AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR THE INSURGENTS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan: Prospects
for the Insurgents
in the Western Provinces
cre
Copy 2 9 6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Top Secret
! t~N Directorate of
Afghanistan: Prospects
for the Insurgents
in the Western Provinces
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 84-10181 CX
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Afghanistan: Prospects
for the Insurgents
in the Western Provinces
Key Judgments Resistance activity will continue to undermine government and Soviet
Information available security in the three western provinces-Herat, Farah, and Nimruz-that
as of 20 April 1984 make up a quarter of Afghanistan. We believe that increasing insurgent ef-
was used in this report.
fectiveness will hinder Soviet efforts to build bases in southwestern
Afghanistan that could threaten US interests in South Asia and the
Persian Gulf:
? The 15,000 insurgents active in the area have attacked supply lines,
raided airfields, and continually contested government control of the
country's third-largest city with successes comparable to those of some
better armed guerrilla bands operating in eastern Afghanistan.
? We believe that the resistance forces will continue to expand and that in-
creasing cooperation among groups will help reduce supply shortages and
gradually lead to more effective insurgent operations.
Although the Soviets probably see the fighting in the west as secondary to
that in eastern Afghanistan, they probably recognize that the resistance in
the west has put increasing demands on limited Soviet and Afghan forces
and could develop insurgent strongholds like those in the east. We expect
that the Afghan Government will increase its air and ground units in the
area but that Soviet and Afghan forces will remain far too few and
ineffective to destroy the insurgency:
? The Soviets might need to permanently deploy at least two additional
divisions to significantly reduce the resistance in the west. Such an
augmentation would occur, however, only as part of a massive Soviet
reinforcement in Afghanistan, which is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Iran has given military aid to the Afghan resistance primarily to develop
pro-Iranian Shia insurgent groups in the western provinces and especially
in central Afghanistan and to try to expand Iranian influence in the
country:
? We believe that Tehran will try to limit the activities of Afghan
insurgents and refugees in Iran. The Iranians refuse to let their country
become a major resistance supply base and sanctuary because of the
threat that would be posed to Iranian security by large numbers of
independent Afghan insurgent groups based in Iran.
Top Secret
NESA 84-10181 CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 m Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Expanding insurgent activity in the western provinces will increase the
chances of border incidents between Iranian and Soviet or Afghan forces,
causing relations between Moscow and Tehran to worsen further:
? Despite concern about Iranian aid to the insurgents, we believe the
Soviets will launch no major or long-range attacks into Iran because of
the lack of long-term benefits against the Afghan insurgents and the
possible impact on future Soviet relations with Iran.
? Continued deterioration of the border situation probably would compel
Iran and the USSR to consider deploying military forces to the Iran-
Afghanistan border region-probably from Iranian forces on the Iraqi
front and Soviet forces elsewhere in Afghanistan.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Afghanistan: Prospects
for the Insurgents
in the Western Provinces
Insurgent activity in Herat, Farah, and Nimruz Prov-
inces has involved about 15 percent of the estimated
full- and part-time armed guerrillas fighting in Af-
ghanistan. They operate in an area covering about a
quarter of the country. Although fewer in number,
less well armed, and developing more slowly than the
resistance in eastern Afghanistan, insurgent groups in
the west have steadily become more effective and
have sometimes achieved successes comparable to
those of some groups operating in the east.
Increasing insurgent operations in the western region
since 1979 have helped prevent the Soviets from
taking advantage of one of the potential strategic
benefits of the occupation of Afghanistan and have
raised new liabilities for Moscow. Without firm con-
trol of the region, the Soviets cannot safely build or
maintain bases there to project their military power
into South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Insurgent
operations across and near the Iranian border and
Soviet and Afghan counterattacks have become seri-
ous irritants in Soviet relations with Iran. Insurgent
attacks on the main road from the USSR have
hampered the flow of supplies to western and southern
parts of the country, helping to isolate Qandahar and
Herat, the second- and third-largest cities in Afghani-
Attacks by 3,000 to 4,000 insurgents in and around
Herat have made Afghanistan's third-largest city a
constant trouble spot for the Soviets and the Afghan
Government.
nsurgents controlled 90
the insur
gents elected their own mayor and set prices and
taxes in the city's bazaar. Embassy sources stated
that in October 1983 insurgent attacks closed the
road to the airport for three days. The same sources
indicate that a month later insurgents killed 26
government officials during a single attack in the city.
stan.
Resistance groups in western Afghanistan have
steadily become more effective, raising military costs
to the Afghan regime and Soviet forces in the region.
