SUDAN: ISLAM AS A POLITICAL FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000100050002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Sudan:
Islam as a
Political Force
NESA 84-10144
April 1984
Copy 3 21
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Intelligence
Sudan:
Islam as a
Political Force
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
NESA,
Secret
NESA 84-10144
April 1984
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Sudan:
Islam as a
Political Force
Key Judgments The major Islamic groups in Sudan are important political forces and
Information available potential rivals to President Gaafar Nimeiri. Their influence was demon-
as of 16 February 1984 strated by Nimeiri's sudden decision in September 1983 to impose Islamic
was used in this report.
law-a move that, in our opinion, was largely an attempt to boost his
standing with the Islamic factions.
The Ansar, the largest of the Sudanese religious fraternities, have members
from virtually all occupational and economic classes in the country and are,
we believe, the most serious potential threat to the regime apart from the
possibility of a military coup. The arrest of the Ansar leader in September
1983 left the group in temporary disarray, but, in our judgment, it has in-
creased the chance that the Ansar will eventually intensify their under-
ground contacts with secular anti-Nimeiri elements.
The Khatmiyyah sect is almost as large as the Ansar but has not been in-
volved as a group in antigovernment activity. Nimeiri's good relations with
Cairo have helped win the tacit support of the Khatmiyyah, who are
strongly pro-Egyptian
Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood, though relatively small, is influential be-
cause of its strength in elite and student circles. The Brotherhood believes
it is most likely to accomplish its goals by working within the system, and
thus it has participated in government since the late 1970s. If Nimeiri
retreats dramatically from his policy of Islamization, however, we believe
the Brotherhood's leaders will face increasing pressure from their funda-
mentalist membership to end collaboration with the regime.
A cohesive coalition of Islamic political-religious groups would be an
extremely powerful force, but such a coalition is unlikely to form. The
Ansar, Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamic groups are split over
political and philosophical issues and divided by historical and personal
rivalries. It is more likely, in our opinion, that one or more of the groups
would join a broad national opposition front. There would be considerable
tension within such a front, however, between the Islamic groups and the
generally left-leaning secular parties.
We believe that the Islamic groups would adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude
toward the most likely successors to Nimeiri-senior Army officers or high
government officials. Some of the sects might participate in a coalition
government.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10144
April 1984
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None of the Islamic groups are openly hostile toward the United States,
but any government in which they played an influential role probably
would maintain a greater distance from the United States than Nimeiri
has. The groups would be unlikely to feel strong enough politically to go as
far as Nimeiri has in supporting US interests, particularly through military
cooperation.
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The Islamic Groups' Past Involvement in Politics
1
Prospects for an Opposition Coalition
6
Relations With a Successor Regime
7
Implications for the United States
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Sudan:
Islam as a
Political Force
The Islamic Groups' Past Involvement in Politics
Islamic life in Sudan has been influenced greatly by
religious fraternities or orders, called tariqas, which
developed around particular charismatic leaders.
There are at least a dozen of these "sects" in Sudan.
The two largest-the Khatmiyyah and the Ansar-
emerged in the 19th century and today include some
70 percent of the country's Muslim population.
Two other religious-political associations-the Suda-
nese Muslim Brotherhood and the Republican Broth-
erhood-are smaller, 20th-century creations. The
Muslim Brotherhood, however, has disproportionate
influence in Sudanese politics because of its populari-
ty in elite circles and its collaboration since the late
1970s with the Nimeiri regime.
The Khatmiyyah originated in the early 19th century
when a spiritual leader from the Arabian Peninsula
traveled to Sudan and quickly developed a following.
The Ansar began in 1881, when an obscure northern-
er declared himself to be the divinely guided Mahdi.
His forces routed British and Egyptian troops in 1885
and established a theocratic state that was in turn
overthrown by British troops in 1898. The Ansar
movement was dormant for the next several years but
reemerged as a strong political force during World
War I under the leadership of the Mahdi's son.
The Ansar and the Khatmiyyah formed the basis of
political parties that, together with the Khatmiyyah's
secular liberal allies, dominated Sudanese politics
from independence in 1956 until Nimeiri's coup in
1969. Once in power, Nimeiri tried to destroy the
influence of the conservative sectarian parties. Many
Ansar, Khatmiyyah, and Muslim Brotherhood leaders
were jailed or exiled. Nimeiri concentrated first on
the strongest group, the Ansar, attacking their strong-
hold at Aba Island in 1970. In 1972 Nimeiri created
the Sudanese Socialist Union and declared all other
political parties illegal.
