CHINA RETHINKS ITS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of Top Secret
China Rethinks Its Nuclear
Submarine Program
A Research Paper
DIA review
completed.
NAVY, NGA Reviews
Completed
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EA 84-10224C
December 1984
Copy 2 9 6
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Directorate of Top Secret
China Rethinks Its Nuclear
Submarine Program
A Research Paper
NAVY Review Completed
This paper was written by
25X1 ~Ofce of East Asian Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, China Division, OEA,
Top Secret
EA 84-10224C
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 Top Secret
China Rethinks Its Nuclear
Submarine Program F--] 25X1
NAVY Review Completed
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Summary After an expensive, 25-year-long program, the Chinese apparently have
Information available decided to discontinue construction of nuclear submarines in favor of
as of7 December 1984 modernizing their large diesel-powered submarine force. Although the
was used in this report.
reasons for the apparent decision are unclear, we believe Chinese leaders
are satisfied they have realized the prestige value of developing nuclear
submarines and see an improved diesel-powered submarine force as a more
cost-effective response to the growing Soviet naval presence in the Pacific.
Only the fifth country to develop and produce nuclear-powered subma-
rines, China has built three Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) and one Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN). Activity at Huludao shipyard indicates that one or two SSNs-or
possibly an SSN and an SSBN-are under construction. If so, we expect
them to be completed.
The small number of China's nuclear submarines and their technological
weaknesses limit Beijing's deployment options. When operational in 1986
or 1987, the Xia will probably make irregular patrols in Chinese waters,
and we expect it would deploy to the Bohai Gulf or Yellow Sea during any
period of prolonged crisis with the Soviet Union. The 2,400-kilometer
range of the CSS-NX-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile and restricted
operation of the Xia, however, would limit the SLBM to targets in the
Soviet Far East.
Even though the Chinese have apparently decided to cease production of
the current generation of nuclear submarines, they will probably continue
to invest in research and development in order to design a bigger, more
capable SSBN that could carry a longer range missile.
For the next five to 10 years China will focus on the acquisition of
advanced foreign technologies-especially from the United States. In
addition, we expect the Chinese to apply any technology they acquire for
their diesel-powered submarines to the nuclear submarine program. In any
event, deployment of a new nuclear submarine system is unlikely for the
rest of this century.
EA 84-10224C
December 1984
Top Secret 25X1
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Contents
Summary
China's Nuclear Submarine Force: A New Direction
1
A Small Force With Technological Weaknesses
1
Deployment Options
Options for the Future
A Longer Range Missile
8
A New SSBN
8
A Continuing
Need for Foreign Technology
8
v Top Secret
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China Rethinks Its Nuclear
Submarine Program F --- ]
China's Nuclear Submarine Force: A New Direction
Over the past 30 years, China's perception of external
threats and plans to build a credible nuclear force to
deter such threats have been substantially revised. In
the mid-1960s, when Beijing began committing exten-
sive resources to the development of a ballistic missile
submarine, China considered the nuclear threats from
the United States and the Soviet Union to be equal.
debate was under way in the military leadership over
the best response to the Soviet submarine threat in
waters off the Chinese mainland and that proponents
of nuclear propulsion systems were losing sunnort In
both the Xia and
the CSS-4 ICBM were originally intended. to threaten
the US mainland.
25X1
25X1
In the late 1960s, China's leaders became more
concerned about a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike
that could destroy China's ability to retaliate. As a
short-term approach to the problem of vulnerability,
emphasized the mobility
of its shorter range ballistic missiles. It also continued
to develop nuclear-powered submarines and a solid-
propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM).
The Chinese apparently now believe, however, that
the deployment of only a small force of current-
generation nuclear submarines will not'add enough to
China's nuclear deterrence to justify the high cost of
continuing the program. According to a contact of the
US defense attache in Beijing, China plans to halt
construction of nuclear submarines and use its limited
resources to improve its large diesel-powered subma-
rine force with advanced naval technology obtained
from the West. The source said. production facilities
would be maintained so that new construction could
be started if necessary. We believe that two nuclear
submarines now under construction will also be com-
pleted.
