MOSCOW AND THE CRISIS IN THE PLO

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seer
Intelligence
Moscow and the
Crisis in the PLO
An Intelligence Assessment
Seeret
SOV 84-10223X
December 1984
Copy 4 6 5
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Moscow and the
Crisis in the PLO
This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third
World Activities Division, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 84-10223X
December 1984
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Key Judgments
Information available,
as of 20 December 1984
was used in this report.
Moscow and the
Crisis in the PLO
The crisis in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-one of the
Soviets' most important clients in the Middle East-has created problems
for the USSR's political position in the region:
? The animosity between PLO leader Arafat and Syrian President Assad
has complicated Soviet relations with both. In the aftermath of the 1982
war in Lebanon, the fragility of the Soviets' relationship with Syria-
their primary client in the region-and their concern about Arafat's
reliability persuaded them to side with- Damascus in its dispute with
Arafat. The Soviets, however, oppose Assad's attempt to control the PLO
because this would force them to deal with the Palestinians through
Damascus and thus eliminate an independent Soviet asset.
? Arafat's setbacks have led him, in turn, to consider a political solution to
.the Palestinian problem through some form of cooperation with Jordan.
This would weaken Soviet leverage in the Arab-Israeli peace process
because a decision by the PLO and Jordan to adopt a joint position would
facilitate US-sponsored peace talks with Israel that almost certainly
would. leave. the USSR and Syria out. It will be difficult for the Soviets to
achieve a major role at any Arab-Israeli peace conference without close
ties to a strong PLO that cooperates with Syria.
? Moscow's inability to prevent these setbacks to Arafat not only strained
Soviet-PLO ties but also weakened the USSR's claim to patronage of the
"national liberation process" and. may have harmed Soviet credibility
among the Arabs.
We believe Moscow has serious reservations about Arafat, especially his
willingness to consider solutions to the Palestinian question that would not
allow for a Soviet role. The Soviets almost certainly still view him,
however, as a more effective leader for the PLO than any likely replace-
ment from the rebels in his Fatah wing of the organization or from the left-
ist Palestinian factions. He is willing to consider a negotiated settlement,
while the rebels and other pro-Damascus Palestinian groups call for a
solely military solution, which the Kremlin has long viewed as unobtain-
able and out of step with the mainstream of Arab and international
thought.
The Soviets apparently want Arafat to remain as head of a unified PLO
but are seeking to increase leftist influence in the organization to curtail his
independent tendencies. They look, in particular, to the Democratic and
Secret
SOV 84-10223X
December 1984
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Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP and PFLP) and the
Palestinian Communist Party. Moscow's long-term strategy is likely to
center on expanding the power of the leftists so that they will eventually be
in a position to take control of the PLO. For now, however, the Soviets ap-
pear to be counseling the leftists to bargain hard with Arafat for a greater
voice in PLO decisionmaking but to give first priority to reuniting the
Palestinians.
The Soviets are likely to continue working discreetly for a reconciliation
among Palestinian factions and a rapprochement between Arafat and
Assad, although they probably are not optimistic on either score. Especially
troublesome for Moscow is the possible formal split in the PLO wrought by
Arafat's decision to convene the 17th session of the Palestine National
Council in Amman in November despite the absence of the leftists and the
Fatah rebels. Soviet officials have stated privately that, if the split is not re-
paired, Arafat's wing will emerge as the more influential. They probably
suspect that, without further need to accommodate the leftists and radicals,
Arafat would be more likely to strike a deal with Jordan allowing it to rep-
resent the Palestinians at US-sponsored peace talks.
Regardless of who wins control of the PLO, the Palestinian issue will
remain central in the Middle East. The Soviets undoubtedly will continue
seeking to use the issue to improve their relations with Arab countries and
undermine US regional interests, particularly Washington's efforts to
achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement that excludes the USSR. Soviet policy
toward the PLO is likely to continue to be characterized by numerous
shifts that reflect the tactical nature of the PLO's place in Moscow's
overall Middle Eastern policy. We believe the Soviets will not allow their
ties to the PLO to threaten their more important regional relationships,
above all, the one with Syria.
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Key Judgments
The PLO in Soviet Strategy
The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Turning Point 3
The Fatah Mutiny and the Arafat-Assad Feud 5
Arafat the "Phoenix"
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Moscow and the
Crisis in the PLO
The crisis in the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), one of Moscow's most important clients in the
Middle East, has been a major setback to. Soviet
fortunes, in the region., The PLO has been driven out
of southern Lebanon by the Israeli invasion and rent
by a violent rebellion within Fatah, its largest faction.
The animosity between PLO leader Arafat and Syri-
an President Assad has resurfaced, with Damascus
expelling Arafat from Syria, helping PLO rebels drive
him and his forces out of their last stronghold in
Lebanon, and attempting to oust him as leader of the
PLO. As a result of the almost complete loss of the
military arm of his organization, Arafat has been
toying with a political solution to the Palestinian
problem through some form of cooperation with Jor-
dan. He has even gone so far as to meet the president
of the former pariah in the Arab world, Egypt. These
moves have led to further dissension within the PLO,
culminating in the possible formal split of the organi-
zation at the 17th session of the Palestinians' parlia-
ment-in-exile in Amman, Jordan, in November. Mos-
cow has been powerless to prevent this turn of events.
