DIRECTORY OF LEBANESE MILITIAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000100070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Directory of
Lebanese Militias
Secret
NESA 84-10171C
June 1984
C
A 5
Copy 3 4
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Intelligence
Directory of
Lebanese Militias
Operations.
This paper was prepared by lof the
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 84-10171 C
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Secret
Directory of
Lebanese Militias
Summary In Lebanon, indigenous and foreign forces are struggling for turf, political
Information available influence, or merely to justify their existence.', Many of them profit from
as of 15 April 1984 the almost constant fighting, and their prestige and the foreign or domestic
was used in this report.
support they attract depend on their ability to,maintain viable militias.
Effective national reconciliation almost certainly would require disarming
the militias.
In the turbulence since the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76, Lebanese
politicians have lost much of their popular support to the young militia
leaders who have entered the political spotlight. Small bands of street
fighters flourished in the chaos wrought by the almost constant internecine
fighting. The dissolution of the Lebanese Army during the civil war freed
many officers and enlisted men to join the militias, which then profited
from the superior training and fighting experience of these former Army
members. Entire Army units deserted and formed the core of new militias
such as Maj. Sa'd Haddad's "Army of Free Lebanon" (now the "Army of
South Lebanon") and the Lebanese Arab Army.
Many of the new militia leaders have amassed considerable military
support and, therefore, must be included in any serious efforts to devise a
new political order for Lebanon. Two of these younger politicians, Druze
leader Walid Junblatt and Shia Amal leader Nabih Barri, preside over
Lebanon's largest non-Christian militias and are virtually uncontested
spokesmen for their coreligionists. Their militias exist principally to defend
their home areas and to exert pressure on the Lebanese Government to
redress their political and economic grievances.
The future of Lebanon also may be shaped by the spoiler tactics of militia
leaders who, although less politically visible than Junblatt and Barri, could
try to destabilize any new Lebanese government. Leaders of smaller, often
more radical, militias probably are less interested in political debate
because their organizations would cease to exist if the Lebanese security
situation stabilized. One such leader is Ibrahim Qulaylat of the Beirut-
based Murabitun militia (nearly destroyed by Druze and Shia militia
attacks in early 1984). His muddled political goals appear secondary to his
desire to preside over a strong militia attractive to potential recruits and
supporters.
Secret
NESA 84-10171 C
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Shia Amal militiaman in West
Beirul[_~
Although a few of these leaders might be placated if consulted on the shape
of the future government, radical militia chiefs like Husayn Musawi and
Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah probably would not halt their
disruptive or terrorist activities as long as they could receive foreign
support. Musawi's Islamic Amal militia, for example, takes orders directly
from Iran, and its existence depends on Iranian support. Islamic Amal and
other pro-Iranian Lebanese groups exist primarily to conduct vindictive
attacks on Tehran's enemies and undertake extreme acts of violence such
as the bombings against Multinational Forces facilities in Beirut on 23
October 1983.
Many of the militias accept assistance and direction from foreign govern-
ments-a development that has seriously impeded various national recon-
ciliation efforts. Few Lebanese militias could exist without foreign support,
although many receive financial aid from Lebanese citizens in contribu-
tions or protection payments.
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The militia's growing dependence on foreign financial and military assist-
ance has further divided their loyalties. Increased weapons shipments from
countries including Syria, Iran, and Libya have provided stronger firepow-
er, inevitably escalating not only the level of destruction and number of ca-
sualties in any fighting that occurs but also fomenting deeper grudges
among the adversaries.
Militia leaders usually have little trouble recruiting fighters. Although
many fighters are drawn to certain militias principally to promote their
political interests and to protect their homes, others are attracted by the
promise of regular pay. Personnel strengths are subject to wide-ranging
changes that often are related directly to employment opportunities-or
the lack thereof-in Lebanon.
In Beirut, where possession of weapons is pervasive, many men-particu-
larly impoverished Muslims-choose to be paid as militiamen to carry
their weapons. For true mercenaries, Lebanon is a fighter's "market"
allowing men to join the militia that pays best or has other attractive
benefits.
Lebanese militias probably will continue to proliferate as the security
situation deteriorates. Political instability in Lebanon invites foreign
involvement, and, for those governments that want to avoid the appearance
of direct intervention, many militias are all too willing to do their bidding.
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Because there are so many small Lebanese militias that are much like
street gangs, this study does not include all of them. Many Lebanese
"militias" make only a fleeting appearance when fighting breaks out and
then disappear-defeated, perhaps by rival factions, disbanded, or having
joined new allies under another name.
Militias included in this study, although differing in size and capability,
could by themselves or in combination challenge Lebanese Government
control. With the exception of the Christian militias, which generally did
not oppose the presence of the Multinational Forces, these militias also are
capable of threatening Israeli forces in Lebanon.
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Contents
Army of South Lebanon
Progressive Socialist Party Militia
Muslim Students' Union Militia
13
Islamic Unification Movement Militia
15
Murabitun Militia
16
Lebanese Arab Army
19
Arab Cavalier Force
21
Syrian Social Nationalist Party Militia
23
Lebanese Communist Party Militia
25
Communist Action Organization Militia
27
Major Lebanese Milit
ias
29
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Lebanese Army
controlled .A ~ A V
Druze Milit
(PSP)
I S R A E L
a'labakk
LAA Lebanese Arab Army
SSNPSyrian Social Nationalist Party
Mediterranean -LAA
A' (probable location)
~.~lslamic Unification Movement
Sea
i
Communist Action Organization
Lebanese Communist Party
Murabitun
Muslim Students' Union
Shia Amal
Army
of South
Lebanon
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Syrian controWe
Arab ~_
c Cavelier -
Fosse
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Secret
Directory of
Lebanese Militias
Leader: Fadi Fram
Personnel Strength: Approximately 5,000
Main Supporter: Israel
Objective: Preservation of Christian Maronite
hegemony in Lebanon
Background
The Lebanese Forces militia was formed in August
1976 from the militias of four major Christian politi-
cal parties. Bashir Gemayel, then commander of the
Phalange Party militia, worked for the unification of
the Christian militias, using force where necessary,
because he hoped to create a conventional Christian
army. By the end of 1980, the Lebanese Forces had a
rudimentary general staff and a Command Council
composed of representatives of each of the political
parties, although Bashir had established Phalange
predominance in the organization.
Fadi Fram, the Phalange's leading military figure,
has succeeded Bashir Gemayel as head of the militia.
Fram was one of the first members of the Lebanese
Forces to be trained in Israel and supports close
militia relations with Tel Aviv.
as the military objectives of the militia
evolved, they included recovery of formerly Christian
villages in the Shuf and `Alayh regions south of
Beirut, destruction of the rival Maronite Christian
militia of Sulayman Franjiyah in the north, expansion
of Lebanese Forces control south to the Nahr al
Awwali (Awwali River), and the expulsion of most
Palestinian refugees from Lebanon.
Heavy fighting with Syrian-backed Druze and Pales-
tinian forces in the fall of 1983 exacted a heavy toll on
Lebanese Forces' fighting capabilities and failed to
bring the militia any closer to its goal of establishing a
defensible Christian presence in the Druze-dominated
mountains south of Beirut.
serious military reverses have compelled the
Monday Morning
Fadi Fram, commander of the
militia's generally poor performance in the fighting
and ensuing financial difficulties also worsened mo-
rale problems among the fighters.
Organization
The Lebanese Forces' headquarters performs all the
staff functions of a regular army headquarters,=
Below a general
staff are the heads of military branches and five
regional military commanders.
