THE INDIAN ELECTION: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000400030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Prospects
and Implications
The Indian Election:
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
NESA 84-10315
December 1984
Copy 3 6 0
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Directorate of Secret
The Indian Election:
Prospects
and Implications
This paper was prepared by of the
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. South Asia Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 84-10315
December 1984
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Secret
The Indian Election:
Prospects
and ImplicationsF_
Key Judgments Rajiv Gandhi's succession to the prime-ministership after his mother's
Information available assassination in late October will make India's parliamentary election a
as of 26 November 1984 referendum on dynastic continuity and on Rajiv's leadership. Rajiv's initial
was used in this report.
conduct in office probably has improved his party's electoral prospects, and
Indira's death has deprived the opposition of its one common goal--her
defeat.
Opposition disunity probably will allow the Congress Party, which controls
over two-thirds of the lower house of Parliament, to return to power with a
reduced majority in the election to be held on 24 and 27 December. Rajiv
will benefit from a sympathy vote among Hindus in the populous north and
perhaps the west. Under his leadership, the Congress Party may regain
some of the ground lost to regional parties in the south since the last
national election. The postponement of voting in violence-ridden Punjab
and Assam will not significantly affect the results of the election but. could
spark protests.
Even so, Rajiv's liabilities could still cost him a parliamentary majority.
Congress-led state governments have performed so poorly that some
voters-breaking with tradition-may reject it on these grounds, rather
than judging it on its national image. The party's record in the states has
contributed to the loss of support among Sikhs, Muslims, and
untouchables.
With only a plurality, Rajiv would have to form a government in coalition
with opposition parties-the regional All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (ADMK) Party and perhaps India's two major Communist
parties. A slim majority or a plurality would imperil Rajiv's position in his
own party and stymie the resolution of serious domestic issues.. damaging
political stability.
Only in the unlikely event that hurriedly reached electoral agreements
among opposition parties endure until the election could an opposition
coalition displace the Congress Party. An opposition victory probably
would set off a struggle among the disparate parties over the composition
of the government. The resultant government would be highly unstable.
Secret
NESA 84-10315
December 1984
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Major foreign policy shifts are unlikely under any Indian administration,
but the election will have several implications for the United States. Rajiv
favors warmer ties with the United States but-like any Indian leader-
will be constrained by enduring differences over US policy in South Asia
and India's reliance on the Soviets for trade, arms supplies, and diplomatic
support. A coalition that included Communist parties would tilt toward
Moscow and away from Washington. No administration is likely in the
near term to make basic changes in India's recent policy toward Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, or Bangladesh.
Secret iv
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The Congress Party on the Eve of the Election: Rajiv's Liabilities
The Opposition: Scrambling To Unite
Rajiv's Electoral Balance Sheet: Consolidating Support
A Congress Party Win: Implications for Political Stability 5
Opposition Coalition: Implications for Political Stability
Implications of the Election for India's Regional Ties 7
Implications of the Election for Relations With Washington and Moscow 7
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Hindi-speaking heartland
State or union territory boundary
0 500
Kilometers
W~, lW st
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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sh \ t? Bengal
1 1
Maharashtra r.,
n.%
Andhra
.ondicherry
Arabian Pradesh
Gujarat
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Secret
The Indian Election:
Prospects
and Implications F_
Rajiv Gandhi's installation as head of the Congress
Party following his mother's assassination in our view
has enhanced the party's prospects in the December
national election. The party's hold on power for 35 of
the past 37 years owes as much to opposition fragmen-
tation as to the Congress's popularity. We believe that
Indira Gandhi's death has stalled growing opposition
unity by depriving the fractious opposition parties of
the one goal they shared-her defeat. Many political
observers expect the Congress Party to benefit signifi-
cantly from sympathy voting for Rajiv by Hindus in
the populous northern "Hindi belt" and possibly
Maharashtra-certainly a factor in his decision to
call elections immediately.