The city of Herat has come under periodic insurgent
attack. Government control often has been limited to
a few towns, and in many the resistance controls all
but the government garrisons after sundown. Afghan
Ministry of Defense estimates suggest that the gov-
ernment has not controlled more than 30 percent of
Resistance forces have demonstrated a great ability
to escape destruction by retreating into the nearby
mountains or into Iran, only to return to the Herat
area later. Embassy sources reported that insurgent
activity around the city resumed after the April
offensive. They reported in August 1983 that govern-
ment security around Herat had again deteriorated.
the three provinces since the Soviet invasion.'
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 T__ . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Iranian-Afghan Border Area
Selected airfield
Selected province
Road
o 100 200
Kilometers
Sovi~t Union
%~ no
boundary
Oman
- Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
Chahar
Borjak
G~;ipte>_#)
Saudi
Arabia
Area of
main map
Qandahar
;Quetta
P,tt kiota n
bian Sam
Boundaryrepresentation is
not neceeeerdy authoritative.
KABUL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Resistance groups in the west have been most effec-
tive in concentrating their attacks on outposts and the
main Soviet and Afghan supply road that extends
almost 600 kilometers from the Soviet border through
Herat to Qandahar City.
we estimate that the insurgents, using mines
or small-arms fire, have destroyed or damaged be-
tween 500 and 1,000 vehicles in the region in h
Soviet invasion in late 1979.
insurgent attacks destroyed at least 45 armored
vehicles and 150 trucks in the three provinces in the
year ending June 1983.
strong insurgent attacks on outposts in Farah
Province in 1983 had forced regime officials to flee to
Kabul
Some insurgent groups have improved their tactics
and intelligence to avoid or limit the effects of enemy
sweep operations and to take advantage of the nearby
border with Iran.
Guerrillas in the three provinces also have improved
their ability to cope with enemy air attacks. We
estimate insur-
gent small-arms fire has shot down as many as 40
Soviet and Afghan aircraft in the three provinces
since the Soviet invasion. Embassy sources reported
that insurgent ground fire severely damaged commer-
cial aircraft landing at Herat Airfield in early 1983.
These tactics have helped keep insurgent casualties
low and morale generally high, although the war
were light during intensive Soviet and Afghan attacks
around Herat in April 1983, according to Embassy
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
sources. The war, however, had caused malnutrition 25X1
among some insurgent groups and civilians in early
1983.
Organization, Manpower, and Cooperation
We believe that the increasing success of the resist-
ance since the Soviet invasion has helped increase
insurgent manpower considerably.
provinces.
and part-time armed guerrillas in the three western
reports in 1982 and 1983 noted that there were at
over parts of the city of Herat. Embassy
nization or leadership. The lack of cohesion among
local insurgent groups has made it easier for the
Afghan Government to maintain a degree of control
Insurgent forces in the region are fragmented into
many small independent groups with no overall orga-
least 23 groups operating in the three provinces. The
Jamiat-i-Islami insurgent group in Herat Province
has become the most effective and, with an estimated
500 to 1,000 men, the largest band in the region,
We believe that cooperation among these groups has
increased slowly, helping to raise overall insurgent
effectiveness. In late 1982
ently in military activities but cooperated on logistics.
the eight major insurgent groups
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2.5X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
made considerable efforts to expand its influence and
cooperation with groups in neighboring provinces.
The relatively small number of Shias in the area,
estimated to be around 15 percent of the population,
has so far limited Iran's influence in the western
provinces.
Weapons and Supplies
A lack of weapons and ammunition, in our view, has
hindered insurgent capabilities and effectiveness in
the region and may have weakened civilian support
especially short of heavy mac nine uns and mortars
and had few automatic weapons.
civilian morale had suffered because of the lack
of air defense weapons necessary to defend villages
against air attacks. The Jamiat-i-Islami insurgent
organization around Herat City, however, is relativel
well armed with small arms and machineguns
Long supply lines from Pakistan have forced resist-
ance groups in the west to build their arsenals slowly
from local sources. Accounts from insurgents state
that most of their arms have been captured from
regime forces or have come from defectors. Groups in
the west have received relatively small amounts of
weapons
Iranian Involvement With the Afghan Insurgency
Relations With the Afghan Resistance and Refugees
We believe Iran wants to build insurgent groups in the
western provinces that will remain loyal to Iran and
increase Iranian influence in the region. High-ranking
Iranian clerics and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
are assisting some Afghan insurgents in Iran and
Afghanistan.
