THE YEMENS: A HANDBOOK

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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'Stj Intelligence
The Yemens:
A Handbook
A Reference Aid
Secret
NESA 84-10007
April 1984
Copy 3 0 7
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The Yemens:
A Handbook
ffice of Near Eastern an South
Asian Analysis, with a contribution from the Office
of Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
25X1
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Secret
NESA 84-10007
April 1984
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The Yemens:
A Handbook
Introduction North and South Yemen are among the poorest countries of the Arab
Information available world. Neither has significant military power, wealth, nor exportable
as ofI December 1983 resources nor manufactures of any consequence.
was used in this report.
The strategic location of the Yemens, however, gives them importance.
They occupy the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula and overlook
the southern end of the Red Sea-Suez Canal waterway. Soviet air and
naval forces have access to facilities in Aden and are strategically placed to
block the Bab el Mandeb, the 26-kilometer-wide entrance to the Red Sea.
Both North and South Yemeni leaders have played upon their geographic
importance to gain economic and military aid from the major powers and
from the Arabian Peninsula states. Sanaa's goal has been to gain
maximum aid by balancing competing foreign interests, while fending off
external control. In Aden, a succession of more ideologically committed
regimes has chosen to align the country with the USSR. The new
pragmatic leadership, however, is moderating its policies in a bid for
increased aid from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, and the
West
Chronic internal instability has complicated the efforts of Aden and Sanaa
to exploit East-West rivalries. Both regimes are products of revolutions of
the 1960s-led in the North by Nasirist-inspired military officers and in
the South by Marxists. Both have attempted to impose alien ideologies and
institutions on deeply traditional Islamic societies. North Yemen is not one
country, but three: the Shafii (Sunni Muslim) south and west coast, the
Zaydi (Shia Muslim) north, and the Sanaa central region. No leader has si-
multaneously controlled all three areas. The Aden government, on the
other hand, long ago consolidated control over its population, but the
leadership remains beset by chronic infighting
Leadership changes have been frequent and violent. Three heads of state-
two in the North and one in the South-have been assassinated or executed
since 1976. South Yemen's President Hasani may have been the target in
1982 of several assassination attempts, which probably were instigated by
former President Isma'il from his exile in Moscow.
Prospects are for continued instability over the near term. North Yemen's
economy by mid-1983 was in a state of near collapse, detracting from the
government's success in repressing the National Democratic Front insur-
gency. In the South, Hasani's curtailment of support for insurgencies in
North Yemen and Oman to induce moderate Arab aid for Aden's
straitened economy still does not sit well with regime hardliners.
Secret
NESA 84-10007
April 1984
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Aden's Policies
A succession of South Yemeni leaders, proud of their revolutionary
credentials and hardened in the struggle for independence against British
forces, has sought to export their revolution throughout the Arabian
Peninsula. In 1969 South Yemeni regulars attacked Saudi border positions
and in 1972 and 1979 fought brief and successful wars with North Yemen.
Aden has provided aid and bases for the insurgents of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman and the National Democratic Front in North
Yemen, as well as for a variety of international terrorist groups.
While less alarming, other initiatives by Aden have tended to be abrasive.
Aden aligns itself with the radical Arabs on Arab-Israeli issues, supports
Marxist Ethiopia on the Eritrean issue, and spearheaded the formation of
the Tripartite Alliance with Libya and Ethiopia in August 1981.
Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have sought periodically to induce Aden to
moderate its policies in return for economic aid. This strategy backfired in
1978 when Riyadh's insistence on public pledges of moderation by then
South Yemeni President Rubayyi Ali led to his overthrow by hardliners
who believed his moves might lead to Aden's withdrawal from the radical
camp. The Saudis now are proceeding more cautiously in attempting to
gauge the depth of the South Yemeni leadership's commitment to modera-
tion, which in part has resulted from disenchantment with Libya and the
USSR over their unwillingness to provide the economic aid Aden believes
it urgently needs
Sanaa's Interests
The energies of North Yemen under President Salih and his predecessors
have been fully engaged in an effort to gain legitimacy, to master the
country's divergent political forces, and to avert economic collapse. In the
tribal north, Sanaa's control does not extend much beyond the major cities
and the country's main arteries. Its military forces are deployed principally
in the south to contain the National Democratic Front's guerrilla forces
and to block attempts at intervention on their behalf by South Yemen's
Army
North Yemen does not present a direct military or subversive threat to its
Saudi and Omani neighbors as has the Aden regime. Nonetheless, North
Yemen has historical claims to areas in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis fear
that a strong, independent government in Sanaa might try to reassert those
claims. In addition, Sanaa continues to hold over the Saudis the threat of
closer cooperation with the USSR and tries to exploit Saudi fears to get
more aid. The Saudis are concerned that Soviet involvement there might
reach the level it has in South Yemen. North Yemen also has more than
600,000 migrant workers abroad-most in Saudi Arabia-and Riyadh
views them as a potential source of unrest over the long term.
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I I
Foreign Influence
Moscow has moved strongly to build its influence in both Yemens.
Although Aden has not acceded to Soviet requests for formal basing rights,
the Soviets have overflight, bunkering, ship repair, and communications
privileges. The Soviet Navy uses the waters around the island of Socotra
for fleet anchorages and engages in military exercises nearby with South
Yemen's naval forces. The armies of both Yemens depend heavily on
Moscow for weaponry and military advisers. Despite the hostility between
Sanaa and Aden, which at times has flared into open warfare, Moscow has
not been forced to choose between the two as was the case in 1977 between
Somalia and Ethiopia
There are indications that Moscow is now pressing Aden for basing rights
in South Yemen in return for easing payments on the debt Aden incurred
in purchasing Soviet arms. Such bases would complement Soviet facilities
in Ethiopia's Dahlak Archipelago and would give Soviet forces a good
position in the strategic Bab el Mandeb. The Saudis, in particular, fear
that the Soviet presence in the Yemens is aimed ultimately at Riyadh and
the Gulf oilfields.
The Saudis and the other Gulf monarchies take the long-term threats from
the Yemens seriously. Riyadh, eager to maintain a buffer against the
radical regime in Aden, has in recent years made up at least a third of
North Yemen's annual budget deficit and funds much of the regime's arms
purchases.
At the same time, the Saudis have sought to prevent the emergence of a
strong central government in Sanaa, to counter the influence of Moscow
and native leftists within the regime, and to derail attempts at significant
cooperation between the two Yemens. Riyadh funds a variety of rightwing
political factions-tribal sheikhs, conservative military and government
officials, and fundamentalist religious groups-to the detriment of North
Yemen's President Salih. The Saudis, who have been instrumental in the
rise to power of Sanaa's last three rulers, continue to search for a North
Yemeni with acceptable conservative credentials to replace Salih.~ 25X1
Outlook
Both Yemens resent interference in their affairs by foreign powers, but
they cannot escape this, given their geographic importance and economic
need. Sanaa has been the more skillful at playing off the interests of
Moscow on the one hand and Riyadh and Washington on the other. Under
the leadership of President Hasani, Aden now appears to be trying to
follow a similar course.
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Even with continuing help from both West and East, however, the Salih re-
gime is unlikely soon to consolidate its power. Sanaa can hope, at best, to
extend government influence gradually beyond the main population centers
while holding in check leftist and Saudi-funded conservative political
factions and whittling down the power of the tribes. This could come to
naught, however, if the economy continues to weaken, possibly triggering
another round of coup attempts. The downturn in Saudi oil revenues bodes
ill for North Yemen, threatening cutbacks in Saudi subventions and in
worker remittances.
Economic factors are also likely to be decisive in determining President
Hasani's longevity in South Yemen. Without tangible benefits for South
Yemen from his moderate course, his rivals on the left will press for a re-
turn to more activist policies and may seek to overthrow him. Neither
Hasani nor a successor, however, is likely to seek to weaken Aden's
association with the Soviets, whatever the pressures from Riyadh. South
Yemen's military will continue to remain almost entirely dependent on the
Communist countries for weaponry and military advisers.
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Figure 1
The Strategic Location of the Yemens
Saudi
Arabia
or~t'alia
11 Zaire Kenya
R. and.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Indian
Ocean
Mm q a as 2,000
nautical
miles
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Arabian Sea
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The Yemens: A Divided Heritage 1
The Zaydi Imamate 1
Change and Revolution 1
The Aden Colony 3
The Myth of Unity 4
Geography 7
Borders 7
Topography 10
Population 15
Religion 16
Economy 21
Agriculture 21
Industry 22
Transportation and Communications 23
Balance of Payments 24
Foreign Exchange Controls 26
41 The Legacy of the Septembrists
Government Organization 27
The Salih Regime 28
Internal Security 29
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Opposition
30
Army
32
Navy
35
Military Aid
35
Foreign Relations
36
Other Arab States
37
Western Europe
38
Economy
41
Agriculture
41
Industry
42
Transportation and Communications
42
Balance of Payments
42
Foreign Exchange Controls
43
Party and Government
44
Internal Dynamics
45
The Party and the Military
45
Internal Security
45
Opposition
46
Army
47
Navy
48
Paramilitary Forces
49
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secret
Foreign Relations
Western Europe 51
Chronology
Statistical Summary 69
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The Yemens:
A Divided Heritage
Most Yemenis, both North and South, are conscious
of a shared national identity based on state traditions
that date back more than three millenia. A distinctive
Yemeni cultural zone, centered on the highland re-
gion of the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsu-
la, includes all of present-day North Yemen and most
of South Yemen and extends into the Asir and Jizan
regions of neighboring Saudi Arabia.' Despite this
common heritage, Yemeni society, like that of many
highland peoples, has always been fragmented. A
proud, fractious people who consider themselves the
The authority of the Imams was generally lightly felt,
even when the Zaydi state was at its zenith. The tribes
viewed the Imam's role as restricted to mediation of
their quarrels and invariably resisted attempts by
Sanaa to govern them. The Imamate throughout its
history remained both inward looking and xenophobic
with only the most rudimentary of governing institu-
tions. Until the death of Imam Yahya in 1948, no
foreign embassies were permitted in the Imamate and
purest in descent of all Arabs, Yemenis are divided
along regional, tribal, and class lines
Islam, which was introduced in 628 AD, failed to
bridge these divisions and, in fact, introduced fresh
ones. In the ninth century, Shia Muslims reached the
Yemen highlands from Persia and founded a theo-
cratic state centered on the Sanaa region. The warlike
Zaydis of the north, the principal Shia sect in the
Yemens, have since dominated the much more nu-
merous Shafiis (Sunni) who are located along the
coasts and through the southern highlands.
The Zaydi Imamate
Under the leadership of Imams, who combined both
religious and secular duties, the boundaries of the
Zaydi state fluctuated widely, extending at times well
to the north of the present North Yemeni-Saudi
Arabian frontier, to Aden in the south, and eastward
into the Dhofar region of Oman. As late as the 1950s,
the Imamate government of North Yemen continued
to assert its claim to Shafli territories under the
protection of the British colonial government in Aden,
sending its forces into repeated skirmishes with the
British
'The Hadhramis and other peoples of the eastern third of South
Yemen have separate cultural and historical traditions. A number
of tribes in the Al Mahrah district and on the island of Socotra
speak Semitic languages that antedate the introduction of Arabic to
South Arabia. Hadhramis traditionally have traveled widely
throughout South Asia as traders and mercenary soldiers. Today
many Hadhramis opposed to the Aden regime have resettled in
no emissaries were sent abroad.
Change and Revolution
Nineteenth-century colonialism, Ottoman Turkish in 25X1
the north and British in the south, introduced changes
to static Yemeni society, which were to culminate in
revolution in the 1960s. But marked differences in the
two colonial heritages profoundly influenced the sepa-
rate directions the revolutions were to take
The North. The Turks, who occupied Sanaa in 1872,
attempted to introduce order and security and estab-
lish a rational bureaucratic administration. Ottoman
rule, however, was violently resisted from the outset in
an intermittently fought war of national liberation led
by the Imams. The Turks withdrew in 1919, their
material legacy limited to a few schools and hospitals.
The Imamate, however, took from the Turks the
concept of a standing army, under the command of
professionally trained officers. A few Turks remained
behind to found and staff a military academy whose
graduates were to become the agents of modernism in
Yemeni politics.
The war against Turkey profoundly altered the char-
acter of the Imamate. Trading on the new phenome-
non of Yemeni nationalism, Imam Yahya and his son
and successor, the even more despotic Imam Ahmad,
sought to transform the Imamate into an absolute
monarchy, a concept entirely alien to Zaydi precepts
and anathema to the Shafii community and the
emerging modernist element. A succession of conspir-
acies culminated in the revolt of the Nasirist-inspired
Free Officers on 26 September 1962.
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Figure 2
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The revolutionaries' base, however, was essentially
urban in a country that was overwhelmingly rural.
The tribesmen and their sheikhs-still the ultimate
arbiters of Yemeni politics-remained attached to
traditional values-the desire for arms and money,
the preservation of their local autonomy, and loyalty
to the Imam to whom they had sworn allegiance.
The solution-a typically Yemeni compromise that
denied outright victory to both sides-essentially
placed the revolution in abeyance. The Imamate
passed into history, while the republican government
moved steadily to the right. To this day the traditional
polycentric Yemeni political system continues to im-
pede the development of a modern nation state.
The Aden Colony. More than a century of British
colonial domination led to a different and more
decisive outcome in the south. In Aden a radical
nationalist regime succeeded British rule in 1967,
combining a successful drive for independence with a
social revolution, and firmly asserted its control over
the traditionally oriented rural population.
The British seized the port of Aden in 1839 as a base
to counter French and Ottoman operations in the Red
Sea area. Its importance as a coaling station midway
on the route to the Indian subcontinent grew with the
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. For the next 100
years, it was the only major urban center anywhere in
the Arabian Peninsula, attracting a polyglot popula-
tion of Westerners, Indians, and Yemenis. From a
total of 20,000 in the mid-19th century, Aden's
population by 1963 had grown to 225,000, a third of
whom were natives of North Yemen.
From the first, Aden acted as an agent of social
transformation. The growth of secular education, the
establishment of bureaucracies on alien, egalitarian
models, and the expansion of commerce and industry
created many new political and social roles for which
members of all Yemeni classes in the south competed
on more or less equal terms. By the 1950s the Aden
Trades Union Congress and its political extension, the
People's Socialist Party, were spearheading a cam-
paign for national independence and social reform. F_
Aden and extended to the east through the Hadhra-
maut. Rejecting the Imamate's claims to suzerainty,
all had become British protectorates by the 1930s.
