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• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of top Sectet
Intelligence --
for Armaments
The Role of the Soviet
Deputy Minister of Defense
Top Seer-et
SOY 84-1
April 1984
copy 394
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Intelligence
Directorate of Top Secret
for Armaments
The Role of the Soviet
Deputy Minister of Defense
This paper was written b Office
of Soviet Analysis, with contributions b
SOYA. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Defense Industries
Division, S O Y _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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SOV 84-10049CX
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Summary
Information available
as of I March 1984
was used in this report.
for Armaments
The Role of the Soviet
Deputy Minister of Defense
since 1978.
The Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments is the central authority in
the Soviet Ministry of Defense (MOD) for supplying the Soviet Armed
Forces and security troops with armaments and related equipment. He
coordinates the planning, development, production, testing, supply, storage,
and repair of all armaments and related equipment deployed with Soviet
troops. To carry out this mission, the Deputy Minister oversees a number
of main and central armaments directorates, each concerned with a
different type of weapon system or component. He also works with the
deputy commanders in chief for armaments of the branches of service who
oversee the armaments personnel in the field. The current Deputy Minister
of Defense for Armaments is Army Gen. Vitaliy Shabanov, a former
radioelectronics industry expert who has been Deputy Minister of Defense
control negotiations.
As one of the best informed persons on military equipment in the USSR,
the armaments chief is an important adviser on arms control issues. His of-
fice is represented at arms control negotiations and is probably responsible
for keeping chief Soviet arms control decision makers aware of technical is-
sues involved. As, the main procurement coordinator for Soviet arms and
equipment, the armaments chief is closely tied to both military and
industrial interests and is probably a conservative force in major arms
The deputy minister is also key in the Soviet bureaucracy for the
acquisition of weapons-related technology from abroad. He or his represen-
tatives help assess the value of the various foreign weapon designs or
production technologies collected and make recommendations on their
incorporation into Soviet designs or production processes. Other activities
in which the armaments chief is involved include coordination of weapons
acquisition in the Warsaw Pact alliance and arrangement of foreign sales.
Centralizing the authority and responsibility for armaments in one individ-
ual provides a number of advantages to the Soviets. As the focal point in
Soviet arms procurement, the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments
helps the Minister of Defense to:
? Conserve scarce resources through coordination of weapons development
programs.
? Coordinate military doctrine and armaments technology.
iii Top Secret
SOV 84-I0049CX
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? Standardize weapons and equipment across branches of services and
throughout the Warsaw Pact.
? Raise-through training and propaganda-the level of technical knowl-
edge and, thus, combat readiness in the Armed Forces.
? Assess the potential military threat to the USSR posed by new and
developing foreign weapon systems.
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Individual Weapon Systems
7
Involvement in the National Planning Process
8
Monitoring Weapons Procurement
9
Oversight and Tasking of Basic Research
9
Development, Production, and Testing
9
Storage, Repair, and Modernization
10
Ancillary Functions
12
Arms Control Inputs
12
Foreign Sales
13
Technology Transfer
13
Wartime Responsibilities
14
Appendix
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The Role of the Soviet
Deputy Minister of Defense
for ArmamentsF - - - I
Marshal Kulikov wrote in 1975 that "people and
armaments' are the two main components of the
Armed Forces." As the primary representative of the
Minister of Defense (MOD) in the field of armaments,
the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments coor-
dinates all aspects of the planning, procurement,
supply, and repair of armaments and related equip-
ment of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Information on the activities of the office of the
Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments is diffi-
cult to obtain. Much of the analysis contained in this
report, therefore, has been derived by piecing together
occasional references in open source materials and
combining these with insights obtained from classified
data. Analogies to similar organizations, such as the
MOD Rear Services or Warsaw Pact armaments
procurement structures, have also played a key role in
this analysis
The position of the deputy minister of defense for
armaments dates back to 18 November 1929, when
leronim P. Uborevich was appointed the first Chief of
Weapons of the Red Army (Raboche-Krest'yanskaya
Krasnaya Armiya, or RKKA). At that time, the
Soviets were reestablishing the Armed Forces and
were planning the production of military equipment
under the First Five-Year Plan. A June 1982 article
in the Soviet Military Historical Journal described
the Red Army chief of weapons as having responsibil-
ity and leadership over all questions of artillery,
chemical warfare, and chemical support. He super-
vised all weapons matters for the Air Forces and the
motorized-mechanized troops and performed inspec-
tor functions for the Navy. The new chief of weapons
was also in charge of the central artillery, chemical,
and military-technical directorates as well as the
Military Scientific Research Committee of the Revo-
lutionary Military Council (Revvoyensovet).2
In the middle and late 1930s, increasing demands
were placed upon Soviet weapons acquisition as the
civil war began in Spain and as German military
power grew. Ostensibly in search of greater effective-
ness (although more likely because of Stalin's plan to
purge his officer corps), a major reorganization of the
Soviet Armed Forces took place in April 1936. The
position of chief of weapons (held since 1931 by
Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy) was abolished
and the functions assigned to other Red Army compo-
nents, such as the newly created General Staff.