Ayatollah Montazeri-Ayatollah Khomei-
ni's heir apparent-had been involved in supporting
Shias in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion.
supporting the Afghan insurgents.
the two largest pro-Iranian groups, totaling a few
hundred men each, are the Hezbollah in Herat Prov-
ince and the Reza in Nimruz Province. We estimate
that the two to four known pro-Iranian groups in the
three provinces have between 500 and 1,000 armed
men.
fami ies of Afghan insurgents fighting in Afghanistan
were held hostage in Iran as a way to force the men to
support pro-Iranian insurgent groups in Afghanistan.
Iranian authorities also have forced Shia refugees in
Iran to join pro-Iranian political organizations to
receive identity cards and food rations
generally reliable source.2
Increasing religious and economic tensions between
Iranians and the estimated 1 million Afghan refugees
in Iran have undermined that country's relations witl:
some Afghan resistance groups. Afghan insurgent
leaders have become increasingly concerned over food
shortages, harassment, and poor treatment of Afghan
refugees by Iran
Long-simmering economic problems
caused Afghan refugees to riot in several Iranian
cities in December 1983. Embassy sources in Islam-
abad stated in early 1983 that 40,000 Afghan Sunnis
were in Iranian refugee camps. Other Embassy
sources report that thousands of Afghan Sunnis left
Iran in late 1983 because of harassment and to escape
being sent to refugee camps.
2 Iranian efforts to develop pro-Iranian groups in the predominantly
Shia area of central Afghanistan appear to have been more
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Military Assistance
Iran apparently has provided relatively small amounts
of aid to the Afghan resistance in the western prov-
inces and mostly to pro-Iranian bands. Jamiat com-
manders around the city of Herat complained in 1983
that they had received few arms from Iran
In late 1982, Afghan insurgents
and the general populace expressed considerable re-
sentment because Iran refused to give the resistance
Iran's control of cross-border movement also is used to
favor pro-Iranian groups. Afghan insurgent groups in
the western provinces complained in early 1983 that
Iranian Revolutionary Guards let only pro-Iranian
Shia groups cross the border.
Although Iran has increased its efforts to control t e
border, we judge that insurgent groups can still cross
the frontier in many areas.
The Iranians have trained few Afghan insurgents in
Iran. We estimate that Iranian Revolutionary Guards
instruct between 1,000 and 2,000 Afghan Shia insur-
gents in small arms and guerrilla warfare each year.
Reliable sources assert that training is given only to
pro-Iranian Afghan Shias, who must agree to foster
pro-Iranian organizations when they return to Af-
ghanistan
Soviet and Afghan Government Activities
Soviet and Afghan officials have become increasingly
concerned over the deteriorating security situation in
the western provinces and Iran's support for the
Afghan insurgents.'
Military Buildup and Operations
The gradual increase in insurgent activity has forced
the Soviets and Afghans to deploy more Afghan
forces to the western provinces despite the need for
troops and aircraft in other parts of the country.
additional Afghan units also were sent to
Farah Province in early August. We estimate that
Afghan forces in the west increased by about 3,000
men in 1983.
Air Force assigned new helicopters and fixed-wing
Afghan and Soviet officials also have made plans to
strengthen their air capabilities against insurgents in
the region. the Afghan
aircraft to Herat Province in April 1983.
a dir25
runway at an airfield 9 kilometers from the Iranian
border had been lengthened by 1,000 meters. Al-
though this base could not support fighters or bomb-
ers, it could support transports or helicopters aiding
ground combat operations near the Iranian border.
The additional ground and air capabilities have been
used, in our view, primarily to try to reduce insurgent
infiltration from Iran.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
] 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Iranian Attitudes Regarding the Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 has been
a major cause of soured relations between the Kho-
meini regime and the USSR. There is a broad
consensus among Iranian clerical factions against any
modification of Tehran's attitude toward events in
Afghanistan.
Tehran does not recognize the Babrak government
and has been aiding some Afghan insurgent groups,
ignoring protests from Moscow and Kabul. Iranian
media regularly praise insurgent activities and criti-
cize Kabul's links to Moscow. Iran wants a cleric-led
Islamic regime established in Afghanistan and will
not participate in negotiations that do not anticipate
such a result.
Soviet and Afghan units, however, have used multi-
battalion sweep operations as their primary tactic
against insurgent groups in the west. The relatively
flat terrain of most of the three provinces has helped
Soviet motorized and tank units in these attacks.
