LEBANON: PROSPECTS FOR THE SHIA COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000300050006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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E??E ~ Directorate of rcrct
Intelligence
Lebanon:
Prospects for the
Shia Community
NESA 84-10279
October 1984
334
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NESA 84-10279
October 1984
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Shia Community
Lebanon:
Prospects for the
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by l Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
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Lebanon:
Prospects for the
Shia Community
Key Judgments We believe stability is unlikely in Lebanon unless the government address-
Information available es the economic stagnation in Shia Muslim areas and the Shia demand for
as of 1 October 1984 political power commensurate with their numbers. Failure to do so will
was used in this report.
drive embittered Shias to challenge the central government by instigating
sporadic violence with rival groups. This would prevent political reconcilia-
tion or economic recovery.
In a worst case scenario, mainstream Shias, bereft of hope in the status
quo, would risk starting another full-scale civil war. They could not win be-
cause Syria would oppose them, but the disruption they caused would
strengthen Christian sentiments for partition, postpone Syrian and Israeli
troop withdrawals, add to regional tension, and distract attention from US
policy initiatives.
We believe that the moderate leaders of Lebanon's Shias are more likely to
adopt militant policies than risk ouster by a constituency disgruntled over
their failure to compel the government to address Shia grievances. The
main factors affecting Shia frustration are a stagnating economy, Chris-
tian-Sunni intransigence, Syrian reluctance to support Shia demands, and
failed attempts to gain reforms within the constitutional system.
Amal leader Nabih Barri and other moderates are competing among
themselves and with pro-Iranian radicals for the allegiance of their
coreligionists. His position will be undermined unless he obtains tangible
benefits for his community. Radicals are making progress in infiltrating
Barri's Amal organization, and they will continue their efforts to win broad
Shia support for establishment of an Islamic republic.
Radical fundamentalist Shias-though a minority in the community-will
continue to seek every chance to attack US and other Western personnel
and facilities in Lebanon. They probably will rely on the terrorist tactics-
including kidnapings, assassinations, and vehicle bombs-- that have proved
effective in the past two years and were recently used against the US
Embassy Annex in East Beirut.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10279
October 1984
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In our judgment, Israel's continued presence and policies in southern
Lebanon will stiffen the Shias' resolve to fight Israeli soldiers using
guerrilla tactics and thwart Israel's efforts to pacify southern Lebanon.
Israel's disruption of the southern Lebanese economy and punishment of
whole Shia neighborhoods for the attacks of a few will, in our view, harden
Shia and government leaders against direct talks with Tel Aviv. If Israel
moved to crush a growing Shia resistance movement, initial successes
probably would give way to an even more sophisticated resistance move-
ment. Shia radicals would gain supporters, while the United States would
face renewed accusations in the Arab world of abetting Israeli militarism.
An Israeli withdrawal from much of southern Lebanon would address one
of the key issues driving Shias toward extremism and would temporarily
ease the Shias' anger. Shia radicals, however, would continue to attack
Israeli advisers and their surrogate Army of South Lebanon. Both
moderate and radical leaders would claim responsibility for improving the
Shias' condition. The lull in Shia activity, however, would soon give way to
renewed Shia demands for redress of their economic and political
grievances.
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Lebanon:
Prospects for the
Shia Community[
The Shia community of Lebanon is the poorest, least
educated, and traditionally the most politically under-
represented of Lebanon's major religious communi-
ties. It also is the largest and fastest growing confes-
sional group. The Shias comprise about 40 percent of
the population and may become the majority within a
decade, according to a CIA estimate.' A large Shia
militia, concentrated in the Beirut area but with
forces throughout southern and eastern Lebanon,
guarantees that the Shias will be able to instigate
recurring violence if they choose. It is probable that
they will do so unless they are given a stake in and
derive benefits from a new program of political and
economic reforms for all Lebanese.