During World War II the provision of armaments to
the front temporarily became a task of the Rear
Services.
After the war, the Soviets reorganized their military
structure to take account of the lessons learned in
combat. To monitor the reconstruction of the defense
industrial base and to oversee the creation of such
bases in Eastern Europe, the post of deputy minister
of defense for armaments was recreated in 1948 and
assigned to Marshal of Artillery Nikolay D. Yakov-
lev, previously head of the Main Artillery Directorate
(Glavnoye Artilleriskoye Upravleniye, or GAU).3 So-
viet accounts of World War II indicate that Yakov-
lev's ability to procure and supply artillery equipment
and ammunition had impressed both Stalin and Mar-
shal Zhukov during and after the war.
The early 1950s marked the beginning of a tremen-
dous drive in Soviet science and technology. Mitrofan
1. Nedelin, head of GAU during 1948-50, became
' According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, the term "arma-
ments " (vooruzheniye) includes weapons and related equipment of
all types as well as the means of their introduction, establishment,
Soviet Ministry of Defense Collegium.
ment agencies, see appendix.
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Deputy War Minister for Armaments in 1952. Nede-
lin played a leading role in the development of nuclear
and rocket technologies. Shortly after Stalin's death
in March 1953 (while Soviet strategic doctrine was in
flux), Nedelin was transferred to a command position
in artillery; but in 1955, as Khrushchev began to
consolidate power, Nedelin once again became Depu-
ty Minister of Defense for Armaments. After the
creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) in
1959, Nedelin served concurrently as SRF Com-
mander in Chief (CinC). Nedelin's armaments posi-
tion appears to have been temporarily left vacant after
In addition to the armaments post, there also has
existed at times the position of Deputy Minister of
Defense for Radioelectronics. The first public identifi-
cation of this position was the appointment of Admi-
ral Engineer Aksel' I. Berg in September 1953. We do
not know the exact functions of this position, but the
Soviet Military Encyclopedia credits Berg with
"great service in outfitting ships of the Soviet Navy
with the latest radio apparatus and in the develop-
ment of radar equipment for the USSR." Berg was
replaced in 1956 by Col. Gen. A. V. Gerasimov. F_
In 1964 the position of Deputy Minister of Defense
for Radioelectronics was abolished. Gerasimov be-
came Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Arma-
ments and apparently assumed both radioelectronics
and armaments responsibilities. At this point it ap-
pears that all central direction in the field of
armaments was absorbed into the General Staff and
that procurement for the individual service branches
may have been accomplished by organizations direct-
ly subordinate to the branches themselves
Col. Gen. (later Marshal of Signal Troops) Nikolay N.
Alekseyev was named Deputy Minister of Defense for
Armaments in 1970. During World War II he had
been chief of a department of the Main Artillery
Directorate, and he served as chief of the Scientific
Technical Committee of the General Staff from 1960
to 1970. His appointment reestablished the position of
armaments chief and seems to have marked a major
reorganization of the defense procurement apparatus.