We judge that Rajiv's first steps as Prime Minister
have established his credibility as a national leader
and won him initial support from most of his party.
His resolute actions and dignified comportment have
dispelled much of the skepticism with which the
Indian public greeted the installation of a novice with
three years' political experience, according to the
Indian press. In his early weeks of leadership, Rajiv
restored order following his mother's death and
moved judiciously to place blame for the assassination
by appointing an investigatory commission and dis-
missing senior intelligence officials.
Rajiv also countered his reputation for indecisiveness
and boldly asserted his prerogative as head of India's
ruling party by calling an immediate election. He
postponed voting in the violence-prone states of Pun-
jab and Assam-a constitutionally permissible move
that will still allow a government to be formed on the
basis of election results from other states. When
voting takes place in the two states, their combined
total of 27 seats is unlikely to alter the parliamentary
balance of power.
In our view, Rajiv so far has successfully balanced
pragmatic concessions to his party's supporters
against the need to establish his reputation as a fair
and honest leader. For example, he has allowed his
aides to highlight his reputation for personal probity
Rajiv Gandhi, son of Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, grand-
son of Prime Minister
in the election campaign. At the same time, press
reports indicate that he has quietly moved to placate
old-line Congress Party politicians by finding them
positions on a Congress Party committee. Several of
these politicians had been sidelined by his mother over
the past two years for blatant corruption that threat-
ened the party's image
The Congress Party
on the Eve of the Election:
Rajiv's Liabilities
We believe Rajiv has moved swiftly to capitalize on
the circumstances of his succession because he is 25X1
aware that organizational decay in the Congress
Party would otherwise hurt his electoral prospects.
Over the past few years, Indira Gandhi virtually
destroyed the party's vital grassroots organizations.
To ensure that its governing bodies would not again
become power bases for political rivals---as they did in
the 1960s-she eschewed party elections. She instead
packed the organization at all levels with appointees
who owed their status solely to her favor and chal-
lenged neither her policies nor her son's succession,
according to Indian commentators.
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The Dominant Congress Party-A Profile
Dominance
With an estimated membership of 15 million, the
Congress Party remains the largest, strongest, and
most durable political organization in India, despite
its difficulties in recent years. The party has domi-
nated Indian politics since it helped achieve independ-
ence from the United Kingdom in 1947, shaping
administrative patterns and governmental norms. F
Genesis
The Congress Party-known as the Congress(I) for
"Indira'-is the result of three successive splits in
the A11-India Congress Party founded 100 years ago.
After each split, Indira Gandhi successfully consoli-
dated her strength within her segment of the party
and eventually defeated or co-opted her opponent._
Ideology
Although formally committed to "democratic social-
ism, " a secular state, and a nonaligned foreign policy,
the Congress(I)-like the All-India Congress Party
before it-has garnered support from a range of
religious, caste, and economic groups by avoiding a
clear-cut ideological position. Its pragmatic poli-
cies-hitherto formulated by Indira Gandhi with
little internal party debate-are often described as
"centrist. '
Organizational decay in the Congress Party has re-
sulted in ineffectual state governments-another seri-
ous liability for Rajiv. Indira Gandhi's practice of
appointing state chief ministers with no independent
popular base and then deposing those who lost her
trust has fueled factional divisions in the party and
corruption in the government. The perceived weakness
of the state governments in turn has encouraged
dissidence and strengthened the opposition
In most states, the Congress
Party faces a single strong opposition party capable of
challenging its preeminence and can no longer expect
to win state elections solely as a result of a divided
opposition. These developments caused the Congress
Party's humiliating defeat last year in Karnataka and
Andhra Pradesh-longtime party strongholds.
Support Base
The Congress(I) could until recently count on tradi-
tional support inherited from the All-India Congress
Party among untouchables, Muslims, many Sikhs,
the urban poor, and landless labor. Voters of the elite
Brahmin caste also tended to support the party. In
elections since 1980, however, these groups have
demonstrated a willingness to consider other alterna-
tives.