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Assistance
Since the 1975-76 civil war, the Lebanese Forces and
Israel generally have had a close relationship.[
Israel
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began providing the militia with training, advisers,
and equipment.
about 4,000 Lebanese Forces militiamen re-
ceived training in Israel between 1978 and 1983-
most of it apparently aimed at upgrading their profi-
ciency in communications, basic infantry tactics, and
individual and crew-served weapons.
Relations between the Lebanese Forces and Tel Aviv
cooled in mid-1982 because the militia failed to
support invading Israeli troops then fighting in Beirut.
Israel
drastically reduced its supplies of military equipment
to the militia and apparently halted almost all train-
The militia's relationship with Israel continued to
deteriorate in 1983. Israel tried to cultivate ties with
the Lebanese Druze and Shia communities to create a
security zone in southern Lebanon. It closed the
Lebanese Forces barracks south of the Awwali River,
while Christian militiamen grumbled about the tight
control Israel maintained over their activities in
southern Lebanon)
After the heavy fighting of September 1983 subsided,
leaving the Lebanese Forces in desperate need of
military assistance,
Israel again increased its arms supply tote militia.
Israel decided to improve relations with the Christian
militia as part of its policy of broadening ties with
various confessional militias. In March 1984 Israel
brokered an agreement between the Lebanese Forces
and the Druze militia that provided for the evacuation
of Christian militiamen from the Kharrub region
south of Beirut.
The extent of Israel's revived military supply relation-
ship with the Lebanese Forces is unclear, but it is
considerably less than before June 1982 and has not
restored the Christian militia's capabilities. In the
aftermath of the heavy fighting last year
ebanese Forces
leaders considered disbanding the and joining
the Lebanese Army to alleviate critical financial and
military supply difficulties.
Lebanese Forces Weapons Inventory
Tanks (Sherman, Super Sherman, and AMX-1 3)
Armored personnel carriers (BTR-152, M-113)
Mortars (80 mm to 120 mm)
Antitank rifles (75 mm, 85 mm, 106 mm)
Artillery (155 mm, 130 mm, 122 mm) (s)
After failing to reach agreement with the Lebanese
Army, Lebanese Forces leaders abandoned dissolution
as an option. President Amin Gemayel's proposal that
half of the Lebanese Forces personnel be integrated
into the Lebanese Army found little support within
the Christian militia. Militia leaders wanted all of
their fighters accepted into Army units segregated
from regular Army ersonnel.
Fighting Capabilities
In spite of its poor performance in the mountain
fighting in September 1983, the Lebanese Forces
militia remains one of the largest and best equipped of
the Lebanese militias. The number of full-time fight-
ers fluctuates between 4,000 and 5,000, and as many
as 5,000 reservists could be called upon in a crisis.
While the other militias typically have fewer than 20
armored vehicles,
the Christian militia has about 200 tanks and ar-
mored personnel carriers-most of which are Israeli
supplied.
The militia's inability to rely on Israel for military
assistance probably accounts in part for the Lebanese
Forces' poor showing in the Druze-controlled moun-
tains in the fall of 1983. Although they are experi-
enced and competent in urban warfare, Lebanese
Forces militiamen proved less adept fighting against
their Druze counterparts, who were familiar with the
mountain terrain in the Druze heartland and enjoyed
extensive military support from Syria. The Christian
militiamen also apparently were unaccustomed to
coordinating military operations among units of more
than 30 men.
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Prospects
The Lebanese Forces militia, although suffering from
critical financial troubles, severely depleted weapons
stocks, and poor morale, probably will rally and
concentrate on defending the Christian heartland
north of Beirut. The militia's weak performance in the
fall of 1983 probably convinced its leaders that their
goals were too ambitious
of the many cease-fires in fall 1983.
Lebanese Forces officials probably will focus on reor-
ganizing the militia in 1984. Foremost among their
considerations will be obtaining much-needed finan-
cial support to retain full-time militiamen. The Leba-
nese Forces will continue to exert pressure on the
Lebanese Government to comply with Christian de-
mands
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Army of South Lebanon
Leader: Maj. Gen. Antoine Lahad
Personnel Strength: 2,000
Main Supporter: Israel
Objective: To assist the Israeli Defense Forces in
preventing Palestinian infiltration into
southern Lebanon and protect northern
Israel from Palestinian rocket and
terrorist attacks
Background
The militia of the Army of Free Lebanon, now called
the Army of South Lebanon, was created during the
1975-76 civil war, when Lebanese Army Maj. Sa'd
Haddad, a Greek Catholic, deserted from the regular
Army with many of the troops under his command in
southern Lebanon. Approximately 500 regular offi-
cers and enlisted men joined Haddad's new group,
Haddad also
enlisted volunteers from Christian villages and the
Druze and Shia communities in southern Lebanon.
Although Haddad depended completely on Israeli
support and was little more than an Israeli puppet-a
"faithful quisling," according to one observer-he
considered himself independent and the leader of the
"free Lebanon republic" he had declared in southern
Lebanon. Neither Beirut nor Tel Aviv officially rec-
ognize this Christian entity, but the former can do
little to challenge it. Israel, in contrast, controls it.
Haddad died of cancer in January 1984, leaving the
militia with no obvious successor. It was several
months before Israeli military planners agreed on
Maj. Gen. Antoine Lahad as a Christian replacement.
Lahad, a former Lebanese Army officer, had a strong
military record and was anti-Palestinian. He renamed
the militia "Army of South Lebanon" and announced
his intentions to expand the force to 6,000 men
organized into three brigades. Israeli officials believed
that Lahad would work with them to double the size
of the militia and reequip it with modern weapons. F_
Organization
In late 1983 the Free
Lebanon militia numbered about 2,500, a figure that
probably included all full-time and partially mobilized
An-Nahar
Antoine Lahad, leader of the
Army of South Lebanon militia
fighters. The militia now probably has about 2,000
men in active service. Christian Lebanese Forces
militiamen probably make up part of the South
Lebanon militia, for many returned to their homes in
southern Lebanon after the fighting in late 1983. F_
The "Army of South Lebanon" is organized along the
lines of a Lebanese brigade. The militia's command,
however, is not as tightly structured and unified as in
a conventional military force. The lack of cohesion in
command levels is due to Israeli control of its activi-
Assistance
From its formation, Israel has given extensive eco-
nomic and military support to the militia, recognizing
that a strong pro-Israeli Lebanese force in southern
Lebanon could provide northern Israel with added
protection from Palestinian attacks. Israel has given
tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as
Israeli uniforms and military training, to the militia.
