THE AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ISSUES AND OUTLOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100020005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 13, 1974
• Content Type: MIN

CONFIDENTIAL
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February 13, 1974
No. 1028/74
The American Foreign Ministers Meeting
PRECIS
For the first time in the Long history of inter-
American conferences a majority of the Latin American
and Caribbean countries will be joined against the
US on a number of important issues. A brooding mood
of ec.:,nomic nationalism has spread as a unifying
force that has brought the region into greater har-
mony than ever before. The Latin Americans have
been drawn together by the urge to dispute US influ-
ence in search of new, more equitable relationships.
Yet they _ disagree over details and priorities, and
on the manner in which the issues should be presented.
Moreover, they want more aid, trade, technology, and
privileges from the US and realize that these will
necessitate more elaborate ties. They disagree among
themselves about how to achieve, in effect, both
greater independence and growing ties.
The have been rapidly moving toward this ambiv-
alent but assertive posture since the late 1960's.
The cumulative Leftward pull by Castro, Allende, and
populist Leaders, as well as the perception of re-
cent US policy as one of benevolent neglect, have
fueled the rising nationalism. The new Latin Ameri-
can consciousness is reflected in most of the eight
points they entered on the agenda for the TZateZolco
conference. Their expectations for the meeting are
ambivalent. Most await positive--even dramatic--
announcements and confirmation by the US that Latin
America is a preferred partner in its foreign policy,
but they worry that the conference will be high on
rhetoric and Low an results.
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At the conference, the Latin American and Carib-
bean delegations will push hardest for concessions
that will enhance their sovereignty as they view it.
A number of countries will be wary of multilateral
diplomacy, and centrifugal tendencies could exert a
stronger force than those drawing the Latins together,
particularly if these are exploited by the US. There
remains, however,, an underlying measure of defiance
in the Latin mood that could surface at the confer-
ence, if it appears that the US is not seriously
considering the problems being raised.
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Most of the items on the agenda for the confer-
ence spring from the rising mood of economic nation-
alism in Latin America. Leaders are convinced that
national sovereignty is measured in terms of their
ability to control their economies while accelerating:
rates of economic growth. There is little disagree-
ment among them on this principle; the main variable
is the intensity of the nationalism that prevails
in each state. From the Brazilians on one extreme
,to the Peruvians on the other, the desire for rigor-
ous definitions of the economic rights and duties of
states amounts to a new Latin American creed of man-
ifest destiny in reverse. Only
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Paraguay, Nicaragua, Guate-
mala, Haiti--have not experienced this surge of na-
tionalism, but even they are likely to vote with
their Latin American colleagues for other reasons..
Latin American leaders have responded eagerly
and sincerely to Secretary Kissinger's initiative
for a new dialogue and are vying with each other for
his attention. Most are in awe of the vigor and
flexibility of US diplomacy, and consider the con-
ference a significant opportunity to impress their
views on the US and to improve bilateral relations.
A few even expect that dramatic innovations in US
policy will be unveiled in Mexico, and will be dis-
appointed if there are no surprises. Many have con-
flicting expectations, however. They suspect that
Latin America will enjoy only a brief appearance in
the spotlight of US diplomacy, that the Nixon admin-
istration is not interested in the area, and that
the conclave is likely to produce only haughty reso-
lutions and promises to cooperate like those that
have characterized such meetings in the past.
Latin American and Caribbean governments rarely
have been more ambivalent about their relations with
the US than now. While they still want the benefits
and privileges inherent in the rhetoric and original
principles of the inter-American system, most also
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believe that US policy toward the region is paterna-
listic. Some leaders are viscerally opposed to the
many facets of US influence in their countries, but
are sobered by the realization that even more elabor-
ate ties will be required with the US and other de-
veloped countries if their economies are to be mod-
ernized. For a majority of the leaders, nationalism
has grown from passive pride and opposition to US
intervention to an assertive claim for a much broader
international role. In this context, the relative
importance of the US in their affairs is shrinking.
Latin ambivalence toward the US is furthered by
the increasing complexity of their relations with one
another. Nationalism has acted to draw them closer
in search for a balance with the US, but it has also
been a centrifugal force tending to splinter Latin
America. The increase in the number and importance
of sub-regional groups that hold their own interests
above those of the region is one manifestation of
these conflicting pressures. The Andean group of
nations, Central. America, and various Commonwealth
Caribbean islands have developed fledgling common
markets. The English-speaking Caribbean countries
already are accustomed to orchestrating foreign
policy and pressing a nationalistic line about as
fervent as any in Latin America. The rising mood
of nationalism has also heightened the worries of
energy importing countries that they will be forced
to pay their oil-producing neighbors exorbitant
prices, and has aggravated old rivalries and terri-
torial disputes.