After World War II, however, British administrators
gradually introduced political reforms and services to
the sultanates, which eroded the authority of the
native rulers. British efforts to disarm the tribesmen 25X1
forced them to turn from their traditional leaders to
the Imamate for weapons.
Dissidence and armed rebellion supported by arms
and money from Sanaa and Egypt spread through
Aden and the protectorates in the 1950s, fanned by
Arab nationalist propaganda directed at the British
and the native elites. Intent on reducing its commit- 25X1
ments in the Gulf and on the Arabian Peninsula,
Britain pledged in 1959 to prepare the protectorates
and the Aden Colony for independence. The Federa-
tion of South Arabia was inaugurated in January
1963 with independence projected five years hence.
Two rival nationalist factions disrupted the timetable.
Between 1964 and 1967 the radical National Libera-
tion Front (NLF) and the Nasirist-influenced Front
for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen
(FLOSY) waged a bitter struggle against the British.
In the face of rising violence, Britain abandoned its
plans to establish a moderate regime upon departure
and began withdrawing its troops from Aden in the
fall of 1967. In November, London negotiated a
transfer of power to the NLF as the dominant
political force in the country.
With the ruling elite of the sultanates discredited and
in flight, the new regime soon consolidated its control
throughout the country, helped by a civil service and
army inherited from the British and the tradition of
strong central government exercised from Aden.
Through the next decade the leadership grew increas-
ingly radical and turned its attention to exporting its
revolution to its nearest neighbors, North Yemen and
Oman
The Protectorates. Social change developed much
more slowly in the petty sultanates that surrounded
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The Myth of Unity
The myth that North Yemen and South Yemen are
two parts of a single nation underlies relations be-
tween Sanaa and Aden. Unification as a central
theme in the political rhetoric of both northerners and
southerners draws strength from:
? The nationalism that developed in the late stages of
the Imamate. The early republican government
asserted the Imamate's claim to southern Yemen-
seats in the national assembly were allocated to
southern representatives, a cabinet post for Yemeni
Unity Affairs was created, and refuge was provided
for South Yemen liberation movements.
? Cooperation between revolutionary movements in
North and South. The opponents of the Imams in
the 1940s and 1950s used Aden as their base. Later,
the guerrilla war against the British in Aden was
directed from North Yemen. Many southerners
joined radical northern republicans in the defense of
Sanaa during the royalist siege in 1967-68.
? Migration from North to South. Northerners, main-
ly from Shafii areas, comprised as much as 35
percent of Aden's population before 1967. Former
President Isma'il is a northerner and has been the
strongest proponent of unity among South Yemeni
leaders
Since its swing to the right in the late 1960s, the
Sanaa government has paid mostly lipservice to calls
for unity, believing that merger between the two
governments would be to Aden's advantage, given its
centralized government and more effective security
forces. Meanwhile, it has attempted to undermine the
southern regime by giving support to opposition ele-
ments. Ex-FLOSY members, for example, have
formed an important political faction in the North,
which has frequently had representatives serving in
Sanaa governments.
The South, for its part, has provoked border conflicts
and supported guerrilla action in the North to wrest
political concessions from the Sanaa government. The
South in particular has sought to force the North to
accept unity of the Yemens and take radicals into its
Secret
government. In 1972 widespread border fighting end-
ed only when the North agreed to the establishment of
joint committees to negotiate a full merger of the
Yemens.
After North Yemeni President al-Hamdi's assassina-
tion in October 1977 by conservatives, relations be-
tween the two Yemens again. deteriorated sharply.
The assassination of Northern President al-Ghashmi
by a South Yemeni agent in June 1978 probably was
ordered by radicals to avenge Hamdi's death. Nation-
al Democratic Front (NDF) guerrillas, recruited from
dissident political factions opposed to the Sanaa re-
gime, began infiltrating in mid-1978 into the North
from bases on the South Yemeni side of the border. In
February 1979 localized clashes between North and
South regulars escalated into full-scale warfare with
Aden holding the edge.
Negotiations in Kuwait in March 1979 ended conven-
tional military hostilities, with Sanaa forced to reaf-
firm its 1972 commitment to unity. Sanaa was also
pressed to accept internal regime changes.
Rightwingers were ousted from its government and
replaced by northerners acceptable to Aden.
The ouster of the radical `Abd al-Fatah Isma'il from
the presidency and his replacement by Ali Nasir
Muhammad al-Hasani, a relative moderate, led to
changes in Aden's relations with Sanaa. Hasani ap-
parently favors political action, including subversion,
over conventional military strategy as the best way for
the NDF to gain power in Sanaa. With the defeat of
the NDF by government forces in the spring and
summer of 1982, an agreement was reached with
Sanaa providing for a pullback of regular forces along
the frontier and curtailment of Aden's support for
NDF conventional forces. Although there have been
continuing tensions since then, both sides have exer-
cised restraint and there has been no serious outbreak
of fighting.
Although neither Sanaa nor Aden appear to believe
that unification is a realistic goal, both find gestures
toward eventual unity politically useful. The Yemeni
Council, set up in December 1981 during President
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Salih's visit to Aden, the first ever by a president of
North Yemen, provides a framework for meetings of
the two heads of state. It also provides for meetings of
joint committees headed by the Ministers of Defense,
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Education, and Develop-
ment. Neither side appears to expect anything con-
crete from these sessions, but they act as a safety
valve for the two countries. Meetings of the military
committee have been useful in monitoring the disen-
gagement of forces along the border.
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Geography
Location
The Yemens occupy the mountainous southwestern
corner of the Arabian Peninsula, their common bor-
der terminating in the west at the Bab el Mandeb (the
Gate of Tears), the 26-kilometer-wide strait that links
the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. With the excep-
tion of the port of Aden and its surrounding area, the
Yemens have been among the least accessible regions
of the Arabian Peninsula, although their coasts lie
along one of the world's most heavily traveled water
routes. Together they have an area of approximately
484,000 square kilometers (South Yemen: 287,500
square kilometers; North Yemen: 195,000 square
kilometers), roughly about the size of Utah and
Nevada combined. Measured from the Bab el Man-
deb, they have a north-south extension of 379 kilome-
ters and an east-west extension of 1,135 kilometers.
British while they still held the South Arabian Protec-
torate. Aden is pressing Muscat to negotiate a final
demarcation of the border.
South Yemen claims and occupies the largely barren
3,100-square-kilometer island of Socotra and two
nearby island groups. The Soviet Navy uses Socotra
for military exercises and its sheltered waters for fleet
anchorages. Aden has fortified Perim Island in the
Bab el Mandeb, which it holds as the result of a
plebiscite. Its claim to Kamaran Island farther north
is disputed by Sanaa, which seized and garrisoned it
during the fighting between North and South Yemen
in 1972.
Borders
Much of the Yemens' frontier with Saudi Arabia to
the north and Oman to the east has never been
defined or remains in dispute. The northern border,
which follows the crests of mountain ridges for ap-
proximately 320 kilometers inland from the Red Sea
to the vicinity of Najran, is the only section that has
been demarcated and accepted as an internationally
recognized boundary. From Najran south and east to
the Oman border, the frontier crosses the still largely
unsurveyed western reaches of the Rub' al Khali
(Empty Quarter). South Yemen's border with Oman
is an administrative boundary laid down by the
Many North Yemenis still are unreconciled to the
northern boundary, reluctantly accepted by Sanaa
after its military defeat by the Saudis in 1934, and
assert a national claim to the "lost" province of Asir,
the Najran oasis, and the Jizan area. Territorial
disputes in the Rub' al Khali also are likely to become
heated if oil exploration being conducted by a US
company in the borderlands results in significant
finds. Sanaa, Aden, and Riyadh cite tribal allegiances
to support territorial claims.
Territorial claims were not at issue in the border
clashes between North and South Yemen in 1972 and
1979. The present border was drawn by the British
and Turks in 1914 to separate their colonial posses-
sions.
Topography
The Yemens are divided into four well-defined geo-
graphic regions-a narrow coastal plain; the moun-
tainous interior; the crescent-shaped eastern escarp-
ment, which gives way in the northeast to plains and
the vast sand deserts of the Rub' al Khali; and in the
east, the broad Hadhramaut tableland. The rugged
terrain covering most of the two countries has favored 25X1
the development of isolated communities, a factor
that, perhaps more than any other, has been responsi-
ble for the fragmentation characterizing Yemeni soci-
ety.
The coastal plain is a southern extension of the
Tihamah, the and lowland that runs north along the
coast of the Red Sea as far as the Saudi border with
Jordan. In the Yemens, the Tihamah varies in width
from 10 to 30 kilometers. Seven major wadis (inter-
mittent streams), which flow from the central high-
lands, make limited agriculture possible. A similar
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Figure 3
Topography in the Yemens
',Perim Island
(P.D.R.Y.)
t Thamar
1514 mA _.
coastal lowland extends eastward along the Gulf of
Aden as far as the Oman border, but it is much more
narrow and, in places, interrupted by mountain spurs
that reach to the sea, making cross-country travel
difficult. Rising above the southern plain is the isolat-
ed volcanic crater around which the port community
of Aden has grown.
The two great mountain systems that parallel the
Arabian Peninsula's western and southern coasts
come together in the Yemens, where they reach their
highest elevations. Interior elevations average be-
tween 2,000 and 3,000 meters. Jabal an Nabi
Sha'ayb, which overlooks Sanaa, is, at 3,760 meters,
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Farmsteads at Rawdah in the plains near Sanaa. Houses and
towers are loopholed for defense. New homes rise on mounds built
up from decaying mud brick buildings F__1
the highest peak in the Arabian Peninsula. The widely
separated towns and villages in the interior are linked
only by a sparse network of mostly unsurfaced roads
and tracks. Tortuous curves and steep grades make
travel particularly dangerous on the Sanaa/Ta'izz
Highway, the only major north-south surfaced
road
Yemen's mountains are slowly uplifting as the entire
Arabian Peninsula tilts eastward. The basin of the
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are actually major
geologic fault systems with associated seismic activity.
A major earthquake devastated the Dhamar region of
North Yemen in December 1982, killing more than
20,000 persons and leaving 300,000 homeless. F__1
on the ancient Ma'rib dam, which impounded the
waters of the Wadi as Sudd. Planning for a new dam
and major irrigation works in this potentially produc-
tive agricultural area, has been held up by a lack of
funds.
The southern coastal range decreases in the direction
of the Hadhramaut, a broad and desolate tableland to
the east, which is geographically and culturally dis-
tinct from the Yemens proper. The narrow Wadi
Hadhramawt runs between steeply incised banks for
more than 350 kilometers before turning south to the
Arabian Sea. The relatively fertile upper and middle
courses support a large farming population distributed
in a string of villages and towns that line the base of
the walls of the wadi.
The interior escarpment is drained by extensive wadi
systems that generally flow northeastward and ulti-
mately disappear in the Rub' al Khali's sands. In the
past this area supported a high civilization centered
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Shibam, founded in the third century A.D., is a town of 10- to 12-
story mud brick apartment houses below the walls of the Wadi
Hadhramawt. Feuding among the some 1,500 tribal groups of the
Hadhramaut was commonplace, even within towns, until the 1967
Climate
The climate of the Yemens has marked contrasts.
Although much of the area is and to semiarid through
most of the year, precipitation at higher elevations is
greater in the Yemens than anywhere else in the
Arabian Peninsula. Wadi Hajar in South Yemen is
the only sizable stream in the Peninsula that is
perennial throughout its entire course.
The coastal lowlands are hot and rainless but have
high humidity, a combination that can produce ex-
tremely high physiological stress. In summer, tem-
peratures occasionally rise to over 55 degrees Celsius.
Annual rainfall in the south of the Tihamah is only 75
In the arid interior plains rain usually falls in cloud-
bursts, but many areas may receive no precipitation
for many years. In January and February the dry
northeast monsoon brings desert aridity and lower
temperatures to much of the rest of the Yemens.F-
The highlands have the most favorable climatic condi-
tions found anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula. At
altitudes between 2,000 and 3,000 meters, mean daily
maximum temperatures in summer range between
22 ? C and 28 ? C and in winter are just above freezing.
The rain-bearing southwest monsoon beats along the
mm, although it rises to 500 mm in the north.
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Figure 4
Precipitation in the Yemens
0 125 250 500 millimeters
7!7711
0 5 10 20 inches
Kamaran
Island
(P .D0.R Y ) Allludaydah
Mocha/
Ethiopia
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
I IM EM M I I I I I MINOMMOMMIM I I I I I I I I I I I. I
J F MA M J J A S O N D J FM AM J J A S O N D J F MA M J J A SON D
I I I I I I MMM
JFMAMJ JA SOND
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Figure 5
Population Distribution in the Yemens
-Saud
Persons per square kilometer
0 26 130
0 10 50
Persons per square mile
(1970 Y.A.R., 1968 P.D.R.Y. estimates)
% Perim Island
Q (P.D R.Y.)
Oilier 1 ~k DJIBOUTI
Gulf of Aden
western and southern faces of the highlands from July
to September and penetrates upland valleys as far as
Asir. A shorter rainy season occurs in March and
April. Annual accumulation ranges from 406 to 813
mm. Along the western slopes rainfall occurs year
round. Moisture conditions are sufficient for dry
farming and terrace agriculture in many highland
locations. Mountain torrents are diverted for irriga-
tion in the lower and more and valleys. In general,
precipitation decreases from south to north and from
higher to lower elevations.
saytjut
Arabian Sea
'Abd al Kuri
(P.D.R.Y.)
Boundary representation is
not neceeasrily authoritative.
Human Resources
Population. North Yemen, with a population of
roughly 6.5 million (including Yemeni emigre work-
ers), is the most populous state of the Arabian Penin-
sula. Although South Yemen falls well behind Saudi
Arabia (5.5-6 million), its population of 1.9 million is
the third highest in the Peninsula. South Yemen's
population is growing at an annual rate of about 1.9
percent; estimates for North Yemen are unreliable,
ranging between 1.8 and 3.4 percent. Like most other
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Sanaa's skyline is dominated
by the minarets of the capital's
many mosques. Most construc-
tion is mud brick, although the
lower stories of the homes of
the elite are usually of cut
The Central Bank is one of
Sanaa'sfew modern structures
countries with high fertility and mortality rates, both
Yemens have young populations. Roughly half of all
Yemenis are under 14 years old. Life expectancy in
the North is about 42 years and in the South about 38
years
North Yemen's population is overwhelmingly rural
with probably less than 15 percent living in urban
areas. Most of the population is distributed among
more than 50,000 farm villages and small towns with
the densest concentrations in the relatively fertile
central and southern highlands and along their west-
ern slopes. Sanaa (150,000 to 250,000), Ta'izz (90,000
to 100,000), and Al Hudaydah (85,000 to 90,000) are
the only cities of any consequence. About 33 percent
of South Yemen's population is urban. Aden (270,000)
and Al Mukalla (80,000) are the main cities.