Other reporting supports the source's claim that a
25X1 decision has been made to halt construction. Earlier
reports from the defense attache had suggested a
A Small Force With Technological Weaknesses
If the Chinese stop production, they will be left with a
force of four or five Han-class nuclear attack subma-
rines (SSNs) and one or two Xia-class nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs . Until
recent months, the
Chinese planned to build five SSBNs.F
most analysts believe one or two
SSNs are being built. It is also possible, however, that
an SSBN and an SSN are under construction.
25X1
25X1
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25X1
China's nuclear-powered submarines have a number
of weaknesses that limit their operational utility:
? Propulsion. China's nuclear submarines are rela-
tively slow and more vulnerable to detection and
25X1 attack.
? Fire Control. China's submarines almost certainly
do not have modern combat ipformation and action
centers. Torpedo fire-control data are probably
manually entered into a rudimentary display, in-
creasing reaction time and limiting the submarine's
combat effectiveness.
? Contamination. China's nuclear submarines may
give off unacceptably high levels of radiation. A
Chinese naval officer on a visit to a US nuclear
submarine base in April expressed surprise that we
did not appear to be concerned about radiation
levels in and around our submarines. He implied
that Chinese crewmen experienced severe health
problems caused by radiation emitted from their
nuclear submarines.
Top Secret
Deployment Options
The limited numbers and capabilities of China's
nuclear submarines restrict Beijing's options for their
deployment. We believe China's nuclear submarines
would not now play a significant role in any conflict
with the Soviet Union, because of the high risk of
detection and the limited range of the CSS-NX-3.
The Xia. Unless or until the Chinese build additional
SSBNs, they will probably limit the Xia to patrols in
waters near China. A fleet of three SSBNs would be
needed to maintain regular patrols, and as many as
five might be needed to keep one permanently on
station in distant waters.
During extreme tension with the Soviet Union, we
expect China to deploy the Xia to one of a number of
preselected areas in the Bohai Gulf or Yellow Sea:
? Short transit time to a missile launch area would
allow the Xia to arrive on station quickly and
remain on station for long periods.
? Chinese air and naval bases in North China would
give the Xia greater protection from antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) forces.
? Closeness to the Chinese mainland would allow the
full use of China's communications network, mak-
ing it easier for Beijing to maintain command and
control over the Xia.
? Short patrols would reduce maintenance, during
which the Xia would be unavailable for operations.
Only a few Soviet cities are, however, within striking
distance of the CSS-NX-3 launched from northern
Chinese waters (see figure 5). These targets are well
within the range of China's land-based medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, some of which
would probably survive a Soviet first strike on China's
nuclear forces.
China could deploy the Xia to the Western Pacific
just east of the Japanese Islands where deep water
would help it hide from hostile naval forces. The risk
of detection in transit would be great, however, and
the Xia would still be a threat to only a few Soviet
cities.
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Figure 5
Xia Deployment Areas Within Striking Range of
Major Targets in the Soviet Far East
10120 '40 ~.~ 160
PS "'CJ C~
O fir"'
Yellow
'Sea
BEIJING*,
East China'
Sea
South
China
Sea
Sea of
Okhotsk
Philippine
Sea
Aleutian Is
lu.s.l
North
Pacific
Ocean
Boundary representation is 25X1
not necessarily authoritative.
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Figure 6
Xia Deployment Areas Within Striking Range of Moscow and Leningrad
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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25X1
Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons
We believe the Military Commission of the Chinese
Communist Party exercises direct control over all
Chinese nuclear weapons and is the only body able to
authorize their use in a war. We expect strict control
at the highest levels of authority to extend to nuclear
weapons deployed on submarines in the future. F_
Naval Headquarters in Beijing almost certainly com-
mands all of China's nuclear powered submarines,
but day-to-day administration is probably exercised
by the Commander of the North Sea Fleet. The Xia
currently operates with units of the North Sea Fleet
believe it will continue to be administered by the
North Sea Fleet when it begins operational deploy-
ment sometime in the next two or three years.
nuclear submariners constitute a distinctive career
service. We expect the Military Commission eventu-
ally to form a centralized nuclear submarine com-
mand with authority over the Xia, any other SSBNs,
and Han-class SSNs.
