NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00310R000200050003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
North Korean Activities
Overseas
NGA Review Complete
Secret
EA 84-10148
August 1984
Copy ) b 4
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
North Korean Activities
Overseas
This paper was prepared byl Office of
East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea
Branch, OEA,
Secret
EA 84-10148
August 1984
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
North Korean Activities
Overseas FI
Overview North Korea increasingly. is using military assistance, including weapons
Information available and training, to strengthen relations in the Third World. We estimate that
as of I July 1984 at the end of 1983 about 450 confirmed North Korean military personnel
was used in this report.
were assigned overseas, primarily in Africa. P'yongyang has had its
greatest success in offering to train VIP security forces. Many Third World
leaders who feel threatened by domestic unrest or regional rivalries view
North Korean military, and security. assistance as an acceptable alternative
to reliance on the Soviets or the Chinese. FI 25X1
North Korean advisers are present in several countries where the Soviets or
Soviet proxy forces are also active, and although the Korean activities often
contribute generally to the local advancement of Soviet objectives, the
Koreans, as far as we know, do not usually coordinate their goals or work
with the Soviets. P'yongyang, in such circumstances, typically conducts
independent assistance programs using its own equipment and pursuing its
own interests.
The stress on the military dimension in bilateral relations results in large
part from the limited economic resources at the disposal of North Korea.
North Korea can mobilize only a modest economic aid program; it focuses
on high-visibility projects-such as sports stadiums, meeting halls, and
monuments-that are intended to achieve maximum political benefit at
minimal cost. Aid projects rarely exceed a commitment of more than $1-2
million, with assistance usually taking the form of grant aid or a loan on
generous credit terms
P'yongyang also has little to offer on the political front. North Korea's
diplomatic corps lacks finesse and experience and is hindered further by:
? Inadequate funding that forces its missions to resort to black-marketing
and smuggling to meet expenses-activities that often lead to serious
irritants in relations.
? The requirement that overseas missions sponsor activities glorifying Kim
11-song and his son and chosen heir, Kim Chong-il. All but a few
developing countries view these activities with disdain.
? Virulent attacks against the policies of the US Government that have led
some embarrassed host governments to deny North Korean diplomats
further acnecc to the nnhlic media-
iii Secret
EA 84-10148
August 1984
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
In one case-that of its arms sales to Iran, which has provided roughly one-
third of North Korean hard currency foreign exchange earnings over the
past several years and totaled more than $1 billion in transfers since the
Persian Gulf war began-the military dimension of P'yongyang's foreign
relations is economically profitable. This is the exception, however, and the
more usual motivation of its military assistance programs is to enhance the
prestige of North Korea. P'yongyang seeks to do so both to gain stature in
the international community and to compete successfully with Seoul for
diplomatic recognition and influence.
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Expansion of 'North Korean Advisory Presence'
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritatwe.
Sizable concentration of
North Korean advisers
North,
Korea
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Secret
Growing Military Relations
Advisory Groups
Arms Production Technology 5
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Secret
North Korean Activities
Overseas FI
As of late 1983, the North had an estimated 450
military advisers serving in some 20 countries with a
large percentage of these advisers having been dis-
patched out over the past five years.' Shipments of
North Korean military equipment overseas have in-
creased sharply since 1980, with arms sales account-
ing for most of the increase. With arms exports
running at about $300 million annually, North Korea
by 1983 ranked eighth among the world's leading
arms suppliers.
Several factors account for P'yongyang's ability to
expand its military presence and involvement abroad:
? P'yongyang has a well-developed arms industry with
the capacity, particularly in munitions and small
arms, to meet its own needs and support foreign
assistance.
? North Korea offers foreign military personnel a
wide range of training in North Korea, and P'yong-
yang has a large pool of military instructors familiar
with Communist bloc weapons who can serve
abroad as advisers.
? Furthermore, because of its small size, North Korea
is not viewed as a threat by most Third World
leaders.