Rivalries among current Shia leaders and regional
differences have created competing power centers in
the Shia community. Shia solidarity collapsed with
the disappearance and probable murder in Libya in
1978 of the charismatic Shia leader Imam Musa al-
Sadr. Al-Sadr founded the Higher Shia Islamic
Council, the community's highest religious authority,
and Amal, which is both a Shia militia and a political
movement (see appendix A). Shaykh Muhammad
Mahdi Shams al-Din now is the most influential
religious moderate,
Amal Secretary General Nabih Barri and most of his
high-level Amal colleagues represent the moderate
secular leadership
A critical struggle pits religious and secular moder-
ates who seek redress of Shia grievances through
political change and constitutional reform against
those who advocate the overthrow of the Lebanese
political system. Key radical clerics espousing this
view include Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah,
whose prominence is growing, and Shaykh Subhi al-
Tufayli. The terrorists Husayn al-Musawi and other
members of the Musawi clan from the Bekaa Valley
are secular leaders of the radical movement
Underlying Grievances
Once seemingly content with their lot, we believe the
Shias increasingly resent their role as the underclass
of Lebanese society. The prevalent attitude toward
the Shias among the Lebanese "haves"--Christians,
particularly the Maronites, and wealthy Sunni Mus-
lims-is one of contempt,
Government domestic policies, in
our view, have neglected basic Shia needs, while
Christian-Sunni collusion makes it hard for Shias to
get an education and enter the professions.
Since independence, Lebanese governments have
withheld money for agricultural development in
southern Lebanon, where poor Shia tobacco and
citrus farmers form the majority of the population.
Government neglect of the Shias also extends to
Beirut, where US Embassy officials observe that the
approximately 250,000 Shias packed in the slums of
the southern suburbs live under the worst health and
sanitation conditions of any confessional group in the
capital.
deepens Shia feelings of oppression,
The Shias, who passively endured
Christian-Sunni primacy for more than two decades,
no longer accept the Lebanese formula for power
sharing that was based on the numerical distribution
of confessional groups in 1932. Shias believe that their
numbers entitle them to a greater voice,
and they resent
In our view, the Shia community is undergoing a
process of political radicalization that started during
the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76, gathered momen-
tum in 1979-82, and continued to build in 1983-84.
An indicator of this is the number and increased
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Figure 1
Lebanon: Estimated Distribution of
Confessional Groups, 1975 and 1983
Confessional Group Population
Muslim sects
Christian sects
Druze
Other Christian-2
Other Catholic-5
? The key factors that account for the dramatic shift in confessional ratios
between 1975 and 1983 are the emigration from Lebanon of many
Christians-over 60,000 per year-and the high birthrate among Muslims,
particularly Shias.
frequency of violent acts-both terrorist-guerrilla at-
tacks and urban fighting-committed by Shias
against their perceived enemies in Lebanon. For
example, there were two spectacular acts of Shia
terrorism in 1979 and again in 1980, five in 1981, six
in 1982, and at least six in 1983
2 Shia attacks against Israeli forces in south-
Another indicator of the radicalization process has
been the gradual hardening of Amal chief Barri's
public position toward the Lebanese Government,
rival Christian leaders, and the Israelis over the past
two years. Barri's mild appeals for reconciliation and
"justice" for all Lebanese in 1982 have given way to
more pointed demands for Shia "rights." Barri, more-
over, has shown an increasing willingness to order his
militia to fight. He publicly urged Shia youths to
attack the Israelis in southern Lebanon in September
1984. We believe that Barri has adopted a harder line
because he fears losing his leadership position to more
radical elements within or outside the mainstream
Amal organization. he
came close to losing control of the militia in July 1983
and in February 1984 because of his reluctance to
fight the Lebanese Armyl
What the Shias Want
In our view, Amal leaders such as Nabih Barri
express the sentiments of most Shias in calling for a
strong central government that will end the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon, improve the Shias'
living standards, grant key government posts to Shias,
and take steps to revise the confessional system.
Barri's moderate approach relies on an older genera-
tion outlook that dialogue and compromise can foster
change in the status quo. His position in the govern-
ment and eventually in Amal will be endangered
unless he demonstrates that he can obtain results.
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Figure 2
Distribution of Lebanese Confessional Groups
Golan
1 Heights
~, l occupied)
-~ Isr srael ~
[ ] Maronite
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholic
Mixed Maronite and
Greek Cathol
Shia Muslim
Sunni Muslim
[ _7 Druze
Mixed Druze anti
[ Greek 0rthoilis
Population shifts caused by the June
1982 Israeli invasion are not depicted.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Cogfessionalism. Amal leaders blame political sectar-
ianism, rooted in the confessional system, for Shia
troubles. They believe that this system, which allo-
cates government-controlled positions on the basis of
Pro-Iranian groups-all part of the Hizb
Allah (Party of God) movement-believe the Shias
can end their troubles only by adhering to fundamen-
tal Islamic principles and eventually by dominating
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sect, must be changed,
Even Amal moderates have proposed restricting
appointments along confessional lines to senior posi-
tions. Paradoxically, however, they want to reallocate
posts in the government and civil service to reflect the
current strengths of Lebanese religious groups, ac-
cording to diplomatic officials.