Chinese naval leaders have told the US defense
attache in Beijing that they want to conduct SSBN
patrols in the Sea of Japan. We believe, however, it is
highly unlikely that the Chinese would conduct blue-
water patrols unless they had two or three SSBNs. If
only one Xia is operational, such patrols would expose
the Xia to a greater risk of accident in an area where
rescue operations would have little chance of success.
Moreover, given the Xia's probable slow speed, lack of
sophisticated electronics, and high noise level, the
Chinese may not wish to send it into waters where
Soviet and US ASW forces could monitor it.
To threaten Moscow, Beijing would have to send the
Xia into the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic (see
figure 6). The transit time to these areas is consider-
able, and the chances of the Xia arriving on station
undetected are minimal. Moreover, maintaining com-
mand and control of the Xia over great distances-
difficult in peacetime-would be nearly impossible
during a war,
platform.
The Han. Because of the Han's limited ASW capabil-
ities, we believe it will be used primarily in defense of
the Xia. Because of their close structural similarity
with the Xia, the Hans could also serve as decoys for
the SSBN, complicating Soviet ASW efforts. The
Chinese would have to make significant improvements
in the Han's electronics and weaponry, however,
before they could function effectively as an ASW
Han SSNs could also be used in an antishipping role.
Given their superior submerged endurance over
diesel-powered Romeo-class submarines, the Hans
may be ordered to attack unescorted Soviet auxiliaries
and interdict Soviet merchant shipping. China, how-
ever, probably would use Romeos, not Hans, to attack
Soviet surface warships. The Romeos are more ex-
pendable and may be harder to detect in the relatively
shallow water where Soviet warships are likely to be
engaged. Diesel submarines can shut down their
engines to reduce noise; nuclear submarines must
keep reactor cooling pumps running at all times. F_
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Table 1
Han SSN and Romeo SS
Operational Characteristics
Submerged Radius of Working Patrol
Speed Action Depth Endurance
(knots) (nautical (meters) (days)
miles)
A New SSBN.I Ithe Chinese
have begun to design a new generation of SSBNs.
Such an SSBN would be much bigger than the Xia
and might be designed to carry a three-stage missile
similar to the French M-4, which has a range of 4,600
km. Even if they are developing a new SSBN and
missile, the Chinese will probably not be able to
deploy them for at least the next 15 years.
Romeo SS 12.5 2,400 240 40 A Modified Han. The Chinese will probably equip
Han SSN 24 3,600 280 60 existing Hans with more modern weapons and elec-
Options for the Future
In spite of all the problems China has had with the
program, nuclear submarines do have advantages that
will continue to make them attractive. The deploy-
ment of the Xia will add 12 missiles to the 100-odd
medium-range and intermediate-range land-based
launchers that can strike targets in the Soviet Far
East, and Beijing could use it to threaten US cities on
the Pacific coast. China's SSNs also have a number of
potential advantages over diesel-powered units. The
high speed and submerged endurance of SSNs could
give China a capability to interdict enemy shipping
far from Chinese waters. If equipped with modern
electronics and torpedoes, the SSNs could give the
Chinese a more effective antisubmarine capability
than they now have.
We believe these advantages, combined with Mos-
cow's growing ability to find and destroy land-based
missiles, will push the Chinese to continue investing in
research and development on SLBMs and nuclear
submarines.
A Longer Range Missile. The Chinese could modify
the Xia to carry a slightly larger missile. With a
larger missile, the possible development of more ad-
vanced propellants, and a lighter reentry vehicle, the
Chinese might be able to deploy an SLBM with a
range of about 3,600 km within the next five to 10
years. But a 3,600-km-range SLBM would still not
allow a modified Xia to threaten the European USSR
from relatively secure waters. Therefore, we believe
the Chinese will opt for a completely new SSBN.
tronics. In the more distant future, they may build a
new SSN with increased speed and diving depth.
