MOROCCO AND THE UNITED STATES: STRATEGIC COOPERATION AFTER THREE YEARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000100040002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seer-et
Intelligence
After Three Years
Morocco and the United
States: Strategic Cooperation
Copy 3 1
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Morocco and the United
States: Strategic Cooperation
After Three Years
This paper was prepared b~ Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, on
Secret
NESA 84-10142
April 1984
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Morocco and the United
States: Strategic Cooperation
After Three Years
Key Judgments In our view, Moroccan-US relations are good, but somewhat fragile. After
Information available nearly a decade of cool relations in the 1970s, Morocco and the United
as of 20 February 1984 States have increased cooperation in military, economic, and political
was used in this report.
affairs. We believe, however, that many Moroccans expect the US
relationship to solve the difficult problems facing Morocco. Despite close
ties, therefore, there is the danger that Rabat will reassess relations with
Washington if there is no improvement in Morocco's economic and
military condition.
US-Moroccan strategic cooperation contributes directly to the dominance
of US forces in the Mediterranean basin. The centerpiece of the new
strategic ties is the six-year agreement signed in 1982 allowing the United
States emergency access to Moroccan military facilities. Underpinning the
formal aspects of strategic cooperation are the shared views between King
Hassan and US leaders on key global and regional problems that have
resulted in Rabat providing substantial support for Washington on a broad
range of issues
Several factors could seriously disrupt US-Moroccan relations. The most
pressing is the prevailing economic malaise in Morocco, the resulting
strains in Moroccan society, and the expectation among many Moroccans
that the United States can restore their once bright economic prospects. In
our view, Moroccans-from the King to the average citizen-hold unreal-
istic expectations of the benefits Morocco will enjoy from closer ties with
Washington:
? Military officers expect to defeat the Polisario insurgency in Western
Sahara.
? The average worker anticipates trade, investment, and employment.
? King Hassan probably expects to prevent any threat to the monarchy
that the current economic crisis-the worst since independence-might
trigger.
Even if Rabat deftly manages its austerity program, there is a strong
possibility for disillusionment with the United States. Under the worst
circumstances, economic grievances fueled by Islamic fundamentalists and
other generally anti-US, anti-Western elements might spiral into civil
disorder that would curtail US-Moroccan cooperation
Secret
Secret
NESA 84-10142
April 1984
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Less dire challenges to US-Moroccan cooperation stem from differing
strategic interests. Despite King Hassan's generally pro-Western outlook,
Rabat's views do not always coincide with Washington's and could lead to
misunderstandings of the sort that dampened friendships in the 1970s.
These differences include:
? Morocco's perception of Algeria as its primary strategic threat and its
limited tolerance for warming US-Algerian relations.
? Rabat's perception of Libya as a regional threat, its policy of limiting
Libya's troublemaking through accommodation, and its muted but
determined disapproval of Washington's confrontational approach to
Tripoli.
? Morocco's reluctance to step too far in front of a moderate Arab
consensus on Arab-Israeli issues and thus its unwillingness to support
openly some of the bolder US-sponsored peace initiatives.
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Morocco and the United
States: Strategic Cooperation
After Three Years
Political and economic ties between the United States
and Morocco have a long history. Moroccans fre-
quently note that Morocco was one of the first
countries to recognize the United States, and, with the
Treaty of Marrakech in 1787, it established commer-
cial relations with the United States. In more recent
times, the US Air Force maintained Strategic Air
Command bases in Morocco until 1963, and the US
Navy operated communications facilities there until
1978. The US Consul in Casablanca reports that
many Moroccans identify with the United States as a
free, tolerant, and powerful country, untainted by
colonial exploitation in northwest Africa.
Balancing the long history of cordial US-Moroccan
relations is the pervasive French influence in Moroc-
co, the result of the French protectorate over Morocco
from 1912 until 1956. In culture, commerce, educa-
tion, and economic and military assistance, Paris
plays the leading foreign role in Morocco, and it is
likely to remain paramount in the future. Nonethe-
less, Moroccans at times consider the French role to
be paternalistic and a vestige of colonialism, and,
when displeased with French policy, Rabat looks to
the United States as an alternative source of support.