Foreign Relations. The complete withdrawal of Israe-
li forces from southern Lebanon dominates the Shias'
foreign concerns. Shias who were pleased by Israel's
expulsion of Palestinian guerrillas from southern Leb-
anon two years ago now view the Israelis as an
oppressive occupation force,
Although a few Shias cooperate with Israeli
officials and belong to the Israeli-sponsored Army of
South Lebanon, most probably will continue to oppose
the Lebanese political system.
Pro-Iranian radicals recognize they will need time to
recruit sufficient numbers of Shias to support their
objectives. As a result, Hizb Allah clerics have
launched a propaganda campaign aimed at the youth
and urbanized elements in the Shia community. The
clerics use their weekly sermons to emphasize the
"injustices" inflicted on the Shias,
In addition, the clerics and their
followers use Iranian funds to supply food, clothing,
and money to poor Shia families, as well as to sponsor
poor Shia students
The donors stress to the
the Israeli occupation.
Economic Development. Amal officials want the Bei-
rut government to divert funds from military spending
to rebuild Shia areas ravaged by the fighting in Beirut
last February, according to public interviews. Decent
housing, health care, and public utilities head the list
of immediate Shia demands. Amal also insists on
reforms in the management of industry, agriculture,
and tourism, as well as the establishment of a progres-
sive tax system that could create long-term economic
opportunities for the Shias
The radicals rely heavily on the mosques as propagan-
da and recruitment platforms. The mosques-a cen-
tral institution in the community-add moral author-
ity to the radical message and help portray radical
objectives as the proper course for "good" Shia
Muslims to follow. They ensure wide dissemination of
the radical message among underprivileged Shias.
Moreover, the use of mosques, in our judgment, helps
draw a sharp distinction between themselves and the
conventional and corrupt Lebanese political parties.
Political Posts. The Shias, in our view, have yet to
reach a consensus on what political positions will
satisfy them. Although they could lay claim to the
prime ministry-and eventually the presidency-be-
cause of their numbers, so far they have not done so.
We believe that the appointment of Amal chief Barri
as Minister of Justice and Minister of State for the
South and Reconstruction will not placate the Shia
masses.
Radical Objectives and Strategy
The Lebanese Shia groups that killed or kidnaped
over 400 US, French, Israeli, and Saudi citizens in the
past two years want to expel Western influence,
mount a Shia revolt, and establish a Khomeini-style
Hizb Allah leaders are combining their propaganda
campaign with a covert effort to take over the main-
stream Amal organization.
radical Shias have infiltrated the Amal
militia and a few have gained positions of influence.
The radicals are spreading the word among Shias that
Amal leaders such as Nabih Barri lack religious
convictions and are not committed to the Shias'
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The-radicals like their Amal rivals-want to force
Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon. Hizb
Allah-beyond opposing Israel on an ideological lev-
el-sees Israel's presence as a barrier to its revolution-
ary objective. As a result, the radicals reinforce
southern Lebanese Shia anger and fear of permanent
Israeli occupation and encourage attacks against Is-
raeli soldiers and officials. Israeli counterattacks and
searches and seizures help push uncommitted Shias to
accept radical leaders.
In our view, hatred of the United States for its
support of Israel, its backing of an "unjust" status
quo, and its image as the enemy of a resurgent Islam
fuel Hizb Allah's desire to punish US officials. Avail-
able evidence indicates that radicals associated with
Hizb Allah planned and carried out the suicide
bombings at the barracks of the Multinational Force
in Beirut. The subsequent withdrawal of the MNF in
early 1984 probably strengthened the radicals' belief
that terrorism can achieve their objectives. The bomb-
ing of the US Embassy Annex in September 1984 and
the warnings of future attacks on US facilities under-
score, in our view, Hizb Allah's determination to
continue the "struggle" against the US presence in
Lebanon
Opposition to Power Sharing With Shias
Maronite Christian resistance to major reforms con-
tinues to frustrate Shia aspirations for a new distribu-
tion of economic and political power. The Christians,
in our view, are determined to retain control of key
institutions, in part because, as a dwindling minority,
they fear that they ultimately will be swamped by a
Muslim majority. Uncertainty about what will satisfy
moderate Shias and certainty about the intentions of
radical fundamentalist Shias heighten Christian fears.
