1974: ELECTION YEAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100010008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 31, 1974
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
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Intelligence Report
1974: Election Year in Central America
Secret
41
January 31, 1974
No. 0915/74
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1974: Election Year in Central America
January 31, 1974
All of the countries of Central America except Honduras will hold national
elections this year.* Voters throughout the area have a number of common con-
cerns, both economic and political. Paramount are the economic problems such as
inflation, the high cost of living, and the energy crisis, which stem in large part from
forces beyond their national boundaries. Voters are also expressing greater concern
than in the past for their political freedom and the future of democratic processes in
their respective countries. All incumbent governments are at least to some degree
seeking highly visible and short-term solutions in an effort to buttress their parties'
chances at the polls. All of the presidential contenders with any chance of winning
could deal effectively with the US.
Past elections offer some indication of the strengths of the various parties and
the possible election results, but a general lessening of political apathy and, in Costa
Rica, the influence of younger voters make this year's contests less predictable.
In none of the countries is there reason to expect a major upheaval or
significant violence. Extensive fraud, heavy-handed tactics on the part of an incum-
bent government, or an economic crisis of serious proportions, could, however,
change that relatively peaceful outlook. Furthermore, even though there are no
indications that US nationals or US official and private interests are in danger, this
too could change if economic problems seem to demand a convenient scapegoat.
*Costa Rica (February 3), Guatemala (March 3), El Salvador (March 10-legislative
and municipal only), and Nicaragua (September 1). Honduras was scheduled to hold
municipal elections in April, but these will probably not take place, since political
party activity remains suspended by order of the military government.
Comments and queries on the contents of this report are welcome
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The Economic Pinch
The economic problems that Central American politicians have had to
address during the campaigns are largely a reflection of international prob-
lems-the devaluation of the dollar (to which Central American currencies
are pegged) and increased prices of basic commodities caused by world-wide
shortages and international tensions. In an area where many are already
living at a subsistence level, an increase in the price of rice, beans, or fuel can
mean the difference between survival and disaster. Most Central American
countries receive their fuel supplies from US oil companies, which have
reduced each country's allocation in proportion to the over-all cutback. Even
these modest reductions, however, have placed a hardship on the Central
American economies.
The I electorates find it easy to acc
t th
ep
e I
explanations o ere by opposition politicians who place the blame on the
incumbent governments. Those in office, for their part, consider it essential
to hold the line on prices and supplies until election day. When they have
been unable to do this, they have resorted to legislating relief, thus buying
their parties some respite-and perhaps a few votes.
In Guatemala, for instance, after a year of the most severe inflation in
recent history, the government decreed minimum wage increases for 22
categories of employees. These increases range from 17 percent to 25
percent and affect 800,000 workers.
In El Salvador, where the governing party has retained majority support
for over a decade largely because of its efforts in behalf of the impoverished
masses, President Molina has continued his concept of the "mobile govern-
ment," visiting every nook and cranny of his overcrowded country to get a
first-hand view of the people's needs. He, too, has recently raised minimum
wage rates. Without the resources-and to some extent the political
strength-to effect a thoroughgoing agrarian reform program, Molina has had
to settle for rural development and assistance. The most recent step on
behalf of the rural workers has been a law requiring employers to furnish one
meal a day of specified minimum standard or pay the employee an addi-
tional 30 cents.
The average worker in Nicaragua has seen his income seriously eroded
by an increase in the cost of living of some 30 percent in less than a year. A
series of strikes won wage increases-the first in over a decade-for some
groups, and in September the government decreed an increase in minimum
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wages of about 20 percent as a relief measure for those still working at the
old levels.
The Costa Rican economy has suffered from a number of strikes in
recent months, and constant complaints of decreased buying power have
reached the politicians. While the governing party's presidential candidate,
Daniel Oduber, has attempted to explain his program for combating infla-
tion, he has generally talked over the heads of most people. President
Figueres, fearing that his party may lose strength, has been trying in vain to
push his family assistance bill through congress. Costa Rica has also been
faced with a more sev ile fuel shortage than have other Central American
countries. After some
threats against the oil companies by his minister of economy, in s tries,
commerce, the government and the companies have turned to negotiation
and have managed to minimize the hardship to the general public-at least
for the time being.
Political Ideals and Realities
More than ever before the Central American voters are expressing their
concern over the degree to which they have developed their democratic
institutions. In countries such as Guatemala and Nicaragua, where demo-
cratic processes are more form than substance, portions of the electorate are
taking a new interest in changing the system. In El Salvador, where for- a
decade or more the people's choice has been honored to a relatively high
degree, and voters are jealously guarding the ground they have won. The
Costa Rican voters, who for half a century have taken pride in their
democracy, are concerned with further improving what they have carefully
built.
