DETENTE: THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100040010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 25, 1974
• Content Type: IM

ILLEGIB
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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Detente: The View from the Kremlin
Secret
152
April 25, 1974
No. 0950/74
ILLEGIB
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April 25, 1974
DETENTE: THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Brezhnev and his col-
leagues, both his supporters and his detractors, are now giving more
intense attention to the status of detente and its usefulness as a
strategy for achieving the purposes of the Soviet state and people in
the world and at home.
Brezhnev has an historical stake in detente, as detente has a
present and future claim on his political fortunes. If detente is
thought to be in trouble, then Brezhnev would probably demonstrate
either that it is not so or that he is moving with alacrity to make the
policy adjustments necessary to protect Soviet interests under
changing circumstances. In his Alma Ata speech in mid-March,
Brezhnev sought to disarm the nay-sayers by arguing that the present
difficulties had been foreseen by himself and the other supporters of
detente. As has been the case at previous uncertain junctures, there
was a defensive quality to his remarks, perhaps suggesting he is under
some pressure from would-be successors, perhaps signaling that he
himself is having second thoughts.
Detente is in trouble when it is thought to be in trouble.
Indeed, detente is as subject to a downward spiral of self-feeding
disappointments as to an updraft of unrealistic expectations. Progress
can be made on a panoply of issues, but one highly visible setback,
even if fundamentally unimportant, can create doubts not com-
mensurate with any objective criteria. At this relatively early stage of
its development, detente is a hostage to the vagaries of domestic
politics, the mercurial nature of public relations, the prejudices, the
fears as well as the justifiable concerns of honest men.
For Brezhnev, the emergence of the negative force of all these
factors has been somewhat unsettling. His recent acerbic references
to the Western press are evidence of frustration that the Soviet Union
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They
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is being unfairly saddled with the responsibility for what seems to be
going wrong with detente. It is one thing to reap opprobrium for
conscious policies, quite another to be blamed for circumstances that
are not of one's own doing.
The following sections present an abbreviated and overly ration-
alized run-down of the major issues affecting detente as they might
be seen by proponents and opponents of detente in the Soviet
leadership. The mixed picture that emerges may convey some sense
of how complex and inter-related the factors are in the "real world."
Detente is bound to have a significant impact on high politics in
the Kremlin. Not only is it a conceptual framework for the conduct
of Soviet foreign policy, it is fraught with ideological and concrete
implications for the nature of the Soviet polity. It is highly unlikely,
however, that a Manichean interpretation of detente's impact on
Kremlin politics-i.e., the "liberal" pro-detente forces vs. the "ortho-
dox" hard-line opponents-accurately depicts the conflicting
opinions and motivations of the contenders for power. The ideal
types almost certainly do not fit existing persons; it seems more
likely that each individual, whatever his own biases, sometimes finds
himself perched right in the middle. Moreover, politics and personal
political gains may take precedence over the "rights" and "wrongs"
of a particular issue. Opportunism and the need or desire to be on
the winning side may cause "hard liners" to back pro-detente policies,
or vice versa.
Although some may argue that the Soviet Union's need to
modernize makes some form of detente eventually inevitable, there
does not seem to be any overriding imperative to pursue it with full
vigor at this very moment. There may be a substantive bias in favor
of detente that is significantly reinforced by Brezhnev's personal
need that detente not end in ignominious failure. Nevertheless, there
is some latitude for a tougher. over-all approach and a harder line in
specific areas that are particularly sensitive for the Soviets or that
Moscow perceives as not fully serving its needs.
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The Fundamental Arguments
The policy of detente means different things to different Soviet leaders.
Some argue that moves toward accommodation with the West can be
pursued with little adjustment of Soviet foreign political objectives or
domestic policies. They contend that a relaxation of international tensions
will provide Moscow with a breathing spell during which greater attention
can be paid to strengthening the Soviet economic and military base. Mos-
cow's detente tactics, they say, have already produced major benefits,
including US acknowledgment of the USSR's right to strategic equality,
recognition of Moscow's special role in the settlement of virtually all inter-
national problems, acceptance of Soviet post-war claims in Europe, and
isolation of China. Those of this persuasion also maintain that persistent
pursuit of detente will eventually result in Soviet emergence as the number
one power in the world.
