THE IRANIAN MINE WARFARE THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000300100002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Iranian
Mine Warfare Threat
NAVY Review Completed
NGA Review Complete
Top Secret
NF4A R4-10292r
November
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{E7fkf Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
The Iranian
Mine Warfare Threat
This paper was prepared bye Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from MESA. It was
coordinated with t e Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 84-10292C
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The Iranian
Mine Warfare Threat) 25X1
Key Judgments Iran's efforts to train mine warfare personnel, develop minelaying tech-
Information available niques, and obtain naval mines and associated mine technology have grown
as of I October 1984 notably over the past year. These efforts suggest Tehran views mine
was used in this report.
warfare as a workable response to growing Iraqi military pressure on
shipping in the Persian Gulf. If Iran embarks on a mine warfare campaign,
it probably would lay a small number of mines over a few weeks or months
to raise insurance rates and deter ships from entering mined areas:
? Iran has limited minelaying capabilities, but we believe the few hundred
contact mines now in its arsenal are sufficient to carry out such a
campaign in the Gulf.
? The Iranian Navy has practiced using helicopters to lay mines, and the
Revolutionary Guard has trained personnel in mine warfare over the last
six months.
The Iranians' mine warfare capability will improve over the next two years.
Although Iran will not be able to make advanced mines in the near future,
its emerging mine manufacturing capacity will allow it to produce a few
hundred large contact mines annually in a few years. The Navy has begun
to explore ways to modify existing ships and equipment for mine warfare.
Iran most likely would use mines first and most successfully against Arab
Gulf ports-particularly those in Kuwait-because of their vulnerability
and high volume of traffic:
? The campaign would be aimed at reducing oil exports and the flow of war
material through Kuwaiti ports to Iraq.
? The Iranians probably would not mine the Strait of Hormuz because of
their dependence on shipping through that waterway.
? Iran is also unlikely to mine areas outside the Gulf. Iranian leaders
denounced the mining of the Red Sea, and they probably recognize that
mining beyond the Gulf could result in sanctions on Iranian shipping and
hamper efforts to buy weapons.
? To avoid US involvement, Iran probably would not mine areas regularly
patrolled by US Navy ships in the southern Gulf.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would turn to the United States and other
Western countries for help if their ports were mined because of their lack
of modern antimine warfare equipment and expertise. US or other Western
naval forces probably would have little difficulty neutralizing Iranian
mines and could open mined areas within a few weeks once mineclearing
operations began.
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Revolutionary Guard
Regular Navy and Air Force 1
Operations Beyond the Gulf 7
Implications for the United States 7
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The Iranian
Mine Warfare Threat
Over the past year the balance of military power in
the Persian Gulf has shifted increasingly in favor of
Iraq. Iraqi ships and aircraft have attacked over 40
vessels since January, and Baghdad has threatened to
expand its military pressure to force Tehran to end
the war, according to press reports. In contrast, Iran's
declining Air Force, with less than 70 fighter aircraft,
has struck 14 ships. Most of the Iranian attacks have
occurred in the southern Gulf because Tehran seeks to
avoid clashes with Saudi aircraft. To compensate for
its deficiencies, Iran apparently has begun to develop
a naval mine warfare capability and strategy as a way
to retaliate against Baghdad and its Gulf Arab sup-
porters
Capabilities
Revolutionary Guard. Over the last six months the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Sepah-e Pasdaran-
has made considerable efforts to train personnel for
We believe that the Revolutionary Guard would not
hesitate to engage in minelaying operations if ordered
to do so by the regime. Unlike the Air Force and
Navy, the Guard is fiercely loyal to the government in
Tehran. It has over 100,000 armed men under its
command, is outside the control of the regular armed
forces, and is responsible directly to the clerical
leadership and Ayatollah Khomeini.
Tehran has assigned the
Guard the task of planning small-boat suicide attacks
on ships and bases in the Persian Gulf, and Guards
have been trained to fly small aircraft on similar
missions against ships.
Regular Navy and Air Force. Since 1983 the Iranian
Navy also has taken steps to train personnel and
develop techniques to increase its mine warfare capa-
bility.
October 1983 eight pilots practiced dropping mines
from RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters flying at low
speeds and some 15 meters above the sea.
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Over the last four years the Guard has attempted to
assume functions and capabilities of the regular
armed forces and has taken steps to build an
independent naval capability that could be used for
mine warfare. the Guard
attempted to expand its naval capability in December
1982 through a request to the Navy to share facilities.
Guard personnel have served on some Navy vessels,
the Guard has acquired its own patrol boats.
Guard naval
units assumed responsibility for defending and patrol-
Iran has between three and six operational RH-53s
that can reach ports in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
from Iranian territory.