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Former Army of Free Lebanon leader, Sail Haddad, Sygma
welcomes Israelis
The militia also depends on taxes levied on shops,
motor vehicles, and the transportation of goods in
southern Lebanon to fund its operations. Members
receive about 1,700 Lebanese pounds (LL) per month
(about US $340),
Army of South Lebanon
About 20 tanks (Sherman, AMX-13)
Armored personnel carriers (BTR-152, M-113)
Mortars (80 mm to 120 mm)
Artillery (155 mm, 130 mm, 122 mm)
Assault rifles (s)
Prospects
The Army of South Lebanon may go through several
transformations in the next few years, but its mission
will remain the same: to protect northern Israel from
Palestinian attacks. The success of Lahad's efforts to
strengthen the militia will depend on how the local
Shia communities view his Israeli connections. His
prospects for winning Shia support probably are bet-
ter than they were for Haddad because he does not
seem to have his predecessor's confrontational man-
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Progressive Socialist Party Militia
Leader: Walid Junblatt
Personnel Strength: 5,000 to 6,000
Main Supporter: Syria
Objective: Defense of Druze villages and Lebanese
Government recognition of local autonomy
for the Druze community
Background
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) militia has
become a tenacious defender of Druze territory and
interests in the mountains southeast of Beirut and
fought the Lebanese Army to a standstill in the fall of
1982. A united military command for the PSP militia
and Druze volunteers in the Shuf region was formed
during Lebanon's civil war in 1975-76. Following his
father's assassination in 1977, Walid Junblatt took
over as PSP leader.
clashes with the Maronite Christians forced
Walid to accept increased military aid from the PLO
and eventually the Syrians. Many Druze object to
these ties, fearing that outsiders could gain too much
influence over Druze affairs. Junblatt has acknowl-
edged their worries but believes he has no choiceF_
Organization
No strict chain of command exists in the Druze
militia, al-
though Walid Junblatt has delegated responsibilities
to commanders at various echelons in the militia's
organization. Commanders, such as Sharif Fayyad
and Anwar al-Futayri, are selected by consensus as a
result of courage displayed in combat, leadership
ability, or family ties. The basic combat element is a
militia group of about 50 men, in some cases drawn
entirely from one extended family.
The militia reserve is based on a system of interlock-
ing village defense companies arranged so that each
fighter defends his own home
this arrangement is particularly suited to
the clannish Druze community, where allegiance usu-
ally is based on the individual's perception of family
interests. During the heavy fighting with the Leba-
nese Army and Christian Lebanese Forces militia in
September 1983, the village-based companies and the
PSP militia proved able to coordinate their activities.
Monday Morning C
Walid Junblatt, leader of the
Progressive Socialist Party and
the Druze community 3
Assistance
Syrian assistance has been essential to sustain Druze
militia operations. Syria increased its support to the
Druze shortly after the signing of the Lebanon-Israel
troop withdrawal accord on 17 May 1983 by supply-
ing extensive military materiel and tactical advice. In
fostering nearly total Druze dependency, Syria gained
leverage over any fighting that occurred as a result of
Israel's withdrawal from Druze-claimed areas south
of Beirut.
Syrian support was instrumental in the Druze mili-
tia's largely successful defense of the Druze areas
against encroaching Lebanese Army and Lebanese
Forces militia units in the fall of 1983. We believe
Syrian supplies included no new equipment, because
Druze militiamen lack the appropriate training to
operate and repair more advanced items.
Fighting Capabilities
Although Syrian military support has been crucial to
Druze military successes, traditional Druze character-
istics and past fighting performance indicate that the
Druze could put up stiff resistance even without such
help-at least until they exhausted their weapons
supply.
Druze militia-
men are tough, experienced fighters determined to
defend their mountain homeland at all costs. The
Druze have deep roots in the contested Shuf and
Alayh areas, and their worst memories are of the
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T-54/55 tanks
BTR-1 52 armored personnel carriers
82-mm, 120-mm mortars
122-mm D-30 howitzers
130-mm M-46 field guns
RPG-7 antitank guns
122-mm BM-21 rocket launchers
Probably SA-7 surface-to-air missiles
Light and medium 7.62 machineguns
AK-47 rifles)
Christian Lebanese Forces militia entering their vil-
lages and massacring most of the inhabitants.
In the fighting in early 1984, the Druze militia
demonstrated improved capabilities in strategy, tac-
tics, and command and control. Instead of attacking
the Lebanese Army at its strongest position in the
mountains south of Beirut-as they repeatedly did the
previous fall-Druze fighters selected an exposed
element of an already isolated Army brigade as the
point of attack. The Druze also took advantage of the
outbreak of fighting in Beirut's southern suburbs and,
combining their forces with those of the Shia Amal
militia, managed to push the Army-weakened by
desertions of many of its Muslim soldiers-out of
West Beirut into Christian East Beirut.
The Druze militia also benefits from its leaders'
formal military training. Many are former Lebanese
Army officers who joined the Druze militia when the
Army disintegrated under confessional pressures dur-
ing the 1975-76 civil war.
Without outside assistance, however, strengths such
as these would not be enough to sustain the Druze
militia. Their weapons stockpiles would be quickly
depleted, and eventually even their determined resist-
ance would prove inadequate. The vast array of
diverse weapons supplied over the years by various
sources presumably undermines Druze fighting capa-
bility because they lack adequate numbers of instruc-
tors. Such weapons diversity also makes training all
the more complex and inadequate.
Prospects
The Druze militia will continue to expand and im-
prove as long as Lebanon is torn apart by internal and
external forces. With continued Syrian support, it
probably will remain one of the strongest Lebanese
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political coloring, cannot afford to ignore Druze de-
sires for more significant representation, because the
increasingly strong Druze militia proved in late 1983
that it could prevent the government from exerting its
influence over predominantly Druze areas. The
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Leader: Nabih Barri
Personnel Strength: 5,000
Main Supporters: Lebanese Shia community and
Syria
Objective: Equitable representation of Lebanese
Shias in the Lebanese Government and
economic development in Shia areas
Background
Traditional Shia leaders created the Shia Amal mili-
tia in the early 1970s as a paramilitary force in
support of their political aims. Imam Musa al-Sadr, a
charismatic Lebanese cleric with strong ties to Iran,
urged his coreligionists to take up arms to press
government authorities to address Lebanese Shias'
social and economic grievances.
Fatah was the militia's major supplier of arms and
training until late 1979,
hen Palestinian leaders oun the
Monday Morning
Nabih Barri, leader of the Shia
living in the valley. Even Barri's nominal representa-
tive there has cooperated with the pro-Iranian group,
the infiltration of
is mi i is increasingly assertive and difficult to
control as a result of the attraction of many members
to the Iranian revolution. Nabih Barri took control of
the Shia Amal in early 1981, but many Shias became
impatient with his moderate course and were drawn,
instead, to activist Shia leaders, who advocated a
more militant approach.
Growing radicalization of segments of the Lebanese
Shia community presented a serious challenge to
Barri's control of the Shia Amal in 1982. In the
aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that
year, Lebanese Shias, bitter about the Amal's failure
to oppose actively the Israeli occupation, increasingly
turned to pro-Iranian radical Shia leaders for direc-
tion. Shia communities in southern Lebanon and the
Bekaa Valley-at the periphery of Barri's influence-
were especially vulnerable to the a eal of extr mist
groups In the
fall of 1982 a radical faction seceded from the Shia
Amal and formed a pro-Iranian radical Shia group
called Islamic Amal based in the Bekaa ValleyF_
Although an undetermined number of Shia Amal
fighters remain in the Bekaa Valley, Barri's influence
over them probably is minimal. The pro-Iranian Is-
lamic Amal may have intimidated most of the Shias
elements of Communist groups, the pro-Syrian Ba'th-
ists, and Islamic fundamentalists has weakened Bar-
ri's hold on Lebanese Shia communities. Many of
these groups virtually disbanded during the Israeli
occupation, and their fighters sought to attach them-
selves to existing militias such as Barri's Amal. In the
south, the Israelis took advantage of the instability to
encourage the formation of village defense groups in
predominantly Shia southern Lebanon.
Organization and Capabilities
Amal is organized around a 27-member council in the
West Beirut suburb of Burj al Barajinah~
The council is composed of
staff officers with a variety of responsibilities includ-
ing military, religious, financial, and administrative.