Other pro-detente leaders argue that detente should be used to modern-
ize the USSR's economic and political system and to redirect scarce re-
sources from defense to more productive economic endeavors. They contend
that increments to Soviet strategic power are unlikely to produce greater
security for the USSR and that economic priorities must be changed to the
benefit of the civilian sectors of the economy. In this view, the future of the
Soviet political system depends more on the modernization of the USSR's
political and economic institutions than on the continued build-up of the
military establishment. If major remedial action is not taken soon, they
assert, Moscow cannot expect to play a major role in world affairs despite its
military power. The USSR must negotiate earnestly with the West and not
insist on marginal advantages that can only cast doubt on Soviet intentions
and deny Moscow access to vital Western technology and capital.
On the other side of the fence are those in the Soviet leadership who
contend that detente either as a tactic or a strategy will only encourage the
West to undertake new assaults against Communism. They point to Allende's
overthrow in Chile and to unilateral US actions in the Middle East as proof
that Moscow's hands are tied because of detente. They see CSCE contro-
versies and the trade-emigration tangle with the US as evidence that the West
is, in fact, already seeking to undermine Soviet society. All these events show
the real nature of US imperialism, which is only waiting for the propitious
moment to pounce on the USSR. They will argue that a defense-dominated
economy and extreme vigilance are required to protect the Soviet Union
from its external enemies and from the subversion of internal dissidents.
Moreover, they say, Moscow is duty bound to support Communist and
revolutionary movements world-wide. Collapse of the capitalist system and
political structure can provide the only conditions under which the Soviet
state can flourish. Thus, any deals with the West will only strengthen
Moscow's adversaries.
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The strategic arms limitation talks have become the cen-
terpiece of the process of accommodation in US-Soviet rela-
tions. Soviet participation in the arms negotiations almost
certainly is no longer a matter of dispute in the leadership.
Disputes are now probably attitudinal, and center o' the pace
of the negotiations and the content of Soviet and US propos-
als. The political fortunes of Soviet leaders urging substantial
constraints on US and Soviet systems may be ceasiderably
affected by the success or failure of the negotiations
"Success" at the talks would mean that, despite continu-
ing deep mutual suspicions about each other's intentions, the
sides could agree to some limits on the strategic arms competi-
tion. This in turn would facilitate greater efforts toward con-
ciliation in other areas. "Failure" at the talks would not only
jeopardize the continued viability of the arms agreements
already achieved, but would lead to an intensification of the
arms race, a sharpening of the adversary relationship across the
board, and increasing official and public questioning on both
sides of the advantage of detente in general.
Proponents of Soviet flexibility at the talks argue that the ABM Treaty
and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons were good deals from
Moscow's standpoint, insofar as they checked the further deployment of
anti-missile weapons-an area in which the US had a commanding technologi-
cal edge at the time of agreement-and allowed a Soviet advantage, both in
numbers and throwweight, in systems limited by the offensive agreement.
These Soviet leaders argue that the USSR faces formidable new US
weapons systems, such as the B-1 bomber, Trident submarine and missile,
and perhaps a new land-based ICBM, the cumulative effect of which could
force a new round in arms competition with all the attendant uncertainties
as to its outcome for Moscow. They contend that the USSR will have to
accept some constraints on its new weapons systems in order to preserve the
advantages obtained in the Interim Agreement and protect the relative
improvement in Soviet strategic capabilities represented by Moscow's expen-
sive new modernization programs. They may assert thai.. Soviet delay or
intransigence in the talks could lead the US to give up on SALT as a means
of' achieving strategic stability or allow new US systems to advance so far
that they were no longer negotiable. These leaders might point out that
Soviet advantages could be ephemeral, particularly if US political leaders
become alarmed and authorize a massive new strategic effort..
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These Soviet leaders might also argue that meaningful agreements could
permit some economies in the strategic weapons area, allowing greater
expenditures on conventional forces and providing more resources for non-
military sectors of the economy as well.