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A merchant shows the effects of qat intoxication. The workday
ends for most North Yemeni males at noon when they visit the suq
(market) to purchase supplies for the afternoon qat session
Secret 14
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The suq (market) is the center
of most commercial and social
activity in the Yemens. A ven-
imported second-hand suit
jackets, which are worn by Ye-
meni males over the wrap-
Yemeni males traditionally have migrated throughout
the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf in search
of employment. About 600,000 North Yemenis and
136,000 South Yemenis work in Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf sheikhdoms.
Social Structure. Yemeni society is hierarchically
organized with clear distinctions between and within
social classes. Endogamy is the rule, perpetuating
these distinctions and giving them the. force of caste
boundaries. The right to bear arms and the manner in
which they are displayed continue to be important
indicators of social status in North Yemen.
The revolutions of the 1960s have not blurred tradi-
tional class distinctions to any great extent, but they
have broken the control by traditional elites of politi-
cal and economic power. The professional military in
both countries and the party in South Yemen have
become channels enabling some persons of the lower,
traditionally non-arms-bearing classes to rise to high-
er status.
regime.
The sayyid class, which claims descent from the
Prophet Muhammad and formed the hereditary reli-
gious aristocracy in the Imamate and the Protector-
ates, has lost its monopoly of political power. Only a
few sayyids still hold influential posts in either
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Under the Imamate, the hereditary qadi class, ranked
socially below the sayyids, provided cadres for the
religious and legal establishments. It continues to be
strongly represented in the bureaucracies in both
North and South. North Yemen's late President al-
Hamdi, for example, was helped to prominence by his 25X1
Tribesmen occupy a middle social rung in North
Yemen, although there are distinctions between tribal
groups based on claims of "noble" origin. Within the
tribes there is a high degree of egalitarianism. Al-
though sheikhs tend to be selected by the tribesmen
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from dominant families, they maintain their positions
only if successful as mediators within the tribe and as
intermediaries between the tribes and the govern-
ment.
At the lower end of the social scale are tradesmen and
tenant farmers, and lower still are the akhdam, most
of whom are of African descent. Members of the
akhdam class in North Yemen typically perform
menial jobs such as sweeping streets
Religion. Although almost all Yemenis are Muslim,
sectarian quarrels have been responsible for much of
the fragmentation of Yemeni society. Most Yemenis
are adherents of the two major branches of Islam-
the orthodox Sunni and the heterodox Shia. The
majority Shafii community, which takes its name
from one of the four schools jurisprudence of Sunni
Islam, constitutes at least half of the population in
North Yemen and virtually all of the population in
South Yemen. In North Yemen, Shafiis occupy the
entire stretch of the Tihamah, the southern highlands,
and the eastern borderlands.
The Zaydis, adherents of a Shia sect, dominate the
central and northern highlands, with Sanaa as their
center, and extend to the north where they straddle
the frontier with Saudi Arabia. Small Ismaili Shia
communities are found in the Haraz region west of
Sanaa and among the Yam tribes in the border area
near Najran. About 1,000 Jews remain from the once
60,000-strong Yemeni Jewish community. Most Jews
left en masse for Israel in 1948.
Although Zaydis and Shaflis are conservative'in
religious matters, neither community displays the
zealotry of contemporary Iranian Shiism or the dour
puritanism of the Wahhabis (Sunni) of Saudi Arabia.
Theologically, there is little distinction between the
Yemeni sects. Zaydi teachings, in fact, are closer to
Sunni dogma than those of any other Shia sect, and it
is not uncommon for Zaydis and Shaflis to intermarry
or worship in each other's mosques
Politically and economically, however, the communi-
ties remain deeply divided, and continuing tensions
between the two have contributed to much of North
Yemen's chronic political instability. The Shafiis,
generally more sophisticated and better educated,
have resented their political domination by the more
warlike Zaydis through much of Yemeni history.
Notwithstanding sectarian feuding, Islamic practice is
supported fully by the Sanaa government in both
Zaydi and Shafii areas. The 1970 Constitution de-
clared Islam to be the state religion and identified the
sharia, the codification of the Islamic legal and moral
system, as the source of all state laws.
The South Yemeni Government, despite its avowed
Marxism, has treated Islamic issues gingerly. Article
46 of the Constitution asserts that Islam is the
religion of the state. South Yemen's social practices,
however, are the least restrictive of any Arab country.
Women, for example, are integrated into the urban
work force, although in the countryside they generally
remain veiled and are confined by custom to tradition-
al roles.)
The Tribes. Tribalism permeates all facets of life in
the Yemens. Sanaa has made only limited progress in
extending its writ beyond the capital and other urban
centers into Zaydi areas. Traditional sheikhly families
continue to lead the Zaydi tribes, which function as
virtually independent political, economic, and military
entities. By contrast, the sheikhly class has been all
but destroyed in South Yemen and has lost much of
its power in Shafii areas of North Yemen.
Most of the Zaydi tribes are grouped into two main
confederations-the relatively tightly organized
Hashid, whose paramount sheikhs in recent years
have been supplied by the al-Ahmar family of the
dominant Bani `Usaymat tribe, and the more numer-
ous but diffuse Bakil. Although acknowledging these
allegiances, tribes join in concerted action only if they
perceive their interests to be directly involved. Loyal-
ties, whether to the government or to the sheikhs,
however, are always subject to negotiation.
To the extent possible, the Zaydi tribes organize their
affairs independently of the government. Rough jus-
tice, often involving collective fines and punishment, is
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Young Adeni women prefer
Western dress. In North Yemen
the veil is still de rigueur, even
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Figure 6
Principal Tribes and Religious Divisions in the Yemens
Tribal confederations in North Yemen
Arhab Bakil Murad Madhhij
saahao Hashid 'Ah= Akk
lunl&AA
Island
Zaydi (Shia) I Shafii (Sunni)
YU fY
Mutiam nad
Banff 'ilsaymat
-YAm
Dahm
SANAA Bwji Hieshayah
m
411-1y
Al
Zaraniq
Sanbin
A! a'
l/ Bayhen
Ethiopia
.Parini !eland
Djibo JtsauTr
Gulf of Aden
Son aIia
meted out according to 'urf, tribal customary law. In
a society permeated by a heroic code, personal
independence, warrior prowess, and loyalty to one's
family, clan, and tribe are highly prized. Every tribes-
man wears a curved dagger, called thejambiya, as a
symbol of manhood. Fighting within and between
tribes is endemic, usually resulting from disputes over
land, water, and honor. These quarrels for the most
part involve a minimum of bloodletting followed by
arbitration, usually by respected sheikhs of other
tribes)
-Saudi Arabia
Mahrah \
Abd a! Kdd
_f
ftmar
Kltotnzt4r?_ -
Boaodaryi praaan Ntdn ri-'
no! rinoHenad1y aSlttr It*bua
Out of ideological necessity, the government does not
officially recognize tribal structures, but it quietly
engages in mediation with tribal leaders; it can ill
afford not to. The more powerful tribes can, in short
order, mobilize thousands of men armed with Soviet
AK-47 assault rifles. Arsenals of the major tribes also
include crew-served weapons and even heavy artillery
and tanks captured from the Egyptians during the
civil war.
Imam
2
Sayhan
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"capital" of the northern tribes
A sheikh and members of his entourage. Tribesmen pay the
equivalent of $1,600 for the Soviet AK-47, the weapon of choice for
most North Yemenis
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Tribalism today is not as strongly developed as for-
merly among the Shafii communities in North Ye-
men. The once powerful Akk confederacy of the
Tihamah never recovered from its military defeat by
the Imamate in 1929. The intrusion of Zaydi land-
holding clans and families has tended to break up
Shafii tribal structures throughout the southern high-
lands. Shafii loyalties now are primarily focused on
the village community.
Although the sheikhly class has effectively been de-
stroyed in South Yemen, identification with a particu-
lar tribal group is still common, even within the
government, party, and military. Members of the
Dathinah tribe, for example, dominate the officer
corps, having replaced the Aulaqi, who had been
favored under the British. Today, many Aulaqi have
joined anti-Aden exile groups in North Yemen and
Saudi Arabia.
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Economy
North Yemen's economy suffers from serious struc-
tural defects:
? Much of the population lives beyond effective gov-
ernment control.
? Communication and transportation are poorly de-
veloped.
? The economy is based largely on subsistence
agriculture.
? Few commercially exploitable minerals have been
found.
As a result, Sanaa has the worst trade imbalance in
the world, with export earnings typically covering less
than 1 percent of the import bill.
Although substantial foreign exchange is received
through worker remittances, these earnings have dis-
torted more than benefited the economy. A labor
shortage was created in the 1970s by the migration of
about 600,000 Yemeni workers-about half the do-
mestic labor force-attracted by the economic boom
in neighboring countries. The worker exodus generat-
ed demand for foreign labor to replace the loss of
Yemenis, pushed up wage scales, and contributed to a
deterioration of the country's agricultural base.
The migration also fostered the development of a
black market. Increased purchasing power afforded
by the wide distribution of worker remittances stimu-
lated unbridled import growth. The government tried
to profit from the burgeoning consumer demand by
imposing customs duties on imports. This resulted in
government dependence on remittances as the largest
source of foreign exchange and the chief source of
revenue. Not surprisingly, imposition of customs du-
ties, coupled with the government's inability to control
border areas, stimulated trade in smuggled goods and
illegal currency transactions, according to the US
Embassy. Black-market activity now siphons off sub-
stantial government revenues and denies it needed
foreign exchange.
Moreover, government hopes of channeling remit-
tances into productive investment have been only
marginally fulfilled. Because of endemic political
uncertainty, private investors have sought rapid re-
turns from ventures in retail sales or production of
light consumer goods and have shied away from
investments involving long-term payoffs. The govern-
ment, therefore, has had to carry the burden of
financing both the country's infrastructure and the
infant industrial sector. As a consequence, the Yeme-
ni industrial base is not sufficiently developed to stem
the consumer-led growth in imports.
Agriculture. North Yemen, with some of the most
fertile land in the Arabian Peninsula, has the poten-
tial to become self-sufficient in food production. The
agriculture sector, however, has performed poorly
despite its importance to the economy. Although over
75 percent of the labor force is employed on the land,
farming accounts for about 40 percent of GDP-
down from 45 percent in 1975. Low farm incomes
have contributed to emigration, which has left the
sector with labor shortages.
North Yemen's farm output has virtually stagnated
since the mid-1970s. The production of cotton-once
North Yemen's main export commodity-plummeted
from a peak of 27,000 tons in 1975 to 3,000 tons in
1980, mostly because of high production costs and the
suspension of subsidized credits. North Yemen im-
ports about 35 percent of its grain requirements, its
largest agricultural import category.
Approximately 20 percent of North Yemen's land is
arable. In the Tihama plain, farming depends on
irrigation. Major crops are cotton, grain, tobacco, and
olives. In the highlands, cereals, coffee, qat, and
vegetables are grown using a labor-intensive system of
terracing. Yields vary substantially from year to year
depending on the rainfall
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Table 1
North Yemen: Government Finances a
783
826
1,066
1,190
483
614
678
729
856
300
100
148
337
334
1,527
1,569
1,900
410
562
656
723
910
582
554
871
846
990
-209
-402
-701
-503
-710
209
402
701
503
710
External d
123
117
451
205
265
Domestic e
86
285
250
298
445
a Fiscal year. Fiscal year changed to coincide with calendar year in
1980. Previously, fiscal year was July-June.
b Provisional.
e Includes taxes and nontax sources.
d Project and commodity loans, minus repayments.
e Includes Central Bank, commercial banks, and statistical
adjustment.
To boost agricultural productivity, the government
began in 1981 to implement the second phase of an
$82 million rural development effort to upgrade
roads, water supplies, and health services and to
improve coordination of the government's activities in
agriculture. The regime also has plans to revive the
domestic textile industry.
The government will not realize quick returns from its,
agricultural investments because of the long lead-
times needed for most of these projects. Mechaniza-
tion to offset labor outflows is hampered by the small
size of individual land holdings-about 90 percent are
less than 5 hectares-lack of adequate financing,
insufficient infrastructure, and rugged terrain. A
shortage of skilled administrators also impedes mod-
ernization.
North Yemen's industry also does not have the diver-
sity to make economic self-sufficiency a realistic goal.
Food and beverage processing is the dominant activity
followed by metal processing and the production of
building materials and chemicals. As a result of the
decline in cotton output, the two government-owned
textile mills operate far below capacity.
infrastructure.
North Yemen's prospects for industrial development
will remain severely limited, even if funding becomes
available. Its raw materials endowment cannot sup-
port more than the expansion of the building materi-
als industries. A shortage of all categories of labor,
the resulting steep wages, and high costs of other
inputs, such as electricity, work against industrial
expansion. Other constraints include the small size of
the domestic market and the lack of supporting
Industry. The industrial sector is not developed
enough to slow the rapid rise in imports. In 1981
manufacturing accounted for only 14 percent of GDP
and mining and quarrying for 1 percent. Together,
these sectors employ less than 5 percent of the labor
force.
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Mountain slopes are covered with terrace farms and gardens
unsuited to mechanical cultivation. Many have been abandoned by
owners who have gone abroad. Others have been given over to qat
cultivation that requires less care and yields greater profits. Even
Mineral Resources. North Yemen has few known
natural resources. Scientific surveying, however, has
been limited. Salt mined at Salif and Al Luhayyah in
the Tihamah has been in demand, principally in
Japan, because of its exceptional purity. Iron is mined
and smelted on a small scale at Jabal Nuqum near
Sanaa.