This paper examines the USSR's response to these
developments. It begins with a discussion of the PLO's
importance to Soviet policy in the Middle East. After
looking at the events of the past two.and a half years,
it assesses the current Soviet view of Arafat, the
prospects for the leftists in the PLO, and the influence
of Syria on Moscow's policy toward the Palestinians.
The Soviets see support for the PLO as a means of
increasing their influence in the Middle East and
reducing that of the United States. By identifying
themselves with the Palestinian cause, the Soviets
gain:
? Enhanced stature among the Arabs, most of whom
regard a country's position on the Palestinian issue
as a litmus test of its support for the Arab world.
? An edge with the Arabs over the United States,
which does not recognize the organization.
? An added means of leverage on Israel.
? A potential tool with which to hinder a US-
sponsored Arab-Israeli settlement and a right to
claim-for themselves a role in any such settlement.
? A source of influence in the region beyond estab-
lished Arab governments.
Backing the PLO also allows Moscow to burnish its
image in the Third World as a defender of "national
liberation" movements. Soviet assistance to many
liberation movements in the Third World is modeled
on experience gained in supporting the PLO. And, in
a region lacking influential Communist parties, the
PLO is one of the most prominent groups with
Marxist members.
The Soviets jumped on the Palestinian bandwagon
relatively late. Between the PLO's creation in 1964
and Arafat's first visit to the USSR in 1968, Moscow
paid little attention to it and, at times, described it as
extremist. The Soviets increased their rhetorical sup-
port during the next few years but continued to
maintain their distance, especially after the PLO's
attempt to overthrow Jordan's King Hussein in 1970.
According to what appear to be authentic minutes of
a meeting between Soviet and Syrian Communist
Party leaders published by a Palestinian journal, the
Kremlin believed as late as 1972 that there were
dangers in seeing the "solution of the Palestine prob-
lem ... [as] the most important task of every Arab
country."
Moscow has never been comfortable with the ideologi- 25X1
cally diverse PLO, which depends on support from
such conservative, anti-Soviet Arab governments as
Saudi Arabia. As one scholar noted in a 1980 study of
the Soviet-PLO relationship, the PLO is "far too
unstable, uncertain and divided, far less Marxist and
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Figure 1
Palestinian Populations
Atlantic
t O,c ea"n':r
Morocco
250 r
Algeria
5,000-12,000
? 400,000-1,800,000
120,000-350,000
50,000-120,000
under 30,000
a Does not include PLO troops
0 500 Kilometers
0 500 Statute Miles
Libya
10,000-15,000
Lsrael a tq,000,000
West B k
1,800,0
Sudan
100
Aiiedab
1LXr
50,00.0
unaary'repreeenlat,ont,s
iat n arily authorilel
yet far too extremist to be Moscow's preferred part-
ner." ' Palestinian disunity, in particular, has contrib-
uted to. the USSR's hesitation to take a definitive
stance and led to its numerous shifts in policy toward
the PLO. Despite the PLO's importance to Moscow,
the fact that it is not an established government
allows the Soviets to pursue a more tactical policy
toward the organization than they can toward the
governments of the region.
The deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations begin-
ning in 1972, the PLO's increased international pres-
tige following the October 1973 War, and US at-
tempts to broker separate peace settlements between
Israel and its neighbors all combined to induce the
'Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization: An Uneasy Alliance (N.Y.: Praeger, 1980), pp. 253-
Secret
Soviets to step up their support for the PLO. During
the rest of the 1970s, the Soviets:
? Began to receive Arafat officially and call for the
creation of a Palestinian state (1974).2
? Opened a PLO office in Moscow (1976).
? Started to grant Arafat meetings with Soviet party
leaders (1977).
? Recognized the organization as the "sole legitimate
representative" of the Palestinian people (1978).
At the same time, Moscow increased its military
support for the PLO, with almost all weapons flowing
to PLO forces in Lebanon through Syria.
'Prior to 1974, when Arafat came to the USSR he was received by
the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African
Qatar M 9a Lo 0.
Saudi
Arabia
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Figure 2. Former Soviet Presi-
dent Brezhnev, PLO leader
Arafat, and aides during dis-
cussions in the Kremlin, Octo-
The Soviets apparently hoped to counter Washing-
ton's success in wooing Egypt toward a US-negotiated
peace settlement with Israel by strengthening those
Arabs opposed to such a course. The PLO was an
important member of what evolved into the "stead-
fastness and confrontation front," which rejected the
Camp David accords negotiated by the United States,
Israel, and Egypt in 1978. More by default than
design, Syria and the PLO became the USSR's most
important clients in the Middle East
The Soviets were the PLO's primary source of arms
from the mid-1970s until its defeat in Lebanon in
1982. The dispersion of Arafat's fighters throughout
the Middle East has decimated Fatah's military
forces, but some Soviet arms reportedly are still
reaching his men. The weapons and the training
Moscow and its East European and Cuban allies have
provided over the years have boosted Soviet influence
in the PLO. But the Soviets have been largely unable
to translate that into leverage on PLO policies be-
cause the weapons have had to transit Arab states-in
particular, Egypt and Syria-which have manipulat-
ed the flow for their own interests.