The Congress Party's Electoral Record
The party has held power for all but two years since
independence, although it has never secured more
than 48 percent of the popular vote or less than 34
percent of it. The party owes its advantage to India's
single-member constituency system and the fragmen-
tation of the opposition. Congress candidates have
been able to capture seats with only a plurality of
constituency votes. As a result, the party returned to
power in 1980 with two-thirds of the seats in Parlia-
ment but only 43 percent of the popular vote-a gain
of only 8.2 percentage points from 1977, when it lost
power to a coalition of opposition parties.
In our analysis, Rajiv and the Congress Party no
longer can count on support from Muslims, Sikhs, and
untouchables, largely because these groups have been
alienated by the failure of inept Congress-led state
governments to protect them. In addition, Indira
Gandhi's efforts over the past two years to woo Hindu
voters led many Indians to view New Delhi's crack-
down against Sikh dissidents in Punjab last June as
part of a tougher line against activist religious minor-
ities.
Rajiv himself may now be identified with his mother's
pro-Hindu image. Sikh leaders and some Hindus have
publicly charged the Congress Party youth organiza-
tion-closely associated with Rajiv-with inciting
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Charon Singh, founder of the
Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party,
served briefly as Prime Minis-
ter of the Janata government
that ruled from 1977 to 1979.
A. B. Vajpayee, who heads the
Bharatiya Janata Party, served
as Foreign Minister under the
1977-79 Janata government. F
Hindu reprisals against Sikhs for Indira's death. His
promise to investigate the violence is not likely to
convince minorities of his commitment to their wel-
fare. Rajiv probably has already written off Sikh votes
in the coming election, but the loss of many Muslim
votes could deprive the party of victories in closely
contested constituencies.
We believe Rajiv's electoral prospects will be hurt if
voters-breaking with tradition judge his party by
its performance in the states rather than on the basis
of his reputation and continuation of the Nehru
dynasty. US scholars have noted that since 1971,
when Indira Gandhi separated national from state
assembly elections, voters have supported Congress
Party candidates for Parliament on the strength of the
party's proven national leadership. Until 1980, the
Congress Party image was powerful enough to help
even unknown candidates in state elections. Since
then, Indian voters have become more critical, voting
the party out of power in states where it has failed to
provide good government. Some Indian and US ob-
servers believe the increasingly sophisticated elector-
ate may for the first time support or reject parliamen-
tary candidates on the basis of their parties'
performance in the states-a possibility we cannot
exclude, especially in the south.
The Opposition: Scrambling To Unite
The opposition threat to Rajiv rests on the dwindling
possibility that local and state opposition leaders will
maintain agreements to pool their support until the
election. No opposition party has emerged as a credi-
ble alternative to the Congress Party at the national
level, but, in alliance, the fragmented and regionally
disparate parties have the potential to displace Con-
gress with a coalition government. Even without
unity, the opposition could deny the Congress Party a
majority and force it to rely on support from other
parties to form a national government
Rajiv's abrupt announcement of elections has caught
opposition leaders unprepared, as he probably hoped it
would. A major realignment of opposition parties is
still under way. Opposition leaders suddenly faced an
immediate deadline either to work out durable elec-
toral alliances that had eluded them for months or
else permit the Congress Party once again to win by
default.
We believe the realignment of opposition parties since
politician Charan Singh's formation in late October of
a new party-the Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party
(DMKP) -has dimmed prospects for successful alli-
ances. By drawing on elements of both non-Commu-
nist opposition alliances and excluding the best orga-
nized opposition party-the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)-the DMKP has ruptured opposition efforts to
reach electoral agreements. Charan Singh has de-
clared his willingness to negotiate with all opposition
parties-including the Communists--but Rajiv's call
for an election in December left him little time.