A nearly successful coup attempt in July 1976 by an
opposition front led by Ansar chief Sadiq al-Mahdi
The Religious Landscape of Sudan
Sudan's population is roughly 70 percent Muslim.
Since independence, Muslims have controlled the
government and dominated the country's political,
economic, cultural, and social institutions.
Religious differences in Sudan for the most part
follow the ethnic and geographic split between north- 25X1
ern and southern Sudan (see map). About two-thirds
of all Sudanese live in the north, which is 90 percent
Muslim. Most southerners practice native, animist
religions. A small percentage of Sudanese, primarily
the southern elite, are Christian.
According to the US Embassy in Khartoum, nearly
all Sudanese Muslims are Sunni, the main school of
Islamic practice. Shia and mystical Sufi beliefs,
however, have influenced many religious observances.
The Embassy reports that Sudanese religious prac-
tice stresses the individual's relationship to God and
opposes government intrusion into religious affairs.
apparently convinced Nimeiri that his survival re-
quired reconciliation with the Islamic groups. Repre- 25X1
sentatives of the Ansar, Khatmiyyah, and Muslim
Brotherhood joined the government between 1977 and
1979. Sadiq and the Khatmiyyah representatives soon
quit, however, after becoming frustrated at their lack
of influence on policy.
Nimeiri's Islamization Campaign
In September 1983 Nimeiri declared the imposition of
the sharia, or Islamic law, in Sudan. The declaration
was a radical shift in government policy that stimulat-
ed political maneuvering among fundamentalists, sec-
ular Sudanese, and non-Muslim southerners.
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President Nimeiri inaugurates
his Islamization campaign in
September 1983 by pub 'c d -
stroying liquor bottles.
We believe the major factor behind Nimeiri's empha-
sis on Islam was his desire to placate the Muslim
Brotherhood, whose disaffection with the regime had
become increasingly apparent during the first several
months of 1983. By adopting the Brotherhood's major
objective, Nimeiri ensured the continued support of
the only former opposition faction that participated
fully in his national reconciliation campaign during
the 1970s. Nimeiri may also have intended his Islam-
ization campaign to appeal to members of the other
orthodox Muslim groups and to win greater aid from
Saudi Arabia.
By mid-December it had become clear that some key
elements were opposed to Islamization. Strong opposi-
tion from some northerners, many southerners, and
important foreign allies-notably Egypt-has led
Nimeiri to moderate his Islamic course. Nimeiri has
gradually deemphasized the government's role in pro-
moting Islam and has stressed that measures already
adopted will be applied with tolerance and respect for
the rights of non-Muslims. Nonetheless, he has not
renounced Islamization. He continues his political
juggling act designed to satisfy simultaneously the
secular left and the religious right, the Muslim north
and the non-Muslim south.
The Sects Today
The Ansar. The Ansar sect is the largest association in
Sudan. Its members represent virtually all occupa-
tional and economic classes in the country. The sect's
size, organization, and history of political activism
make it the most serious potential threat to the
regime, apart from the possibility of a military coup.
Some 5 to 6 million Sudanese are Ansar, according to
US Embassy estimates. They are concentrated pri-
marily in the rural central and western regions of the
country, although in recent years they have migrated
in significant numbers to Khartoum and other urban
centers. As of 1971 Ansar constituted a majority of
the population in the Kordofan and Darfur Regions
and about 60 percent in the Central Region. We
believe the clustering of Ansar in certain cities and
provinces facilitates their organizational efforts
Ansar constitute a disproportionate percentage of the
rank and file in the Army, according to defense
attache reporting. In our judgment, any antigovern-
ment move by Ansar leaders would gain at least tacit
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support from many of their followers in uniform. At a
minimum, Ansar in the military might not resolutely
defend the Nimeiri regime against a coup attempt led
by the sect. When Ansar chief Sadiq al-Mahdi tried
to overthrow Nimeiri in 1976, only 10 percent of the
soldiers mobilized by the government reported for
duty. Since then, the government has tried to recruit a
larger percentage of non-Ansar for the Army, and few
Ansar reach the senior officer level.
1981 as "economically wrong and socially destruc-
tive" and proposed that government administrative
and security budgets be cut before measures were
taken that lowered the standard of living.
