INDONESIA: TIGHTENING THE SCREWS - SOEHARTO'S GROWING AUTHORITARIANISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00310R000200030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
Directorate of
Intelligence
Indonesia:
Tightening the Screws
Soeharto's Growing
Authoritarianism
Secret
Secret
EA 84-10143
July 1984
Copy 3 0 7
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
Intelligence
Authoritarianism
Indonesia:
Tightening the Screws-
Soeharto's Growing
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 84-10143
July 1984
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
secret
Indonesia:
Tightening the Screws-
Soeharto's Growing
Authoritarianism
Key Judgments President Soeharto has begun his fourth five-year term in office with an
Information available eye on his place in history:
as of 5 June 1984 ? He has begun the process of regeneration within the military and the
was used in this report.
government by promoting younger people-all Soeharto loyalists-to
replace his comrades from the revolutionary generation of 1945 in
leadership positions.
? He also has accelerated institutional changes to restructure the military
and to convert the government party (Golkar) into a more effective
organization so that he will bequeath to his successor an effective
political system.
The 1981-83 recession, however, has weakened the government's economic
underpinnings and contributed to a shift in Soeharto's tactics for maintain-
ing political stability ip Indonesia. Soeharto now faces the danger that
some of the more repressive measures taken in the past year may become
institutionalized at the same time economic austerity undercuts the
government's ability to attack the underlying causes of Indonesia's political
and social strains. The result could be a rise in domestic discontent and a
backlash against the government that would produce further repression.
Secret
EA 84-10143
July 1984
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
secret
Indonesia:
Tightening the Screws-
Soeharto's Growing
Authoritarianism F_
Tightening the Screws
Soeharto's ruling style traditionally has incorporated
a mix of coercion and co-option that has varied as his
political strength changed and events dictated (see
inset). His gradual assumption of power following the
October 1965 abortive Communist coup, for example,
reflected his cautious approach and a realistic assess-
ment of the political strengths and loyalties of various
groups such as the Sukarnoists, the Communists,
other political parties, civilian politicians, and factions
within the military. He skillfully manipulated his
adversaries, including former President Sukarno, as
he consolidated his hold on power without arousing
organized opposition or antagonizing the masses. F_
The severity of the 1981-83 recession has intensified
government concern over internal stability and helped
spur Soeharto to shift from his traditional preference
for balancing coercion with less repressive measures.
The government has resorted to increasingly authori-
tarian measures to deal with social and political
problems in the past year and a half-in contrast to
its pragmatic measures to restore the long-term health
of the economy. In part, this reflects the government's
reduced ability to alleviate social problems because of
its financial austerity. We also believe it reflects a
decreasing tolerance for political dissent by a regime
that has held office for nearly 20 years and has never
hesitated to use repressive measures against potential
threats to domestic order.
In early 1983, the government, in response to a rising
wave of violent crime committed largely by organized
urban gangs, undertook a campaign of arbitrarily
shooting criminal suspects. Security officials, who
referred to the killings as "mysterious shootings,"
were concerned that growing public apprehension over
crime and distrust of local police forces threatened a
breakdown in public order. Although the government
has scaled down the killings in recent months, officials
indicate Jakarta will not hesitate to resume such
drastic measures to keep crime in check.
Earlier this year, a draft version of a controversial bill
on internal exile was leaked to the public. It is
intended to replace a 1962 presidential decree issued
by former President Sukarno. Once it becomes law, it
will legitimize the government's authority to detain
dissidents, often on flimsy grounds or suspicions. The
Soeharto government has previously used internal
exile as a means of punishing dissidents. Thousands of
Communists and their sympathizers, for example,
were exiled for years on Buru Island, typically with-
out any legal recourse. Soeharto released the last
prisoners only after strong human rights pressures
from the United States a few years ago. Although the
Soeharto government remains sensitive to human
rights criticisms, it continues to detain Timorese
suspected of opposing the Indonesian takeover of the
former Portuguese colony of East Timor on Atauro
Island and would not hesitate to take similar action
against any group challenging the government's au-
Jakarta's tougher line during the past year is reflected
particularly in:
? The unprecedented "mysterious shootings" cam-
paign by special military units that have killed over
4,000 known or suspected criminals without judicial
trials during the first year of operation.
