AFGHANISTAN: PARTY FACTIONALISM AND FRATRICIDE

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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Fratricide
Afghanistan: Party
Factionalism and
Seeret
NESA 84-10132
April 19$4
Copy 3 4 6
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Intelligence 25X1
Afghanistan: Party
Factionalism and
Fratricide
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 84-10132
April 1984
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Afghanistan: Party
Factionalism and
Fratricide
Key Judgments A deep rift in the ruling People's Democratic (Communist) Party of
Information available Afghanistan is seriously impeding the Soviet and Afghan military effort,
as of 1 March 1984 hampering the operation of the Afghan Government, and weakening the
was used in this report.
regime's claim to legitimacy. Moscow's inability to resolve the party split in
the near term will hamper the Soviets' consolidation of control over
Afghanistan. Use of force to purge either faction would cause widespread
insurrection in the Afghan Government and military.
Factionalism contributes to the regime's security problems:
? Disaffected faction members in the military have killed Soviet and
Afghan officers.
? Military promotions along factional lines have resulted in low morale,
desertions, and collaboration with the insurgents.
? Sabotage and assassinations occur.
Factionalism also impedes the effective functioning of the government by
distracting the leadership, diverting expertise, and restricting information
exchanges.
To deal with the party rift, the Soviets have used an evenhanded approach
and an extensive indoctrination program:
? The Soviets have permitted President Babrak Karmal to surround
himself with loyalists but have also supported rival faction members.
? The Soviets have removed the most partisan factional leaders from the
Afghan scene for long periods through "training" and ambassadorship
assignments.
? Extensive Soviet indoctrination programs concentrate on youthful mem-
bers of the party.
A strong, unified government in Kabul is unlikely for many years. Without
a regime that will ensure stability and a continued pro-Soviet orientation,
the Soviets are likely to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10132
April 1984
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The split in the People's Democratic (Communist)
Party began soon after the party's founding in 1965,
and by 1966 Khalq and Parcham became separate
factions. Each took its name from party newspapers.
In 1977 the two factions united under Soviet pressure
but only papered over their differences, which reap-
peared in July 1978, a few months after the party
came to power. In the next few months, the Khalqis
exiled or jailed most important Parchamis and domi-
nated the Communist movement until December
1979, when Soviet troops overthrew the Khalqis and
installed a government in which both factions were
represented. The Parchamis, however, had a clear
edge. Since then, the Parchamis have gained slowly
at Khalqi expense.
According to US Embassy sources, the Communists
strengthened their presence throughout the govern-
ment in 1983. Pressure to join the party has intensi-
fied, and party organizers have become more influen-
tial in forcing government personnel to attend
meetings and rallies and to participate in organiza-
tional activities. A strong inducement to join the
party is the perception that the Soviets are not going
to be forced out of Afghanistan and that accommoda-
tion to their presence must be made.
Although the size of the party in Kabul and the
degree of commitment to it may have risen, the
regime's inability to deter assassinations has ham-
pered party growth,
Embassy sources report that a jibe often heard in
Kabul's bazaars is "Join the party and die. " The
party's influence outside the capital is almost nil,
according to US Embassy sources
Although Kabul has become a base
from which Communist control could expand, the
resistance so far has prevented that expansion. F_
pressure to join the
party has been particularly keen on Afghan military
officers because Soviet advisers are reluctant to work
with those who have refused membership. At staff
meetings, officers are left with the impression that
refusal to join may result in early retirement and loss
of pension. Although candidates cannot specify fac-
tional association, the new member is informally
recruited into one faction or the other depending on
his job and prior association with colleagues who
may also be party members.
An indication of recent growth is the proportion of
youths among party members. Kabul media in July
1983 claimed that 65 percent of party members were
under age 30 and that 20 percent of the armed forces
were party members.
approximately 80 percent are un-
belong to the party.
der age 30, and about 10 percent of the military
young
civil servants are attracted to the party by promises
of good pay, monthly food subsidies, and career
advancement. only 20 to 30
percent of party members are ideologically commit-
ted. Most activists are assigned to KHAD, the re-
gime's intelligence service, and to sensitive ministries.
approximately 80 percent
of the personnel in the Ministries of Interior and
Foreign Affairs are party members, and about half of
the personnel in the Ministry of Finance also belong.