At this point, responsibility for the coordinating *of
weapons procurement appears to have been largely
removed from the services and again centralized at
the MOD level.4
The current Deputy Minister of Defense for Arma-
ments, Army Gen. Vitaliy M. Shabanov, was former-
ly a Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry. Ustinov's
choice of a radioelectronics industry expert probably
reflects the need to fill this position with someone
knowledgeable in the bureaucratic politics and indus-
trial processes of defense production. Shabanov's ap-
pointment probably also illustrates the increasing
importance of radioelectronics in modern Soviet
weaponry. Furthermore, Shabanov's election to full
membership on the CPSU Central Committee in June
1983, an honor not accorded his predecessor, is proba-
bly an indication of the growing perception on the
part of the Soviet leadership of the need for better
coordination of defense acquisition. His election to the
Central Committee is part of a policy commenced
under Brezhnev of granting political prestige to those
involved in weapons production
As Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments, Sha-
banov serves as a member of the MOD collegium, a
consultative body composed of the first deputy and
deputy defense ministers that advises the Minister of
Defense. As the focal point for all weapons procure-
ments matters, Shabanov also works frequently with 25X1
' Procurement directorates previously subordinate to the General
Staff (such as the 4th, 5th, and 12th Main Directorates) were
placed directly under Alekseyev. It is unclear whether armaments
directorates subordinate to the services were also placed immediate-
ly under the supervision of the Deputy Minister. Nevertheless,
responsibility for coordinating the work of all the armaments
directorates was entrusted to him at that time. For further discus-
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leronim Petrovich Uborevich. Chief of Aleksandr Ivanovich Berg. Deputy
Armaments of the Workers and Peas- Minister of Defensefor Radioelectron-
ants Red Army, 1929-31 ics, 1953-56
Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy. Anton Vladimovich Gerasimov. Deputy
Chief of Armaments of the Workers .I Minister of Defense for Radioelectron-
and Peasants Red Army, 1931-36 ics, 1957-64, then 1st Deputy Chief of
the General Staff for Armaments,
1964-70
Nikolay Dmitriyevich Yakovlev. Depu- Nikolay Nikolayevich Alekseyev. Dep-
ty Minister of Defense for Armaments, uty Minister of Defense for Arma-
7~ "~%
ments, 1970-80
1948 52
Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin. Deputy
Minister of Defense for Armaments,
1952-53,1955-60
Vitaliy Mikhaylovich Shabanov. Dep-
uty Minister of Defense for Arma-
ments, 1980-present
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Vitally Shabanov came to his post without a career
military background and is the only Deputy Minister
of Defense for Armaments not appointed to his
position directly from another military slot. Sha-
banov served in World War II, and later he worked in
the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force as a
tester of aviation equipment. From 1949 to 1974 he
held various positions in the radio industry, including
that of general director of a scientific production
association (1972-74). In 1974 Shabanov became
the ministers and representatives of the defense indus-
tries, officials of the Military-Industrial Commission
(VPK), and high-level officials of the State Committee
for Foreign Economi istance (GKES)
Shabanov and his staff are based in Moscow, where
they coordinate an extensive apparatus for weapons
procurement. This centralized apparatus includes sev-
eral MOD-level organizations as well as a large
number of armaments supply depots, repair facilities,
and other MOD enterprises designated to provide
technical and armaments support to the branches of
the armed forces.
Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry. The first
identification of his MOD appointment came in an
article published on 19 September 1978 in Krasnaya
Zvezda, which identified him as a deputy minister of
defense.
Shabanov's exact responsibilities at the time of his
appointment are unclear, because Alekseyev was still
officially the deputy for armaments. Some Western
analysts hypothesized, on the basis of Shabanov's
background, that he was filling the reestablished role
of Deputy Minister of Defense for Radioelectronics.
It was not until after Alekseyev's death in 1980 that
Shabanov was identified for the first time as Deputy
Minister of Defensefor Armaments. A Soviet SALT
delegate noted in 1981 that Shabanov had been
promoted to army general at the time of his MOD
appointment and said that Shabanov was then sitting
in two deputy minister chairs, one was Alekseyev's
old post related to armaments and the other was his
earlier deputy job, which, among other things, includ-
ed space systems. It is possible, however, that Sha-
banov and Alekseyev were sharing the same position,
because of increased demands on the position-given
the invasion of Afghanistan-and Alekseyev's poor
health. This is supported by the fact that no other
successor to Alekseyev has been identified since his
death.
The armaments chief controls a number of MOD-
level main and central armaments directorates 5 that
monitor research and development (R&D), produc-
tion, storage, supply, and repair of specific types of
are counterparts tote central-level weapons procurement organi-
zations within some of the branches of service as well. These
counterparts include the 5th Directorates of the Navy and the Air
Forces and the Mine/Torpedo Directorate and Rocket/Artillery
Directorates of the Navy. With the exception of the Naval
Mine/Torpedo Directorate, whose product is applicable only to the
Navy, these service-level counterparts probably work with the
MOD-level main and central directorates to procure equipment
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equipment for the armed forces. (For further informa-
tion on the different directorates, see appendix.) A
deputy to the armaments chief heads a Scientific
Technical Committee (NTK), which probably consists
of highly trained engineer-officers and leading acade-
micians from universities and institutes. This council
advises the Deputy Minister on weapons-related tech-
nical problems. We believe that the armaments chief
also maintains a staff, which prepares documents,
calls meetings, and otherwise acts as a permanent
secretariat to the chief and the NTK.
Procurement of military equipment is probably coor-
dinated with the branches of service through the
deputy commander in chief for armaments (the exact
title varies) of each branch. The deputy CinC for
armaments monitors all research and production ac-
tivity for his service and serves as an adviser to the
CinC on technical matters.
