THE SAKHAROV CASE: A SOVIET SAGA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001400930001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 September 1984
The Sakharov Case: A Soviet Saga
Summary
The Soviet CJnion's most prominent dissident, Andrey
Sakharov, has fort two decades presented the regime with a
dilemma: how to silence him without incurring too much damage
to the Soviet regime's image at home and abroad. In the past,
sensitivity to Western and domestic criticism restrained the
leadership from using the full panoply of repressive measures
against Sakharov and even enabled him at times to win
concessions from Moscow. When the 63-year-old physicist went
on a hunger strike on 2 May to gain a temporary exit visa for
his wife Yelena Bonner, however, the regime adopted a tough
approach. By forcing Sakharov to end his hunger strike and
severing Bonner'St ties with the outside world, the Kremlin
appears to have Calculated that the mia of advantages and
drawbacks of a hardline policy had changed:
-- They may have believed that Sakharov enjoyed less
foreign support than previously because he had
concentrated recently on personal causes (e.g.
efforts to win emigration for his family) rather
than broader political questions.
-- They may have concluded that Bonner, especially
after she asked for asylum in the US Embassy in
Moscow, would not return to the USSR if permitted
to leave and would stir up more foreign criticism
of Soviet policies than would ensue from harsh
regime actions to suppress her dissent.
This paper was pzeparea by the Office of Soviet Anal sis.
Qatonents may be directed to Chief, Policy Analysis Divison
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-- They may have felt that an unyielding position
would signal that OS policies toward the Soviet
Union have produced tougher, not more
accommodating, behavior.
-- They may have judged that a tough stance would
reinforce other recent regime actions designed to
increase greater ideological controls and
eliminate Western influences at home.
-- It is conceivable that some Soviet leaders have
used the Sakharov situation to give an anti-
Western thrust to policy or to complicate General
Secretary Chernenko's tenure.
The regime isolated Bonner in Gor'kiy in early May, then
probably threatened both Sakharovs with the prospect that she
would receive a harsh sentence for anti-Soviet propaganda or
possibly even fog treason. The authorities also hospitalized
Sakharov soon after he began his hunger strike and may have
subjected him to psychiatzic treatment in order to break his
resolve and to end his fast.
By the end of August, the regime brought the situation to
its present status. Bonner was convicted of anti-Soviet
slander but given a relatively lenient sentence. For the
first time, both Sakharovs are confined to Gor'kiy, out of the
Moscow spotlight and in a controlled environment. Sakharov's
hunger strike has been ended. The Soviets have combined their
actions against Sakharov and Bonner with a disinformation and
propaganda campaign to deflect foreign criticism.
The regime is likely to view the status quo as a victory
of sorts. While Sakharov's death could enliven the issue of
Soviet mistreatment of its dissidents, Moscow appears to have
weathered the storm for now. The leadership is probably
counting on time and the lack of information from unofficial
sources about Sakharov's situation to cause the West to lose
interest in his plight.
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Background
Andrey Sakharov, considered the father of the Soviet Union's
first hydrogen bomb, has presented the regime with a dilemma since
becoming a leading critic of Soviet foreign and domestic policies
nearly two decades .ago. His prominence at home and abroad as a
physicist, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and symbolic head of the
Soviet dissident movement has made it difficult for the regime to
silence him without incurring both the wrath of its own scientific
community and condemnation from the world at large. Indeed,
Sakharov's international visibility and the high regard for him at
home has forced the leadership to treat him as a special case. In
recent months, however, the leadership appears to have reassessed
its approach on the Sakharov issue, seeing fewer disincentives than
previously and new incentives to move against Sakharov.
Sakharov's weapons research intially led him to dissident
activities. He came into disfavor after writing a series of
letters to then Premier Khrushchev (1958, 1961 and 1962) opposing
nuclear weapons tests. He cofounded the Moscow Human Rights
Committee in 1970, but it was not until February 1973 that Soviet
officialdom first publicly criticized him--then for a letter
written in 1968 and published abroad as "Thoughts on Progress,
Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom." Subsequent calls by
Sakharov for an investigation of mental hospitals run by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, and--with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn--for
the leadership to renounce Marxism as an ideology, provoked strong
attacks in the Soviet media on Sakharov in the mid-1970s, but the
regime still refrained from subjecting him to disciplinary
actions.