A Yemeni subsidiary of a US company located
several potential oil-bearing structures in 1982 near
Ma'rib. If commercial quantities of crude are found,
the exports will be delayed for at least three to five
years until the fields are fully developed and a
pipeline constructed from Ma'rib through Sanaa to
the port at Salif. A German subsidiary of Shell Oil
discovered a promising offshore area in 1981, and
drilling to ascertain the size of the reserves continued
in 1982
Transportation and Communications. North Yemen's
transportation sector is poorly developed. The country
has no railroads and few all-weather highways. The
major port at Al Hudaydah has berths with depths to
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Figure 7
Land Use and Economic Activity in the Yemens
VIIIIIIII Main cultivated area
Grains
Coffee and qat area
Tobacco
Fish processing
Ji
Fruits
Cotton
44
Goats and sheep
$a'dah
f
Isla
B II BayhAn al Qi?eb
A7 Hudaydah" ?
ement =
,* A
ej Agab
s plant ,* Y 4%,
F kJdkal
ta=
BQynd*' rip!eM I tlpris'-
note oeBiNiily 9ld4wdatlve
7.9 meters, but its use is limited by shoals. The Balance of Payments. North Yemen's balance of
government is planning new port facilities at Salif and payments has deteriorated sharply since 1979. Work-
major highway expansion, especially in the south. er remittances dropped from a peak of over $1.1
Only a few thousand telephones are in use, but France billion in FY 1980 to an estimated $900 million as
has agreed to help build a $63 million telecommunica- emigre workers began to return home.
tions system.
Secret 24
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Table 2
North Yemen: Balance of Payments, 1978-82 a
-1,247
-1,539
-1,902
1,737
-967
3
7
13
11
NEGL
1,915
1,748
967
-36
0
-21
-51
-78
58
135
106
32
NA
-94
-135
-127
-83
NA
Unrequited transfers
1,145
1,211
1,232
1,126
778
Government receipts d
312
112
148
337
343
833
1,099
1,084
789
435
1,243
1,360
1,341
988
574
Payments
-410
-261
-257
-199
-139
Current account
-138
-328
-691
-662
-267
Net capital
116
158
494
229
118
Drawing on loans
114
124
466
262
NA
Repayment of loans
-10
-7
-15
-58
NA
Investments
12
41
43
25
NA
Errors and omissions
182
24
49
103
21
Overall balance
160
-146
-148
-330
-128
a Fiscal year. Fiscal year changed to coincide with calendar year in
1980. Previously, fiscal year was July-June.
b First six months.
c Consists mainly of investment income from official reserves.
d Cash grants and value of commodity grants.
e Primarily workers' remittances.
At the same time, the value of imports has remained
high-roughly $1.7 billion-despite efforts to cut
spending. The government has essentially abandoned
the FY 1983 budget, and new restrictions have been
placed on imports and hard currency transactions
Foreign loans and grants apparently are declining
from 1980-82 levels when North Yemen received
$300-400 million in official development assistance
and military aid. Saudi Arabia, North Yemen's larg-
est benefactor, has promised to maintain assistance at
1982 levels, however. Saudi Arabia will continue to
provide only enough aid to ensure that the Salih
regime does not fall victim to a leftist takeover.
Revenue shortfalls have forced Sanaa to draw down
its foreign exchange assets to cover its growing cur-
rent account deficit, which in 1980-81 reached over
$480 million. Reserves fell to about $500 million in
February 1983 from a peak of $1.4 billion in 1979 and
are still dropping.
Income and Prices. Per capita income in North
Yemen is only about $544 per year. Most of the
population lives at a subsistence level in the agricul-
tural sector. In the industrial sector, many business-
men ironically must rely on foreign workers. The
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Table 3
North Yemen: Foreign Loans, 1981
Disbursed
During
1981
Disbursed
Undisbursed
1,100.9
599.2
1,700.1
47.5
209.0
183.0
392.0
Arab fund for economic and social
development
28.2
87.1
46.1
133.2
International development association
16.2
115.8
111.5
227.3
OPEC special fund
2.9
5.7
9.3
15.0
Islamic development bank
0.2
5.9
6.1
International fund for agricultural
development
0.2
10.2
10.4
Bilateral
214.5
891.9
416.2
1,308.1
USSR
66.7
362.7
62.5
425.2
Saudi Arabia
59.1
200.3
112.2
312.5
Iraq
5.0
81.4
39.2
120.6
China
5.0
81.4
39.2
120.6
Kuwait
5.0
46.1
43.7
89.8
Abu Dhabi
5.3
20.3
23.9
44.2
Japan
12.4
20.1
35.1
55.2
Netherlands
2.4
16.6
5.0
21.6
5.4
19.8
19.8
0.2
5.5
23.9
29.4
domestic labor shortage is so acute that some firms
had difficulty adhering to the government's require-
ment that 50 percent of a company's labor force be
Yemeni)
Foreign Exchange Controls. Since February 1973 the
Central Bank has maintained a fixed exchange rate
for the North Yemen riyal at 4.5 to 1 US dollar. This
rate is applied to the value of all foreign assets and
liabilities. For revenue purposes the exchange rate is 5
riyals to the dollar resulting in an effective customs
duty of 11 percent. To curb imports of luxury goods,
duties on these items have been increased; cars for
example, are taxed 90 percent of their value. Import
licenses otherwise are freely granted by the Ministry
of Economy and Industry, but trade with Israel is
prohibited. Exports have been free of customs duties
since May 1981 but must be registered for statistical
Politics
The Yemen Arab Republic is politically the least
stable state on the Arabian Peninsula. Since its
founding in 1962 its history has been a compendium
of woes: civil war, two coups, two wars with South
Yemen, and a major leftwing insurgency. These have
been compounded by endemic tribal and sectarian
feuding and by foreign meddling in North Yemen's
internal politics, chiefly by Riyadh and Aden.
Chronic political violence has inhibited the develop-
ment of stable governing institutions. Assassinations
since the 1962 revolution have included President
Salih's two predecessors. Although the Salih regime,
which came to power in 1978, has survived longer
purposes.
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1976/77
4.3
2.1
6.4
1977/78
5.8
2.6
8.4
1978/79
9.8
3.8
13.6
1979/80
7.4
4.4
11.8
July-December 1980
10.8
3.9
14.7
1981
57.5
10.6
68.1
Scheduled
1982
1983
1984
68.0
21.5
89.5
1985
72.1
21.9
94.0
1986
88.1
20.3
108.4
than any government since the revolution, its govern-
ing authority is not strongly felt much beyond the
major urban centers of Sanaa, Ta'izz, and Al Huday-
dah.
The Legacy of the Septembrists. The proclamation of
the Yemen Arab Republic in Sanaa by Nasirist-
influenced military officers in September 1962
sparked an eight-year civil war between royalists
supported by Saudi Arabia and republicans dependent
on troops and administrators furnished by Egypt. The
war ended in 1970 under the terms of a compact
under which the Imam was exiled and royalists were
absorbed into the republican government and mili-
tary
After four years of ineffective civilian government,
Deputy Commander in Chief Ibrahim al-Hamdi
seized power on 13 June 1974 with support from
conservative elements and the Saudis. He suspended
the Constitution, abolished many civilian institutions,
and installed a Military Command Council with
himself as chairman and Commander in Chief.F_
When al-Hamdi moved against entrenched interests
of the major tribal sheikhs, conservative elements,
possibly with Saudi connivance, assassinated him on
a End of year.
b Estimated.
11 October 1977 on the eve of a planned visit to Aden.
His successor, the conservative Ahmad Husayn al-
Ghashmi, who allegedly led the coup, was killed by -a
South Yemeni agent on 24 June 1978.
Within a month of al-Ghashmi's death, `Ali `Abdallah
Salih won the endorsement of the People's Constitu-
ent Assembly as president. His conservative creden-
tials brought him Saudi backing, and his earlier
success in putting down a mutiny by leftist paratroops
enabled him to pick up key support in the military.?
Government Organization. North Yemen's political
institutions and government structure are weak, re-
flecting four violent changes of regime since 1961.
Executive authority is concentrated almost exclusively
in the hands of the President, whose decrees are law.
He appoints the Vice President and the Prime Minis-
ter and often appoints those he wants to placate or co-
opt to the largely ceremonial posts of Second Vice
President and Deputy Prime Minister. Salih also has
created an Advisory Council comprised of 15 nota-
bles
creasingly have been held by technocrats.
The Prime Minister chairs the Cabinet and the
Council of Ministers. He is responsible for daily
administration of the government and coordination of
economic development. Under al-Ghashmi and Salih,
the prime ministers have been politically neutral
technocrats. Since 1974, ministerial portfolios in-
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The 149 members of the People's Constituent Assem-
bly, established in February 1978 by al-Ghashmi and
expanded under Salih, are all presidential appointees
and do little more than rubberstamp the decisions of
the executive.
Salih has laid the groundwork for replacement of the
assembly by a new People's Assembly with 80 elected
and 20 appointed members who supposedly will be
empowered to propose laws, approve or reject presi-
dential initiatives, and draft a new constitution. Salih
is almost certain to tightly circumscribe its powers if
and when it is inaugurated.
North Yemen is divided into 11 provinces, each
headed by a presidentially appointed governor. The
governor shares power with the province's military
commander. Provinces have changed little since the
time of the Imamate, which accounts in part for the
wide disparity in size and population between prov-
inces.
Political and legal authorities at the subdistrict, vil-
lage, and hamlet levels are locally chosen. Usually the
sheikh of the most important tribe or clan in the
region heads the subdistrict.
More than 200 rural cooperatives, organized and
operated on a voluntary basis, are engaged in building
schools, health care facilities, access roads, and other
local community projects. The government, recogniz-
ing their growing political and economic importance,
assigns a Deputy Prime Minister to head the Confed-
eration of Yemeni Development Associations. He
coordinates Local Development Association activities
and assists in securing government and foreign financ-
ing. Tribal sheikhs and local government officials
reportedly dominate the Development Associations,
although, in theory at least, they are to be run on a
democratic basis.
Political Constituencies. The major tribal sheikhs
constitute a political elite whose power derives from
the allegiance of thousands of armed tribesmen. They
exert influence through tribal networks that honey-
comb the government and the military
families controlled six of the then 10 provincial
governorships. Tribal and personal rivalries prevent
the sheikhs from presenting a united front toward the
government. Salih exploits this by dealing with the
sheikhs individually. The regime's control of develop-
ment funds for clinics, schools, and road projects
popular with tribesmen also gives it important lever-
age over the sheikhs.
Islamic fundamentalism, long dormant in North Ye-
men, has shown new strength in the 1980s, drawing
adherents from across the social spectrum. Funda-
mentalist groups made gains in the municipal elec-
tions of 1982 and in contests for seats on rural Local
Development Associations. Some groups have strong
ties to similar movements in Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Syria, and Iran. The groups attack corruption in
government and have called publicly for renewed
emphasis on Islamic law, an economy based on Ko-
ranic principles, and renewed restrictions on women's
activities.
Saudi Arabia funds the Muslim Brotherhood in
North Yemen and the Islamic Front and its paramili-
tary force, which has fought alongside the Army
against the National Democratic Front (NDF) insur-
gents. By strengthening Salih's conservative oppo-
nents, Riyadh hopes to gain additional leverage over
the President, but without causing his downfall.
The regime has responded by stepping up surveillance
of activists, launching occasional harassing arrests,
and replacing known Muslim Brotherhood members
in the school system. At the same time, the regime has
sought to refurbish its Islamic credentials by tighten-
ing restrictions on foreigners and by increasing public
executions and floggings for serious crimes
The Salih Regime. In the absence of a strong institu-
tional, framework, North Yemeni leaders maneuver
by playing off the tribal groupings, leftist and rightist
factions, and the modernist and traditionalist commu-
nities. Underrated by the Saudis and considered at
best an interim President, Salih has proved adept at
outmaneuvering and co-opting real and potential op-
ponents.
President Salih has successfully resisted pressure to
return the sheikhs to the commanding position they
held prior to al-Hamdi's presidency when sheikhly
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Table 6
Identified Islamic Fundamentalist
Groups in North Yemen
Muslim Brotherhood
Egyptian origin.
Follows Hasan al-Banna's principles.
Egyptian professionals and Sudanese are foreign members.
Largest group in North Yemen.
Vocally anti-American.
Takfir Wa Hijra (Anathematization and Pilgrimage)
Egyptian origin.
Extremist spinoff of Muslim Brotherhood.
Small size.
abroad. An uncle, a sheikh of the Sanhan, handles all
important dealings with North Yemen's tribes. These
four and another brother advise Salih on policy
matters
"Leftist" Muslim Brothers
Blends Islamic fundamentalism, social justice rhetoric, and Marxist
approach to politics.
Some "leftist" academics visit North Yemen with government
sponsorship.
Hizb Tabrir al Islamiyya (Islamic Liberation Party)
Palestinian and Syrian support.
Extremist.
Covert oriented.
Wahabis
Operate from network of religious institutes.
Look to Saudi Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Bas for support.
Have paramilitary organization.
Al Jihad (The Crusade)
Remnants of group that assassinated Anwar Sadat.
Small size.
Al Tabliigh (The Report)
Egyptian origin.
Little known.
Al Jabha al Islamiyya (Islamic Front)
Paramilitary organization.
Formed in 1979 to fight insurgents.
Recruits Zaydi (Shia) tribesmen.
Less active recently.
Khomeini Supporters
Small but active.
Attracts Yemeni Shias who see revolution in Iran as triumph over
alien, pro-Western regime.
Like most Middle East strongmen, Salih has secured
his position by concentrating power in the hands of a
small group of trusted relatives-all members of the
Sanhan tribe-and close tribal associates. A brother
and a cousin command the countercoup forces of the
2nd Artillery and 1st Armored Brigades stationed
near the capital. Another brother, a Deputy Minister
of the Interior, commands the Central Security
Forces and substitutes for the President when he is
Salih's preoccupation with day-to-day survival has
contributed to the near paralysis of the state in
administrative and financial affairs. The foreign ex-
change reserves built up during the al-Hamdi era and
the credit standing vital to carry out long-term devel-
opmental projects have been squandered by Salih in
attempts to build political support
Internal Security. Three organizations share respon-
sibility for internal security-the National Security
Organization, the Central Security Forces, and the
National Organization for General Intelligence and
Military Security. President Salih's relatives or close
personal associates hold key posts in each
organization.
Founded in 1967 with British help, the 4,000-strong
National Security Organization (NSO) is North Ye-
men's primary internal security organization. It con-
ducts counterintelligence and provides for the protec-
tion of high-level personages as well as gathering and
evaluating foreign intelligence. President Salih keeps
a tight rein on the NSO through its director, a close
confidant who also heads the Supreme Defense Coun-
cil. The NSO administers the presidential bodyguard
that is largely recruited from the Sanhan tribe.
The Interior Ministry's Central Security Forces (CSF) 25X1
are organized along paramilitary lines and are pri-
marily responsible for riot control and the protection
of foreign embassies and officals. They also have
taken part in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist
operations. The CSF has an approximate strength of
5,000 men armed with light and crew-served weapons
and equipped with armored personnel carriers. They
are headed by Deputy Interior Minister Muhammad
Abdallah Salih, a full brother of the President.