Storage, maintenance, and servicing of weapons in the
field are also coordinated with the deputy CinCs of
each branch of service. In the Air Forces and the Air
Defense Forces, field management is carried out by a
separate deputy CinC, while in the Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF), the Ground Forces, and the Navy the
same deputy may be responsible for overseeing both
procurement and field management. These deputy
CinCs, while immediately subordinate to their respec-
tive CinCs, appear to receive technical direction from
the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments.
-Planning
Individual Weapon Systems. Weapons planning in
the Soviet Armed Forces is a complex process involv-
ing representatives from organizations subordinate to
Shabanov, the General Staff, the five branches of
service, and the Rear Services.
concept is considered feasible, the main or central
armaments directorate will probably draft formal
technical requirements. These requirements specify
such factors as size constraints, weight or displace-
ment, propulsion characteristics, necessary special
new weapon concepts may evolve within the
military, within industrial institutes, or elsewhere in
the economy. Concepts in which interest has been
indicated either by MOD officials, the Politburo, or
its advisory body for national security affairs, the
Defense Council, are probably reviewed for technical
feasibility by the main or central armaments director-
ate responsible for the particular type of equipment.
materials, and logistic support.
At the same time, the idea is probably reviewed by the
Main Staff of the branch of the service for which the
weapon is intended. If the Main Staff agrees that the
proposed system meets operational needs, it will com-
pose tactical requirements for the system and pass
if the
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tactical
requirements include factors such as speed, endur-
ance, durability, intended types of operations and
theaters, manning levels, and, for delivery systems,
the types of weapons and electronics systems to be
included in the proposed system.
Formulation of the final weapon requirements, known
as the Tactical-Technical Requirements (taktiko-
tekhnicheskoye trebovaniye or TTT), is probably
completed by the main or central directorate and
submitted back through the service Main Staff and up
to the deputy CinC for armaments of the service. He
then probably passes the requirements to the service
CinC for approval.
Checking for Standardization and Efficiency. At the
same time that the requirements are receiving final
approval by the service, they are probably passed to
Shabanov. He and his staff check to ensure that
weapon and component requirements have been
standardized to the greatest extent possible.
Standardization facilitates weapon design, produc-
tion, and servicing, and, according to Chief of the
Rear Services S. K. Kurkotkin, "constitutes one of the
principal directions taken to improve the organization
of production and the military goods supply systems;
to increase efficiency of economic support of the
troops; and, consequently, Armed Forces combat
readiness as well." Shabanov's long experience in
defense industry management most likely helps him in
this task
Shabanov's office probably also checks to make cer-
tain that all possible economies (that would not affect
product quality) have been included. Shabanov's man-
date to keep costs down gives him a somewhat unique
role in a sector sometimes considered to have a blank
check for its weapons wish lists. The fully approved
proposal is probably then submitted through the
General Staff for incorporation into the Five-Year
Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces, the
military portion of the national five-year plan (see
section on national planning below)
Soviet students of military science frequently make
the claim that technology drives doctrine-that the
pressing advance of science and technology opens
doors to the discovery of new battlefield approaches.
In the course of acquisition planning, the Deputy'
Minister of Defense for Armaments is quite likely an
active consultant to those on the General Staff who
formulate military doctrine.
Work With the VPK. After the Ministry of Defense
has approved the weapons requirement, it is formally
submitted to the Military-Industrial Commission
VPK .6
Involvement in the National Planning Process. In
addition to coordinating the planning of individual
weapon systems, the deputy minister of defense for
armaments is a central figure in the national defense
planning process. Although specific information on
Shabanov's participation in this process is scarce,
analogy to the Polish system suggests that he coordi-
nates the formulation of those portions of the Soviet
one-year, five-year, and long-range defense plans that
deal with weapons.
the armaments planning process
is initiated by the Deputy Minister of Defense for
Armaments and the General Staff, who solicit propos-
als from the armaments directorates and the military
6 The VPK is a coordinating agency of the Council of Ministers,
responsible for monitoring development of new systems and for
ensuring the smooth functioning of defense industry R&D and
production programs. To ensure consistency with overall state plans
and to guarantee that sufficient scientific and technological re-
sources are applied to development efforts, the VPK coordinates its
activities with the State Planning Committee.