As a result, we believe many Christians prefer to
oppose concessions and withdraw into a Christian
enclave than face the risks of ceding real power to the
Shias
We expect Sunni Muslims to oppose reforms that give
Shias influence proportionate to their numbers. Sun-
nis have held power and privilege with the Maronites
since 1943, and we believe they recognize that new
arrangements could enable the Shias eventually to
replace them
Sunnis, nonetheless, may be more willing than the
Maronites to make limited concessions to Shia moder-
ates. The Sunnis lack a strong militia and a strong
foreign ally from whom they might expect military
support. Moreover, the geographic dispersion of the
Sunnis gives them a common interest with the Shias
in opposing the breakdown of Lebanon into confes-
sional enclaves.
The Druze, whose power is out of proportion to their
small numbers, want to preserve the status quo. As a
result of the fighting over the past year, the Druze
have consolidated their territory and increased their
influence in the government. In our view, they fear
change would diminish their role.
with Damascus.
Syria-by supporting only minor changes in Leba-
non's political system-also frustrates Shia aspira-
tions. Syrian concern for Shia grievances is guided, in
our view, by its interest in keeping the Christians.
Muslims, and Druze weak and in preserving its key
role in the interconfessional struggles. Syria's support
for the Bikfayya security plan announced last July
reaffirmed its intention to oppose any militia that
attempts to perpetuate instability, as 'bong as the
Lebanese Government coordinates its policies closely
Shia Options
In our judgment, Shia leaders have three options--
work with the government, apply a combination of
bargaining and military pressure, or resort to large-
scale violence. None, in our opinion, will quickly
achieve major gains for the Shias.
violence and meddling by Syria or Iran.
Cooperation With Gemayel. Amal chief Barri has
stated publicly that he wants full control of recon-
struction funds and more political posts for the Shias
from the government. To gain government support,
Barri can argue that his constituents are Lebanese
nationalists who wish to avoid renewed sectarian
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Outside of formal channels, Barri and his colleagues
can try to strike private deals with Druze and Sunni
leaders. Amal could pledge to support traditional
Druze control in the Ash Shuf region and guarantee
Druze commercial interests in Beirut in exchange for
Druze support of Shia demands. To gain Sunni
backing, Amal can promise not to push them out of
their neighborhoods and businesses in West Beirut.
At the same time, Amal can solicit Syrian pressure on
the Christians and Sunnis in the Shias' behalf. Barri
could argue that Syria's interests in stabilizing a
friendly Lebanese government and in avoiding a
confrontation with Israel would be served by sponsor-
ing domestic gains for the restive Shias.
Amal, in our view, can try a political approach to gain
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Continu-
ing appeals for UN mediation and for US pressure on
Israel, combined with encouragement of harassing
attacks against Israeli soldiers in the south, allow
Amal leaders to show their commitment to their
followers. Barri may also quietly encourage the Leba-
nese Government to talk with Israel.
Amal's choice of this option might produce some
economic and political gains sufficient to satisfy older
Shias who may be weary of civil strife. Without
Syrian support, however, Amal's political option prob-
ably would not yield concessions that satisfied young-
er Shias or permanently changed the Shias' under-
privileged position.
The chances are slim that Christian and Sunni
"haves" would voluntarily respond to Amal's initia-
tives. Indeed, Christian leaders, in our view, are
inclined to see Amal's attempts to negotiate a political
settlement as a sign of weakness and an incentive to
oppose further reforms. Damascus, if faced with
having to act alone on behalf of the Shias, probably
would try to mediate and avoid taking sides.F___-]
Amal's political efforts by themselves to gain an
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon would fail.
In our view, Tel Aviv would withdraw its forces from
Lebanon only if it believed an expanded UNIFIL
force and the Army of South Lebanon could keep
hostile guerrillas away from Israel's northern border.
Shia radicals would continue to attack Israeli advisers
and their surrogate Army of South Lebanon. The
Israelis apparently believe the Lebanese Government
and the Army will be unable to assume primary
responsibility for security in southern Lebanon for at
least the next six months
Failure to resolve the major issues embittering the
Shias would further expose Amal officials to radical
criticism and undermine their leadership positions.