North Korea has dispatched military equipment and
advisers to a wide range of countries, but the primary
emphasis is on Africa, where advisers are currently
assigned to 13 states, including seven in Sub-Saharan
Africa with sizable contingents. Taking advantage of
the political turmoil of the decolonization period in
the 1960s and early 1970s, North Korea actively
courted insurgent groups and newly independent gov-
ernments. P'yongyang's early support, including co-
vert military shipments and training, helps to account
in part, we believe, for the durability of its alliances
with such countries as Tanzania and Zimbabwe
Interested in expanding its influence outside Africa,
North Korea has recently increased its activities in
Latin America. North Korea believes that the emer-
gence of leftist, anti-US governments and opposition
groups in the area offers opportunities to expand its
recognition and influence at the expense of Seoul. In
addition to its longstanding ties with Cuba, it is
vigorously courting Nicaragua, Guyana, Suriname,
and former Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica
change in the level of arms transfers
Although these inroads in the Western Hemisphere
are important to North Korea in a broad political
context, they have not yet had a significant impact on
the region. Nicaragua thus far has received only
limited supplies of arms, most notably several patrol
boats, but the visit of North Korean Chief of Staff 0
Kuk-Yol in early July may presage a qualitative
In Grenada, North Korea had attempted since 1980
to strengthen ties with the Bishop regime, but it had
not established a significant presence by October
1983, when the United States intervened. On the
economic side, North Korea had offered to help build
a 15,000-seat stadium, a party headquarters building,
a fruit-processing factory, two fishing boats, and an
irrigation system. These projects were part of a five-
year development program announced publicly during
Prime Minister Bishop's visit to P'yongyang in April
1983. North Korea was to provide technical advisers
and some construction materials and equipment;
Grenada would have payed for the expenses of the
technicians
Documents captured in Grenada reveal that in April
1983 Bishop concluded a secret military agreement
that provided for the training of a crack Grenadian
force similar to Zimbabwe's 5th Brigade. According
to the agreement, North Korea had promised to
' This estimate places North Korea's military presence abroad
roughly on a par with China (530), but well behind Cuba (44,000-
mostly troops) and the USSR (18,000 not including Afghanistan).
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Status of North Korean Military Activities Overseas
Advisers
(number of
persons)
Selected Arms
Deliveries (since 1975)
Burundi
None
Mortars, antiaircraft machineguns
Egypt
10
Multiple rocket launchers, field artillery,
antiaircraft machineguns
Ethiopia
None
Field artillery, small arms
Guyana
Small number
Patrol boats, artillery, ammunition
Iran
50 to 100
T-62 tanks, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles,
antitank missiles and launchers, small
arms, field artillery, mortars, rockets, na-
val mines.
Libya
Small number
Field artillery, multiple rocket launchers,
mortars, antiaircraft machineguns.
Madagascar
50 to 75
Patrol boats, field artillery, antiaircraft
macllineguns
Mozambique
100 a
Patrol boats, field artillery, antiaircraft
machineguns
Nicaragua
Small number
Patrol boats, artillery, trucks
PLO
Small number
Artillery, multiple rocket launchers, anti-
tank weapons, mortars, antiaircraft
machineguns
Pakistan
None
Artillery, multiple rocket launchers
Rwanda
10
Air defense artillery, small arms, antiair-
craft machineguns
Seychelles
90
Antiaircraft machineguns, ammunition
Somalia
Small number
Mortars, small arms
Suriname
None
Small arms, ammunition
Syria
Small number
Gunpowder, unidentified military equip-
ment
North Korea no longer has any advisers in the
country.
In early 1984, North Korean delegations toured
several of Egypt's military-industrial complexes,
suggesting increased cooperation in that sector.
North Korea recently offered to build a small
arms factory.
Twelve additional advisers arrived in May 1984
to train Guyanese forces on howitzers and antiair-
craft guns recently purchased from North Korea.
P'yongyang is likely to remain Tehran's chief
source of military supplies.
Since the departure of its pilots in early 1981,
P'yongyang has not had a significant military
relationship with Libya.
North Korean pilots and ground support person-
nel have become a more or less permanent fixture
in Antananarivo.
Publicity concerning a "secret" military agree-
ment between P'yongyang and Valletta set off a
storm of protest in Malta's parliament in late
1983.
Military advisers are training a "special" army
brigade for a counterinsurgency role.
Although arms shipments have been limited thus
far, a spate of recent high-level military ex-
changes points to a larger North Korean supply
relationship.
During a visit in May 1984, Arafat received
renewed pledges of support in the form of arms
shipments.