Moscow also has been a source of funds for the PLO,
but its subventions have been dwarfed by those of the
Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia's.
The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon:
Turning Point
Israel's thrashing of PLO and Syrian forces in Leba-
non in the summer of 1982 has had major repercus-
sions for Moscow's relationships with both of its allies,
particularly the Pajestinians. The serious weakening
of the PLO reduced its usefulness as an ally to the
USSR. The PLO's military arm was all but severed,
as the organization lost what had. been its base of
operations since its expulsion from Jordan in 1970.
The PLO no longer could claim to be confronting
Israel directly, for the only way it could now attack
Israeli forces, aside from minor raids in southern
Lebanon, was through Syrian lines. Damascus, of
course, was not eager to give,the Israelis a pretext for
another attack.
The USSR's cautious reaction to the invasion strained
Soviet-PLO relations. A Soviet Embassy officer in
Damascus told a US counterpart shortly after the
invasion that Moscow's reaction was "too slow" and
acknowledged that this angered the Palestinians and
other Arabs. Many PLO leaders publicly criticized
Soviet inaction. Whatever Arafat felt personally, the
Israeli siege of his forces left him in no position to
engage in public recriminations with one of his most
important backers. After he left Beirut, however, he
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Table 1
Milestones in Soviet-PLO Relations
Soviets openly label its first Chairman, Ahmad
Shukeiri (1964-67), an extremist
UN Security Council Resolution 242 adopted
treating Palestinians as "refugee problem"
Soviets endorse it; PLO rejects it
Arafat becomes head of Fatah, and it joins PLO
Arafat makes first visit to USSR
1969
Arafat becomes Chairman of PLO
1970
First publicly acknowledged visit to USSR by
Arafat
Invited by Soviet Committee for Solidarity With
Asian and African Countries
First mention in Soviet media of Palestinians'
"national" rights
Still sporadic; not an official endorsement
1972
Third Arafat visit to USSR
1974-July-August
Fourth Arafat visit to USSR
Soviets agree to open PLO office in Moscow (not
done until 1976)
1974-September-October
First Soviet endorsement of Palestinian "home-
land" or "national home"
First time hosted officially by Soviet Govern-
ment; first meeting with Soviet leader (Premier
Kosygin)
1975-April-May
Sixth Arafat visit to USSR
Meets with Foreign Minister Gromyko
1975-November
Seventh Arafat visit to USSR
In joint statement both endorse an independent"
Palestinian state
1976
PLO office opened in Moscow
1977
Eighth Arafat visit to USSR
First meeting with Soviet party chief (Brezhnev)
1978-March
Ninth Arafat visit to USSR
Meets with Brezhnev and Gromyko
1978-July
10th Arafat visit to USSR
No publicized high-level meetings
1978-October-November
11th Arafat visit to USSR
Soviets officially endorse PLO as "sole legitimate
representative" of Palestinian people
Meets only with Gromyko and candidate Politbu-
ro member Ponomarev
Soviets accord "full diplomatic status" to PLO
office in Moscow
1982
Arafat attends Brezhnev's funeral in Moscow
No announced meetings with Soviet officials
1983
14th Arafat visit to USSR
Meets with General Secretary Andropov; first
official communique issued at end of talks
1984-February
Arafat attends Andropov's funeral in Moscow
No announced meetings with Soviet officials;
Soviets later announce publicly that Arafat did
not have talks with General Secretary Chernenko
1984-October
Arafat meets with Gromyko in East Berlin during
East German National Day ceremonies
First Arafat meeting with high-level Soviet since
Fatah rebellion and Arafat-Assad feud erupted in
1983
told Monte Carlo Radio that the Soviets during the
invasion had respected the US sphere of influence in
the Middle East "more than we expected." He was
much more explicit in criticizing the Soviets in private
Arafat's military defeat led him to explore some form
of confederation with Jordan. The timing of his move,
following as it did President Reagan's 1 September
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Figure 3. Arafat with PLO tank
crew during Israeli siege of Bei-
rut, July 1982
1982 speech calling for Jordan to represent the Pales-
tinians at peace talks with the Israelis, almost certain-
ly heightened Soviet apprehension about the PLO
leader's reliability.
The PLO's defeat, which Arafat blamed partly on the
Syrians' "desertion" of his forces in Beirut, and its
turn toward Jordan exacerbated latent tensions in the
Arafat-Assad relationship. This animosity made coop-
eration between the USSR's two most important allies
in the Middle East all but impossible and put Moscow
in the difficult position of attempting to preserve its
ties with both while alienating neither.
The invasion also led to a significant shift in the
USSR's relationship with Syria.
Assad and senior Syrian leaders concluded that Isra-
el's victory was due to the failure of Syria's Soviet
weaponry. The Soviets were in a position where they
had to restore their ally's trust in their willingness and
ability to be a reliable military patron.