The National Organization for General Intelligence
and Military Security (NOGIMS), reportedly set up
in the late 1970s with Jordanian help, maintains
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security within the armed forces and collects military
intelligence. Although nominally subordinate to Chief
of Staff Bashiri, its chief, a member of the Sanhan
tribe, reports directly to President Salih. A Jordanian
military mission trains and advises NOGIMS. F__1
Opposition
The most serious challenge to the Salih regime has
come from the South Yemen-backed NDF insurgen-
cy. The NDF was formed in 1976 as an umbrella
organization of North Yemeni leftist groups and
disaffected nationalists. Its goals are to eliminate
Saudi influence in Sanaa, to replace North Yemen's
tribally based society with an Arab socialist state, and
to unite the Yemens, according to Front propaganda.
It has successfully exploited Shafii resentment of
Zaydi domination of the Sanaa government to build a
power base in the south. Using this as leverage, the
NDF has pressed Salih to give it several cabinet posts,
including the Interior Ministry.
The NDF leadership is dominated by Marxists. It is
headed by Sultan Ahmad Umar, born in North
Yemen and a Marxist revolutionary with longstand-
ing ties to South Yemeni radicals, including former
President Isma'il. Some non-Marxist NDF leaders
reportedly have close ties to Libya
South Yemen has long been the NDF's principal
supporter, providing arms, advisers, training bases,
and even regular troops posing as volunteers. Sultan
Umar and other prominent NDF leaders are also
members of the Central Committee of South Yemen's
ruling party, the Yemen Socialist Party. The NDF
also receives aid from Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, and at
least indirectly from Cuba and the USSR
In early 1982 the NDF appeared on the verge of
gaining control over most of southern and south-
central North Yemen. It had largely shifted to con-
ventional warfare, using heavy weapons supplied by
South Yemen. This provoked a strong military re-
sponse from Sanaa, whose forces rolled the insurgents
back in a series of counterattacks beginning in the
spring of 1982. To avoid a more serious military
confrontation with the North, South Yemen's Presi-
dent Hasani subsequently reduced support to the
NDF.
Since the counteroffensive, President Salih has fur-
ther weakened the NDF by exploiting its internal
divisions, splitting non-Marxists from doctrinaire left-
ists and successfully encouraging defections through
an amnesty program
The NDF's popular support also has declined. Al-
though the Shafiis still resent the Sanaa government,
many were alienated by the brutal repression that the
NDF inflicted upon the towns and villages it con-
trolled. The Shafiis for the moment appear reconciled
to accepting the Sanaa government as the lesser of
two evils
Armed Forces
The armed forces and the internal security forces are
the key to the survival of North Yemen's rulers. The
Army is the single most cohesive group in the republic
and is the principal means of political control over the
population. Many military officers fill high-level gov-
ernment posts
Victories over the NDF in the spring of 1982, continu-
ing weapons acquisition, and relatively liberal salaries
and perquisites appear to have blunted criticism of the
regime within the armed forces. Army political fac-
tions tend to be centrist; most radicals were purged
before 1970 or have since defected to the NDF.
President Salih, however, tolerates some pro-Soviet
officers, probably as a counter to Saudi influence
within the military. Chief of Staff Bashiri, a confidant
of Salih, is pro-Soviet, according to US Embassy
officials
units must be directly authorized by the President
President Salih is Commander in Chief of the armed
forces and acts as Defense Minister. He frequently
bypasses the chain of command and issues orders
directly to unit commanders. Movement orders for all
The Army commander also serves as chief of staff.
Below him are deputy chiefs for military affairs,
finance and logistics, and training. The deputy chief
of staff for military affairs holds a particularly sensi-
tive post and is responsible for planning operations,
positioning units, and promulgating doctrine.
North Yemen's armed forces have primitive logistic
support, maintenance facilities, and command, con-
trol, and communications. Military personnel are
generally illiterate and undernourished and are poorly
trained and led. Nepotism, corruption, and bribery
are widespread.
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Figure 8
Counterinsurgency Successes in North Yemen
RMORTS
E
+
8rim:Islan'd
It2E ,recess 1 y autho`itativ
Area secured by government, spring/ summer 1982
Former National Democratic Front (NDF)-controlled
area secured by government, January 1983
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 ^ Table 7
North Yemeni Ground Forces Equipment
North Yemen takes recruits at a tender age. Despite their scruffy
appearance, Yemeni soldiers, when well led, are tough and re-
Main battle tanks
673
M60
64
T-54/5
465
T-34
144
Tank transporters
18+
Artillery pieces over 100 mm
129
M101 100-mm howitzer
24
M102 105-mm howitzer
12
D-30 122-mm howitzer
48
M1931 122-mm field gun
30
M1937 152-mm field gun
3
M114 155-mm howitzer
12
Armored personnel carriers
418
M113
76
AML-M-3/VTT
140
BTR-60
62
BTR-40
40
BTR-152
100
Special armored vehicles
57
SU-85 AT gun 85 mm
25
SU-100 AT gun 100 mm
32
North Yemeni mechanics mount US-made Vulcan AA cannon on
Soviet APO-an innovation that has been highly effective in
Nonetheless, the government's successes against the
National Democratic Front indicate that, when well
led, its forces are capable of effective action. This is
especially true when the regime commits elements of
Sanaa's best troops, the countercoup force, normally
held in reserve near the capital
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Army. The Army has an estimated active strength of
at least 20,000 men; its organizational structure calls
for 31,000. There are 11 combat brigades, four
combat support brigades, and one airborne brigade. A
North Yemeni brigade corresponds roughly in person-
nel strength to a US battalion of 800 to 900 men,
although strength varies widely from one brigade to
another. Two of the brigades are equipped with a mix
of Soviet and US equipment, while the remainder are
wholly Soviet equipped.
Until mid-1982 the bulk of the Army's strength was
concentrated in or near the capital. The 7th Armored
Brigade, considered by Western observers to be one of
the better North Yemeni units, is usually stationed to
the north at `Amran to guard against a possible march
by northern tribesmen on the capital.
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Figure 9
Ground Force Deployment in North Yemen
Buq',ah
AI Khawkhat`t1'
~Al
Bay~l
SAN AA
1Hizyaz
511
Dhamar
i_.
Yarim
_ rx~rtiarlfatt<
IONIC
Army
Headquarters
Rida
Najd
al Jama'i
ArRahidah
D
err'!s1in
f !LYf
Artillery brigade
Airborne infantry brigade.
Antiaircraft brigade
0
Kilometers
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Tribesmen armed with old Lee-
Enfelds on the march during
the 1970s. The government still
calls up tribal levies to back up
regular troops, but now they
are equipped with Soviet shoul-
der and crew-served weapons
In mounting Sanaa's successful drive in 1982 against
NDF insurgents, much of the Army was deployed to
the south. The buildup has been maintained. Fortified
positions have been constructed along the border with
South Yemen to prevent resupply of the insurgents by
Aden
To supplement regular military forces the government
on occasion calls up levies of tribal auxiliaries under
the leadership of their sheikhs. The government also
recruits and arms local tribal militias and charges
them with holding areas cleared of insurgents
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Table 8
North Yemen: Air Force
MIG-15
6
MIG-17
22
MIG-21
46
SU-20/22
12
101
C-47
2
Skyvan
2
AN-24
2
AN-26
1
F-27
2
11
Augusta Bell 206
6
Alouette III a
3
MI-8/Hip
17
31
Air Force. North Yemen's Air Force is short of
equipment and personnel and depends on foreign
sources for aircraft, ammunition, parts, and mainte-
nance. It has a strength of 1,000, 49 of whom are
pilots-34 reportedly are jet qualified.
Air Force headquarters is located at Sanaa Interna-
tional Airport, much of which is given over to military
use. The F-5 fighter program is operated there by the
Saudis. In 1983 the Soviets expanded their presence
at the base, causing the Saudis to threaten a major
cutback or even a cancellation of their Air Force
assistance programs. Most of the Soviet-administered
programs are run from the airfield near Al Huday-
dah
Table 9
North Yemen: Naval Forces
Osa-II 2
Yevgenya 2
6
Navy. North Yemen's Navy, which is headquartered
at Salif, is minuscule. It has 16 ships, only three of
which are combatants, and an estimated personnel
strength of about 950 men, including 400 marines.
The ships-all supplied by the Soviets with the excep-
tion of three US-built patrol craft-are poorly main-
tained, and the crews are poorly trained. Naval
officers, most of whom have had Soviet training, have
shown little aptitude for even basic ship handling. F
Military Aid. The Soviet Union has provided the bulk
of North Yemen's military assistance since 1956.
Approximately 400 Soviet military advisers serve in
North Yemen, and 1,200 to 1,500 North Yemeni
personnel are enrolled in military courses in the
USSR. Most Yemeni officers have had at least some
training by Soviets. F_~
Saudi Arabia, the United States, Taiwan, Jordan, and
Pakistan also provide advisers and/or technical assist-
ance. Saudi advisers provide guidance on US-manu-
factured equipment, although the Yemenis resent
their role and presence. A small Jordanian team
conducts ground forces unit training and assists in
equipment maintenance. Pakistan supplies about 50
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Table 10
North Yemen: 1979 Arms Agreements a
60 MIG-21s
14 SU-22s
18 MI-8 helicopters
400 T-55 tanks
65 BTR-60PB APCs
50 BRDM-2 ARCs
48 howitzers, 122 mm
50 rocket launchers, BM-21
12 rocket launchers, FROG-6
40 antiaircraft ZSU-23/4s, 23 mm
69 antiaircraft M-1939s, 37 mm
40 SA-2 (guideline) launchers
200 SA-2 missiles
2 Osa-II missile patrol boats
36 Styx missiles
2 Yevgenya minesweepers
2 patrol boats, Zhuk-class
12 F-5s
32 M-60 tanks
50 M-113 APCs
12 howitzers, 105 mm
12 howitzers, 155 mm
30 recoilless rifles, 106 mm
1,569 Dragon missiles
302 Sidewinders
264 TOW missiles
a Includes equipment not yet delivered. Does not include small arms
or ammunition.
technicians who maintain US-manufactured equip-
ment. Approximately 100 Taiwanese technicians are
assigned to maintenance duties with North Yemen's
F-5 squadron
Foreign Relations
North Yemen's foreign relations are shaped by its
location as well as its political and economic weak-
nesses. Over the past 20 years, it has often been
caught up in rivalries between regional states as well
as between the superpowers. Egypt and Saudi Arabia
were contenders during the 1960s, supporting oppos-
ing sides in the civil war, until Egypt's defeat in the
1967 Arab-Israeli war forced Cairo to reduce its
forces in North Yemen. Today, the Soviets-who
regard North Yemen as a vantage from which they
can exert pressure on the Saudis-seek to increase
their influence in Sanaa at Riyadh's expense
To maintain some measure of independence, recent
Yemeni leaders have attempted to play off these
contending powers. In the process, Sanaa has come
to depend heavily on Saudi Arabia for economic
assistance and the Soviet Union for military hard-
ware.
Saudi Arabia. The Saudis regard North Yemen as a
buffer against the Marxist regime in South Yemen.
They also believe North Yemen could be a threat if a
strong and independent regime were to emerge in
Sanaa. The North Yemenis have not abandoned
claims to territory seized by the Saudis in the 1930s,
and the largely undemarcated frontier between the
two nations is a potential source of conflict. Of more
concern to Riyadh are the potential security problems
posed by the more than 600,000 Yemeni workers in
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms
Riyadh's policies are designed to maintain leverage
over North Yemen's leaders. To enhance their influ-
ence, the Saudis provide $400 million in direct gov-
ernment-to-government aid as well as private subsi-
dies to northern tribal leaders, to President Salih and
an assortment of other Yemeni politicians, and to
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Saudis,
in particular, regard their aid to the Zaydi tribes as a
hedge against the emergence of a radical, leftist
regime in Sanaa. offi-
cial and private payments combined have amounted in
recent years to as much as $1 billion annually.
Direct Saudi Government financial aid varies in
proportion to Riyadh's concern over security threats
to Sanaa, particularly from South Yemen. Hence, the
Saudis were more willing to help Sanaa in early 1982
at the height of the NDF offensive than they are now
that this threat has receded. The Saudis also occasion-
ally hint at cutbacks in their assistance in an effort to
force Sanaa to reduce the number of Soviet military
advisers in its armed forces.
The Saudis deeply distrust Salih and have searched
for a candidate with acceptable conservative creden-
tials whom they can back as a replacement. Yemenis,
for their part, strongly resent Riyadh's heavyhanded
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Secret
Figure 10
North Yemen: Arms Sales by Suppliers'
1975-77
Average annual sales: $82 billion
Others-3 1 States-53 Others-3- ---\ States-15 Others-2-11 States-10
a In current US dollars.
b Information available as of July 1982.
meddling in their affairs. Salih, in fact, has won a
measure of respect domestically by resisting Saudi
pressures while exploiting Riyadh's security concerns
to obtain the financial aid he needs to stay in power.
Other Arab States. Sanaa seeks to remain on good
terms with both conservative and radical Arab states
to gain financial aid and political support. Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates have provided substantial
developmental assistance to keep Sanaa on a stable
and moderate course. In 1981 Abu Dhabi's Arab
Economic Development Fund loaned $37.5 million,
and in 1982 Kuwait loaned $35 million. Kuwait also
played an active role in mediating the withdrawal of
South Yemeni forces from the North in 1979.
North Yemen remains grateful for Baghdad's help in
ending the 1979 conflict with South Yemen. In
return, Sanaa, in 1982 and 1983, sent regulars and
volunteers to fight on Iraq's side against Iran. Sanaa
made the gesture in the vain hope of obtaining at least
some of Iraq's promised financial assistance of $400
million.
1978-80
Average annual sales: $379 million
1981
Total: $184 millionb
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Jordan organized and trained North Yemen's military
intelligence and military security services. Almost all
intelligence officers are graduates of Jordan's Bir al-
Roman intelligence school
North Yemen views Egypt as a potential counter-
weight to South Yemen and Saudi Arabia and has
quietly lobbied for Cairo's return to the Arab fold. On
a more practical level, Egypt has been a source of
military spare parts and munitions. It also provides
approximately 13,000 schoolteachers to North Ye-
men
Palestinians. Sanaa extended full diplomatic status to
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Janu-
ary 1982, and the government is viscerally anti-Israel.
Salih derives political capital from his largely symbol-
ic support of the Palestinian cause, embellishing his
revolutionary credentials by stressing the kinship of
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the Yemeni and Palestinian revolutions. Sanaa is
suspicious of radical PLO factions that have close ties
with Aden and supports the more conservative Yasir
Arafat and Fatah.