The Khalqis remain a majority in the lower ranks of
the Ministry of Defense and throughout the Ministry
of Interior, US Embas-
sy officials believe the Parcham faction is slowly
gaining over the Khalqis through recent appointments
to key positions in the Army and Air Force and high-
level civilian posts, including four ambassadorships
in the Communist world.
in spring 1983 Parchamis were installed as
commanders of Air Force wings and as political
officers. Appointments at the 12th plenum in mid-
1983 reduced the proportion of Khalqis in the Polit-
buro and Central Committee to about 25 percent,
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Afghanistan: Party
Factionalism and
Fratricide'
The rift between the dominant Parcham (Banner)
faction and the larger Khalq (Masses) faction of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has been
wide since the late 1970s,
describes the split as "tremendous,"
"very personalized," and "venomous." We estimate
that there are about 40,000 party members and
candidates, though the regime publicly claims 90,000.
We further estimate that about 40 percent are Par-
chamis and about 60 percent Khalqis.
the Parchamis control most influen-
tial government posts (see table 1). The Khalqis,
however, predominate in the military, particularly in
the junior ranks. Both factions lavishly praise the
Soviets in public, though, in private, members of both
factions are critical of Soviet control,
Neither faction reflects any pro-
Social and Ethnic Differences
Differences over political tactics may have been one of
the original causes of the Parcham-Khalq schism,
with the
early Khalqis favoring revolutionary extremism and
the Parchamis favoring more moderate tactics. We
believe, however, that the basic differences between
the factions are social and ethnic. Parchamis tend to
come from urban and middle- or upper-class back-
grounds and Khalqis from the rural lower class.
Nearly all Khalqis are Pathan (Pashtun), while nearly
all Parchamis are from other ethnic groups.
Social and ethnic differences among the traditionally
volatile Afghans are often sufficient cause for distrust
and strife within the party,
The disunity is complicated by su actions,
which generally develop as personal followings,
(see table 2). According to
US Embassy reports, at the 12th party plenum in July
1983, President Babrak decried party members' "lack
of desire and ability to work in an organized and
cooperative manner and to have friendly and com-
radely relations with each other." Babrak blamed
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disunity on an atmosphere of tribalism, family ties,
ambition, favoritism, localism, and lack of mutual 25X1
respect. Parchami policies, in turn, came under sharp
criticism because they had not led to any increase in 25X1
party or regime control over the country. Security,
especially for party members and regime officials, was
deteriorating throughout the country, the economy
was worsening, and insurgent activity was increasing.
Factional Issues
In our judgment, the underlying social and ethnic
differences have given rise to numerous parochial
issues that intensify the party split. We believe the
primary issue dividing the factions-and at times the
cause of disputes within factions-is rivalry over
professional advancement. Parchami efforts to dis-
lodge Khalqi Interior Minister Gulabzoi-apparently
to neutralize his influence and to gain control of his
ministry's political and military resources-have been
a major source of tension.
in 1983 Parchamis accused Gulabzoi of con-
spiring against the party for personal gain and called
for his resignation. Rivalry over the advancement
issue has been especially intense in the armed forces,
according to US Embassy reports
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Table 1
Factional Affiliations of Key Persons
Secretary
Mir Sahib Karwal (P)
Influential commander of the Central Security Zone.
Secretary
Zuhur Razmjo (P)*
Secretary of the Kabul City Party Committee.
Secretary
Muhammad Yasin Saddiqi (P)*
Chief of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Defense.
Member
Abdol Majid Sarbuland (U)*
Deputy Prime Minister.
Member
Imtiaz Hassan (P)*
Former Ambassador to Bulgaria.
Member
Shah Mohammad Dost (I)*
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Member
Habib Mangal (P)
Ambassador to USSR, first cousin to Deputy Prime
Minister Sarwar Mangal.
Member
Maj. Gen. Gul Aqa (P)*
Member
Najmuddin Akhgar Kawyani (U)*
Member
Nizamuddin Tahzib (P)
Chief Justice of Qonduz Province.