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Parties Merged in Charan Singh's
Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party
Lok Dal/Charan Singh
Janata Party/Subramaniam Swamy faction
Democratic Socialist Party/H. N. Bahuguna
Congress(S)/Sharad Pawar
Other National Non-Communist
Opposition Parties
Bharatiya Janata Party/A. B. Vajpayee
Janata Party/Chandra Shekhar faction
Rashtriya Sanjay Manch/Maneka Gandhi
Major Regional Parties
Telegu Desam/N. T. Rama Rao
ADMK/M. G. Ramachandran
DMK/M. Karunanidhi
National Conference/G. M. Shah (rival faction
leader: Farooq Abdullah)
Akali Dal/H. Longowal
Communist Parties
Communist Party of India/C. Rajeshwar Rao
Communist Party of India/Marxist/E. M. S.
Namboodiripad
Greatest strength in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana
among small landowners and farmers. Some strong
areas in Bihar, Orissa.
Principally among educated urban voters in Hindi-
speaking belt, with pockets of support in Karnataka
(whose government the Janata Party controls), Maha-
rashtra, Bihar, and Gujarat.
Support chiefly confined to pockets of Uttar Pradesh,
where Bahuguna was chief minister.
Support only in Maharashtra.
Support concentrated among landowners, traders,
and civil servants in Hindi-belt states-especially
Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and
Rajasthan.
Support base same as that of S. Swamy faction.
Limited support in Uttar Pradesh.
Andhra Pradesh, where it controls state government.
Tamil Nadu, where it controls state government.
Supported by a broad cross section of populace,
excluding Brahmins.
Chiefly among Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir,
where it holds power.
Punjab, among Sikhs.
Scattered support nationally.
Support concentrated in West Bengal, where it rules,
and in Kerala. Scattered support nationally
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C. Rajeshwar Rao heads the
Communist Party of India,
which has formal ties to the
Communist Party of the Soviet
The abiding animosity between the Communist par-
ties and the BJP is a further obstacle to broad
cooperation among opposition parties.
the Communist Party of
India Marxist (CPI/M}-whose stronghold is the
state of West Bengal-and the Communist Party of
India (CPI) have agreed to avoid direct electoral
agreements with the BJP. Although the Communists
are optimistic that the opposition parties will success-
fully pool their votes in many constituencies, they
expect Rajiv Gandhi to win on the strength of the
sympathy vote.
Rajiv's Electoral Balance
Sheet: Consolidating Support
We believe that Rajiv is likely to fare well in the
northern Hindi belt states, retain some seats in the
west, and gain support from a major regional party to
secure a parliamentary majority. According to press
reports, Rajiv's campaign itinerary gives priority to
the populous states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in the
north, Maharashtra in the west, and Andhra Pradesh
and Karnataka in the south-acknowledged swing
states in any election. The first three-all Congress
ruled-account for 188 of the 542 seats in Parlia-
ment. Most Indian observers have calculated that the
Congress Party will need at a minimum to retain most
of its seats in these three states and also secure help
from at least one opposition party-most likely, the
ADMK Party that governs Tamil Nadu.
We judge that the Congress Party will benefit from
current trends in the south if they persist. According
to the Indian press, Andhra Pradesh remains firmly in
N. T. Rama Rao, recently rein-
stated as chief minister of
Andhra Pradesh state, heads
the Telegu Desam Party but
aspires to national leadership.
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the hands of the regional Telegu Desaim Party, but
Karnataka-now governed by the Janata Party in
coalition with other opposition parties-could return 25X1
to the Congress Party fold. A decision by Karnataka's 25X1
principal farmers' union to field its own candidates
would, if implemented, cut into support for the Janata
Party and improve the odds for the Congress Party.