Amal leaders have divided the city into sectors,
subsectors, and enclaves. The paramilitary branch of
the organization is composed of an armed militia and
an intelligence section
The militia numbers about 5,000 full-time militiamen
and, as most Shia either belong to or support the
organization, probably could field at least twice as
many fighters during a crisis. The militia's basic
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tactical unit, at least in the Beirut area, is a squad of
about 10 men, each of which is assigned to an enclave
in West Beirut. Each squad is armed with an RPG-7
antitank gun and assault rifles.
Before the fighting in the fall of 1983,
Shia Amal militiamen
were paid about LL700 to 800 per month (about US
$140 to 160) and provided two meals daily. By early
October funds were depleted, and Amal was forced to
lower the fighters' monthly pay to about LL300 and
provide only one meal a day, forcing street fighters
manning roadblocks to beg food from nearby resi-
dences.
By early 1984, when the Shia Amal began to play a
major role in the fighting, many new fighters-caught
up in the rising Muslim tide against the Gemayel
government and the Lebanese Army-flocked to join
the militia. Reinforced by Druze and Palestinian
elements, the Shia Amal succeeded in forcing the
Lebanese Army out of predominantly Muslim West
Beirut. Barri apparently exercised fairly effective
control over his militiamen, as they did not make a
move unless they had specific instructions from Amal
headquarters.
the Shia Amal also coordinated its activities
with Druze fighters and sometimes acted as forward
observers for Druze artillery gunners in the hills south
Assistance
Amal has received military and financial assistance
from a variety of sources who often have been each
other's opponents.
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Christian Lebanese Forces supplied the Shia militia
with weapons and ammunition throughout 1983 after
Fatah ceased providing military assistance. Syria also
continued to provide military aid to the militia. Funds
raised among wealthy and middle-class Lebanese
Shias also were funneled into arms purchases. An
undetermined amount of funding comes from the sale
of hashish grown in the Bekaa Valley
New militia recruits receive basic training either
during a six-month course in the Ba'labakk (Baala-
bakk) area or by attending weekend classes in Burj al
Barajinah. Training is conducted in the use of individ-
ual and crew-served weapons, with emphasis on guer-
rilla warfare and neighborhood defense. Although
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Fatah provided most of the instructors in the past,
Amal probably has enough seasoned fighters from
which to create its own corps of instructors. Former
members of the Lebanese Army who defected during
the 1975-76 civil war also probably provide training
assistance.
Prospects
The militia's strong performance in the fighting in
early 1984 will increase the Shia Amal's status as the
leading political body for Lebanese Shias. During the
fighting, most Muslim factions recognized Barri as
the civil and military commander of West Beirut and
obeyed his instructions. Their active role in fighting
also probably strengthened the resolve of Shia Amal
militiamen to support Barri. Many of those who
earlier were impatient with the Shia leader's middle-
of-the-road course probably lost interest in deserting
to join radical, pro-Iranian Shia groups.
Nabih Barri's control over Shia communities outside
Beirut-especially those in the Bekaa Valley that are
under the influence of the pro-Iranian Islamic
Amal-may continue to erode, particularly if inter-
factional fighting continues. Persistent financial diffi-
culties also could undermine Barri's efforts to retain
Shia Amal militiamen outside the city, as many of the
more radical militias can afford to pay their militia-
men generously. Many Amal fighters in Beirut proba-
bly will remain loyal to Barri, however, unless forced
by economic necessity to seek other employment.
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Leader: Husayn Musawi
Personnel Strength: 800+
Main Support: Iran
Objective: To spread the fundamentalist tenets of the
Iranian revolution among Lebanese Shias,
develop a strong group of militant follow-
ers willing to carry out terrorist attacks in
support of Iran, and create conditions
conducive to a revolution in Lebanon
Background
The Islamic Amal, a pro-Iranian radical Shia militia
based in the northern Bekaa Valley, was formed in
the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by
militants of the predominantly moderate Shia Amal
militia who were angry with their leaders for not
militarily opposing the Israeli invasion. Husayn
Musawi, a 40-year-old former teacher, instigated the
secession and, with Iran's support, set up strongholds
in the northern Bekaa Valley. In addition to establish-
ing new camps and headquarters, the group took over
a Shia Amal training camp in the Bekaa and evicted
Lebanese Army troops from a garrison in Baalabakk.
Although Musawi nominally commands the Islamic
Amal, he is little more than a puppet for Iran, which,
provides most of the
financial and military assistance to the group.
Musawi cooperates with Iran in spreading Ayatollah
Khomeini's fundamentalist tenets and worked Iran's
wrath on the Multinational Forces contingents in
Beirut as well as on Israeli units stationed in southern
Lebanon. Musawi's group is the prime suspect in the
bombing on 23 October 1983 of the US Marine Corps
barracks and a building of the French contingent of
the MNF.
press accounts revealed that
Israeli and French airstrikes on Islamic Amal loca-
tions in the Bekaa Valley not long afterward increased
the desire of radical Shia militants for vengeance. The
militants' perceptions of US complicity in the air-
strikes encouraged them to plan retaliatory terrorist
attacks against US forces as well.
Assistance
Iranian assistance to Islamic Amal has included the
provision of arms, training, financial support, and
even personnel.
as of late 1983 approximately 700 Iranian Revo-
each of the mixed militia units.
lutionary Guards were distributed throughout the
militia's locations and an Iranian commander headed
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Estimated Islamic Amal Militia
Weapons Inventory
AK-47s and M-16s
Heavy machineguns (DSHKs and 12.5)
RPG-7 antitank guns
Various mortars (60 mm, 81 mm, 120 mm)
Field artillery guns (130 mm)
Rocket launchers (type 36)
Trucks equipped with 50-caliber machineguns
or 23-mm antiaircraft guns
Land Rovers equipped with heavy machineguns
Islamic Amal fighters receive religious and military
training. Religious shaykhs emphasize to the trainees
that martyrdom during an attack on an enemy guar-
antees entrance into paradise. Military training em-
phasizes small-arms firing, street combat, martial
arts, and some tactics.
Syria has provided extensive local support to Islamic
Amal, In
many instances, Syrian Army units are virtually
colocated with Islamic Amal and Iranian Revolution-
ary Guard units, a situation that facilitates the move-
ment of Syrian supplies to the radical Shia militia.
Syria has provided the militants with arms, ammuni-
tion, food, fuel, and medical supplies
Certain Islamic Amal operations have been executed
by a group known as the Husayn Suicide Comman-
dos. Led by the Islamic Amal leader's cousin, Abu
Haydar al Musawi, this group probably is a loosely
structured strike force and obtains fighters from
Islamic Amal on an ad hoc basis. The two cousins
almost certainly collaborate in carrying out Iranian
directives. The Husayn Suicide Commandos may
exist only when fighters are needed to perform a
suicide mission.
Prospects
The Islamic Amal, with Iranian and possibly Syrian
direction, will attempt further attacks on Israeli units
in Lebanon. Husayn Musawi's militia probably will
grow and become more radical as impoverished, hith-
erto passive Lebanese Shias, impatient with the in-
ability of Amal leader Nabih Barri to extract political
and economic gains from the central government, seek
out activist leaders whose militancy seems to offer
hope for a better future.