Soviet Union. North Yemen views Moscow as a
counterweight to Saudi influence. Moscow seems
content to slowly expand its military aid programs,
hoping thereby to anchor its influence and ultimately
to encourage the emergence of a sympathetic leftist
regime in Sanaa. The Soviets probably also believe
that an expanded presence in North as well as South
Yemen will encourage other Arabian Peninsula
states, in particular Saudi Arabia, to seek a political
accommodation with Moscow
Diplomatic relations with the USSR date from 1928
but became close in the mid-1950s when Moscow
provided North Yemen with its first modern military
equipment. In late 1967, during the civil war, the
USSR earned the gratitude of Yemeni republicans by
mounting a massive airlift to help lift the royalist
siege of Sanaa and by flying bombing missions
against the royalists.
After the civil war ended in 1970, relations with the
USSR alternately warmed and cooled. They took a
dramatic turn for the better in 1979 when Sanaa,
unable to get all the arms it wanted from Saudi
Arabia, accepted a $750 million arms offer from
Moscow. Moscow currently provides North Yemen
with approximately 400 military and 100 to 200
civilian advisers.
Moscow's limited economic assistance is funneled into
showy projects such as the Bajil cement plant, the
Sanaa airport, Al Hudaydah port and airport facili-
ties, and the "Revolution" Hospital in Sanaa. Approx-
imately 750 civilian Yemenis are studying in the
USSR. Many returnees are employed by the Informa-
tion Ministry, which takes a decidedly pro-Soviet line.
President Salih values Soviet aid but also views
Moscow as a potential threat. He rebuffed Soviet
offers to expand naval facilities. North Yemen also
has begun isolating Soviet advisers in a central com-
pound near Sanaa to facilitate monitoring and to limit
unofficial contacts.
China. North Yemenis have a high regard for the
work of the 3,500-man Chinese economic assistance
team, the largest foreign assistance mission in the
country. Chinese aid is channeled through two Chi-
nese-owned construction firms, which built the Sanaa
textile mill, the Ta'izz hospital, and several major
highways and redeveloped and expanded Sanaa air-
port and its access roads. Chinese personnel operate
the hospital at Al Hudaydah
Western Europe. Sanaa looks to Western Europe for
political support and economic assistance:
? In 1982 Bonn forgave a $110 million loan, and
Rome provided approximately $60 million in grants
and loans.
? Sanaa has encouraged the Italian firm AGIP to
explore for oil off the Tihamah.
? Great Britain helped establish and train North
Yemen's National Security Organization
US Interests
US interests in North Yemen center largely on
containing the Soviet presence and potential threat to
Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing states of the
Arabian Peninsula. The United States provides mili-
tary and economic aid to the Sanaa government in
close coordination with the Saudis, although its inter-
ests are not necessarily congruent with those of
Riyadh.
The North Yemenis, bitter at Saudi policies that
undercut the Sanaa regime, would prefer to develop
ties with the United States free of any Saudi connec-
tion. President Salih has long complained that most
US assistance, such as the $390 million arms package
in 1979, is actually financed by the Saudis, giving
Riyadh a veto over what North Yemen obtains from
the United States.
Salih probably believes that by seeking better rela-
tions with the United States he can also stimulate the
Soviets to be more generous in providing assistance.
Indeed, shortly after the US-North Yemeni agricul-
tural deal was concluded in 1982, Moscow apparently
agreed to reschedule an old debt.
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The United States established diplomatic relations
with the Imamate government of North Yemen in
1946. On 19 December 1962, three months after the
officers' coup that overthrew the Imamate, Washing-
ton recognized the new Yemen Arab Republic. Less
than five years later (6 June 1967), however, the
Sanaa regime, angry at US support for Israel during
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, severed relations with
Washington. Full diplomatic ties were restored after a
visit by the US Secretary of State to Sanaa in 1972.
US Embassy and AID personnel in North Yemen
number under 100. The Department of Defense main-
tains a small Military Training Mission of just under
30, which is supplemented by training teams sent out
from the United States on temporary duty.
A small number of US citizens are employed by the
North Yemeni Government, and the Peace Corps has
about 50 volunteers in the country. Medical services
are provided by the American Baptist-operated hospi-
tal and clinic in Ta'izz. Approximately 1,850 nonoffi-
cial US citizens reportedly receive social security
payments, although the actual number of US citizens
living in North Yemen may be considerably higher.
Most reside in the area east of Ibb, which traditional-
ly has supplied emigrants to the Yemeni colony in the
United States (50,000 to 60,000, concentrated mainly
in Detroit and San Francisco).
US educational opportunities are eagerly sought after
by Yemenis. Approximately 215 are currently study-
ing in the United States, most with US Government
funding. (US AID annually offers 60 scholarships for
Yemenis to study in the United States.) The Fulbright
Program provides for 13 Yemenis in US graduate
schools as well as a US professor at Sanaa University
and several field researchers. The Consortium for
International Development, American University, and
Eastern Michigan University provide US experts to
staff development projects in North Yemen.
In 1980 and 1981 the US share of the North Yemen
import/export market amounted to only about
2 percent in each category. In 1982, however, Wash-
ington extended $63 million in credit to Sanaa for the
purchase of agricultural commodities, which could
increase US exports to North Yemen.
No US or North Yemeni air carriers have regularly
scheduled flights between the two countries. There is
only one direct shipping connection per month be-
tween the United States and North Yemen, making 25X1
US goods generally unattractive to North Yemeni
importers.
US investment in North Yemen is minimal and
unlikely to increase so long as North Yemen remains
financially unsound and the government cannot end
its chronic budget deficits. A US oil company is
exploring for oil in the Ma'rib-Al Jawf region. Oppor-
tunities for small ventures, especially in the import
business, are available.
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South Yemen
Economy
South Yemen's narrow resource base, arid climate,
and, more recently, a shortage of labor are major
constraints to economic development. Aden, so far,
has discovered no significant deposits of commercially
exploitable minerals and only small quantities of
crude oil. Less than 1 percent of the area is cultivable.
Low productivity levels are the norm and result from
such factors as inefficient management and inade-
quate equipment. South Yemen has a substantial
fishing potential that could become an important
North Yemen. About one-third of the 410,000-person
labor force is working abroad, mostly in the Arab
Gulf states. Moreover, most are the more skilled
workers, leaving behind a largely untrained work
force. Partly because of the labor migration, South
Yemen cannot build all of its planned projects. Real 25X1
growth in 1983 probably will be only slightly better
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economic asset.
South Yemen has a centrally planned economy with
an established bureaucracy to administer the system.
Government ownership predominates, especially in
industry and fishing. The Ministry of Planning has
overall responsibility for implementing economic
guidelines established within the framework of a five-
year plan. Despite comprehensive government plan-
ning and control, the private sector plays an important
role in the economy. Private enterprises, mostly in the
domestic trade and transport sectors, account for
roughly half the economy's output.
Aden is pursuing a strategy of rapid economic growth.
The Second Five-Year Plan (1981-85) sets an overly
ambitious spending level of $1.2 billion, more than
double actual expenditures under the previous plan.
The broad objectives of the plan include development
of the agricultural and industrial sectors, which to-
gether would account for over 50 percent of total
government spending. The plan also focuses on infra-
structure spending, especially for housing, transporta-
tion, and electric power. The regime plans to expand
the fishing sector by upgrading shore facilities, boats,
and equipment.
Several obstacles preclude plan fulfillment. Extensive
flooding during March-April 1982 caused massive
damage to the agricultural sector. As a result, Aden
probably will have to scale back its development
program to help cover repair costs that could reach
about $1 billion, according to unofficial estimates in
than last year's 3.5 percent as Aden adjusts its
spending plans to compensate for these problems
To augment the development process, the government
is encouraging limited development of the private
sector in some areas such as light industry. Although
the five-year plan nominally deemphasizes the private
sector, Aden passed a law in 1981 to provide incen-
tives to private and foreign investors to participate in
development projects-including tax exemptions,
credit access, and exemption from some import duties.
Agriculture. The agricultural sector, including fisher-
ies, is the most important segment of the economy,
providing work for nearly 45 percent of South Ye-
men's labor force. A well-developed water conserva-
tion system allows South Yemen to partly overcome
its environmental handicaps. Nevertheless, agricultur-
al output accounts for only about 13 percent of GNP,
and, as a result, farm income is at the subsistence
level. Moreover, domestic food production has not
been able to keep pace with growing consumption,
forcing the regime to import roughly two-thirds of its
food requirements.
Aden plans to continue investing in agriculture to
boost food output. Since the mid-1970s the regime has
spent over $230 million on various agricultural
schemes. During the current five-year plan, the gov-
ernment expects to start irrigation projects in the
Nisab and Wadi Mirka areas and an agricultural
project at Wadi Bayhan. Aden also has established an
agricultural fund to provide economic assistance to
farmers.
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Agricultural investments so far have not paid major
dividends. Production has stagnated; for example,
grain output has averaged about 95,000 tons annually
since 1977 and probably will not exceed this level in
the 1983/84 marketing year. Prospects for increased
production are hindered by low regulated crop prices
to farmers, poor maintenance of farm equipment,
inefficient management of cooperative farms, and
Mineral Resources. South Yemen must import all of
its petroleum, which accounts for over 90 percent of
total energy consumption. The Soviets have searched
for oil in the South Yemen interior for 10 years with
inconclusive results. In 1981 an Italian company
discovered an offshore field that has shown promise.
Brazil has also signed a concession agreement to
explore for oil.
seasonal labor shortages.
The state fishing industry is not doing well despite its
sizable resource potential and infusions of government
spending to modernize the fleet and shore facilities.
Japanese companies, which have concessions to fish
Aden's waters, and joint ventures with the USSR
have accounted for most of the increase in the fishing
catch in recent years. Fish exports account for about
half of South Yemen's export earnings. To increase
fish production among its state cooperatives, the
government expects to complete a new fishing port at
Nishtun in 1984 that will include processing and
storage facilities. Inadequate storage has been a ma-
jor constraint to higher fish catches. The government
plans to begin construction on other ports and related
facilities, including a drydock the USSR has agreed
to build at Aden.
Industry. The industrial sector is small, accounting
for about 14 percent of GNP. The 170,000-barrel-per-
day oil refinery at Aden makes by far the largest
contribution to industrial output. Since 1982, Aden
has processed crude oil from Iran, and additional oil is
supplied by other countries including Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and the USSR. The refinery is undergoing a
$100 million expansion and modernization. Other
industrial enterprises are small scale and concentrated
in food processing, textiles, and minor consumer goods
production
No other mineral wealth is at present exploited.
Production of salt from seawater in salt pans, once a
major industry in Aden, has declined because of high
costs and foreign competition
Transportation and Communications. South Yemen's
transportation and communications links are not well
developed. The country has about 5,300 km of roads,
of which only about 15 percent are paved. Telex,
telegraph, and cable communications exist, but tele-
phone subscribers probably do not exceed 10,000.
Under the five-year plan, about 3,000 km of highways
are to be upgraded, and the number of telephone lines
is to be doubled.
Balance of Payments. South Yemen's current account
deficit has increased considerably in recent years-
from $54 million in 1979 to approximately $290
million in 1982. Imports have risen sharply because of
Aden's needs for its development programs, the in-
creased price of petroleum, and the government's
efforts to raise living standards. Imports in 1982
reached an estimated $820 million, almost double the
1979 level. Food purchases account for roughly one-
third of imports; petroleum products, 23 percent; and
machinery and transport equipment, 20 percent. Most
of South Yemen's imports are from oil-exporting
countries in the Persian Gulf and the industralized
West, especially Japan.
South Yemen does not have an extensive infrastruc-
ture. Electric power capacity probably does not ex-
ceed 233 MW. Projects under way at Wadi Hadhra-
mawt and Al Mansurah will add only about 50 MW
to existing capacity. Several water supply projects also
are under construction, including one for greater
Aden that will cost about $38 million)
Foreign exchange earnings fall far short of South
Yemen's requirements. Merchandise exports, mostly
fish products and cotton, are insignificant. Remit-
tances from workers abroad have become the most
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Table 11
South Yemen: Economic Assistance
a Includes European Economic Community.
b Includes Arab states.
important source of income since the liberalization of
emigration laws in 1976. In 1982 worker remittances
earned Aden approximately $450 million. Neverthe-
less, this revenue has not been enough to offset the
import bill. Prospects for increased earnings from
workers abroad are not good as long as Aden's Arab
neighbors continue to trim their own spending pro-
grams
South Yemen has had to rely heavily on foreign
assistance to finance the current account deficit and
its development programs. Aden receives financing
from a variety of international organizations includ-
ing the International Monetary Fund and the OPEC
Special Fund. Bilateral loans come mainly from the
Communist countries, especially the USSR, which is
South Yemen's largest benefactor. Some of the Gulf
states also provide financial assistance. Virtually all
South Yemen's foreign exchange assets of about $240
million consist of loans and grants. Aden's external
debt as of the end of 1982 was about $750 million.
The regime has negotiated with its major bilateral
creditors to reschedule some of its debt payments to at
least 1985.
Income and Prices. Per capita income in 1980 was
$442, making South Yemen one of the world's least
developed countries. About two-thirds of the estimat-
ed 1.9 million population live in rural areas. Because
of strict enforcement of price controls, the official rate
of inflation runs about 5 to 8 percent annually. Aden25X1
subsidizes several commodities to keep prices low.
Revenue shortages in 1982, however, forced the re-
gime to raise some prices to reduce the subsidy bill.)
Foreign Exchange Controls. Aden maintains compre-
hensive controls on imports and worker income earned
abroad. The government allocates foreign exchange
for imports based on its estimates of requirements and
on the availability of funds. Worker remittances must
be exchanged at the central banking system for local
currency. To encourage the inflow of remittances, the
government permits private foreign exchange ac-
counts and duty-free imports within specified limits.
The South Yemeni currency is pegged to the US
dollar at the rate of about $2.90 to the dinar.
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The triumvirate before the split. Hasani, Isma'il, and Rubayyi Ali
sit before their portraits at a Politburo meeting in 1970. Rubayyi
'Ali was executed in 1978, and Isma'il took refuge in Moscow in
1980. Others among the party leaders shown above have since
Politics
The radical leaders of the National Liberation Front
took power in Aden after the British withdrew in
1967. In contrast to the officer revolutionaries in
Sanaa five years earlier, they had both the time and
the means to consolidate their power:
? The country had a long tradition of effective central
control.