At the same time, the Iranians also have begun to
explore ways to modify their existing equipment and
ships for mine warfare.
the Navy could use its two 100-ton troop
transport ships based at Bandar-e Abbas naval base
as minelayers. The Iranians also may equip some of
their commercial cargo vessels with cranes and guide
rails to lay mines, In
addition, Iran has two seaworthy frigates and nine
ling Iran's coasts in February 1983
some Guards are being trained to fly helicop-
ters that could be used over the Gulf.
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seaworthy patrol boats that we judge could be altered
to lay a small number of mines in the Gulf. As of late
August 1984, however,
Iran had not begun the changes needed to mo i y
Iranian naval vessels for mine warfare.
Such modifications as well as additional personnel
training probably would be necessary because the
Navy lacks special mine warfare vessels
Iran has no naval ships capable of laying mines.
ran also has no personnel able to disarm mines,
and the Navy's coastal
and river minesweepers are no longer operational.
The Iranian Air Force and Navy have no fixed-wing
aircraft configured to lay mines but could modify
existing military or cargo aircraft for such missions.
The Air Force has 20 operational C-130 cargo and
two to six operational PC-3 aircraft that have.the
range and payload to carry large mines. They lack
special aerial mines for aircraft, however, and would
have to develop techniques to airdrop their existing
mines that are designed to be laid from ships. Other
Iranian helicopters besides the RH-53 could be adapt-
ed to carry and lay mines.
Continuing opposition in the Air Force and Navy to
the clerical regime and its policies suggests that some
officers might oppose mine warfare missions in the
between 200 and 500 sea mines in its inventory.
the Iranian Navy had a total of 200 mines
phased from North Korea. Although each of these
mines is filled with 500 kilograms of explosive, they
are fitted with contact detonators and not the more
advanced acoustic or magnetic detonators. The Revo-
lutionary Guard also received an unknown number of
this type of mine from North Korea last spring,
The Iranians have been unable to obtain modern sea
mines from foreign sources over the last year despite
considerable and continuing efforts.
In addition to trying to purchase foreign mines, Iran
has begun efforts to manufacture its own weapons
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We estimate that Iraq has between 500 and 1,000
mines, many of which probably are obsolete. F
Iraq has 500 old
Soviet contact mines and also may have an unknown
number of more sophisticated Soviet acoustic or _
Iraq has laid an unknown number of mines in Iran's
coastal waters in the northern Persian Gulf during
the war. These mines apparently have had little
success in hindering shipping.
in 1983 small mines probably damaged
two small vessels outside the port of Bandar-e'Kho-
other Gulf states.
The Iraqis also
claim to have laid mines near Khark Island, but there
are no reports of ships hitting mines in that area.
Mines probably laid by Iraq in the northern Gulf
have drifted down the coast of Saudi Arabia and
Iraq's capability to plant or neutralize mines appears
to be limited largely to Iran's coasts in the northern
Gulf.
naval units.
The Iraqi
Navy also has five minesweepers. Iraq's two oceango-
ing minesweepers, which can lay mines, may not be
fully operational. These vessels and some other Iraqi
patrol craft may have been used to lay mines near
Iran's harbors in the northern Gulf. We doubt Iraq
would send its helicopters or surface vessels farther
into the Gulf and risk destruction by Iranian air and
Strategy
The Iranians appear to have recognized the limita-
tions of their mine warfare capability and have adopt-
ed a strategy in which a few mines or the threat of
mining would be used to deter shipping. F__
Iran could
use mines to raise insurance rates and dissuade ships
bound for Arab Gulf ports from entering the Persian
Gulf,
such mining would be just as
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 Figure 1
Iranian Mines
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Copy of obsolete Soviet
World War II mine. Iran
is attempting to make its
own copies of this mine.
The large number of ships transiting the Gulf provide
ample targets for mine warfare. As many as 60 ships
pass through the Strait of Hormuz each day, about
half to or from Kuwaiti or Saudi ports. An average of
12 tankers-carrying about 20 percent of the West's
oil imports-arrive or depart oil-loading facilities at
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The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz
The Persian Gulf is generally favorable for mine warfare.
It is almost 1,000 km in length and 330 km at its
widest but is relatively shallow and rarely deeper than
100 meters. Areas near Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian ports
are less than 20 meters deep and could be seeded with
moored or bottom mines.