Despite these and other centrifugal forces in
the hemisphere, the Latin Americans have worked to-
gether more harmoniously during the last few years
than ever before. Though they have undoubtedly been
influenced--and bolstered--by the success of joint
Arab diplomacy in recent months, the Latin Americans
actually began to collaborate on issues relating to
their economic and development needs in 1969. At the
Vina del Mar Conference, ministers from all of the
Latin American countries endorsed a highly national-
istic resolution that impatiently called on the US
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to engage in a serious dialogue in order to reach
"more equitable standards" in inter-American rela-
tions. As a result of the meeting, the Special Com-
mittee for Consultation and Negotiation (SCCN) was
created under OAS auspices as a new forum through
which the Latins present their coordinated views to
the US.
An exclusively Latin American entity--the Special
Latin American Coordinating Committee (CECLA)--has
been more active however. The emergence of CECLA,
.the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), and
other regional caucuses created outside of the OAS
during the last few years, highlights the increasing
ability of the Latin Americans to forge collective
positions without US participation. Even in forums
with the US present and dissenting, the Latins have
been able to assume united positions on certain
issues. Though the OAS commission on reorganization
could agree last year on only the most superficial
proposals for restructuring the organization, the 22
Latin American and Caribbean delegates were almost
unanimously aligned against the US on economic issues
relative to their control of their economies.
"Ideological pluralism" has become a favorite
phrase used by the Latin Americans to declare this
new consciousness. It refers to a pragmatic attitude
that reflects the desire of a majority of governments
to become independent of the US and more a part of the
new world of the 1970's. They reject ideological
polarization in the world and in the hemisphere, and
thus object to the US policy of ostracizing the Castro
government and aspects of the regional collective
security system. Similarly, most also are increas-
ingly tolerant of their ideological opposites in the
area. This has permitted military and civilian
governments, authoritarian and reformist regimes, and
traditionally rival countries to work together es-
pecially on economic issues. Today in fact, the
major differences of opinion among the Latin Americans
are fundamentally non-ideological for the first time
in over a decade.
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This unprecedented degree of unity was reflected
at the caucus of Latin American foreign ministers in
Bogota last November when it took only three days to
agree on an eight-point agenda for the meeting with
Secretary Kissinger. The Brazilian delegate played
a dominant role as the spokesman of a bloc of con-
servative countries that included Chile, Bolivia,
Uruguay, Paraguay, and most of Central America. The
group diluted draft language critical of the US, and
defeated the Mexican and Jamaican initiative to in-
clude an agenda item on Cuba, but on economic issues
especially, it also worked in harmony with other
delegations. These and other countries will work
closely with the US in Mexico City, but primarily as
mediators between the US and the radical states.
Peru acted as the lightning rod of the smaller
group of countries more antagonistic,to the US at
Bogota, but in Mexico the Peruvian delegation is
likely to be reasonable and cooperative unless Lima
concludes that there has been no significant change
in US policy. Mexican Foreign Minister Rabasa was
perhaps the ablest negotiator at Bogota. He succeeded
in molding the Tlatelolco agenda to include virtually
all of the points in Mexico's proposed Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States. The charter,
an attempt to codify the mutual responsibilities of
the more and less developed countries in the fields
of international trade and aid, has unanimous backing
in Latin America. The first five agenda points below,
which are merely five facets of the Latins' growing
economic nationalism, reflect the objectives of the
Mexican charter.
Development Cooperation--This is a code phrase
for an over-lapping hierarchy of Latin concerns about
the conditions of access to US financial resources
and markets and to the capital of international lend-
ing institutions. The agenda separates the issue
into four constituent elements: 1) discriminatory
or unilateral conditions on US assistance should be
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proscribed; 2) a system of collective economic security
should be established; 3) Latin American products
should have free access to the US market; 4) the SCCN
should be strengthened and used more by the US. In
the first two of these points the Latin Americans
seem to be advocating a code of conduct which would
make foreign assistance and trade concessions by the
US mandatory instead of discretionary. Argentina's
ambivalence on this item probably is representative
of a majority of Latin American countries. While
the Peron government wants to attract outside capital,
.it is also imposing conditions unacceptable to cap-
ital exporters.