Member
Jamillah Palwasha (P)*
Relative of Babrak and Finance Minister Wakil.
Member
Abdul Wakil (P)*
Minister of Finance, first cousin to Babrak; has
shown independence, exchanged death threats with
Prime Minister Keshtmand, and denounced some
Parchamis as opportunists.
Minister of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs; many
consider him an independent.
Member
Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoi (K)
Minister of Interior, head of the Khalq faction.
Member
Ghulam Jilani Bakhtari (P)*
Ambassador to Hungary, first cousin and devout
follower of Babrak.
Member
Wasif Bakhtari (U)
Candidate member
Sayed Amin Shah Zara (P)*
Candidate member
Sayed Akram Paigir (P)*
Candidate member
Hunar Ghairat (K)*
Candidate member
Abdul Samad Azhar (P)*
Ambassador to Cuba.
Candidate member
Khodadad Basharmal (U)
Chief of the Eastern Security Zone.
Politburo
President of Afghanistan, General Secretary of the
People's Democratic Party.
Member
Nur Ahmad Nur (P)*
Undergoing "training" in Moscow.
Member
Najibullah (P)*
Director of KHAD.
Member
Saleh Muhammad Ziray (K)*
Head of the National Fatherland Front (propaganda
organization).
Deputy Prime Minister, former Minister of Defense;
violently anti-Khalq.
Member
Muhammad Esmail Danesh (K)
Minister of Mines and Industries.
Member
Ghulam Dastagir Panjshiri (K)
Often votes with Parchamis.
Member
Mahmud Baryalai (P)*
Babrak's brother.
Candidate member
Abdul Qader (P)
Minister of Defense.
Candidate member
Sayed Tahir Shah Paykargar (P)*
a P = Parcham
K = Khalq
I = independent
U = unknown
Asterisk (*) indicates Babrak supporters, when known.
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Table 2
Parchami and Khalgi Subfactions
President Babrak Karmal Holds more influence than all other
group groups combined; comprises ap-
proximately 80 percent of
Parchamis.
Prime Minister Keshtmand More a following than a subfaction;
group vies with Babrak's group in seeking
favor with Moscow.
Mir Sahib Karwal's group Minor influence.
Khalgi a
Interior Minister Gulabzoi Most influential Khalqi group; Gu-
group labzoi acts as the head of the entire
faction.
Politburo member Panjsheri Maintains close links with Parcha-
group mis; not trusted by either faction.
Ambassador Sarwari group Little influence following Sarwari's
posting to Mongolia; known for
brutality.
Minister of Mines and Minor influence.
Industries Danesh group
Communications Minister Minor influence.
Watanjar group
a Khalqi officials such as Politburo member Ziray and Deputy
Prime Minister Aryan frequently shift affiliation to support
Parchami policies, probably to take advantage of what many
Khalqi officials perceive as growing support for the Parchamis.
Khalqi subfactions have also aligned according to links with
the former Khalqi presidents of Afghanistan, Taraki and Amin,
and other groups have formed around local leaders. Intrafactional
rivalry sometimes erupts in violence. Several shooting incidents
have occurred in Paktia Province among groups identified with
Taraki, Amin, and two local leaders.
the Parchamis began a
campaign in early 1983 to reduce the Khalqi presence
in KHAD and the Ministry of Interior by appointing
Parchamis to all new positions.
Conscription is another serious factional issue. At the
12th plenum Gulabzoi opposed the recall of men
mustered out as late as 1981, arguing that the policy
would have severe effects on the Afghan economy,
according to US Embassy reports. Several US Em-
bassy sources report that Gulabzoi challenged the
Parchamis to conscript the "tens of thousands" of
draft age men working for KHAD, which is heavily
staffed by Parchamis. In October 1982 the dispute 25X1
crossed factional lines,
when the Parchami Minister of Nation-
alities and Tribal Affairs supported Gulabzoi in op-
posing conscription of Pathan tribesmen. The abortive
regime attempt to conscript tribesmen nevertheless
has overtones of factionalism, since most Khalqis have
ties with the Pathan tribal area.