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commands regarding current weapons requirements
and future requirements for R&D and capital invest-
ment. Similar plans are generated by other military
components as well, such as the Rear Services and the
Engineering Troops
The task of the Deputy Minister of Defense for
Armaments is to prepare, on the basis of policy
guidance that originates with the Soviet Defense
Council, an integrated requirements plan for the
weapons and combat equipment needs of the entire
Directorate. In the Polish case, two representatives
from the equivalent of the office of the Deputy
Minister of Defense for Armaments are assigned to
the directorate. Their participation in this organiza-
tion allows them to press the case for devoting
increased proportions of the military budget toward
Soviet military.'
in Poland this preliminary plan of requirements must
describe in detail every weapon and type of equip-
ment. Timetables and financial estimates must be
included. The plan deals with weapon supply, R&D,
industrial expansion, and mobilization reserves. For-
mulation of this plan is coordinated with the mobiliza-
tion plan, which is prepared by the General Staff.
Every requirement plan, short or long range, has one
or more variation, with a justification for each.
After the compiled requirements plan has been re-
viewed by the Deputy Minister of Defense for Arma-
ments and approved by the General Staff, it is passed
to Gosplan. On the basis of our knowledge of the
Polish planning process, we believe that Gosplan
revises the plan according to economic feasibilities
and limitations and then submits it to the VPK for
consideration.' The VPK-approved version is then
returned to the Deputy Minister of Defense for
Armaments and the General Staff, who, after review-
ing it once more, submit it for signature to the
Minister of Defense. The signed plan proposal is then
forwarded to the Defense Council for approval.
Monitoring Weapons Procurement
Oversight and Tasking of Basic Research. The Depu-
ty Minister of Defense for Armaments uses the
Section on Applied Problems of the USSR Academy
of Sciences to monitor basic and applied scientific
research performed by Academy institutes.
We believe that the primary function of the Section
on Applied Problems is to screen and evaluate Acade-
my of Science research proposals for possible military
sponsorship and to task promising basic scientific
Formulation of the military budget proposal is accom-
plished by the Central Finance Directorate, which is
attached to the General Staff. The main and central
armaments directorates draft budget proposals for
armaments and submit them to the Central Finance
' During the 1960s the armaments requirements plan was prepared
by the General Staff. When Alekseyev was transferred from his
position as chief of the General Staff Scientific Technical Commit-
tee to become Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments in 1970,
he appears to have taken this planning function with him.
' When the requirements plan is revised and accepted by Gosplan, it
becomes a formal "supply plan." It is unclear, however, whether
Gosplan reviews the entire plan or rather just a list of the resources
Development, Production, and Testing. The main and
central armaments directorates subordinate to the
MOD armaments chief are the central customer-
agents in the weapons acquisition process (see appen-
dix). As the bridge between the Ministry of Defense
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and the defense industries, the main and central
directorates follow the procurement process from the
generation of requirements to the delivery and storage
of weapons for the troops in the field. Specifically, the
directorates:
e Issue the tactical-technical requirements for
weapons.
o Monitor design and engineering.
o Test prototypes.
c Negotiate prices and contracts and handle payment.
e Monitor quality during series production.
u Operate ranges and facilities for testing equipment.
c Accept produced items on behalf of the services.
Store and maintain finished weapons and equipment
in specially designated depots throughout the
country.
Supervise the repair and modification of armaments
and equipment in special military repair plants.'
Much of this work is accomplished by means of
military representatives assigned to institutes, design
bureaus, and production, test, and repair facilities
throughout the Soviet Union. The military representa-
tives communicate military needs to the managers at
plants and research facilities while keeping the MOD
informed about technological developments with mili-
tary application, and of industrial capabilities and
shortcomings.1?
evidence shows that, when Nedelin was Deputy Min-
ister of Defense for Armaments, he participated ac-
tively in the oversight of defense industries. In his
biography of Nedelin, SRF CinC Chief Marshal of
Artillery Tolubko says that the late deputy minister
"systematically became involved in the creative activi-
ty of the design offices and the manufacturing
plants," and that he "met regularly and worked
' This may not be the case for all types of equipment. In the Air
Force, for instance, repair plants appear to be the responsibility of
the engineering aviation service,
jointly with the scientists, designers, engineers, test
officers, and many other people" who were involved in
the procurement and production of nuclear weapons.
Storage, Repair, and Modernization. Personnel of the
main and central armaments directorates continue to
have some responsibility for military equipment even
after it has been delivered to the field.
once armaments andequtp
ment are delivered, they are stored by the representa-
tives of the main and central directorates in special
depots until distributed to the units. Careful account-
ing is kept on the quantity and condition of equipment
in storage.
After the equipment has been released from the
depots to the troops, it becomes the responsibility of
the main and central directorates when it requires
capital repair." Armaments and equipment requiring
capital repair are returned to repair plants or mobile
repair bases where the work is monitored by military
representatives of the MOD.