? The submission to parliament of a bill proposing
new legislation on internal exile-a move aimed at
legitimizing the government's harsh treatment of
political dissidents.
thority.
In addition, the Soeharto government in the past year
has reemphasized its concern with internal security
through:
? The appointment in the spring of 1983 of loyalist
hardliners to key cabinet posts to deal with internal
security, students, and the labor force.
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85T00310R000200030001-1
Soeharto's Use of the Carrot
Soeharto has often emphasized co-option to maintain
his rule. To win and hold the loyalty of key asso-
ciates and subordinates, he has tolerated a high level
of personal corruption not only within his inner circle
but also throughout the military and bureaucracy. In
addition, Soeharto has permitted many of the sym-
bolic trappings of democracy such as a vocal press,
political parties, elections, and a parliament to act as
safety valves for the political frustrations of many
Indonesians-although within strict, but unwritten
guidelines.
Soeharto views the economy as a critical determinant
of his political leverage. The rapid economic growth
of the 1970s, underpinned by sharp increases in oil
export earnings, enabled the government to play a
benevolent role. Although critics complain that the
government's development strategy is too capital in-
tensive and has benefited mainly the elite, one of the
regime's most striking accomplishments has been the
doubling of rice output from 1968 to 1981. Agricul-
tural growth has received a strong impetus from
government investment in irrigation facilities, high-
yield rice varieties, and the application of fertilizer
and other modern techniques. Although Jakarta's
motives are primarily to protect the military, civil
servants, and the more influential urban consumers
from rice shortages or sharp price hikes, the benefits
of the government's rice pricing and production poli-
cies are evident in adequate rice supplies and the
absence of rural unrest.
Soeharto used the financial windfalls from oil ex-
ports in the 1970s to help maintain political control
by increasing spending on popular programs such as
food and fuel subsidies and on education, health, and
housing. In addition, Jakarta has provided jobs in
state enterprises and the bureaucracy for faithful
supporters of the government party (Golkar). State-
owned firms and government agencies direct business
to favored suppliers and subcontractors. With central
government control extending down to the village
level through the military command structure, bu-
reaucratic channels, and the government party orga-
nization, spending on construction projects and other
programs continues to be funneled to firms controlled
by Soeharto loyalists. In addition, foreign investors
must contract only with approved subcontractors and
suppliers, an arrangement that gives government offi-
cials powerful leverage in winning support for the
Soeharto regime.
And the Stick
Soeharto, nevertheless, has maintained the underly-
ing reality of a military regime that brooks no
ed to use the full panoply of powers available to him
to consolidate and maintain his rule. For example,
although the government permits a fairly lively press
to operate, Ministry of Information officials screen
all publications to ensure they do not expose prohib-
ited topics such as the business interests of Mrs.
Soeharto, incidents of civil unrest, or other potential-
ly damaging information. Whenever any of the media
fails to observe the unwritten guidelines, the govern-
ment responds swiftly. In the first four months of
1984, for example, the government shut down three
publications.
Soeharto also demonstrates a readiness to use mili-
tary force whenever necessary to maintain order.
Troops have been deployed in Indonesia's cities on
numerous occasions when security officials feared
explosions of violence, such as anti-Chinese riots or
outbursts following election campaign rallies. Over
the years, Soeharto has also used his power to
transfer or reassign uncooperative officers or to reor-
ganize the military to reward his loyalists and to
remove potential challengers from positions of power.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85T00310R000200030001-1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85T00310R000200030001-1
,ecret
? An increase in antisubversive rhetoric by govern-
ment spokesmen, including warnings of a resur-
gence of activity by the Communist Party.
? Repeated anti-Muslim measures, including at-
tempts to impose the state ideology, Pancasila,' on
all organizations
These measures bolster the regime's long-established
policies of tightly controlling potential opposition ele-
ments and critics, including the media.
The Cabinet-All Soeharto's Men
The most notable characteristics of the new Cabinet
were the elimination of potential rivals to Soeharto
and the concentration of power among a smaller circle
of trusted advisers, particularly State Secretary Sud-
harmono and Armed Forces Commander Murdani.
Major figures outside Soeharto's inner circle were
excluded from top posts in government. Previous
cabinets included such well-known independent fig-
ures as the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Adam Malik, and
General Jusuf, a devout Muslim untainted by corrup-
tion. Indeed, Jusuf was considered by many as a
potential successor to Soeharto after his appointment
as Defense Minister in 1978.