Soviet leaders urging caution in the negotiations argue that the US has
not given up its hopes of regaining strategic superiority. They point to
changes in US nuclear weapons employment doctrine, planned new US
strategic systems, and US proposals in SALT as evidence of that objective.
They argue that the USSR should be in no hurry to make agreements,
particularly because of the stronger Soviet bargaining position deriving from
current programs.
They argue that only an agreement patently one-sided in favor of the
USSR could protect Soviet security in the face of the combined US, Chinese,
British, and French strategic threats. They contend that the Soviet Union
must preserve the numerical advantages in missile launchers obtained in the
Interim Agreement and keep open its options for qualitative modernization.
In short, their arguments would tend toward the position that the only safe
agreement for the Soviet Union would be one leaving Soviet strategic
systems virtually unconstrained while limiting programs of concern under
way in the US.
The Technology Factor
Although there is strong doubt in the minds of Western
analysts about the extent to which the Soviet economy can
effectively absorb advanced foreign technology and managerial
methods, Soviet efforts to gain both have been an important
part of Moscow's move toward detente.
The proponents of detente probably assert that without access to
Western goods and markets, the USSR will have little hope of catching up
with the industrialized countries of the West and, in fact, may have difficulty
in maintaining Moscow's present position. They tend to rationalize the
setback for most-favored-nation treatment, saying that the Nixon administra-
tion is fully committed to improving trade and extending credits to Moscow.
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The administration and US businessmen will find ways of circumventing
congressional opposition, they say, and efforts to link the trade issue with
Soviet emigration policies.
The detente advocates contend that autarky has failed and that the
USSR must have access to Western technology and capital investments if the
Soviet economy is to be modernized. Greater economic interdependence
with the West, they argue, will tend to produce a more stable and advanta-
geous international order, insofar as Moscow's adversaries have as much to
gain from increased economic ties as the USSR and will therefore be
reluctant to move against clearly perceived Soviet interests
Mindful of traditional Soviet sensitivity to Western ideas and influences,
the detente faction says that greater access to Western economies need not
require a loosening of internal discipline, and certainly will not require
fundamental changes in the economic or political system. A greater influx of
Westerners in the USSR will naturally require vigilance on the part of Soviet
authorities, but if the Communist state has any vitality at all, the populace
can he made resistant to bourgeois overtures.
The opponents of detente dispute the foregoing considerations on
political and economic grounds. They say that the West is I-)ent on subverting
Soviet society and that economic bridge-building is the instrument for this
effort. They argue that more Westerners in the USSR, whether businessmen
or tourists, will inevitably result in a resurgence of bourgeois morals and
political dissidence in Soviet society. They further contend that the internal
adjustments needed to make this policy work will corstitute a kind of
"creeping capitalism."
The detractors of detente also contend that greater economic ties with
the West will entail forms of dependence that will inhibit Moscow from
pursuing traditional political objectives, will encourage Soviet allies and
clients to follow Moscow's example, and will constitute a"'sell-out" of other
progressive political forces in the world. They point to US congressional
efforts to link trade issues with Soviet domestic policies as proof of Washing-
ton's perfidy, alleging that the Nixon administration is not genuinely com-
inutted to non-discriminatory treatment of the USSR, but wants only to
extract advantages from Moscow. They single out the US as a particularly
unstable and leverage-minded partner, and argue that if closer economic links
are necessary, Japan and Western Europe are safer bets.
On economic grounds, the anti-detente forces charge that the West is
only interested in gaining access to vital Soviet natural resources. To allow
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such access would strengthen the economies of Moscow's adversaries at the
expense of future Soviet economic growth and would deplete resources that
the USSR will itself eventually need.
Internal Security and the World Communist Movement
Ideology is in fundamental competition with detente: the
concept of a revolutionary international Communist move-
ment, with the Soviet Union as its leader and chief benefactor,
must somehow be squared with the Soviet Union as partner in
peaceful coexistence.
Detente does not preclude strenuous ideological competition with the
West; pro-detente forces not only subscribe to, but emphasize the proposi-
ition. The Soviet Union has the best social system and it should become clear
in both the industrial West and the Third World that it is socialism, not
capitalism, that will meet the needs of the people. Socialism need not fear
that increased contacts with the West necessarily mean a loss of ideological
fervor. On the contrary, it may turn out that the greater familiarity with the
West will be a tonic for the socialist peoples. Brezhnev's concept of "victory
through contacts" means victory over the backsliders and the reactionary
elements in the socialist systems as well as over the ideas and the gimmickery
of the capitalist nations.
