(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00310R000200020003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
South Korea:
Chun at "Midterm"
EA 84-10139
July 1984
309
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
South Korea:
Chun at "Midterm"
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 84-10139
July 1984
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South Korea:
Chun at "Midterm"
Key Judgments South Korea has made substantial progress on economic and political
Information available issues since President Chun Doo Hwan came to power in 1980:
as of 15 June 1984 ? Economic performance has improved substantially; real growth should
was used in this report.
top 7 percent, with exports growing at double-digit rates in 1984-85.
? South Korea's international diplomatic status has also improved in
comparison with the North's, although this is partially a result of the
Rangoon bombing.
? US-South Korean ties are stronger than in many years, and Seoul's oft-
troubled relations with Tokyo are much smoother.
Despite the successes, Chun remains highly unpopular with most South
Koreans, in part a vestige of the way he came to power and the repressive
measures he used to consolidate his control. Many Koreans also question
Chun's own contribution to his government's achievements. Recognizing
this, Chun has moved gradually to defuse opposition claims of repression
and enhance the credibility of civilian political institutions. To these ends,
over the last year he has taken steps to "liberalize" the domestic political
process, including:
? Amnesty for several hundred persons imprisoned for political offenses.
? Reinstatement of the political rights of all but 99 Park-era figures.
? Introduction of a more tolerant policy toward student demonstrations.
Additional measures to reduce press controls and permit more organized
labor activity are being considered.
Thus far, the experiment with "liberalization" has gone well. Student
demonstrations, although widespread and at times violent, have been easily
contained by the well-prepared security forces. The moves have also helped
isolate radical antigovernment elements and divide the opposition.
As part of the effort to create more credible and effective political
institutions while retaining control over the political process, Chun is now
attempting to:
? Strengthen the power base of the ruling Democratic Justice Party by
expanding its influence over local development programs.
? Increase-within limits-the role and power of the National Assembly,
in part to serve as a "safety valve" for dissenting views.
iii Secret
EA 84-10139
July 1984
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Secret
Chun's successes on those fronts are real but fragile. And he must
negotiate several hazards over the next four years:
? He must avoid giving the opposition-students, Christian dissidents, and
politicians-issues with broad public appeal. A government misstep, such
as another major corruption scandal or the deaths of student demonstra-
tors, could undo the progress made thus far.
? He must keep his own camp in order. In particular, he must keep in
check rivalries among his advisers and military supporters that could stall
forward movement on meeting popular expectations for political reform.
? He must convince senior military officers that the political reform
measures are not significantly reducing their influence in the
government.
The next major test of Chun's ability to keep opposing political forces in
hand will come with the National Assembly elections, which probably will
be held in late 1984 or early 1985. The balloting also will test the ability of
Chun's Democratic Justice Party to deliver the popular mandate he seeks
and of the government's willingness to tolerate a more vigorous opposition.
Looking further ahead, the most potentially explosive issue remains Chun
himself. He has repeatedly insisted publicly and privately that he will step
down in 1988, when his term ends. Even some of Chun's harshest critics
now believe he will do so but that he will seek to orchestrate the political
transition to ensure stability and protect himself. Astute observers question
whether Chun has the ability and political vision to manage the situation
successfully, but Chun almost certainly recognizes that both domestic and
foreign support for his government could quickly dissipate should he appear
to be moving to retain the presidency.
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South Korea:
Chun at "Midterm"
A Pattern of Success
Resurgent Economic Growth. After three years of
lackluster performance, recent economic growth has
eased fears that South Korea could not recover the
economic momentum of the 1970s. Economic indica-
tors improved strikingly in 1983, and prospects for
1984-85 are bright: strong global demand and a solid
competitive position put South Korea in a position to
sustain double-digit rates of export expansion and
surpass its 1984 goal of 7.5-percent real GNP growth.
Government restraint should hold inflation below 5
percent
Chun and particularly his advisers deserve much of
the credit for current economic conditions. Chun has
put together a team of experienced technocrats com-
mitted to gradual economic liberalization and to
broad sharing in the benefits of growth. And the
economic rebound reflects their success in shifting
away from the unbalanced emphasis on investment in
heavy industry and in controlling serious inflation.