US Embassy in Rabat, warm expressions of friend-
ship from US officials especially pleased the Moroc-
can leaders. At the same time, Washington's decision
to lift the restrictions on the use of US-supplied
materiel in Western Sahara further improved ties
between the two countries. In our view, Washington's
renewed emphasis on strategic concerns-such as
countering Cuban military activity in Angola-struck
a responsive chord with King Hassan, adding to the
warmth between Morocco and the United States. In
the past three years, Washington and Rabat have
forged a strategic partnership involving cooperation
on military, economic, and political issues.
US Interests
Traditional US interests in Morocco are, in large
measure, a product of Morocco's strategic location.
Occupying the northwest corner of Africa, Morocco
dominates the western approaches to the Mediterra-
nean and affords US naval craft-including nuclear-
powered warships-access to ports on both the Atlan-
tic and the Mediterranean. In a conflict between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a friendly Morocco
would constitute a reserve area close to Europe and
accessible to the Atlantic.
In the late 1970s there was friction in US-Moroccan
relations in part because King Hassan believed that
Washington was not shouldering its responsibilities as
a great power. The establishment of a Soviet-backed
Cuban military presence in the Horn of Africa and
the fall of the Shah of Iran-whom Hassan urged the
United States to support during the revolution-led
the King to doubt the efficacy and reliability of US
friendship. These doubts were compounded by Wash-
ington's restrictions on the use of US-supplied
military equipment in the Western Sahara insurgency
and by its growing concerns over human rights in
Morocco.
Relations between Washington and Rabat began to
mend in 1980 when the United States sold F-5 and
OV-10 aircraft to Morocco. In 1981, according to the
For much the same reason, the United States has
benefited from Rabat's refusal to grant the Soviet
Union access to Moroccan facilities. Under hostile
influence, Morocco would pose a serious threat to
NATO's southwestern flank-particularly Spain and
Portugal-and would threaten maritime communica-
tions with the eastern Mediterranean and Middle
East. In the view of the US Embassy in Morocco,
Rabat's continued denial of sea and air facilities to
the Soviet Union contributes directly to the domi-
nance of US forces in the Mediterranean basin.
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Figure 1
North A tlan tic Ocean
Canary Islands
7 (Spain)
Ad Dakhta
Guelta Zemmur
Western
Sahara
Portu .\
Gibraltar (U.K;)
Mediterranean S
Tanut t Ceuta (Sp.)
`+ &Melilla(S
AF I
zj 1
RABA
Casabiancy%% I < `
lI it
llr t
"Sidi Slimane Q19~a1
US transit and access facility {
%MarrakecMr
1 l
- Road
0 150
Kilometers
C C o
r
-~o
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Washington in 1982 led to
closer strategic ties with the
Strategic cooperation has become the centerpiece of
US-Moroccan relations. In May 1982 Washington
and Rabat signed a six-year transit and access agree-
ment, which gives the United States access to Moroc-
can airfields to support force deployments in unspeci-
fied contingencies, subject to Moroccan approval. In
addition, a joint military commission was formed to
manage the various facets of US-Moroccan security
affairs, including joint exercises, training, intelli-
gence, mapping exchange, and US security assistance.
To help strengthen Rabat's defense capabilities, the
United States also has provided substantial military
aid, which in fiscal year (FY) 1984 is to amount to
$21.7 million in foreign military sales (FMS) credits
and $30 million in military assistance grants.
US economic interests in Morocco are not as impor-
tant as its strategic interests. Morocco controls signifi-
cant economic assets, however, that may become
increasingly important to the West. It possesses 70
percent of proven global reserves of phosphate rock, of
which Morocco is the world's leading exporter. Cur-
rently, the United States is Morocco's main competi-
tor in the phosphate trade, but, as US exports decline,
Morocco is expected to dominate the market by the
mid-1990s. In addition, these deposits could become
an important source of byproduct uranium, which
Morocco plans to begin extracting by the mid-1980s,
although commercial production may be somewhat
further off.