Most Ansar are strongly anti-Egyptian, according to
the US Embassy in Khartoum. The sect's antipathy
toward Egypt has roots in the 19th century, when
Egypt aided Great Britain in overthrowing the
Mahdiya, the theocratic Sudanese state established
by Sadiq's great-grandfather, the Mahdi. During
Anwar Sadat's rule, Sadiq was a vocal critic of the
Egyptian regime and the Camp David Accords.=
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Sadiq al-Mahdi, the great-grandson of the original
Mahdi, was formally elected last year as the sect's
imam, its political and spiritual leader,
The election ended a rivalry
over the position that had begun when the previous
imam was killed in a battle with government forces in
1970. Sadiq's selection will, we believe, strengthen the
sect's internal cohesion despite his incarceration since
September 1983 for alleged plotting against the re-
gime.
Splinter Ansar factions on both the right and the left
do not appear to threaten Sadiq's leadership of the
sect. His uncle Ahmad al-Mahdi, head of a group of
Ansar who oppose active resistance to the regime, has
conceded Sadiq's preeminence since his election as
imam in September
source. Wali al-Din Al-Hadi al-Mahdi, a first cousin
and another rival of Sadiq, continues to cooperate
with other outlawed antigovernment parties. Accord-
ing to an assessment by the US Embassy in Khartoum
in 1981, however, the London-based Wali al-Din has
only a small following
Ansar are generally orthodox in their religious beliefs
and practices, according to the US Embassy. They
have long advocated greater Islamization of Sudan,
but many of their goals are more political than
religious. They often criticize the regime for economic
mismanagement, corruption, and one-man rule.
In public statements before his incarceration, Sadiq
often called for greater democracy and criticized
Nimeiri's economic policies. He described the auster-
ity program implemented by the regime in November
Sadiq may be less antago-
nistic toward Mubarak. Nonetheless, in discussions
with US diplomats in Khartoum in October 1982,
Sadiq criticized the just-concluded integration charter
between Egypt and Sudan as an empty gesture. He
suggested that Nimeiri focus his diplomacy on the
Persian Gulf rather than Egypt
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We judge that Sadiq and
Qadhafi both believe they can use each other for their
own purposes and then disregard each other once their
shared goal-Nimeiri's removal-is achieved.
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Ansar chief Sadiq al-Mahdi
meets Nimeiri during br'
period of reconciliation.
During 1983 Sadiq resumed political activity after
several years of political quietude. His return from 16
months of self-imposed exile, his well-planned at-
tempts to shore up his support within the sect, and his
pointed public criticisms of the regime in September
indicate that he was positioning himself to take
advantage of any faltering by Nimeiri.
The arrest of Sadiq and several of his key lieutenants
last September has left the Ansar in organizational
disarray. The regime's crackdown has increased the
odds, in our view, that the sect eventually will collude
with other outlawed opposition parties. Should Sadiq
be freed and immediately leave the country, he
probably would resume his effort to organize the
opposition from abroad, as he did in the mid-1970s.F
The Khatmiyyah. Sudan's Khatmiyyah sect has near-
ly as many adherents as the Ansar, according to the
US Embassy, but it has not attempted as a group to
influence Nimeiri's policies. The Khatmiyyah are
concentrated in Sudan's Northern and Eastern Re-
gions but also have large' communities in Kordofan,
Darfur, and Khartoum. Khatmiyyah form a large
part of Sudan's business community, especially in
Port Sudan, and many are shopkeepers. In rural areas
many work on large Khatmiyyah farming estates.
Theologically, Khatmiyyah practice is orthodox and
emphasizes personal piety. Until recent years, loyalty
to the sect's imam, who was considered semidivine,
had been an important principle and unifying factor,
according to the US Embassy. The sect never had as
cohesive a political organization as the Ansar, and its
religious leaders have largely stayed out of politics for
several years. Their influence now rests on their
persuasiveness and the residual political loyalties of
their followers from the pre-Nimeiri era.
The Khatmiyyah have long favored strong ties to
Egypt, and Nimeiri's good relations with Cairo since
the early 1970s probably have helped to win the sect's
grudging acquiescence to his role. According to US
Embassy reporting, the Khatmiyyah have their own
contacts with Egypt and also get some funding from
Saudi notables. They favor a free enterprise economy
and have not advocated a strong government role in
religious affairs, but their leader, Muhammad Uth-
man al-Mirghani, publicly endorsed Nimeiri's institu-
tion of Islamic law in September 1983.
Although the sect does not formally participate in the
current government, a number of people with
Khatmiyyah connections are involved in politics. Dr.
Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad, a Khatmiyyah, is presiden-
tial adviser for political affairs. Several politicians
formerly associated with the old Khatmiyyah-based
People's Democratic Party hold high positions, most
notably People's Assembly Speaker Izaddin al-Say-
yid. Most Khatmiyyah in government, however, retain
only loose ties to the imam, according to the US
Embassy.
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A small Khatmiyyah faction is allied with exiled,
secular remnants of the National Unionist Party,
which has in recent years accepted aid from Libya.
According to the Embassy's assessment, this group
has only a nominal following, principally outside
Sudan.
We believe that the Khatmiyyah probably will contin-
ue their tacit support of Nimeiri.
the Khatmiyyah are unlikely
to challenge the military regime because a majority
are relatively well-to-do and would be unwilling to
take arms. In contrast to the Ansar,
difficult to mobilize.
The Muslim Brotherhood. Sudan's Muslim Brother-
hood is smaller than the two mass sects but has
greater support in elite circles. According to estimates
of the US Embassy in Khartoum, membership in the
Brotherhood is at least 100,000 but might be consid-
erably higher. Embassy reporting suggests there could
be as many as 300,000 members. The Brotherhood
admits that it has remained more elitist than similar
organizations in other countries and that it is most
interested in gaining influence among the intelligen-
According to Embassy reporting, the Brotherhood
enjoys strong backing among students, intellectuals,
and professionals-especially lawyers, physicians, and
engineers. The organization's influence is strongest in
the Khartoum area, but the group is active in schools
throughout the country, even in the predominantly
non-Muslim south. The Muslim Brotherhood domi-
nates the student councils at the University of Khar-
toum, the Islamic University of Omdurman, the
Khartoum extension of Cairo University, and Juba
University.
The Brotherhood's sizable following within the politi-
cally active student population has been one of its
most important assets. The Brotherhood's political
standing with the government was boosted in January
1982, for example, when its leaders persuaded their
student followers not to join other youths in large
antigovernment demonstrations.
Hasan al-Turabi, the Brotherhood's leader, has served
in government since reconciling with Nimeiri in 1977.
The group's policies are set by an advisory council,
chaired by Turabi, which is composed of representa-
tives from all regions. A political bureau, also headed
by Turabi, meets regularly to implement policy. ~I 25X1
The Brotherhood has a highly organized and secretive
structure, and administrative units exist down to the
town, neighborhood, and "family" cell level. Despite
the Brotherhood's participation in government, it is
proscribed as a political party under Sudan's one-
party system. Therefore, the Brothers keep most of
their activities secret.
Because of this secrecy, the Brotherhood's foreign
links are difficult to discern. According to the US
Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan's Muslim Brothers
have only loose ties to fundamentalist groups outside
Sudan and receive most of their funding from the
Saudis.
The Brotherhood's declared goal is to establish a
"true" Islamic society in Sudan. The Muslim Broth-
ers believe that the Koran provides a complete guide
to religious practice and social organization, accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Khartoum. Most members
believe, however, that their objective can be achieved
only gradually and have pledged to support any
leader, party, or organization sharing their goal. F_
Embassy reporting indicates that the Brotherhood's
principal activity since joining the government in
1977 has been to press the regime to adopt Islamic
law as the legal basis for Sudan. The Brothers
proposed increasing the jurisdiction of Islamic law
courts throughout the country and,
advocated the official use of Ara is
even in the south. Turabi has stressed a gradual
approach to avoid alarming secular northerners and
non-Muslim southerners.
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Although Turabi is universally recognized as the
Brotherhood's leader, there is a more radical faction
led by his predecessor, Sadiq Abdullah Abdel Majid.
The two leaders differ primarily over whether to
cooperate with the regime.
Iurabi believes his organization has more
influence working within the system and has opposed
violent action as too risky and disruptive. Abdel
Majid's faction advocates open opposition to the
government, having claimed until September 1983
that Turabi's efforts toward Islamization were fruit-
less. he has since
claimed that Nimeiri's religious measures have been
incomplete and un-Islamic.
In return for the Brotherhood's acceptance of Ni-
meiri's national reconciliation program, its members
have been appointed to several high government posts.
Turabi served as Sudan's Attorney General from
August 1979 until May 1983 and is now presidential
adviser for foreign affairs, Sudan's equivalent of the
US National Security Adviser. The Brotherhood's
deputy secretary general, Yassin al-Imam, and sever-
al other members have been appointed to parliament.