The pro-detente people do not deny that increased contacts with the
West will place an additional burden on ideological discipline within the
socialist community. But socialism is equal to the challenge, and heightened
awareness of what it means to be a communist, they may well argue, will not
only immunize the Soviet people against the siren song of the capitalists, but
will have the positive effect of reinvigorating and rededicating the socialist
parties. At home, it will be necessary to clamp down on those who oppose
the socialist system and those who are irretrievably lost to anti-Sovietism.
The disposition of the Solzhenitsyn case demonstrates that detente has not
reduced Moscow's ability to purge the Soviet society of heretics.
Taking the tactical line, the pro-detente forces also argue that detente
helps promote the idea of "united front"; it makes Communist movements
and parties respectable in parts of the world where they are thought to be
sinister creatures of the Soviet Union, or it makes them viable candidates for
power in countries of Western Europe where they have been effectively shut
out. Given the energy, resource, and inflation crisis that grips the capitalist
West, the socialist world can afford to take the offensive in an expanded
ideological competition.
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The nay-sayers emphasize that detente, even as it seems to be working--
reducing tensions with the West and establishing increasing contacts and
inter-dependence-will inevitably cause a lessening of socialist discipline, no
matter what lip service is paid to greater vigilance. The USSR will be inclined
to adopt quasi-capitalist methods and thinking in order, for example, to
make more effective use of the Western technology and know-how that is to
be introduced.
In Eastern Europe, pro-capitalist elements will be encouraged to pres-
sure their governments for increased liberalization in the economic sphere, in
the pattern of everyday life, and in the expression of diverse (and noxious)
ideas. This will make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to keep Eastern
Europe from going the route of Romania, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia
during the 1968 "Prague Spring."
It may be true, they say, that the so-called detente atmosphere will
make it easier to organize a new world Communist meeting, but at the same
time it makes it less likely that such a conference will take a firm stand
against the Chinese or will otherwise rally around the Soviet Union as the
head of a disciplined, cohesive, and aggressively competitive world commu-
nist movement. Detente with the US makes it easier for Peking to charge
that it is the Soviet Union that is revisionist. Moreover, it makes a tough line
with China more difficult to sell psychologically within the Communist
world. After all, they ask, if the Soviet Union can find a way of composing
its differences with the capitalists, why not with the apostate Communists?
The current crisis of capitalism, far from demonstrating the efficiency
of detente, is a good reason to question detente's utility to the Soviet Union.
As the "crisis" grows worse, the capitalists will become more desperate,
adventuresome, and dangerous. The Soviet Union will need greater vigilance
not less. Moreover, the problems of the capitalists offer opportunities to the
Soviet Union which ought not to be forgone in the interests of anything as
ephemeral as detente.
The proponents of detente argue with some force that better relations
with the West and the US help to isolate Communist China. They contend
that China is a real and growing threat to the Soviet Union. Not only does
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Peking have a growing military capability that makes any Soviet pre-emptive
attack less and less attractive, but the whole raison d'etre of Peking's foreign
policy is to frustrate the Soviet Union, to counter and arrest Soviet influence
in the non-Communist world, and to challenge its hegemony among the
Communist parties and nations. The threat from Peking has grown as China
has ended its self-imposed isolation of the Cultural Revolution and seeks to
promote its place in the world as the first among equals of the "third
world."
More important, the proponents also see detente as forestalling closer
relations between Washington and Peking. The US would naturally turn to
Peking if it believed that the prospects had declined for better relations with
the Soviet Union. It would do so to apply psychological and diplomatic
pressure on Moscow, and perhaps to create a security threat for the Soviet
Union in the East as a means of diverting Soviet attention from Europe and
the Middle East. For their part, the Chinese would seize the opportunity
afforded by a breakdown in the detente atmosphere to improve their
relations with the US in order to gain some leverage with the Soviet Union.