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Significant oil shale reserves-fourth largest in the
world-are in Morocco. At current prices, recovery of
petroleum from these deposits is not economic, but, as
more easily exploitable oilfields are exhausted near
the turn of the century, Moroccan oil shale should
prove increasingly valuable-particularly to Western
Europe.
The View from Morocco
Washington and Rabat both view strategic coopera-
tion as serving their interests, but their definitions of
those interests do not always coincide. In our judg-
ment, Rabat's immediate strategic concerns are Alge-
ria-its chief rival for primacy in the Maghreb-and
the anti-Moroccan insurgency in Western Sahara. We
believe Moroccan officials-particularly in the mili-
tary-judge the worth of US-Moroccan strategic ties
according to their usefulness to Rabat's efforts to
counter these regional threats. In our view, Moroccan
officials are likely to be disappointed when competing
US global interests or emerging regional interests,
such as economic relations with Algeria, prevent
Washington from fully satisfying Moroccan desires
for political, military, and economic support. This
disappointment eventually could cause Rabat to ques-
tion the value of strategic cooperation and lead to
cooler US-Moroccan relations such as occurred in the
late 1970s.
The potential for misunderstanding is compounded by
an inflated Moroccan perception of US capabilities
and of Rabat's importance to Washington.
December 1983 Hassan regarded the US aid package
to Tunisia-roughly equal to Morocco's-with sur-
prise, and, we believe, displeasure. Moreover, the US
defense attache in Rabat and US Consul in Casablan-
ca both report that many Moroccans anticipate the
reestablishment of permanent US military bases, such
as the old Strategic Air Command bases of the 1950s.
Moroccan perceptions of the military relationship
with the United States are perhaps most unrealistic in
regard to Western Sahara. Re ortin from the US
Consul in Casablanca indi-
cates a widespread perception that strategic coopera-
tion with the United States will enable Rabat to
defeat the Polisario guerrillas in the Sahara.
most Air Force
officers believe that the Sahara war can only be
settled militarily and that the Polisario is backed by
the Soviet Union and Cuba, which thus calls for US
support of the Moroccan war effort.
Despite increased US military aid, how-
ever, we do not expect Morocco to defeat the Poli-
sario. Rabat, therefore, may blame Washington for
not providing sufficient aid to break the stalemate.
Economic Cooperation: Great Expectations
Strategic cooperation between Rabat and Washington
is complemented by US programs to address Moroc-
co's pressing economic problems. In 1981-82 total US
economic assistance to Morocco-loans and grants-
more than doubled compared with 1979-80. In FY
1984 the United States will provide $209 million in
agricultural credits and an additional $36 million in
PL-480 aid-enough to finance over half of Moroc-
co's annual wheat imports.
There have also been efforts to stimulate US trade
and investment in Morocco. In January 1982 the US
Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce led a trade
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Figure 4
Morocco: US Economic and Military Assistance
? A foreign exchange shortfall of $550 million is
expected this year, according to US Embassy esti-
mates, which predict even higher shortfalls in 1985.
Morocco's financial situation forced the government
to implement an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
austerity program and to reschedule 85 percent of its
medium- and long-term debt due between September
1983 and the end of 1984. In late 1983 Hassan
publicly outlined the need for increasing austerity
measures, including a further reduction in food subsi-
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Fiscal year
Economic assistance (includes aid and PL-480 Title I
and Title 11)
Military assistance (includes FMS credits and IMET)
to outweigh US imports by nearly 10 to 1
and investment mission to Morocco. At the same
time, a US-Morocco Joint Committee on Economic
Relations was established. The kingdom also was host
to several other US trade missions and sponsored a
fisheries colloquium. Despite these efforts, the US
Embassy reports that US exports to Morocco continue
While US programs ease the burden of Moroccan
poverty, they cannot solve Rabat's severe economic
difficulties. According to the US Embassy in Rabat,
Morocco faces the most serious economic and finan-
cial crisis since independence:
? The 1983 current account deficit hit $1.8 billion as
prices for phosphate, Morocco's main export, re-
mained severely depressed.