Some generational change in the new Cabinet was
evident in Soeharto's transfer of longtime comrades
such as Amir Machmud and the since deceased Ali
Murtopo to less demanding jobs and their replace-
ment by younger advisers. The Cabinet also includes
more Javanese from Soeharto's native province and a
stronger military representation in key portfolios than
the previous cabinet.
The appointment of the former head of internal
security, Admiral Sudomo, as Minister of Manpower
showed the regime's intent to maintain a tight lid on
the activity of organized labor, which had become
increasingly restive over growing unemployment and
a wage squeeze since 1981. Although Sudomo has
made it clear he will not tolerate strikes, he has often
helped maintain labor peace by siding with labor
against employers. He has taken a hard line against
' Pancasila is a broadly based formulation expressing five principles
of belief in one god, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy,
and social justice. The first principle, belief in one god, is intended
to accommodate Muslims, Christians, Javanese mystics, and any
other adherents of belief in a supreme being, while maintaining the
reality of a secular state.
many private employers, typically Chinese business-
men, and forced them to absorb at least part of the
cost of supporting idle laborers during the current
recession by prohibiting them from laying off workers
without his approval. The Minister of Education,
retired Gen. Nugroho Notosusanto, was credited with
stifling student dissent when he was rector of the
University of Indonesia and is continuing to cooperate
closely with the military to maintain order on campus.
Targeting the Security Threats
Government officials also repeatedly warn of the 25X1
danger of a resurgence in Communist Party (PKI)
activity as a result of the clandestine return of former
PKI members who had fled Indonesia in the after-
math of the 1965 coup attempt. Over the past year
and a half, security forces have arrested a handful of
former PKI members who reentered Indonesia illegal-
ly from China and other Communist countries. Al-
though security officials do not consider the number
of illegal returnees an imminent threat, they are
concerned over the specter of foreign support for the
PKI and the danger that PKI promises may prove
attractive to Indonesian youth, particularly if the
economic situation deteriorates. Jakarta's nervousness
about the PKI underscores its preoccupation with
internal security; the remnants of the PKI-which
was nearly eliminated following the attempted coup in
1965-pose no threat to the government.
Government officials reserve their strongest state-
ments for the threat posed by Islamic fundamental-
ism. Soeharto and his associates monitor all signs of
Islamic opposition to avert a recurrence of the Muslim
rebellions against the central government such as
occurred during the war against the Dutch and the
early years of the republic. They remain concerned
that a resurgence of Muslim militancy threatens the
unity of Indonesia and regularly monitor sermons in
major mosques for signs of dissidence. On several
occasions during the past few years, the government's
fears have been intensified by the circulation of
radical Islamic literature among students and other
groups. Although Muslims have demonstrated against
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85T00310R000200030001-1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
government moves they considered anti-Islamic, they
remain leaderless and divided. Most demonstrations
quickly dissipate once the immediate cause is correct-
ed or eliminated.
Officials also are concerned over the danger of sub-
version presented by students returning from the
Middle East where they might have been infected by
radical Islamic tenets associated either with Iran's
Khomeini or Libya's Qadhafi. Security officials moni-
tor returning students for signs of radical influence.
Besides relying on its internal security apparatus to
counter the Islamic threat, the government has
pushed hard to impose its nonsectarian, and essential-
ly secular, state ideology, Pancasila, on all groups in
society.
Soeharto's Perspective: A Still Firmer Hand
Soeharto's position in Indonesia is as strong now as it
will ever be. He is the unchallenged national leader
with the full backing of the armed forces, the loyalty
of the bureaucracy, and widespread respect among
the populace. Opposition groups are disorganized and
leaderless. No organization exists that can readily
challenge the government nor is there any individual
with the political stature to challenge Soeharto suc-
cessfully. The Muslim schools might become a stage
for a potential challenger, but we have too little
information on them to determine whether they pro-
vide a suitable environment for the emergence of a
charismatic leader who could attract enough followers
outside the orthodox Muslim community.