Beijing may also decide to develop a nuclear-powered
cruise missile submarine based on the Han design.
China modified a Romeo-class diesel submarine in
1982-83 to carry six solid-propellant cruise missiles
now under development. If this program is successful,
we believe China may decide to build a nuclear-
powered cruise missile submarine sometime in the
future.
One key decision China will have to make is whether
to use two reactors to increase the speed and reliabil-
ity of its nuclear submarines. The Soviet Union has
put dual reactor systems on most of its nuclear-
powered submarines. They gained speed, but at some
sacrifice in quietness. In order to build quiet subma-
rines, we believe China will choose to develop power-
ful, single-reactor systems similar to those on US and
French submarines. Advanced technology from West-
ern nuclear power plants being built in China will give
the Chinese an advantage the Soviets did not have
and may allow Beijing to develop better reactors for
its submarines.
A Continuing Need for Foreign Technology
Whatever China decides, it will continue to look upon
the West-especially the United'States-as a prima-
ry supplier of needed technology.
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Naval Technologies the Chinese Want
Over the next several years, we expect the Chinese to
concentrate on the acquisition of certain key
technologies:
? Antisubmarine warfare:
- Long-range passive sonars.
- Towed-array sonars.
- High-speed, wire- and optical-.fiber-guided
torpedoes.
? SLBMs:
- Guidance systems.
- High-energy solid propellants.
- Production of filament-wound cases for rocket
motors.
? Submarine design:
- Noise-reduction methods.
- Safe, more powerful reactors.
- Special steels and advanced welding tech-
niques.
In addition, we expect the Chinese to apply foreign
technology acquired for the civilian nuclear power and
steel industries, as well as military technology ob-
tained to improve the diesel-powered submarine force,
to their nuclear submarine research effort. In Decem-
ber 1983, China signed a contract to purchase French
Fenelon passive sonars, ostensibly to be fitted on
Romeo-class submarines. Some analysts believe these
sonars are also destined for China's SSNs and
SSBNs. According to a defense attache source, the
Chinese also are negotiating with the Italians for an
advanced antisubmarine torpedo which could be used
on either diesel- or nuclear-powered submarines.
Despite the apparent shift in emphasis from nuclear-
to diesel-powered submarines, China's submarine
fleet will remain the most effective arm of the Navy
and, as such, will receive the bulk of naval moderniza-
tion funding. Beijing will be able to modernize an
existing fleet of 90-odd Romeo-class submarines,
knowing that the technology acquired for the Romeos
can later be applied to second-generation nuclear
submarines.
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Figure 7
China: The CSS-NX-3 SLBM
Maximum Range 2,400 kilometers I
Warhead Yield 700 kilotons I
Circular Error Probable 2 to 3.5 km
(at maximum range)
Propellent Solid Composite
2 Stage
Chinese Name
I Approximate.
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Appendix A
The CSS-NX-3 SLBM
Although designs of early Chinese ballistic missiles
(the CSS- 1, 2, and 3) were based on missiles and
technology supplied by the Soviets in the late 1950s,
designs of later missiles (the CSS-4 ICBM and CSS-
NX-3 SLBM) were clearly influenced by Western
technology. The CSS-NX-3 probably has steel motor
cases and composite propellants similar to those used
in the Polaris A2 and French M1/M2 SLBMs. The
Chinese have attempted to acquire more advanced
technology-including high-energy propellants and
manufacturing equipment for filament-wound motor
cases-but we do not know if they have been success-
ful. In any case, we believe the Chinese will be unable
to produce a missile system with such state-of-the-art
technology for at least the next five years.