? The 1984 current account deficit is likely to reach
$1.6 billion as phosphate prices have not recovered,
and the country continues to be buffeted by
drought.
? Foreign debt at the end of 1983 totaled $11 billion,
with the debt service ratio reaching 45 percent.
dies as mandated by the IMF.
The King clearly wants Washington to help the
kingdom's economic ills. In 1981 Morocco made a
series of requests for drought relief, and in June 1983
Hassan called in the US Ambassador to request
economic support and Washington's assistance in
Rabat's IMF negotiations. The visit to Washington in
late February 1984 of the Moroccan Prime Minister
focused largely on economic issues.
Consular and defense attache reports indicate that the
King's expectations of greater US economic assist-
ance are shared by the Moroccan public. The US
Consul in Casablanca notes that many Moroccans,
remembering the old US airbases, expect the transit
agreement to yield an influx of US servicemen and
new jobs for the local populace. The business commu-
nity hopes closer US-Moroccan ties will increase US
trade and investment in Morocco.
Moroccan expectations of the immediate economic
benefits of closer relations with the United States
seem to be exaggerated. The US Embassy in Rabat
estimates it will take the kingdom at least three to five
years to return to economic soundness. Meanwhile,
domestic austerity may disillusion those Moroccans
who expect prosperity to flow from an American
spigot. The access agreement, we believe, will produce
few Moroccan jobs; and a strong dollar, geography,
and language and cultural barriers will continue to
militate against a rapid rise in US-Moroccan busi-
ness.
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ocu c I
Table 1
Moroccan Imports From
the United States
Million US $, F.O.B. Table 2
Moroccan Exports to the
United States
2,628
3,333
3,806
3,840
3,732
United States
406
271
344
429
397
Foodstuffs
128
94
140
180
169
Raw materials
12
26
33
9
19
Manufactures
112
110
115
100
121
153
40
57
139
88
Total
1,502
1,997
2,425
2,283
1,960
United States
45
45
37
38
47
Foodstuffs
4
5
6
10
11
Raw materials
35
35
26
15
23
Manufactures
5
4
4
6
6
Other
1
1
1
7
7
Political Cooperation: Common Concerns
Shared political interests and views have fortified
bilateral relations. The US Embassy in Rabat believes
King Hassan's views, which generally parallel those of
Washington, have produced policies that assist US
objectives and oppose Soviet aims and those of region-
al radical states hostile to the United States. In the
past few years, Morocco's friendship has been espe-
cially helpful in managing Arab and African
problems:
? Middle East. Hassan generally has been a voice of
moderation in Middle Eastern issues and has indi-
cated a willingness to support a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli settlement. The King has maintained
quiet, unofficial contact with the Israelis and was
instrumental in arranging Egyptian President Sa-
dat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977. According to the
US Embassy in Rabat, in January 1983 Hassan
urged other Arabs to support the Reagan Middle
East peace plan. Nonetheless, Hassan is constrained
by Arab-particularly Saudi-sensibilities and has
been unwilling to publically support the Camp
David accords or to restore full diplomatic relations
with Cairo.
? Arab and Islamic Issues. Despite his public opposi-
tion to Camp David, the King has supported the
reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world, and in
February he met with Egyptian President Mubarak.
In January 1984, as chairman of the Islamic Con-
ference held in Casablanca, Hassan was instrumen-
tal in that organization's decision to invite Egypt to
resume its seat. As always, though, Hassan's sup-
port is tempered by his need to respect the Arab
consensus, and he did not prevent the summit's
passage of a number of anti-US resolutions.