The Strait of Hormuz is about 275 km long and an aver-
age of 80 km wide. At its narrowest point, the waterway
is only 50 km wide. Most of the Strait is more than 45
meters deep and suitable for mines moored to or resting
on the bottom. Off the Omani coast, however, depths
exceed 200 meters, making it difficult to use mines. With
a prevailing current of about 1 knot, drifting mines could
remain in the vicinity for days and, even after drifting into
the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman, would pose a hazard.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia and Mina Al Ahmadi in
Kuwait each day. In 1983, moreover, Iraq received
over $1 billion worth of Soviet-made tanks, artillery,
and other military equipment through the port of Ash
Shu'aybah in Kuwait. Kuwait depends on ship traffic
to provide more than 85 percent of its food needs and
nearly all the equipment to run the country's oil
refineries and desalination plants
Prospects
We believe the progress Iran has made in mine
warfare training over the past year now gives it the
capability to respond to Iraqi attacks on shipping with
a limited campaign of mine warfare. Such Iraqi
attacks on shipping are likely to increase as Baghdad
acquires more aircraft capable of firing Exocet mis-
siles in the next few months. In contrast, the Iranian
Air Force's capability to defend friendly shipping or
attack other vessels in retaliation will continue to
decline as more aircraft are lost or become nonopera-
tional. These trends increase the possibility that
Tehran will consider mining as a tactic against Iraq
and its Gulf supporters.
Should it turn to mine warfare, Iran is likely to adopt
a long-term strategy of sporadic mining primarily
designed to raise insurance rates and thereby deter
shipping bound for Arab Gulf ports. We believe Iran
has enough contact mines to carry out such a plan.
The Iranians probably will lay only a few of these
mines in each operation, judging that if a ship has
been damaged or sunk, the fear of encountering more
mines will discourage other vessels from entering the
area. The 500-kilogram contact mines in Iran's inven-
tory are capable of seriously damaging or sinking even
large ships.
We believe Revolutionary Guards, rather than regu-
lar service personnel, are likely to be used in these
missions because of their loyalty to the regime. The
Iranians will take advantage of darkness, bad weath-
er, cover from commercial vessels, and periods when
AWACS aircraft are refueling to shield their mine-
laying units from detection and interception. After
some modifications, small patrol boats, aircraft, dis-
guised or overt Iranian commercial vessels, and even
dhows would be used to lay mines and confuse enemy
defenses. New mines would be sown periodically or
after sweep efforts to keep the mine threat credible.
Future Capabilities. Over the next year Iran's mine
inventory is likely to consist only of crude contact
mines. Its mine production program probably will be
able to produce a few hundred such mines annually in
the next few years. Even if Iran acquired sample
advanced mine technology, the Iranian electronic
industry probably could not duplicate the parts need-
ed for magnetic and acoustic mines for several years.
Iran will continue to try to buy advanced mines and
mine technology abroad but probably will have limit-
ed success so long as the war with Iraq continues. The
US arms embargo will discourage potential suppliers
who also are concerned about the threat of a conflict
in the Gulf that could endanger oil supplies, particu-
larly if the mines could be traced to the supplying
country. Moreover, because of their profitable arms
trade with Iraq and the Arab Gulf states, many Wes.
European countries that produce sophisticated mines
are unlikely to sell mines or permit third parties to
send them to Iran
Although Iranian capabilities to lay mines will remain
limited in the short run, we judge they will be
sufficient to implement sporadic mining operations.
Over the longer term we believe Tehran probably will
develop other, less orthodox ways to deliver mines.
The Iranians are attempting to buy aircraft and ships
that could be adapted for mine warfare. Moreover, we
believe some Iranian commercial vessels could be
modified to lay mines covertly in the Gulf or other
areas of the world during commercial voyages.
Arab Gulf State Ports. In our judgment, the Iranians
would most likely, and could most effectively, use
mines against Gulf Arab ports, particularly those in
Kuwait. Mines would allow Iran to attack the ship-
ping of Iraq's Arab supporters in areas where Iran's
fighter aircraft can no longer fly because of Saudi air
defenses. We judge that Iranian mines would-if not
countered by competent and persistent minesweeping
operations-reduce but not stop Kuwaiti imports and
oil exports. Mining Kuwaiti ports would have the
added benefit of potentially decreasing the supply of
vital war material to Iraq. This would not, in our
judgment, cripple Baghdad's ability to continue the
war. Soviet arms shipments normally unloaded in
Kuwait could be shifted to Saudi or Jordanian ports
on the Red Sea and transported overland to Iraq.
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If the operations against Kuwait proved effective and
went unchallenged, we believe Iran would consider
mining Saudi ports. Saudi Arabia's main oil export
facility at Ras Tanura, which exports 90 percent of
the country's oil, would be a particularly tempting
target for Iran, despite Saudi defenses.
We believe the Arab Gulf states would be largely
unable to preempt or neutralize Iranian mining activi-
ty. They lack the air and naval capability to locate
and neutralize mines. They also are unlikely to ac-
quire the equipment or expertise to counter mines
effectively in the next few years.