In our judgment, Rajiv also can be confident of
finding coalition partners in case his party falls short
of a majority. In Tamil Nadu, deputies of the ailing
ADMK Party leader-a longtime ally of Indira Gan-
dhi-have decided to continue his policy of supporting
Congress Party candidates,
A Congress Party Win:
Implications for Political Stability
In our view, opposition disunity is likely to permit the
Congress Party to return to power, probably with a
reduced majority. The magnitude of Rajiv Gandhi's
win will determine his ability to secure his own
position in the Congress Party against possible chal-
lenges. In turn, the confidence and parliamentary
strength of the government will decide whether it can
take the political risks to address problems that
threaten India's near-term political stability. With
only a bare majority, Rajiv would appear to yield
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 M. G. Ramachandran, a former
movie star, nominally still
heads the ADMK Party and is
Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu,
although his deputies have
wielded the authority since
"MGR" became ill several
months ago. F__~
such changes the Congress Party and the institutions
of state government will continue to disintegrate. F_
In our judgment, if the Congress Party secures only a
bare majority or a plurality, Rajiv will be vulnerable
to challenges from within the party, and the party to
power out of weakness if he made concessions to
political opponents. A fragile base also might spark
increased separatist or communal strife as these
groups tested what they would view as a weakened
national government.
We believe Sikh unrest in Punjab and Hindu-Sikh
tensions in the military-the most urgent problems
facing Rajiv after the election-will severely tax his
political resources. If, as we judge possible, militant
Sikhs launch a campaign of violence during the
election, Rajiv's difficulties will multiply. Concessions
to the Sikhs are likely to offend his party's conserva-
tive Hindu constituents and could even lose him some
support in Parliament-risks he could ill afford with-
out a firm footing in his party. Yet if New Delhi fails
to conciliate moderate Sikhs with an acceptable politi-
cal settlement, the threat of renewed Hindu-Sikh
conflict and more violence by Sikh dissidents probably
will force the reluctant Army to remain in indefinite
control of Punjab. Associated sectarian tensions and
morale problems in the military could ultimately
affect combat readiness.
In our view, initiation of long overdue reforms in the
Congress Party and reexamination of the national
government's relationship to state governments also
will entail major political risks. Last year, Rajiv
advocated party elections to replace appointed party
officials as soon as possible, but giving up his mother's
practice of appointing state party and government
officials will deprive him of a major source of political
leverage. Rajiv also will be called on to meet or defuse
demands from regional groups for greater devolution
of authority to the states. We believe that without
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Congress Party showing in the election could set off a
chain of defections from the party and perhaps spark
bids to replace Rajiv as its leader. Even before the
election, a number of Congress members of Parlia-
ment have threatened to run as independents against
the candidates Rajiv selected in their stead.
We judge that if Rajiv returns to power at the head of
a coalition government-a possibility we believe less
likely-his ability to make the tough decisions re-
quired to solve domestic problems will be drastically
reduced. The need to secure agreement from coalition
partners would reduce his policy flexibility and under-
cut his authority. Even the friendly ADMK probably
would expect special favors for its constituents in
Tamil Nadu, but we believe the Communist parties
would exact a higher price. The Communists might,
for example, demand rapid social reforms that would
antagonize the Congress Party's conservative support-
ers, bringing government and party into conflict.
Opposition Coalition:
Implications for Political Stability
An electoral alliance of opposition parties broad
enough to win a majority in the election in our view
could scarcely govern. The allied parties-which
could range from Communists to conservatives associ-
ated with the BJP-probably would have serious
difficulties agreeing on a Cabinet and Prime Minister
and setting priorities. Personal rivalries among the
disparate opposition leaders also would make a coali-
tion vulnerable to defections that could leave it short
of the majority it needs to govern and ensure the
collapse of the government-as occurred in 1979. F
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OMA UL
The government's expected difficulties in making
controversial decisions probably would encourage civil
disorder. At the same time, a coalition that included
parties representing single states or regions probably
would favor devolution of authority to the states,
particularly for setting national planning goals and
priorities
Implications of the Election
for India's Regional Ties
We judge that, regardless of the outcome of the
election, New Delhi will make few changes in its
policy toward its neighbors in the near term. Indira
Gandhi's stances toward Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Bangladesh, although heavyhanded, reflected endur-
ing Indian concerns and interests in South Asia. Any
Indian government will view as threats to India's
security and regional dominance such developments
as Pakistan's growing ability to inflict damage on
India and ethnic violence in Sri Lanka. New Delhi
probably will also continue to assert India's right to
counter such threats.