Guatemalans have every reason to feel politically frustrated. They have
endured one of the most violent political histories of any country in the
area, and until the mid-l 960s they had rarely experienced a fair election. To
the extent that two opposition candidates for president (1966 and 1970)
have won pluralities and had their victories confirmed by congress, Guate-
mala has made some headway in democratization. In the present campaign,
however, President Arana has gone to great lengths to gain a victory for his
hand-picked candidate, General Laugerud.
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Under these conditions, the Guatemalan voters would have
little hope of democratizing their system in the foreseeable future.
Nicaraguans, too, are showing signs of frustration, but for different
reasons. Their history-especially during the 45 years the Somoza family has
governed-has been among the most peaceful and orderly in the area, and
economic development has proceeded steadily. Many Nicaraguans, however,
feel that their political development has not kept pace with that of some
neighboring countries. The electoral machinery, particularly the voter regis-
tration system, is outmoded, and the secret ballot, although constitutionally
required, has been disregarded. Electoral officials have even been known to
issue cards certifying that the person voted "correctly"-to be used later
when requesting governmental favors.
Before the devastating earthquake of December 1972, opposition
leaders had won promises that the electoral machinery and voter registration
would be thoroughly overhauled. Since the quake these feelings have intensi-
fied, as inefficiency and corruption during reconstruction have pointed up
the pitfalls of government by one man. Former President Anastasio Somoza,
the power behind the present government, is still personally popular with
many-perhaps with a majority-and his Liberal Party is by far the strongest
political group. He could very likely win an honest election in September
1974, but not by the large margins of the past. Voters, even those who have
remained out of politics in the past, are taking a more active interest in the
1974 election, viewing it as a chance for someone else to reach for the top
job-or at least to see Somoza's popularity confirmed honestly. It is not
possible, however, to effect significant electoral reforms in the short time
remaining; thus the election in September will represent little if any advance
over previous ones.
El Salvador, formerly governed by and for a wealthy oligarchy, has seen
its mildly reformist military assume increasing control since about 1950.
Since 1961 significant steps have been taken-especially the election of
legislative deputies by proportional representation-to give opposition parties
a chance to participate in the government. For the most part, they have
acted as a constructive opposition.
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Opposition parties are threatening to boycott the legislative and munic-
ipal elections this year unless fairness is guaranteed. President Molina appears
willing to trust his party's future to the voters and has said it will win a
majority of seats because of its record in office. He has worked industriously
over the past year to make that record a good one. Although he has had to
walk a tightrope between competing political forces, he has accomplished
much for the average Salvadoran. The governing party will probably win a
majority, but not an overwhelming one.
Costa Ricans have always expected fair elections and forcefully served
notice in 1948-when they fought a revolution to uphold the electorate's
decision-that they would have them. The fact that opposition candidates
have won every presidential contest since then is proof that Costa Rican
elections are relatively honest, open, free-swinging affairs. This year Costa
Ricans are hoping to improve what they already have by adding a reputation
for clean, efficient government to their record as a well-established democ-
racy. The Figueres government is quite vulnerable to charges of inefficiency
and cronyism, and the governing party's candidate, Daniel Oduber, cannot
completely dissociate himself from that record because he needs Figueres'
support. He is, therefore, running on the party's long-term record. With eight
candidates in the presidential race, Oduber may not get the required 40-
percent plurality-and could lose in a runoff election, if enough of the
fragmented conservative opposition coalesces behind the expected runner-
up, Fernando Trejos, of the National Unification party.
Two New Ingredients
Two factors may bring more Central Americans to the polls this year
than in the past: an increase in political awareness and the growing influence
of youth. The first is especially true in Nicaragua. In Costa Rica, where a
high degree of electoral participation is the norm, the voting age has been
lowered to 18, bringing to the voter rolls some 70,000 young people who
could significantly affect the outcome of the election.
In Nicaragua the economic dislocations that followed the earthquake
and the government's failure to cope with them effectively have led many to
seek ways of influencing the course of government. Some shortcomings, such
as the slowness of decision-making on certain phases of reconstruction, have
been apparent only to those already politically aware. The government's
indecisiveness was a serious problem to businessmen who had to await some
word on the over-all rebuilding plan to know where to relocate their
demolished businesses. Of more general concern was the failure of the
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National Guard to protect property; indeed, many guardsmen were directly
involved in the looting that followed the disaster. Another general concern
has been corruption, a high degree of which has long been tolerated. But
when land speculation, black market operations, and irregularities in award-
ing construction contracts increased significantly after the quake, critics of
the government considered these practices inexcusable because so many
people were in such great need.