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Leader: Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah
Personnel Strength: Probably has no regular
fighters, but sends promising
candidates to Islamic Amal for
training and may establish its
own militia
Main Supporter: Iran
Objective: Establishment in Lebanon of an Islamic
state on the Iranian model and attacks on
"collaborators" with Israel
Background
The Muslim Students' Union (MSU) is an extremist
Islamic fundamentalist group based in Beirut's south-
ern Ash Shiyah suburb and, although primarily politi-
cal and religious in orientation, encourages fanatical
terrorist activities and apparently sends prospective
fighters to the Islamic Amal militia in the Bekaa
Valley. Led by Lebanese cleric Shaykh Muhammad
Husayn Fadlallah, whose Khomeini-style religious
zeal attracts young Shia followers, the MSU seeks the
establishment in Lebanon of an Islamic state similar
to that in Iran.
In pursuit of his goal of spreading "true Islam,"
Fadlallah is attempting to undermine moderate Shia
Amal leader Nabih Barri's support among Shias in
West and South Beirut,
The Shaykh charges that Amal fighters lack
religious purpose and are corrupted by Barri's con-
tacts with Druze leader Walid Junblatt, who receives
Libyan aid. Lebanese Shias despise Libya because of
the abduction and presumed murder in Libya in 1978
of their religious leader, Imam Musa al-Sadr.
Fadlallah's in-
volvement in the suicidal truck bombings of the US
Marine barracks and the French military headquar-
ters in Beirut on 23 October 1983. Although the
operation almost certainly was planned and carried
out by the pro-Iranian, radical Shia Islamic Amal
Shaykh Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah, leader of the Mus-
lim Students' Union, giving a
speech
Organization
The Muslim Students' Union apparently is primarily
a political organization and also is known as the Al
Dawa Party. Its military wing
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is known as Jund Allah and probably is a
component of Islamic Amal.Z Fadlallah maintains
close contacts and usually coordinates his activities
with Husayn Musawi and other radical Lebanese
Shias. He combines his propaganda efforts with a
comprehensive social action program to recruit young
Shias to "true Islam." His charitable activities in-
clude giving money to impoverished Shia families and
to Shia students so they can continue their education.
grenades, and explosives.
The MSU,I I is
organized along neighborhood ines iffiest Beirut.
Shia clergymen provide political and religious indoc-
trination in mosques and report regularly to Fadlal-
lah. Promising candidates are given weapons and sent
to training camps established in the Bekaa Valley by
Husayn Musawi. The training includes instruction in
the use of light automatic weapons, rocket-propelled
2 The Muslim Students' Union and Islamic Amal probably are
subsumed under the umbrella organization of "Hizb Allah."
"Hizb Allah" appears to be a term used loosely to identify pro-
Iranian, radical Shia movements in Lebanon and may also repre-
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Assistance
The MSU probably receives most of its support and
instructions from Iran, but this aid may be channeled
through Musawi.
most weapons destined for Fadlal-
a s group are smuggled into Beirut's southern sub-
urbs in vegetable trucks from the Bekaa Valley.
Fadlallah's social action program aimed at drawing
Shia supporters away from Nabih Barri probably
depends almost entirely on Iranian funds.
Fadlallah also receives Syrian assistance, probably
arms and funds. In late 1983
Fadlallah had established a joint military
committee with Syria to carry out Syrian directives in
Beirut's southern suburbs. Through this committee,
Syria coordinates the delivery, of arms and money to
the MSU.
Prospects
Although the MSU is small, the political extremism
and religious fanaticism of its members constitute a
major terrorist threat to the Lebanese Government.
The growing impatience of impoverished Lebanese
Shias to have their social and economic grievances
redressed provides a good environment for recruiting.
More Shias may abandon Nabih Barri if he fails to
win concessions from the government and may join
radidal groups such as Fadlallah's MSU.
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Islamic Unification Movement Militia
Leader: Shaykh Said Shaban
Personnel Strength: Probably less than 1,000
Main Supporter: Possibly Iran: traditional PLO
support probably has terminated
Objective: Sunni control of Tripoli and
establishment of a Muslim government for
all of Lebanon independent of foreign
influence
Background
The Islamic Unification Movement (IUM), one of the
strongest of a multitude of Tripoli-based political
groups and militias, rallied in popular resistance to
the presence of Syrian troops in the area. The group
was founded by Shaykh Said Shaban, who, although
one of Tripoli's leading mosque orators, is known for
his "fuzzy" ideology and rapidly shifting political
alliances.
Shaban traditionally had close ties with Fatah forces
loyal to Arafat, but Arafat's departure from Tripoli in
late 1983 left the Sunni leader and his fighters weak
and without the support they needed to protect them-
command. By providing Shaban with funds, equip-
ment, and assistance in recruiting, Arafat hoped to
elicit the Muslim leader's support in eliminating pro-
Syrian forces in Tripoli.
In 1983 IIUM
fighters began a campaign against smaller militias in
Tripoli, beginning first with rival anti-Syrian groups,
forcing them either to disband or to join the IUM.
Anti-Syrian forces such as the pro-Iraqi Ba'ath Party
and the 24 October Movement were virtually crushed.
IUM fighters also took on their Communist counter-
parts and militiamen of the Syrian Social Nationalist
Party (SSNP). Members of the SSNP held out suc-
cessfully against IUM attacks.
Prospects
If Iran becomes the IUM's principal supporter, a
relationship may develop resembling that between
Tehran and the Bekaa Valley-based radical Lebanese
Shia militia. The IUM probably would have to accept
increased Iranian influence in Tripoli and adopt Irani-
an-inspired goals. Syria may acquiesce in Iran's sup-
port of the IUM but probably would not provide
support to the traditionally anti-Syrian organization.
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selves against Syrian-backed Fatah rebels.
Iran quickly sought both to aid
Shaban's militia and influence the IUM leader's
behavior because Shaban's continued public accusa-
tions against Syria would damage Iranian relations
with Damascus.
Organization
The militia of the Islamic Unification Movement
probably lacks a formal chain of command and may
not even have organized fighting units. Its members,
although equipped with light arms and antitank guns,
probably have had little formal military training, but
many have years of street fighting experience. The
fighters are mostly Sunni residents of Tripoli who are
adept at neighborhood defense
Assistance
Before his departure from Tripoli in 1983
Arafat provided extensive support
to Shaykh S a an to gain an ally against PLO
dissidents and to encourage the leader in his efforts to
consolidate all Muslim forces in Tripoli under one
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Leader: Ibrahim Qulaylat
Personnel Strength: 200 to 500
Main Supporters: PLO
Objective: Equitable Muslim representation in the
Lebanese Army and Government
Background
Murabitun militiamen first appeared during the fierce
street fighting that took place in Beirut during Leba-
non's 1975-76 civil war. Although small in number,
they proved to be tough, well organized, and ruthless.
They quickly seized control of West Beirut's tallest
structure, the Murr Tower, and from its rooftop-a
vantage point coveted by other militias-relentlessly
bombarded nearby Lebanese Army and Christian
Lebanese Forces positions.
The Murabitun emerged from the fighting as one of
the more radical and better armed small militias in
West Beirut-a status that it maintained until early
1984, when combined Druze and Shia Amal militia
attacks weakened it. Its founder, Ibrahim Qulaylat-
a Sunni Muslim-is now in his forties and continues
to espouse an ill-defined Pan-Arab ideology. His
political statements generally reflect standard leftist
demands for expanded Muslim representation in the
Lebanese Government and the Army.
Organization
Following the civil war, Qulaylat and his supporters
intensified their efforts to enlist new party members,
On the
eve of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer
of 1982, he had approximately 1,200 to 1,500 fighters.