We believe these efforts have generally failed to
destroy the resistance groups or reduce infiltration.
insurgent activity re-
sumes relatively quickly after Soviet and Afghan units
depart. Despite encirclement efforts during operations
near the city of Herat in April 1983, for example
insurgent groups managed to escape into Iran.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Most Afghan troops have 25X1
been press-ganged into service, have had only a few
days' training, and do poorly on the battlefield. 25X1;1
The poor performance of Afghan, and sometimes of We judge that there are far too few Soviet and
Soviet, troops also has helped undermine the effective- Afghan Government forces in the region to destroy
ness of such operations.
insurgent groups, maintain control in key areas, or
significantly reduce infiltration.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Iranian Revolutionary Guards protect the Soviet Embassy after its Afghan refugees in Tehran burn the Soviet flag on the third
attack by demonstrators protesting the invasion of Afghanistan, anniversary of the Soviet-backed government in Kabul, April 1981.
Subversion in Afghanistan and Iran
To weaken the resistance, the Soviets and Afghans
have tried to foment tension between Iranians and
Afghan refugees, as well as Shias and Sunnis in Iran Prospects and Implications
and Afghanistan.
Prospects for the Resistance in the Western Provinces
We believe that slowly improving organization and
cooperation among insurgent groups will lead to more
effective resistance operations in the western prov-
inces. Increasing combat success and low casualties
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Potential Soviet Air Coverage From Afghanistan
?ABU DHA
U.A.E.
man,
nee Line
will help maintain insurgent morale and provide
sufficient recruits to replace losses and expand forces
in the next two years. Resistance forces will continue
to experience some equipment shortages, but we
believe collaboration on logistics will help the many
groups establish better supply lines to Pakistan. Such
joint efforts may well foster sharing of information,
training of personnel, and, eventually, coordinated
military operations.
Caspian
Sea
TEHRAN
Pal istan
BoandaryrepresoMati- is
not neaesealily authoritative,
The Jamiat-i-Islami organization probably will be the
most successful insurgent group in promoting cooper-
ation and expanding its control among insurgent
groups in the west. We believe it will continue to use
its effective organization in Herat Province and grow-
ing contacts with other guerrilla bands in nearby
regions to increase resistance cooperation. The efforts
Low altitude
High altitude
Combat radii from Shindand Airbase
and Chahar Borjak
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
^vu ~cu ci
The Strategic Implications of Soviet Airpower in
Afghanistan
Our analysis shows that a new airfield in southwest-
ern Afghanistan would not bring most tactical air-
craft now in the Soviet Air Forces within operational
range of Persian Gulf targets. We expect that by the
end of the 1980s, however, the Soviets will have
begun deploying new aerial tankers and new tactical
aircraft to the Soviet Air Forces that may have aerial
refueling capabilities. If operated together with tank-
ers from airfields in Afghanistan, such tacticalfight-
ers could strike targets throughout southwest Asia.
Basing longer range aircraft, such as the Backfire
bomber, at airbases in Afghanistan would significant-
ly improve the Soviets' ability to attack more distant
targets, including US carrier task forces in the Indian
Ocean and the US base on Diego Garcia. (Unescorted
Backfire bombers already can strike Persian Gulf
targets from bases in the USSR.) We believe, how-
ever, that the Soviets would need to lengthen the
runways at existing airbases in Afghanistan to sup-
port Backfire bomber operations.
The construction of major new airbases in southwest-
ern Afghanistan would be costly and confront ex-
treme logistic difficulties that would be worsened by
increasingly effective insurgent attacks on supply
lines, construction sites, and construction equipment.
Imagery shows that Soviet airbases in the USSR
usually are located along major lines of communica-
tion, including railroads. There are no railroads in
Afghanistan, and the economic infrastructure, espe-
cially the poor road system, would hamper efforts to
build and support an airbase in southwestern Afghan-
istan, even in peacetime.
of Jamiat and other groups to expand their control,
however, could cause more infighting among insur-
gent groups, especially between pro-Iranian Shia and
more moderate Sunni bands.
We judge that the growing use of hit-and-run guerril-
la tactics will help individual insurgent groups in the
western provinces to survive and to inflict consider-
able damage on the enemy in the next two years. We
expect that, as bands slowly grow larger and become
better armed, they will become more effective in
attacks on vulnerable border and road security out-
posts and on convoys in the three provinces. Greater
access to mortars and more experience in their use
will lead to more effective hit-and-run raids against
airfields, such as at Shindand and Herat, and Soviet
and Afghan garrisons. Although resistance groups
probably will launch more attacks on Herat, they will
not be able to take and maintain control of this or any
other major city against major Soviet and Afghan
counterattacks.
Iranian Involvement in the Afghan Insurgency
Although Iran in our view will not give significant aid
to independent Afghan insurgent groups in the west-
ern provinces, Tehran will continue to provide mili-
tary support and training to pro-Iranian insurgent
groups in the region and probably would increase this
assistance if the war with Iraq ended. We judge that,
by infiltrating a few hundred additional trained and
armed men a month to each of the three provinces,
Iran could make the pro-Iranian insurgent groups an
important military force in the region in about a year.