Peking might calculate that a souring of US-Soviet relations would inevitably
have the effect of increasing suspicions in Western Europe of Soviet inten-
tions and would, therefore, breathe fresh life into the nascent European
movement toward defense cooperation. This in turn might have the effect, in
Chinese eyes, of making it harder for the Soviet Union to uphold a tough
line in the East. As a consequence, the proponents of detente might argue,
the Chinese would be even less inclined to reach an acceptable accommoda-
tion with the Soviet Union.
The proponents could also make the case that maintaining the detente
atmosphere with the US would force a post-Mao leadership to be more
amenable to improving relations with the Soviet Union. As long as the
Chinese feel themselves on the short end of the triangular relationship, they
will have some constraints on their international adventurism and some
incentive to compromise their differences with Moscow. If US-Soviet rela-
tions are relatively cool and, concomitantly, if Sino-US relations are rela-
tively warm, the new leaders would see little reason to follow a conciliatory
line with the Soviet Union.
The hard liners on detente refute the idea that good relations with the
US are forestalling or limiting a Peking-Washington connection. The Chinese
invasion of the Paracel Islands and Peking's acquiescence to the prospective
US base on Diego Garcia, they say, prove that a de facto understanding
between the US and China is already a reality, detente notwithstanding.
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Furthermore, it is not necessarily immutable that Moscow would become the
isolated party if its relations with Washington went sour. On the contrary,
evidence of a general toughening of the Soviet posture might have a tonic
effect in Peking; it might do more to bring the Chinese to their senses than
evidence of Soviet pusillanimity. Moreover, Peking may believe that the
requirements of detente have a more restraining influence on Soviet behavior
with respect to China than would be possible with a closer Sino-US relation-
shin.
A Moscow that is less concerned about what the US or Europe thinks is
also freer to deal with China from a position of strength. It the ultimate aim
is to bring the post-Mao leadership around to accepting a better relationship
with Moscow, then a period of renewed intimidation may first be necessary;
only after the veiled nuclear threats of 1969 did the Chinese finally agree to
negotiations. But intimidation will not really be credible to Peking so long as
Moscow is seen to be hobbled by the requirements of maintaining a detente
relationship with the West.
Regarding the effects in the rest of East and South Asia, the hard liners
argue that if the USSR really needs Japanese investment, the profit motive is
enough to bring the Japanese around. They contend that there is an irre-
ducible foundation of mistrust and conflicting interests between the Chinese
and Japanese that would forestall any relationship that need greatly concern
the USSR.
Europe
Detente is portrayed by its proponents as the most suitable means
for achieving Moscow's goals in Europe under present conditions. The best
way to remove US influence and extend Moscow's influence in Europe is by
encouraging a multiplication of interlocking ties between the USSR and
various European states. Detente has already produced major results, as
attested by the various agreements signed over the past tew years between
Moscow and/or its Warsaw Pact allies and West Germany and France in
particular. International acknowledgment of the GDR's legitimacy has at last
been achieved.
The supporters of detente can also point to Western disarray during the
resent Middle East crisis and to the split between the US and a majority of
the European states over the Arab oil embargo as further vindication of
Soviet detente efforts. In general, the exposure of West Europeans to a
benign Soviet policy face will tend to make them less desirous or tolerant of
a US presence in Europe.
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A careful nurturing of Soviet ties in Europe, the proponents say, will
produce greater access to Western technology on terms favorable to Moscow,
and will provide the USSR with an alternative to economic reliance on
Washington. Although acknowledging that Moscow at times will be required
to make concessionary gestures in the interest of producing Western accept-
ance of common objectives, for instance at MBFR or CSCE, the Soviet
advocates of detente contend that Moscow's aims will still be more readily
realized than by adopting a tough belligerent posture. Minimal concessions at
CSCE, for example, will lead to a hasty conclusion of that conference,
securing West European acknowledgment of the far more important Soviet
objectives of permanence of post-war boundaries, a greater Soviet voice in
European affairs, and an enhancement of Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe. On MBFR, detente supporters say that Soviet willingness to reduce
its military presence in central Europe can be manipulated so as to result in a
weakening of US and NATO capabilities, not those of the Warsaw Pact.