Although Islamabad was once a major customer,
P'yongyang has not had much success in recent
years in making arms sales.
A limited advisory presence in recent years.
North Korea's advisers will be the principal for-
eign military presence on the islands following the
departure of Tanzanian security forces in 1984.
Advisers supervise the operation of a North Kore-
an-supplied ammunition factory.
Not much progess since a small-arms sale in
1982.
Most military shipments to the PLO are routed
through Syria.
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Secret
Status of North Korean Military Activities Overseas (continued)
Country Advisers Selected Arms
(number of Deliveries (since 1975)
persons)
with Dar es Salaam to construct two small-arms
factories.
Uganda 50 to 90 Aircraft spare parts, small arms, and am- Providing artillery, infantry, and military intelli-
munition gence training for the Ugandan Army.
Upper Volta 20 to 49 Undetermined
Zambia 20 to 40 Field artillery, ammunition
Advisers are training local security forces.
Advisers are training a Zambian commando unit
for operations along the northern border with
Zaire.
craft machineguns, small arms, ammuni- formed militia force.
tion, trucks
supply small arms and ammunition free of cost for a
force of about 1,000. This equipment, valued in the
document at $12 million, was to include 1,000 rifles,
80 machineguns, two coast guard boats, 6,000 uni-
forms, and large amounts of ammunition. We believe
that this military assistance had not been implement-
ed as of late 1983.
North Korean advisers are often active in areas where
Soviet, Chinese, or Soviet proxy forces are also
present. In some areas of West Africa, for example, it
is common to find Cuban, Libyan, and East German
experts working alongside North Korean personnel.
Even so, we are able to identify only a few countries
where North Korea and the Soviet Union actually
coordinate their aid programs:
? In Madagascar, North Korea in 1978 provided a
small number of pilots and jet fighter aircraft until
the Soviet Union could place a more sizable jet
fighter contingent on the island. The North Kore-
ans, however, have stayed on but have never inte-
grated with the Soviet pilots.
? In Libya, North Korean pilots in 1979 used Soviet-
supplid MIG-21s to cover an important air defense
sector until the Libyans could make other arrange-
ments. The North Koreans departed after two years.
We do not know if these cooperative arrangements
resulted from direct Soviet-North Korean military
contacts or were worked out by the host governments
in consultation with Moscow and P'yongyang.
25X1
The North Koreans usually conduct independent as-
sistance programs using their own equipment and
pursuing their own interests. In fact, North Korea, in
attempting to portray itself as a nonaligned state, 25X1
deliberately plays down its own security relationship
with China and the USSR. The North's attitude
reflects Kim 11-song's obsession with reducing, in both
form and reality, dependence on the Soviet Union and
China. On occasion, Kim has even sought to capitalize
on Moscow's misfortunes in the Third World. In the
Middle East, for example, North Korea moved quick-
ly to extend aid to Egypt following the late President
Sadat's decision in 1972 to expel Soviet military
advisers
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Advisory Groups
North Korea's military presence abroad takes three
basic forms: individual technical specialists, Air Force
tactical contingents, and advisory groups. Technicians
usually accompany and supervise the transfer of arms
when a new military supply relationship is established.
In most cases, the number of technicians in any one
country is small, ranging from five to 10. Military
technicians also are assigned on a long-term basis to
assist in the operation of North Korean-equipped
small arms and ammunition factories, such as those in
Somalia and Madagascar.
Largely self-contained Air Force tactical contingents
comprising pilots, controllers, and maintenance per-
sonnel have served in Vietnam (1965-68), Egypt and
Syria (1973-75), and in Libya (1979-80). There is
currently a 50-man contingent in Madagascar. The
North Korean pilots serve an air defense role and are
rarely engaged in hostile encounters. The limited
scope of this program over the years suggests that
North Korea reserves it for select clients.
Military advisory groups (MAGs)-first noted in
Zaire in 1975-account for most of the recent in-
crease in the number of North Korean military
personnel abroad. Essentially, North Korea offers an
assistance package to train special VIP security forces
and also paramilitary or militia forces. P'yongyang
usually provides "free" equipment for a brigade-size
security force (perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 men), requiring
that the host government meet the costs for the
advisers' pay and living allowances.