? The British-trained military and civil service, per-
haps the best in the Arabian Peninsula, passed
virtually intact to the new government.
? The native ruling elite in the hinterland, the petty
sheikhs and sultans who had formed the South
Arabian Federation, immediately fled the country.
Infighting within the Marxist-oriented leadership,
however, has occasionally unsettled the regime. The
leadership was comprised of young, ambitious radicals
hardened in the guerrilla war against the British and
the rival nationalists of the Front for the Liberation of
Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). Disputes have
centered around the degree to which internal political
and economic institutions are to be radicalized and
the extent to which Aden is to become involved in
supporting radical movements throughout the region.
Differences are exacerbated by personal rivalries that
often have roots in regional or tribal affiliations,
alliances formed during the guerrilla struggle, and
differing foreign patrons.
Party and Government. Under its 1970 Constitution-
amended after Isma'il seized power in June 1978-
South Yemen's Government and party structures
closely follow the Soviet model. Authority rests with
the Yemen Socialist Party, the country's only legal
political party. Organized on Marxist-Leninist lines,
it is an amalgam of Communists, Ba'thists, and Arab
nationalists. The seven-man Politburo, headed by the
party's secretary general, makes all important foreign
and domestic policy decisions. The party's Central
Committee, which meets only once or twice yearly,
oversees the trade unions, people's militia, and wom-
en's and youth organizations.
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Government authority and sovereignty, in theory at
least, are vested in the Supreme People's Council,
which alone has the power to pass laws. Its 111
members are elected for a five-year term. A Presidi-
um of under 20 members, "elected" by the members
of the Council, serves as its permanent organ. The
Presidium's chairman serves as chief of state. The
Council similarly elects the prime minister, approves
the ministers he appoints, and chooses senior judges
and the attorney general.
The country is divided into six governorates, which
are subdivided into directorates and districts. Admin-
istrative boundaries at each level are designed to
break down traditional tribal and regional loyalties.
Governors and directorate and district commissioners
as well as the Local People's Councils are elected for
terms of two and a half years and are subordinate to
the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council. This
system-which South Yemenis refer to as "democrat-
ic centralism"-extends the control of the central
government to the most remote villages. Party cadres
at the governorate and lower administrative levels
provide ideological guidance and supervise and report
on the activities of governmental bodies, popular
organizations, industrial enterprises, and rural cooper-
however, when North Yemen's armed forces decisive-
ly defeated the National Liberation Front insurgents
whom he had strongly backed.
The Party and the Military. South Yemen's military
will remain a strong institutional power center with an
important behind-the-scenes role in politics. In 1969
President Rubayyi Ali and party Chairman Isma'il
bought off active opposition from the then largely
conservative, tribal-based military by appointing a
relative moderate (current President al-Hasani) as
Defense Minister. Isma'il's failure to win over the
military after he took over the presidency in 1978
ultimately proved his undoing when the armed forces
supported his ouster two years later.
South Yemeni leaders have attempted-with mixed
results-to subordinate the military to the ruling
party. Party members, for example, hold key positions
in the military and pass on all promotions. The armed
forces are also subjected to heavy doses of political
indoctrination. Nevertheless, the party has been un-
able to overcome strong personal and tribal loyalties.
To offset the armed forces, therefore, the party
created the paramilitary People's Militia in 1972. The
militia provided most of the muscle behind Isma'il's
successful coup.
atives and state farms.
Internal Dynamics. President Hasani has proved to
be particularly adept at expanding his network of
supporters in the Politburo and Presidium and at
lower levels. He has further consolidated his control
by assuming the positions of President, Prime Minis-
ter, and party chief, the first South Yemeni leader to
do so. He has also been careful to involve most of the
top leaders in collective support for South Yemen's
new moderate stance.
Hasani's control, however, is by no means absolute.
Two major figures, Defense Minister Salih Muslih
Qasim and First Deputy Prime Minister Ali Antar,
still have independent power bases. Qasim is the more
dangerous. He is a shrewd and opportunistic politician
with a strong following in the military and security
services. Considered more of a nationalist than a
Marxist, he is widely respected for his role in the
struggle against the British and is supported strongly
by Libya's Qadhafi. His position weakened in 1982,
Internal Security. The Committee for State Security
and the Ministry of the Interior share primary respon-
sibility for South Yemen's internal security. Although
the quality of personnel varies, they have earned a
reputation as perhaps the most ruthless and efficient
of any in the Arab world. Internal security organs are
nominally government agencies but are supervised
closely by the party. Many officers are party mem-
bers, and networks of local volunteers are organized
by the party to back up the regular services. About 70
East Germans provide security and police training for
the security services.
The Committee for State Security is modeled on the
Soviet KGB, combining intelligence collection and
analysis with internal and external security functions.
The security functions are handled by the Commit-
tee's Revolutionary Security Service, which is charged
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with countering subversion, sabotage, and economic
crimes and conducting covert operations abroad.
Uniformed personnel provide security at
the presidential palace and other key installations.
The Public Security Force, an organ of the Ministry
of the Interior, is a more conventional police force
with a reported strength of about 10,000. It has
specialized riot police, customs, and port and airport
security units. Overlapping jurisdictions reportedly
have led to some friction with the Revolutionary
Security Service.
Opposition
The only organized opposition to the government
comes from exile factions drawn from South Yemeni
refugee colonies. The opposition, rent by ideological
differences, is weak and divided. The National Group-
ing of Patriotic Forces in South Yemen, an umbrella
organization founded in Baghdad in March 1980,
attempts to coordinate the activities of the major
dissident organizations under the leadership of Mu-
hammad Ali Haytham, a former Prime Minister of
South Yemen.
With much of the opposition leadership living com-
fortably on stipends from the Saudis, Iraqis, and
Egyptians, there is little incentive to undertake action
against the Aden regime, although some of the groups
have engaged in border forays. The Saudis and North
Yemenis monitor opposition movements closely, sanc-
tioning only those activities that accord with Riyadh's
and Sanaa's current policies toward South Yemen.
They are unlikely to dismantle the exile apparatuses
unless there is a long-term shift by Aden away from
its radical orientation.
Saudi Arabia continues to support the paramilitary
forces of several of the exile groups in camps in the
vicinity of Sharura. They may have mustered several
thousand men in the late 1970s, but their numbers
probably are now much lower. Many of the members
have been integrated into the Saudi economy and
maintain only a part-time affiliation at best. The
forces, however, apparently still conduct occasional
Armed Forces
After independence in 1967, South Yemen trans-
formed its largely British trained and equipped mili-
tary into one modeled on its new Soviet patron. Over
the past decade, Aden has purchased on easy credit
terms approximately $1.2 billion worth of military
equipment from the USSR and its East European
allies, including tanks, combat aircraft, surface-to-
surface missiles, and guided missile patrol boats. The
Soviet military advisory presence in South Yemen
climbed to about 1,000 in 1982. Over 1,000 South
Yemeni military personnel have been trained in the
USSR. About 500 Cuban advisers help train the
People's Militia.
South Yemen's forces are small but effective. They
seem able to maintain internal security; conduct
successful but limited attacks against North Yemen;
and repel attacks by North Yemeni, Saudi, or Omani
forces. The defensive capabilities of the armed forces
are enhanced by the harsh border terrain that acts as
a buffer against potential adversaries.
The armed forces' military capabilities have been
strengthened by combat experience gained during
brief but intense clashes with North Yemen in Febru-
ary 1979. South Yemeni regulars serving as "volun-
teers" fought alongside National Democratic Front
insurgents in North Yemen. Army and Air Force
elements have assisted Ethiopian forces against Eri-
trean dissidents and Somali troops. A small South
Yemeni contingent went to Syria in June 1981 and
may have seen action against Israeli forces in Leba-
non's Bekaa Valley.
South Yemen's small population base and lack of
trained manpower are the main obstacles to the
expansion of its military capabilities. Total military
strength, including the 15,000-strong People's Militia,
is roughly 40,000. In an effort to raise the regular
military to its authorized strength of 24,000, South
Yemen began conscripting young men for two years
of service in 1977. Many evade the draft, however,
and the government's recruiting efforts have become
increasingly heavyhanded. This has hurt military
morale, and a number of conscripts, uneducated and
ill prepared for military life, have deserted.
exercises under Saudi auspices.
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Table 12
South Yemen: Soviet-Supplied
Military Equipment as of 30 April 1983 a
T-62
90
T-54/55
255
T-34
125
Armored personnel carriers
BTR-40
30
BTR-60
85
BTR-152
190
BMP
125
Attack helicopters
MI-24/Hind
12
MI-8/Hip
45
Surface-to-surface missiles
Scud-B
MIG-17
48
MIG-21
82
SU-20/22
29
Missile patrol boats
Osa-II
Tank landing ships
Ropucha
a Includes major equipment items delivered since the late 1960s.
Due to attrition and inventory phaseouts, some of the weapons may
no longer be in the South Yemeni inventory. For example, DIA
shows only 40 active MIG-21s.
Deficiencies in leadership also plague the armed
forces. Lingering tribal rivalries and the involvement
of high-ranking officers in politics have hurt the
development of a professional officer corps. Compe-
tent officers often are passed over for promotion or
purged because their political loyalties are suspect
Army. The Army has about 22,000 troops organized
into 10 infantry brigades, one mechanized brigade,
several independent battalions, and support units.
Most of the infantry brigades have subordinate infar25X1
try and armor battalions and field artillery, antiair-
craft artillery, and reconnaissance units. They also
have engineering, signal, and transport elements. F__1
South Yemen is divided into three areas of military
responsibility called Axis Commands, subordinate to
General Headquarters in Aden. Each Axis Command
directs at least two brigades. There is a close opera-
tional relationship between the brigades at Mukayris
and Lawdar, and they may constitute a fourth Axis.
Several units in the Aden area report directly to
General Headquarters. The units include an artillery
brigade, a heavy transport battalion, FROG-7 and
Scud B surface-to-surface missile battalions, and a
parachute battalion
The Army has more equipment than it can effectively
absorb. Hence, over the past few years, it has empha-
sized integration of weapons over acquisition of more
equipment. South Yemen has begun replacing BTR-
152 armored personnel carriers in its infantry bri-
gades with the more advanced BMP armored infantry
fighting vehicle. It formed its first mechanized bri-
gade, equipped with BMPs, in 1981. It has added tank
battalions to most of its infantry brigades.FI 25X1
Most unit training is at the company or battalion
level. South Yemen conducted a mechanized infantry
exercise and a large combined-arms exercise for the
first time in late 1981. The combined-arms exercise
simulated the defense of coastal areas against land-
ings by US amphibious forces. South Yemen's Scud B
surface-to-surface missile battalion has begun opera- 25X1
tional training after two years of familiarization on
the equipment 25X1
Air Force. South Yemen's Air Force is charged with a
threefold mission-control of the country's airspace,
tactical support of ground forces, and air transport of
men and materiel to forward deployment areas. It has
about 1,500 men and a pilot-to-aircraft ratio of less
than 1:1. About 100 fighter pilots are jet qualified, 25X1
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Figure 11
Major Military Deployment in South Yemen
Infantry brigade
Mechanized brigade
Rocket brigade
Helicopter squadron
Airbase
Naval base
Khamis
1 Mushayt
Saudi Arabia
and most have trained in ground-controlled intercept,
ground attack, and night flying. North Korean and
Cuban pilots, used extensively in the past, may still fly
some South Yemeni aircraft. Several of the transport
aircraft apparently are crewed by Soviets.
The transport squadron plays an essential role in
support of operations because of South Yemen's
limited road network. Air ferry operations have been
about the only way to move troops and supplies to
otherwise inaccessible areas.
Boundary repranntallon is
not necessarily authoritative.
Navy. The Navy's main operating base is located at
Aden, which has one of the finest natural deepwater
harbors in the region. A smaller base is at Perim
Island in the Bab el Mandeb, and naval patrol boats
frequent the port of Al Mukalla in the Fifth Gover-
norate for provisions, bunkering, and crew rest. The
Navy is charged with monitoring traffic passing
through the Bab el Mandeb and protecting South
Yemen's 1,300-km coastline-a mission beyond its
capabilities.
7
`~ JO~man
Thuf
f \ Salalah
25X1
25X1
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Paramilitary Forces. The 15,000-strong People's Mi-
litia was formed in 1972 and consists of regulars and
irregulars. The regulars receive the same training as
Army personnel, but by Cuban rather than Soviet
advisers. They then are sent to their home communi-
ties, where they form a small cadre to command and
train irregulars. Most of the militia is composed of
irregulars who function as a reserve for the regular
armed forces.
Two other paramilitary organizations, the People's
Police and People's Forces, carry out internal security
duties. The People's Police undergoes limited military
training, and some units probably are equipped with
light antiaircraft and antitank weapons and mortars.
They are stationed at points along the country's
borders and conduct antismuggling patrols. The Peo-
ple's Forces help patrol the borders and protect wells
and government buildings. They generally employ
villagers and are armed only with automatic rifles.
Foreign Relations
South Yemen regards itself as a member of the
international socialist community and has long com-
mitted itself to a policy of supporting leftist revolu-
tionary movements, maintaining solidarity with the
Arab Steadfastness Front in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and opposing what it has labeled as reactionary Arab
regimes and imperialist governments. Its still relative-
ly young leaders, proud of their revolutionary creden-
tials, have supported insurgencies in Oman and North
Yemen and given aid and made training facilities
available to a variety of international terrorist organi-
zations. President Hasani, however, has sought to
modify South Yemen's tactics-if not its policy objec-
tives-in an effort to end South Yemen's isolation and
induce Saudi Arabia and the oil sheikhdoms to pro-
vide urgently needed economic aid.
Saudi Arabia. Relations between Riyadh and Aden
have been strained, even after diplomatic ties were
established in 1976. Saudi Arabia consistently has
sought to induce Aden to cease propaganda attacks on
the moderate Arabs, curtail support for insurgencies
against Oman and North Yemen, and reduce the
Soviet presence in South Yemen in exchange for
financial aid. Riyadh has extended modest loans and
established banking links, enabling remittances from
the large South Yemeni work force in Saudi Arabia to
flow home easily. Further help probably will be
modest in scope and depend on Aden's adherence to
its present moderate course.
Oman. Until recently Aden gave strong support to the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). It
supplied weapons and provided facilities for training
of insurgents by personnel from Communist and
radical Arab states.
In October 1982, as part of its campaign to ease
tensions with the Saudis and the Gulf sheikhdoms,
South Yemen signed a reconciliation agreement with
Oman under Kuwaiti auspices. Both sides agreed to
stop cross-border infiltration, end media campaigns
against each other, and discuss border issues. PFLO
fighters appear to be restricted to base camps, and
some dependents have been repatriated.