Moscow's response was to revamp the entire Syrian
air defense system and provide Damascus with more
sophisticated Soviet equipment and, most important,
with Soviet air defense personnel to man it. In doing
so, the Soviets were qualitatively increasing their
commitment to and stake in Syria and taking a
greater risk there than ever before. This called for
reconciling political differences with Damascus and
avoiding new frictions, even if it meant looking the
other way as Assad tried to crush Yasir Arafat.
The Fatah Mutiny and the
Arafat-Assad Feud
The Soviets have been torn by conflicting interests in
the Arafat-Assad dispute. The USSR sympathizes
with some of Assad's and the Syrian-backed Fatah
rebels' criticism of Arafat, but it does not want to see
the PLO come under Syrian control.
Moscow's conflicting interests have been reflected in
its response to the Fatah mutiny, which began in May 25X1
1983. The Soviets avoided taking a definitive public
stance. They periodically issued statements implicitly 25X1
critical of Syrian support for the move against Arafat,
but at no time have they criticized Syria by name.F_~
The Soviets apparently began working behind the
scenes to reconcile Arafat and Assad right from the
outset of the rift.
ndropov sent Assad a letter in June 25X1
1983 expressing support for Arafat. The PLO publicly
claimed that Andro- 25X1
pov sent a similar message to Arafat about the same
time. But by July Arafat was expressing disappoint- 25X1
ment with Soviet "pressure" on the PLO to resolve its
differences with Syria. 25X1
The Syrian-backed attempt by the Fatah rebels in
November 1983 to push Arafat's forces out of Leba-
non compelled the USSR to become more involved.
Soviet media coverage of Syrian Foreign Minister
Khaddam's talks in Moscow with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko in November suggested that the
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Soviet Attitude Toward
the Fatah Rebels
Moscow has kept its distance from the Syrian-backed
rebels. The few times it has taken note of them in
Soviet media, it has done so without comment. We
know of no meetings between Soviet officials and
rebel leaders. Nimr Salih, one of the two anti-Arafat
leaders, lamented publicly in October 1983 that the
Kremlin's other commitments in the Middle East
prevented it from supporting the rebels. The Soviet
stance stems from reservations about some of the
rebels' goals, a desire to prevent Syrian domination
of the PLO, and the realization that Arafat com-
mands far more loyalty among the Palestinians and
more international recognition than any other PLO
figure.
The Soviets, like the rebels, have serious misgivings
about Arafat's dealings with Jordan, oppose his
willingness to consider President Reagan's Arab-
Israeli peace plan, and deplore his feud with Assad.
The Kremlin, no doubt, also welcomes the rebels' call
for closer ties with the USSR and their unmitigated
hostility toward the United States.
The rebels' rejection of a political solution to the
Palestinian question and their emphasis on a military
solution, however, fly in the face of more than a
decade of Soviet advice to the PLO and strike
Moscow as self-defeating. An article published in the
Czechoslovak Communist Party newspaper Rude
Pravo on 3 March 1984 by an official of the Palestin-
ian Communist Party (almost certainly reflecting
Moscow's views) stated that the rebels' "extremist
rejectionist" view "isolates in practice the cause of
our people and deprives it of... recognition on the
international scale. "
The rebels' declining fortunes since they forced Ara-
fat to evacuate Tripoli, Lebanon, in December 1983
have made them even less appealing to Moscow. A
Soviet radiobroadcast on the June 1984 talks in Aden
between Arafat's wing of Fatah and some of his leftist
rivals in the PLO noted that "all the principal
Palestinian organs" were represented. The rebels
were not participants.
Soviets expressed their displeasure with Syria's at-
began their final push on Arafat's headquarters north
of Tripoli a few days after the Syrian Foreign Minis-
The Soviets, in any event, did not allow the issue to
damage Soviet-Syrian relations. The communique
released after the Gromyko-Khaddam talks contained
no allusion to Syria's role in the dispute with Arafat
and emphasized the close ties between Moscow and
Damascus. Subsequently, an authoritative unsigned
editorial in Pravda on 19 November 1983 gave the
clearest public indication that the Kremlin's ties to
Syria are the primary determinant of its position on
the Arafat-Assad feud. The Soviet stand on the
dispute, according to Pravda, is based on an under-
standing of the "important" role played by the PLO
in the struggle against Israel and the United States
and on solidarity with Syria, which is now the "most
important" force in that struggle.
Moscow's unwillingness to press
Damascus harder probably prompted Arafat's rare
public outburst of dissatisfaction with the Soviets in
late November. In an interview with an Egyptian
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Figure 4. Arafat and Syrian'
President Assad in Damascus
in May 1983, afew days before
newspaper, Arafat said that, forced to choose between
its Palestinian "friend" and its Syrian "ally," the
USSR was "siding with Syria."
During Politburo member Geydar Aliyev's visit to
Syria in March 1984, the Soviets reiterated that
Arafat, not Damascus, bore the primary responsibility
for repairing ties. The communique issued at the end
of the visit repeated the advice Gromyko had given
Qaddumi in November: the PLO must increase coop-
eration with Syria. It also echoed Khaddam's public
warning to the PLO, during a speech at a dinner for
Aliyev, against "separate deals" like the Reagan plan.