The relatively close contact between French and
Chinese military officials since the late 1960s, the
similarities between Chinese and French SLBMs, and
between Chinese and French solid-propellant produc-
tion and test facilities have convinced many analysts
that French manufacturers provided direct assistance
to the Chinese SLBM program. Others point out,
however, that critical US and French technology has
been available in Western journals, which the Chinese
have mined assiduously for many years. We have no
firm evidence that the French helped the Chinese
develop SLBMs or other missiles.
China could have produced many more solid-propel-
lant missiles, including SLBMs, than we account for
in our estimates of current and future missile force
size (see table 2). We believe, however, that only a
small fraction of this potential capacity will be used to
produce SLBMs. The Chinese will also produce other
solid-propellant missiles that are now being developed
for deployment on land. And, as with related military
industries, excess production is almost certainly in-
tended to overcome inefficient production methods
and disperse key manufacturing plants to decrease
their vulnerability to attack.
Table 2
Projected Chinese SLBM Force,
1984-94
Deployed
System a
1984
1986 19
88
1990
1994
SSBN
0
0-1 1
-2
1-2
1-3
SLBM
0
0-12 12
-24
12-24
12-36
a The high figure allows for the restart of production in 1989-90.
25X1
25X1
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Appendix B
The Xia SSBN
The Xia SSBN has a single pressurized-water reactor and parts for the Golf SSB from the Soviet Union in
and a raised turtleback. Its double-hull construction the late 1950s and may have been privy to plans for
and electronics are similar to those of early Soviet the November SSN, Moscow's first nuclear-powered
SSBNs. submarine.
The development of China's SSBN has been largely
an indigenous effort. We believe China received plans
Table 3
Characteristics of Early Generation SSBNs
Chinese
Xia
US
La Fayette
Soviet
Yankee I
French
Le Redoutable
UK
Resolution
Initial operational 1986-87
capability
1963
1968
1967
1967
Reactor One pressurized-water
reactor (PWR)
One PWR
One PWR
One PWR
One PWR
Hull Double
Single
Double
Single
Single
Submerged displace-
ment (tons)
6,500
8,250
10,800
9,000
8,400
Length (meters)
120
?129.5
131
128
129.5
Speed (knots)
20-24
30
27
25
25
Number of missiles
12
16
3
16
16
SLBM range
(kilometers)
2,400
4,600 a
2,700
3,200
4,600
a The La Fayette was originally equipped with a 2,800-kin-range
missile.
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Appendix C
The Han SSN
China has apparently resolved problems that plagued
the first Han-class nuclear attack submarine and has
probably resumed construction on at least one, possi-
bly two, additional Han submarines. China has built
three Han SSNs-pennant numbers 401, 402, and
403:
This suggests that the cause
of 401's breakdown, possibly nuclear reactor or
propulsion problems, has been at least partially
resolved.
? Han 402 has been operational since April 1981. It
was shown to US Navy Secretary Lehman during
his August 1984 visit to China.
? Han 403 was launched in November 1983 and
began sea trials after only 11 months' fitting out.
Table 4
Characteristics of Early Generation SSNs
This compares favorably with Han 402's three-year
and the Xia's 20-month fitting-out times.
F
25X1
This 25X1
submarine could be operational by March 1985.
profile is strikingly Western.
China's Han nuclear submarine has a rectangular sail
mounted forward on the boat. The Han's blunt bow is
characteristically Soviet in design, but the overall
The Han is double hulled and probably has a propul-
sion plant similar to Soviet nuclear submarines. We
believe that the electronics on the Han are similar to
early Soviet systems.
US defense attache reporting indicates that the Han
apparently lacks most of the electronic equipment
found on more advanced nuclear submarines. This
reflects a probable lack of sophistication of the Chi-
nese SSN, which can severely weaken its mission
effectiveness.
Chinese
Han
US
SSN-637
Soviet
Victor II
French
SNA-72
UK
Swiftsure
Reactor One pressurized-water
reactor (PWR)
Hull Double
Single
Double
Single
Single
Submerged displacement (tons)
5,500
4,700
5,200
2,700
4,500
Length (meters)
96
89
94
72
83
Speed (knots)
20-24
30+
32
26
30+
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