Ecuador energetically has pressed the second
point as a corollary to the Rio Treaty, but has been
joined only by a few other countries. Peru, because
of its experience with the effects of US constraints
and conditions on assistance--and Mexico--are the
leading advocates of a code of conduct. While the
Echeverria government apparently is now willing to
settle for a declaration of the principles contained
in its charter, Peru, the Commonwealth Caribbean,
and a few other countries will push for a binding
commitment.
Economic Coercion--This item is tersely stated
in the agenda as follows: "an effective mechanism
should be established to protect against the purpose,
adoption, and implementation of such measures." The
Latins are referring specifically to the variety of
sanctions--arising both from legislation and executive
action--that have been applied in expropriation and
fisheries disputes. In addition, the use by the US
of its veto over the granting of soft loans by the
Inter-American Development Bank is widely viewed by
the Latins as another form of interventionism. The
strict application of economic sanctions against the
Allende and Castro governments has charged the issue
with considerable emotion for many, moreover. Peru
will be the most uncompromising proponent of this
item, but virtually every other country at least will
seek assurances from the US that economic sanctions
will never be used against them.
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International Trade and Monetary System--The
central argument here is that the economic power of
the US and other developed nations has created a
preferred position for the more developed countries
because of unfavorable terms of trade. Although the
world energy shortage has alleviated the problem for
petroleum producers, it has also caused exporters of
other raw materials to escalate their demands for
higher prices and better terms of trade. The Latins
are frustrated and disillusioned with the sincerity
of past US pledges to coordinate our trade policies
with them, and with US failure to implement a system
-of generalized tariff preferences for developing
countries. They are in nearly full agreement that
the US should explore with them ways to flatten out
fluctuations in the cost and quantity of goods traded
in order to guarantee prices and availability over
time. Argentina and other countries that have un-
favorable trade balances with the US are particularly
anxious to gain better access to the US market and'
are likely to work actively for concessions on this
item.
. Transnational Enterprises--The multi-national
corporations are seen by the Latins as a source of
profound concern, and an increasingly onerous mani-
festation of "yankee imperialism." Their sensitivi-
ties are conceptualized in the Calvo Doctrine which
main tains that the foreign investor does not have
the right to the protection of his own government,
and by implication, that the latter has no right to
defend an investor's interests. These concerns are
heightened by the capacity of international enter-
prises to exert powerful pressures of their own on
host governments. While all of the countries of the
region want to make their sovereignty more effective
against foreign investors, some, particularly Brazil,
now have acquired the technical and administrative
skills necessary to deal with them more effectively.
This, and the Latins' realization that they need
foreign capital and technology for development, will
tend to soften the issue. A few incipient capital-
exporting countries like Brazil, Venezuela, and
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Mexico are beginning to encounter both sides of the
problem, moreover. With the countries that often
vote with Brazil, they probably will work with the
US while remaining committed to the minimum demand
that a declaration of principles governing the be-
havior of multi-national companies be approved.
Transfer of Technology--The Latins' demand for
the "greatest possible" chnical cooperation from
the US dates from the Vina del Mar Conference. They
want: 1) help in strengthening their scientific and
technological infrastructure; 2) the transfer of re-
search projects on problems unique to them that are
now being done in the US; 3) greater access to US
patents; and 4) a reduction of restrictive US gov-
ernment measures that impede technological transfer.
Of the five economic items on the agenda, they proba-
bly are least united and concerned about this one,
because no direct threats to their sovereignty are.
involved and because it does not apply evenly to all
of them.- The issue is more important to the larger,
more developed countries--Brazil, Argentina, Mexico,
Venezuela--than it is to countries with little infra-
structure, and the latter--a large majority--are not
likely to pursue it. In addition, Brazil, and some
of the other countries that strongly advocate it are
sensitive to the fact that most modern industrial
technology is privately owned and therefore beyond
the scope of the Tlatelolco deliberations.
The Inter-American System--Although most of the
Latin American and Caribbean states claim that there
are serious deficiencies and inequities built into
the inter-American system, they are deeply divided
about what remedies are needed. Peru and a few other
countries prefer a mechanism that does not include
the US; with Mexico, Panama, and Ecuador, this group
would scrap the Rio Treaty and its ancillary hemis-
phere defense agencies as "Cold War anachronisms."