Kim I1-song makes a point of inviting potential MAG
hosts to P'yongyang, where they are briefed on the
need to organize a loyal and well-drilled presidential
security force along the lines of Kim's own praetorian
guard. We believe Kim is trying mainly to capitalize
on those leaders who will view North Korea as less
threatening than the Soviet Union or China. Prime
Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe, President Obote of
Uganda, and President Rene of the Seychelles all
have contracted with the North Koreans to train a
special security force. The secret agreement signed by
the late President Bishop of Grenada appeared to
have the same purpose.'
In 1981, the North Korean advisory role came under
intense world scrutiny in Zimbabwe, where 100 North
Koreans equipped and trained a newly formed 5th
Brigade comprising army personnel drawn exclusively
from Prime Minister Mugabe's preliberation guerrilla
forces. The brigade, since becoming operational in
1982, has gained notoriety for its ruthless suppression
of domestic opposition elements. The adverse publici-
ty does not appear to have damaged the appeal of the
North Korean program and may in fact have helped
carriers or self-propelled guns.
Arms Sales
North Korea. in the past several years has become a
significant factor in the international arms market.
North Korea produces almost all of its ground forces
and naval weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
Sales consist primarily of small arms and ammuni-
tion, towed artillery, mortars, multiple rocket launch-
ers, and antiaircraft weapons. P'yongyang exports
only a few domestically produced T-62 tanks and
none of its indigenously designed armored personnel
Throughout the duration of the Persian Gulf hostil-
ities, North Korea has been the major supplier of
weapons to Iran. Artillery, antiaircraft machineguns,
mortars, and ammunition make up most of the trans-
fer. Tanks, small arms, naval mines, and antitank and
surface-to-air missile systems have been sold in more
limited quantities. North Korea's rapid response to
Iran's purchase orders for conventional ground force
weapons and ammunition in 1980 suggests that
P'yongyang has acquired significant military stock-
piles to meet any surge in demand.
North Korea derives an estimated one-third of its
hard currency earnings from arms sales to Iran. We
estimate that arms shipments between July 1980 and
December 1983 totaled at least $1 billion. In 1982-
the last year for which relatively complete data are
available-North Korea provided 30 percent of the
arms that Iran received from overseas. P'yongyang's
close ties with Tehran also have enabled North Korea
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Secret
to diversify its sources of oil. Prior to 1980, North
Korea, which has no significant domestic oil deposits,
was almost completely dependent on China and the
Soviet Union for its oil.
Arms Production Technology
North Korea has helped a small number of countries
build and operate factories that produce small arms
and ammunition. Although providing this kind of aid
cuts into potential arms sales, P'yongyang probably
calculates that in the, long run it gains more lasting
influence. In the case of Somalia, for example, Moga-
dishu's desire to keep its North Korean-supplied
small-arms plant in operation is a major factor keep-
ing the Somalis from upgrading relations with South
Korea.
In June 1984, Dar es Salaam concluded a preliminary
w
agreement w' Korea for construction of
arms plants.
North Korea has
also offered recently to build a small-arms factory in
Ethiopia,
Factory construction reportedly will begin
in late 1984, with completion planned for 1987.
North Korea's reputation as a patron of international
terrorism dates to early 1970, when P'yongyang gave
asylum to nine Red Army Faction members who had
hijacked an airliner from Japan. In the spring of 1971,
both Sri Lanka and Mexico publicly identified North
Korea as the source of training and financial backing
for local subversive groups. Colombo expelled the
North Korean Embassy and suspended diplomatic
relations; Mexico City responded by turning down
repeated North Korean requests to establish a mis-
sion.
The developments in Sri Lanka and Mexico grew out
of established government policies: by 1968, P'yong-
yang was offering guerrilla warfare training in North
Korea and was directing its missions overseas to
maintain contacts with local underground movements.
P'yongyang's willingness to deal with terrorists, sub-
versives, and insurgents reflected in general its desire
to prove its revolutionary credentials. Other motiva-
tions were at work as well:
? In the late 1960s and early 1970s, expertise in
commando and guerrilla training-honed in agent
operations against South Korea-was one of North
Korea's few salable commodities or services.
? Contacts with terrorist and subversives were natural
byproducts of North Korean efforts to strengthen 25X1
ties with leftist movements abroad.