Sakharov's special status was reflected in the fact that TASS
announced Sakharov's Nobel Peace prize in October 1975, although it
asserted that the award is given to Soviet "enemies." The regime
attempted during 1977 to rein Sakharov in when it publicly warned
him to curb his dissident activities or face criminal charges. In
January 1980, following Sakharov's criticism of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the regime took its first direct disciplinary
action against him,, stripping him of his state honors and exiling
him to Gor'kiy. The Academy of Sciences censured Sakharov in 1978
and 1980, but it has not expelled him. A vote for his expulsion--
which, according to academy statutes, would have to be by secret
ballot--would probably be difficult to obtain. Moreover, because
any failed attempt would embarrass the regime, the leadership has
been reluctant to force the issue.
Despite the regime's disciplinary action in 1980, it did allow
his wife's daughter and her husband to emigrate that same year.
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Sakharov was also successful in pressuring the regime to gain
emigration for another family member in 1981, after his stepson
(who lived in the United States) married a Soviet woman by proxy
(at the time the woman was denied permission to emigrate). In
November 1981 Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, went on a
hunger strike as a way to force the authorities into granting the
emigration of the wife of Sakharov's step-son. The authorities
hospitalized both Sakharovs and threatened to force-feed them, but
yielded to their demands in little more than a week. The woman
entered the United States in January 1982.
The Regime Says No
The current situation was precipitated in September 1982 when,
according to Bonnet's family, she again applied for a temporary
exit visa to visit Italy for eye treatment (she was permitted to
visit there in 1975, 1977 and 1979). This time the regime said
no. Moreover, Sovfet media launched a new campaign to discredit
Sakharov after his article on "The Danger of Thermonuclear War" was
published abroad (Foreign Affairs, July 1983). On 2 May 1984,
Sakharov went on a new hunger strike to gain an exit visa for
Bonner.
Since April it has been difficult to reconstruct with
precision the events in the case. Bonnet's access to US diplomats
ended then, and in May her ability to communicate with others was
largely cut off. It appears that the authorities isolated Bonner
in Gor'kiy in early May, then threatened both Sakharovs with the
prospect that she would receive a harsh sentence for anti-Soviet
propaganda or even possibly be tried for treason. They also
hospitalized Sakharov and may have subjected him to psychiatric
treatment as a way to break his resolve and to end his hunger
strike. The regime appears to have brought the Sakharov situation
to its current status by the end of August.
It is possible that a temporary settlement was reached with
the couple under which Bonner would receive a light sentence and be
permitted to reside with her husband in Gor'kiy. A "most reliable"
source of the US Embassy in Moscow reported that Bonner was tried
and sentenced on 17 August for anti-Soviet slander. An
investigation had been under way since May, and she was given a
relatively light sentence--five years internal exile in Gor'kiy.
According to the West German press, Viktor Louis--an agent of the
KGB who has functioned as a "tipster" and unofficial channel abroad
for the regime's views and actions--indicated in early September
that Sakharov had been released from a hospital and was living with
Bonner in Gor'kiy.
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Only days after Bonner's sentence, Viktor Louis, according to
media reports, provided photographs of the Sakharovs dating from
mid-June. He also provided a videotape of the couple in Gor'kiy.
That tape appears to be the work of the KGB. Although extensively
edited and heavy-handed, the videotape does seem to show that both
Sakharovs are alive and confined to Gor'kiy and that Sakharov is
not on a hunger strike. According to dated material introduced
into the tape, Sakharov was in the hospital as of mid-July. For
example, the physicist is shown in hospital dress with two other
people (one of whom is a nurse, the other possibly a
psychiatrist). Magazines held up to the camera by one of the
people in the scene bear the dates 28 June 1984 (Bunte) and 13 July
1984 (Paris Match). Sakharov is again depicted in the videotape in
what may be a hospital dining room, and someone hands him an
international edition of Newsweek, dated 16 July 1984. (Some of
his comments in this instance were edited out by the
authorities.) Bonner is shown in Gor'kiy on the videotape with her
lawyer, and a Soviet journal that appears in the scene places the
date around 15 July. Although both Sakharov and Bonner appear
together in the videotape, there is no indication of the date they
are together. (While it seems Bonner was isolated from Sakharov
and others in early May, the couple may have been reunited in
Gor'kiy after Bonner's conviction in mid-August.) There is nothing
apparently more recent in the videotape than 16 July. The West
German newspaper Bild Zeitung recieved the tape on 22 August.