A further key responsibility of the main and central
armaments directorates is the upgrading of weapons
and equipment, which, according to Soviet military
writings, improves their performance capabilities, ex-
tends their life, and allows standardization for routine
maintenance. Upgrading usually appears to be under-
taken when the equipment has been submitted for
capital repairs. Smaller improvements may be accom-
plished during routine maintenance under the supervi-
sion of main or central directorate personnel.
Armaments in the Field. Technical supervision of the
storage, maintenance, and servicing of Soviet arma-
ments in the field appears to extend organizationally
" The Soviets divide repair into three categories: light, medium, and
capital. Light repair, which includes scheduled maintenance and
simple fixes, is performed at the company, battalion, and regimen-
tal (or equivalent) level. Medium repair, which includes the replace-
ment of two or more major assemblies, is performed at the division
or army level. Capital repair, the most serious, involves complete
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from the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments
down through deputy CinCs in the services to at least
regimental level in the ground armies. At each eche-
lon in the ground armies, there is a deputy command-
er for armaments who controls the distribution, main-
tenance, and repair of armament and equipment, as
well as a deputy commander for technical affairs who
performs the same functions for armored and other
vehicles. In the Navy there are deputies for arma-
ments and repair at the fleet, flotilla, and squadron
levels. The Air Forces have deputy commanders for
the engineering aviation service at the divisional air
forces and air armies echelons. We believe that each
deputy is immediately subordinate to his commander
but is also subordinate in substantive matters up the
armaments management ladder. (This structure can
best be compared to the US concept of "technical
channels.") In addition, the armaments organizations
operate within a cooperative network with the rear
services and other organizations at each echelon.F_
According to the Internal Service Regulations of the
USSR Armed Forces, the deputy for armaments
maintains all the records on parts and equipment,
investigates equipment malfunctions, and monitors
the condition and status of weapons and equipment.
In addition, he coordinates actions with subordinate
units, implements the commander's orders and poli-
cies, and advises the commander on all matters
pertaining to the status and combat readiness of the
unit's equipment. During war the deputy for arma-
ments keeps current with the needs of the units in the
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field and supervises the supply of new equipment and
the collection and limited repair of damaged equip-
ment. The deputy commander for technical affairs
has the same responsibilities with regard to armored
and other vehicles.
The deputy commander for armaments and the depu-
ty commander for technical affairs supervise person-
nel belonging to special technical services across the
branches of the Armed Forces and keep them in a
state of readiness. According to the Soviet Military
Encyclopedia, a service (sluzhba) is a system of estab-
lished organs of direction and military formations
intended for the supply and servicing of the Armed
Forces according to their specialties. Services respon-
sible for the supply and servicing of armaments
include the Armored Vehicle Service, the Engineering
Aviation Service, the Missile/Artillery Armament
Service, the Auto-Tractor Service, and others. At
each echelon, the deputy for armaments and the
deputy for technical affairs have deputies who are
chiefs of the applicable services
The Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments
occasionally becomes directly involved with arma-
ments in the field through inspection tours of military
The Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments has
also been a strong advocate of increasing the technical
skills of the units in the field. Both Shabanov and his
predecessor Alekseyev have authored several articles
in military journals on the need for better, more
thoroughly trained troops because of the higher tech-
nological levels of the equipment being introducedF_
Innovation by the troops in the field is also a concern
of the armaments chief. An August 1978 article by
Alekseyev in Equipment and Armaments claims that
"in the first two years of the 10th Five-Year Plan
alone, more than 2 million efficiency proposals by
young innovators have been utilized in the national
economy, and a cost benefit of 2.4 billion rubles '2 has
been obtained from the introduction of these propos-
als." For this reason the Deputy Minister of Defense
for Armaments works closely with the MOD Depart-
ment of Inventions to arrange innovation competitions
and expositions such as the annual Central Exposition
of Scientific and Technical Creativity of the Young.
Ancillary Functions
Arms Control Inputs. The armaments chief and his
staff are key technical advisers to Soviet policymakers
on arms control matters. When the first Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in 1969,.Col.
Gen. Alekseyev, then chief of the Scientific Technical
Committee of the General Staff, participated as a
delegate. He continued through fall 1970, when he
was appointed Deputy Minister for Armaments. At
that time Lt. Gen. Konstantin A. Trusov, Alekseyev's
deputy who had followed Alekseyev from the General
Staff to his new position, replaced him at the talks.
One Soviet delegate to the talks commented that
Alekseyev continued to participate in the talks from
Moscow "only indirectly," but another Soviet dele-
gate noted that supervision of the negotiations for
limitations on antisatellite weapons was one of Sha-
banov's responsibilities.