Another Brotherhood member is Minister of Internal
Affairs. Muslim Brotherhood influence is greatest in
the Ministry of Finance and the judiciary, where
brethren hold man ke ositions.
Brotherhood members serv-
ing at the lower levels of government keep the party
informed about developments in their agencies and at
times can discreetly influence decisions in favor of
Islamic doctrine.
In our judgment, the Muslim Brothers' future atti-
tude toward the government will be shaped largely by
the regime's pace in implementing Islamic law. If
Nimeiri retreats from his commitment to Islamiza-
tion, Turabi will face increasing pressure from his
membership to end the group's cooperation with the
regime. The fact that the government allows the
organization to function without serious constraints,
however, militates against a complete break. We
believe, moreover, that the Brotherhood has been
pleased by Nimeiri's periodic crackdowns on Sudan's
leftists and fears that almost any other leader would
be less tolerant of Islamic interests. In our judgment,
the President's adherence to Islamic precepts in his
personal life also has impressed the Brotherhood.
The Republican Brotherhood. The Republican Broth-
erhood is decidedly unorthodox and philosophically
innovative, but it is politically insignificant. Number-
ing no more than several thousand students, the
Republican Brothers criticize traditional Islamic law
as "outdated and irrelevant" and believe new princi-
ples must be derived from Koranic sources, according
to Embassy and scholarly assessments.
The group claims its goals are spiritual rather than
political, and until recently it had been generally
sympathetic toward Nimeiri. First Vice President and
State Security Chief Umar Tayyib cracked down on
the organization in May 1983 after it distributed a
pamphlet criticizing his religious associations,
Several Republican
sy in Khartoum.
Brotherhood leaders were arrested. Considered hereti-
cal by most Muslims, the Republican Brothers have
few foreign connections, according to the US Embas-
Prospects for an Opposition Coalition
A cohesive coalition of the four Islamic political-
religious groups would be extremely powerful but, in
our judgment, is unlikely to form. According to the
US Embassy in Khartoum, last year there was re-
newed talk among Sudanese Muslim groups of a
common "Islamic line." The four Islamic groups
share a strong commitment to Islam and a general
belief that the political and economic situation in
Sudan has continued to deteriorate under Nimeiri.
Despite these shared attitudes, however, there was no
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evidence that an Islamic front was developing. The
Ansar, Khatmiyyah, and Muslim Brotherhood are
split over political and philosophical issues and divid-
ed by historical and personal rivalries. The Republi-
can Brotherhood, because of its heterodoxy, would not
participate in an Islamic front.
The Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, the two main rivals
for political power in the pre-Nimeiri period, have
fundamental differences and are divided by historical
animosity. They also are diametrically opposed in
their attitudes toward Egypt, with the Khatmiyyah
favoring closer ties and the Ansar wanting to loosen
those already established. Although both groups are
religiously orthodox, Ansar beliefs are tinged with a
messianic cast and Khatmiyyah, a mystical one. The
US Embassy in Khartoum notes that although the
political rivalry between the two sects has been blunt-
ed by Nimeiri's 14 years in power, there still is little
collaboration between them.
The Muslim Brothers have informal links with both
the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, according to the US
Embassy. The Brotherhood is separated from the
other two groups, however, by its close collaboration
with the regime and its role in shaping Nimeiri's
Islamic policies during the past year. In any Islamic
front, there would almost certainly be disputes over
the government's role in promoting religion, given
Sadiq al-Mahdi's harsh criticism of Nimeiri's Islamic
campaign, the Khatmiyyah's lukewarm endorsement
of it, and the Khatmiyyah's traditional attitude favor-
ing separation of "church" and state.
Although we believe an Islamic front based on a
common religious platform is unlikely, one or more of
the groups might join secular opposition elements in
an antigovernment coalition. The Ansar, with their
history of political involvement and antigovernment
activity, are the most likely to do so. The only
common ground, however, between any of the Islamic
groups and the secular opposition-which tends to be
leftist or socialist in orientation-would be opposition
to Nimeiri. Any such opposition front would be
marked by considerable internal tension.
In our judgment,
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In our view, the Republican Brothers or some Khat-
miyyah might participate in an opposition front. The
potential increase in dissident ranks from the small
Republican Brotherhood and the relatively few Khat-
miyyah malcontents would be marginal, in our judg-
ment. We believe that the Republican Brotherhood,
once fairly favorably disposed toward Nimeiri, has 25X1
changed its attitude because of the arrest of its leaders
last spring and Nimeiri's flirtation with orthodox
Islam. Some Khatmiyyah already belong to opposition
parties and probably would not hesitate to join a
broader coalition. Most Khatmiyyah, however, proba-
bly will continue their tacit support for the regime,
barring a drastic decline in Sudanese-Egyptian rela-
tions.