The Regime's Motivations
By refusing to give in to Sakharov and his wife this time, the
Soviets chose a course of action that practically ensured
international condemnation at a time when several foreign leaders
were planning first-time meetings with General Secretary
Chernenko. It also risked even greater condemnation since Sakharov
could have died during his hunger strike. Indeed, West European
governments grew concerned in May about the medical condition of
the then fasting Sakharov. For example, Portuguese Prime Minister
Soares sent a letter to Moscow on Sakharov's behalf, and King Juan
Carlos of Spain broached the subject of human rights during his
visit to the USSR in May. The furor over Sakharov's status almost
torpedoed French President Mitterand's visit to Moscow in June.
In taking a hard line stance toward Sakharov, the Soviets
probably were motivated by the following calculations:
-- They may have believed that Sakharov's tendency in
recent years to concentrate on personal causes--such as
helping family members to emigrate rather than on
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broader questions of human rights--had weakened his
moral appeal at home and abroad. In sum, the regime
may see Sakharov as having somewhat less sympathy than
he had earlier. Moreover, Bonner's action in seeking
asylum afforded the regime a greater opportunity to
smear her as a would-be defector than had earlier been
the case.
They may have concluded, at least by the time Bonner
apppealed for asylum in the US Embassy in Moscow, that
if Bonner left the USSR again, she would not return.
The leadership probably believes that the Soviet image
internationally would suffer more if Bonner were abroad
and able to criticize the regime with impunity than if
they resorted to repressive techniques in keeping her
at home. The Soviets probably assume that even if
Sakharov died and the tone of Soviet-West European
relations worsened temporarily, little real change
would occur in the substance of these relations.
-- They may have believed they had no incentive to
accommodate Sakharov at a time when dialogue with the
West was negligible and could use the Sakharov issue in
a broader campaign to make it appear that US policies
had backfired by producing tougher Soviet behavior.
-- They may have judged that a tough policy toward the
Sakharovs would reinforce the regime's other actions
designed to limit Western influences on Soviet society
and to inculcate greater ideological commitment among
youth and intellectuals. The leadership has increased
internal repression generally in recent months. The
hardline stance is reflected in the regime's increased
efforts to block refusenik contacts with Westerners
(especially with US Embassy officers and American
newsmen) and in new dissident prosecutions, including
that of Yuriy Shikanovich--a mathematician and friend
of Sakharov--who has been sentenced to five years in
prison and five more in internal exile for his
involvement with the prominent underground publication
Chronicle of Current Events.
While the decision to refuse to give in to Sakharov was
probably made by the leadership as a whole, it is conceivable that
even Soviet policy toward Sakharov has become bound up in
differences in the leadership and pre-succession politics.
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Tactics
The regime has made a major effort to keep the West from
finding out the true state of affairs in the Sakharov case. To
this end the Soviets have employed a variety of propaganda
techniques. Soviet media and Soviet officials in contact with US
officials have been used in an attempt to convince the West that
the Sakharovs are alive and well and to counter recurring rumors
that Sakharov has died.
-- TASS alleged on 30 May that Sakharov was feeling well,
eating regular meals and living normally in Gor'kiy and
that Bonner was getting good medical treatment. A week
later, TASS specifically denied Western press accounts
that Sakharov had died, asserting that such accounts
were part of a broader smear campaign undertaken by "US
special services."
-- A senior Soviet diplomat in Moscow told the US
Embassy's deputy chief of mission on 31 May that
Bonner's health was good, that she was living in
Gor'kiy and even driving her car all over the city. He
described Sakharov's hunger strike as a "pseudo-hunger
strike," asserting that he had not lost a pound.