Other Arab States. South Yemen has taken consist-
ently hardline positions on Arab-Israeli issues but
recently has made gestures toward the moderate
Arabs in the hope of being rewarded with more
financial assistance. President Hasani participated in
the Fez summit in September 1982 and gave unex-
pected support to the position adopted by the moder-
ate Arab delegations. South Yemen provided a small
military unit to serve with Syrian units of the Arab
Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon. Aden accepted ap-
proximately 2,000 of the Palestinian fighters evacuat-
ed from Beirut in August 1982, about half of whom
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Tripartite Alliance. Aden broke ranks with the Arab
states to support Ethiopia in its war with Somalia over
the Ogaden region and sent troops and pilots to fight 25X1
with Ethiopian forces. Aden also backs Ethiopia's
campaign to suppress the Eritrean insurgency.) 25X1
In August 1981 South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia
signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in Aden,
which provides for political, economic, and military
cooperation. The alliance was intended to counter
increased US political and military support for Egypt
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Figure 12
Paramilitary Training Camps in South Yemen
NDF-National Democratic Front
PFLO-Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
PFLP-Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO-Palestine I iberation Organization
Saudi Arabia
Kamaran
Island
(P.D.,R.Y.)
Red Sea
Yemen
Arab Republic
(N. Yemen)
PLO officer training camp
Somali officer training camp
NDF training camp
PFLO training camp
Najd Merged
_(pass)
Somali guerrilla training camp
Ad DaIP - Guerrilla training camp
AI Al Hi -
PFLP training camp -Habilayn
Ethiopia d6 BI'r J, ADEN
t:-Uq m
-Perim Island
Gulf of Aden
Somalia
0 150
Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
and Oman. Aden's relations with Libya, however, switching its ties from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa
have cooled as a result of Tripoli's failure to provide after the Soviets were expelled from Somalia in 1977,
promised economic aid. Libya also is disenchanted endorsing Brezhnev's proposals for an Arab-Israeli
with Aden because of its withdrawal of support for peace settlement and for a "Zone of Peace" in the
insurgent forces in North Yemen Indian Ocean, and backing the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. The close ties between the two countries
Soviet Union. Since independence in 1967 South were further strengthened in October 1979 with the
Yemen has looked to Moscow for protection and arms signing of a 20-year treaty of friendship and coopera-
to offset its virtual isolation in the region. Aden gives tion.
strong support to Moscow's regional objectives,
Iman
Socotra T
(P.D.R.Y.)
'Abd al Kuri
(P.D.R.Y.
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The Soviets value South Yemen primarily for its
strategic location on the Bab el Mandeb and Saudi
Arabia's southern flank. With the loss of their base at
Berbera in Somalia, South Yemen's air and port
facilities have become more important to the Soviets:
? The Soviets use South Yemeni port facilities to
supplement logistic support for their Indian Ocean
squadron.
? Ships of the squadron use anchorages off Socotra
Island and have joined with South Yemeni forces in
military maneuvers staged in response to US exer-
cises in the area.
Despite these close ties, Aden has not granted formal
basing rights to Moscow such as it enjoyed in Somalia
and now holds in Ethiopia's Dahlak Archipelago in
the lower Red Sea.
Strains in the Soviet-South Yemeni relationship be-
gan to appear in 1982. Moscow is suspicious of
Hasani's intentions and particularly his overtures to
the moderate Arabs and West Europeans. By fall
1983, however, public statements from both sides
suggested that the strains had eased. Nonetheless, the
Soviet position in South Yemen is not in jeopardy.
Hasani and other South Yemeni leaders are still
deeply concerned over US intentions and are reluctant
to forgo Moscow's protection. However paltry, the
Soviets and East Europeans still have provided about
one-third of all aid received since 1974)
Other Communist Countries. Aden maintains close
relations with the European Communist countries and
with Cuba. Official delegations at all levels are
regularly exchanged with these states and with Marx-
ist regimes in Nicaragua and Vietnam. Hasani is also
looking to China as a possible source of economic help
and weapons
decade.
Western Europe. Diplomatic relations have been es-
tablished with Italy, Iceland, and West Germany and
are under discussion with Norway. Great Britain
upgraded its diplomatic mission in Aden to ambassa-
dorial status in 1983. Paris funded the Aden Interna-
tional Airport modernization project and offers schol-
arships for study in France. A French warship made a
port call in Aden in July 1983, the first in more than a
US Interests
US interests in South Yemen are few. South Yemen
broke its ties with the United States in October 1969
as the Aden regime took a sharp turn leftward.
Efforts to improve relations ceased with the outbreak
of fighting between North and South Yemen in 1979.
Visits by Americans have been infrequent. In 1982
several US business representatives visited Aden at
official invitation. The British Embassy handles US
interests.
South Yemen is hostile to US regional initiatives and
treats its public to a steady stream of anti-US rheto-
ric. Aden routinely portrays itself as directly threat-
ened by US forces in the region. Operation "Radfan
81," the largest military exercise conducted by South
Yemen, was mounted in mid-December 1981 in re-
sponse to the earlier US-Omani "Operation Bright
Star.'
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September 1962
January 1963
October 1963
March 1964
June 1967
November 1967
February 1968
Chronology
Yemen converts to Islam.
Zaydi Shia sect introduced in Yemens, becomes basis for theocratic rule.
Aden captured by the British.
Sanaa occupied by Ottoman Turks.
Turks withdraw from North Yemen.
Imamate government of North Yemen recognized by the USSR.
Saudi Arabia defeats North Yemen in brief war; annexes Asir, Jizan, and
Najran regions.
North Yemeni Government recognized by the United States.
Imamate overthrown in military coup; Yemen Arab Republic proclaimed,
and civil war begins.
Federation of South Arabia inaugurated by British in South Yemen.
National Liberation Front insurgency against British begins.
North Yemen signs five-year friendship treaty with the USSR (routinely
renewed every five years).
North Yemen breaks relations with the United States over Arab-Israeli
British withdraw from Aden, and Southern Yemen People's Republic
proclaimed.
Royalist siege of Sanaa lifted with Soviet aid.
June 1969 South Yemen's President Qahtan ash-Shabi ousted in coup known as
Corrective Revolution.
US Embassy in Aden closed.
Peace agreement reached in Saudi Arabia ends civil war in North Yemen.
65 Secret
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December 1970
July 1972
June 1974
October 1977
June 1978
June 1978
July 1978
December 1978
February 1979
March 1979
October 1979
November 1979
April 1980
South Yemen promulgates Constitution; changes country's name to Peo-
ple's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
North Yemen promulgates Constitution.
North Yemen and the United States reestablish diplomatic ties.
Lt. Col. Ibrahim al-Hamdi launches bloodless coup; declared President of
North Yemen; suspends Constitution.
Saudi Arabia and South Yemen establish diplomatic relations.
Al-Hamdi assassinated; Ahmad Husayn al-Ghashmi appointed President
of North Yemen.
North Yemen's President al-Ghashmi assassinated by South Yemeni
agent.
South Yemen's President Salim Rubayyi Ali executed following two days
of fighting in Aden.
`Ali Abdallah Salih elected President of North Yemen with Saudi backing.
South Yemen's United National Front renamed Yemen Socialist Party.
`Abd al-Fatah Isma'il becomes chairman of the Presidium of South
Yemen's Supreme People's Council.
Fighting breaks out between the two Yemens. Aden's forces temporarily
occupy North Yemen territory.
The United States approves $390 million in arms for North Yemen.
Summit meeting in Kuwait ends war between the two Yemens.
South Yemen signs 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the
USSR.
North Yemen's President Salih concludes arms deal with USSR, estimated
at $700 million.
Isma'il ousted in bloodless coup in South Yemen; Ali Nasir Muhammad
al-Hasani becomes chief of state and secretary general of the Yemeni
Socialist Party.
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May 1980 Fighting between North Yemeni forces and National Democratic Front
(NDF) insurgents intensifies.
August 1981 South Yemen signs Tripartite Agreement with Libya and Ethiopia.
April 1982 North Yemeni town of Juban falls to NDF in biggest government setback
of guerrilla war.
May-June 1982 Major North Yemeni counteroffensive pushes NDF insurgents back to
stronghold in Jabal Murays adjacent to South Yemeni border. Salih
declares amnesty for guerrillas.
January 1983 Last NDF forces in Jabal Murays turn over control of area to government
in Sanaa; NDF insurgency winds down.
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Statistical Summary
Area
195,029 km2, 20 percent arable
287,490 km2, 1 percent arable
Limits of territorial waters
(claimed)
12 nm, plus 6-nm "necessary supervision zone"
12 nm, plus 6-nm "necessary supervision zone";
200-nm fishing and economic zone
Coastline
523 km
1,383 km
People
Population a
6,500,000 (approximately)
1,930,000 (approximately), excluding Perim and
Kamaran Islands for which no data are available
(January 1981 estimate)
Average annual growth rate
2.3 percent
1.9 percent
Life expectancy at birth
42 years
38 years
Infant mortality rate
211 per 1,000
NA
Ethnic divisions
90 percent Yemeni Arabs, 10 percent Afro-Arab
Yemeni Arabs in west and Hadhrami Arabs in
east; a few Indians, Somalis, and Europeans in
Aden
100 percent Muslim divided into Zaydi (Shia) and
Shafii (Sunni) sects, and a small Ismaili (Shia)
community
100 percent Muslim, almost all Shafii Sunnis
Language
Arabic
Mostly Arabic; non-Arabic Semitic languages
spoken in Al Mahrah area and on the island of
Socotra; English commonly used foreign lan-
guage in Aden
Literacy
15 percent (estimate)
10 percent (estimate), Aden 35 percent (estimate)
Labor force
1,400,000, approximately 50 percent of labor
force is abroad
410,000, approximately one-third of labor force is
abroad
Agricultural
75 percent
43.8 percent
Industrial and commercial
9 percent
28 percent
Services
16 percent
28 percent
Official name
Yemen Arab Republic
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
Capital
Sanaa
Aden; Madinat ash Sha'b, administrative capital
Political subdivisions
11 provinces
6 governorates
Type
Republic, military regime since June 1974
Republic, power centered in Marxist-oriented
Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)
Based on Islamic law (sharia) and local customary
law (`urf); Constitution promulgated in December
1970, suspended June 1974; compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction not accepted
Based on Islamic law for personal matters and
English common law for commercial matters;
Constitution promulgated in November 1970
Leaders
Col. Ali Abdallah Salih, President
Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council,
YSP Secretary General, and Prime Minister
Suffrage
Universal
Universal
Political parties
None
Yemeni Socialist Party-coalition of National
Front, Ba'th, and Communist Parties
Arab League, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, IDA,
IFC, ILO, IMF, ITU, NAM, UN, UNESCO,
UPU, WHO, WMO
Arab League, FAO, G-77, GATT (de facto),
IRBD, ICAO, IDA, ILO, IMF, ITU, NAM,
UN, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, WTO
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$3,810 million (1981 estimate), GNP per capita
$544
$853 million (1980 estimate) at market prices,
GNP per capita $442
GDP
$2,800 million (1981 estimate)
$570 million (1980)
Composition of GDP
Agriculture
38 percent
13 percent (including fishing)
Industry
14 percent
14 percent (including refining)
Construction
13 percent
Sorghum, millet, qat, cotton, coffee, fruits, and
vegetables
Cereals, dates, qat, coffee, livestock, fish; cotton
is main cash crop
Industries
Cotton textiles, aluminum products, small-scale
production of leather goods, small-scale fishing
Refining of imported crude (Little Aden refinery),
food processing, textiles, consumer goods
Electric power
134,900-kW capacity (1982), 295 million kWh
produced (1982), 45 kWh per capita
233,200-kW capacity (1982), 511 million kWh
produced, 255 kWh per capita
Exports
$11 million (f.o.b. 1981 estimate); biscuits, con-
fections, hides, coffee, cotton, qat
$38 million excluding reexports
$1,800 million (f.o.b. 1981); foodstuffs, chemicals,
petroleum products, manufactured goods, ma-
chinery (North Yemen has world's worst export/
import ratio)
$820 million (1982); foodstuffs, livestock, manu-
factured goods, machinery, petroleum, feedstock
China, South Yemen, USSR, Japan, United
Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia
North Yemen, East Africa, United Kingdom,
Japan
$400 million annually (approximately), Saudi
Arabia principal donor
$100-200 million annually, USSR largest
benefactor
Total revenues
$1,066 million (1981)
$495 million (1980)
Current expenditures
$1,568 million (1981)
$280 million (1980)
Expatriate remittances
$789 million (1981)
$450 million (1980)
Monetary conversion rate
1 riyal = US 22 cents
1 dinar = US $2.90
Fiscal year
Calendar year
Calendar year
Communications
Railroads
Highways
4,000 km, 1,000 km paved, 1,200 km gravel,
1,800 km earth tracks
5,311 km, 322 km paved, 290 km gravel, 4,699
km motorable track
Pipelines
None
Refined products, 32 km
Civil air
9 major transport aircraft
14 major transport aircraft
Airfields
26 total, 14 usable; four with permanent-surface
runways; four with runways 2,440 to 3,252 me-
ters, seven with runways 1,220 to 2,439 meters
96 total, 42 usable; five with permanent-surface
runways; nine with runways 2,440 to 3,659 me-
ters, 18 with runways 1,220 to 2,439 meters
Meager open-wire lines and low-power radio com-
munications stations; 10,000 telephones (0.2 per
100 population); three AM, no FM, and five TV
stations; one Indian Ocean satellite station; prin-
cipal center Sanaa; secondary centers, Al Huday-
dah and Ta'izz
Small system of open-wire, troposcatter multicon-
ductor cable, and radio communications stations;
only center Aden; estimated 10,000 telephones
(0.6 per 100 population); one AM, no FM, and
five TV stations
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Military manpower
Males 15 to 49, 1.2 million; 670,000 fit for service
Males 15 to 49, 400,000; 200,000 fit for service
Personnel
20,000 Army; 950 Navy; 1,000 Air Force, of
which 34 are jet qualified
22,000 Army; 1,000 Navy; 1,500 Air Force,
including 100 jet-qualified pilots; 15,000 People's
Militia
Predominantly Soviet/Warsaw Pact with some
US F-5 aircraft, M-60 tanks, and M-113 ar-
mored personnel carriers
Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Intelligence and security
National Security Organization; Central Security
Committee for State Security-internal security
Forces; National Organization for General Intel-
Public Security
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