Moscow's willingness to sign a joint document with
Syria containing this language underlined its tilt
toward Damascus in the dispute.
The Kremlin's tilt toward Syria is no longer quite as
pronounced. Arafat's display over the past year of an
uncanny ability to survive Syrian efforts to bring him
to heel, coupled-ironically-with the improvement
in Soviet-Syrian relations, has prompted Moscow to
signal support for the PLO leader.
The Soviets kept their distance from Arafat for a long
while after his evacuation from Tripoli in December
1983. His name was hardly mentioned in the Soviet
media. For example, the Soviet Government's June
1984 message to the PLO commemorating the 20th
anniversary of its founding was addressed to the PLO
Executive Committee. (A similar congratulatory mes-
sage in November 1983 had been addressed to Ara-
fat.) An article in the Czechoslovak party organ Rude
Pravo in March by a Palestinian Communist Party
Politburo member-almost certainly reflecting Soviet
views-contained specific criticism of Arafat's poli-
cies. The article condemned the Palestinian leader-
ship's courting of "rightwing and reactionary re-
gimes" (read Jordan and Egypt), its split with Syria,
and its pursuit of "the illusion of an American
solution" to the Palestinian problem. It charged that
these policies amounted to a tilt toward "upper strata
of the Palestinian bourgeoisie."
There were a few signs even then, however, that the
Soviets were not ready to write Arafat off:
? Nikolay Shislin, an influential consultant to the
CPSU Central Committee's Secretariat, stated on a
Soviet television program in December 1983 that
Arafat's departure from Lebanon was a loss for the
Arabs. "Some" believed that his days were num-
bered, but Shishlin contended that Arafat had
shown great political skill in extricating himself
from Lebanon and implied that he still had political
life left in him.
? At a public foreign affairs lecture in Leningrad in
February 1984, a Soviet academic told his audience
that "we shouldn't rush to bury Arafat. He is like a
phoenix."
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Figure 5. Arafat and Soviet President Chernenko on receiving line
during lying-in-state ceremonies for former President Andropov in
? The Soviet Ambassador to Syria told his British
counterpart in March that the USSR still regarded
Arafat as the legitimate leader of the PLO.
By late summer, the Soviets began to end their public
silence on Arafat. A brief Izvestiya article in August
mentioned him by name, the first time he had been
noted in the official Soviet press since February. The
article's endorsement of a PLO-Syrian reconcilia-
tion-at a time when Damascus was pulling out all
stops to prevent the convening of the Palestine Na-
tional Council, which probably would have solidified
Arafat's leadership-appeared to be a signal to Assad
to cease his efforts.
The clearest sign that Moscow had not abandoned the
PLO leader came in October, when Gromyko met
with him while in East Berlin for East Germany's
National Day celebrations. It was Arafat's first meet-
ing with a high-level Soviet since his session with
Andropov in January 1983. An Egyptian diplomat in
Moscow told US Embassy officers that Gromyko had
lectured Arafat about the latter's past political and
military mistakes but emphasized that Moscow still
favored a united PLO under his leadership. Whatever
Gromyko said, the meeting itself showed that the
Soviets are now less worried about offending Assad,
who continues to seek Arafat's ouster. Paradoxically,
the fact that Moscow has repaired the damage to its
Arafat's Manipulation of the
"Soviet Card"
Arafat no doubt recognizes the importance the Sovi-
ets attach to the PLO, and this provides him with
some leverage on them as long as he is the organiza-
tion's recognized head. The Soviets often have tried
to keep their contacts with the PLO discreet, especial-
ly when it has been at odds with Syria. Arafat, on the
other hand, has a vested interest in publicizing-and
frequently exaggerating-his dealings with Moscow.
Having the "support" of a superpower enhances his
stature and influence within and outside the PLO.
Publicizing his contacts with the Soviets also tends to
limit their room for maneuver, particularly vis-a-vis
Syria.
Thus, PLO radio stations always advertise Arafat's
meeting with Soviet envoys in the Middle East and
usually claim that he exchanged "important mes-
sages" with Kremlin leaders. Moscow almost invari-
ably keeps silent on these meetings, presumably in
order not to antagonize Damascus. Even at the height
of the Soviet "tilt" toward Syria in its dispute with
Arafat in early 1984, the PLO leader was publicly
claiming he had the USSR's support. The Soviets
were in no position to deny it in public.
Arafat has derived more benefits than Moscow from
their relationship over the years. He has received
both military support in the form of weapons and
training, and recognition as the sole legitimate Pales-
tinian representative from one of the two superpow-
ers. But Arafat also needs the Soviets more than they
need him. Despite tensions in their relations since
Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the PLO
leader has been careful not to cut his ties with the
Soviets. He almost certainly believes continued con-
tacts with Moscow will help him eventually to im-
prove relations with Syria and mend the rift with the
leftwing PLO groups.
relations with Damascus may have made it less
concerned about catering to Syrian sensitivities than
it had been since June 1982.