? Sub-Saharan Africa. King Hassan generally sup-
ports the status quo in Africa and opposes radical
regimes. In the late 1970s he twice sent troops-
after considerable US urging and promises of logis-
tic support-to quell a rebellion in Zaire's Shaba
province. In 1981 a senior Moroccan official told
the US Consul in Tangier that he agreed with
Washington's insistence that the Cuban withdrawal
from Angola be linked to an overall peace settle-
ment in Namibia. More recently, however, the
King's preoccupation with Western Sahara and
domestic troubles has caused him to take a less
active role, outside of diplomatic efforts in the
Organization of African Unity on matters related to
Western Sahara.
? International Forums. In the United Nations and
the Nonaligned Movement, Hassan has advocated
US views. In 1982 Morocco led all 101 nonaligned
states in support for US positions in the UN Gener-
al Assembly, according to the US Embassy in
Rabat. The Embassy expects the figures for 1983 to
be similar. In October 1983 King Hassan issued a
public statement of support for the US invasion of
Grenada, one of a very few heads of state to do so.
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Figure 5. King Hassan and President Mubarak:
Hassan supports the reintegration of Egypt into
We believe Hassan's main goal in cooperating with
the United States is to capitalize on US strategic
concerns in order to secure a long-term US presence
in the region and a US commitment to protect the
monarchy. Accordingly, if Hassan perceives the Unit-
ed States to be less generous in its support, friction
may develop between Rabat and Washington. For
example, following the reprograming of $52 million in
Moroccan FMS funds for El Salvador, Hassan can-
celed Moroccan participation in the July 1983
"Bright Star" exercises and refused landing rights to
US aircraft involved in the maneuvers.
In addition, Morocco's foreign relations are heavily
conditioned by the Saharan conflict. In our view, the
King could follow policies inimical to US interests if
they serve his objectives in the region. Rabat's rap-
prochement with Libya last summer was driven large-
ly by Hassan's desire to cut off Tripoli's aid to the
Polisario. In return, Hassan did not oppose the Libyan
drive into Chad, and he has disapproved of Washing-
The Effect of Domestic Uncertainty
In December 1983 the US Embassy in Rabat report-
ed Morocco's preoccupation with domestic problems.
As these problems loom larger in Rabat, King Hassan
may find it increasingly difficult to maintain highly
visible ties with the United States.
turn against the United States.
According to the US Embassy, the economy is the
central domestic concern in Morocco today. This
problem became especially acute in January when
planned reductions in food subsidies led to riots in a
number of Moroccan cities, which had to be put down
by Army regulars. The US Embassy reports that
discontent will continue in a period of prolonged
austerity, and US officials who toured the riot areas
noted increased local resentment toward the authori-
ties. Although the January riots do not herald an
imminent popular revolt, we expect austerity may
provoke further civil disorder over the next year. If
there is more violence, popular resentment probably
would deepen, focus on the monarchy, and perhaps,
There is little evidence, however, that domestic dis-
content has led to resentment of US-Moroccan ties.
The US Consulates in both Tangier and Casablanca
have reported a generally positive public reaction to
US naval visits to those ports and to other aspects of
close relations with the United States. There are,
however, indications of a nascent opposition to closer
US-Moroccan cooperation:
? The US Consul in Casablanca reports that this
opposition is mostly underground and is strongest
among students, intellectuals, and leftists. He re-
ports that some younger Moroccans sarcastically
compare the transit agreements to conditions under
the old French protectorate.
Foreign
Minister Boucetta faced "major problems" from his
party's left wing over his support for the access
agreement.
marily the pro-French infantry officers-may op-
pose closer strategic ties with the United States.
? Islamic fundamentalists, divided into small, compet-
ing groups, also are likely to oppose closer coopera-
tion with any Western power, in our judgment
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We believe the strains resulting from the economic
malaise and the possibility of protest from opposition
groups may lead Moroccan officials to reassess rela-
tions with Washington.
number of Moroccan politicians feared that once the
United States achieved its strategic objectives in
Morocco, US support for the kingdom would dwindle.