A Western observer at the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks in Geneva said that he believed that the last
Soviet delegation before the talks broke off in Decem-
ber 1983 contained a representative from Shabanov's
office. Vyacheslav P. Mironov, identified only as a
former missile testing and telemetry expert, was
probably this representative. It is logical that a Soviet
arms control delegation would contain a representa-
tive from Shabanov's office, since this office is a
repository for all technical data regarding Soviet
Coordination of Warsaw Pact Armaments. The Soviet
Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments plays a
role in Warsaw Pact weapons acquisition through the
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Pact weapons planning organization, the Technical
Committee. Headed by a Deputy CinC of the War-
saw Pact, Soviet Col. Gen. Ivan A. Fabrikov, the
Technical Committee conducts studies on future tech-
nical developments in the Warsaw Pact armies and
coordinates within the framework of the Warsaw Pact
the scientific research and development activities nec-
essary for equipping the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
nations with modern, standardized weaponry. F_~
A representative of Shabanov's office serves on the
Scientific Technical Council, which is subordinate to
the Technical Committee. The Council's task is to
study the most important recommendations prepared
by the Technical Committee. The Council is com-
posed of the deputy ministers for armaments and
deputy chiefs of the general staffs for armaments or
chairmen of the scientific technical councils of the
ministries of defense or the general staffs of the
Warsaw Pact states.
Technical Committee chief Fabrikov and CinC of the
Combined Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet
Union Kulikov, maintain a continuing liaison with
Shabanov and the deputies for armaments to the
Ministers of Defense of the member states.
Foreign Sales. In addition to his responsibilities for
domestic and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact weapons ac-
quisition, the.Deputy Minister of Defense for Arma-
ments monitors Soviet procurement of armaments and
related equipment for foreign sales as well. He also
appears to participate in the negotiation of sales of
turnkey i ilitary production facilities and technologies
to other countries, although this may be in an advisory
capacity.
an institute
was created in the Main Shipbuilding Directorate, for
which the. armaments chief has responsibility, which
designed and provided actual assistance in the con-
struction of foreign shipyards, particularly in socialist-
allied countries such as Cuba. It is likely, therefore,
that -Shabanov is actively involved in all discussions
relating to the transfer of production capabilities, as
well as with problems in domestic production intended
for home use.
Technology Transfer. Acquisition of foreign technol-
ogy frequently allows the Soviets to shorten leadtimes
in the development of new systems, to cut costs by
avoiding expensive mistakes, and to develop some
systems that might otherwise be out of reach of Soviet
industry. Despite these advantages, however, the ac-
quisition of foreign technology (legally or illegally) is
an expensive and time-consuming task. Before the
decision is made to devote manpower and other
resources toward acquisition, the requirement for a
particular item or a set of plans from abroad is
carefully scrutinized.
The Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments
participates in the technology transfer decisionmaking
process through his membership on the Interagency
Commission on Intelligence Information. This Com-
mission was created by an order of the VPK in 1979.
Its mission is to organize the study and utilization of
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Western technology acquisitions
Participation of the armaments chief and his repre-
sentatives on this commission affords the MOD an-
other way to influence future development of defense
capabilities. They are able to review new types of
foreign production processes for possible acquisition
for defense industry facilities. They are also able to
influence the channeling of acquired weapons or
technologies to industrial institutes or institutes of the
main and central armaments directorates, where the
advanced materials and technologies used in these
arms can be studied by industrial or military experts.
Wartime Responsibilities. In the event of general
war, the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments
would be responsible for ensuring the continuous flow
of armaments and equipment to the fronts at a greatly
increased tempo. Military representatives of the
MOD main and central directorates are responsible
during peacetime for ensuring that sufficient reserves
of production materials are maintained at all plants
that contribute to the defense effort. They also make
sure that contingency plans for wartime production
are available. Should war break out, the main and
central directorates would help direct any planned
relocation of industries and provide instructions for
new modes of production.
In addition to overseeing the work of the main and
central directorates during wartime mobilization, the
Deputy Minister of Defense would also serve as a
liaison to the Main Organization-Mobilization Direc-
torate and the Main Operations Directorate of the
General Staff, providing status reports on armaments
supplies and performance from the deputy command-
ers for armaments in the field.
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Appendix
The Main and Central
Armaments Directorates
History
The Soviet weapons procurement apparatus has its
roots in Czarist military organization. It has evolved
over time to reflect the changing armaments require-
ments of the Soviet Armed Forces and the advancing
technologies available for weapons design.
The Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) was a direct
successor to its Czarist counterpart and existed until
1953. Occupied mainly at first with guns and artil-
lery, the scope of GAU's work expanded over time to
include all antiaircraft weaponry, radar, and probably
electronics. During World War II, GAU monitored
the production of ammunition as well.
Sometime after the creation of the National Air
Defense Forces (PVO) as an official separate service
in 1948, a separate procurement agency was created
for it. This organization, the 4th Main Directorate of
the Ministry of Defense, assumed responsibility for
monitoring the production of tactical and strategic air
defense equipment.
The appearance of new forms of weaponry at the
beginning of the 1950s made it necessary to create
new organizations better suited for equipping the
Armed Forces. In the mid-1950s, GAU was renamed
GRAU (Main Rocket/Artillery Directorate) to reflect
its growing responsibility for providing short-range
missiles for the Soviet Ground Forces.
Marshal of Artillery Pavel Nikolayevich Kule-
shov. Chief the Main Rocket and Artillery
Directorate.
1929 under the new Deputy People's Commissar of 25X1
Defense for Armaments. Figure 2 shows how this
directorate evolved into today's Central Auto-Tractor
Directorate (TsAVTU) and Main Armor. Directorate
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Tanks and other military vehicles were originally the
responsibility of the Mechanization-Mobilization Di-
rectorate of the Red Army, established in November
The current naval vessel procurement agency, the
Main Shipbuilding Directorate (GUK), is the direct
successor to the Czarist Main Directorate of Ship-
building and Supply (GUKiS). The evolution of arma-
ments procurement organizations within the Navy is
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Figure 2
Evolution of a Soviet Armaments Directorate
Mechanization-
Mobilization
Directorate
Motor Vehicle and
Armor Directorate
Motor Armored
Material Directorate
Main Motor Vehicle
Directorate
Automotive
Directorate
Main Auto-Tractor
Directorate
Central Auto-Tractor
Directorate
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Main Directorate for
Armored Equipment
Main Armor
Directoratea
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not known, but probably closely reflects the evolution
of the main and central directorates responsible for
similar equipment. Thus, for example, the Navy's
Missile/Artillery Directorate was probably estab-
lished shortly after the creation of Granit, as the naval
applications of the new strategic missiles became .
obvious.
Little is known about the evolution of the 12th
GUMO, which acquires nuclear warheads,
Subordination
We believe that all main and central directorates
currently responsible for Soviet weapons acquisition
are either immediately subordinate to or subordinate
in technical matters to the Deputy Minister of De-
banov as well.
The evidence regarding the subordination of the Main
Shipbuilding Directorate (GUK) is still less conclu-
sive. Because ships are not required by any other
branch of service, the Navy may indeed maintain its
own procurement apparatus. The case for naval sub-
ordination is enhanced by the fact that the Soviets
(like the Americans) have treated the Navy as a
special case, different from the other branches of
service." Moreover, when the post was first created,
the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments only
carried out inspector functions for the Navy. Never-
theless, in articles Shabanov mentions sailors just as
frequently as soldiers and discusses combat readiness
on ships as well as in field units. If the Main
Shipbuilding Directorate is a Navy organization, it is
most likely subordinate in technical matters to Sha-
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Figure 3
Structure of a Typical MOD Main Directorate
Chief
1st Deputy
Chief
Deputy
Chief
Research and
Development
Directorates
Scientific
Research
Institutes
Military
Representatives
Deputy
Chief
Production
Directorates
Military
Representatives
Deputy
Chief
Scientific Technical
Committee (NTK)
Storage Supply
and Maintenance
Directorate(s)
Deputy
Chief
Administrative
Organizations
Organization The chief of a main directorate is assisted by a first
Internally, all of the armaments-related main direc- deputy and several deputies, each of whom has re-
torates appear to have basic organizational similar- sponsibility for certain functional directorates. The
ities. Figure 3 presents the structure of a typical main directorates are composed of several departments and
directorate; each of the components has been identi- sections. It is unclear whether administrative organs
fied in one or more of the main and central arma-
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hold directorate status. Administrative organs have
political, personnel, finance, education/training, and
other responsibilities.
The substantive directorates are responsible for pro-
duction, R&D, and storage and supply services. The
production and R&D directorates employ the military
representatives that oversee work in plants, institutes,
and design bureaus. R&D directorates supervise the
work of MOD scientific and central scientific re-
search institutes, which help solve technical problems.
There is also usually a Scientific Technical Commit-
tee (NTK) that serves as an advisory body to the chief
of the main directorate. In addition to solving prob-
lems of a technical nature, it is probably the NTK
that drafts weapons requirements.
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