The general public clamor for more efficient, more honest government
has been unusually loud. Urban workers, whose income had been seriously
reduced by high prices, were especially resentful of profiteering. There have
been a number of strikes by formerly docile unions, businessmen have
demanded a voice in planning, and the previously quiescent Catholic Church
has become almost militant in behalf of the poor.
All this has given opposition politicians hope for additional votes in the
September elections. Factions of the Conservative Party have taken the first
steps toward capitalizing on this potential support by agreeing on one
generally respected candidate, Eduardo Chamorro. Chamorro probably could
not win the presidency against Somoza, even if the electoral machinery were
overhauled in time and the election conducted in a completely fair manner.
A respectable showing by the opposition, however, could do much to
strengthen its future chances and preserve the two-party system.
In Costa Rica the generational factor adds an unknown quantity to the
.electoral equation. Many of the approximately 70,000 new voters will
probably vote as their parents do, since young Costa Ricans are not as
strongly leftist as many of their Latin American counterparts. The number
involved is great enough, however, to cause most candidates to take the
views of youth into consideration. A third party candidate has special appeal
with young people and could win enough of the new voters to force a
run-off.
None of these elections is expected to produce any lasting political or
economic changes. The Costa Rican contest, however, will reflect the passing
from the political scene of many old guard party leaders and the emergence
of a new, younger group, more removed from the antagonisms of the 1948
revolution' than their predecessors. In foreign policy, potential winners show
no inclination to depart from the attitudes of incumbent governments
toward other countries or regional organizations.
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Barring an economic crisis of serious proportions or the use of espe-
cially heavy-handed tactics on the part of an incumbent government, the
outlook for peaceful elections in all four countries is good with the possible
exception of Guatemala. The candidates of the incumbent parties have an
edge in the four contests, but there are no candidates with even a slim
chance of victory with whom the US could not deal effectively.
US interests could be adversely affected, however, if disorders erupt.
Should disturbances be precipitated by government repression, especially in
Guatemala and Nicaragua, critics of US assistance to internal security forces
might become more vocal. If there is an outburst with economic overtones,
US businesses and personnel could become scapegoats, especially in coun-
tries with substantial US investments, such as Costa Rica and Guatemala.
Date of Election: February 3, 1974
Office to be filled: President, 2 Vice Presidents, all 57 legislative deputies,
and municipal and local officials in all 80 cantons.
Parties registered, ideological position, and estimated electoral strength and
presidential candidates:
*National Liberation Party, slightly left-of-center, 35-45 percent,
Daniel Oduber.
National Unification, conservative, 18-20 percent,
Fernando Trejos Escalante.
Democratic Renovation Party, left-of-center, 10-20 percent,
Rodrigo Carazo.
Christian Democratic Party, left-of-center, 5-8 percent,
Jorge Monge.
Independent National Party, far right, 10-14 percent,
Jorge Gonzalez Marten.
Socialist Action Party, Communist Front, 3-5 percent,
Manuel Mora Valverde.
Socialist Party, Marxist, less than 1 percent,
Francisco Aguilar Bulgarelli.
Democratic Party, centrist, less than 1 percent,
Gerardo Villalobos.
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Election Procedures:
Frequency: Every 4 years
Suffrage: Mandatory for all persons 18 years of age and over. Penalties
for not voting exist but are not strictly enforced.
Method of determining winner: President and Vice Presidents must
receive majority of at least 40 percent; otherwise a run-off election
is held in April between the two front-running slates. Deputies are
elected by a system of proportional representation. Voting mem-
bers of municipal councils are also chosen by proportional repre-
sentation; non-voting councilmen are chosen by plurality.
Safeguards against voting abuse: Voter marks his ballot in the secrecy
of a voting booth by placing his right thumbprint in indelible ink
at the bottom of the party list of his choice. Observers from
participating parties monitor voting and ballot counting.
Nature of the electoral process: Although there are occasional charges of
fraud, Costa Rica has a well-earned reputation for respecting and
preserving the democratic electoral process. Costa Ricans have a
high rate of participation, generally about 80 percent of the
registered electorate.
GUATEMALA
Date of Election: March 3, 1974
Offices to be filled: President, Vice President, all 61 congressional deputies,
and mayors of the 325 municipalities.