The Muslim Brotherhood, in our view, is the least
likely of the Islamic groups to participate in an
opposition coalition. Even with the slowing of
Nimeiri's Islamization campaign, the decrees promul- 25X1
gated in 1983 probably reinforced the Brothers' con-
viction that Nimeiri is the most sympathetic ruler
they can reasonably expect. Moreover, the US Em-
bassy reports that Turabi has repeatedly emphasized
his unwillingness to cooperate with leftists in a nation-
al front.
Relations With a Successor Regime
Even if the sectarian parties do not try to overthrow
Nimeiri, any successor to the President will have to
take account of their political strength. We believe
that the lack of an heir apparent will lead to intense 25X1
The Sudanese Government has charged that Ansar
led by Sadiq al-Mahdi are already cooperating in an
opposition front with the Sudanese Communist Party,
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jockeying for power after Nimeiri departs. Any suc-
cessor probably would try to co-opt those parties he
considers malleable and crush those he considers
dangerous, just as Nimeiri did in the early years of his
rule.
In our judgment, the most likely successors are senior
Army officers or high government officials. Most
Sudanese now in those positions hold views close to
those of the President. We believe that the Ansar,
Khatmiyyah, and Muslim Brotherhood would adopt a
wait-and-see attitude toward a new leader drawn
from the military or the government, hoping that such
a ruler would continue the main lines of Nimeiri's
Islamization policy and avoid blatant attacks on the
groups' corporate or political interests.
According to the Sudanese Constitution, First Vice
President Umar Tayyib would replace Nimeiri if he
dies or becomes disabled while in office. If Tayyib did
become president, he probably would enjoy good
relations with all Islamic groups except the Republi-
can Brotherhood. Tayyib has maintained a good
relationship with Sadiq al-Mahdi
The Vice President also has
strong family ties to the Khatmiyyah. Moreover, he is
a devout Muslim.
In the unlikely-but not impossible-event that
young, leftist officers seized control of the govern-
ment, the new regime's relations with the Islamic
groups would almost certainly be tense. The orthodox
parties would undoubtedly perceive a leftist regime as
inherently anti-Islamic. The sort of direct clashes that
took place between the Ansar and Nimeiri loyalists
soon after Nimeiri took power might well recur.
Implications for the United States
If Nimeiri is succeeded by an officer or official close
to him, there is an at least even chance that one or
more of the orthodox Islamic parties would accept an
invitation to participate in the government. According
to the US Embassy in Khartoum, none of the Islamic
groups are hostile toward the United States. In our
judgment, however, none would be as willing as
Nimeiri to cooperate closely with Washington. A
Sudanese government dominated by one or more of
the Islamic groups would be less supportive than
Nimeiri of US interests in the region and would be
particularly likely to reduce US military access in
Sudan. We believe that, even in government, the
Islamic leaders would fear they would lose support
among their followers if they come to be seen as
closely allied to Washington as Nimeiri is perceived to
Sudanese-US relations would be most likely to suffer
under a government in which Sadiq al-Mahdi played
an influential role. Sadiq has publicly criticized the
United States several times, charging in a press
interview in 1982 that Washington looks at Sudan
only in terms of its strategic importance to Egypt. He
decried the fact that Washington has not used its
influence to "persuade" the International Monetary
Fund to grant loans to Sudan on easier terms. Sadiq
earlier had opposed Nimeiri's offer to allow the
United States to use Sudanese military facilities.
Despite these public jibes, Sadiq's attitude toward the
United States is somewhat ambivalent. An Ansar
serving in Nimeiri's cabinet told US officials in
October 1982 that Sadiq had made a statement
suggesting at least indirect support for President
Reagan's Middle East peace initiative. During the
Iranians on behalf of the United States.
hostage crisis in Iran, Sadiq interceded with the
The Islamic groups have focused primarily on politics
and religious issues and paid less attention to econom-
ic matters. We do not believe that these groups would
necessarily promote commercial policies harmful to
US interests if they were in a position to influence
government policy. The leaders of the two strongest
groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansar, are
known for their pragmatism and, in our judgment,
would not be likely to support nationalization of
foreign companies in Sudan or other measures aimed
at harming US commercial interests.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/20: CIA-RDP85T00314R000100050002-5