During the 1982-83 election campaign, Soeharto
made a number of references to preparations for the
transfer of power to a new generation of leaders and
indeed he has begun the process. His contemporaries
in the military-the generation of 1945-have begun
to cede command to younger officers, although most
observers expect Soeharto to remain in office after his
current term expires in 1988-when he will be 67
years old-as long as his health remains good.F_
Although Soeharto has brought some younger faces
into the Cabinet, his inner circle is narrowing and
outsiders have less access to him. His subordinates
have found it difficult to report unpleasant news.
Although Soeharto still exhibits realism in
his assessments of current political and social develop-
ments, he faces a danger of growing isolation simply
by virtue of his position.
Reliance on a decreasing circle of loyalist advisers and
the institutionalization of heavyhanded techniques-
such as the shooting campaign, the internal exile law,
and the Pancasila campaign-suggest the regime is
growing less tolerant of alternative views, criticism, or
threats to social order. Soeharto periodically lashes
out against unspecified critics of his New Order
economic policies. Recent statements, plus renewed
threats by officials to close newspapers and magazines
critical of government policies, offer further evidence
of Soeharto's intolerance of dissent.
Dangers Ahead
Having restored the nation from the political and
economic chaos of the late Sukarno years, Soeharto
seeks a legacy of political stability based on self-
sustaining economic growth. The regime's tendency
toward more authoritarian solutions during the cur-
rent period of economic austerity and social strain,
however, poses a danger of institutionalizing repres-
sion. The "mysterious shootings" campaign against
criminal suspects provides a precedent for using simi-
lar tactics against other groups in the future.
Jakarta's reliance on coercion to contain social pres-
sures risks alienating significant segments of society
and producing serious outbursts. For example, al-
though efforts to impose Pancasila on all groups in
society do not offend most of the population, the
government's heavyhanded tactics have created ill
will among many of the 20 to 30 percent who are
orthodox Muslim believers. Ill-conceived government
moves, such as the ban last year on wearing tradition-
al Islamic headdress by high school girls, have the
potential for producing major disturbances. A near
riot ensued at the Al Azhar Mosque in Jakarta when
security forces moved in to break up a meeting at
which Muslim activist Tony Ardie criticized the ban.
Similar incidents could escalate into widespread com-
munal violence although Ardie's later arrest and trial
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
Secret
did not lead to major demonstrations. The 1980 anti-
Chinese riots, for example, were sparked by a traffic
accident.
If Soeharto remains in office beyond 1988, there is an
increasing risk that his current term could be the last
five-year term in which his government can confident-
ly undertake bold new initiatives or respond construc-
tively to new problems. Beyond 1988, there is a
danger that Soeharto and his close advisers will
concentrate primarily on retaining power, resisting
change, and relying on force rather than imagination
to solve some of the intractable problems Indonesia
will face.
We cannot predict who will succeed Soeharto or
when, but we can project some of the major domestic
problems he or his successor will face in the coming
decade, such as the need to deal with the nearly
2 million who will enter the labor force annually.
Increasing rural landlessness, migration to the cities,
rising expectations, and growing dissatisfaction with
poor living standards will tax the government's limit-
ed financial and managerial resources. As employ-
ment in the informal sector of the urban economy
approaches its saturation point, even street vending or
pedicab driving will disappear as cushions for absorb-
ing jobless workers and landless rural migrants to the
cities.
At the same time, Indonesia's oil exports will not
generate financial windfalls in the 1980s as they did
in the 1970s, and the country's primary commodity
exports will not provide a comparable boost in foreign
exchange earnings. As for the development of new
manufacturing export industries, Jakarta faces both
stiff competition from more advanced Third World
producers and protectionism in developed country
markets. With dim prospects for a dramatic improve-
ment in the country's financial position in the next
several years, the government will be hard pressed to
avoid resorting to increased coercion to maintain
stability.
On the political front, Jakarta probably will face
increasing demands for a political voice by groups
that have been effectively disenfranchised by the
government such as the intelligentsia, students, and
human rights advocates. With the danger of repres-
sion becoming institutionalized or cyclical as the
government responds to political and social strains,
pressure for political freedom is likely to cause grow-
ing problems. At present, we have no evidence of
foreign involvement in Indonesia's domestic politics,
but Jakarta's tighter finances and growing authoritar-
ianism increase the government's vulnerability to
internal political opposition with or without foreign
support.
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP85TOO31 OR000200030001 -1