Factional tensions frequently escalate to include
charges of disloyalty.
the Parchami-dominated KHAD has accused Khalqis
of refusing to fight against the insurgents; of selling or
giving away weapons, ammunition, and equipment to
the insurgents; and of claiming that the insurgents are
better than the Parchamis. At the 12th plenum,
Khalqis accused Parchamis of "selling" Afghanistan
to the Soviets,
Khalqis also have criticized the Parchami regime's
policy of indiscriminate bombing of civilians, accord-
ing to US Embassy reports.
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Soviet and regime forces also have been affected by
the factional disputes.
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Undermining Security
In our view, factionalism contributes substantially to
the ineffectiveness of the Afghan armed forces. It
plays a role in armed clashes, low morale, insufficient
manpower, collaboration with insurgents, and under-
mining of security.
Armed Clashes. fac-
tionalism has prompted several armed clashes that
have resulted in the deaths of military and political
personnel. In the extreme, intraparty feuding has
escalated into attempts to overthrow the government.
spring 1983 an attempted coup by Khalqi junior
officers in Kabul caused fighting in several garrisons
that resulted in at least 10 Khalgi deaths.
an insurgent
group consisting solely of former Klialqis has been
established in Pakistan and has been carrying out
limited operations in southeastern Afghanistan
against regime forces. Although the Khalqi group
claims to have no political ambitions, other insurgent
groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan distrust the band
and do not cooperate with it,
Khalqis, motivated by
vengeance, had killed a number of Soviets in and
around Kabul.
a year later Khalqi troops fired on Soviet
forces in Paghman who were shooting civilians. Also
in summer 1983, several days of fighting occurred
between Khalqi and Parchami officers of the 25th
Division The fighting
began when a Khalqi officer burned a weapons depot
belonging to a company commanded by a Parchami,
destroying over 1,000 cases of ammunition, hundreds
of rifles and uniforms, and 10,000 liters of gasoline.
Similar clashes occurred in the Herat area in late
summer 1983, according to US Embassy sources.
Though reports conflict, the clashes apparently in-
volved Khalqi-dominated police forces from the Min-
istry of Interior and Parchami-dominated military
units. The fighting caused over 100 casualties.F_~
factional feuding often flares at
local gatherings of party members. During a party
meeting in July 1983 in Farah Province, a Khalqi and
a Parchami shot each other in an argument over
factional excesses. In Balkh Province a former party
secretary and three others were hanged in November
1983 for the murder of a Parchami official, according
to US Embassy and Kabul press reports. The hang-
ings set off a new round of violent incidents between
the factions.
Desertions, Collaboration With Insurgents. We be-
lieve that factionalism had a role in massive defec-
tions from regime forces during 1983. According to
US Embassy reports, a rash of desertions from the
25th Division in Paktia was sparked by the replace-
ment of a Khalqi officer with a hardline Parchami.
Communist troops in the 25th Division are predomi-
nantly Khalqi, and photographs of former Khalqi
presidents Taraki and Amin are still displayed on
messhall walls.
factional tensions in Jalalabad also were a
prime factor in several desertions from the 11th
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Figure 1
Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan
= Pashtun 0 Hazara
0 Tajik 00 Turkmen
FW- Uzbek ( Baluch
n Chahar Aimak
Division. They were prompted by the arrest in June
1983 of the deputy secretary of the party committee
for Nangarhar Province, a Khalqi, who was accused
of colluding with insurgents. Irate Khalqis threatened
violence, and the official was released after the per-
sonal intervention of the party zone chief, a Parchami.
A desire for vengeance and rivalry over military
promotions have caused a number of Khalqis to
collaborate with insurgents.
seeking revenge on Parchamis had transferred arms
and supplied information to insurgents, refused to
carry out orders, and urged other soldiers to defect.
