has
acquiesced before (1955-57 and 1961-62) in a static situation when the
North seemed to feel it had nothing to gain by intensifying the war.
Moreover, China and the USSR both want to see the conflict dampened, to
let the political yeast ferment and count on time being on the Communists'
side. Their advice has adherents in the Hanoi Politburo, but it is probably
not decisive. A "political action" strategy is in fact the course being followed
now. It was adopted after the cease-fire and reaffirmed by the Central
Committee at its 21st Plenum which was held toward the end of 1973.
The strategy has forced the Politburo to make difficult compromises.
Le Duan has joined with the Politburo in a major effort to maintain a large
North Vietnamese fighting force in the South. Although the immediate
mission of this force is defensive, it is large enough with relatively little
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reinforcement to allow the Politburo to keep open the option of renewing
the military offensive. There may be strains in the North Vietnamese
leadership over just how much more effort should be put into support of the
South and how much into construction of the North.
Such strains could get worse if the present strategy fails to produce
results in the South, and especially if reconstruction in the North lags as
well. A continued failure to make substantial progress toward both goals
could make the next few years a period of serious challenge to Le Duan's
leadership.
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