The US Consul in Casablanca has reported similar
doubts among some middle- and lower-level officials,
although in 1982 optimism about relations with the
United States was predominant.
Impact on Other States
,The growth of US-Moroccan strategic cooperation
has complicated US relations with other states in the
Western Mediterranean. In particular, Algeria,
France, and Spain have exhibited concern over the
US-Moroccan military relationship. These countries
appear satisfied that US-Moroccan cooperation does
not jeopardize their interests, but the potential for
friction over this issue remains.
Algeria. Algiers-which under President Bendjedid
has gradually improved ties with the United States-
was at first alarmed by Rabat's grant of transit
facilities to the United States. Following a policy of
strict nonalignment, Algeria opposed what it consid-
ered excessive superpower meddling in the Maghreb.
Algiers was particularly concerned that the agree-
ment might presage the establishment of US bases
and greater US involvement in the Sahara war, which
Algiers hopes to insulate from the East-West rivalry.
We believe that US explanation of the agreement has
assuaged Algerian worries. Nonetheless, should Alge-
ria perceive US-Moroccan strategic cooperation to be
leading to a permanent superpower presence in the
region, US relations with Algeria probably would
suffer.
France. Since the end of the French protectorate in
1956, Paris has retained considerable political, mili-
tary, economic, and cultural influence in Morocco.
France is Morocco's largest commercial partner and a
significant donor of economic and military aid. The
movement toward closer US-Moroccan cooperation in
these areas coincided with a downturn in French
relations with the kingdom over Moroccan loan ar-
rearages and the election of the socialist Mitterrand
government, which we believe the conservative Has-
san initially distrusted. Paris, jealous of preserving its
influence, feared the United States would replace
France as Rabat's main patron, according to the US
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We believe French and US interests in northwest
Africa are essentially congruent, and a greater US
presence in Morocco is unlikely to threaten the domi-
nant French position. Meanwhile, US Consular re-
porting and press reports suggest that Rabat has
overcome its initial suspicions of Mitterrand. King
Hassan, however, is not above turning to the United
States to obtain concessions from the French
in 1982 Hassan was
angered by his perception that Paris was pressing him
to refrain from closer ties with Washington. The King
intended to press France in return. The Mitterrand
government's fear-reflected in the French press and
voiced by the French Ambassador to Rabat-that
increased US military activity in Morocco will pro-
voke a greater Soviet presence in the Western Medi-
terranean may also lead Paris to try to contain US
influence in the kingdom.
Spain. According to the US Embassy in Madrid, any
growing US involvement-especially military cooper-
ation-with Morocco unavoidably arouses Spanish
sensitivities. Spain holds two small enclaves-Ceuta
and Melilla-and several islands along the northern
Moroccan coast, which Rabat also claims. Any US
exercises with Morocco, particularly near the en-
claves, harms US-Spanish relations. As with France,
US and Spanish interests in the Maghreb are general-
ly parallel. Still, we believe the potential remains for
Moroccan-Spanish disputes, possibly incidents, over
the enclaves, which would force the United States to
support both parties to the dispute.
Outlook
After three years of growing cooperation, US-Moroc-
can ties are good but somewhat fragile. The US
defense attache in Rabat reports that a senior Moroc-
can military officer stated that relations between
Rabat and Washington were the best he had seen in
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25 years, but that they were still "thin" and especially
dependent on good personal relations between the
President and King Hassan.
In our view, however, Rabat may temper US-Moroc-
can friendship as initial optimism and exaggerated
Moroccan expectations yield to the difficult economic,
military, and social problems facing Morocco. We do
not expect a more sober Moroccan outlook to threaten
the US strategic relationship, but Hassan is likely to
minimize the more public aspects of US ties, such as
shin visits and joint exercises.