? Dealings with underground groups helped support
North Korea's widescale black-marketing and drug-
trafficking activities. 25X1
there are six training complexes near P'yongyan
of the type known to support agent training. Instruc-
tion at these facilities typically includes training in
urban and guerrilla warfare, martial arts, military
medicine, clandestine communications, explosives use,
and infiltration-exfiltration techniques. These facili-
25X1 I
25X1
ties are also used for North Korean personnel, and it 25X1
is not possible to judge what share is dedicated I
exclusively for the training of foreign personnel. I)Fxl
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, North Korea had
extensive dealings with terrorist groups and extremists
in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. By
the mid-1970s, Ghana, Chad, Central African Re-
public, Argentina, and Mauritania had followed Sri
Lanka in suspending relations because of the North's
proven or suspected dealings with subversive groups.
In recent years, North Korea's quest for international
recognition and respect has had some moderating
effect on such dealings. Also, as the number of active
liberation movements has declined, North Korea has
had fewer opportunities to offer covert backing for
insurgent groups.
Nonetheless, some support activities still exist:
? In Tanzania
North Korean advisers are training South African
insurgents.
25X1
25X1
25X1 1
? In Jamaica and Peru, P'yongyang is supplying funds
to opposition political elements.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
? P'yongyang supplies arms and training to the Pales-
We believe that North Korea's military assistance
program will continue to play an important role in
P'yongyang's foreign dealings. At the same time,
problems encountered earlier in the 1970s in aiding
insurgencies and extending military aid will color
North Korea's approach to such activities:
? North Korea today seeks to avoid commitments that
might entangle it in regional disputes. An exception
is its involvement in Iran, where-we believe-the
financial inducements outweigh the costs that
P'yongyang has paid in terms of strained relations
with most Arab states.
? North Korea also is reducing its support to locally
based underground movements. Its support of such
groups set back relations with Mexico and Sri
Lanka in 1971.
? As a corollary to the above, North Korean dealings
with terrorists now emphasize support to groups
that are stateless such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), where the risks to bilateral
diplomatic dealings are minimized.
North Korea's 1'military diplomacy" will not enable
P'yongyang to mount a serious challenge to South
Korea's commanding lead in the diplomatic sweep-
stakes. P'yongyang, moreover, faces increasing com-
petition in the international arms market from suppli-
ers who are able to offer more advanced equipment
and training. As in the past, North Korea will find its
greatest receptivity among the relatively small, less
developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, although
we believe P'yongyang is likely to place more empha-
sis on Latin America as an area to increase its
influence.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Secret
Appendix
Major Military Advisory
Groups Stationed Abroad
North Korea established a military presence in Mada-
gascar shortly after President Ratsiraka signed an
economic and technical cooperation agreement during
a visit to P'yongyang in 1978. The core of the North
Korean presence is a detachment of four MIG-17 jet
fighters and a 50-man contingent of pilots, air control-
lers, mechanics, and other ground support personnel.
The planes, of Korean war vintage and Soviet manu-
facture, are officially on loan and are stationed at
Madagascar's principal military base outside the capi-
The North Korean contingent was sent to Antanana-
rivo as an interim measure until the Soviets could
equip and train the local air force with more advanced
MIG-21s. (This is the clearest example of a coopera-
tive arrangement involving Soviet and North Korean
security assistance to a third country.) Although
Moscow subsequently has provided MIG-21s and
Soviet pilots, Ratsiraka has asked the North Koreans
to remain. The North Korean pilots, who have never
integrated with the Soviets, serve in effect as a private
air force responsive directly to the President.
In addition to the MIG-17s, North Korea has provid-
ed an assortment of military arms, ammunition, and
equipment, including four patrol boats. A small
number of military technicians also help operate an
ammunition plant that was completed last year with
North Korean aid.
the spring of 1982. Machel may have concluded an
agreement for the North Korean advisers during his
In Mozambique, North Korean military advisers are
training a "special" army brigade for a counterinsur-
gency role. President Machel, dissatisfied with the
assistance he was receiving from Soviet and Cuban
advisers, intensified his search for new military aid in
visit to P'yongyang in April 1982,
arriving m ate 1 .
We believe the special brigade will be used for
operations against the Mozambican National Resis-
tance Movement (RENAMO) who remain a serious
problem for the Machel regime despite Mozambique's
March 1984 si nin of a nonaggression pact with
South Africa.