The Israeli occupation of Beirut and the subsequent
exodus of many Palestinian fighters left the militia a
skeleton of what it had been.
In 1983, Qulaylat and his deputies, aware of the
heightening tension in Beirut because of the anticipat-
ed Israeli withdrawal, attempted to improve and
expand the Murabitun militia.
' Combined Druze and Shia Amal forces attacked Murabitun
strongholds in West Beirut in early 1984 in an effort to destroy the
militia because it was a rival for Muslim support and apparently
had also been assisting Palestinian infiltration into the city. The
militia probably lost more than 50 percent of its personnel to
Qulaylat began sending his deputies to seek outside
support and found Fatah dissidents most receptive.
Relations between Murabitun and Fatah usually had
been good Qulay-
lat resolve to remain neutral regarding the split in
the PLO in order to preserve all sources of sunnort
Murabitun fighters outside of Beirut may number
between 150 and 200. In the Bekaa Valley and the
Tripoli area they receive orders from the central
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Secret
command in each region,
In southern Lebanon, primarily Sidon, Mura-
itun fighters take direction from the Beirut central
Ready availability of weapons and ammunition and
the attraction of regular pay have again succeeded in
drawing young fighters to the militia.
The Murabitun's reported monthly payroll suggests
that only a fraction of the militiamen are actually
paid full-time wages.
Qulaylat stated in October 1983 that the
monthly payroll for his fighters was LL720,000 (about
US $145,000). Divided equally among roughly 750
fighters (before March 1984), the sum does not appear
generous. Many militiamen may be paid allowances
to participate in training activities and to join the
militia quickly in the event that fighting erupts.
Assistance
Qulaylat has accepted money, training, and weapons
from a variety of sources. During the civil war, for
instance, the Murabitun was one of several Lebanese
leftist groups depending on Fatah for su port.=
Fatah origi-
nally supported the Murabitun because the Palestin-
ians wanted to use the Sunni militia to mask
Palestinian involvement in the conflict. More recently,
Fatah consistently supported the Murabitun because
the militia represented the Sunni community and was
a source of information as well as a security and
military asset for Fatah.
Iraq also assisted the Murabitun after the civil war by
providing funds for the Murabitun radio station,
Forces militia.
The
station's "Voice of Arab Lebanon" presents noon
sermons on Fridays given by a well-known Sunni
shaykh who is popular with West Beirut Muslims.
The Murabitun uses the sermons to criticize the
Gemayel government and the Christian Lebanese
Syria and Libya increased their support to the Mura-
bitun after the small militia performed impressively
during the 1975-76 civil war. Syria provided training,
equipment, and funds to the militia. In early 1981,
Libya sent artillery specialists to train Murabitun
members.
Former members of the Lebanese Army, which splint-
ered along religious lines during the civil war, also
provided training assistance.
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Prospects
The Murabitun militia is likely to make a comeback
in spite of the beating it took in early 1984. Qulaylat
was in Libya at the time of the Druze and Shia
attacks on his militiamen, and he may still be able to
solicit support from Qadhafi and other sources for the
militia. Judging from characteristics revealed in past
Murabitun fighting, such as the militia's penchant for
making a sensational entrance and then quickly fad-
ing from the scene, we believe that, once it is reorga-
nized, the militia will have a limited role in future
fighting in West Beirut.
New Sunni Militias
In 1982 at least two Sunni figures began independent
efforts to rebuild or form new Sunni militias in West
Beirut because of growing Sunni perceptions that
their interests were being crowded out by the increas-
ing militancy of other Lebanese confessional groups.
Dr. Samir Sabbagh, Qulaylat's right-hand man, led a
secessionist revolt from the Murabitun in the summer
of 1983 and is forming a new Sunni political group
and its requisite militia.
Sabbagh, who is better educated than Qulay-
at, became discouraged because of fruitless efforts to
replace the Murabitun leader and many personal
disagreements. Sabbagh's new organization has tend-
ed to play down the Pan-Arab aspects of Murabitun
pronouncements in favor of a more nationalistic ap-
proach focusing on Sunni interests. Although Sab-
bagh took several Murabitun officials with him, his
new group remains small and probably does not
present a serious threat to Murabitun recruiting
efforts
Tamam Salam, son of former Sunni Prime Minister
Saib Salam, also tried to create a new Sunni militia
last summer. Tamam sought support from a Sunni
charitable organization and influential Sunni leaders
in Beirut.
Shia Amal militiamen intercepted a large shipment of
weapons destined for the new militia. The weapons
probably originated in Syria.
Syria was concerned about the prospect of independ-
ent Sunni militias in West Beirut,
and warned various Sunni lead-
ers there against speaking for the Sunni community
the Syrians
revealed their willingness to provide generous finan-
cial support and materiel in order to create a Sunni
network in Beirut responsive to Syrian directives.
Sunni leaders probably tried to resist Syrian attempts
to dominate their new political groups but may even-
tually be intimidated by Syrian threats and choose
either to disband or to accept Syrian aid and domina-
tion.
Although the Beirut-based Murabitun militia is well
known and led by a Sunni, it has not represented
specific Sunni interests. Instead, Murabitun political
statements generally have called for expanded Mus-
lim representation in the Lebanese Government. Mur-
abitun leader Ibrahim Qulaylat's reputation as an
uneducated street thug has increased anxiety within
the Sunni establishment about its eroding political
standing. The defeat in early 1984 of the Murabitun
in fighting with Druze and Shia Amal militiamen,
moreover, could further persuade Sunnis to support
the efforts of their coreligionists to create new mili-
tias.
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Secret
Lebanese Arab Army
Leader: Ahmad al-Khatib
Personnel Strength: 500 to 700
Main Supporters: PLO and Syria
Objectives: Uncertain; probably acts on Syrian
directives
Background
The Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) was created in 1976
by a disgruntled former lieutenant in the Lebanese
Army, Ahmad al-Khatib, a young Muslim officer
who frequently had been passed over for promotion.
Lebanese Army units defected en masse, bringing
with them most of their weapons and equipment, to
join Khatib's breakaway "Muslim Army," then form-
ing in the Bekaa Valley.
Khatib's militia declined in importance after the
Lebanese civil war, and many of its members served
instead under Fatah command in southern Lebanon.
By early 1981 the LAA had approximately 500 to 700
members who were almost completely integrated with
Palestinian units in southern Lebanon.
Fatah paid the salaries of
LAA members, and provided them equipment, as well
as funds, personnel, and training to maintain the
equipment.
Organization and Assistance
Khatib began reorganizing the LAA in 1983 and
made weekly trips to Syria for advice and, presum-
ably, aid. Syria probably became interested in devel-
oping the LAA as another surrogate in Lebanon
because of the bitter feud taking place within Fatah,
traditionally Khatib's main supporter. KhatibF--]
was receiving funding
from both Fatah factions and wanted to remain
neutral in the PLO dispute. Syria discouraged his
dependency on Fatah and pressed Khatib to subordi-
nate himself and his militia to Syrian political and
military goals in Lebanon
Lack of popular support probably has hampered the
LAA's reorganization efforts.
training apparently is still conduct-
ed in the same five LAA camps that have existed in
central and northern Lebanon for years. There is no
indication that the LAA has more manpower than it
Ahmad al-Khatib with Lebanese Army
deserters who joined his militia during the
did shortly after the 1975-76 civil war, and the
fighting capabilities of its personnel probably have
declined because of the lack of formal military train-
ing
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Syria's interest in the LAA appears limited; Syrian
involvement in the Muslim Army's reorganization in
1983 appeared to be minimal. Syria, with more
powerful surrogates such as the Lebanese Druze
militia and the Arab Cavalier Force in northern
Lebanon, probably will only help Khatib if he actively
supports Syrian interests in Lebanon.