The skeptics can argue that the achievement of Soviet policy goals in
Europe requires no concessions to the West. They contend that a manifest
disunity among the West European states and a gradual weakening of the
Atlantic alliance were evident in the period before detente. Conciliatory
moves on Moscow's part now, they say, could backfire if the European
nations demanded that the USSR pay a price for gains that were likely to
come Moscow's way in any event.
Opponents point out that the MBFR talks had provided the US with
the means to postpone indefinitely the unilateral reduction of its military
forces in Europe; such reductions had been all but inevitable prior to the
opening of MBFR. CSCE was supposed to be a quick, simple consolidation
of the Soviet position in Europe, but the conciliatory requirements of
detente have diluted CSCE's impact. De facto Western recognition of post-
war boundaries in Europe had been achieved before the talks as a direct
result of Moscow's military might. Soviet concessions at the talks now,
particularly on such issues as the freer exchange of ideas and people, could
imperil Soviet control over Eastern Europe and prove to be disruptive inside
the USSR as well.
The movement of events in the Middle East, particularly
since the October war, make this one of the most difficult
areas for the proponents of detente. They would be hard
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pressed to find solid evidence that detente has helped the
Soviets or that it has created conditions that point to a
brighter future for Soviet influence in the region. In essence,
their arguments boil down to assertions that, without a reason-
ably close relationship to the US, things would be ven worse.
The pro-detente leaders say that for the first time the US has publicly
acknowledged that the USSR has a legitimate role to play in the Middle Fast.
This acknowledgment, they contend, has considerable symbolic importance
because the countries of the region will recognize the fact that the Soviet
Union will continue to be a power to be reckoned with in the Middle East.
Detente supporters make the case that the setbacks the USSR has
suffered in the Middle East do not derive from any constraints imposed by
detente. If anything, detente enabled the Soviets to back the Egyptians and
the Syrians with less risk of directly involving themselves in hostilities with
the US than was the case during the 1967 war. Because of detente, a
potentially explosive situation was brought under control in a way that not
only preserved Soviet influence in the Middle East but, in tact, provided via
the Geneva conference a means by which Moscow could retain a major voice
in the future political arrangement of the region.
The problem for the USSR, the detente supporters assert, is that the
objective conditions in the Middle East were, through no vault of Moscow or
its policies, working in a way that was favorable to the US. The US was able
to regain some initiative in the Middle East because the Arabs, particularly
the Egyptians, were for their own reasons interested in affording the US a
larger role. This had nothing to do with detente. It is well to remember., the
pro-detente faction may well argue, that the Soviet Union is dealing with
rulers in the Middle East whose social outlook is not always fundamentally
in accord with the progressive forces of the world. Many of them share an
ideological affinity with the US that acts as a bias-although one that can be
overcome with a properly tuned policy--against Soviet interests.
Detente, the nay-sayers point out, did not help prevent a war in the
Middle East. Moreover, recent developments in the area show that detente
does not promote Soviet interests in the world; to the contrary it is being
artfully used by the US as a way of limiting or even erasing the USSR's
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hard-won gains. It was not detente, they say, that paved the way or even put
the finishing touches on the emergence of the Soviet Union as a Middle East
power. Washington's "acknowledgment" was nothing more than recognition
of the reality of Soviet power and influence that was won by years of
efforts, billions of rubles, and the reality of the Soviet Navy in the Mediter-
ranean.
The objective evidence demonstrates that whatever its lip service to the
"proper" Soviet role, Washington will do everything it can to thwart the
Soviet Union in the Middle East. It is not only that Sadat is ungrateful for
the Soviet Union's past assistance. US diplomacy is skillfully designed, say
the opponents, to drive a wedge between the Arabs and the USSR, and it
has done everything in its power to isolate the Soviet Union from the
mainstream of Middle East events. US support for Israel has increased, not
diminished. In truth, the Soviet Union has been relegated to the sidelines.
Nor will going to Geneva necessarily change the situation. The Soviet Union
may well find itself as isolated there as it does when Kissinger shuttles
between the Arab capitals, or when the Israelis and Syrians are talking in
Washington.