On the other hand, Brazil and the bloc of conserva-
tive countries that it often represents prefer simply
to revitalize the inter-American system with super-
ficial changes.
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Almost all agree, however, that the economic
grievances described in the above agenda items should
somehow be dealt with in the OAS framework, although
they cannot agree on how this should be done. This
diversity of views is complicated by the fact that
some of the countries participating at Tlatelolco are
not full participants in the inter-American system:
Guyana is only an observer in the OAS, the Bahamas
have not yet acceded, and the Commonwealth Caribbean
countries are not signatories of the Rio Treaty.
The issue of Cuba's exclusion will loom impos-
ingly over the proceedings on this issue, moreover.
Last year Venezuela came within a few votes of win-
ning majority support for a resolution that would
have made the sanctions against Cuba optional rather
than mandatory, and a number of countries already
have violated them. Even the countries that are
the staunchest supporters of the sanctions--especially
Brazil and Chile--are concerned that the US will
abandon the present policy without consulting them--
a suspicion that has mounted following Brezhnev's
recent visit to Cuba. Meanwhile, Castro's continuing
campaign of scurrilous attacks on the OAS has con-
tributed to the declining prestige of the organiza-
tion. The rising tendency of the Latins to work
through other forums outside of the OAS--and the
fact that the Tlatelolco conference itself is one of
them--highlight the problem.
The Panama Canal Question--This bilateral issue,
sponsored by Rabasa and Panamanian Foreign Minister
Tack at Bogota, was included in the agenda partly
as an effort to dramatize the Latins' opposition to
US "imperialism." Because of the progress subse-
quently achieved in the Canal negotiations, however,
the issue is likely to be muted at Tlatelolco. The
US will be able to point to the concessions it has
made, the Secretary's trip to Panama, and the new
opening in the Canal talks as proof of its desire to
resolve the full range of nagging inter-American
problems. The Torrijos government has reacted posi-
tively to the results of the recent negotiating
sessions with Ambassador Bunker, and Tack undoubtedly
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will endeavor to keep the issue out of contention at
the meeting. Panama can be expected to adhere to its
highly nationalistic line on the remaining issues,
however.
General Panorama of Relations--This item merely
calls for "consideration of political problems of
hemisphere interest in the light of present world
and regional situations." It is the result of com-
promises at Bogota that reflect the inability of the
Latins. to agree on more than the principles of
.selected issues. In effect, it leaves the agenda
open to those who may wish to introduce new items at
Tlatelolco. Had the US not added an agenda item on
international energy matters, for instance, the sub-
ject undoubtedly would have arisen here. The Latins--
both energy importers and exporters--want more from
the US and from the oil companies, and will be anxious
to be informed of the outcome of the energy confer-.
ence in Washington on February 11. Brazil--the
largest net energy importer in the area--wants to
maintain maximum independence to deal with Arab
producers, but may be annoyed at not being included
in the Washington meeting.
Supply restrictions and increased petroleum
prices have had varying effects in Latin America.
Reductions have been felt most keenly by countries
in Central America and the Caribbean that previously
had imported up to a third of their oil from Arab
sources through US companies. There have been severe
effects on the economies of importing countries,
while exporters have substantially increased their
earnings. Venezuela is in the forefront on the issue
because it provides about 1.0% of total US petroleum
consumption and is the founder and leading influence
in OLADE. Although conflicts among Latin American
countries over energy matters were papered over in
the deliberations last year that led to the formation
of OLADE, its prospects as a collective Latin bar-
gaining tool are limited by the conflicting interests
of exporters and importers in the area. The energy
issue is intricately involved with other agenda items
discussed above, and is likely to be a persistent
theme in Mexico.
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The Law of the Sea is also an issue of major
interest in the hemisphere which is not formally
included in the agenda but likely to be raised.
Latin American states have joined in unusual al-
liances on the issue, with Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador
taking the more extreme stand, and Mexico, Colombia,
and Venezuela advocating a more moderate position.
There is considerable agreement among the US and the
moderates, and with Mexican support, the Tlatelolco
conference could prove an effective means of advancing
US positions in the broader context of give and take.
At Tlatelolco the Latin American and Caribbean
delegations will push hardest for concessions that
will enhance their own views of their sovereignty.