Prospects
The Lebanese Arab Army remains relatively weak,
suffering from a shortage of officers and financial
backing. Unless an outside supporter such as Syria
increases its support to Khatib, the militia probably
will continue to have problems attracting new fight-
ers. The LAA therefore is unlikely to play a signifi-
cant role in any fighting in the foreseeable future. F
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aecrer
Leader: Nassib al-Khatib
Personnel Strength: 1,500
Main Supporters: Syria and Libya
Objectives: To project Syrian power against other
Lebanese militias and to establish Rif`at
Assad as a significant player on the
Lebanese scene
Background
The Arab Cavalier Force (ACF), also known as the
Red Cavaliers and the Pink Panthers because of the
distinctive rose color in its militia uniforms, was
created in June 1981 by Syria from a breakaway
element of about 500 men from the Lebanese Arab
Army. Syrian authorities believed that, to achieve
their goals in Lebanon, they needed a new militia
whose "Lebanese" cover would conceal the Syrian
role in certain activities. Syria, moreover, had been
experiencing problems in getting existing Lebanese
militias to follow Syrian direction.
Rif'at Assad, the Syrian President's brother, was the
primary instigator in the creation of the ACF. He
wanted a militia powerful enough to exert his influ-
ence on the Lebanese scene as well as to protect his
many interests there, which
include a profitable hashish crop in the Bekaa Valley.
The Syrians appointed a former Lebanese Arab Army
officer, Nassib al-Khatib, to lead the ACF, but he has
never had any real authority. Rif`at Assad's Syrian
Defense Companies trained ACF recruits and gradu-
ated 1,200 new militiamen in July 1981. Many of the
new fighters probably were indigent Lebanese Shias,
a significant number
of Syrian officers were seconded to the ACF from
Rif at Assad's elite Defense Companies.
Organization
The Arab Cavalier Force probably has about 1,500
fighters, most of whom are stationed in the Tripoli
area. Token ACF detachments are also located in the
Bekaa Valley, the Shuf region, and in Beirut
Sana ? Syrian Special Forces patch, . 25X1
Rif"at Assad, actual leader of
the Arab Cavalier ForceF
A significant number-~
between 3 and percent--of ACF
officers and enlisted men are Syrian. At least 15
Syrian officers from the Syrian Defense Companies
command the ACF militia.
Although Khatib nominally heads the ACF, Syrian-
ordered troop movements routinely take place without
his concurrence and without any official notification
from Syrian headquarters elements. Khatib merely
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average of once weekly to confer with Rif`at Assad or
The militia's headquarters for the Bekaa Valley is
located in a new barracks at Baalabakk, and other
headquarters almost certainly are located in the Trip-
oli area, Beirut, and possibly in the Shuf or Matn
regions. These headquarters probably relay Rif`at
Assad's orders directly to the Syrian commanders of
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Assistance
Rif'at Assad's Defense Companies provide all train-
ing, weapons, and ammunition to the ACF. ACF
militiamen are equipped with multiple rocket launch-
ers, air defense artillery, mortars, and assault rifles.
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basic training for
ACF militiamen is conducted by 10 Syrian officers at
a training camp near Hirmil in the northern Bekaa
Valley.
Libya has provided financial assistance to the ACF in
the past, but it is not clear if this aid continues. Syrian
funds almost certainly constitute the bulk of the
ACF's financial resources.
Prospects
The ACF probably will continue to be highly visible
in the Tripoli area as well as occasionally in Beirut.
Its rose-colored uniforms, reported predilection for
using excessive firepower, and Rif`at Assad's strong-
man tactics probably will ensure that the militia stays
in the spotlight
Syrian backing virtually guarantees that the militia
will grow in manpower and strength, representing an
increased threat to the Lebanese Government. If the
security situation in and around Beirut continues to
deteriorate, the ACF probably will try to establish a
stronger presence in the area, placing itself on the
frontlines of future internecine fighting.
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Secret
Leader: In'am Ra'ad
Personnel Strength: Probably less than 200
Main Supporter: Uncertain; Fatah rebel support
probably depends on Syrian
approval
Objective: Ideologically espouses a "Greater Syria"
geographically composed of most of
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and
practically seeks Syrian financial and
military support
Background
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) has its
roots in the former Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS)
founded in 1932 by Antoun Saadeh, an advocate of
"Pan-Syrianism." Educated in Germany and im-
pressed with Hitler's national socialism, Saadeh
sought the realization of his geographical concept of
Pan-Syrianism.
In 1961 the PPS failed to overthrow the Lebanese
Government of Gen. Fuad Chehab, in the first at-
tempted coup in Lebanon's history. Many of the party
members were jailed, and by the time they were
released, about a decade later, the party had aban-
doned its rightist orientation and adopted a distinctly
leftist platform. In an attempt to project a new image,
members renamed the party the SSNP, seized upon
the Palestinian cause, and developed their own militia.
Organization
The SSNP attempted in 1983 to reorganize and
expand its militia,
but apparently lacked the financial and mili-
tary support to attract a large following. The number
of SSNP fighters probably remains close to 200.
Many of these fighters and other party members
settled near Barr Ilyas in the southern half of the
Bekaa Valley,
Reorganization efforts probably have made little
progress since late 1983, when SSNP officials met
frequently in Beirut to gather all SSNP members and
divide them into fighting units.
only about 100 fighters were
Monday Morning
In'am Ra'ad, leader of the Syr-
collected from various SSNP centers in Beirut and
armed with assault rifles and RPG-7 antitank guns.
Assistance
The SSNP depended on Fatah for financial and
probably military aid since at least 1970, but the split
in the PLO forced the party's leaders to reconsider
their sources of support. SSNP leaders already had
close working relations with Syrian-backed Fatah
rebels, but they realized that any future aid from
them hinged on approval from Damascus. By 1983,
moreover, Syrian ground forces controlled areas in
Lebanon where SSNP operational centers were locat-
requests, as Damascus has proved generally
interested in Lebanese militias that could serve its
interests in Lebanon. Syrian officials, however, proba- 25X1
bly have had difficulty forgetting political differences
that, in the past, led to the party's illegal status in
Syria.F1 25X1
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Militiamen of the Syrian Social Nationalist Par-
ty patrolling the streets of Bhamdun, a Druze-
Prospects
Without an accommodation with Syria, the SSNP
militia probably cannot survive. Syrian backing, how-
ever, would ensure the militia's growth and enable it
to play a more significant role in future fighting.
Given Syrian support, the party almost certainly
would adjust its more immediate goals to whatever
direction it receives from Damascus
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becret
Lebanese Communist Party Militia
Leader: George Hawi
Personnel Strength: 500 to 600
Main Supporters: Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Objective: To mount attacks against Israeliforces in
Lebanon as well as the Lebanese Army
and Christian Lebanese Forces
Background
The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) is an outspo-
ken opponent of the Christian Phalange Party and the
West, including the United States. It is led by George
Hawi, a Greek Catholic, adheres to a strict Marxist-
Leninist line, and traditionally has received political
direction and military training from the Soviet Union.
the
Soviet Union has become increasingly displeased with
Hawi's variety of Communism, Moscow probably
continues to support the party's growing militia.F_
Although the party and its militia were well organized
before Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, they were
disbanded during the Israeli occupation of Beirut. B
early 1983,
the LCP militia was in severe financial straits and
could field only about 100 fighters-a substantial
decrease from its reported full-time strength in 1982
of more than 1,000 militiamen.