Strait of Hormuz.) Iran
is unlikely to mine the Strait of Hormuz because of
fears about international intervention and Tehran's
dependence on shipping to export oil and import
supplies. We believe Iran's leaders wish to avoid
Western military activity in the Gulf that would
divert Iran's already limited resources from the war
the clerical leadership appears to recog-
nize the importance of keeping the Strait open for
Iran's economy and to avoid foreign intervention.
If Iraq were to attack and destroy Iran's major oil-
exporting facility on Khark Island, however, we be-
lieve Tehran would be more likely to mine the Strait.
The Iranians, however, probably would seed only a
few mines in the Strait, and they would be restrained
from trying to close it completely because of their
need for seaborne supplies. Given the proximity of
Iran's major naval base at Bandar-e Abbas, an Irani-
an campaign using mines, aircraft, and artillery to
restrict access through the Strait would be fairly
effective if unopposed by Western navies. The Gulf
Arab states alone probably could not reopen and
maintain free passage through the.Strait.
Operations Beyond the Gulf In our judgment, Iran
probably will not attempt to mine areas beyond the
Gulf for the near future. High-ranking Iranian lead-
ers-including Ayatollah Khomeini-publicly disa-
vowed responsibility for and denounced the mining of
the Red Sea. Mining outside the war zone could sink
nonbelligerent shipping, for example, a passenger
liner, resulting in condemnation of Iran and perhaps
Gulf State Minesweeping Capabilities
bilities.
In our judgment, Saudi Arabia-the only Arab Pen-
insula state with minesweepers in its inventory-has
only a limited mine warfare capability. As under-
scored by its request to France and the United States
for minesweepers following the mine explosions in the
Red Sea last August, the kingdom remains dependent
on external assistance to help it deal with even a
minimal mine threat. US Navy reporting from both
1983 and 1984 rated the mine warfare skills of the
Saudi squadron of four minesweeping ships as gener-
ally low. The ships have fairly modern equipment,
but. personnel deficiencies remain the primary barrier
to an effective Saudi minesweeping capability. The
limited education of most Saudi recruits, normal
attrition, and widespread personnel shortages that
often result in the transfer of trained personnel to
positions where they are more urgently needed hinder
the retention of crucial technical skills in the all-
volunteer Saudi Navy. Given the Navy's personnel
problems and its need to absorb a large amount of
equipment recently received or due for delivery within
the next two to three years, we anticipate little -
immediate improvement in Saudi minesweeping capa-
Lacking mine warfare craft in their navies, the small-
er Gulf states also would require external assistance
to counter Iranian mining. Kuwait and Oman have
considered acquiring mine warfare craft, but person-
nel shortages, limited funds, and the Kuwaiti Navy's
need. to absorb the recent delivery of eight missile
patrol craft probably will rule out purchases of such
ships in the near future
international restrictions or prohibitions against Irani-
an vessels. Such activity also could undermine Iran's
efforts to buy desperately needed weapons from for-
eign countries.
Implications for the United States
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia probably would ask the
United States for help in neutralizing Iranian mines
because of their limited mine warfare capabilities and
the continuing vulnerability of their ports. We believe
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Figure 3
Minesweeping Operations
Non-metallic-hull minesweep-
ing ships pull underwater wires
in the area where mines have
been reported. The cutters or
explosive charges attached to
the wires cut the cable connect-
ing the moored mine to its an-
chor. After the mine floats to
the surface, the minesweeper
uses heavy machinegun or
cannon fire to destroy it.
A helicopter tows a mine sled
that simulates the metallic hull
of a large ship and sets off
magnetic mines. The helicopter
can also pull a special device
simulating the ship engine
noises that set off acoustic
mines.
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US or Western naval forces would have little difficul-
ty clearing unsophisticated Iranian mines from any-
where in the Persian Gulf, but US mine warfare
aircraft would need a week and ships might take a
month to reach the Gulf. Arab ports or the Strait of
Hormuz could be reopened within a few more weeks
once operations began. A long-term US presence,
however, probably would be necessary to keep crucial
areas free of mines if Iran mounted a persistent mine
warfare campaign. This could lead to confrontations
between US and Iranian forces if US ships or aircraft
came upon Iranian units before or as they were laying
mines]
Iranian mines would present little direct danger to US
Navy ships in the Gulf in the short term. To avoid an
incident that might give the United States an excuse
to intervene in the Gulf, Iran probably would not mine
areas patrolled regularly by US Navy vessels. US
commercial vessels and Navy ships, however, would
run the same risk as other vessels using Arab Gulf
ports mined by Iran. Moreover, some Iranian mines
could break free from their moorings and drift
through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, present-
ing a hazard to all ships.
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