Pro-Iranian and other radical Shias, in our view,
would seize the opportunity to recruit a wider follow-
ing in the community. Amal leaders probably would
try to silence their rivals by taking a harder line in
demanding concessions and Israel's withdrawal. F_
Bargaining Combined With Military Pressure. Amal
leaders have the option of taking military initiatives
intended to weaken Christian-Sunni resistance to
reforms and strengthen the Shias' political bargaining
position. Increasingly bold initiatives, in our view,
would show heightened Amal frustration with the
political stalemate and willingness to risk casualties
and hardships. Amal officials, at this stage, probably
would be reluctant to abandon completely the Leba-
nese political system and would link their military
moves with appeals for Arab-particularly Syrian-
understanding and support.
In our view, Amal can resume intermittent shelling of
Christian and Sunni neighborhoods in Beirut without
provoking direct Syrian intervention. Amal officials,
in a bolder move, could order their 5,000-man, full-
time militia to seize all key government and commer-
cial facilities in West Beirut. We believe the militia,
whose numbers might swell to over 10,000 in a crisis,
could hold West Beirut unless confronted by Syrian
forces.
Given Christian fears of Muslim hegemony, Maro-
nites-backed by their 3,000- to 4,000-strong Leba-
nese Forces militia-probably would resist Amal's
bargaining and pressure tactics. We expect they
would push for a separate confessional enclave, try to
forge an alliance with Sunni and Druze forces by
portraying a common Shia "threat," and seek Israeli
military support.
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Syria's reaction to the Shia initiatives would heavily
influence Sunni and Druze responses. Strong Syrian
support probably would elicit guarded Druze and
possibly Sunni cooperation. If Syrian officials opposed
Shia actions, Sunnis in Beirut, looking to Damascus,
would resist major concessions to the Shias, despite
the weakness of their 500-man Murabitun militia.
The Druze, with little to gain by helping the Shias
under these circumstances, in our view, would put
distance between themselves and the Shias and possi-
bly oppose their actions
Military Takeover. Amal leaders could mobilize Shia
fighters in a drive to establish by force a Muslim-
dominated government, centered on the Shias. This
would amount to a desperation move by a totally
frustrated Amal or the radicals to shock the Lebanese
political system. A radical Shia push would prompt
most Christians to resist fiercely while they fortified
an enclave in Jabal Lubnan (Mount Lebanon), ex-
plored a tactical alliance with the Druze, and sought
Israeli military intervention. Some Christians might
flee the country. Initially, the Sunnis in Beirut would
resist, but they later would lapse into sullen acquies-
cence.
In our judgment, a Shia drive against the government
would fail. Syria would be willing to use many of its
45,000 troops in Lebanon to prevent the Shias from
gaining the upper hand. The secular government in
Damascus fears that the Shias might support its
domestic Islamic opponents and help to spread an
Islamic revolution in the area. Tel Aviv might conduct
limited airstrikes to support Christians in Beirut, but
it would concentrate on keeping a firm grip over the
Shias in southern Lebanon.
A defeat of the Shias by Syria probably would leave
Damascus facing a hostile Shia population. Attempts
to mediate a meaningful political accommodation
among the confessional groups would cease. Chris-
tians would see an opportunity to try to reassert their
prominence, thereby ensuring further turmoil. The
defeat also would pave the way for radical Shias to
take over the political and military wings of Amal and
attempt to reorient and rebuild them over time
Outlook
We believe Amal officials, currently the most widely
recognized spokesmen for the Shias, will face growing
pressures to obtain tangible gains for their communi-
ty. Disadvantaged Shias have not benefited from
Amal's military takeover of West Beirut last Febru-
ary and Nabih Barri's appointment to the Lebanese
Cabinet. Young Shias--radicalized by Musa al-
Sadr's drive for Shia rights in the early I 970s, by
later Shia revolutionary successes in Iran, and by nine
years of civil turmoil---want more than token repre-
sentation in the government. Poor economic condi-
tions, the longstanding grievance in the community,
are worsening and are likely to fuel Shia bitterness.