(Both problems were inherited from the Park govern-
ment.) Moreover, Chun has outgrown the "command
post" style of his first year in office, giving increased
responsibility and authority to key planners in the
Cabinet. Economic advisers, encouraged by prospects
that strong aggregate growth will continue, appear to
have persuaded him of the need to promote the
growth of small and medium firms no less than the
large conglomerates and to move forward on promised
welfare programs and distributive measures.
Better US-South Korean Relations. Seoul's success in
cultivating its most important foreign tie has helped
calm the chronic nervousness of the South Koreans
about their place in Washington's strategic priorities.
Chun has personally worked hard to appear respon-
sive to US interest in human rights and political
development as well as on bilateral trade issues. In
fidence from recent achieve-
ments but is still hampered by
a tarnished image.
turn, strong US support in the wake of the KAL
shootdown in September 1983 and the Rangoon
bombing incident in October 1983 has boosted confi-
dence in Washington as a friend and ally as did the
visit of President Reagan last November.
Smoother Relations With Japan. Openly belligerent
toward Japan when he first came to power, Chun has
established excellent rapport with Japanese Prime
Minister Nakasone, and dealings between Tokyo and
Seoul on matters of substance are freer of irritants
than at any time in the past decade. Chun's visit to
Japan-now scheduled for early September-will be
the first state visit by a South Korean president.
Chun's opponents will seek to exploit deep-seated
anti-Japanese sentiments to sully this milestone, but
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we believe the trip, on balance, will help to burnish his
image as a leader who manages key bilateral relation-
ships with self-assured equality.
Growing International Stature. Such successes are
the result of an aggressive, skillful approach to foreign
policy that has given Seoul a diplomatic status com-
mensurate with its status as a rising economic power.
The selection of South Korea to host major interna-
tional events-including the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU) meeting last October, the Asian Games
in 1986, and the summer Olympics in 1988-is a
source of pride to the vast majority of South Koreans.
These events-and others such as the Pope's pastoral
visit in May-have helped Seoul shed its image as a
junior ally of the United States.
Contacts With China. Last year, Seoul used the
hijacking of a Chinese airliner to initiate unprecedent-
ed direct negotiations and broader informal exchanges
with Beijing. The Chinese, although unprepared to
make any moves that might damage relations with
P'yongyang, nonetheless have demonstrated a willing-
ness to expand nonofficial relations:
? Beijing is hosting Korean officials, academics, and
athletic teams at internationally sponsored events,
and it has begun participating in international gath-
erings in South Korea.
? The Chinese have relaxed restrictions on the ex-
change of mail and have announced their willing-
ness to allow mutual visits between ethnic Koreans
in China and their relatives in South Korea.
Contacts With the Soviet Union. Until the downing of
a South Korean airliner by the Soviets last Septem-
ber, contacts with Moscow were broadening as well.
Soviet officials had twice visited Seoul since late
1982, and reporting suggested that Moscow was
prepared to send a delegation to Seoul for the IPU
meeting last October. The shootdown set back Seoul's
hopes for more regular contacts with Moscow, as did
the Soviet media's one-sided reporting of P'yong-
yang's statements on the Rangoon bombing.
South Korean officials assert that the basic policy on
approaches to the Soviets is unlikely to be changed
before the anniversary of the shootdown on 1 Septem-
ber, but we believe that a resumption of low-key
nonpolitical contacts could come sooner: a South
Korean delegation may attend an international con-
ference in Moscow in mid-August, according to press
and Embassy reporting. In our judgment, both the
warming trend in Soviet-North Korean relations and
the Soviet-led boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics
may have spurred Seoul to moderate its posture
toward Moscow, partly in hopes of parrying anticipat-
ed efforts by P'yongyang to prevent the 1988 Olym-
pics from being held in the South.
Fostering "National Reconciliation"
Despite the government's economic and international
successes, knowledgeable observers assert that Chun
himself remains unpopular among most South
Koreans-many of whom question the extent of
Chun's contribution to these achievements and re-
main skeptical about their durability. Counseled by
close advisers to reduce his political liabilities before
attempting to lay the groundwork for 1988, Chun in
recent months has focused more of his attention on
reducing domestic political tensions, promoting confi-
dence in his pledge of gradual political reform, and
lessening public cynicism toward political institutions.