-- During French President Mitterand's June visit to
Moscow, Soviet spokesman Leonid Zamyatin asserted to
the foreign press that Sakharov was feeling well,
getting a high salary as an Academy of Sciences member
and was being exploited in a US-sponsored anti-Soviet
campaign. Soviet media repeated these themes throughout
the summer.
-- A prominent member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
told the foreign press in early June that Sakharov was
in Gor'kiy, well, and that his situation as publicized
in the West--"this disinformation"--does not correspond
to reality.
One plausible explanation for some of the erroneous reports
that Sakharov had died is that Sakharov's friends and sympathizers
were spreading rumors to focus Western attention on the case. It
is also conceivable that Soviet authorities themselves were
responsible for putting out the false stories. They could have
done this in order to prepare the foreign audience for the
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possibility that he might die either from his hunger strike or from
force-feeding. They could also have seen an advantage in floating
contradictory rumors to confuse Western observers and cloud the
issue of Sakharov's fate. Moreover, they could have fed alarmist
rumors to friends and relatives of Sakharov in order then to refute
them, thereby discrediting the veracity of Sakharov's friends, and
the Western press that publicized rumors of mistreatment of
Sakharov.
For example, the circumstances of a reported telephone call
from Bonner to an Italian acquaintance in June suggested the
possibility that the Soviets were "setting up" Bonner by
deliberately providing her with false information. An Italian
newspaper reported that Bonner said in the call that her husband
was "no longer with us." Bonner's family abroad concluded that
since contact with Bonner had been tightly controlled by the
authorities, the call probably was designed to confuse them about
the situation. Bonner almost certainly could not have made an
international phone call without official approval, she may have
been led to believe that Sakharov had died, as part of the pressure
the authorities were then applying. After the Western press
reported the phone. call the Soviet attacked it as representative of
the Western "smear campaign."
Finally, it is possible that the false stories of Sakharov's 25X1
death were floated by Soviets who may have used the Sakharov
situation to give an anti-Western thrust to policy or to complicate
General Secretary Chernenko's tenure, attempting to embarrass his
regime over its handling of the affair. We have little evidence,
however, to support this hypothesis.
The Soviet Endgame
With both Sakharovs confined to Gor'kiy, the end of Sakharov's
hunger strike, and the prosecution of friends of the Sakharovs, the
regime may be satisfied that it has concluded the Sakharov affair
on its own terms and forced the submission of the country's most
prominent dissident. At a minimum, the regime has bought some time
for itself on the issue.
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The Soviet leadership could conceivably now move to arrange an
exchange of Bonner for someone in the West. They have exchanged
people for political prisoners in the past. In fact, Sakharov's
family abroad broached the subject of possible exchanges for the
couple with West European leaders during the summer. This
prospect, however, seems unlikely. The regime probably will
continue to believe that Bonner alone, or together with Sakharov,
would stir up criticism abroad of Soviet policies.
The most likely course is for the regime to continue the
status quo and wait out the situation, believing that the interest
of foreign governments and even its own intellectuals will wane
with the passage of time. To maintain the status quo the regime
can still rely on intimidation and the threat of even more
repression against the Sakharovs.
The status quq seems also to remove some of the embarrassment
over the case felt by Soviet intellectuals and officials at home.
For example, in July the director of the Soviet Space Research
Institute commented that the Sakharov situation was standing in the
way of US-Soviet scientific exchanges. Earlier
reported after visiting the USSR that there was
widespread concern among Soviet intellectuals about Sakharov.
While Soviet diplomats and scientists may have no illusions about
what has happened In this case, in dealing with foreigners they can
at least point to the pictorial evidence in the Soviet film (no
matter how contrived) that the Sakharovs are not being
mistreated.
In sum, the regime appears to have succeeded in placing
Sakharov and his wife in a completely controlled environment,
isolated from foreign diplomats and Western reporters. The
leadership is consequently likely to view the status quo as a
victory of sorts. While Sakharov's death could trigger a major
propaganda problem for the regime, the leadership for now appears
to have weathered the storm and reined in a critic who has rankled
it for two decades and who until now had seemed to enjoy some
immunity from the full panoply of Soviet repressive measures.
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