Even with increased economic reconstruction in Leba-
non, investors would be strongly inclined to bolster the
capital-intensive service sector before helping the
labor-intensive industries in Beirut and the agricultur-
al sector in southern Lebanon that give most Shias
their livelihood. Moreover, as long as Israeli forces
remain in southern Lebanon, radical Shias will have
an explosive issue to discredit Amal moderates, erode
Barri's leadership, and possibly topple him
The leadership positions of moderates such as Nabih
Barri will become increasingly untenable, in our view,
if they remain reluctant to order military action to
alter the Shias' situation. Public interviews indicate,
however, that in the near term they believe that
continued fighting will further weaken the Lebanese
economy and diminish the chances for government
and outside financial aid to the Shias. Fear of a
confrontation with Syrian troops will also make them
cautious.
In the near term, Amal chief Barri probably will use
the political option in the hope of gradually gaining
concessions for the Shias. Judging from his actions
over the past two years, Barri is conciliatory in
temperament and inclined to avoid risky decisions.
Although Barri senses the Shias' frustration, he seems
to believe that his Cabinet position and the lowered
public activity of his radical rivals since Syria's
reassertion of influence in Lebanon give him time and
freedom to maneuver politically.
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We believe, however, that growing Shia discontent
eventually will push Barri to take military initiatives
or risk replacement. Radicalization of the Shia com-
munity now under way will become widespread unless
an outside power forces Christians and Sunnis to meet
Shia demands for a greater political voice and eco-
nomic benefits.
Radicals will continue their efforts to win broad Shia
support for the establishment of an Islamic republic.
The longer moderate leaders fail to gain tangible
benefits for the community, the more weight the
radical argument will have with Lebanon's Shias.
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, unless the government addresses the
economic stagnation in Shia areas and the demand for
more political power in line with their numbers,
embittered Shias will spark recurring crises in Leba-
non that add to regional tensions and hinder US
policy initiatives.
Fundamentalist Shias will continue to seek opportuni-
ties to attack US and allied personnel and facilities in
Lebanon. They probably will rely on the terrorist
tactics-including kidnapings, assassinations, and ve-
hicle bombs-that have proved effective in the past
two years. The severity and scope of the radical threat
to US interests in the area will depend on the
willingness of many Shias to join the radical side.
We believe that Israel's presence and policies in
southern Lebanon, if continued, will deepen the Shias'
hatred and stiffen their resolve to fight Israeli soldiers
with guerrilla tactics. Israel's disruption of the south-
ern Lebanese economy and punishment of whole Shia
neighborhoods for the attacks of a few are also likely
to harden Shia and government leaders against direct
talks with Tel Aviv. In our view, if Israel moved to
crush a growing Shia resistance movement, initial
successes probably would later give way to an even
more sophisticated resistance movement. Radical Shi-
as would gain supporters in the community, while the
United States would face renewed accusations in the
Arab world of abetting Israeli "aggression.'
In our view, addressing the key issues driving Leba-
non's Shias toward extremism-economic stagnation,
political underrepresentation, and Israeli occupa-
tion-would facilitate retaining moderates in posi-
tions of leadership in that community. Regarding
economic stagnation, we believe any real stabilization
of Lebanon would require Christian and Sunni leaders
to come to grips with the long-term dangers to their
security and business interests of an increasingly
hostile, armed Shia population. Immediate action by
the Lebanese Government to reconstruct Shia homes
and improve social services in the Shia slums of
Beirut, in our view, would serve Christian-Sunni
interests and increase the chances for stability in the
capital. Lebanese officials would be inclined to ad-
dress the Shia's economic grievances only in response
to outside leverage.
Even minor improvements in the Shias' economic and
political status would bolster the position of moderate
Shias and deflate the radicals' appeal in the Shia
community. At a minimum, however, Christian lead-
ers probably would complain about favoritism toward
the Shias and try to circumvent the aid programs. In
an act of extremism, they could oppose the aid
programs and seek Druze and Sunni military support
in shelling Shia neighborhoods.
Saudi initiatives also could help the Shias. An easing
of the Saudi boycott of Lebanese produce would
relieve some of the burden on Shia farmers. In our
view, Riyadh would link ending its economic boycott
to the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, even
though its primary concern is to keep Israeli products
out of Saudi Arabia.
Saudi pressure on Sunni leaders might lead to greater
Sunni support for reconstruction of Shia areas in the
Beirut suburbs. We believe Saudi pressure on the
Sunnis to cooperate would be minimal, however, while
there is a chance the Shias might permanently take
over Sunni areas in West Beirut.