To this end, he has:
? Amnestied more than 350 persons imprisoned for
political offenses, including nearly all jailed student
protesters convicted since 1980. Only a dozen or so
violators remain in jail.
? Reinstated nearly 1,600 university students who had
been expelled from school for antigovernment
activity.
? Restored political rights to an additional 202 indi-
viduals banned from political activities; only 99
Park-era figures remain under the ban.
? Reinstated professors and journalists banned since
1980 from working in their professions.
? Reduced, if not entirely eliminated, the use of
physical and psychological abuse in the interroga-
tion of suspects and prisoners, according to US
Embassy reporting.
? Permitted more pointed discussion of policy matters
in the National Assembly and fuller press coverage
of political affairs.
Formulated a more tolerant policy toward campus
political activities, including the removal of the
security forces from the universities.
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The adoption of more relaxed political controls also
reflects, in our judgment, the rising influence of
politically moderate advisers.
External factors very likely spurred Chun to move
more boldly and rapidly than he would have done
otherwise.
Chun sought to reduce tensions prior to the pastoral
visit of Pope John Paul II in early May. South Korean
officials reportedly also hope to prevent the human
rights question from becoming an issue that might
undermine support in the US Congress on economic
and security issues. Finally, we suspect that Chun has
seen in the more sober public mood since the Rangoon
bombing incident an opportunity to experiment with
several popular reform measures at a minimum risk of
political instability.
Skepticism and Success
Public confidence in the reform measures is slowly
growing, but skepticism remains high on campuses, in
particular about the government's intentions. Some
faculty members and many students still suspect the
government is being more tolerant in order to invite a
level of student violence that would justify reimposing
tighter political controls.
mishes between students and riot police.
large-scale off-campus clash, despite numerous skir-
Government moderation during the spring demonstra-
tions clearly has helped. As of the end of May, no
arrests had resulted from the approximately 250 25X1
demonstrations in Seoul this year. The anticipated 25X1
high water mark of student protests during 18-27
May, the anniversary of the riots in Kwangju in 1980
against the military government, passed without a 25X1
Just as important, given the strength of the hardliners,
the leveling off of the scale of demonstrations vindi-
cates the argument that moderation would isolate the
hardcore activists-claimed by Lho Shinyong to num-
ber less than 300-and reduce their influence on
The relative success of the new campus policy, the
riskiest of the recent measures, will enable the govern-
ment to take additional reform steps
Profes-
sors and students will be free to engage in political
debate and even criticize the government as long as
25X1
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the government may revise unpopular regulations 25X1
governing university admissions and graduation quo-
tas 25X1
and perhaps eventually disband the government-
authorized Student Defense Corps that has substitut- 25X1
ed for popularly elected student government since the
Park era. 25X1
they do not advocate leftist views.
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Student demonstrations, invig-
orated by looser government
controls, have failed to gain the
public's sympathy
Strengthening Political Institutions
In addition to undertaking tactical measures to erase
lingering reminders of how he came to power, we
believe Chun seeks to build civilian political institu-
tions that can buttress his own authority, yet also
meet the desire of most South Koreans for a greater
voice on issues that directly affect them.
The Democratic Justice Party. To achieve this, he has
focused first on building up the ruling party. The
President's goal is an organization that cannot only
deliver the votes needed to ensure continuing DJP
control of the National Assembly, but also secure a
firm public endorsement of his government now and
manage diverse popular political currents during the
next four years. Maintaining control of the legislature
is the least difficult of these objectives. Current
election procedures make it possible for the strongest
party to parlay a narrow popular plurality into a solid
majority in the assembly. For example, in 1981 the
36-percent share of the popular vote received by the
DJP translated into 91 of the 184 elective seats as well
as 61 of the 92 appointive seats that are divided
among the three top parties, giving the DJP a 56-
percent overall majority in the legislature.
In line with these aims, DJP chairman Kwon Ik
Hyun-who together with floor leader Lee Jong Chan
manages the party for Chun-is attempting to turn
the DJP into South Korea's first mass political move-
ment. The DJP claims to have enrolled more than 1
million members in its drive to recruit 5 percent of the
voters in each district, or one out of every eight
households.
A new DJP organizational structure gives greater
control to the party's central leadership and also
broadens rank-and-file participation in local party
affairs. Newly created local consultative committees
are intended, we believe, to enable the party to use
control of development projects to expand its power
base. The organizational changes should strengthen
the position of Kwon and other retired Army officers
who lack well-developed personal political networks.