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Assad's meeting with General Secretary Chernenko
in Moscow in October provided further evidence of
the Soviets' more evenhanded stance in the Arafat-
Assad dispute. The communique issued at the end of
the visit stated that the leaders had an "in-depth
exchange of opinions" on the Palestinian issue and, as
during Assad's talks with Aliyev in March, called for
an end to the discord within the PLO. Missing was the
implicit slap at Arafat contained in the March com-
munique, which said that the Palestinians' national
aspirations could not be achieved without close coop-
eration with Syria. Moscow's failure to send an
observer to the November session of the Palestine
National Council, however, underlined its unwilling-
ness to take a definitive stand behind Arafat.
Arafat and other Palestinian leaders have acknowl-
edged publicly that the USSR-along with Algeria
and South Yemen-has been involved in continuing
attempts to reunite the PLO and mend the rift
between Fatah and Syria. Leftist, pro-Soviet Palestin-
ian factions are playing a key role in this reconcilia-
tion process. These factions-the Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the
Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), and the Pales-
tine Liberation Front (PLF)-joined forces in March
1984 to create the "Democratic Alliance." The group
has been conducting negotiations with Arafat's Fatah
wing, as well as with the Syrian-backed "National
Alliance," made up of the Fatah rebels, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Com-
mand (PFLP-GC , Saiga, and the Popular Struggle
Front (PSF).
Moscow has long maintained support for the Palestin-
ian leftists, even while its relations with Arafat were
good. The PCP, for obvious reasons, is the faction
closest to Moscow. Its influence among Palestinians
has been limited, but its membership in the "Demo-
cratic Alliance" may have slightly boosted its stock
recently.
The much more influential Marxist DFLP has coop-
erated closely with the Kremlin for years. DFLP
leader Nayif Hawatmah speaks out often for greater
The Palestinian Communist Party
The Soviets endorsed theformation in February 1982
of the Palestinian Communist Party. It is made up of
Palestinians who formerly belonged to the Jordanian
Communist Party (JCP). Palestinians who live in
Jordan proper-the East Bank-remain in the JCP,
while those who live in the Gaza Strip, the West
Bank, or elsewhere outside Jordan belong to the PCP.
The PCP, headed by General Secretary Bashir
Barghuti, cooperates with the Israeli Communist
Party and has some influence among Palestinian
labor unions on the West Bank. Its strictly pro-
Moscow line-including support for the USSR's call
limited its appeal among most West Bankers.
for a negotiated Arab-Israeli peace settlement-has
The PCP is not a member of the PLO but has sought
admittance. The PCP'sfirst declaration stated that
the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people and insisted on the party's right to
be represented in the organization. An article by a
PCP Politburo member published in the Czechoslo- 25X1
vak Communist Party newspaper Rude Pravo in
March 1984, however, charged that the Arafat lead-
ership has consistently been hostile to the PCP.
The PCP has its own splinter factions-the PCP/
Leninist Cadres and the PCP/Provisional Command.
Both are small, more radical than the PCP, and
presumably more independent of Moscow. The Provi-
sional Command is based in Damascus and depend-
ent upon Syrian support.
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Figure 6. Nay if Hawatmah,
head of the Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine
The DFLP supports Moscow's
call for a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian
question.
The Marxist PFLP, on the other land, until 1981,
rejected negotiations and called for the "liberation" of
all of Palestine, not just the lands Israel occupied in
the 1967 war. It softened its position slightly in 1981
but essentially still regards a negotiated settlement
with skepticism. This radical stance has led to fric-
tions in Soviet-PFLP relations over the years. PFLP
leader George Habbash, however, has adopted a more
pro-Soviet stance since the late 1970s.
The DFLP and PFLP are-after Arafat's Fatah-the
two most influential PLO factions. Hawatmah and
Habbash have received wider international attention
than any other PLO leader except Arafat and have
increased their factions' influence since 1982. They
have managed to keep their organization independent
of foreign control, unlike many other PLO factions.
The DFLP and PFLP both maintain close ties with
Syria, however, and this link has greater influence on
their policies than their relations with Moscow.
The Soviets have said very little in public about the
Democratic Alliance, but it is evident from its compo-
sition and platform that they support it. Among its
goals are the rejection of the "capitulationist" Camp
David accords and the Reagan peace plan and the
strengthening of ties with the USSR and Syria
Figure 7. George Habbash,
head of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine
We believe Moscow does not view the leftists at this
point as a replacement for Arafat. A Soviet Foreign
Ministry official told a US Embassy officer last year
that neither Hawatmah nor Habash seemed ready to
step into Arafat's shoes. This assessment probably still
Nonetheless, the Kremlin probably sees the leftists'
membership in the PLO' as a corrective influence on
the "bourgeois" Arafat and as a base from which they
might someday dominate the organization. Soviet
support for the leftists seems designed to reunite the
PLO on a basis that curtails Arafat's ability to pursue
talks with Arab moderates.' Moscow also apparently
hopes that the leftists can help mend the rift between
Arafat and Assad.
As yet, however, little progress has been made toward
realizing these goals. The leftists were unable to
persuade Arafat to postpone the convening of the 17th
session of the Palestine National Council (PNC), the
PLO's parliament-in-exile, in Amman in November.