Such growth in resistance forces would increase Sovi-
et and Afghan regime military problems but also
would cause more infighting between pro-Iranian and
independent insurgent groups.
Iranian officials will try to limit the presence and
activities of Afghan resistance groups and refugees in
Iran. They will keep Iran from becoming a major
resistance base and sanctuary such as Pakistan be-
cause of the potential security threats posed by the
presence of large numbers of well-armed, independent
Afghan insurgent groups. We believe the Iranians will
continue to harass Afghan refugees and attempt to
force them into camps, actions that will increase
tensions between Iranians and Afghans in Iran and
cause some refugees to flee to Pakistan.
Soviet Options
We believe the Soviets might need to deploy perma-
nently at least two additional motorized rifle divisions
to significantly reduce the growing resistance in the
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 T - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Areas Unsuited to Cross-Country Movement in Afghanistan
Area unsuited to cross-
country movement by wheeled
and tracked vehicles
western provinces. The Soviets, however, would un-
dertake such a buildup only as part of a massive
reinforcement throughout Afghanistan, which we do
not see as likely in the foreseeable future. Although
the Soviets might consider deploying a few thousand
troops to bolster security in the area, we do not believe
this would significantly improve the situation.
Instead, we believe Soviet and Afghan forces will try
to reduce the insurgency over the next year by
deploying more Afghan forces to the western prov-
inces and by launching more large-scale attacks. The
Afghan units, however, will continue to be under
strength, untrained, and unreliable. Although the
efforts of Soviet and Afghan forces will temporarily
weaken insurgent control in some areas, we believe
that these forces will remain far too few and ineffec-
More intensive Soviet and Afghan operations in the
western provinces probably would lead to increased
violations of Iran's border. Tehran will protest such
incidents but, because of the war with Iraq and its
military weakness in the east, will try to avoid a major
confrontation. We believe that the Soviets and Af-
ghans will not launch deep or large-scale raids into
Iran, because they realize that such attacks would
involve serious international political costs and would
not yield permanent gains against the resistance.
We believe the Soviets are not now planning to invade
and occupy all or part of Iran solely because of
tive to curtail the insurgency.
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Afghan insurgent activity.
25X1
25X1
Soviet and Afghan air and ground forces have made
shallow incursions across the border with Iran but
have avoided large-scale or deep attacks. Embassy
report that in December 1983 the Soviet
Along with their military efforts in Afghanistan, we 25X1
believe the Soviets and Afghans will increase attempts
to foment subversion in Iran to weaken the resistance
groups and erode Iranian support for them. They will
focus on religious and economic differences that will
increase tension between Afghan refugees and Irani-
25X1
25X1
Ambassador in Kabul admitted that Soviet troops
had followed insurgents into Iran on a number of
Although the Iranians have not made an issue of the
small-scale incursions, they have sent strong protests
to Kabul after several larger attacks.
Iran's reluctance to respond militarily to the incur-
sions probably stems in part from its military weak-
ness in the east. We estimate that there are only a few
regular army troops and a relatively small number of
lightly armed border troops and Revolutionary
the Afghan insurgents.
ans. They also may launch clandestine attacks against
Iranian leaders and facilities that can be blamed on
Implications for the United States
Resistance activity in the western provinces, especial-
ly if augmented by more foreign material support
through Pakistan, would make it more difficult for the 25X1
Soviets to develop facilities capable of threatening US 25X1
interests in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Al-
though the guerrillas could not prevent the Soviets
from establishing new airbases, we judge that the
threat of insurgent attacks would be a factor influenc-
ing the Soviets against stationing long-range bombers,
fighters, or transport aircraft in western Afghanistan.
Increasingly effective and widespread insurgent at-
tacks also would hinder construction of the roads the
Soviets would need to support bases in the area. Soviet
military planners probably realize that, even after
such roads were built, continuing resistance raids
along supply lines could create problems for major
regional operations.
Soviet military threat to Pakistan.
A deterioration of the situation along the Iran-Af-
ghanistan border, in our judgment, could cause Iran
and the Soviets to divert some of their military forces 25X1
to the area, weakening both countries' ability to 25X1
threaten countries in the region that are friendly to
the United States. Iran probably would consider
redeploying some of its forces from the Iraqi front to
the east, thus reducing its military capabilities against
the Persian Gulf. Unless the Soviets augment their
forces with troops from the USSR, they would have to
consider moving some of their units from other parts
of Afghanistan to the three western provinces. This
would weaken their ability to fight the Afghan resist-
ance in eastern Afghanistan and somewhat reduce the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100100004-7