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The National Assembly. The influence of the legisla-
ture in decisionmaking remains limited, but here, too,
Chun has made concessions in order to create an
institution with greater credibility. For example,
Chun allowed procedural concessions last December
that have resulted in more pointed questioning during
the National Assembly session this spring. Assembly
members demanded explanations of government poli-
cy toward P'yongyang's tripartite talks proposal, plans
for import liberalization, and countermeasures to deal
with dumping cases against Korean exports. Seoul
permitted such sensitive issues as election law reform,
local autonomy, and stronger legal supports for free-
dom of the press to be debated on the Assembly floor.
The National Assembly is not likely to develop into a
major political force even under a more open system,
but we anticipate that if Chun continues on this
present course it will serve as a safety-valve forum for
debate.
Obstacles Yet To Be Negotiated
As Chun seeks to build public confidence in his
personal leadership and overall political agenda, he
must negotiate several hazards that can easily bring
these efforts to ruin.
Chun's Own Image. Even officials close to Chun have
voiced concern that his unpopularity may pose the
greatest challenge. Even though most South Koreans
now appear resigned to Chun's leadership, resentment
over the way he seized power-and his government's
history of repressive measures-has been aggravated
by his aloof and authoritarian manner, widespread
dislike for his wife, and suspicions that she and her
family have been directly involved in financial scan-
dals and corruption. In our judgment, Chun's ability
to weather a serious political crisis, garner political
strength from reform gestures, and overcome suspi-
cions about his long-term intentions depends to a
large degree on his success in blunting such public
enmity.
The Opposition. Chun must also be able to keep his
adversaries in check. Even though he has become
much more sophisticated in combining political con-
cessions with strict controls, he must avoid giving his
diverse opponents an issue around which they could 25X1
rally broad public support. Seoul's manipulation of
the opposition has been especially successful in reduc-
ing the inclination of more moderate Christian dissi-
dents to openly challenge government policies.'
Chun's concessions on human rights and his more
careful handling of dissident clergymen have not only
weakened the force of issues that unify moderate
Christians, but have also made many disinclined to
support activities in which more radical opposition
elements are involved,
Most students are committed to their studies,
but there is a hardcore of antigovernment activists
who to some extent are heroes to younger students
whose political views have not been tempered by work
or military service. Opposition parties remain badly
divided and largely ineffective, in part because the
lifting of the ban on 450 Park-era political figures has
fomented competition for party nominations and re-
kindled longstanding factional animosities-as Chun
calculated. The Rangoon bombing also has weakened 25X1
the force of opposition claims that the Chun govern-
ment, like its predecessor, has exaggerated the North
Korean threat in order to justify repressive political
controls. 25X1
The government's success in controlling its opponents
is still fragile. A government misstep-the killing of
student demonstrators or another major financial
scandal involving persons close to Chun, for exam-
ple-could ignite antigovernment activity on the part
of all these groups and ensure them a more sympa-
thetic public hearing.
Solidarity in His Own Camp. Chun must also main-
tain political discipline among his supporters. The
moderate advisers are in ascendancy, but there is no
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Key Opposition Figures Languish Offstage
The civilian politicians most capable of invigorating
the opposition ranks still remain under the political
ban. In particular, Chun remains adamantly opposed
to allowing the "three Kims'-Chun's leading civil-
ian challengers before he arrested them in May
1980-to resume active political life. Kim Jong P'il,
chairman of late President Park's now disbanded
Democratic Republican Party, is keeping a low pro-
file, and former opposition leader Kim Young Sam's
efforts to cast himself as the leading off-stage politi-
cian have met with indifference from the public. Kim
Dae Jung, South Korea's best known dissident figure
and the opponent Chun fears most, recently stated he
intends to return home from exile in the United
States this year, and he may believe that the desire to
avoid international criticism will dissuade Chun from
sending him back to jail. Efforts to create a common
opposition front, such as the formation in May of the
Democratization Promotion Council by the Kim
Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung camps, will continue
to be hindered by government controls and by a
history of bitter rivalry and fundamental differences
over objectives and tactics that the government in the
past has found easy to exploit.
guarantee they will continue to be. Hardliners, partic-
ularly in the senior officer corps and among the
retired Army officers who followed Chun into civilian
politics, stand ready to seize upon any policy failure to
push their point of view. In addition, the military
security service, the Defense Security Command
(DSC), opposed the campus liberalization at the out-
set. Despite that policy's apparent success, the DSC's
longstanding institutional rivalry with the civilian
NSP-to say nothing of the conservative leanings of
the DSC's military officers-will incline it to view
further political concessions with suspicion.