Both the Democratic and National Alliances boycott-
ed the session, and Democratic Alliance leaders made
quick trips to Moscow on the eve of the session. The
Soviet aim during these talks may have been as much
to prevent a falling out between Hawatmah and
Habbash as it was to avoid a split within the PLO.
' The PCP is the only Democratic Alliance faction that is not a
Not all the Democra is Alliance members share this limited goal.
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Table 2
Groups Within the Palestine Liberation Organization
Fatah loyalists Yasir Arafat Palestinian nationalism; main goal is to 6,000 to 8,000
secure Palestinian political demands;
largely nonideological.
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) Abd al-Rahim Ahmad Controlled by Iraq.
Democratic Alliance (neutral) a
Popular Front for the Liberation of George Habbash Revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist move- 1,500 to 2,000
Palestine (PFLP) ment committed to elimination of con-
servative monarchical Arab regimes as
well as Israel. Uses support for Arafat
as PLO leader to press him for more
radical policies.
Democratic Front for the Libera- Nayif Hawatmah Marxist-Leninist; most "ideological" 1,200 to 1,500
tion of Palestine (DFLP) group; generally supports Arafat and
mainline PLO policy.
Front for the Liberation of Taalat Yaqub Militant opposition to Israel. 300 to 500
Palestine (FLP)
Political: Nimr Muhammad Reject negotiated solution with Israel. 2,000 to 2,200
Salih (Abu Salih) and Sami
Abu Kuwayk Qadri
Military: Said Muragha (Abu
Musa)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Ahmad Jibril Lacks clearly defined political ideolo- 800 to 1,100
Palestine-General Command gy; emphasizes military struggle; fol-
(PFLP-GC) lows anti-Israel policy.
Militant advocate of armed struggle to 200 to 300
eliminate Israel.
Hawatmah announced upon his return from Moscow One potential byproduct of increased leftist influence
that he was not prepared to implement the DFLP- in the PLO might be pressure for greater use of terror
PFLP joint command that had been established in the by the Palestinians. The PFLP is the leftist faction
spring.F___1 that has been most involved in terrorism in the past, 25X1
The Soviets are frustrated by this continuing dissen-
although its use of that weapon has declined in recent
years. The Palestinian groups that are currently most
actively involved in terrorism are the PFLP-GC, the 25X1
Popular Struggle Front, and Abu Nidal's organiza-
tion. The Soviets maintain contacts with the PFLP- 25X1
GC, but it is primarily a Syrian-dominated group, as
are the PSF and, at the moment, Abu Nidal's faction.
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The Soviets have long been ambivalent about the
utility of terrorism for the Palestinian cause. They
distinguish between international terrorism and acts
against targets inside territories occupied by Israel in
1967. For instance, an article in Novoye Vremya in
March 1974 asserted that:
One must draw a clear-cut moral and political
dividing line between acts of international ter-
rorism and the use of force in the struggle for
national liberation, such as that waged by the
Palestinian patriots on territory unlawfully
occupied by Israel.
Moscow regards the latter as a legitimate form of
struggle,
the Soviets believe
some operations in the occupied territories are suicidal
and have questioned their worth.
Soviet officials have argued with the Palestinians over
the years, both publicly and privately, that acts of
international terrorism by Palestinians are counter-
relations with the PFLP in the late 1970s after it
sharply reduced its involvement in international ter-
rorism.
The USSR, in our view, probably calculates that
continued sporadic terrorist operations inside Israeli-
occupied territories are a useful means of pressure on
Tel Aviv. If this were the policy of a leftist-dominated
PLO, Moscow almost certainly would countenance it.
Indeed, Moscow might encourage the wide-scale use
of terrorism by the Palestinians inside Israel if it
concluded that the split between Arafat and the
leftists was permanent and that Arafat planned to
enter peace negotiations that excluded the USSR.
The Soviets might attempt to sabotage such a move
by Arafat by supporting some spectacular Palestinian
terrorist acts against Israeli targets. Moscow and
Damascus presumably would calculate that terrorist
tactics would undermine any US peace initiative that
they did not support.
The Soviets also probably realize, however, that a
return now to wide-scale use of terrorism would only
play into Israel's hands. It would provide pretexts for
Israeli strikes against Palestinian targets, just as Tel
Aviv used the shooting of the Israeli Ambassador in
London as justification for its invasion of Lebanon in
1982. Moscow might be even more concerned that
such terrorism could trigger an Israeli military move
against neighboring Arab states, particularly Syria.
primarily on terrorism.
A return to terror also would further split the PLO-
because Arafat's mainline Fatah opposes such a
move-and thus retard Moscow's efforts to achieve
Arab unity. The Soviet goal is leftist dominance of a
unified PLO, not a fractionated organization. The
Soviets may calculate that the influence of the DFLP,
backed by the PCP, neither of which has been heavily
involved in terrorism, will be sufficient to counter any
PFLP appeal for a return to a course that relies
In the past, despite problems within the PLO and
between the USSR and the Palestinians, Moscow was
able to maintain a close relationship with a powerful,
unified Palestinian organization. The difference today
is that the decimation of the PLO's military arm, the
rift within Fatah and the PLO, and the falling out
between Arafat and Assad have all gone further than
before and may be approaching a point of no return.