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Appendix A
Emergence of the
Shia Community
The term Shia or Shiite derives from "Shiat Ali," or
the partisans of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the
prophet Muhammad. Following Muhammad's death
in the early 7th century, Shia Muslims split from
orthodox Sunnis over the issue of succession to reli-
gious and political leadership of the Muslim commu-
nity, insisting that only Ali and his direct descendants
possess qualities to rule. In response to persecution by
the Sunni majority, a group of Shias migrated to
Lebanon late in the 7th century.
The Shias settled in the Mount Lebanon area and
prospered during the 10th and 11th centuries under
the protection of the Shia Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo.
The decline of Fatimid power, the Crusader invasion,
and the rise of the Ottoman Turks resulted in the
Shias' expulsion to the northern Bekaa Valley and
southern Lebanon, where they were largely ignored
until recent times.
In the south, where about half of the Shia population
resides, they constitute a majority in the districts of
Tyre, Sidon, and Marj'Uyun. In the Bekaa, they are a
majority in the Ba'labakk and Al Hirmil districts. As
a result of Israeli-Palestinian fighting in the 1970s,
Shia families began moving to Beirut's suburban
slums, particularly Ash Shiyah
Wealth in the Shia community is unevenly distribut-
ed. Hashish farmers in the Bekaa Valley and citrus
growers on the southern coast are relatively well off.
Menial laborers in Beirut and tobacco farmers in the
south, however, who must lease land from absentee
landlords, barely subsist. The French, who controlled
Lebanon from 1920 to the 1940s, concentrated their
development efforts on Mount Lebanon and Beirut.
Successive Lebanese governments also have neglected
the south.
Either from a sense of powerlessness or from a lack of
desire to disturb the status quo, influential Shia
families such as the Assads, the Usayrans, and the
Hamadas have done little to improve the sect's eco-
nomic situation. Until the emergence in Lebanese
politics of Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1969-related by
marriage to Ayatollah Khomeini-Shia grievances
From 1969 until his disappearance and probable
murder in mid-1978, al-Sadr succeeded in galvanizing
Lebanon's Shia population into a political force. As a
man of religion, he capitalized on the Shia respect for
religious leadership. His formation of the Higher Shia
Islamic Council, separate from the Sunni-dominated
General Muslim Higher Council, fostered solidarity
on the basis of religious belief. At the same time, his
theme-the unjust deprivation of the community-
awakened the Shias to political action.
The Shia Awakening
Domestic and regional developments from 1975
through early 1984 transformed lower-class Shias
from a traditionally passive group into an embittered
and angry mass awaiting the emergence of a charis-
matic leader.
The civil war of 1975-76 and frequent Israeli raids on
Shia villages in southern Lebanon in the 1970s in-
stilled fear among lower-class Shias about their physi-
cal security. The violence also demonstrated to the
Shias the inability of the Lebanese Government and
their traditional leaders to protect them. Traditional
chiefs, who had no militias, were discredited, and the
feudal system of patronage in the Shia community
became irrelevant.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Former President of the National Assembly Kama]
al-Assad is an example of the traditional Shia bosses
whose influence has waned since the outbreak of the
civil war. Assad's family connections have guaranteed
his membership in government for over 30 years. 25X1
Many young Shias, who increasingly consider him
ineffective, ignore or oppose him,
poor Shias, particularly
the youth, started responding to any figures or orga-
nized groups that promised to improve their lot.
Meanwhile, according to academic studies, rural Shi-
as who migrated from the south to the capital to 25X1
escape the fighting were embittered. by having to live
in the overcrowded Shia slums
were ignored.
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Three events-Israel's first major invasion of Leba-
non in March 1978, the disappearance of Amal
founder Musa al-Sadr in August 1978, and the
Islamic revolution in Iran that toppled the Shah in
January 1979 accelerated the mobilization of Leba-
non's Shia community and helped to focus Shia
demands for greater political influence. The Israeli
Operation Litani, which,
claimed almost 1,000 Shia lives, prompted
many Shias to join Amal for protection. Although the
presumed "martyrdom" of Imam al-Sadr gave the
Shias a unifying symbol of discontent with their
situation, Ayatollah Khomeini's success in overthrow-
ing a seemingly strong military/security establish-
ment demonstrated what a well-organized and mobi-
lized Shia community could accomplish
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