Opponents charge that detente has had the effect of beguiling the
USSR into believing that the US would not seek unilateral advantage in an
area of vital interest to both countries. The US, far from being constrained
by detente, feels it has greater latitude to operate in the area. This, the
opponents say, is the real meaning of the Defcon III alert.
The same misperceptions that make the US less solicitous of the Soviet
Union's amour pro pre in the Middle East also have the effect of making the
nations of the region less mindful of Soviet advice, less willing to shape their
policies in accordance with Soviet desires, and even contemptuous of the
Soviet will. Moscow's adherence to detente leads to a sense of Soviet
ineffectuality and weakness that provides the basis for Sadat's swing toward
the US, for Asad's refusal to take Soviet advice, and even-the detente
opponents may add-for the failure to make more inroads among the Persian
Gulf states. Opponents contend that the meaning of detente must be shaped
in such a way as to enable the Soviet Union to pursue without impediment
its own interest in the Middle East. This might mean that the Soviet Union
would work against any peace settlement to which it did not make a major
contribution, or which does not afford the Soviet Union the opportunity to
strengthen its position in the region. The answer lies not in hoping that
detente will cause the US gratuitously to grant the Soviet Union a place in
the Middle East sun, but in a return to the basics of Soviet foreign policy,
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i.e., vigorous support of progressive forces and a vigorous opposition to their
enemies, all with a mind to shaping the objective realities v, ithin the region
n :1 way favorable to Soviet interests.
The Third World is not a front burner issue in the
Kremlin, but it is of considerable interest, both because of the
ideological questions that are raised with regard to the proper
role of the Soviet state in carrying the Communist n-iessage to
the developing states and because the Third World is fre-
quently an area of rivalry among the Soviets, the Chinese, and
the US.
The proponents of detente assert that the new image of equality and
probity afforded by detente helps the Soviet Union in Third World countries
that are still wary of dealing with the USSR. Detente helps reduce the
possibility that rivalries between the USSR and the US in the Third World
will- in any specific case, result in an unacceptable and d. rigorous level of
tension between the two super powers. 'Ihe USSR can compete in the Third
World with less fear of drifting into high-risk situations. The atmosphere of
detente allows and encourages Washington to contract its global presence
and commitments, which in turn affords the USSR opportunities for ex-
panding its influence. Detente does not forestall the Soviet Union from
making inroads into new areas or from selectively expanding its influence in
countries of strategic location or natural resource value. At the same time,
detente makes it easy for the USSR to avoid frittering away its resources in
the third World in a senseless competition with the US.
The anti-detente forces say the gains cited by the proponents have little
to co with detente. The waning of Washington's interest and activities in the
'Third World stems from the Vietnam war and domestic problems of the US
and from the USSR's military progress. Although detente may make it
marginally less risky for the USSR to compete in the Thi.-d World, it also
makes it more difficult for the Soviets to spread their influence there in a
meaningful way. Insofar as the USSR becomes identified with the US as
having some special responsibility in the world, then it lases its claim to
having an historical, revolutionary mission identifiable with the revolu-
tionary aspirations of the Third World.
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Anti-detente groups suggest that the Soviet Union's identification with
the US makes it easier for China to interpose itself as a leader of the
revolutionary Third World. In some areas of the world, like sub-Saharan
Africa, the Chinese are actively and effectively challenging the USSR. The
Chinese-Algerian communique following Boumediene's visit to Peking was a
tacit acknowledgment that the USSR is now considered a part of the
technological and industrial world and can no longer claim to speak on
behalf of or as part of the developing nations.
Epilogue
While Soviet detente policy can usefully be examined in this fashion, it
is doubtful that such a comprehensive review is actually under way. In
political terms, an across-the-board challenge to a formally adopted policy is
extremely dangerous; it throws a gauntlet on the Politburo table which must
be picked up. So long as results are mixed and all the returns are far from in,
debate is likely to be carefully confined to specific cases, which will be
treated in narrow tactical terms. There are more reasons for the proponents
of detente to be on the defensive today than there were last summer, but the
evidence points much more toward particular re-examinations and partial
adjustments than toward a broad challenge to the general line.
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Secret
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