Khalqi
officers in Qandahar grew resentful over promotions
in April 1983 that favored Parchamis. The consequent
drop in morale led insurgent leaders in Qandahar to
expect more desertions as well as offers by the troops
to supply information. Later that summer insurgent
leaders claimed they were obtaining more intelligence
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than ever before. Following large-scale insurgent at-
tacks on Kabul in mid-August 1983, the US Embassy
reported widespread rumors that at least some of the
operations were coordinated with anti-Soviet Khalqis
who took the opportunity to settle scores with Parcha-
mis and KHAD agents. In late autumn 1983, US
Embassy sources reported continuing evidence of con-
tacts and cooperation between Khalqis and insurgents
in Kabul.
Urban Security, Assassinations. In our view, faction-
alism plays a significant role in undermining security
in several cities, especially Kabul. We estimate that
some 30 assassinations occur in the capital each
month as a result of factionalism.
regime leaders have described as "fright-
ening" the number of Parchamis assassinated in
Kabul. An Interior Ministry official has stated that
intraparty feuding is responsible for more political
assassinations in the capital than can be blamed on
insurgents. KHAD reports
indicate that a group of Afghan military officers,
presumably Khalqis, has been responsible for assassi-
nating several Parchamis.
alism
in autumn 1983 a bomb was discovered and
defused at the headquarters of the Parchami-
dominated KHAD, and a few days later a bomb
exploded in the corridor outside the office of KHAD's
First Deputy
Impeding Government Operations
In our view, factionalism often diverts government
leaders from the tasks of formulating and implement-
ing government policy.
sessions of the 12th plenum in July 1983 were con-
sumed in angry disputes-generally divided along
factional lines-over promotions and appointments.
The meeting had to be adjourned temporarily after
the discussions threatened to get out of hand, and the
Perhaps the main factional impediment to the effec-
tive functioning of the government is the strife be-
tween the Khalqi-dominated Ministry of Interior on
the one hand, and the Parchami-dominated KHAD
and Ministry of Defense on the other.
the Defense Ministry is charged
with waging war against the resistance, KHAD is
responsible for organizing negotiations to win over
resistance groups and for counterrevolutionary activi-
ties, and the Interior Ministry is charged with guard-
ing roads and economic installations. These functions
often overlap, and serious problems frequently arise
between the agencies over regime tactics. For exam-
ple, Khalqi opposition to Parchami attempts to con-
script traditionally exempt tribesmen in the southeast-
ern border region in 1983 and the tribesmen's
consequent resentment were major factors in frustrat-
ing regime efforts to interdict insurgent supply lines.
We believe the Parchamis' distrust of Khalqis has led
to diversion of counterintelligence expertise and ham-
pered Khalqis in KHAD from performing their du-
ties. in winter 1983 the
Parchamis attempted to reduce Khalqi power by
establishing a new ministerial directorate, designated
KHAD-Ministry of the Interior, subordinate to
KHAD rather than to the Interior Ministry. This
directorate was formed to serve as a counterintelli-
gence unit to monitor Khalqis in the ministry and is
headed by a staunch Parchami. Earlier,
key Khalqi officials in KHAD were
placed on "reserve status," and the Khalqi Second
Deputy of KHAD was purged from his position. F_
Parchami attempts to protect themselves and weaken
security for Khalqis have paradoxically augmented
the power of Interior Minister Gulabzoi.
the regime has prohibited most
Khalqis from carrying or possessing sidearms, a policy
that has caused many Khalqis to apply to the provin-
cial police force, controlled by Gulabzoi.
A source of frustration for the Soviets,
has been the refusal of the Kabul city
police to share information with the Ministry of
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Interior. The city police, in conjunction with KHAD,
regard security incidents in Kabul as strictly their
business and have so far successfully excluded the
provincial police run by the Ministry of Interior. As
with KHAD, most of the senior city police officers are
Parchamis, and they fear that Khalqis would use
information on security incidents to discredit them.
are required to attend political indoctrination
sessions, and the party is continually seeking new
members. Building membership, however, has had
little effect on the party rift because the factions
immediately co-opt new members.
The Soviets have attempted to deal with Afghan
Communist disunity by taking an evenhanded ap-
proach to both factions and by trying to build a
monolithic party through indoctrination. Although
permitting Babrak to surround himself with Parchami
loyalists, the Soviets have supported Interior Minister
Gulabzoi and other important Khalqis. In winter
1983, Gulabzoi signed
agreements with the Soviets to guarantee delivery of
weapons and supplies directly to his ministry's logis-
tics office, apparently to prevent Parchamis from
diverting the shipments.