We believe that New Delhi's suspicion of Pakistani
involvement with Sikh dissidents, together with Indi-
an concerns over Islamabad's acquisition of sophisti-
cated US weapons, will continue to sour relations
between the two countries. Public opinion polls sug-
gest that the popular Indian image of Pakistan has
worsened significantly since 1983-a factor that part-
ly reflects New Delhi's pronouncements on Islamabad
but could in turn discourage efforts by any govern-
ment to ease bilateral tensions.
Rajiv's hard line toward Islamabad before the elec-
tion-including renewed charges of Pakistani involve-
ment with Sikh dissidents-probably signals that a
Congress Party government would not be inclined to
improve relations with Islamabad in the near term.
Rajiv will consider
better ties only if President Zia promises to end
assistance to Sikh dissidents and releases Sikh hijack-
ers to Indian custody or tries them in Pakistan-
developments we consider unlikely. Several opposition
leaders have indicated their willingness to ease ten-
sions with Pakistan, but we believe that domestic and
strategic concerns would limit their actions.
We believe any government in New Delhi probably
will hesitate to reverse policies that have helped
ensure quiescence among volatile groups at home. To
deflect pressure from Indian Tamils to aid Tamils in
Sri Lanka, New Delhi is likely to continue pressing
the Sinhalese-dominated government of Sri Lanka for
a political settlement, while turning a blind eye to
covert aid by Indian Tamils to their Sri Lankan
brethren.
Likewise, any Indian government is likely to continue
to build a wall along the border with Bangladesh to
keep out illegal immigrants, despite Dacca's protests.
The move in our view is intended to placate predomi-
nantly Hindu native Assamese, who believe they are
disadvantaged politically and economically by compe-
tition from the largely Muslim immigrants. Reversal
of Indira Gandhi's decision to seal the border would
risk setting off renewed violence in Assam
Implications of the Election
for Relations With Washington
and Moscow
We judge that New Delhi's ties with the United
States and the Soviet Union will not change dramati-
cally under any likely government, although impor-
tant shifts in tone may occur. Indian concerns over
US arms sales to Pakistan, rumored attempts by
Washington to secure military bases in neighboring
countries, and ties between China and the United
States probably will continue to limit Indo-US rela-
tions. These factors, added to the importance of Soviet
arms and technology to India's arms modernization
program and the widespread Indian view that Mos-
cow is a uniquely reliable friend, are likely to sustain
New Delhi's special relationship with Moscow.
If the Congress Party returns to power, we believe
Rajiv Gandhi's favorable disposition to the United
States will warm the chilly relations he inherited from
his mother, but within limits.
Rajiv's Westernized outlook an
approval o private enterprise are likely to improve the
tone of New Delhi's relationship with Washington.
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Even so, we expect Rajiv to look to the United States
for initial concessions as a precondition for substan-
tially improving relations.
he favors better ties
with the United States, but only if Washington avoids
increased military aid to Islamabad.
New
Delhi's unhappiness over alleged support from Sikhs
resident in the United States for Sikh extremists in
India also is likely to remain an irritant in Indo-US
relations.
In our view, Moscow has secured no special benefit
from its public endorsement during the past year, first
of Indira Gandhi's leadership, and then of Rajiv's.
In our judgment,
New Delhi would significantly increase its tilt toward
Moscow in the near term only if Rajiv were compelled
to form a coalition government with the help of the
CPI.