The LCP weathered its financial crisis and by late
1983 was recovering much of its former strength. In
the interim, the party stayed involved in fighting by
coordinating many of its activities with the Commu-
nist Action Organization, the only other Beirut-based
Communist group
some of its fighters also voluntarily placed
themselves under Druze militia commands. We esti-
mate the militia has around 1,000 part-time and
regular fighters.
before the Israeli
invasion in 1982 that LCP militia officers traditional-
ly received military training in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe.
George Hawi, leader
of the Lebanese Communist
Communist militiamen providing
training to private citizens in southern
Lebanon before the 1975-76 civil war
many of these officers returned to the militia when it
was reorganizing in 1983, but many of them presum-
ably were eager to regain their former positions. F_
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The LCP normally receives weapons from Eastern
Europe, particularly Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, via
Syria, but other sources also have provided arms and
financial assistance. Before withdrawing from Beirut
in September 1982, for instance, the PLO provided
funds to the LCP. The militia may have assumed
control of some PLO arms caches. Palestinian funding
apparently dried up soon thereafter, and we do not
know if it has been resumed. Syria also may have
provided assistance to the LCP,
Prospects
The LCP militia appears to be rebuilding its strength
and, in the event of prolonged factional fighting,
probably will have little trouble recruiting new mem-
bers. Its relatively large size and well-trained officer
corps probably will increase the militia's visibility in
future fighting. The LCP militia probably will have to
fight its own battles, however, because other, larger
Lebanese militias would not agree to a formal alliance
with the Communist fighters
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aecrer
Communist Action Organization Militia
Leader: Muhsin Ibrahim
Personnel Strength: 100 to 200
Main Supporters: Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Objectives: To support Muslim demands for greater
political representation and to spread
Communism in Lebanon
Background
Founded in 1970 by Muhsin Ibrahim, the Communist
Action Organization (CAO) attempts merely to outdo
its allies.
CAO strives to be more Communist than the Leba-
nese Communist Party (LCP), more Palestinian than
the Palestinians, and more Arab than other Arabs.
The militia typically has recruited among the impov-
erished Shias of south Beirut, the Beirut student
community, and members of leftist trade unions. In
late 1983,
CAO militia had 1,600 men dispersed in the southern
suburbs of Beirut, the Shuf mountains, and in the
Bekaa Valley. We estimate the number of full-time
militiamen to be closer to 100 to 200. The larger
figure may represent the number available in the
event of a crisis.
The CAO had a fairly significant role in the early
fighting in the fall of 1983. CAO militiamen wore
masks to conceal their identities and urged the youth
in West Beirut to attack Lebanese Army units. The
militia also took part in an attack on the Murr Tower,
Beirut's tallest structure.
Assistance
Like the Lebanese Communist Party, the CAO nor-
mally receives weapons through Syria from Eastern
Europe, particularly Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
Syria has also provided arms to the CAO. In one
instance, before the fighting in September 1983,
Syrian forces gave the CAO arms captured from two
Fatah arms depots. Although some CAO militia
leaders presumably have been trained in the Soviet
Union as have their LCP counterparts,
the officer corps and staff
LCP.
Wide World
Muhsin Ibrahim, leader of the
Communist Action Organiza-
tion, meeting with Yasir Arafat
Prospects
Widespread fighting and continued political instabil-
ity in Lebanon will provide a conducive environment 25X1
for the growth of the CAO. CAO fighters have
seemed fairly eager to join in Beirut street fighting,
and they probably will assume at least a minor role in
any fighting in the future. As a result, the CAO
militia is yet another group likely to confront, with
machineguns and grenades, the authority of the
present and future governments of Lebanon. F
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Major Lebanese Militias
Lebanese Forces (5,000) a
Leader: Fadi Fram
Army of South Lebanon (2,000)
Leader: Antoine Lahad
Progressive Socialist Party Militia
Druze (5,000 to 6,000)
Leader: Walid Junblatt
Shia Amal Militia (5,000)
Leader: Nabih Barri
Islamic Amal Militia (800+)
Leader: Husayn Musawi
Muslim Students' Union Militia
Leader: Shaykh Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah
Islamic Unification
Movement Militia (1,000-)
Leader: Shaykh Said Shaban
Murabitun Militia (200 to 500)
Leader: Ibrahim Qulaylat
Lebanese Arab Army (500 to 700)
Leader: Ahmed al-Khatib
Arab Cavalier Force (1,500)
Leader: Nassib al-Khatib
Syrian Social Nationalist
Party Militia (200-)
Leader: In'am Ra'ad
Lebanese Communist Party Militia (500
to 600)
Leader: George Hawi
Communist Action Organization Militia
(100 to 200)
Leader: Muhsin Ibrahim
To preserve Christian hegemony in Lebanon's
predominantly Muslim society
Control buffer zone along Israeli border
Receives extensive Israeli economic and mili-
tary support
Recognize the Druze community as an equal
confessional entity with commensurate politi-
cal privileges
Establish a national government that is repre-
sentative of Shia interests and the Shia
Muslims' plurality in Lebanon's confessional
balance
To spread the tenets of the Iranian revolution
among Lebanese Shias and to develop group
of militant followers willing to carry out ter-
rorist attacks
Establish an Islamic state in Lebanon on the
Iranian model and attacks on "collaborators"
with Israel
To gain control of Tripoli for the Sunnis and
establish a Muslim government for all of
Lebanon
Equitable Muslim representation in the Leba-
nese Army and Government
Support Syrian objectives in Lebanon
To establish, with appropriate Lebanese cov-
er, a force capable of projecting Syrian influ-
ence in Lebanon
Syrian controlled
Ideologically espouses a "Greater Syria" com-
posed of most of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and
Israel
Depends on Syrian financial and military
support
To mount attacks against Israeli forces in
Lebanon, as well as the Lebanese Army and
Christian Lebanese Forces
To support Muslim demands for greater polit-
ical representation and to spread Communism
in Lebanon
a Numbers in parentheses are estimates of the number of militia-
men who could go into action with little advance warning. 29
Tanks (Sherman, Super Sherman, AMX-
13)
Armored personnel carriers (BTR-152, M-
113)
Mortars (80 mm to 120 mm)
Artillery (155 mm, 130 mm, and 122 mm)
Tanks (Sherman, AMX-13)
Armored personnel carriers (BTR- 152, M-
113)
Mortars (80 mm to 120 mm)
Artillery (155 mm, 130 mm, and 122 mm)
Machineguns
Tanks(T54/55)
122-mm D-30 howitzers
82-mm mortars
130-mm M-46 field guns
Probably SA-7 missiles
Assault rifles
Antitank guns
Mortars (60 mm, 82 mm, and 120 mm)
Assault rifles
Heavy machineguns
Various mortars
Rocket launchers
Assault rifles
Mortars (60 mm, 81 mm, and 120 mm)
122-mm D-30 howitzers
Tanks (M41, Charioteer)
Armored personnel carriers (M- 113)
Mortars (60 mm, 81 mm, and 120 mm)
Artillery (105 mm, 120 mm, 122 mm, and
130 mm)
Assault rifles
82 mm, 120-mm mortars
Multiple rocket launchers
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