Parties registered, ideological position, and estimated strength based on 1970
elections and presidential candidates:
*Government coalition, rightist, 43 percent, General Kjell Laugerud.
National Liberation Movement.
Institutional Democratic Party.
Revolutionary Party, centrist, 36 percent,
Colonel Ernesto Paiz Novales.
Guatemalan Christian Democracy, left-of-center, 21 percent,
General Efrain Rios Montt.
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Frequency: Elections for President, Vice President, Congressional
Deputies, and Mayors of Guatemala City, departmental capitals,
and other cities of over 30,000 are held every 4 years. All other
mayors elected every two years.
Suffrage: All persons 18 years of age and over. Compulsory for lit-
erates, but not enforced.
Method of determining winner: President and Vice President chosen by
an absolute majority. If no candidate wins a majority, congress
chooses between the two front-running slates. For congress, a
system of proportional representation is used for districts entitled
to 3 or more deputies. For those districts which elect only 2
deputies, the party with the largest vote elects both unless the
second place party polls votes equivalent to 80 percent of the
first-place party's tally. Mayorality elections are decided by plu-
rality.
Safeguards against voting abuse: Voter's identification card is marked
after voting and his index finger is dipped in indelible ink to
prevent multiple voting. Observers from each participating party
monitor the ballot count.
Nature of the electoral process: Despite safeguards designed to ensure honest
elections, the incumbent governments and dominant parties have
traditionally conspired to control the electoral process.
The constitutional provision for
secret ballot, however, is generally respected. The abstention rate
is one of the highest in Central America; in 1970 less than 50
percent of the eligible voters registered, and less than 25 percent
actually went to the polls.
NICARAGUA
Date of election: September 1, 1974
Offices to be filled: President, two Vice Presidents, all 100 members of the
bicameral legislature, and councilmen in all 125 municipalities.
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Parties registered, ideological position, estimated strength and presidential
candidates:
*Nationalist Liberal Party, conservative, 65-80 percent of votes,
Anastasio Somoza Debayle.
Nicaraguan Conservative Party, conservative, 20-35 percent of votes,
Eduardo Chamorro.
Frequency: General elections every 6 years; municipal elections every 3
years.
Suffrage: 18 years or over if married or literate; otherwise compulsory
for those 21 years or over. Minor penalties for not voting are
rarely enforced.
Method of determining winner: President and Vice Presidents elected
by majority vote. Congressmen elected by proportional representa-
tion, except that opposition parties are guaranteed 40 percent of
the seats. Two of the three municipal offices in each municipality
go to the winning party and the other to the runner-up.
Safeguards against voting abuse: Electoral machinery is a separate,
independent branch of the government. Participating parties
monitor voting and vote count.
Nature of the electoral process: Secret ballot is not respected; most elections
characterized by fraud, intimidation, and other abuses. In 1972,
73 percent of the registered voters participated. Because of a high
degree of apathy and the large number who refused to vote as a
protest, this figure supports charges of inflated voter rolls and
multiple voting.
EL SALVADOR
Date of Election: March 10, 1974
Offices to be filled: 52 members of the national Legislative Assembly and
municipal officers for 261 municipalities.
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Parties registered, ideological position, and estimated strength:
*National Conciliation Party, centrist, 45-5 5 percent of electorate.
Christian Democratic Party, left-of-center, 20-30 percent.
National Revolutionary Movement, left-of-center, about 4 percent.
National Democratic Union Party, Communist front, about 6 percent.
Salvadoran Popular Party, conservative, about 5 percent.
Independent Democratic United Front, rightist, 2-3 percent.
Frequency: Legislative and municipal elections every 2 years. Presi-
dential election every 5 years. Next Presidential election 1977.
Suffrage: Compulsory for all persons 18 years of age and over. Fines of
from 2 to 100 colones exist, but are rarely levied.
Method of determining winner: President and Vice President chosen by
absolute majority. If no candidate wins majority, congress chooses
between the two front-running slates. Legislative seats filled by
proportional representation. Municipal offices filled by plurality.
Safeguards against voting abuse: Identity card stamped to show person
has voted. Observers from each participating party to prevent
ballot box stuffing and to monitor vote tally.
Nature of the electoral process: Although there were charges of official fraud
following the 1970 and 1972 elections, elections in El Salvador
have generally been honest since around 1962. Ballots are marked
in secrecy of a curtained voting booth. Abstention rate generally
has been higher (about 50 to 60 percent of registered voters) for
legislative elections. Was only 31 percent for presidential election
in 1972.
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