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Appendix
Indian Parliamentary
Elections
Purpose
To elect representatives to the lower house (Lok
Sabha, or "people's assembly") of India's Parliament
in New Delhi. For the purpose of Lok Sabha represen-
tation, the 22 states are divided into single-member
constituencies. Seats are allocated to the states in
proportion to their population. Constituency bound-
aries are adjusted as needed after each national
census.
Lok Sabha Seats
The Constitution allows for the election of up to 525
members from the states, with up to 20 more to be
elected or appointed to represent union territories.
The Lok Sabha currently has 542 members. Certain
constituencies can be represented only by a member
of designated disadvantaged castes and tribes. The
state of Uttar Pradesh has the largest number of
"reserved" constituencies, numbering 18. The Presi-
dent also may appoint members to represent the
Anglo-Indian minority. Lok Sabha members must be
at least 25 years old.
General Election Procedure
The Constitution defines procedures for both national
and state elections, with details provided in various
legislative acts. It also provides for the Election
Commission to supervise and conduct elections.
The Election Cummission
The Constitution created a permanent and autono-
mous Election Commission to conduct elections to
Parliament, the state legislatures, and the offices of
President and Vice President. The Commission main-
tains electoral rolls and revises them regularly. It
appoints tribunals to resolve disputes arising in con-
nection with any election and rules on the qualifica-
tions of legislators, the composition and duration of
legislatures, and the reservation of seats for specified
disadvantaged caste and tribal groups.
Voter Qualifications
Any Indian citizen at least 21 years old and not
disqualified by unsoundness of mind or criminal acts
is eligible to vote. There are no literacy or property
requirements.
Timing
Although the usual term for the Lok Sabha is five
years, the President may dissolve it before the end of
its term and hold new elections. He may do so if he
judges the composition of the Lok Sabha is not
conducive to stable government-for example, in case
of a stalemate in a governing coalition. In practice,
the Prime Minister has decided the timing of elec-
tions. If a state of emergency has been declared, the
term of the Lok Sabha may be extended up to one
year at a time and up to six months after the state of
emergency ends. Byelections to fill empty Lok Sabha
seats may be held at any time within the five-year
term.
By contrast, the upper house of Parliament (or Rajya
Sabha) is a continuous body not subject to dissolution.
One-third of the 244 members end their term every
two years.
Size of Electorate
An estimated 380 million persons will be eligible to
vote in the 1984 election.
Turnout
Voter turnout varies greatly by state. Nationally, the
turnout in 1971 was 55.3 percent of the electorate; in
1977, 60.5 percent; and in 1980, 57 percent. Turnout
has gradually increased with the establishment of
more polling booths and the reduction of travel time.
A large turnout generally has not favored the Con-
gress Party.
Ballots
The ballots used in India's 542 single-member parlia-
mentary constituencies differ in the number of candi-
dates listed and the languages used, but everywhere
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they show the candidates' names and party symbols.
Election symbols are allocated by the Election Com-
mission in New Delhi.
How Citizens Vote
Voting takes place in polling booths placed so that
voters will have to walk no more than 5 kilometers. To
prevent undue influence on voters, candidates are
forbidden to provide voters with transportation to the
polls and are permitted at most one representative at
each polling place.
The voter signs or places his thumb impression in
indelible ink on the stub of the ballot. The ballot is
separated from the stub and given to the voter, who
goes behind a curtain to mark it with an inked rubber
stamp supplied by the polling officer. The voter then
folds the ballot and places it in the ballot box in the
presence of polling officers.
Who Wins
In each constituency the party whose candidate gar-
ners the largest number of votes wins the seat.
Nationally, the party holding the majority of parlia-
mentary seats forms the national government. If no
party wins a majority, the party with the largest
number of seats may form a coalition government
with the support-and seats- of one or more other
parties.
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Secret
Secret
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