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The Jordanian Connection
The Soviets have taken a purposefully ambiguous
stance on the issue of links between Jordan and a new
Palestinian state. Their public comments suggest
they oppose the idea of a confederation but are
unwilling to say so openly for fear of damaging
relations with Arafat and Hussein.
Back in 1974, when Soviet ties to both were not as
extensive, Moscow was more outspoken. The editor-
in-chief of Izvestiya wrote an article criticizing con-
federation as an attempt to "extinguish the revolu-
tionary spirit of the Palestinians. " By 1979 the
Soviets were taking the line that they viewed a
Jordanian-PLO connection with "understanding --a
polite form of nonsupport. Andropov used the same
term in his January 1983 talks with Arafat in
Moscow. A month later, the CPSU's top Middle
Eastern specialist, Karen Brutents, recited Androp-
ov's phraseology to a Lebanese newspaper but added
that the Soviets "understand" the confederation idea
only on the basis that Jordan and the PLO proceed
with 'full awareness and caution, " safeguarding the
right of the Palestinians to establish their own state.
Moscow's Arab-Israeli peace proposal of 29 July
1984 acknowledged the right of the Palestinians to
form a confederation but did not specify with whom
and emphasized that this `possibility" could be
considered only after a Palestinian state is formed.
Moscow's skepticism about a Jordanian-Palestinian
confederation stems from several factors. First, the
Syrians oppose the scheme, fearing it would facilitate
peace negotiations with Israel that exclude Syria.
Figure 8. Jordan's King Hussein greets Arafat in October 1984,
shortly before convening of the Palestine National Council in
Second, the Soviets have no wish to see the PLO co-
opted by Jordan, which is linked historically, finan-
cially, militarily, and ideologically to the conserva-
live Arab regimes and the United States.
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Finally, the Soviets evidently fear that a confedera- 25X1
Lion would breathe life into the Reagan plan, which
callsfor Jordan to represent the Palestinians at peace
talks with Israel. In January 1984, for example,
Pravda noted that candidate Politburo member Boris 25X1
Ponomarev and Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumb-
latt emphasized during their talks in Moscow the
importance of stopping "imperialist intrigues" aimed
at imposing on the PLO "capitulationist solutions
similar to the anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian 'Reagan
plan.-.'Moscow's greatest objection to the plan is its
exclusion of a Soviet role.F__~ 25X1
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Moreover, the Soviets have become even more de-
pendent upon Syria as their primary ally and avenue
of influence in the Middle East and thus have less
room for maneuver. The need to protect this relation-
ship after the damage it suffered during the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon accounts, in large part, for the
difference between Moscow's publicly displayed irri-
tation with Syrian moves against the PLO in 1976
and its unwillingness to take the same step in 1983-84.
The Palestinian issue is likely to remain the central
one in the Middle East, regardless of who wins the
power struggle within the PLO, and the Soviets will
continue championing the cause. But the PLO's value
as a vehicle for advancing Soviet interests in the
region probably will remain much diminished, espe-
cially if the organization fragments. The PLO's inter-
nal rifts and feud with Syria put the attainment of the
Arab unity the Soviets always place so much empha-
sis on even further away. It will be difficult for the
Soviets to achieve one of their primary goals in the
Middle East-a major role in an Arab-Israeli peace
conference-without close ties to a strong PLO that
cooperates with Syria.
A long-term Soviet aim remains leftist control of the
PLO. The Soviets have long had misgivings about
Arafat's close ties with conservative Arab govern-
ments and his attempts to establish a dialogue with
the United States. Being realists, however, they ap-
parently still believe he is the best available choice to
head the PLO because he is the only Palestinian
leader on the scene today with the ability to appeal to
a wide spectrum of Palestinian views and the interna-
tional standing to represent the PLO effectively and
keep it independent of Damascus. Moscow is likely to
continue its behind-the-scenes efforts to reconcile the
PLO's factions but on a basis that gives the leftists a
greater say in policymaking and curtails Arafat's
ability to pursue solutions to the Palestinian question
that exclude the USSR or favor the United States.
The Soviets are also likely to continue discreetly
urging a rapprochement between Arafat and Assad.
They probably are not sanguine about the prospects of
this occurring, however, and they have shown there
are clear limits on their willingness to anger Assad in
order to achieve it. Maintaining their position in Syria
have over the last two and a half years
will continue to take precedence over the Soviets'
support for the PLO. But the Soviets probably will
press Damascus a bit harder on the issue than they
A formal breakup of the PLO would be one of the
holding of the PNC in Amman in November has
made such a split unavoidable. Moscow would worry
that Arafat might take his wing and strike a deal with
Jordan, allowing the Palestinians to be represented at
US-sponsored peace talks that exclude the USSR. To
prevent such a development, the Soviets probably
would attempt to maintain their ties with Arafat, even
if this meant further tensions with Damascus, which
would be likely to field its own PLO. At the same
time, Moscow probably would step up efforts to
strengthen the Palestinian leftists in the hopes that
the split would provide an opportunity to increase
their influence among Palestinians.
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