Gulabzoi, despite
being a Parchami target, has remained a "favorite
son" of the Soviets and been permitted to build a
formidable military force in the provincial police
command.
The evenhanded Soviet approach includes the removal
of the most uncompromising factional leaders from
the Afghan scene for long periods-through ambassa-
dorial assignments or "training" in the Soviet Union.
Among those removed have been Assadollah Sarwari,
a highly partisan Khalqi who was made Ambassador
to Mongolia, and Lt. Gen. Muhammad Rafi, who
recently returned to Kabul after two years of "train-
Moscow is also trying to dilute factional influence
over the long term through indoctrination and expan-
sion of the party membership.
the party in spring 1983 was
sending hundreds of young members to the USSR
every 90 days for six-month courses in tarty work.
Afghan ministry employees,
The aura of regime instability created by factionalism
is so intense that, nearly every time a high-level
Afghan official visits Moscow, rumors spread
throughout Kabul that the official or other personnel
are about to be dumped. We believe that such percep-
tions will continue to diminish the government's ca-
pacity to function and contribute to low morale,
insecurity, and opportunism.
Party factionalism also will remain a problem for the
regime and the Soviet Union over the next several
years. The Parchamis probably will continue to aug-
ment their authority at the expense of the Khalqis
over the short term. Substantial Khalqi power in the
provincial police and in the military, however, will
prevent the Babrak regime from risking a full-scale
purge, which probably would result in widespread
insurrection in the government and military.
We believe the Soviets are not likely to use force to
purge either faction because of the risk of widespread
insurrection. Even an attempt to purge Khalqis in the
military would not be feasible, given the Soviet and
regime desire to rebuild the already undermanned
forces. Strife caused by vengeful Khalqis is probably
not sufficiently serious to cause Soviet abandonment
of Interior Minister Gulabzoi. Such a move would
alienate other influential Khalqis, who would have
even greater cause to support the insurgency. Recent
instances of Soviet support for Gulabzoi indicate that
Moscow will, for the short term at least, continue to
back both factions. Along with the Soviets' need to
retain influence over Khalgis'in the military, Moscow
may also wish to maintain the Khalqis as a potential
counterweight against the Parchamis, particularly
should the Soviets decide to replace Babrak Karmal.
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necrer
Meanwhile, we believe Moscow will continue at-
tempts to indoctrinate the next generation of party
members, with the aim of eliminating factionalism.
Unless either faction presents an outright threat to the
Soviet presence, Moscow will probably continue its
current policy of evenhandedness while permitting
Parchami dominance. Over the long term, that policy
will lead to a greater erosion of Khalqi power and
increasingly firm Parchami control. Because of the
fractious nature of Afghans, however, new rivalries
will probably arise even within Parchami ranks and
continue to disrupt party work, though probably
neither so frequently nor so violently as at present.
Given the long-term outlook for continued factional-
ism, a strong, unified government in Kabul is unlikely
for many years. The Soviets will probably remain in
Afghanistan indefinitely because they have little hope
of creating a regime that will ensure stability and
continued pro-Soviet orientation.
Implications for the United States
Communist factionalism serves US interests by frus-
trating Soviet attempts to consolidate control in Af-
ghanistan, hampering security measures in Kabul,
and impeding the effectiveness of the Afghan Govern-
ment and armed forces:
? Factionalism requires the Soviets to divert manpow-
er from the struggle against the insurgents to
oversee the functioning of the Afghan regime and
ensure the operation of the Afghan armed forces.
? Collaboration with the insurgents grows out of
factionalism, increasing the costs of the war to the
Soviets.
? Soviet manpower and economic resources are re-
quired to indoctrinate party members to overcome
factionalism.
? The instability that factionalism creates belies Sovi-
et claims about the Babrak regime's legitimacy,
diminishing its influence in international forums
such as the United Nations and conferences of the
nonaligned nations.
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