The Military's Backing. In our judgment, Chun has
managed military affairs well, and-of critical impor-
tance-the Army remains firmly behind him. Knowl-
edgeable observers assert that at present there are no
indications of factional divisions that could seriously
weaken Chun's control of the armed forces. Should it
turn out that Chun is sincere about stepping down in
1988, however, he must persuade the military that the
transition can be managed with minimum risk of
political instability and without compromising the
military's ability to protect national security. Tradi-
tionally, the South Korean Army has intervened
overtly in politics only when ineffectual civilian lead-
ers have left a void. Military Academy alumni who
graduated in the early 1960s and rose through the
ranks during a time of rising military influence in the
civilian government will probably control the Army at
the end of Chun's term, however, and Chun will have
to ensure that these officers do not believe their
interests are being sacrificed as a consequence of the
political rise of the technocrats and businessmen
responsible for South Korea's economic successes.
The integration of more retired military officers into
the DJP or the civilian bureaucracy may provide
means of doing so.
National Assembly Elections. The balloting will pro-
vide a key test of the public's reaction to recent efforts
by Chun and his moderate advisers to improve the
political atmosphere as Chun enters the second half of
his term. The elections also will measure the DJP's
ability to deliver the popular mandate Chun seeks and
test the degree to which the government is prepared to
tolerate freer political expression and a more vigorous
opposition.
Some Thoughts on the Future
It is, of course, too early to tell whether Chun can
keep the political fabric together for the next four
years. On the plus side, most South Koreans see no
practical alternative to Chun in the near term, chiefly
because of the broadly shared desire to avoid political
instability. On the other hand, we agree with US
Embassy officials and astute Korean observers who
believe Chun may not prove strong enough or far-
sighted enough to manage the situation.
Besides being highly unpopular, Chun also is widely
belittled for lackin executive ability and political
vision.
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officials have contrasted Chun's penchant for domi-
nating meetings with his own views with the late
President Park's willingness to listen to a spectrum of
power against a rising tide of opposition. Chun wit-
nessed how such a course left Presidents Rhee and
Park vulnerable not only to explosive popular discon-
opinions.
an overall philosophy or long-term strategy.
Chun's disjointed decisions have caused
frequent reversals of previously announced policy
guidelines, thereby aggravating frictions between gov-
ernment agencies and fostering an image of govern-
ment ineptitude. Although we believe the government
occasionally has orchestrated such incidents to test
public opinion on controversial issues and smoke out
opposition strategies, they more often seem to reflect a
lack of direction at the political center.
Casting the largest shadow over political develop-
ments during the next four years will be the succes-
sion issue itself. The Constitution promulgated by
Chun in 1980 limits the president to one seven-year
term and specifically rules out amendments that
would permit an incumbent president to extend his
term. Chun has repeatedly stated-both publicly and
in private to US officials
that he will step down.
Chun has told US officials that he wants to be
remembered as "Korea's George Washington"-the
first Korean president to leave office willingly. Many
knowledgeable contacts of US Embassy officials, in-
cluding some of Chun's harshest critics, increasingly
believe he is committed to stepping down-indeed
that the potential for violent public opposition should
he renege on his promise will force him to do so-but
that he almost certainly hopes to transfer the presi-
dency to a handpicked successor. Although Chun's
thinking on the succession issue may change, it is
clear that for now Chun views his promise of a
constitutional transfer of power as the cornerstone of
his claim to legitimacy.
We believe Chun is aware of the strong possibility
that the political capital his government is slowly
accumulating at home and through his personal diplo-
macy could quickly dissipate should he appear to be
retracing his predecessors' steps toward retaining
tent, but also to challenges from within the Army, and 25X1
we believe he recognizes the probable costs to himself
and his family should he be removed forcibly or
replaced by an unsympathetic successor
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