A majority wants the US to eschew the use of "coer-
cive" economic sanctions--including those in force-
against Cuba--and to endorse "codes of conduct" that
would regulate the activities of multi-national com-
panies and the terms of US development assistance.
They want preferential trade arrangements, guaran-
tees against unstable markets, monetary fluctuations,
and energy shortages, as well as greater access to
US technology and markets. They favor modifying
the inter-American system with the objective of re-
ducing US influence in the hemisphere.
Although they have demonstrated unprecedented
unity in principle on these and similar issues, the
Latin American governments will be struggling
against a formidable array of problems that will re-
duce their leverage. They disagree profoundly among
themselves over the details, dimensions, and priori-
ties of the issues, and over the tone and manner in
which they should be presented to the Secretary.
There is no evidence that they have worked out joint
positions on the specifics of what they want from
the US or what they would be willing to concede in
return. Some, especially the Peruvians, believe
that they already have conceded too much to US in-
terests, but they will be outnumbered by the coun-
tries that will work to formulate reciprocal guaran-
tees for foreign investors.
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Jealousies, old rivalries, and conflicting
national interests will also work against harmony.
Thus, although the Mexican Charter of Rights and
Duties of States is the most detailed articulation
of the general Latin views on sovereignty-related
issues, Brazil and other countries may work against
portions of it because of their opposition to Mexico's
leadership in the region. Other
countries may also take uncharacteristic or unexpected
positions because of pride or jealousy. Guatemala--
embarrassed by charges that it was pliant to US
.objectives at the preparatory conference--or Bolivia
might split with Brazil on some issues to demonstrate
their independence.
A number of countries are wary of multi-lateral
diplomacy. Brazil and Chile, for instance, would
prefer to work bilaterally with the USF_
Many others may also be more
interested in bi-lateral talks with the Secretary
than in the regular conference proceedings, and even
the Peruvian foreign minister will probably seek to
advance his country's objectives in private sessions.
A few other governments may be unwilling or unable
to make commitments on important issues because of
domestic concerns. The Peron administration has not
reached full internal agreement on how to deal with
the US, and governments that are lame duck--Vene-
zuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala--may abstain
on important issues.
Together, centrifugal tendencies may exert a
stronger force at the conference than the factors
that have drawn the Latins together. The US will
be in a position to influence the delicate balances
inherent in the Latin's ambivalence toward the US
and in the countervailing forces that affect their
attitudes toward each other. If the US exploits
these centrifugal forces--or stands back and allows
them to flourish--few specific Latin grievances are
likely to win majority support.
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There would be risks, however. An underlying
and strong measure of defiance resides in the current
Latin mood. It could surface at Tlatelolco if dele-
gates from reform-minded countries suspect that the
US is not seriously considering the problems they
have raised. Some are not above grandstanding or
mean rhetoric, and if disillusioned enough, Peru and
other countries might resort to efforts to embarrass
the US.
Virtually all of the Latin delegations expect
the US to assume an energetic stance at center stage.
From the outset they will be looking for signs of
US flexibility while awaiting the dramatic announce-
ments that some believe are inevitable. Most probably
would welcome US proposals for revitalizing the
inter-American system as long as they are given a
larger role. They would be enthusiastic if the US
moves decisively to reaffirm a belief in the pre-
ferred status of Latin America in its foreign policy,
and would consider a tour of the region by the
Secretary as confirmation of renewed US interest.
US concessions to Panama already have created a posi-
tive balance to charges of US interventionism, and
further announcements of progress in the Canal talks
probably would create some pro-US momentum in Mexico.
Cuba will be on nearly all of their minds,
moreover. Many already suspect that the US will
announce a major shift in its Cuba policy at the
conference, and rumors to this effect are multiplying.
A majority opposes the continuation of mandatory
sanctions against Castro and would endorse any uni-
lateral moves by the US that.would give them freedom
of action to deal with Havana. Some, particularly
Brazil and Chile, are opposed to loosening the OAS
policy, and would be appalled if they were not in-
formed in advance of a change in US policy.
Most Latin American and Caribbean leaders are
convinced, however, that Castro has ceased to use
violent methods in his foreign policy and are not
concerned about his ties to the USSR. Many believe,
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moreover, that a flexible US policy toward Cuba
would be like a skeleton key capable of opening a
new era of inter-American harmony. They prefer that
"ideological pluralism" become an inter-American
reality rather than a partisan slogan, and that US
foreign policy look southward.
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