25X1
25X1
Fifty-six North Korean military trainers arrived in
Seychelles in April 1983. President Rene requested 25X1
such troops because of his concern about the low
morale of his forces and the unreliability of Tanzani-
an forces assigned to Seychelles. Planning for the
North Korean advisory group probably dates to Octo-
ber 1982, when Defense Minister Berlouis traveled to
P'yongyang only two months after an army mutiny in
his country 25X1
'North Korean advisers have sought to restructure the
Seychellois Army by emphasizing the use of small
arms and quick-reaction forces. In November 1983, a
North Korean merchant ship delivered
military supplies that included antiaircraft
guns and ammunition 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
Since 1981, North Korea has assumed an increasingly
important role in security assistance training in
Uganda. President Obote, who returned to power in
December 1980, turned to North Korea for help
following the withdrawal of Tanzanian troops and the
emergence of several Ugandan dissident groups; mili-
tary advisers began to arrive in sizable numbers by
October 1981. Because of the transient nature of their
training mission, the number of military advisers in
Uganda has varied considerably. We estimate there
are currently about 50 in country, but the number
could be considerably higher.
The North Koreans are providing artillery, infantry,
and military intelligence training for the Ugandan
Army as well as training a presidential security force.
Some advisers who have participated in antiguerrilla
operations have been killed in these actions; this is the
only known instance of hostile fire against North
Korean advisory personnel assigned abroad.
In January 1984, an 11-man North Korean team
arrived to take over the task of training police special
forces from a private British firm. This is a long-term
program aimed at training up to 1,000 special forces.
Since at least 1981, North Korea has shipped large
amounts of arms and ammunition to Uganda, primar-
ily through Tanzania. We estimate the value of the
shipments-which have included artillery and com-
munications equipment-as high as $45 million by
North Korean military advisers first arrived in Upper
Volta in late 1983, following more than two years of
discussions with the shifting governments in Ouaga-
dougou. North Korean advisers, who reportedly num-
ber about 20, are providing instruction in individual
combat and martial arts to security forces in the
capital and to military units at Po, site of the para-
commando school near the border with Ghana. The
Upper Voltan Defense Minister's visit to P'yongyang
in May 1984 suggests that North Korea's military
training role will increase.
Twenty North Korean military advisers arrived in
Zambia in the spring of 1981 to begin training a
security guard for President Kaunda. Discussions
about the training program, under way at least since
April 1980, undoubtedly received impetus following
an alleged coup attempt against Kaunda in October
1980. The advisers are running a training
In 1982 a separate group of North Korean advisers
began training a Zambian commando unit, which
Kaunda is using against smugglers and illegal aliens
h
along the nort ern border with Zaire as well as to
combat urban crime.
the commandos are using tactics similar to those
employed by the North Korean-trained brigade in
neighboring Zimbabwe. The Kaunda government has
tried to keep its North Korean connection out of the
public eye-leading some observers to believe that the
program is beiing phased out-but there is no firm
evidence that the North Korean trainers have depart-
ed.
Approximately 100 North Korean military instructors
arrived in Zimbabwe in August 1981 to equip and
train the newly formed 5th Brigade of the Zimbab-
wean Army. This arrangement was first discussed
during Prime Minister Mugabe's visit to P'yongyang
in October 1980, but it was not formally signed until
June 1981
The brigade has been trained using equipment pro-
duced in North Korea, including artillery, mortars,
and trucks. Supplied on a grant basis, this equipment
is claimed to be valued at $12-25 million. North
Korean advisers departed for home at the completion
of the training lprogram in June 1982.
Another group's of North Korean advisers arrived in
the fall of 1982 to begin training a presidential
security unit and a nationwide militia force. Following
.six months of basic training, the North Korean advis-
ers working with the presidential guard returned
home. Advanced training is being conducted by the
British and the Chinese. In March 1983, the North
Koreans completed a four-month training course for
some 750 Zimbabweans who will serve in turn as
instructors for militia units. The militia training is a
long-term program aimed at developing a 20,000-man
force. It will probably require the presence of roughly
30 North Korean advisers, more or less permanently.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7
 Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85T0031OR000200050003-7
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/07/30: CIA-RDP85TOO31OR000200050003-7