We believe unrealistic Moroccan expectations could
result in bitter disillusionment with the US strategic
relationship if Washington appears insensitive to Mo-
roccan needs. Precipitate aid cuts, major Polisario
battlefield victories, or increasing domestic austerity,
we believe, could lead to Rabat's disenchantment with
Washington. In such a case, we would expect Rabat
to be much less sympathetic in political and military
matters and to turn to France and Saudi Arabia for
military and economic support
? US-Israeli Ties. King Hassan found the announce-
ment of US-Israeli strategic cooperation awkward
for his government and other moderate Arab re-
gimes. in
December 1983 young socialist militants in asa-
blanca, angry over US airstrikes in Lebanon, boy-
cotted a regional meeting of the Socialist Party to
protest the party leader's meeting with Secretary of
State Shultz. We believe an outbreak of fighting
between Israel and Syria or between the United
States and an Arab country will damage Washing-
ton's relations with Rabat.
? Western Sahara. Although, in our view, the contin-
ued Moroccan war effort in the Sahara conflicts
with the US objective of stability in the Maghreb,
most Moroccans believe the United States should
support them.
Istiqlal Party guidelines on
US-Moroccan strategic cooperation explain that
cooperation is a necessity based on Rabat's military
needs in the Sahara. Unrealistic and unfulfilled
Moroccan expectations of US support for a military
victory in the Sahara could eventually threaten US-
Moroccan strategic cooperation.
? Economic Woes. We expect deteriorating economic
and social conditions to continue to feed unrest
among Morocco's poor and to damage middle-class
confidence in the monarchy. Anti-American themes
were not stressed in the Casablanca riots in 1981 or
the disturbances of January 1984. US association
with the King, however, could cause opponents to
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We foresee a number of abrasive features in the
strategic partnership between Morocco and the Unit-
ed States. Although manageable, the following issues
could hinder close relations between Rabat and
Washington:
? Sovereignty. Despite Rabat's control over US use of
Moroccan facilities, the granting of military rights
to Western powers is an emotional issue in the
kingdom, which still remembers its subjection to
French protection. We believe the transit facilities
could become a focal point for Moroccans angry
with US policy or a symbol useful to opponents of
the monarchy, such as radical Muslims and leftists.
inject anti-US protests into future disorders.
Morocco's security forces remain loyal to the monar-
chy and, in our view, can maintain order in the near
term. Still, continued domestic unrest could diminish
Hassan's support and curtail his room to maneuver in
foreign policy. Hassan probably would then move
away from the more visible aspects of strategic coop-
eration, such as joint exercises.
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The Succession Issue. We believe the King will
remain on the throne for the near future. We do not
anticipate the overthrow of the monarchy as a result
of popular revolution. All the same, worsening eco-
nomic conditions and foreign pressures-such as the
Sahara war-could cause opposition groups to co-
alesce and exploit public discontent in a challenge to
the government. This worst case scenario could deal a
severe blow to US relations with Morocco. We believe
a revolutionary successor regime probably would ab-
rogate the transit and access agreement and cancel
other US-Moroccan military cooperation programs.
Strong nationalist and Islamic sentiments, however,
would probably preclude a sudden turn to the Soviet
Union]
More likely than a revolution is the possibility that
King Hassan might fall victim to a sudden fatal
illness or an assassination. In this case, we would not
expect a major shift in Moroccan policy toward the
United States, but domestic politics would be unset-
tled in Morocco for some time. According to the
constitution, 20-year-old Crown Prince Sidi Mo-
hamed would succeed his father. There are some
doubts about Sidi Mohamed's ability to rule, and a
government under the young prince probably would
lack the prestige and authority of his father. We
believe the senior military officers would remain loyal
to the throne, unless Sidi Mohamed proved weak, in
which case the Army might seek a greater role in the
government. A military or military-dominated regime
probably would reflect the pro-Western views of the
officer corps and could be expected to look to the
United States for assistance.
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Secret
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